## REVIEW OF THE FCL, PLL AND SLL (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY)

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### Context and overarching objective
- The Fund’s precautionary toolkit rests on the proposition that facilitating crisis prevention is far less costly than crisis resolution.
- An adequately funded global financial safety net (GFSN) with a suite of precautionary tools allows qualifying members to respond to balance of payments (BoP) shocks, reducing the incidence of crises and limiting contagion.
- The Fund is the only layer of the GFSN available to all members; other layers vary in their availability and externalities.
- Overarching objective: ensure that the precautionary facilities toolkit (FCL, SLL, PLL) is fit for purpose for the challenges ahead.
- Document date: September 20, 2023.

### Key premises and motivation
- Robust qualification framework and reforms of the toolkit are required to prevent crises in a shock-prone environment.
- Robust qualification is essential for strong signaling, maintaining market confidence, and safeguarding Fund resources.
- Precautionary tools are intended for strong performers that face a risky external environment and not for members with notable domestic weaknesses.
- Systemic risks call for minimum longer-horizon insurance, simultaneous access to instruments addressing different BoP difficulties, and adequate access.

### Qualification framework — preserving signaling and safeguards
- Objective: preserve strong signaling power by reinforcing safeguards and ensuring a robust qualification framework with judgment guided by applicable criteria, core indicators, and thresholds, based on transparency and predictability.
- Safeguards proposals include:
  - Board briefings after significant economic policy changes;
  - a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for budget support drawings of FCLs;
  - follow-up briefings on drawdowns of FCLs and PLLs approved on a precautionary basis.
- Qualification-related proposals aim for:
  - better reflection of AML/CFT in the “effective financial sector supervision” criterion;
  - alignment of the qualification framework with the 2018 Governance Framework (use Article IV SR coverage of governance and corruption vulnerabilities);
  - recalibration of the public debt sustainability requirement for precautionary exceptional access (EA) PLLs (require “sustainable with HP” in baseline and debt on a decreasing path or at least stabilizing over a 5-year horizon under the drawing scenario).
- FCL qualification criteria (amended wording preserved): (i) a sustainable external position; (ii) a capital account position dominated by private flows; (iii) a track record of steady sovereign access to international capital markets at favorable terms; (iv) a reserve position that is relatively comfortable when the FCL is requested on a precautionary basis; (v) sound public finances, including a sustainable public debt position; (vi) low and stable inflation; (vii) sound financial system and absence of solvency problems that may threaten systemic stability; (viii) effective financial sector supervision; and (ix) data transparency and integrity.

### Precautionary toolkit design — increasing flexibility and firepower (proposals)
- Goals: improve value of Fund precautionary instruments by increasing flexibility and ensuring adequate firepower.
- Key proposals:
  - (i) Not requiring articulation of exit expectations in precautionary FCL arrangements for access levels not exceeding 200 percent of quota.
  - (ii) Raising the SLL access limit to 200 percent of quota (from 145 percent of quota).
  - (iii) Introducing explicit provisions on concurrent FCL/SLL use.
  - (iv) Raising all PLL-specific access limits and caps by 20 percent from current levels (annual limit at approval and instrument cumulative cap for one- to two-year PLLs to 300 and 600 percent of quota respectively; 6-month limits increased proportionally).
- Potential combined access consequences:
  - Proposals (i)–(iii) could allow up to 400 percent of quota of combined FCL-SLL access without articulation of exit expectations, subject to qualification and assessment of potential BoP needs.
- Expected benefits:
  - Leverage comparative advantages of FCL and SLL,
  - provide greater firepower in a shock-prone world,
  - bolster stability of qualifying members facing persistent external risks,
  - reduce incentives for accumulating costly excessive reserves,
  - provide greater predictability of available buffers,
  - help limit spillovers and systemic risks.
- Synchronized SLL take-up procedures proposed to encourage simultaneous offers and opt-ins.

### Management of the toolkit — governance, fees, and risk assessment
- Maintain sound management by:
  - (i) continuing to require Board approval of arrangements in all cases, while streamlining administrative procedures related to use of precautionary instruments;
  - (ii) revisiting, but not changing, financial aspects of Fund commitment of financing under precautionary arrangements (commitment fees and scoring of the forward commitment capacity (FCC));
  - (iii) assessing risks to the Fund of implementing proposals, implications for Fund resources, and risks of inaction.
- Staff will develop an outreach plan to authorities, market participants, and the public to raise awareness of precautionary tools, including precautionary SBAs.
- Staff considered time-based commitment fees (TBCF) and other price options but does not propose changes to commitment fee structure at this stage.

### Use, deployment, and empirical evidence
- Instrument classification:
  - SLL is the sole “precautionary-only” instrument relying exclusively on ex ante conditionality.
  - FCL and SLL rely on ex ante conditionality; PLL combines ex ante and ex post elements.
  - Precautionary SBAs fully rely on ex post conditionality and are available to the entire membership.
- Usage since 2017:
  - Five FCLs: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, and Peru.
  - Two PLLs: Jamaica and North Macedonia.
  - Six new precautionary SBAs since 2017: Armenia, Honduras (2019), Armenia, Georgia, Serbia (2022), and Kosovo (2023).
  - Chile used the SLL in 2022 then reverted to an FCL as tail risks rose.
- Market confidence effects:
  - Event study difference-in-difference regressions find declines in sovereign spreads for FCL and PLL users ranging from 17 to 24 basis points in the seven trading days following announcements, rising to over 70 basis points on average in the following 30 trading days; effect stronger for FCLs.
  - Panel regressions over 2019Q2-2020Q3: countries with an FCL or PLL in place during the pandemic experienced about 7 percent lower increases in spreads relative to other EMEs.
  - Two drawdowns in 2020 (Colombia partial purchase, Morocco full PLL drawdown) showed limited statistically significant market impact (spreads declined by 7.2 and 9.3 basis points respectively in 30 trading days following drawdowns).
- Costs and fiscal implications:
  - Basic rate of charge equals the SDR interest rate plus a moderate fixed margin; commitment fees (except SLL) refunded upon drawdown; service charge 50 basis points upon drawing.
  - A two-percent surcharge applies to outstanding borrowings exceeding 187.5 percent of quota, plus an additional one percentage point if balances outstanding for more than 36 months (more than 51 months for EFF).
  - Over last five years, basic rate of charge of IMF instruments was on average 2 percentage points lower than market financing; difference rose to about 4 percentage points in recent distress episodes.
  - For current FCL users, cost of holding reserves around 220 basis points during 2018–22 versus a 26 basis-point effective commitment fee for illustrative IMF precautionary arrangement of 450 percent of quota, translating into a saving of 0.12 percent of GDP per year.
  - A decline in government borrowing costs up to 70 basis points on announcement of an FCL approval could imply savings of 0.33 percent of GDP per year given average public debt of about 50 percent of GDP for current FCL users.

### Complementarity with BSLs and RFAs; GFSN context
- GFSN estimated around US$18.6 trillion at end-2021 versus US$12 trillion at end-2010.
- BSLs and RFAs expanded role in early 2010s and during COVID-19; general SDR allocation, BSLs, and RFAs provided top-ups to reserves for many EMEs since 2020.
- FCL and SLL target countries with very strong fundamentals; PLL for sound fundamentals; SBA available to all members.
- Comparison:
  - FCL and SBA have no cap on access; PLL current cumulative cap 500 percent of quota (proposal to raise to 600 percent).
  - SLL designed for moderate short-term BoP needs and capped at 145 percent of quota (proposal to raise to 200 percent).
- RFAs and BSLs constraints:
  - BSLs often have longer duration (three years), revolving access, and lack ex post conditionality; may be more attractive in some respects.
  - Smaller RFAs (AMF, FLAR) have limited lending capacity; CMIM and ESM precautionary tools untested in deployment.
  - IMF-RFA cooperation priorities: consistent macroeconomic framing, alignment of qualification standards, IMF technical support to RFAs.

### PLL-specific proposals and debt sustainability recalibration
- Proposed permanent increases (20 percent) to PLL limits:
  - 1–2 year PLL: annual limit at approval from 250 to 300 percent of quota; instrument cap from 500 to 600 percent.
  - 6-month PLLs: standard per arrangement limit from 125 to 150 percent; exceptional per arrangement limit from 250 to 300 percent; 6-month instrument cap from 250 to 300 percent.
- Debt sustainability analysis proposals:
  - For precautionary PLL arrangements under EA settings (i) and (ii), require baseline to be “sustainable with HP” and drawing scenario to show debt on a decreasing path or at least stabilizing over a 5-year horizon (recalibration from requiring “sustainable with HP” under the drawing scenario).
  - No change for FCL arrangements: FCL remains carved out of EA policy and drawing scenario generally not tested except in specified circumstances.

### FCL-SLL package details and operational design
- Staff proposes three-part FCL-SLL package:
  1. Up to 200 percent-of-quota precautionary FCL arrangement without articulation of exit expectations.
  2. Increase SLL access limit to 200 percent of quota.
  3. Explicit provisions permitting concurrent use of FCL and SLL.
- Exit expectation-free FCL design:
  - Authorities’ exit strategy expected only when access exceeds 200 percent of quota.
  - Approval without articulation of exit expectations for maximum duration of two years.
  - Threshold for articulating exit expectations lowered by outstanding credit under prior FCL arrangements (illustrative: 50 percent outstanding lowers threshold to 150 percent).
- Concurrent use operational principles:
  - Country must meet qualification criteria for both instruments; combined access must be justified by total potential BoP need.
  - Countries could request SLL simultaneously with FCL request or at mid-term review; combined discussion in same Board meeting encouraged.
  - Combined FCL-SLL access of up to 400 percent of quota free of exit expectations possible subject to qualification and assessment.
- Safeguards and limits:
  - Concurrent use allowed only to extent combined access reflects total potential BoP need; SLL should not be a simple “top up.”
  - SLL repurchase within 12 months implies combined drawings produce lower outstanding credit beyond first year than an equivalent single-year FCL drawing.

### Procedural reforms to streamline approvals and transitions
- Board procedure reforms proposed:
  - Back-to-back Article IV/informal Board meetings for FCL and PLL approvals to reduce lags; combine FCL/PLL reviews with Article IV where feasible with clear separation.
  - Drop requirement for informal Board meetings for successor FCL/PLL arrangements when requested within three months of prior successful arrangement meeting five specified conditions.
- Streamlined FCL augmentation:
  - Staff reports can cross-reference prior Board qualification analysis if not more than 6 months old; possible synchronized augmentations for groups of FCL users.
- SLL procedural changes:
  - Stand-alone SLL SRs need not include a full adverse scenario; option for members to request SLL approval via written communication (become effective upon Board approval).
  - Simplified transition mechanics between FCL and SLL; streamlined SRs if transition within six months of prior approval/review.

### Resource implications, scenarios, and safeguards
- Staff expects limited impact on GRA resource demand because:
  - Instruments not introduced/removed; qualification perimeter unchanged; access remains contingent on demonstrated BoP needs.
  - Exit expectation-free low-access FCLs combined with streamlined augmentations could reduce long-term demand by lowering incentives to maintain large precautionary arrangements.
- Review clause:
  - Propose adding SLL to the review clause: trigger a new review when aggregate outstanding credit and commitments under FCL, PLL, and SLL reach SDR 150 billion (current aggregate as of August 31, 2023: SDR 70.9 billion).
  - SLL to be reviewed by end-December 2025 (or earlier if SDR 150 billion threshold reached).
- Scenario analysis (extreme illustrative assumptions, new commitments in billion SDRs):
  - Scenario A: potential qualifiers with reserves below 120 percent of ARA metric opt for concurrent FCL and SLL (combined 400 percent of quota) → New Fund commitments: 29
  - Scenario B: same as A but reserves threshold at 150 percent of ARA metric → New Fund commitments: 30
  - Scenario C: builds on B and assumes current PLL arrangements augmented to 600 percent and past PLL users request successor PLLs at 600 percent → New Fund commitments: 35
  - Total commitments including existing outstanding SDR 70.9 billion as of August 31, 2023:
    - Scenario A: Total commitments 100 (billion SDRs)
    - Scenario B: Total commitments 101 (billion SDRs)
    - Scenario C: Total commitments 106 (billion SDRs)
- FCC implications:
  - Starting end-FY2023 FCC level of SDR 146 billion, additional commitments from Scenarios A–C would bring the FCC below the SDR 125 billion Board notification threshold derived from moderate tolerance of liquidity risk.
- Caveats: scenarios use simple criteria to identify potential qualifiers; simultaneity and maximum access assumptions are extreme and unlikely in practice.

### Scoring of precautionary arrangements in the FCC (full scoring rationale)
- Current practice: FCC reflects the full amount of all commitments of GRA resources (full scoring).
- Empirical drawing rate 2009-2023Q2: 1 percent of total commitments under FCL and PLL arrangements ended up being purchased.
- Some Directors proposed partial scoring to reflect lower drawing probabilities; staff recommends retaining full scoring because:
  - Partial scoring would not create real additional resources and would raise liquidity risk by delaying activation of borrowed resources (NAB and BBAs) and potentially overcommitting quota resources.
  - Correlated drawings in systemic events could materialize, undermining credibility if commitments cannot be honored.
  - Legal/operational constraints: activation of borrowed resources requires creditor consents and FCC-based thresholds (practical NAB activation threshold linked to FCC expected to fall below SDR 100 billion).
- Annex IX illustrative numeric figures preserved (examples):
  - Existing precautionary commitments (end-April): SDR 66 billion.
  - FCC under current practice: SDR 146 billion.
  - Available quota liquidity: SDR 124 billion.
  - Hypothetical new precautionary commitments: 4 × SDR 20 billion = SDR 80 billion.
  - Quota preservation to deploy full lending capacity: about SDR 129 billion.
  - NAB maximum: SDR 278 billion; BBAs maximum: SDR 108 billion.
  - Current total lending capacity: SDR 695 billion (around US$936 billion).

### Enterprise risks and mitigants
- Risks of inaction:
  - Business risk: under-provision of Fund financing when needed.
  - Strategic risk: increased reliance on self-insurance, BSLs, or RFAs, fragmenting the GFSN.
  - Reputational risk: Fund perceived as not responding adequately to members’ needs.
- Risks of proposed reforms:
  - Credit risk: higher PLL and SLL limits and concurrent FCL/SLL use could raise credit risk; mitigants include continued stringent qualification and safeguards (debt sustainability and CtR analyses).
  - Liquidity risk: higher access limits could raise demand and reduce Fund liquidity; mitigants include the SDR 150 billion review clause and qualification safeguards.
  - Operational and human capital risks: potential need to upskill staff and reprioritize work; expected limited impact within existing budget envelopes.
- Other options considered but not proposed:
  - Partial scoring — rejected due to liquidity and credibility concerns.
  - Time-based commitment fees (TBCF) — considered but not proposed because it would make exit time- rather than state-dependent and could impair usefulness amid elevated global risks; detailed design considerations preserved in Annex VIII.

### Procedural and publication amendments (decision summaries)
- Decision proposals include:
  - Decision I: complete FCL, PLL reviews and review periodicity tied to SDR 150 billion threshold.
  - Decision II: implement PLL-specific access limit increases and streamline PLL procedures (replace “500 percent” with “600 percent”, “250” with “300”, “125” with “150” where applicable).
  - Decision III: streamline FCL procedures, add augmentation provisions, and align safeguards assessment policy for budget support use.
  - Decision IV: amend SLL decision to increase access limit to 200 percent of quota and permit members to request SLL approval via written communication.
  - Decision V: amend Transparency Policy Decision to account for SLL request-by-written-communication option and update publication timing requirements.
- Publication and press release updates: require consent to publication at time of member’s written communication for SLL effectiveness; staff report and authorities’ written communication expected to be published no later than fourteen calendar days after SLL becomes effective.

*Prepared by Finance, Legal, and Strategy, Policy, and Review Departments; Team leads: Alexander Culiuc (SPR), David Moore (FIN), Gabriela Rosenberg (LEG); Approved by Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Bernard Lauwers, and Rhoda Weeks-Brown.*

*Italic: Source — ppea2023039, “Review of the FCL, PLL and SLL” (selected excerpts, September 20, 2023).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Context and overarching objective
- The Fund’s precautionary toolkit rests on the proposition that facilitating crisis prevention is far less costly than crisis resolution.
- Serial shocks to the global trading and financial systems pose significant and persistent headwinds for well-integrated emerging markets.
- An adequately funded global financial safety net (GFSN) with a suite of precautionary tools allows qualifying members to respond to balance of payments (BoP) shocks, reducing the incidence of crises and limiting contagion.
- The Fund is the only layer of the GFSN available to all members; other layers vary in their availability and externalities.
- Overarching objective of this review of the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL), and Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) is to ensure that the precautionary facilities toolkit (henceforth “the toolkit”) is fit for purpose for the challenges ahead.

### Key premises and motivation
- Robust qualification framework and reforms of the toolkit are required to prevent crises in a shock-prone environment.
- Robust qualification is essential for:
  - strong signaling,
  - maintaining market confidence,
  - safeguarding Fund resources.
- Precautionary tools are for strong performers that face a risky external environment and not for members with notable domestic weaknesses.
- Systemic risks call for:
  - some minimum level of insurance available over a longer horizon,
  - simultaneous access to precautionary instruments designed to tackle different BoP difficulties,
  - adequate access.

### Review process
- The review builds on a survey of the membership and on discussions with Executive Directors in two Informal Sessions to Engage on July 13 and September 13, 2023.
- Document date: September 20, 2023.

### Qualification framework — preserving signaling and safeguards
- Objective: preserve strong signaling power by reinforcing safeguards and ensuring a robust qualification framework with judgment guided by applicable criteria, core indicators, and thresholds, based on transparency and predictability.
- Safeguards proposals include:
  - Board briefings after significant economic policy changes,
  - a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for budget support drawings of FCLs,
  - follow-up briefings on drawdowns of FCLs and PLLs approved on a precautionary basis.
- Qualification-related proposals aim for:
  - a better reflection of Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT),
  - alignment of the qualification framework with the 2018 Governance Framework,
  - recalibration of the public debt sustainability requirement for precautionary exceptional access (EA) PLLs.

### Precautionary toolkit design — increasing flexibility and firepower
- Goals: improve value of Fund precautionary instruments for qualifying members by increasing flexibility and ensuring adequate firepower.
- Key proposals:
  - (i) not requiring articulation of exit expectations in precautionary FCL arrangements for access levels not exceeding 200 percent of quota,
  - (ii) raising the SLL access limit to 200 percent of quota,
  - (iii) introducing explicit provisions on concurrent FCL/SLL use,
  - (iv) raising all PLL-specific access limits and caps by 20 percent from current levels (i.e., annual limit approval and instrument cumulative cap for one to two-year PLLs to 300 and 600 percent of quota respectively).
- Potential combined access consequences:
  - Proposals (i) through (iii) could allow up to 400 percent of quota of combined FCL-SLL access without articulation of exit expectations, subject to qualification and assessment of potential BoP needs.
- Expected benefits:
  - Leverage comparative advantages of FCL and SLL in confronting a variety of BoP shocks,
  - provide greater firepower in a shock-prone world,
  - bolster the stability of qualifying members facing persistent external risks,
  - reduce incentives for accumulating costly excessive reserves,
  - provide greater predictability of available buffers,
  - help limit spillovers and systemic risks.
- Reforms to facilitate synchronized take-up of the SLL are also proposed.

