## SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS AND PROGRAM DESIGN IN PRGT AND PSI-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS AND PROGRAM DESIGN IN PRGT AND PSI-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/pp042117social-safeguard.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/pp/pp042117social-safeguard.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/pp/pp042117social-safeguard.pdf.json) --- ### Executive summary — context and objectives - The Fund provides considerable support to low-income countries (LICs), including concessional financing from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), which currently carries an interest rate of zero percent. - Since 2010, over half of Fund-supported arrangements have involved a PRGT facility. - PRGT-eligible members may make use of the Policy Support Instrument (PSI). Since the establishment of the current concessional financing architecture in 2010, 43 Fund members have benefited from 90 PRGT- and PSI-supported programs. The latter represented over 60 percent of Fund-supported programs during this period. - Poverty reduction is a core objective of PRGT and PSI-supported programs; the 2009 PRGT reform called for program design in all PRGT facilities to support policies that safeguard social and other priority spending—and, whenever appropriate, to increase it—using social and other priority spending indicative targets where possible. - “Social safeguards” in this paper comprise: - (i) minimum floors for social and other priority spending, typically established using indicative targets (IT); and - (ii) specific reform measures designed to protect vulnerable groups (which can be set as prior actions or structural benchmarks under Fund-supported programs). - Social spending is generally defined to include spending on health, education and social safety nets. Vulnerable groups are defined in a country context and could include the poor, elderly, the youth and women. ### Fiscal policy design in LIC programs — features and contrasts with GRA-supported programs - Program orientation and magnitude: - LIC programs are driven largely by balance-of-payments needs linked to enhancing growth and reducing poverty rather than crisis prevention/mitigation. - The average fiscal adjustment in LIC programs over five years, measured in percent of GDP, is twice as large in GRA-supported programs as in LIC programs. - The average GRA-supported program envisages a reduction in real per capita spending for the first three years after program approval, whereas the average LIC program aims at a 15 percent increase over five years. - Program mix (review of 68 staff reports issued since 2010): - 50 percent of LIC programs involved fiscal consolidation. - 43 percent involved fiscal expansion. - 7 percent were fiscally neutral. - At program approval: - The median program aimed for fiscal consolidation (reduction in the deficit) of 1.9 percent of GDP phased over five years. - A quarter of programs encompassed a widening of the deficit. - Mechanisms to achieve consolidation: - Across programs, fiscal consolidation was to be achieved mainly through revenue mobilization efforts. - Public spending on health and education: - Government spending on health and education has generally increased steadily since the mid-1990s across all countries. - World Bank data indicate the increase in health and education spending was the highest in LICs; health and education spending in LICs as a share of GDP has caught up with emerging economies. - Short-run behavior: health spending is less pro-cyclical in LICs than in more advanced economies; in LICs average real expenditure growth is more than 8 percentage points higher in times of high revenue growth than in times of low revenue growth. - Regression evidence: updated staff analysis (1988–2014) confirms programs increase education spending; the positive effect on health spending is substantially smaller and no longer statistically significant. Overall, no evidence that fiscal adjustment in LIC programs comes at the expense of health and education spending. ### Social and other priority spending indicative targets (ITs) — coverage, performance, and shortcomings - Coverage: - Since the 2009 policy, review focuses on programs approved since 2010. - 90 percent of LIC programs reviewed included an IT covering social and other priority spending. - Of the 68 program request documents reviewed, only eight did not include such an IT. - Of these eight, five explained the exclusion as the need to first develop a better tracking system to monitor social spending; three did not offer any explanation. - Performance: - The targets were met in more than two-thirds of the reviews. - Average met is 68% across reviews; isolating programs with fiscal consolidation, average met is 71%. - When missed, the targets were missed by an average margin of 20 percent. - 10 countries account for about 65 percent of missed targets. - One-in-five LIC program documents did not provide any explanation of why targets were missed. - A majority of program reviews in such cases did not discuss corrective measures to ensure future program targets would be met. - Target definition and monitoring shortcomings: - Social and other priority spending is often not effectively targeted on vulnerable groups; coverage varies significantly and often extends beyond vulnerable groups. - Spending floors are frequently defined to cover total spending on health and education. - In some cases, “other priority spending” includes infrastructure projects without specifying their contribution to poverty reduction. - TMUs often lack details on coverage, monitoring, and reporting arrangements. - Program design features used to protect social spending: - Some programs excluded social and other priority spending from the fiscal deficit target or included an adjustor for social and other priority spending (examples cited include Malawi (2010) and Grenada (2014)). ### Reforms and conditionality to protect vulnerable groups — usage and effectiveness - Rationale: - Specific reform measures can protect vulnerable groups where economic reforms have adverse distributional impacts and social safety nets are underdeveloped. - World Bank (State of Social Safety Nets, 2015) findings: - Social safety nets cover only a quarter of the extreme poor in low-income and lower-middle-income countries, compared to 64 percent in upper-middle-income countries. - Coverage gap is particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia: only one-tenth and one-fifth of the poorest 20 percent are reached by social safety nets, respectively. - World Bank recommendations include: (i) invest