### Management of the toolkit — governance and risk assessment
- Maintain the Fund’s sound management of its precautionary toolkit by:
  - (i) continuing to require Board approval of arrangements in all cases, while streamlining administrative procedures related to the use of precautionary instruments;
  - (ii) revisiting, but not proposing changes to, the financial aspects of Fund commitment of financing under precautionary arrangements, such as commitment fees and scoring of the forward commitment capacity (FCC);
  - (iii) assessing the risks to the Fund of implementing this paper’s key proposals, the potential implications for Fund resources, and the risks of inaction.
- Staff intends to develop an outreach plan to authorities, market participants, and the general public to raise awareness of the Fund’s precautionary toolkit, including precautionary Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs), and better communicate their benefits, including new ones derived from reforms undertaken as part of this review.

### Additional procedural and content notes included in the document
- The executive summary and review were prepared by the Finance, Legal, and Strategy, Policy, and Review Departments.
- Team leads: Alexander Culiuc (SPR), David Moore (FIN), Gabriela Rosenberg (LEG).
- Approved by: Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Bernard Lauwers, and Rhoda Weeks-Brown.

*International Monetary Fund — REVIEW OF THE FCL, PLL AND SLL (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY), September 20, 2023*

### 5. This review recognizes the evolving value-added of precautionary instruments. They

### 5. This review recognizes the evolving value-added of precautionary instruments. They

### Evolving role and expectations of precautionary instruments
- Precautionary instruments are a critical part of the bulwark against persistent aggregate shocks to the global trading and financial systems.
- Experience with FCLs shows users value: insurance against external risks and the ability to signal a continued unwavering commitment to very strong macroeconomic and financial stabilization policies and institutional frameworks.
- Original FCL expectation at establishment during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC):
  - Exit and declining access were expected once systemic risks (e.g., the GFC and the European sovereign debt crisis) receded.
  - Implicit assumption: post-resolution, the pattern of shocks would revert to the pre-GFC “great moderation”—a stable “core” with only idiosyncratic shocks to EMEs.
  - Full exit was the ultimate objective as a signal of ability to face idiosyncratic shocks without Fund reliance.
- That assumption of reversion to pre-GFC dynamics "has yet to materialize."

### Alternatives to Fund insurance and their limitations
- Greater self-insurance alternatives are often costly or infeasible:
  - Accumulating higher international reserves is costly, may contribute to global imbalances, and hence may not be advisable.
  - Joining regional financing arrangements (RFA) typically requires geographical proximity and is not an option for many.
  - Securing sizable Bilateral Swap Lines (BSLs) with reserve currency-issuing central banks usually requires strong financial and trade linkages and are not available to all countries.
  - Achieving advanced financial development to insulate from external shocks requires extensive market and public institution development and has historically taken time.
- Footnote evidence:
  - Among the 12 WEO reclassifications from EME to advanced economy (AE) since 1993, only three countries—Israel, Korea, and Singapore—were not associated with the country joining the EU or the Euro Area (Croatia being the latest one), on top of Taiwan ROC (that is not an IMF member).

### Fit for purpose: countries and reform goals
- Fund precautionary instruments are a natural fit for countries with very strong or sound fundamentals confronting persistent external risks.
- This review of precautionary instruments proposes reforms to:
  - (i) deliver the characteristics valued by users (strong signal, policy commitment device, insurance),
  - (ii) facilitate exit when warranted,
  - (iii) ensure that precautionary arrangements do not place an excessive burden on Fund resources.

### Overview of the precautionary toolkit and deployment since the last review
- Instruments available in the General Resources Account (GRA):
  - The precautionary Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) fully relies on ex post conditionality.
  - The Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the Short-term Liquidity Line (SLL) rely exclusively on ex ante conditionality (i.e., qualification), as well as a mid-term review for 2-year FCLs.
  - The Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) generally combines elements of ex ante and ex post conditionality.
- Classification and availability:
  - The FCL and PLL are usually referred to as “precautionary instruments”; the SLL is the sole "precautionary-only” instrument.
  - Precautionary SBAs are included in the “precautionary arrangements” toolkit but are not a separate instrument from disbursing SBAs.
- Use since the 2017 Review and COVID-19:
  - Currently five FCLs: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, and Peru.
  - Two PLLs: Jamaica and North Macedonia.
  - Significant increase from two FCLs and one PLL before the pandemic.
  - Chile became the first country to use the SLL in 2022, although it reverted to the FCL as tail risks rose.
  - Six new precautionary SBAs approved since 2017: Armenia and Honduras in 2019, Armenia, Georgia, and Serbia in 2022, and Kosovo in 2023. (Serbia intends to treat the SBA as precautionary during the second year of the program.)
  - Analytical work: members with existing and new FCL arrangements enjoyed better financing conditions than peers, helping reduce acute external financial pressures faced by EMEs in the Spring of 2020.

### Objectives of the review and three-pronged approach
- Two overarching goals:
  - Draw lessons from use of FCL, PLL, SLL (and precautionary SBA) since the 2017 Review.
  - Assess how these instruments can be made more useful as external risks persist, even among countries with very strong or sound macroeconomic fundamentals.
- Core aims:
  - Make the toolkit fit for purpose, safeguard Fund resources, and preserve signaling power.
  - Keep a clear, transparent, and robust qualification framework so greater use is driven by stronger interest from already qualifying members without compromising qualification standards—“lowering the barriers without lowering the bar.”
- Three-pronged approach:
  - Preserve signaling power by reinforcing safeguards and ensuring a robust qualification framework with transparent judgment guided by applicable criteria, core indicators, and thresholds.
    - Safeguards proposals include: Board briefings after significant economic policy changes, an MoU for budget support use of FCLs, and follow-up (possibly in subsequent country document) on drawdowns of precautionary FCLs and PLLs.
    - Qualification proposals include: better reflection of AML/CFT, alignment with the 2018 Governance Framework, and recalibration of the public debt sustainability requirement for precautionary EA PLLs.
  - Make instruments more useful and available with flexibility and adequate firepower.
    - Key proposals include:
      - Raising the SLL access limit to 200 percent of quota.
      - Introducing explicit provisions on concurrent FCL/SLL use.
      - Not requiring articulation of exit expectations in FCL arrangements for access levels not exceeding 200 percent of quota.
      - Raising all PLL-specific annual access limits by 20 percent (respectively to 300 and 600 percent for one- and two-year PLLs).
    - Reforms to facilitate synchronized take-up of the SLL by multiple countries.
    - Low-access FCL arrangements without articulation of exit expectations would:
      - Bolster stability of qualifying members facing persistent external risks.
      - Reduce incentives for accumulating costly excessive reserves.
      - Provide greater predictability of available buffers and help limit spillovers and systemic risks.
    - Subject to qualification and assessment of potential BoP needs, proposal could allow up to 400 percent of quota of combined FCL-SLL access without articulation of exit expectations.
  - Maintain sound management of precautionary lending by:
    - Continuing to require Board approval of precautionary arrangements in all cases, while streamlining related administrative procedures.
    - Revisiting, but not proposing changes to, financial aspects of Fund commitment of financing under precautionary arrangements—commitment fees and scoring of the FCC.
    - Assessing risks to the Fund of implementing key Review proposals, implications for Fund resources, and risks of inaction.

### Boxed proposed changes (summary)
- Clarify and update selected qualification criteria:
  - AML/CFT — Explicitly integrate AML/CFT as part of the effective financial sector supervision criterion. A FATF grey-listed country would unlikely qualify for the FCL or SLL if staff assesses that deficiencies underpinning the listing indicate that the criterion is not met.
  - Governance — Align assessment of ability to effectively respond to shocks as part of institutional strength with the 2018 Governance Framework.
  - Debt sustainability — For exceptional access (EA) precautionary PLLs, maintain requirement for “sustainable with high probability (HP)” assessment in the baseline scenario and recalibrate the requirement in the drawing scenario with a decreasing, or at least stabilizing, debt ratio over five years.
  - Political assurances — Reiterate application of policy on political assurances to precautionary arrangements. Propose a Board briefing after significant economic policy changes.
  - Safeguards policy and drawdowns — Align with the safeguards assessment policy the requirement for a framework between central banks and finance ministries for servicing Fund obligations when purchases are drawn for budget financing under the FCL. Reiterate Board briefing shortly after any drawdown of a precautionary FCL or PLL (including for budget support) and propose a follow-up briefing on drawdowns.
- Increase availability and firepower:
  - An SLL-FCL reform package allowing combined (FCL and SLL) access of up to 400 percent of quota without articulation of exit expectations:
    - (i) No articulation of exit expectation for FCLs when access does not exceed 200 percent of quota.
    - (ii) Higher access SLL — Increase access limit under the SLL to 200 percent of quota, to be reviewed as part of the next comprehensive review of access limits or if “the review clause” is triggered.
    - (iii) SLL-FCL concurrent use — Explicitly permit concurrent use of the FCL and SLL.
  - Higher access PLL — Increase the annual limit at approval and the cumulative cap for access under the PLL by 20 percent from current levels, to be reviewed as part of the next comprehensive review of access limits or if “the review clause” is triggered.
  - Synchronized SLLs — Outline procedures for synchronized take-up of the SLL by multiple countries.
- Streamline procedures:
  - Board meetings/time lags — Back-to-back Article IV/informal Board meetings for FCL and PLL approvals; drop requirement for informal Board meetings for successor FCL/PLL arrangements (when requested within three months of previous successful arrangement); combine FCL/PLL reviews with Article IV (clear separation between surveillance and FCL/PLL-related discussions) to reduce number of Board meetings/time lags. Board approval still required in all cases.
  - SLL requirements — Adverse scenario not required to justify stand-alone SLL access; option of requesting an SLL; simpler transition between FCLs and SLLs.
  - Streamlined FCL augmentation and synchronized augmentation requests — Staff reports can cross-reference qualification analysis in a prior Board document if not more than 6 months old; synchronized FCL augmentations proposed.
  - Transition processes — Staff reports can be streamlined if previous arrangement approved/reviewed not more than six months ago for transitions among SLL/FCL/concurrent use.

### Use and benefits of precautionary instruments within the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN)
- GFSN growth:
  - Estimated at around US$18.6 trillion at end-2021, compared to US$12 trillion as of end-2010 (Perks and others, 2021).
  - BSLs and RFAs became a larger part in the early 2010s.
  - BSLs expanded during the GFC and during the COVID-19 pandemic (2020).
- The Fund’s precautionary instruments are a critical component with universal access; choice of instrument depends on BoP needs, fundamentals, policy frameworks, and track record.
  - FCL and SLL are for countries with very strong fundamentals; PLL for countries with sound fundamentals.
  - SBA is available to the entire membership and lacks ex ante qualification criteria.
- Instrument access and caps:
  - FCL and SBA have no cap on access.
  - PLL currently has a cumulative access cap of 500 percent of quota (with related per-arrangement and duration limits described).
  - SLL designed for potential moderate short-term BoP needs and is capped at 145 percent of quota (current cap subject to proposed increase).
- Recent demand influenced by other GFSN layers:
  - 2021 general SDR allocation, BSLs, and RFAs provided significant top-up to reserves for many EMEs.
  - GFSN buffers exceed 20 percent of GDP for many EMEs.
  - These alternative buffers have provided substantial financing alternatives to Fund precautionary arrangements, especially since 2020.
  - Surveyed country authorities noted availability of BSLs, RFAs, and other financing sources influence take-up of PLLs and precautionary SBAs.
  - Lower availability of other GFSN layers in some regions may have contributed to concentration of FCLs in the Western Hemisphere.
  - Survey respondents did not cite perceived stigma from associating with the Fund as the main factor influencing demand; sample may overrepresent certain regions and current/past users.

*Source: REVIEW OF THE FCL, PLL AND SLL (excerpts).*

### 14. Going forward, demand for precautionary arrangements could increase as global

### 14. Going forward, demand for precautionary arrangements could increase as global shocks become multifaceted and global liquidity less easily available

### Demand outlook and role of precautionary instruments
- Precautionary instruments are particularly important in the current shock-prone environment as external risks become more prevalent and diverse, potentially raising demand for precautionary arrangements (albeit not dramatically).
- The introduction of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), which can only be requested under a concurrent IMF upper-credit tranche (UCT) arrangement, could, at the margin, increase future demand for precautionary arrangements.
- Precautionary instruments help create additional policy space and allow countries to better deal with shocks.

### Regional concentration of FCL and PLL arrangements
- As of end-2022:
  - Most FCL and PLL arrangements were concentrated in the Western Hemisphere, representing around 50 percent of total credit committed under the GRA, or 93 percent of total credit committed under precautionary arrangements (including SBAs).
  - Commitments under the five ongoing FCLs amount to almost SDR 65 billion.
  - The Jamaica and North Macedonia PLL arrangements represent commitments of SDR 1.1 billion, out of SDR 129 billion committed under current GRA arrangements.
- Factors contributing to concentration in the Western Hemisphere:
  - A higher share of countries in the Western Hemisphere meet the simple proxy qualification criteria used: (i) public debt ratio below 70 percent of GDP; (ii) international reserves above 80 percent of the ARA metric; (iii) single-digit inflation; and (iv) external gross financing needs below 15 percent of GDP.
  - Western Hemisphere EMEs generally have lower availability of alternative financing sources, in particular international reserves and RFAs, than Asian and European EMEs.
  - FLAR—the Western Hemisphere RFA—is smaller at 1.3 percent of GDP on average for member countries compared to RFAs in other regions at 4.1 percent of GDP on average.
  - The lower size of GFSN buffers for EMEs in the Western Hemisphere (23 percent of GDP on average) compared to EMEs in other regions (27 percent of GDP on average) could explain the concentration of precautionary arrangements.
  - De-jure measures of capital account openness indicate Western Hemisphere EMEs have somewhat higher average degree of account openness relative to other regions, potentially increasing exposure to financial account shocks.

### Precautionary arrangements and market confidence (empirical findings)
- Announcement effects:
  - Event study difference-in-difference regressions find a decline in sovereign spreads for FCL and PLL users ranging from 17 to 24 basis points in the seven trading days following announcements, rising to over 70 basis points on average in the following 30 trading days. The effect for FCLs is stronger.
  - Additional country-level analysis using the synthetic control method corroborates the positive and persistent effect, particularly for FCLs.
- Pandemic period:
  - Using panel regressions over 2019Q2-2020Q3, countries with an FCL or PLL in place during the pandemic experienced lower increases in spreads relative to other EMEs; sovereign spreads were about 7 percent lower in countries with an FCL or PLL arrangement relative to other EMEs.
- Drawdowns:
  - The two drawdown instances in 2020 (Colombia partial purchase under FCL, Morocco full drawdown of PLL) show limited impact on market sentiment: average sovereign spreads declined by 7.2 basis points in Colombia and 9.3 basis points in Morocco in the 30 trading days following drawdowns; these variations were not statistically significant.

### Costs, terms, and fiscal implications
- Charges and surcharges:
  - FCL and PLL arrangements are subject to the same charges and surcharges as other GRA facilities. The basic rate of charge equals the SDR interest rate plus a moderate fixed margin.
  - Commitment fees (except for the SLL) are refunded upon drawdown. The service charge is 50 basis points upon drawing.
  - A two-percent surcharge applies to the portion of outstanding borrowings exceeding 187.5 percent of a member’s quota, and an additional one percentage point applies to this portion if balances have been outstanding for more than 36 months (more than 51 months in case of borrowing under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF)).
- Cost comparisons with market financing:
  - Over the last five years, the basic rate of charge of IMF instruments was on average 2 percentage points lower than market financing. This difference rose in recent episodes of market distress (the onset of the pandemic and the tightening of global financing conditions at end-2022) to about 4 percentage points.
  - Owing to surcharges, the average cost advantage of an FCL arrangement of 450 or 750 percent of quota vis-à-vis market financing was smaller—about 1 and ½ percentage points over the last five years, respectively.
- Cost comparisons with holding reserves:
  - For current FCL users, the cost of holding reserves constituted around 220 basis points during 2018–22, compared to a 26 basis-point effective commitment fee for an illustrative IMF precautionary arrangement of 450 percent of quota, translating into a saving of 0.12 percent of GDP per year.
  - Given the average public debt level of current FCL users (about 50 percent of GDP), a decline in government borrowing costs up to 70 basis points on announcement of an FCL approval could imply savings of 0.33 percent of GDP per year, suggesting that FCL arrangements on a precautionary basis could have led to almost ½ percent of GDP in savings during 2018–22 relative to increasing reserve holdings.
- Cost profile by access level:
  - Due to surcharges applied to the portion of GRA credit outstanding exceeding 187.5 percent of quota, an FCL arrangement of 450 or 750 percent of quota has an effective cost that is, on average, about 1 or 1½ percentage points larger than the effective cost of an FCL arrangement of 150 percent of quota.

### Comparison with BSLs and RFAs
- Features making BSLs potentially more attractive than Fund precautionary arrangements:
  - Many BSLs have a duration of three years, longer than the usual maximum duration of precautionary arrangements (PLLs and FCLs have a maximum duration of two years), although precautionary arrangements can be renewed.
  - BSLs often provide revolving access, a feature shared only by the SLL among IMF instruments.
  - BSLs are more likely to be signed when a country’s external position is weakening, which might make them more accessible compared to the Fund’s precautionary arrangements that are granted only to countries with very strong (or sound) fundamentals.
  - BSLs have no associated ex post conditionality and may therefore be perceived to carry less stigma than PLL or precautionary SBAs.
- RFAs:
  - Most RFAs have precautionary and liquidity support tools, but their preventive stabilization role remains largely untested.
  - Lending by smaller RFAs (AMF and FLAR) has been mostly concentrated on assisting fragile economies in the region. Precautionary tools of the ESM and CMIM have not been deployed so their stabilization effect cannot be assessed with certainty.

### Complementarity, eligibility, and flexibility of IMF precautionary instruments
- The Fund’s precautionary arrangements:
  - Are the only layer of the GFSN available to all member countries (subject to qualification, for PLLs, SLLs and FCLs).
  - Are provided under clear and transparent qualification rules, with swift availability of financing when a shock hits.
  - Offer safeguards via high qualification standards, which limit risks from regional concentration.
  - Complement other layers of the GFSN; by contrast, extension or continuation of a BSL is usually at the discretion of the reserve currency issuer.
- Flexibility and usage:
  - Not all members qualify for FCL, SLL, or PLL, but most members can use precautionary SBAs. PRGT-eligible members are eligible for precautionary SCFs.
  - Five countries have used precautionary SBAs since the last review.
  - Access under precautionary SBAs is uncapped and can be augmented quickly.
  - SBAs allow for hybrid use: starting as a disbursing arrangement and turning precautionary during subsequent reviews (example: Serbia, 2022).
  - PCI users can switch to a precautionary SBA if potential BoP needs materialize (example: Serbia); concurrent use of the PCI with the SBA/SCF is feasible (example: Senegal, 2021); and a precautionary SBA can be the basis for an RSF request (example: Kosovo, 2023).
  - Since 2017, Honduras used the precautionary SCF through a blended SCF/SBA and drew on it after an augmentation during the pandemic.

*Source: Review of the FCL, PLL and SLL (Chapter 14 content).*

### Box 5. Precautionary and Liquidity Support by RFAs

### Box 5. Precautionary and Liquidity Support by RFAs

### Overview of RFA precautionary and liquidity toolkits
- Most RFAs have precautionary and liquidity support instruments, but the degree of operationalization varies.
- Smaller RFAs (AMF, FLAR) that are active lenders concentrate on supporting fragile economies in the region; their preventive stabilization capacity for relatively stronger members is constrained by their limited lending capacity.
- The RFAs considered include the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR).
  - The EFSD does not have a dedicated instrument for precautionary or short-term liquidity support.
  - Information available on the CRA modalities is limited.

### Characteristics of short-term liquidity instruments
- Some RFA instruments intended for short-term liquidity support provide limited access to funding with no instrument-specific conditionality.
  - AMF: Automatic Loan and Short-Term Liquidity Facility have no instrument-specific conditionality or qualification criteria; Automatic Loans can be used in conjunction with other AMF instruments that require conditionality.
  - FLAR: offers short-term liquidity support; higher access is subject to an availability commission and requires a debtor’s guarantee.

### Developments in larger RFAs and precautionary tools
- RFAs with the largest lending capacity (ESM and CMIM) have actively engaged in developing precautionary support tools, though their preventive role remains untested.

- CMIM:
  - Qualification criteria for the Precautionary Line cover the same areas as the FCL/SLL/PLL and CMIM has taken steps to further align with IMF practice.
  - The legal framework governing its conditionality has been strengthened, embedding a requirement for consistency with the IMF in co-financing situations.
  - The threshold for the access amount that does not require engagement with the IMF (IMF de-linked portion) has been increased to 40 percent of a maximum arrangement amount.
  - CMIM clarified review requirements, increased flexibility for instrument renewal, and adjusted disbursement terms, though the six-month repayment remains significantly shorter compared to repayment under the IMF facilities.

- ESM:
  - The 2020 ESM toolkit reform aimed at enhancing efficiency of precautionary assistance and predictability of ex ante qualification, revising eligibility requirements and revamping credit line governance, including functioning of periodic reviews.
  - The ESM reform will become effective upon ratification of an amended ESM Treaty.
  - The ESM’s Pandemic Crisis Support was based on the ESM’s credit line framework with temporary modifications in financing terms and conditionality.

### Comparative capacity and illustrative examples
- Smaller RFA capacity can be much smaller than IMF credit lines:
  - Access under the 2020 FCL for Colombia was over two times the FLAR’s total lending capacity ($7.9 billion in 2021).
  - Morocco purchased SDR 2.15 billion under the PLL in 2020, compared to SDR 247 million provided under the AMF facilities in the same year.

### IMF-RFA cooperation and priorities
- The 2017 RFA paper established that effective firepower of the GFSN and its timely deployment could be increased through enhanced IMF-RFA cooperation.
- Lending-related priorities identified in the 2017 paper remain relevant:
  - Ensure a consistent macroeconomic framework in IMF-RFA co-lending.
  - Align qualification standards when delivering precautionary assistance.
  - IMF staff may provide technical support to RFAs in developing regional approaches to preventive stabilization.

*Prepared by Rimtautas Bartkus (SPR).*

### 27. While the analysis of qualification assessments since the last review illustrates that the

### 27. While the analysis of qualification assessments since the last review illustrates that the

### B. Debt Sustainability Analysis
- In precautionary arrangements, debt sustainability assessments need to be informed by the drawing scenario, in addition to the baseline, under any of the following three settings (¶28):
  - (i) if the arrangement is subject to EA policy;
  - (ii) if shocks that may trigger a drawing are not adequately captured by the medium-term Market Access Country (MAC) Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework (SRDSF) modules; or
  - (iii) when review departments have doubts about the realism of the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) baseline that cannot be resolved through discussions with the country team.
- In practice, when any of the three settings above holds for precautionary arrangements, the debt sustainability assessment has been based on the mechanical signal obtained under the drawing scenario.
- Proposal to amend setting (iii) (¶29):
  - Revise setting (iii) to read simply: “when there are doubts about the realism of the DSA baseline.”
  - Remove language about discussions between review departments and the country team, since those are generally resolved during the review process and should not affect whether a drawing scenario is used.
- Recalibration proposed for precautionary PLL arrangements (¶30):
  - Rationale: PLL countries have sound fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks.
  - Proposed rule: For precautionary PLL arrangements in settings (i) and (ii), the sustainability assessment should be informed by:
    - the mechanical signal for debt sustainability under the baseline scenario—which should be “sustainable with HP”; and
    - whether debt is on a decreasing path or at least stabilizes over a 5-year horizon under the drawing scenario (Table 1).
  - Justification: The current requirement that debt be sustainable with HP under the drawing scenario in settings (i) and (ii) is considered too stringent given PLL qualifiers’ fundamentals and expected policy reactions.
- Safeguards and expected impact (¶31):
  - The recalibration is not expected to materially impact qualification because:
    - PLL countries’ sound fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks (ex ante conditionality) help maintain debt sustainability in the drawing scenario through strong policy reactions that generally increase debt-carrying capacity and keep debt levels in check;
    - Debt sustainability with HP would continue to be required in the baseline for all (including EA) PLL arrangements;
    - The adverse scenario would continue to determine access and inform the Capacity to Repay (CtR) analysis in all settings;
    - When there are doubts about the realism of the DSA baseline (see ¶29), sustainability assessments for the PLL would continue to use the drawing scenario.
- Precautionary SBAs (¶32):
  - No change: Under the three settings in ¶28, debt sustainability analyses for precautionary SBAs would need to be conducted fully on the drawing scenario, which determines the mechanical signal for debt sustainability.
- Precautionary FCL arrangements (¶33):
  - No change proposed. The FCL is carved out of EA policy, so circumstance (i) does not apply; circumstances (ii) and (iii) are very unlikely for FCLs.
  - CtR assessments and, for large FCL arrangements, assessments of the impact on Fund liquidity would continue to be based on the drawing scenario.
- Relative stringency (¶34):
  - Qualification requirements are most stringent for FCL arrangements, least stringent for SBAs, and PLLs occupy an intermediate position.

- Table 1. Debt Sustainability Requirements for Precautionary FCL and PLL Arrangements (as presented)
  - Baseline scenario:
    - FCL status quo: Sustainable with HP
    - PLL status quo: Sustainable with HP
    - Proposed baseline: Not tested* (for FCL and PLL below EA; PLL with EA remains Sustainable with HP**)
  - Drawing scenario:
    - Status quo: FCL not tested*; PLL not tested*; PLL with EA Sustainable with HP (**)
    - Proposed refinement: FCL not tested*; PLL not tested*; PLL with EA Debt on a decreasing path or at least stabilizing over 5-year horizon
  - Notes: HP = high probability; EA = exceptional access
    - *The “Not tested” wording for the drawing scenario applies only in the absence of circumstances (i) and (ii) specified in ¶28 above and in the absence of circumstance (iii) under the proposed refinement.
    - **The requirement of a public debt position sustainable with HP applies at approval of the PLL and is a core indicator for meeting the qualification criterion of sound public finances.

### C. Governance
- Background (¶35):
  - Since the 2017 Review, the Fund adopted the 2018 Governance Framework to promote systematic engagement on corruption vulnerabilities and governance weaknesses across six state functions:
    - (i) fiscal governance;
    - (ii) financial sector oversight;
    - (iii) central bank governance and operations;
    - (iv) market regulation;
    - (v) rule of law; and
    - (vi) AML/CFT.
- Current practice and limitations (¶36):
  - The FCL/SLL/PLL qualification frameworks currently rely importantly on third-party indicators.
  - The FCL and PLL operational guidance notes note that the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) on government effectiveness and control of corruption could inform staff judgment.
  - Poor governance and weak control of corruption can weaken institutional frameworks, deteriorate capital flow composition (e.g., away from FDI), undermine prospective BoP stability, and reduce ability to respond to shocks.
- Proposed change (¶37):
  - Replace reliance on third-party indicators with an approach leveraging Article IV (AIV) consultation coverage of governance and corruption vulnerabilities.
  - Assessment of government effectiveness and control of corruption will be based on staff’s coverage of governance weaknesses (the six state functions) and corruption vulnerabilities in AIV SRs, rather than the WGI alone.
  - AIV SR coverage is based on the Fund’s centralized assessment established under the 2018 Governance Framework and relies on quantitative (including the WGI) and qualitative inputs from Fund staff analysis and reputable external sources (e.g., World Bank, OECD).
  - Operational implication:
    - A member would likely not be considered a strong performer for FCL/SLL qualification if AIV findings indicate governance and corruption vulnerabilities that hamper the country’s ability to respond to shocks.
    - For PLLs, where addressing identified vulnerabilities is critical to program goals, programs would be expected to include commitments or conditionality related to such measures.

### D. AML/CFT
- Observations on past treatment (¶38):
  - Treatment of AML/CFT deficiencies in qualification assessments for FCL and PLL arrangements has varied.
  - FATF “grey listing” can present risks to financial sector soundness and signal institutional weaknesses, particularly supervision.
  - The “effective financial sector supervision” criterion does not currently explicitly refer to AML/CFT issues.
  - No country approved for FCL support has been on the FATF grey list at approval.
  - Three countries were approved for a PLL arrangement while on the grey list: Panama in 2021, Morocco in 2012, and Jamaica in 2023 — treatment and ex post conditionality varied across these cases.
  - Result: need for clearer guidance to avoid perceptions of differing treatment and reputational risks.
- Proposed integration into qualification (¶39):
  - Integrate AML/CFT issues, including FATF grey listings, into staff’s assessment of “effective financial sector supervision.”
  - The bottom-line assessment will consider existing indicators (FSAP findings, assessments of legal and institutional framework and operational capacity for prompt corrective actions and emergency assistance).
  - In the event of FATF grey listing, the member would be unlikely to qualify for an FCL or SLL if staff assesses that deficiencies underpinning the listing indicate the “effective financial sector supervision” criterion is not met.
  - Assessment would consider depth and persistence of AML/CFT deficiencies, substantive aspects of the FATF listing, and the country’s action plan related to effective supervision.
  - Staff must make its own judgment and cannot solely rely on FATF determinations (cross-conditionality prohibited); FSAP and Article IV reports should inform judgment, guided by the FATF standard and methodology endorsed by the Board.
  - Under PLL arrangements for countries with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies relevant to financial sector supervision, the member would generally be expected to commit to addressing these deficiencies, likely supported by structural conditionality if critical to achieving program objectives.

### Adequacy of the Precautionary Toolkit — Developments in Access Levels (beginning ¶40)
- Trend since 2017 (¶40):
  - Access levels in FCL and PLL arrangements have generally decreased.
  - Examples:
    - Mexico: FCL access reduced from 700 to 400 percent of quota since 2017.
    - Colombia: FCL access reduced from 400 to 350 percent of quota since 2017.
    - Peru: FCL access halved from 600 percent of quota in 2020 to 300 percent of quota in 2022; declared intention—external risk permitting—to exit the FCL arrangement.
    - Chile: temporarily exited the FCL (1,000 percent of quota) and transitioned to an SLL (145 percent of quota), then returned to a new FCL (800 percent of quota) as external risks re-emerged.
  - Average FCL access over the last five years: declined from 550 percent of quota at end-2017 to 462 percent of quota at end-2022.
- Note on Figure 6: chart shows cumulative access over the period of the arrangement for PLLs.

*Source: ppea2023039 - 27. While the analysis of qualification assessments since the last review illustrates that the*

### 41. Adverse scenarios developed to justify PLL and FCL access have been underpinned by

### ppea2023039 - 41. Adverse scenarios developed to justify PLL and FCL access have been underpinned by

### Adverse-scenario design and common shocks
- Recent Staff Reports (SRs) present detailed assumptions underpinning adverse scenarios, often in tabular form (Chile, Peru, Panama, Morocco) and compare them to prior arrangements (Colombia, Chile).
- Most common shocks included:
  - shocks to fuel prices;
  - shocks to foreign direct investment (FDI);
  - shocks to debt rollover (public and private).
- Financial-account shocks account for the largest share of the overall adverse scenario shock:
  - 72 percent of the overall shock before reserve drawdown, on average.
- Comparisons to historical shocks:
  - shocks to fuel prices and private short-term debt rollover tend to be the most severe relative to historical shocks;
  - shocks to public medium-term debt are generally assumed to be less severe.
- Country practice:
  - For each country, shocks have tended to stay in the same percentile range from one arrangement to the other.
  - There is limited evidence that shocks to the current account and capital flows have become less severe in 2022 or 2023 compared to previous years.

### External Economic Stress Index (ESI)
- The ESI continues to inform access and exit discussions under FCL and PLL arrangements (Annex VI).
- The ESI captures similar sources of external risks across arrangements—mainly risks to exports and financial flows—with weights reflecting country characteristics.
  - Example: risks to equity and debt portfolio investment flows account for 45 to 50 percent of the ESI for Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Panama.
  - Example: growth developments in the euro area drive the bulk of the ESI for Morocco.
- Empirical associations:
  - improvements in the ESI (lower external risks) are associated with reductions in access;
  - increased risks correlate with higher or unchanged access levels (example: Mexico’s lower access in 2021 relative to 2019; Colombia’s augmentation of access after a sharp worsening of the ESI in 2020).
- Construction and guidance:
  - the ESI construction has been broadly aligned with best practices since the 2017 Review, with systematic use of the latest WEO downside scenario, GFSR, or G-RAM to construct the ESI.
  - no further enhancements to the ESI seem warranted at this stage, though updates to proxy variables and/or weights consistent with existing guidance could address limitations highlighted in selected arrangements.

### Reserve buffers and access considerations
- Since 2019 (except Chile), adverse scenarios for FCL access have progressively assumed a higher share of the financing gap would be covered by reserve drawdown.
- This trend has not been accompanied by deterioration in remaining reserves after reserve drawdown in adverse scenarios.
- Most countries have retained the 80 percent threshold as a floor for reserve coverage in adverse scenarios.
- For Colombia, Mexico and Peru, higher reserve drawdown in adverse scenarios compared to previous arrangements—and commensurately lower FCL access—could reflect shifts in authorities’ views on optimum self-insurance.
- Figure reference: Reserve Buffers in Adverse Scenarios (sources: Country Staff Reports, and IMF staff calculations).

### Proposed package of FCL-SLL reforms (staff proposal)
- Staff proposes a package of three reforms to improve complementarity of FCL and SLL:
  1. an up to 200 percent-of-quota precautionary FCL arrangement free of the articulation of exit expectations (“exit expectation-free FCL”);
  2. an increase in the access limit for the SLL to 200 percent of quota;
  3. explicit provisions on concurrent use of the SLL and the FCL.
- Potential combined coverage:
  - subject to qualification and assessment of potential BoP needs, up to 400 percent of quota of combined FCL-SLL access without exit expectations could be allowed.
- Expected benefits:
  - extended coverage with positive externalities to the rest of the system;
  - more effective response to shocks if they materialize;
  - adequate firepower for qualifying countries while preserving safeguards.

### Exit expectation-free FCL (design and conditions)
- Key design element:
  - inclusion of authorities’ exit strategy would be expected only when access exceeds 200 percent of quota.
- Board approval and qualification:
  - approval of low-access precautionary FCL arrangements without explicit exit expectations would be decided by the Board after confirming the member’s qualification.
  - qualification would be assessed at each request and review under the arrangement; the proposed access level must be justified through staff analysis.
- Duration and state-dependence:
  - approval without articulation of exit expectations would be for a maximum duration of two years;
  - exit expectations would continue to hold above 200 percent of quota and exit remains state-dependent for all FCL arrangements.
- Interaction with prior FCL credit:
  - for assessing whether exit expectations should be articulated, the 200 percent-of-quota threshold would be lowered by any credit outstanding under prior FCL arrangements; outstanding credit to the Fund under non-FCL GRA, PRGT, RST would not be taken into account for this purpose.
  - illustrative example given in the source: if a member has 50 percent of quota outstanding under prior FCL arrangements, exit expectations would not need to be articulated if the new FCL stays at or below 150 percent of quota.

### Safeguards, temporariness, and resource considerations
- Temporary use of Fund resources:
  - the proposal is asserted to be consistent with the Fund’s Articles requirement that Fund financing be temporary and under adequate safeguards.
  - key safeguard: resolution of a member’s BoP problems and the member’s capacity to repay the Fund when maturities fall due.
- Additional safeguards listed in the source:
  - proposed exit expectation-free low-access FCL arrangements are intended to address temporary BoP problems;
  - each FCL arrangement will have a fixed duration;
  - approval of initial and successor FCL arrangements requires Executive Board decision and continued meeting of strict FCL qualification criteria—no automaticity for successor arrangements.
- Resource-use considerations:
  - staff argues that this proposal, combined with streamlined augmentation procedures, could reduce demand for Fund resources in the long run by reducing incentives to request and maintain large FCL arrangements and by enabling swift augmentations when genuinely needed.
- Historical practice examples (as described):
  - Mexico: 2019 FCL approval at 500 percent of quota described exit strategy (gradual reduction to exit), later reduced to 400 percent of quota in 2021 with intent to reduce to 300 percent at mid-term review; pauses in exit strategy occurred in 2020 and 2022 due to elevated global risks (pandemic and Ukraine war).

*Italic: Source — ppea2023039, “Review of the FCL, PLL and SLL” (excerpts provided in the content unit).*

### 50. Second, the paper proposes to raise the access limit for the SLL to 200 percent of

### 50. Second, the paper proposes to raise the access limit for the SLL to 200 percent of quota.

### Proposal to raise SLL access limit
- Proposal: increase the access limit for the SLL to 200 percent of quota.
- Rationale:
  - Responds to calls from a number of Executive Directors to increase SLL access limits.
  - Permanent change to acknowledge larger capital flows and larger moderate and short-term BoP needs covered by the SLL.
  - Will be reviewed as part of the next comprehensive review of access limits or if the “review clause” is triggered.
- Context and current limitations:
  - SLL access limit currently at 145 percent of quota (or 2.1 percent of GDP on average for EMEs).
  - Average size of BSLs extended to EMEs is 3.1 percent of GDP.
  - Use of the SLL has been very limited—Chile is the only user since its establishment in April 2020.
  - Pandemic tail risks made the FCL the appropriate instrument rather than the SLL.
  - Potential qualifying countries may not have been fully aware of the SLL’s benefits.
- Expected effects:
  - Bring the SLL access limit closer to that of BSLs while offering wider coverage.
  - Provide more visibility to the instrument.
- Constraints:
  - At 200 percent of quota the access limit remains modest and aligned with the SLL’s purpose addressing “special, short-term, moderate BoP need resulting from volatility in the capital markets.”
  - Raising access beyond 200 percent of quota may be inadvisable because:
    - It would concentrate large repayments within the SLL’s short 12-month repurchase period.
    - It might imply the need to revisit features linked to the SLL (e.g., revolving aspects and lower fees).

### Concurrent use of the FCL and SLL
- Proposal: explicitly provide for concurrent use of the SLL with the FCL.
- Operational aspects:
  - Countries could avail themselves of an SLL (FCL) arrangement when already in an FCL (SLL) arrangement, or avail themselves of the two simultaneously, provided:
    - The country meets the qualification criteria (identical for the two instruments).
    - The relevant BoP problem is addressed under the instruments.
    - External risks warrant it.
  - Request, offer, and approval process would remain the same, with potential streamlining if related proposals are approved.
  - Countries would normally be expected to request an SLL arrangement simultaneously with the FCL request or mid-term review, with both discussed in the same Board meeting and on the basis of a single document.
  - Combined costs lowered since the SLL has somewhat lower commitment fees than the FCL.
- Use cases and scenarios where concurrent use is beneficial:
  - a) Longer-term shocks: FCL preferred due to longer repurchase period.
  - b) Short-term capital account shocks: SLL appropriate due to shorter repurchase and revolving access; can be used to lean against depreciation in specific conditions.
  - c) Shocks of limited scale and uncertain duration: authorities may initially draw on SLL and, if persistent, draw on FCL while repurchasing SLL.
  - d) Longer-term shocks with short-term capital account component: concurrent use may be optimal (example: Chile’s 2022 experience).
- Safeguards and limits:
  - Concurrent use allowed only to the extent the country meets qualification criteria and if external risks imply potential BoP needs whose total amount does not exceed total access requested under both instruments.
  - Rigorous analysis required to ensure combined access reflects the size of a member’s total potential BoP need (i.e., the SLL would not be a “top up”).
  - Impact on Fund liquidity quantified and analyzed in the “Resource Implications of Proposed Reforms” section.

### Chile’s 2022 BoP shock (Box 9)
- Event summary:
  - Chile had an SLL arrangement (after an FCL arrangement since 2020) and experienced a significant drop in copper prices in summer 2022—a large BoP shock.
  - Uncertainty over magnitude and duration triggered unusually high FX volatility and prompted Chile to switch to an FCL arrangement.
- Authorities’ interventions:
  - Announced intervention program: spot and forward sales of USD 10 billion each (compared with USD 3.5 billion from the SLL).
  - Central bank FX spot sales ultimately totaled USD 6 billion.
  - Copper prices stabilized, political uncertainty receded after the September 2022 Constitution referendum, and BoP pressures dissipated quickly.
  - Within a year, the Central Bank announced a program to replenish reserves.
- Counterfactual with proposed reforms:
  - Had higher SLL access (200 percent of quota, USD 4.7 billion) and explicit concurrent use been available, an SLL at 200 percent of quota along with concurrent FCL use would have been an alternative to provide necessary firepower and anchor confidence.
  - Alternatively, Chile canceled the SLL and requested a higher access FCL arrangement.

### Enhanced effectiveness and combined access
- Complementarity:
  - The three key proposals (raise SLL access, allow concurrent use, and related reforms) are complementary and expected to improve effectiveness of SLL and FCL.
  - They address survey-identified issues and would enhance attractiveness while safeguarding Fund resources via qualification criteria and annual reviews.
- Combined access proposal:
  - The three proposals would allow for a combined FCL/SLL access of up to 400 percent of quota free of exit expectations, subject to caveats and safeguards.
  - Countries could request simultaneously the two instruments at 200 percent of quota each (as part of a single document), if justified by potential BoP needs.
  - Alternative: a country with a large FCL access could reduce FCL access to 200 percent of quota and request an SLL at 200 percent of quota if it faces the SLL’s special BoP need.
- Important caveats:
  - Such access is neither an entitlement nor a “default” value; external risks and potential BoP needs must be justified at request and for every successor arrangement (annual in case of SLL).
  - Direct comparison with a 400 percent of quota FCL arrangement is inaccurate: a 200 percent FCL plus 200 percent SLL drawing results in lower credit outstanding than a 400 percent FCL drawing beyond the first year because the SLL must be repurchased within a year.
  - Countries with combined access would not be expected to draw on both instruments simultaneously under most circumstances; concurrent drawings would be warranted only in combined-shock cases aligned with scenario (d) in ¶54.
  - If hit by a large persistent shock requiring Fund support above 200 percent of quota, a request for an FCL augmentation (upon Board approval) would be preferable to using both instruments together.
  - Access of 400 percent of quota is at the low end of historical FCL uses, which averaged about 550 percent of quota since the last review.

### Maintaining and adjusting the PLL
- Role of the PLL:
  - PLL continues to have an important role in the lending toolkit despite arguments for elimination in the 2017 Review.
  - Recent uptick in PLL use (North Macedonia, Jamaica’s RSF qualifying UCT program) and tightening global financial conditions argue against elimination.
  - Survey results support maintaining the PLL, citing its use as a graduation instrument from the SBA.
- Proposed increases to PLL limits (permanent):
  - Raise the limit on access at approval for PLL arrangements and the PLL instrument access caps by 20 percent from current levels.
  - Specifically:
    - Annual limit that applies at approval of a one to two-year PLL arrangement: raise from 250 to 300 percent of quota.
    - Access cap that applies cumulatively to all PLL arrangements (regardless of duration): increase from 500 to 600 percent of quota.
  - For 6-month PLLs:
    - Standard per arrangement limit: raise from 125 percent of quota to 150 percent of quota.
    - Exceptional per arrangement limit: raise from 250 percent of quota to 300 percent of quota.
    - Overall 6-month PLL instrument cap: increase from 250 percent of quota to 300 percent of quota.
  - Notes:
    - Access limits are net of scheduled PLL repurchases.
    - The per-arrangement access limit for 6-month PLLs is subject to a higher limit of 250 percent of quota in exceptional circumstances where the member is experiencing or has the potential to experience larger short-term BoP needs due to exogenous shocks, including heightened regional or global stress conditions.
    - The PLL is also subject to annual and cumulative limits under the GRA. Exceptional access policy will continue applying to PLL arrangements with access exceeding the normal annual and cumulative GRA access limits.
- Rationale:
  - Since creation in 2011, PLL instrument access cap has never been increased “in SDR terms”; original cap of 1,000 percent of quota was halved to 500 percent of quota in 2016, eroding access relative to GDP and other aggregates.
  - PLL cap has fallen behind increases in the normal cumulative access limit (NCAL), especially after the 2023 temporary NCAL increase.
  - Survey respondents cited increasing PLL access as a top reform to enhance the instrument’s effectiveness.
- Summary table (Status quo vs Proposal) — Access Limits at Approval and PLL Instrument Caps (Percent of quota):
  - 1–2-year PLLs:
    - Annual limit at approval: Status quo 250 → Proposal 300
    - Instrument Cap (for all arrangements, regardless of duration): Status quo 500 → Proposal 600
  - 6-month PLLs:
    - Standard per Arrangement limit: Status quo 125 → Proposal 150
    - Exceptional per arrangement limit: Status quo 250 → Proposal 300
    - 6-month PLL instrument cap: Status quo 250 → Proposal 300

*Review of the FCL, PLL and SLL — International Monetary Fund*

### 62. The precautionary SBA has been a useful instrument for signaling countries’

### ppea2023039 - 62. The precautionary SBA has been a useful instrument for signaling countries’

### Benefits and empirical findings on precautionary SBAs
- The precautionary SBA has been a useful instrument for signaling countries’ commitment to credible policies and macroeconomic stability.
- Case studies of recent users show the instrument has been a critical anchor for macroeconomic policies and reforms, supporting progress in:
  - fiscal and external sustainability,
  - monetary policy modernization,
  - financial sector resilience,
  - governance.
- Survey respondents agreed the precautionary SBA provides a credible commitment mechanism with strong policy signaling to donors and investors, thus contributing to:
  - reducing sovereign borrowing costs,
  - catalyzing external financing,
  - strengthening reserves (Annex VII).
- Example: Honduras—reform implementation under successive precautionary SBA/SCF arrangements improved market confidence and attracted financing from donors and international markets, evidenced by successful bond placements during the program periods (Annex IV).

### Flexibility and recent uses in times of shock
- Precautionary SBAs have flexibly catered to users’ needs in difficult times (Annex IV).
- 2022 approvals: Armenia, Georgia, and Serbia—approved in the context of high uncertainty to insure against shocks including those stemming from the war in Ukraine.
- 2019 Honduras SBA/SCF intended to cover BoP needs potentially arising from a negative terms-of-trade shock due to commodity price swings.
- Serbia SBA design: hybrid—addressed an actual BoP need at approval and during the first year, and a potential need during the second year.
- Treatment as of May 2023:
  - Armenia and Georgia continue to treat their SBA as precautionary.
  - Serbia intends to treat access under the SBA during the second year as precautionary.
- Rapid access examples:
  - Armenia and Honduras benefitted from rapid access to Fund resources under their 2019 arrangements following actual BoP needs at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis.
- May 2023: Executive Board approved a precautionary SBA for Kosovo, together with an RSF arrangement.
- Target recalibrations, program extensions, access augmentations and rephasing (twice for Honduras) demonstrate SBA and SCF flexibility to manage large shocks within a UCT-quality program, obviating need to seek emergency financing.
- Survey respondents valued:
  - use on precautionary or disbursing basis depending on BoP need,
  - flexible duration,
  - uncapped access,
  - absence of ex ante conditionality making it accessible to all Fund members (Annex VII).
- Staff plans outreach on precautionary instruments to authorities, market participants, and the public, underscoring the role of precautionary SBAs.

### Political assurances and Board briefings (proposals)
- Several recent FCL requests occurred prior to elections, raising questions about political assurances.
- Postponing approval until a new government takes office could be detrimental due to delayed access or temporary discontinuation of resources.
- Very strong institutional policy frameworks required for FCL or SLL serve as guardrails during election periods.
- FCL/SLL/PLL qualification assessments require countries remain committed to maintaining very strong (FCL/SLL) or sound (PLL) policies and institutional frameworks.
- Guidance notes suggest delinking timing of requests from electoral cycle but staff should seek political assurances from electoral candidates that key policies and frameworks will be maintained.
- Review proposes introducing Board briefings on macroeconomic developments following significant economic policy changes in countries benefiting from FCL and PLL support; briefings would be informal—for example as part of country matters meeting—after significant policy changes following a new government installment.

### Drawdown of precautionary FCLs and PLLs — existing practice and proposed follow-up
- Purchases under precautionary arrangements address actual BoP needs when they materialize.
- Existing practice: Board is normally informed shortly after a drawing under an FCL or PLL arrangement that was requested on a precautionary basis upon approval. The information is ideally provided in a concise note discussing latest developments leading to the actual BoP need, corresponding purchase, and the outlook, sent to the Executive Board for information or as background for an informal briefing.
- Proposed additional follow-up:
  - A further follow-up briefing on any FCL or PLL drawdowns on resources that were requested on a precautionary basis at approval.
  - Purpose: better understand macroeconomic circumstances leading to the drawing, the member’s policy responses, any developments in policy frameworks pertinent to qualification, and evolution of access to international capital markets.
  - This additional briefing, possibly in a subsequent country document, should normally precede the next request (including for an augmentation) or review, but would not change existing timeframes for review of the member‘s qualification.

### Safeguards assessment policy under budget support use (proposal)
- Proposal to align the FCL policy with the safeguards assessment policy requirement for a framework between central banks and finance ministries for servicing obligations to the Fund when IMF resources are drawn for budget financing.
- Such framework is typically provided through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between central bank and government; Fund resources are expected to be kept in government accounts with the central bank pending use.
- Currently, FCL policy does not include a specific requirement on such an MoU.
- The paper proposes modifying FCL policy to require central banks and finance ministries to agree on a framework clarifying responsibilities for timely service of obligations to the Fund before FCL resources are drawn for budget financing, including that Fund disbursements will be deposited in the government’s accounts at the central bank pending their use.

### SLL safeguards requirements (proposal)
- Clarification proposed for safeguards requirements for standalone SLL SRs:
  - Given relatively low access and short maturity, an SLL arrangement is unlikely to have a significant bearing on medium-term sustainability or multi-year macroeconomic projections; it primarily serves as a liquidity management resource.
  - Proposal: do not require standalone SLL SRs to feature a full-fledged adverse scenario.
  - Capacity to repay analysis in SRs for standalone SLL arrangements can be streamlined, focusing on short-term liquidity risks, given the SLL’s low access level and 12-month repurchase period.

### Procedural reforms to streamline precautionary arrangements
- Objective: respond to new precautionary arrangement requests in an agile manner by simplifying processes for members, staff, and Executive Board while maintaining existing procedural safeguards and Executive Board approval for qualification.

- Overall Board procedure reforms proposed:
  - Reform 1: Drop requirement for an informal Board meeting for successor FCL and PLL arrangements if documentation is issued to Executive Board for consideration within three months of expiration of a previous undrawn FCL or one- or two-year PLL arrangement (i.e., an arrangement not cancelled and with all reviews completed), provided Managing Director assesses country circumstances and access requested do not differ significantly since last review. Board would review qualification at time of Board meeting to consider successor request.
  - Reform 2: Encourage, where feasible, holding same-day back-to-back Article IV and informal Board discussions for FCL and PLL requests to reduce administrative/timing pressures; follow with formal Board discussion two to four weeks later.
    - Note: FCL and PLL operational guidance recommend holding Article IV Board discussions at least 4 to 6 weeks prior to a formal Board meeting; in practice intervals have often been shorter (less than three weeks).
    - For FCL requests, impact on Fund liquidity must be assessed when access exceeds 575 percent of quota or SDR 10 billion (whichever is lower), as required by FCL policy.
  - Reform 3: Encourage holding a single Board meeting for the Article IV Consultation and the FCL mid-term review or a PLL review where feasible; staff may circulate a single SR combining Article IV and FCL/PLL review with clear separation between surveillance discussion and FCL/PLL sections. The FCL/PLL qualification assessment would rely on the Board’s assessment of policies in the previous Article IV consultation and staff’s appraisal in the concurrent Article IV. Board’s assessment would be reflected in the press release for the combined document bundle.

- FCL- and SLL-specific procedural proposals:
  - Simplify modalities for augmenting access under the FCL and introduce options for synchronized FCL augmentations and SLL offers/requests.
  - Streamlined augmentation procedures for FCL users:
    - If augmentation request is issued to the Executive Board within six months from approval of the FCL arrangement or completion of the mid-term review, streamlined procedures apply.
    - Streamlined procedures entail concise SRs that can cross-reference analysis in the most recent Board document (if staff assesses qualification still holds).
    - Executive Board will consider and confirm member’s continued qualification and then consider the augmentation request.
    - A request for augmentation will normally require a short SR providing an updated ESI supportive of increased external risks, developing an adverse scenario to demonstrate increased BoP needs, the case for higher access, and a staff assessment that prior qualification analysis remains unchanged. Executive Board confirmation of qualification under streamlined procedures does not change the date set for mid-term review completion.
  - Extend synchronized approvals process for FCL augmentations to allow nimble response when a group of FCL users face the same external shock.
  - Introduce option of synchronized SLL offers to incentivize uptake:
    - Synchronized access by several countries could reduce stigma of first-mover requests and strengthen response to common shocks.
    - Synchronized extension of SLL offers to, and opt-ins by, qualifying members could encourage take-up.
    - Process similar to previously envisaged synchronized FCL approvals; could also apply if countries request SLL arrangements through written communication.

*Source: ppea2023039 - 62. The precautionary SBA has been a useful instrument for signaling countries’*

### 72. The paper proposes to include the option of requesting approval of an SLL

### 72. The paper proposes to include the option of requesting approval of an SLL

### Proposal to allow authorities to request SLL approval
- Currently, after the Board approves an SLL arrangement on a conditional basis, the arrangement becomes effective only once the Fund confirms receipt of the member’s signed written communication, including acceptance of the “offer” and policy commitments. Authorities have two weeks to accept the offer from the Fund.
- The paper proposes an alternative: authorities may request an SLL arrangement through a written communication attached to the SR, analogous to FCL arrangements.
- Under the request option:
  - The SLL arrangement would become effective upon Board approval of the request, eliminating the three-step offer-acceptance-confirmation sequence.
  - In cases of concurrent approval of an SLL and FCL arrangement, a country needs to request both arrangements in a single written communication to ensure synchronized start dates of the two arrangements.
- The “offer” option under the SLL policy remains available for cases where the SLL is put in place/renewed on a stand-alone basis or added to an already-existing FCL arrangement.

### Streamlined transitions between SLL and FCL arrangements
- Transition mechanics:
  - A transition from an existing FCL (SLL) arrangement to a new SLL (FCL) arrangement involves a request for approval of the new arrangement combined with a simultaneous decision by the member to cancel the previous one, with the cancellation effective on the date of approval of the new arrangement.
  - If the member opts to transition within six months from (i) the entering into effect of the SLL (or FCL) arrangement to be cancelled; or (ii) the date of completion of the mid-term review under the FCL arrangement to be cancelled, the SR may cross-reference the analysis in the most recent Board document (if applicable) where staff assessed that qualification has not changed, provided the SR includes an update on the member’s BoP problem.
- For concurrent use of FCL and SLL:
  - A member with an ongoing FCL or SLL that opts to use both concurrently and issues documentation to the Executive Board within six months from approval of the stand-alone arrangement (or completion of the FCL mid-term review) may use streamlined SRs.
  - The SR for the new additional arrangement may be more concise by cross-referencing prior analyses, but must include:
    - An assessment confirming that the member has the special BoP problem addressed by the SLL (if applicable).
    - A discussion of the total BoP need showing combined access under the SLL and FCL is commensurate to the potential BoP gap in the adverse scenario.
    - An updated ESI and the member’s CtR.

### Resource implications of proposed reforms
- Overall expectation:
  - Staff expects proposed reforms to have only limited impact on demand for GRA resources for several reasons:
    - Proposals do not introduce or eliminate instruments.
    - Proposals do not loosen qualification criteria; the qualification perimeter remains unchanged.
    - Not all qualifying countries would want precautionary arrangements; some have reserve buffers or access to RFAs or BSLs.
    - Higher access limits are not entitlements; access is contingent on qualification, heightened/abating external risks, and commensurate potential BoP needs.
    - Introduction of exit expectation-free FCLs at low access, combined with streamlined augmentation procedures, could help reduce demand for Fund resources over the longer term.
  - The proposed clause that would trigger a review when total outstanding credit and commitments under the PLL, FCL, and SLL reach SDR 150 billion serves as a strong safeguard.

### Scenario analysis (Box 10) — illustrative extreme scenarios
- Purpose: Illustrative scenarios assess potential new commitments if reforms (removing exit expectations for low-access precautionary FCLs, increasing SLL and PLL access limits, and permitting concurrent SLL/FCL use) were realized under extreme assumptions.
- Common extreme assumptions across scenarios:
  - (i) all qualified members experience potential BoP needs large enough to justify access of 200 percent of quota under the SLL and at least 200 percent of quota under the FCL; and
  - (ii) the SLL is used concurrently with the FCL for complementary insurance.
- Results (new commitments, in billion SDRs):
  - Scenario A:
    - Assumes potential qualifiers with reserves below 120 percent of the ARA metric opt for concurrent FCL and SLL, combined access of 400 percent of quota.
    - New Fund commitments: 29
  - Scenario B:
    - Same as A but with reserves threshold at 150 percent of the ARA metric.
    - New Fund commitments: 30
  - Scenario C:
    - Builds on B and assumes current PLL arrangements are augmented to 600 percent of quota and past PLL users (not current FCL users) request a successor PLL of 600 percent of quota.
    - New Fund commitments: 35
- Total commitments (after accounting for outstanding credit and commitments under the FCL, PLL, and SLL of SDR 70.9 billion as of August 31, 2023):
  - Scenario A: Total commitments 100 (billion SDRs)
  - Scenario B: Total commitments 101 (billion SDRs)
  - Scenario C: Total commitments 106 (billion SDRs)
- Other illustrative parameters and assumptions preserved exactly:
  - Access under the SLL assumed at 200 percent of quota.
  - FCLs (PLLs) assumed to be approved at, or augmented to, 200 (600) percent of quota cumulative.
  - Access under combined FCL and SLL in scenarios set to 400 percent of quota for considered members.
  - The scenario set of “potential qualifiers” in the analysis uses criteria: (i) a public debt ratio below 70 percent of GDP; (ii) international reserves above 80 percent of the ARA metric; (iii) single-digit inflation; and (iv) external gross financing needs below 15 percent of GDP.
  - The scenario restricts potential users to reserves below 120 percent of the ARA metric in Scenario A to identify “marginal” qualifiers.
- Key contextual figures and impacts:
  - When the SLL was established, the 2020 SLL Board Paper calculated potential commitments under the SLL to amount to about SDR 40 billion.
  - While liquidity impact varies by timeframe, none of the illustrative scenarios triggers the review clause (SDR 150 billion threshold).
  - Starting with the end-FY2023 FCC level of SDR 146 billion, additional commitments from Scenarios A–C would bring the FCC below the SDR 125 billion Board notification threshold derived from the Fund’s moderate tolerance of liquidity risk.
- Caveats noted about the scenarios:
  - Use of simple criteria to identify potential qualifiers; actual qualification requires Board approval against nine criteria and overall Article IV SR assessment.
  - Assumption that all qualifying members simultaneously experience maximum BoP needs is extreme.
  - Scenario C conservatively assumes PLL requests reach maximum even if total external buffers exceed 150 percent of the ARA metric.
  - Assumes all qualified countries request maximum access regardless of alternative financing sources; in practice, reliance on RFAs or BSLs would reduce demand.
  - Assumes no reduction in access for existing FCL users; expirations of existing FCLs (earliest end-2023) could lower total commitments unless external risks rise.

### Implementation and staffing implications
- Proposed reforms expected to be implemented within existing budgetary envelopes with limited impact on human resources.
- Quantification is difficult, but implementation is not expected to require significant additional human resources.
- Upskilling staff may be useful and could be supported by training and updates to operational guidance notes for the FCL/PLL (SLL).
- Streamlined Board and instrument-specific procedures could yield compensating resource savings.

### Review clause and safeguards
- The paper proposes to add the SLL to the review clause.
- Current review clause (Decision No. 16286) triggers a new review of the precautionary toolkit whenever aggregate outstanding credit and commitments under the FCL and PLL reach SDR 150 billion.
- As of August 31, 2023:
  - Fund’s current outstanding credit and commitments under the FCL, PLL, and SLL total SDR 70.9 billion.
  - This comprises SDR 65.5 billion in undrawn credit and SDR 5.3 billion in credit outstanding under the FCL and PLL. No credit or commitments are currently outstanding under the SLL.
- Going forward, the review will stipulate that the FCL, SLL, and PLL will be reviewed whenever aggregate outstanding credit and commitments under these instruments reach SDR 150 billion or following the time-based reviews in 2025 for the SLL and every 5 years thereafter.

### Commitment fees and pricing options
- The paper revisits design issues related to commitment fees, focusing on pros and cons of time-based commitment fees (TBCF), but does not propose changes to the structure of commitment fees.
- Background:
  - The 2017 Review explored—but did not adopt—time-based commitment fees as an option to strengthen price-based incentives to exit precautionary facilities.
  - Staff revisits these design issues but, after careful consideration, does not propose changes at this time.
- Price-based options considered (summary of Box 11, Annex VIII):
  - Option 1: Revisit level-based commitment fees (LBCF) for precautionary access (e.g., adding a new step at 800 percent of quota or increasing fees at existing steps).
  - Option 2: Re-consider time-based commitment fees (TBCF) to discourage prolonged large-scale precautionary commitments by imposing an additional fee once undrawn credit remains above a threshold for a defined period.
- Staff view and legal considerations:
  - Both options would strengthen price-based disincentives but could unduly reduce the usefulness of the FCL amid elevated global risks.
  - Option 2 would make exit time- rather than state-dependent, contrary to the FCL’s objective.
  - Legal requirement of uniformity of charges (Article V, Section 8(d)) means any change would apply to all arrangements in the credit tranches under the GRA approved in the future.
  - Given divergent Director views and potential implications, staff does not propose changes to the commitment fee structure at this stage; the structure could be revisited in the future if warranted.

*Source: IMF staff paper — Review of the FCL, PLL and SLL (selected excerpts).*

### 82. A few Directors asked staff to reconsider the possibility of moving from the current

### ppea2023039 - 82. A few Directors asked staff to reconsider the possibility of moving from the current practice of accounting for precautionary arrangements at full value in the calculation of Fund liquidity.

### Scoring of precautionary arrangements (full vs. partial)
- Current practice: The Fund’s primary measure of the GRA’s liquidity, the FCC, reflects the full amount of all commitments of GRA resources, whether approved on a disbursing or a precautionary basis.
- Empirical observation: Since the establishment of the FCL and the PLL, only 1 percent of the total commitments under FCL and PLL arrangements ended up being purchased (drawing rate calculated as total amount drawn under FCL/PCL/PLL arrangements in SDR terms divided by total approved commitments for the period 2009-2023Q2).
- Proposal considered by some Directors: “Partial scoring” that treats only a portion of amounts committed under precautionary arrangements as committed usable resources, reflecting a lower probability of actual drawings.
- Staff position: Staff does not support moving from full to partial scoring because:
  - Partial scoring would not create additional resources but would increase the risk that the Fund’s financing commitments exceed available resources.
  - Partial scoring implicitly assumes members’ purchases would be uncorrelated, but systemic events could induce correlated purchases.
  - If commitments exceed available resources, the Fund could be unable to honor commitments, undermining credibility and the value of precautionary arrangements.
  - Partial scoring could encourage perverse borrower incentives (e.g., early drawdowns), increasing the risk of a “run” on Fund usable resources.
  - Borrowed resources (NAB and BBAs) can be used only when activated; commitments approved outside activation periods must be financed from quota resources, which could be depleted.
  - Partial scoring would raise the FCC (because full undrawn balances would be partially discounted), delaying activation of borrowed resources and elevating liquidity risk.
  - Modifying the FCC definition could have implications for the NAB Decision and the 2020 BBAs, potentially requiring consent of NAB participants and 2020 BBA creditors.
- Conclusion: Full scoring of precautionary arrangements under the FCC remains appropriate given the Fund’s mandate and financing structure.

### Enterprise risks related to proposed reforms
Risk to the Fund without the proposed reforms:
- Business risks:
  - Not proceeding with reforms would weaken the Fund’s response to evolving member needs.
  - Could lead to under-provision of Fund financing in an environment of heightened and persistent global risks for members with very strong or sound economic fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks.
- Strategic risks:
  - Could increase members’ reliance on self-insurance, BSLs, or RFAs, fragmenting and reducing efficiency of the GFSN.
  - Could lead to expensive reserve accumulation, contributing to larger global imbalances and slower economic growth.
- Reputational risks:
  - Fund perceived as not adequately responding to members’ needs could erode credibility and willingness to engage.

Risk to the Fund with the proposed reforms:
- Credit risks:
  - Increasing PLL and SLL limits and permitting concurrent FCL/SLL use could raise credit risk.
  - Mitigants:
    - Continued application of stringent qualification criteria for FCL, SLL, and PLL (very strong for FCL/SLL; sound for PLL).
    - For PLLs, proposed access increases are proportionally less than recent temporary increases in GRA access limits; EA policy would apply to PLLs exceeding normal annual and cumulative GRA access limits.
    - For FCLs, the expectation that members with access exceeding 200 percent of quota (or 400 percent of quota of combined FCL-SLL access) would gradually reduce access would be maintained.
    - Standard safeguards remain: debt sustainability assessments and CtR.
    - Proposed modification to PLL debt sustainability requirements would not materially impact quality or accuracy of staff’s assessment; not expected to increase credit risk.
  - Financial protection: Any implications for protection against non-payment would be considered holistically at the next precautionary balances review. Under current framework, commitments of precautionary arrangements are not included in the forward-looking credit measure determining the indicative range for precautionary balances’ coverage ratio, but are taken into account judgmentally when setting the precautionary balances target.
- Liquidity risks:
  - Increasing PLL and SLL access limits, concurrent FCL/SLL use, and exit-expectations-free low-access precautionary FCLs could raise demand for precautionary lending, reduce Fund liquidity, and commit a higher share of lending capacity.
  - Especially high demand could prompt activation of borrowed resources; in baseline, activation proposals would depend on developments in demand for non-precautionary lending.
  - Mitigants:
    - Review clause triggers a new Review of Precautionary Arrangements if precautionary credit and commitments reach SDR 150 billion (from current SDR 72 billion).
    - Same mitigating factors as for credit risk.
- Business risk (standards/perception):
  - Higher take-up might be perceived as loosening standards; mitigated by stringent qualification requirements and subsequent reviews.
- Operational risk:
  - Concurrent use of FCL and SLL (different repurchase periods) could be operationally challenging but mitigated by the Fund’s experience with multiple operational procedures.
- Operational human capital risk:
  - Significant increase in demand would raise staffing needs in area and functional departments and require reprioritization given the Fund’s flat real budget.
  - Staff expects limited impact from Board briefings after political events and follow-ups on drawdowns, particularly given proposed streamlining.

### Other reforms considered but not proposed
- Partial scoring (shift to treating only part of precautionary amounts as committed usable resources) — rejected because it would create liquidity risk by delaying and complicating activation of borrowed resources.
- Reduction in commitment fees to incentivize precautionary instrument use — not proposed because it would generate income risks by reducing lending income.

### Issues for discussion (questions posed to the Board)
- Do Directors concur with proposals and clarifications of qualification assessment and process on AML/CFT, governance issues, political assurances?
- Do Directors agree with safeguard proposals: reporting on changes relative to past assessments, and Board briefings after drawdowns and significant economic policy changes?
- Do Directors agree with recalibration of debt sustainability assessment for exceptional access precautionary PLLs?
- Do Directors favor explicit provisions on concurrent use of the SLL with the FCL?
- Do Directors agree that exit out of high-access FCLs should be state-dependent and encouraged only above low levels of access as defined in the proposed package? Do Directors agree with the proposal for the FCL-specific threshold for the non-articulation of exit expectations?
- Do Directors agree with not requiring an adverse scenario for a standalone SLL?
- Do Directors concur with reforms to streamline the number of Board meetings associated with approval and review of FCL, SLL and PLL arrangements?
- Do Directors favor simplifying transition between SLL and FCL arrangements, streamlining FCL augmentation, and extending simplified procedures for transitioning to concurrent use?
- Do Directors agree with the possibility of synchronized SLLs?
- Do Directors favor no change at this stage relative to financing of precautionary arrangements (maintaining full scoring and current commitment fees)? Do they accept adding the SLL to the Review clause?
- Do Directors encourage staff’s outreach plans?

### Proposed decisions (summary)
- Decision I:
  - Complete the FCL and PLL reviews called for in Decision No. 16286-(17/98), adopted December 6, 2017.
  - Provide that the next review of FCL and PLL policies will take place in five years or more, or on an as-needed basis, or whenever aggregated outstanding credit and commitments under the FCL, PLL and SLL reach SDR 150 billion.
  - Complete the SLL policy review called for in Decision No. 16747-(20/43), adopted April 15, 2020, and provide for a review of the SLL by end-December 2025 (or earlier if the SDR 150 billion threshold is reached before end-2025).
- Decision II:
  - Implement proposed amendments increasing PLL-specific access limits and streamlining PLL procedures.
  - Specific textual amendments include replacing “500 percent of quota” with “600 percent of quota”; replacing references to “250 percent of quota” with “300 percent of quota”; and replacing references to “125 percent of quota” with “150 percent of quota”.
  - Amend paragraph 6(b) to allow informal Executive Board consultation exceptions for certain successor PLL arrangements meeting five specified conditions (including no purchases under prior PLL, completed reviews, stable circumstances, and requested access not greater than prior approved access).
- Decision III:
  - Implement proposed streamlining of FCL procedures, add provisions on FCL augmentations of access, and amend the FCL decision to incorporate the safeguards assessment policy requirement set forth in ¶68.
- Decision IV:
  - Amend the SLL decision to increase the access limit under the SLL to 200 percent of quota and incorporate the option of requesting approval of an SLL arrangement through a member’s written communication.
- Decision V:
  - Amend the Transparency Policy Decision to account for the option of requesting approval of an SLL arrangement through a member’s written communication.
- Annex X: Redlined texts show revisions against current decisions for convenience of Executive Directors.
- Note: All other proposals not covered by the proposed decisions will be reflected in the summing up of the discussion.

*Source: ppea2023039 - Extract (pp. 61–69) from "Review of the FCL, PLL and SLL" (IMF).*

### 1. The second sentence of paragraph 2 shall be further amended to read as follows:

### ppea2023039 - 1. The second sentence of paragraph 2 shall be further amended to read as follows:

### Amendments to FCL decision — qualification criteria
- The second sentence of paragraph 2 is amended to specify the relevant criteria for assessing qualification for an FCL arrangement as follows:
  - (i) a sustainable external position;
  - (ii) a capital account position dominated by private flows;
  - (iii) a track record of steady sovereign access to international capital markets at favorable terms;
  - (iv) a reserve position that is relatively comfortable when the FCL is requested on a precautionary basis;
  - (v) sound public finances, including a sustainable public debt position;
  - (vi) low and stable inflation, in the context of a sound monetary and exchange rate policy framework;
  - (vii) sound financial system and the absence of solvency problems that may threaten systemic stability, or, for arrangements approved before May 21, 2014, the absence of bank solvency problems that pose an immediate threat of a systemic banking crisis;
  - (viii) effective financial sector supervision; and
  - (ix) data transparency and integrity.
- Supplementary requirement: a very positive assessment of the member’s policies by the Executive Board in the context of the most recent Article IV consultations, which shall be supplemented by a very positive assessment by staff in an Article IV Consultation report where a review pursuant to paragraph 5(b) occurs concurrently with an Article IV consultation.

### New paragraph 5(c) — augmentation of FCL access
- New paragraph 5(c) added:
  - The Fund will stand ready to consider a member’s request to make additional amounts available under any FCL arrangement.
  - Such requests for augmentation shall be considered by the Executive Board:
    - (i) in the context of a scheduled review specified in paragraph 5(a); or
    - (ii) on another date within the period of the arrangement.
  - Approval of an augmentation request under (i) or (ii) will be subject to confirmation by the Executive Board of the member’s adherence to the qualification criteria specified in paragraph 2.
  - An Executive Board decision not to approve an augmentation request shall not affect:
    - (i) the member’s right to make one or more purchases under the arrangement for up to the amount of the approved access in accordance with this Decision; or
    - (ii) the date of the mid-term review in two-year FCL arrangements pursuant to paragraph 5(a).

### Paragraph 6(a)(iii) — consultations and accelerated successor arrangements
- Amended paragraph 6(a)(iii) provides that once management decides access under this Decision may be appropriate, it will consult with the Executive Board promptly in an informal meeting, except that such consultation will not be required for a successor FCL arrangement for a member not having an actual balance of payments need at the time of the request where all of the following hold:
  - (1) the documentation on the request has been issued to the Executive Board for its consideration within three months of the expiration of the term of a prior FCL arrangement under paragraph 5(b)(i);
  - (2) no purchases were made under such prior FCL arrangement;
  - (3) all reviews pursuant to paragraph 5(a) in such prior FCL arrangement were completed;
  - (4) management has decided that the member’s economic circumstances (including economic fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks) and external risks have not changed significantly since the last completed review in such prior FCL arrangement; and
  - (5) the amount of requested access under the successor FCL arrangement is not greater than the approved access under such prior FCL arrangement.
- For the purpose of the informal consultation, Executive Directors will be provided with a concise staff note setting out the basis on which approval could be recommended, including:
  - (I) a rigorous assessment of the member’s actual or potential need for Fund resources and repayment capacity; and
  - (II) an assessment of the impact of the arrangement on Fund liquidity in cases where it is contemplated that access would exceed 575 percent of quota or SDR 10 billion, whichever is lower.

### Paragraph 6(b) — safeguards, audits, and access conditions
- A member requesting an FCL arrangement would not be subject to the Fund’s policy on safeguards assessment for Fund arrangements, provided that:
  - In cases where purchases under an FCL arrangement will be used for budget financing, an appropriate framework between the central bank and the state treasury will be in place for timely servicing of the member’s financial obligations to the Fund, in line with BUFF/10/115.
- At the time of making a formal written request for an FCL arrangement, the member will provide authorization for Fund staff to have access to the most recently completed annual independent audit of its central bank’s financial statements, whether or not the audit is published, including:
  - authorizing central bank authorities and the central bank’s external auditors to discuss the audit findings with Fund staff, including any written observations by the external auditors regarding weaknesses observed in internal controls;
  - an expectation that the member will act in a cooperative manner during such discussions with staff.
- For as long as Fund credit is outstanding under this Decision, the member will also provide staff with:
  - copies of annual audited financial statements and management letters, together with an authorization to discuss audit findings with the external auditor.

### Decision IV — Amendments to SLL Arrangements
- Decision No. 16747-(20/43), adopted April 15, 2020, is amended as follows:
  - Paragraph 2 (introductory sentence) amended to read: “An SLL arrangement shall be approved upon a member’s informal expression of its potential interest in an SLL arrangement, subject to paragraph 6(a)(iv)(B) below, or upon a member’s request, and where the Fund assesses that the member:”
  - Paragraph 4: replace “145 percent of the member’s quota” with “200 percent of the member’s quota”.
  - Paragraph 6(a)(ii) amended to require that when the Managing Director is prepared to recommend provision of an SLL opportunity or approval, the relevant documents, including a staff report assessing the member’s qualification and, where applicable, the text of the written communication, will be circulated to the Board.
  - Paragraph 6(a)(iv) (cases not involving a member’s written communication) amended to specify:
    - (A) If the Executive Board assesses the member qualifies and approves an SLL, that approval will be conditional on receipt of a satisfactory written communication from the member confirming it wishes to avail itself of the SLL arrangement. The written communication must be submitted no later than two weeks after the Board’s conditional approval and must outline the member’s commitment to maintain very strong policies, its commitment to take corrective measures when relevant, and its consent to publication of the associated staff report.
    - (B) The SLL arrangement becomes effective on the date the Fund confirms receipt of a written communication satisfying the requirements; a copy of the written communication will be circulated for information to the Executive Board.
  - Paragraph 6(a)(v) amended to require that where a member requests approval of an SLL arrangement in a written communication, the text of the communication include the outline, commitment and consents specified in paragraph 6(a)(iv)(A).
  - Paragraph 6(b) first sentence amended to read: “(b) A member submitting to the Fund a satisfactory written communication that it wishes to avail itself of an SLL arrangement or that it requests approval of such arrangement, would not be subject to the Fund’s policy on safeguards assessments for Fund arrangements”

### Decision V — Publications of Reports (Decision No. 15420-(13/61))
- Paragraph 4.c. amended to read:
  - The Executive Board’s decision to approve an SLL arrangement under paragraph 6(a)(iv) of the SLL Decision for a member shall be conditioned on receipt of the member’s consent to publication at the time the member sends a written communication confirming it wishes to avail itself of the SLL arrangement.
  - The associated staff report and the authorities’ written communication would be expected to be published by the Fund no later than fourteen calendar days after the member’s SLL arrangement becomes effective.
- Paragraph 11 amended to require a Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement after the Executive Board:
  - (i) adopts a decision regarding a member’s use of Fund resources (including completing a review under a Fund arrangement), or
  - (ii) adopts a decision approving a PSI or a PCI, or conducts a review under a PSI or a PCI, or
  - (iii) completes a discussion on a member’s participation in the HIPC Initiative, or
  - (iv) completes a discussion on a member’s I-PRSP, PRSP, PRSP preparation status report, APR, EDD, or PRGS in the context of the use of Fund resources or a PSI.
  - A Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement will also be issued after an SLL arrangement under Paragraph 6(a)(iv) of the SLL Decision becomes effective.
  - The Executive Director elected, appointed, or designated by the member concerned will have the opportunity to review the Chairman’s statement, propose minor revisions, and consent to its publication immediately after the Executive Board meeting, or for SLL arrangements approved under Paragraph 6(a)(iv), immediately after the SLL becomes effective.
  - No Press Release published under this paragraph shall contain any reference to a discussion or decision pertaining to a member’s overdue financial obligations to the Fund where a Press Release following an Executive Board decision to limit the member’s use of Fund resources because of the overdue financial obligations has not yet been issued.
  - In the case of an Executive Board meeting pertaining solely to a discussion or decision with respect to a member’s overdue financial obligations, no Chairman’s statement will be published.
- Paragraph 13.b.(iii) amended to read:
  - If, after twenty-eight calendar days from the effective date of an SLL arrangement approved under Paragraph 6(a)(iv) of the SLL Decision, the staff report has not been published, a brief factual statement will be issued stating the fact of the effectiveness of an SLL arrangement for a member and clarifying the authorities’ publication intention with respect to the staff report.

### Annex I — Overview of FCL, SLL, PLL and Precautionary SBA Arrangements Approved in 2018–23 (data as of May 2023)
- Notes:
  - Data as of May 2023.
  - Access under Armenia's 2019 SBA was augmented to SDR 308.8 million (239.8 percent of quota) in May 2020.
  - Access under Honduras' 2019 SBA was augmented to SDR 258.1 million (103.3 percent of quota) in June 2020, and again to SDR 358 million (143.3 percent of quota) in September 2021.
  - Serbia and North Macedonia intend to treat their respective arrangements (SBA and PLL) on a precautionary basis during the second year of the program.
- Selected entries from the approval table (columns: Country, Year, Facility, Percent of GDP at approval, Percent of Quota at approval, Amount at approval (SDR million), Amount Drawn (SDR million)):
  - Armenia 2019 SBA — 1.8, 140, 180, 309
  - Armenia 2022 SBA — 1.0, 100, 129, 0
  - Chile 2020 FCL — 9.9, 1,000, 17,443, 0
  - Chile 2022 SLL — 1.0, 145, 2,529, 0
  - Chile 2022 FCL — 6.0, 800, 13,954, 0
  - Colombia 2018 FCL — 3.3, 384, 7,848, 0
  - Colombia 2020 FCL — 6.5, 600, 12,267, 3,750
  - Colombia 2022 FCL — 3.1, 350, 7,156, 0
  - Georgia 2022 SBA — 1.5, 100, 210, 0
  - Honduras 2019 SBA — 0.8, 60, 150, 281
  - Jamaica 2023 PLL — 5.6, 190, 728, 0
  - Kosovo 2023 SBA — 1.0, 97, 80, 0
  - Mexico 2019 FCL — 4.9, 500, 44,564, 0
  - Mexico 2021 FCL — 4.0, 400, 35,651, 0
  - Morocco 2018 PLL — 2.5, 240, 2,151, 2,151
  - Morocco 2023 FCL — 3.6, 417, 3,726, 0
  - North Macedonia 2022 PLL — 4.0, 290, 784, 0
  - Panama 2021 PLL — 4.4, 500, 1,884, 0
  - Peru 2020 FCL — 5.6, 600, 8,007, 0
  - Peru 2022 FCL — 2.4, 300, 4,004, 0
  - Serbia 2022 SBA — 4.2, 290, 1,899, 786

### Annex III — Timing of Article IV Consultations for FCL and PLL Arrangements Approved Since 2017
- Tabulated timing highlights (Year of FCL/PLL Approval, Date of Preceding AIV Board, Date of FCL/PLL Approval, # of Days Between AIV Board and FCL/PLL Formal Board):
  - 2017 — Preceding AIV Board 13-Nov-17; FCL/PLL Approval 30-Nov-17; 17 days
  - 2019 — Preceding AIV Board 5-Nov-19; FCL/PLL Approval 25-Nov-19; 20 days
  - 2021 — Preceding AIV Board 5-Nov-21; FCL/PLL Approval 19-Nov-21; 14 days
  - 2016 — Preceding AIV Board 20-May-16; FCL/PLL Approval 13-Jun-16; 14 days
  - 2018 — Preceding AIV Board 30-Apr-18; FCL/PLL Approval 25-May-18; 25 days
  - 2020 — Preceding AIV Board 17-Apr-20; FCL/PLL Approval 1-May-20; 14 days
  - 2022 — Preceding AIV Board 4-Apr-22; FCL/PLL Approval 29-Apr-22; 25 days
  - Morocco 2023 — Preceding AIV Board 24-Jan-23; FCL/PLL Approval 3-Apr-23; 2 months and 2 days
  - Poland 2017 — Preceding AIV Board 5-Jul-16; FCL/PLL Approval 13-Jan-17; 6 months and 8 days
  - Mexico 2020 — Preceding AIV Board 9-Nov-18; FCL/PLL Approval 29-May-20; 1 year, 6 months and 20 days
  - Average (when less than 1 month) for FCLs: 19 days
  - Average (when less than 1 month) for PLLs: 20 days
- Examples with longer intervals and other country-specific timing are listed in the annex.

### Annex IV — Precautionary SBA case study: Armenia 2019 Precautionary SBA
- Background:
  - Armenia had a series of Fund arrangements since the GFC: an SBA in 2009, an ECF/EFF in 2010, and an EFF in 2014.
  - Despite good macroeconomic progress through these arrangements, public debt remained elevated in 2019 and the economy was vulnerable to external shocks.
  - The government requested a 140 percent of quota SBA in May 2019, followed by the current 2022 SBA.
- Objectives and Design:
  - The 2019 SBA aimed to maintain macro stability through strong policies and structural reforms to generate higher, more inclusive, and resilient growth.
  - Program objectives included growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, strengthening the monetary policy framework, maintaining a flexible exchange rate, safeguarding the financial system and improving access to finance, and implementing structural reforms.
  - Program instruments included four Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPCs), a Monetary Policy Consultation Clause (MPCC), four Indicative Targets (ITs), and 32 Structural Benchmarks (SBs) across 6 reviews.
- Duration, Access, and Disbursements:
  - In 2019 an SBA was approved for 3 years, 140 percent of quota, and initially intended to be precautionary.
  - In 2020 the authorities requested an augmentation of 100 percent of quota (SDR129 million) to cover BoP needs related to the pandemic and global financial tightening.
  - Authorities drew fully on the first three tranches available, followed by full drawing of the remaining tranches upon completion of later reviews.
- Performance:
  - Performance under the 2019 SBA was sound: the first three reviews were completed with minor delays and all QPCs were met, though the lower bound of the MPCC was breached in the second review.
  - QPCs and ITs for the combined fourth and fifth review were met except for the Net International Reserve (NIR) floor and a breach in the upper-bound of the MPCC.
  - The sixth review was completed successfully in April 2022 and all QPCs, ITs, and MPCC were met; two out of four SBs for the sixth review were not met.
- Impact:
  - The arrangement, along with support from other IFIs, helped mitigate adverse effects of regional conflict and ease BoP pressures during the COVID crisis, without use of Fund emergency financing.
  - Achievements included appropriate fiscal policies to ensure targeted health and social spending while preserving fiscal sustainability, increased reserve coverage, structural reforms improving transparency, governance, business environment, and social spending adequacy.
  - The Armenian economy remained vulnerable to external shocks in 2022 (spillovers from the war in Ukraine, global financial tightening, and a slowdown in major trading partners) and still faced structural challenges, leading to request of another precautionary SBA in December for 100 percent of quota (SDR129 million).

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/2023/english/ppea2023039.pdf*

### 6. Background. Georgia benefitted from three consecutive SBAs with decreasing access levels

### ppea2023039 - 6. Background. Georgia benefitted from three consecutive SBAs with decreasing access levels

### Background: Georgia's program history
- Georgia benefitted from three consecutive SBAs between 2008 and 2017, one of which was an SBA-SCF used on a precautionary basis (and not drawn down).
- The 2017-21 EFF was implemented successfully, with all reviews completed and an extension and augmentation approved during the pandemic.
- The authorities, seeking to build on the success of the EFF and being familiar with the SBA instrument, requested a precautionary SBA in 2022 for the same access level as the 2017-21 EFF at approval: 100 percent of quota.
- Georgia previously used a precautionary SBA-SCF from 2012-14.

### Objectives and design of the 2022 precautionary SBA
- Authorities intended to treat the program as precautionary to send a strong signal of commitment to credible policies and macroeconomic stability.
- Main program objectives:
  - Medium-term fiscal adjustment to restore fiscal buffers.
  - Strengthening public financial management and revenue generation to limit fiscal risks and create room for priority spending.
  - Maintaining a sufficiently tight monetary stance to bring inflation to target.
  - Bolstering financial sector resilience.
  - Implementing structural reforms to strengthen labor market participation and inclusive growth.
- Monitoring and program instruments:
  - Inflation consultation clause (ICC).
  - Fiscal, debt- and reserve-related quantitative performance criteria (QPCs).
  - Current primary spending and general government domestic expenditure arrears indicative targets (ITs).
  - Structural benchmarks (SBs) focused on controlling fiscal risks, improving tax policy and administration, and following up on 2021 FSAP recommendations.

### Duration, access, and disbursements
- The precautionary SBA was approved for a duration of three years, with access evenly phased across 6 reviews.
- The total access level was intended to help address a potential balance of payments gap in case of a protracted downside shock (e.g., escalation and prolongation of the war in Ukraine via higher commodity prices, lower exports, and weaker tourism revenue and financial inflows).
- As of May 2023, Georgia had not drawn on the SBA.

### Performance to date
- One review was successfully completed under the ongoing precautionary SBA in December 2022, with all QPCs being met.
- End-June 2022 inflation was within the inner bands of the ICC.
- Four SBs met and four implemented as prior actions (PAs) before the First Review.
- Staff level agreement was reached on May 11, 2023, for the Second Review.

### Impact and expectations
- It is early to assess whether objectives of the current SBA will be met.
- Georgia’s successful experience with previous programs, including the precautionary SBA-SCF from 2012-14, encouraged the request for the 2022 precautionary SBA to provide a strong anchor for macro policies and signal policy credibility to donors and foreign investors.
- While net external loan inflows had decreased post-COVID, general government loans (from private and public sources), supported by the program, were still expected at program approval to hover around pre-pandemic levels in the following years.

*International Monetary Fund — content extracted from the specified chapter.*

### 1. External risks informing the ESI have been broadly similar within and across

### 1. External risks informing the ESI have been broadly similar within and across

### ESI design and proxy variables
- The ESI typically captures risks to exports and financial flows.
- Exports proxies:
  - Commodity price fluctuations for large natural resource exporters: Mexico (oil), Colombia (oil), Chile (copper), and Peru (copper and gold).
  - Main trading partners' growth (the U.S. for Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico; Euro area for North Macedonia and Morocco).
- FDI proxies:
  - Commodity price fluctuations for natural resource exporters or main investing country growth.
- Equity and debt inflow proxies:
  - Equity inflows usually proxied by the emerging market volatility index (VXEEM).
  - Debt inflows proxied by the change in the 10-year US Treasury yield.
- Other, less widely used proxies:
  - Tourism receipts (Morocco), imports (Morocco and North Macedonia), and remittances (four out of seven countries).
- The impact of tail risks is captured by the difference between the ESI under the adverse and baseline scenarios.

### Weights, country exposures, and methodological approaches
- Weights on proxy variables vary across members to reflect country characteristics and exposure to external risks.
- For almost all arrangements, weights were estimated using BoP and IIP data as a share of GDP (data-based approach).
- Morocco’s FCL used a model-based approach.
- Specific weight and exposure findings:
  - Risks to equity and debt portfolio investment flows account for 45 to 50 percent of the ESI for Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Panama.
  - Growth developments in the US and the Euro area drive the bulk of the ESI for Mexico and Morocco.
  - External risks to the oil and copper industries contribute to a third of the ESI for Colombia and Chile, respectively.
  - For North Macedonia and Jamaica, risks to energy and food imports account for a third and a quarter of the ESI, respectively.
- Proxy variables and associated weights generally remained unchanged within and across arrangements, except:
  - Mexico: changes reflecting data updates.
  - Morocco’s FCL: US 10-year Treasury yield substituted for the VXEEM used in Morocco’s PLL.

### ESI role in access and exit decisions
- The ESI guides discussions of access and exit prospects, together with considerations on the availability of reserve buffers.
- Evidence indicates:
  - Improvements in the ESI and/or declines in the impact of tail risks (difference between adverse and baseline ESI) are associated with reductions in access, consistent with progressive exits from the FCL/PLL.
  - Increased risks correlate with higher or unchanged access levels.
- Country examples:
  - Mexico: request for lower access in 2021 relative to 2019 consistent with reduced external risks signaled by the ESI; mid-term reviews maintained access levels in line with still-elevated external stress.
  - Colombia: ESI worsened after 2020 FCL approval, leading to an augmentation of access in 2020; access was reduced under the successor arrangement in 2022 as risks abated.
  - Peru: despite the ESI pointing to continued high risks, the 2022 FCL was approved at half the level of access under the 2020 arrangement given stronger reserve buffers and authorities’ strategy to phase out FCL use.
  - Colombia (2018 vs 2020 FCL): deterioration in the ESI but access maintained at the same level on the back of higher external buffers.
- Availability of reserve buffers can delink the relationship between external stress (ESI) and access levels.

### Review of shortcomings and scope for updates
- Shortcomings identified at the 2017 Review (lack of comparability of ESI shock scenarios across countries) have been broadly addressed.
- Systemic leveraging of the latest WEO downside scenario, GFSR, or G-RAM to construct the ESI has facilitated better comparability of ESI downside scenarios across countries with arrangements in place around the same period.
- Use of older vintages has been rare and, when used, duly justified.
- Limitations remain in some country cases where proxy variables may understate stress:
  - Peru (SR for mid-term review of 2020 FCL): ESI could understate stress due to a disconnect between external risk and its proxy—Peru’s exports of non-mineral goods and services (including tourism) expected to lag global growth following the pandemic shock.
  - Morocco (SRs under the PLL): ESI did not include a proxy for geopolitical risk, potentially leading to more benign stress levels than reality.
- Recommendation-style point (per guidance in the text): Updates to weights and/or proxy variables, together with clear justification, could be encouraged to accommodate country-specific developments as warranted.

### Annex VII — Survey: background and participation
- Survey purpose: seek inputs from country authorities on the IMF’s precautionary lending toolkit (FCL, PLL, SLL, precautionary SBA).
- Survey design: multiple-choice questions; four sections covering FCL, PLL, SLL, and precautionary SBA.
- Target sample: authorities from 91 member countries perceived as potential users of precautionary arrangements (EMDEs not PRGT-eligible, not fragile and conflict-affected, and without a reserve currency).
- Response metrics:
  - Response rate: 29 percent.
  - Number of country responses: 26 countries as of end-January, 2023.
  - Participation highest among regions: Europe 57 percent; Latin America 37 percent.
  - Responding institutions: central banks accounted for 63 percent of submissions.
  - Separate central bank and ministry submissions for one country; averages used in analysis.

### Annex VII — Key stylized facts from the survey
- User composition:
  - 64 percent of respondents were current or past users of precautionary arrangements.
  - Current use breakdown: FCL (four countries), precautionary SBA (two countries), PLL (one country).
  - Past use: mostly precautionary SBA (eight countries) and only one past FCL.
  - Ten respondents indicated never having used IMF precautionary arrangements; only one of those ten expressed interest in potentially requesting a precautionary arrangement in the future.
- Perceived benefits:
  - Strengthened foreign reserves, contained market borrowing costs, and a commitment mechanism to maintaining improved macroeconomic stability and policy frameworks.
- Attractiveness drivers:
  - Upfront access to financing valued across FCL, SLL, and PLL.
  - FCL: absence of ex post conditionality and use by only countries with very strong fundamentals stand out.
  - SLL: revolving nature and extension of an offer by the IMF are attractive features.
  - PLL: perceived as a graduating instrument from the SBA.
  - Precautionary SBA: strong policy signaling considered important.
- Factors inhibiting take-up:
  - FCL top concerns: market reaction if assessed as not qualifying at the mid-term review (for two-year FCLs), preference for self-insurance through reserve accumulation, and an expectation of exit from the arrangement.
  - SLL perceived limitations: low access and absence of concurrent use with the FCL.
  - Precautionary SBA inhibitors: access to alternative financing (e.g., RFAs, BSLs, donor financing), preference for self-insurance via reserve accumulation, limited awareness of the instrument’s benefits.
  - Stigma associated with Fund resources does not stand out as the top concern overall.
- Improving effectiveness (survey consensus):
  - Strengthened IMF outreach to authorities, public opinion, and international markets.
  - For SLL: concurrent use with the FCL and higher access would increase attractiveness; pre-qualifying potential users could help.
  - For PLL: increasing duration under the standard window and the access limit among top reforms to enhance effectiveness.
- BSLs and RFAs comparison:
  - Limited support that BSLs and RFAs are more attractive than the FCL and SLL overall.
  - Evidence that BSLs and RFAs could be perceived as more attractive than the PLL because they carry less stigma and no ex post conditionality.
- FCL exit and regional concentration:
  - Users agree increasing SLL access could make the SLL a more attractive exit instrument from the FCL.
  - Limited appetite among FCL users for introducing a time-based commitment fee or steepening the commitment fee schedule.
  - Uneven regional distribution (concentration in Latin America) attributed mainly to varying access to alternative financing instruments (RFAs, BSLs, donor financing), rather than differences in fundamentals, institutions, and policies according to FCL users.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and survey results summarized in Annexes VI–VII of the chapter.*

### 8. Perception of inferior instrument compared to FCL/SLL/PLL

### 8. Perception of inferior instrument compared to FCL/SLL/PLL

### Survey: Factors Making the Precautionary SBA Attractive
- Survey categories listed (average response): Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree.
- Factors listed:
  - 1. No ex ante conditionality
  - 2. No cap on the level of access
  - 3. Long repayment terms
  - 4. Strong policy signaling
  - 5. Possibility to be disbursing or precautionary
  - 6. Flexible duration

### Survey: Benefits of the Precautionary SBA for Current and Past Users
- Survey categories listed (average response): Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree.
- Benefits listed:
  - 1. Higher foreign reserves
  - 2. Reduced market borrowing costs
  - 3. Commitment mechanism
  - 4. More donor and RFA financing

### Survey: How to Improve the Effectiveness of the Precautionary SBA for Users
- Survey categories listed (average response): Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree.
- Options listed:
  - 1. Making the prec. SBA a revolving credit line
  - 2. Lighter ex post conditionality
  - 3. Better IMF outreach
  - 4. Renaming the prec. SBA

### Annex VIII — Time-Based Commitment Fees: Revisiting Reform Options — Context
- The 2017 Review explored—but did not adopt—time-based commitment fees (TBCFs).
- Under a TBCF with the same parameters as the 2017 proposal, current users of precautionary arrangements would not incur additional fee in the immediate future, as all prolonged users have access levels below the hypothetical threshold considered.
- The annex does not propose to introduce a TBCF.
- Introducing a TBCF at the current juncture of elevated global vulnerabilities would weaken the responsiveness of the Fund’s toolkit to membership’s needs by making exit time- rather than state-dependent.
- The annex also explores reducing the commitment fee for low-access arrangements to encourage entry of additional qualifying members, but does not propose this in view of the negative impact on the Fund’s income.

### A. Context — Key points
- Some Directors called for strengthening exit incentives from prolonged use of precautionary facilities at high access levels to preserve the revolving nature of Fund resources.
- Views in 2017 were divided: options considered included TBCFs, steepening the commitment fee structure, or combinations; others favored maintaining state-dependent exit.
- Large precautionary commitments maintained for extended periods tie up a significant share of the Fund’s limited resources and impose costs on creditor members in the Financial Transactions Plan (FTP).
- Current global context: global liquidity under pressure from monetary policy tightening and fiscal normalization; worsening global outlook could raise potential balance of payments needs, including among members with strong policies.
- The annex focuses on TBCFs targeted to prolonged use of high-access precautionary arrangements and on a potential combination of TBCFs with reduced commitment fees at lower access levels; it proposes not to introduce a TBCF at this time.

### B. Commitment Fees in Fund Arrangements — Current structure and rationale
- Commitment fee rationale: compensate the Fund for processing potential lending arrangements and for committing resources; ensure resources are not tied-up unnecessarily.
- Up-front commitment fee applies to the amount available for purchase under GRA arrangements (SBA, EFF, PLL, or FCL) that may be purchased during each annual period and is refunded proportionally as purchases are made.
- SLL arrangements: non-refundable commitment fee charged on SLL arrangements reflecting expected revolving use.
- Current commitment fee schedule (levied on amounts available for purchase within each 12-month period):
  - 15 basis points a year on amounts up to 115 percent of quota;
  - 30 basis points a year on amounts in excess of 115 percent and up to 575 percent of quota;
  - 60 basis points a year on amounts above 575 percent of quota.
- SLL arrangements are charged a non-refundable commitment fee of 8 basis points instead of the above structure.

### C. Exploring a Time-Based Commitment Fee (TBCF)
- Purpose: discourage large-scale prolonged precautionary lending commitments by applying an additional fee once undrawn credit remains above a specified access threshold for a defined period (including under previous arrangements).
- Arrangements would remain subject to the fee until undrawn credit falls below the threshold (through purchases, reduction of access, or expiration).
- 2017 Review parameters considered as a starting point: increase commitment fee rate by 10–20 basis points for members with precautionary arrangements above 575 percent of quota after a set period.
- A lower threshold not considered here to avoid encouraging premature reductions in access when larger BoP assistance may be appropriate.
- The annex explores triggering a higher commitment fee after 24 months (as opposed to 48 months considered in 2017), noting no country has maintained access above 575 percent under a precautionary arrangement for more than 42 months.
- Current status and examples:
  - Only one FCL arrangement (Chile) with access level above 575 percent of quota, approved recently (August 2022).
  - Two other FCL arrangements previously had access above 575 percent:
    - Mexico’s FCL: total of 42 months between May 2016 and October 2019, maximum access level of 700 percent of quota.
    - Colombia’s arrangement: maximum access level of 600 percent of quota for 24 months between May 2020 and April 2022.
  - PLL arrangements are currently capped at 500 percent of quota, below the 575 percent TBCF threshold considered.
  - All currently active precautionary SBAs have access below 575 percent of quota.
- Illustration of limited impact:
  - A TBCF of 20 basis points above 575 percent of quota would have a small impact on effective commitment fee rates.
  - Example: for Chile with access at 800 percent of quota, triggering a time-based commitment fee would increase the effective (average) rate from 36 to 42 basis points and lead to additional Fund income of SDR 7.8 million per year.
- Potential combination with reduced commitment fee for low-access arrangements:
  - Reducing commitment fees by 10 basis points for precautionary arrangements with access below 575 percent of quota would lower commitment fee revenues by about SDR 60 million per year, or about 34 percent of the average annual commitment fees from precautionary arrangements (Table 5).
  - Such a reduction would have to apply uniformly to all GRA arrangements, potentially producing additional revenue loss compared with the status quo.

### D. Assessment — Staff conclusions
- Staff does not support introducing a TBCF at this time to incentivize exit because:
  - It would weaken responsiveness of precautionary facilities by making exit time- rather than state-dependent.
  - Under parameters not tighter than in the 2017 Review, a TBCF would be expected to have limited impact on FCL exit based on FCL experience to date.
  - It would effectively tighten policies when global vulnerabilities are elevated.
  - Legal requirement of uniformity of charges means application cannot be restricted to arrangements treated as precautionary; ramifications for the wider GRA toolkit must be carefully considered.
  - A targeted TBCF accompanied by reduced commitment fees for low-access precautionary arrangements would significantly and negatively impact Fund income.
  - Any TBCF would increase complexity of the Fund’s fee structure and be operationally burdensome.

### Annex VIII. Box 1 — Further Design Aspects of a Time-based Commitment Fee
- Operational mechanics:
  - TBCF would operate similarly to time-based surcharges and be charged on top of existing level-based commitment fees.
  - It would apply once undrawn credit for each relevant 12-month period under successive arrangements remains above a specified threshold for a defined duration (“duration trigger”).
  - The fee would be charged only for periods when undrawn credit remained above the threshold.
  - Counting toward the duration trigger starts when the threshold is breached, pauses when undrawn credit falls below the threshold or the arrangement expires/cancels, and resets only after a “cooling-off” period is exceeded.
  - Once triggered, the TBCF would be levied ex-post at each anniversary date of the relevant period (or at the end of the arrangement if sooner) for the time during which undrawn balances remain above the threshold.
  - The TBCF, once triggered, would not be refundable against purchases (contrast with current level-based commitment fees).
- Threshold considerations:
  - Threshold should be set sufficiently high to target large precautionary commitments and mitigate unintended consequences; example threshold: 575 percent of quota.
  - A high threshold would primarily apply to protracted use of high access FCL arrangements; a lower threshold risks premature moves to lower access.
- Additional design elements:
  - Duration trigger: balance between supporting revolving resources and recognizing extended stress; options around 3 or 4 years considered; a 4-year trigger could be applied at the beginning of a third FCL arrangement.
  - Cooling-off period: pause and reset mechanics; on balance, a cooling-off period when undrawn credit remains below the threshold continuously for one-year would seem appropriate.
  - Ex-post billing: fee billed and paid ex-post at each anniversary date and upon expiration/cancellation for periods when commitments exceed the threshold; pro-rated TBCF would be levied if purchases brought undrawn credit below the threshold during the period.

*Source: ppea2023039 - 8. Perception of inferior instrument compared to FCL/SLL/PLL*

### Annex IX. Scoring of Precautionary Arrangements in the FCC

### Annex IX. Scoring of Precautionary Arrangements in the FCC

### Context
- The Forward Commitment Capacity (FCC) indicates the Fund’s capacity to make new financial commitments under the General Resources Accounts (GRA) over the upcoming 12 months.
- FCC definition: uncommitted usable resources plus members’ scheduled repurchases, less the repayments due by the Fund to its creditors (to repay resources borrowed under the New Arrangements to Borrow and/or Bilateral Borrowing Agreements), both measured over the upcoming 12 month period, minus a prudential balance. The FCC is updated and published weekly.
- Since the FCC inception in 2002, commitments under arrangements treated as precautionary have been fully scored in the FCC (full scoring): commitments under precautionary arrangements are counted at their full value for measuring liquidity regardless of likelihood of purchase.
- Full scoring is embedded in the Fund’s Borrowing Guidelines and in each individual bilateral borrowing agreement.
- The Board reviewed full scoring in 2017; Directors generally supported continuation of full scoring, though a few Directors saw scope for partial scoring based on expected low probability of drawings to free up quota resources for lending.
- From December 2017 the Fund publishes breakdowns of undrawn balances under GRA commitments by precautionary and non-precautionary basis.

### Key scoring considerations
- Nature of precautionary arrangements:
  - Arrangements provide assurance that committed amounts are available to members subject to terms; a member can revisit precautionary intent and at any time purchase the entire amount available under the arrangement.
  - Timing and likelihood of purchases are inherently uncertain.
- Effect of partial scoring:
  - Partial scoring treats only part of precautionary amounts as “committed usable resources”; the lower the scoring, the higher the FCC.
  - Example: under full scoring, undrawn balances under GRA precautionary commitments stood at SDR 66 billion at end-FY2023. Under 50 percent partial scoring, these commitments would be scored at only SDR 33 billion, implying the FCC would be higher by SDR 33 billion.
- Two pre-conditions identified (from 2017 Review) remain binding constraints for partial scoring feasibility:
  i. Diversification of precautionary exposures:
     - Drawings should be expected to represent only a fraction of total commitments and not be drawn concurrently.
     - Currently, largest precautionary commitments remain concentrated in the Western Hemisphere; correlated drawings cannot be ruled out (despite some recent diversification: FCL for Morocco, PLL for North Macedonia, precautionary SBAs for Armenia and Georgia).
     - Correlated drawings remain a risk in globally impactful events (e.g., pandemic shock in 2020).
  ii. Credible and quick mobilization mechanism for additional resources:
     - Borrowed resources (NAB and BBAs) can supplement quota resources but can be activated only subject to creditor conditions and activation procedures.
     - NAB and BBAs cannot finance purchases under commitments approved outside respective activation periods.
     - U.S. legislative provisions allow U.S. support for a proposed NAB activation only if the FCC is expected to fall below SDR 100 billion during an activation period, effectively setting a threshold for NAB activation given U.S. share.
     - The Fund cannot unilaterally raise the FCC threshold at which borrowed resources can be activated.
- Risk framework implications:
  - Under the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) framework, “moderate” liquidity risk is defined when the FCC is above SDR 125 billion and up to SDR 175 billion; notification to the Board is envisaged when FCC falls to SDR 125 billion.
  - Partial scoring would increase the FCC but change underlying risk tolerance and delay mitigation measures (e.g., activation of borrowed resources requiring creditor consents).
- Risks of partial scoring summarized:
  - Delayed access to borrowed resources: partial scoring increases FCC without increasing actual liquidity, making FCC a misleading indicator and delaying/complicating NAB/BBA activation that depends on FCC outlook.
  - Overcommitting quota resources: delay in activation of borrowed resources could force larger commitments based on quotas than under full scoring; if NAB activated later, GRA could be left without sufficient quota resources to co-finance new commitments, potentially precluding use of borrowed resources and more than halving the Fund’s overall resource envelope in the scenario shown.
  - Diminished credibility in the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN): doubts about ability to meet commitments could erode confidence-enhancing effects of precautionary arrangements and prompt members to rush drawings, undermining rather than instilling confidence.

### Activation of Borrowed Resources (Annex IX, Box 1)
- Borrowed resources contribution to lending capacity (as of end-April 2023):
  - NAB: SDR 278 billion
  - BBAs: SDR 108 billion
  - Total lending capacity: SDR 695 billion (around US$936 billion)
  - Borrowed resources represent around 55 percent of the Fund’s lending capacity.
- Borrowed resources availability constraints:
  - Borrowed resources are available for lending only for commitments made during periods in which these resources were activated in accordance with their procedures (including creditor consents).
  - The Fund has not activated the NAB since 2016; the 2020 BBAs have never been activated.
  - NAB activation conditions:
    - Requires approval from NAB participants representing an 85 percent majority of total credit arrangements eligible to vote, and approval of the Executive Board.
    - Key activation parameters: size of activation; activation period (up to 6 months); resource mix of quota to NAB in financing new lending (usually 1:2, or 1:3).
    - Time needed to activate the NAB may take 6 weeks or more.
  - NAB and BBAs can be used to finance only lending commitments made during activation periods; they cannot finance commitments approved before activation.
  - The NAB can, in principle, be amended to allow financing of commitments approved when NAB was not activated, but such an amendment would require at least 85 percent support from NAB participants.
- Operational threshold for NAB/BBA activation:
  - In practical terms, NAB (and BBAs under similar constraints) can be activated only when the FCC is expected to fall below SDR 100 billion during an activation period.
  - Since 2021 the NAB decision includes a clause limiting the Fund’s ability to seek activation of the 2020 BBAs linked to the outlook for the modified FCC: the Fund may only seek activation of bilateral borrowing during this period where the modified FCC (including all available uncommitted NAB resources) is below SDR 100 billion.
  - Given the required 85 percent NAB participant majority and the U.S. share in excess of 15 percent, the U.S. requirement effectively sets the threshold for any NAB activation proposal.
- Implication: under partial scoring, a higher FCC would likely delay NAB/BBA activation, making FCC a misleading indicator of the Fund’s ability to commit new resources and potentially depleting quota resources prior to activation.

### Illustrative scenarios of partial scoring
- Analytical setup:
  - Starting point: actual end-April 2023 FCC of SDR 146 billion.
  - FCC compared with SDR 100 billion threshold for potential NAB activation.
  - The analysis contrasts full scoring and partial scoring across scenarios:
    - Full scoring:
      1. Based on existing precautionary commitments.
      2. Based on hypothetical new demand (“new commitments”) for new precautionary arrangements.
    - Partial scoring:
      3. Based on existing precautionary commitments.
      4. Based on hypothetical new demand (“new commitments”) for new arrangements.
      5. Based on additional hypothetical new demand (stress scenario, “additional new commitments”) for precautionary arrangements.
- Key conceptual distinction:
  - FCC measures resources available for new financial commitments over the next 12 months.
  - Available quota liquidity differs from FCC: it measures actual quota-based resources immediately available for new financing after fully accounting for existing commitments but excludes future repurchases expected over the next 12 months.
- Numerical and scenario-specific outcomes and implications are presented in the Annex table and discussed in the Annex text (see source content for detailed table and steps). The narrative conclusions emphasize that partial scoring:
  - Immediately increases FCC without increasing actual liquidity.
  - Could delay activation of NAB/BBAs due to FCC-based activation thresholds.
  - Could leave the Fund dependent on quota-only financing for longer periods, risking depletion of quota and constraining eventual access to borrowed resources.
  - Could, in stress scenarios, more than halve the Fund’s overall resource envelope if borrowed resources cannot be co-financed due to exhausted quota resources.

*Source: Annex IX. Scoring of Precautionary Arrangements in the FCC (pp. 108–113) from the provided IMF content unit.*

### Annex IX. Figure 2. Approved Access Under

### Annex IX. Figure 2. Approved Access Under Precautionary Arrangements (in billion SDR)

### Scoring of precautionary commitments
- Current practice: full scoring — both existing and new commitments on a precautionary basis (FCL/PLL/SLL/SBA) are fully reflected (fully counted or scored) in the FCC.
- Partial scoring (illustrative): 50 percent partial scoring, implying commitments on a precautionary basis would be counted in the FCC at half their amounts.

### Demand scenarios for precautionary facilities
- “Existing commitments” scenario: current demand remains unchanged.
  - Existing precautionary commitments as of end-April: SDR 66 billion.
- “New commitments” scenario (hypothetical): demand for 4 new precautionary arrangements (for simplicity, under the FCL) — of SDR 20 billion each — for a total of SDR 80 billion.
- “Additional new commitments” (stress scenario): 3 additional new precautionary arrangements of SDR 20 billion each, bringing total new demand to SDR 140 billion.

### Financing mix and quota preservation
- Assumption: new precautionary arrangements are co-financed by quota and borrowing in the ratio of 1:3.
- Implication: the Fund would need to preserve about SDR 129 billion of its quota resources for co-financing of NAB and BBAs to be able to deploy its full lending capacity.
  - For the NAB alone, to access the maximum amount available (SDR 278 billion) if activated, the Fund would need to preserve about SDR 92 billion (i.e., one-third of NAB total) of its quota resources for co-financing.
  - Additional quota resources would need to be preserved to co-finance BBAs to access the maximum amount of SDR 108 billion available under BBAs; this would require preserving additional quota resources in the amount of SDR 36 billion.

### Scenario implications — Full scoring scenarios
- Existing precautionary commitments (column 1):
  - Full amount of existing precautionary commitments (SDR 66 billion as of end-April) is reflected, resulting in the FCC of SDR 146 billion (row G).
  - To meet creditor conditions to activate the NAB, the FCC would need to be projected to fall below the threshold of SDR 100 billion, requiring new commitments of at least SDR 46 billion.
  - Available quota liquidity (row I) amounts to SDR 124 billion, immediately available to finance further new commitments of about SDR 124 billion—whether on a drawing or precautionary basis.
- New precautionary commitments (column 2):
  - Approval of 4 new precautionary arrangements of SDR 80 billion in total would reduce the FCC excluding borrowing from SDR 146 to SDR 66 billion, reflecting full scoring.
  - NAB activation would be possible under this scenario as the FCC would otherwise fall below the SDR 100 billion threshold.
  - NAB resources could then be used to co-finance those new arrangements approved after activation (at 1:3 ratio), for which the Fund would have sufficient quota resources remaining.
  - Calculations in column 2 do not assume the size of potential NAB activation; in reality both FCC and available liquidity would be higher than values in column 2.

### Scenario implications — Partial scoring (50 percent) scenarios
- Existing precautionary commitments (column 3):
  - With 50 percent scoring, existing precautionary commitments of SDR 66 billion are scored at SDR 33 billion.
  - This implies a higher FCC of SDR 179 billion (row G).
  - The Fund’s actual available liquidity to immediately finance new commitments remains SDR 124 billion (row I), unchanged from full scoring.
  - Conclusion: partial scoring raises FCC but does not change true amount of resources available for lending.
- New precautionary commitments (column 4):
  - The 4 new precautionary commitments (SDR 80 billion total) would be scored at SDR 40 billion.
  - FCC would fall to SDR 139 billion instead of SDR 66 billion under full scoring (column 2), implying NAB could not be activated.
  - The Fund’s actual available liquidity would be SDR 44 billion — dangerously low.
  - Consequences:
    - Any requests to draw down the new precautionary arrangements would need to be fully financed from quota resources.
    - Partial scoring delays NAB activation and uses more quota resources.
    - Low remaining quota resources constrain the Fund’s ability to co-finance a subsequent activation of NAB and/or BBA resources.
    - Partial scoring creates a risk the Fund would have effective access to only a fraction of the borrowed resources — effectively reducing the Fund’s total lending capacity (from the current US$936 billion) and potentially undermining the Fund’s role in the GFSN.
- Additional new commitments (stress scenario) (column 5):
  - Approval of 3 additional commitments bringing the total to SDR 140 billion; 50 percent partial scoring would account these at SDR 70 billion.
  - This would bring the FCC down by a further SDR 30 billion from SDR 139 billion (column 4), to SDR 109 billion.
  - FCC would remain above the threshold for a possible NAB activation (SDR 100 billion), but actual available liquidity would have turned negative (row I).
  - In this scenario:
    - The Fund would have over-committed its quota resources available to meet potential drawings under its existing precautionary commitments, but would remain unable to access NAB resources to finance new lending commitments.
    - In the event of a common shock where FCL users simultaneously draw on their commitments, the Fund may not be able to honor its assurances to all members with FCL arrangements amid a crisis, which could be destabilizing and damage the Fund’s reputation and role in the GFSN.

### Key numeric figures cited in the analysis
- Existing precautionary commitments (end-April): SDR 66 billion.
- FCC under current practice (existing commitments): SDR 146 billion (row G).
- Available quota liquidity (row I): SDR 124 billion.
- Hypothetical new precautionary commitments: 4 arrangements × SDR 20 billion = SDR 80 billion.
- Stress scenario total new demand: SDR 140 billion.
- Quota preservation needed to deploy full lending capacity: about SDR 129 billion.
- NAB maximum amount available if activated: SDR 278 billion.
  - Quota preservation for NAB: SDR 92 billion (one-third of NAB total).
- BBAs maximum amount available: SDR 108 billion.
  - Additional quota preservation for BBAs: SDR 36 billion.
- Illustrative reduction in Fund lending capacity referenced: from the current US$936 billion (as stated).

### Assessment and conclusion
- Full scoring of precautionary arrangements under the FCC remains appropriate given:
  - (i) the importance of avoiding doubts over the Fund’s ability to meet financial commitments under precautionary arrangements and ensure their effectiveness as part of the GFSN;
  - (ii) the potential for drawings to be highly correlated in response to external shocks affecting several members simultaneously;
  - (iii) partial scoring could undermine the Fund’s activation of borrowed resources under existing frameworks;
  - (iv) partial scoring could lead to situations where the Fund would overcommit all of its resources, undermining the Fund’s role in the GFSN;
  - (v) continued absence under the current framework of an alternative source of liquidity that could be tapped in the event of correlated drawings.
- Summative point: under partial scoring, NAB activation could be delayed and the Fund could potentially commit all its available quota resources even with the FCC remaining above the NAB activation threshold — effectively restricting access to borrowed resources. In a stress scenario, the Fund’s liquidity may not be sufficient to honor requests for purchases under already committed financing.

*Source: Annex IX. Figure 2. Approved Access Under Precautionary Arrangements (in billion SDR), ppea2023039 — Annex IX (data and text as provided).*

### 6.     The following procedures and arrangements for consultations with the Executive Board will

### ppea2023039 - 6. The following procedures and arrangements for consultations with the Executive Board will apply following a member’s expression of interest in any PLL arrangement

### Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) — consultation and access procedures
- Staff will conduct a confidential preliminary assessment of the qualification criteria set forth in paragraph 2 of this Decision.
- Management will consult with the Executive Board promptly in an informal meeting once it decides access under this Decision may be appropriate, except for successor PLL arrangements with a duration of one to two years for a member not having an actual balance of payments need at the time of the request where all of the following conditions are met:
  - (1) the documentation on the request has been issued to the Executive Board for its consideration within three months of the expiration of the term of a prior PLL arrangement under paragraph 5(a)(i);
  - (2) no purchases were made under such prior PLL arrangement;
  - (3) all reviews pursuant to paragraph 3(b) under such prior PLL arrangement were completed;
  - (4) management has decided that the member’s economic circumstances (including economic fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks) and external risks have not changed significantly since the last completed review under such prior PLL arrangement; and
  - (5) the amount of requested access under the successor PLL arrangement is not greater than the approved access under such prior PLL arrangement.
- For the informal consultation, Executive Directors will receive a concise note including:
  - a preliminary assessment of the member’s qualification for the PLL;
  - an initial discussion of key policy areas where policy actions might be sought;
  - an assessment of the member’s actual or potential need for Fund resources and repayment capacity.
- A member may make one or more purchases up to the amount available under a PLL arrangement; the Fund shall not challenge a representation of need by a member for a purchase requested under a PLL arrangement.
- Phasing and performance clauses:
  - Omitted in any PLL arrangement in the first credit tranche.
  - Included in other PLL arrangements where specified, but apply only to purchases outside the first credit tranche.
- Documentation required when requesting a PLL arrangement:
  - A concise written communication outlining policy goals and strategies for at least the duration of the arrangement, measures to address remaining vulnerabilities, and a quantified macroeconomic framework.
  - For PLL arrangements of one to two years: the macroeconomic framework shall be underpinned by a streamlined set of indicative targets, and where warranted, structural benchmarks and performance criteria.
  - For six-month PLL arrangements: the member shall commit to undergo a safeguards assessment, provide staff access to the central bank’s most recently completed external audit reports, and authorize external auditors to hold discussions with Fund staff. Timing/modalities determined case-by-case; normally safeguards assessment would need to be completed before Executive Board approval for any subsequent arrangement to which the Fund’s safeguards assessments policy applies.
- Fund waiver of Article V, Section 3(b)(iii) limitation:
  - The Fund will be prepared to grant a waiver of the limitation of 200 percent of quota whenever necessary to permit purchases under this Decision or to permit other purchases that would raise the Fund’s holdings of the purchasing member’s currency above that limitation because of purchases outstanding under this Decision.
- Transitional and nomenclature provisions:
  - All arrangements under Decision No. 14715-(10/83) in force on the effective date shall be renamed Arrangements under the Precautionary and Liquidity Line and subject to this Decision.
  - The term “PCL” in Decision No. 14064-(08/18) is revised to read “PLL”; and terms “Precautionary Credit Line” and “PCL” in Decision No. 14745-(10/96) are revised to read “Precautionary and Liquidity Line” and “PLL.”
  - Decision No. 7925-(85/38) shall not apply to PLL arrangements.
  - Decision No. 14715-(10/83) is repealed.

### Flexible Credit Line (FCL) — qualification, access, and consultation procedures
- FCL arrangements may be made available in the credit tranches subject to Decision terms.
- Qualification criteria (paragraph 2) include (verbatim terms preserved): (i) a sustainable external position; (ii) a capital account position dominated by private flows; (iii) a track record of steady sovereign access to international capital markets at favorable terms; (iv) a reserve position that is relatively comfortable when the FCL is requested on a precautionary basis; (v) sound public finances, including a sustainable public debt position; (vi) low and stable inflation, in the context of a sound monetary and exchange rate policy framework; (vii) sound financial system and the absence of solvency problems that may threaten systemic stability, or, for arrangements approved before May 21, 2014, the absence of bank solvency problems that pose an immediate threat of a systemic banking crisis; (viii) effective financial sector supervision; and (ix) data transparency and integrity.
- FCL arrangements shall not be subject to performance criteria or other forms of ex-post program monitoring, except for the review requirement in paragraph 5.
- No phasing: the entire amount of approved access is available upon approval; a member may make one or more purchases up to approved access at any time during the period of the arrangement; the Fund shall not challenge a representation of need for a purchase.
- Duration and mid-term review:
  - (a) FCL may be one year or two years. For two-year FCLs, no purchase shall be made after one year has elapsed until an Executive Board review of the member’s policies has been completed; such review will assess continued adherence to qualification criteria and be scheduled to complete immediately prior to the lapse of the one year period.
  - (b) Expiration occurs upon the earlier of: (i) expiration of the approved term; (ii) purchase of the entire amount of approved access; or (iii) cancellation by the member. Upon expiration, the Fund may approve additional FCL arrangements per Decision terms.
  - (c) Augmentations: requests to make additional amounts available under an FCL shall be considered by the Executive Board either in the context of the scheduled review in paragraph 5(a) or on another date within the period; approval subject to confirmation of adherence to qualification criteria. An Executive Board decision not to approve an augmentation does not affect the member’s right to make purchases up to the approved access or the mid-term review date.
- Consultation procedures following expression of interest in an FCL:
  - (i) Staff will conduct a confidential preliminary assessment of qualification criteria.
  - (ii) Where support from other creditors is likely important, staff will consult with key creditors as appropriate.
  - (iii) Management will consult promptly with the Executive Board in an informal meeting, except for successor FCL arrangements for a member not having an actual balance of payments need where five specific conditions (mirroring PLL conditions) are met.
    - For this informal consultation, Executive Directors receive a concise staff note including:
      - (I) a rigorous assessment of the member’s actual or potential need for Fund resources and repayment capacity;
      - (II) an assessment of the impact on Fund liquidity where contemplated access would exceed 575 percent of quota or SDR 10 billion, whichever is lower.
  - (iv) When the Managing Director is prepared to recommend approval, documents to be circulated include:
    - (I) a written communication from the member requesting an FCL and outlining policy goals and commitment to take corrective measures where relevant;
    - (II) a staff report assessing qualification; an assessment of the impact on the Fund’s finances and liquidity will be included.
  - (v) Minimum circulation periods for staff reports apply; Executive Board will generally be prepared to consider a request within 48 to 72 hours after circulation in exceptional circumstances (e.g., urgent actual balance of payments need).
- Safeguards and audit access:
  - Members requesting an FCL are not subject to the Fund’s safeguards assessments policy, except where purchases will be used for budget financing an appropriate framework between central bank and state treasury must be in place (in line with BUFF/10/115).
  - At time of formal written request, the member will authorize Fund staff access to the most recently completed annual independent audit of its central bank’s financial statements (published or not), and authorize central bank authorities and external auditors to discuss audit findings with staff, including written observations regarding weaknesses in internal controls; the member is expected to act cooperatively.
  - For as long as Fund credit is outstanding under this Decision, the member will provide staff copies of annual audited financial statements and management letters and an authorization to discuss audit findings with the external auditor.
- The Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM) procedures (BUFF/95/102, 9/21/1995) do not apply to FCL requests.
- Fund waiver: prepared to grant a waiver of the limitation of 200 percent of quota in Article V, Section 3(b)(iii) whenever necessary to permit purchases under this Decision or to permit other purchases that would raise Fund holdings above that limitation because of purchases outstanding under this Decision.
- Amendment and deletion provisions:
  - Paragraph 1 of Decision No. 12865-(02/102) shall be deleted; Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 shall be renumbered as Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
  - Paragraph 10 [Deleted].

### Short-Term Liquidity Line (SLL) — scope, qualification, access, and consultations
- Purpose: SLL provides financial assistance to a member facing short-term balance of payments difficulties that: (i) are only of a potential nature, reflected in pressure on the capital account and the member’s reserves; (ii) result from volatility in international capital markets; and (iii) are reasonably expected to be limited in scale and to require, at most, fine-tuning of monetary and exchange rate policies.
- Approval mechanics:
  - Subject to paragraph 6(iv), an SLL shall be approved upon a member’s informal expression of potential interest or upon a member’s request, subject to paragraph 6(a)(iv)(B) or where the Fund assesses the member meets criteria mirroring FCL/PLL (very strong fundamentals, sustained track record of very strong policies, commitment to maintain such policies).
  - Qualification criteria include: (i) a sustainable external position; (ii) a capital account position dominated by private flows; (iii) a track record of steady sovereign access to international capital markets at favorable terms; (iv) a reserve position that is relatively comfortable; (v) sound public finances, including a sustainable public debt position; (vi) low and stable inflation in the context of a sound monetary and exchange rate policy framework; (vii) a sound financial system and absence of solvency problems that may threaten systemic stability; (viii) effective financial sector supervision; and (ix) data transparency and integrity.
- Monitoring and phasing:
  - SLL arrangements shall not be subject to performance criteria or other forms of ex-post program monitoring, including reviews.
  - SLL arrangements may be approved in an amount of up to 145 200 percent of the member’s quota, with this limit being cumulative for total credit outstanding under the SLL. There shall be no phasing.
- Purchases and repurchases:
  - A member may make one or more purchases up to the amount of approved access at any time during the arrangement, subject to Decision provisions.
  - Outstanding amounts purchased under the current or any previous SLL arrangement shall commensurately reduce the amount that can be purchased during the course of an SLL arrangement.
  - Repurchases increase subsequent purchasable amounts by an equal amount, provided a member may not purchase more than the approved access amount of its current SLL arrangement.
  - The Fund shall not challenge a representation of need by a member for a purchase requested under an SLL arrangement.
- Duration:
  - (a) An SLL arrangement shall be approved for a period of 12 months.
  - (b) An SLL arrangement shall expire upon the earlier of: (i) expiration of the approved period; or (ii) cancellation by the member. Upon expiration, the Fund may approve an additional SLL arrangement per Decision terms.
- Consultations following informal expression of interest:
  - (i) Staff will conduct a confidential preliminary assessment of qualification criteria in paragraph 2.
  - (ii) When the Managing Director is prepared to recommend providing the opportunity to avail an SLL or to recommend approval for a member that requested such approval in a written communication, relevant documents including a staff report assessing qualification and, where applicable, the text of the written communication, will be circulated to the Board.
  - (iii) Minimum circulation periods for staff reports apply; the Executive Board will generally be prepared to consider a request within 48 to 72 hours after circulation in exceptional circumstances.
  - (iv) For cases not involving a member’s written communication requesting an SLL:
    - (A) If the Executive Board assesses the member qualifies and approves an SLL, such approval communicated within one business day will be conditional on receipt of a satisfactory written communication from the member confirming it wishes to avail itself of the SLL. This written communication must be submitted no later than two weeks after conditional approval, outline maintenance of very strong policies and commitment to corrective measures where relevant, and consent to publication of the associated staff report.
    - (B) The SLL becomes effective on the date the Fund confirms receipt of the satisfactory written communication; a copy will be circulated to the Executive Board for information.
  - (v) Where a member requests approval in a written communication, the text shall include the outline, commitment and consents specified in paragraph 6(a)(iv)(A).
- Safeguards and audit access:
  - Members submitting satisfactory written communication to avail or request an SLL are not subject to the Fund’s safeguards assessments policy.
  - At the time of written communication, the member will authorize Fund staff access to the most recently completed annual independent audit of its central bank’s financial statements (published or not), and authorize central bank authorities and external auditors to discuss audit findings with staff, including written observations regarding weaknesses in internal controls; the member is expected to act cooperatively.
  - For as long as Fund credit is outstanding under this Decision, the member will provide staff with copies of annual audited financial statements and management letters and an authorization to discuss audit findings with the external auditor.

*Source: ppea2023039 - 6. The following procedures and arrangements for consultations with the Executive Board will apply following a member’s expression of interest in any PLL arrangement (PDF).*

### 7.     Purchases under this Decision and holdings resulting from such purchases shall be excluded

### 7.     Purchases under this Decision and holdings resulting from such purchases shall be excluded

### Exclusion from reserve tranche purchase definition
- Purchases under this Decision and holdings resulting from such purchases shall be excluded for the purposes of the definition of reserve tranche purchase pursuant to Article XXX(c).

### Repurchase obligation for SLL arrangements
- A member shall be obliged to repurchase any amounts purchased under an SLL arrangement no later than 12 months after the date of the purchase of such amounts.

### Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM)
- The Emergency Financing Mechanism (EFM) procedures set forth in BUFF/95/102, 9/21/1995 shall not apply to requests for SLL arrangements.

### Waiver of 200 percent of quota limitation
- The Fund will be prepared to grant a waiver of the limitation of 200 percent of quota in Article V, Section 3(b)(iii), whenever necessary to permit purchases under this Decision or to permit other purchases that would raise the Fund’s holdings of the purchasing member’s currency above that limitation because of purchases outstanding under this Decision.

### Review schedule and termination
- The Fund will review this Decision within two years from the date of adoption of this Decision as part of a review of the Flexible Credit Line and Precautionary and Liquidity Line.
- The SLL shall terminate seven years after the date of adoption of this Decision, provided that by end-2025 the Executive Board would be expected to decide whether to extend the SLL beyond the seven-year period.

### Consent and publication requirements for SLL arrangements
- The Executive Board’s decision to approve a Short-Term Liquidity Line (SLL) arrangement under paragraph 6(a)(iv) of the decision on Short-Term Liquidity Line Arrangements, Decision No. 16747-(20/43), adopted April 15, 2020, as amended (“SLL Decision”), for a member shall be conditioned on receipt of the member’s consent to publication at the time the member sends a written communication to the Fund confirming that the member wishes to avail itself of the SLL arrangement.
- The associated staff report and the authorities’ written communication would be expected to be published by the Fund no later than fourteen calendar days after the member’s SLL arrangement becomes effective.

### Press Releases and Chairman’s statements
- After the Executive Board (i) adopts a decision regarding a member’s use of Fund resources (including a decision completing a review under a Fund arrangement), or (ii) adopts a decision approving a PSI or a PCI, or conducts a review under a PSI or a PCI, or (iii) completes a discussion on a member’s participation in the HIPC Initiative, or (iv) completes a discussion on a member’s I-PRSP, PRSP, PRSP preparation status report, APR, EDD, or PRGS in the context of the use of Fund resources or a PSI, a Press Release, which will contain a Chairman’s statement on the discussion, emphasizing the key points made by Executive Directors, will be issued to the public.
- A Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement on the discussion, emphasizing the key points made by Executive Directors, will also be issued to the public after an SLL arrangement under Paragraph 6(a)(iv) of the SLL Decision becomes effective.
- The Executive Director elected, appointed, or designated by the member concerned will have the opportunity to review the Chairman’s statement, to propose minor revisions, if any, and to consent to its publication immediately after the Executive Board meeting, or, in the case of the SLL arrangement approved under Paragraph 6(a)(iv) of the SLL Decision, immediately after the SLL arrangement becomes effective.
- No Press Release published under this paragraph shall contain any reference to a discussion or decision pertaining to a member’s overdue financial obligations to the Fund, where a Press Release following an Executive Board decision to limit the member’s use of Fund resources because of the overdue financial obligations has not yet been issued.
- In the case of an Executive Board meeting pertaining solely to a discussion or decision with respect to a member’s overdue financial obligations, no Chairman’s statement will be published.

### Non-publication and factual statements in lieu
- With respect to the consent provisions set forth in paragraph 4(c), if, after twenty-eight calendar days from the effective date of an SLL arrangement approved under Paragraph 6(a)(iv) of the SLL Decision, the staff report has not been published, a brief factual statement will be issued stating the fact of the effectiveness of an SLL arrangement for a member and clarifying the authorities’ publication intention with respect to the staff report.

*Source: ppea2023039 - 7. Purchases under this Decision and holdings resulting from such purchases shall be excluded*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/2023/english/ppea2023039.pdf_