in integrated systems; (ii) adopt a social and beneficiary registry; (iii) improve spending efficiency by strengthening institutional capacity, coordination, and program administration and evaluation. - Use of conditionality in LIC programs: - Only a minority of LIC programs with fiscal consolidation or energy subsidy reform included specific conditionality measures to protect vulnerable groups. - Only about 15 percent of LIC programs with fiscal consolidation included such conditionality, mostly as benchmarks on measures to strengthen social safety nets. - Of 68 program requests, 34 involved fiscal consolidation; o/w included conditionality on strengthening social safeguards: 5. - o/w did not include conditionality on strengthening social safeguards but included a substantive assessment of social safeguards issues: 15. - While a quarter of programs included conditionality on energy subsidy reforms, only 17 percent of these included an explicit program condition to mitigate its impact on the poor. - Most supporting conditionalities focused on improving targeting, tracking, and monitoring of the social safety net. - Measures to improve safety nets by increasing transfers, expanding coverage, or introducing new programs were rare (examples cited: Yemen (2014) structural benchmark; Madagascar (2015) structural benchmark). - Reasons for rarity: underdeveloped social safety net systems, limited financial resources, and implementation constraints in many PRGT-eligible members. - Comparison: GRA-supported programs more often included conditionality to introduce new social assistance schemes increasing transfers to groups affected by adjustment measures (examples: Jordan (2012), Tunisia (2013), Ukraine (2014)). ### Mission chief survey — views on obstacles and improvements - Survey response context: - Mission chief survey referenced 15 responses in the body and 42 (current and former) mission chiefs in Annex VI; selected reporting in the main text reflects 15 responses. - Key constraints identified (Figure 10 — reflects 28 respondents): - 86% — Lack of social policy instruments - 75% — Lack of administrative capacity of the authorities - 61% — Lack of social indicators data - 57% — Inadequate resources to finance new programs - 32% — Lack of expertise in Fund staff in social policies - 21% — Other - 18% — Lack of commitment from authorities - 11% — Inadequate collaboration between Fund and World Bank - Additional mission chief observations: - Where countries have safety nets (often the case with GRA-supported programs), these can be used at short notice to deliver support; when missing, it generally takes considerable time to design and implement new tools. - Early collaboration with country authorities and other development partners (DPs) during surveillance can allow sufficient time to identify affordable and effective social safety net tools. - Most mission chiefs view weak capacity in the country as a key implementation constraint. - Respondents indicated lack of social indicators data hampers impact assessments. - Technical assistance (TA) from the Fund or other DPs can improve administrative and implementation capacity and assist in improving data availability. - More than half of mission chiefs noted limited financial resources to fund new social safety net programs. - One in three respondents cited a lack of Fund staff expertise on social safety nets as a constraint. - Selected suggested improvements (percent of respondents; mission chief survey 15 responses): - More targeted specification of spending floors: 67% - Seeking expertise from the World Bank and others: 53% - More input from authorities on design of the targets: 47% - Improving the quality of fiscal data: 47% - Including adjustors to the program target to account for shocks: 40% - Adopting contingency plans to preserve spending from fiscal shocks: 40% - Revisiting and revising these targets more frequently: 20% - Making the target a binding conditionality: 20% - Other: 20% ### Coverage of social safeguards in program documents - Program documents do not consistently discuss how fiscal adjustment or other economic reforms may adversely impact poor and vulnerable groups, nor the scope for mitigating measures. - Only half of LIC program request documents discuss social safety net issues, compared to nearly 90 percent for GRA-supported programs. - One-quarter of LIC program requests discuss ongoing or planned DP support on social protection issues, compared to about half in GRA-supported programs. - For LIC programs with fiscal consolidation, coverage of social safety net issues in program request documents increases to 60 percent. - Mitigating measures discussed in LIC programs with fiscal consolidation included: - Protecting key social spending from cuts. - Fixing total social spending at certain percent of GDP. - Expanding social protection programs and increasing transfers. - Revamping social safety net programs. - Sequencing of reforms, and gradual removal of subsidies. - Improving data/reporting systems for social safeguard services. - Instituting law/legal framework on social protection services. - Program documents infrequently mentioned direct collaboration with other DPs; where discussed, details on how identified weaknesses would be addressed and how collaboration would be operationalized were often limited. ### Recommendations — summary of policy guidance and good practices A. Social and Other Priority Spending Indicative Targets (IT) - Core principle: design ITs with flexibility for country-specific circumstances and clarity on how the IT achieves social safeguard goals to avoid box-ticking. - Recommended good practices: - Focus on safeguarding resources for vulnerable groups: - Narrowly define spending floors to cover needs of the most vulnerable when reforms have adverse distributional consequences. - Current policy allows country teams to focus program targets on social spending or on social and other priority spending combined, depending on country needs. - Select social spending with the biggest impact: - Improve targeting and quality of spending; prioritize critical sectors and deliver targeted assistance through social safety net programs. - Targeted cash or near-cash transfers are usually preferred to compensate for adverse impact of energy subsidy removal. - Create fiscal space through domestic revenue mobilization or increasing spending efficiency (e.g., eliminating inefficient spending such as on energy subsidies). - Complementary program conditions could strengthen social safety nets; social safeguard spending can have other economic benefits, including through relatively high fiscal multipliers. - World Bank (2015) found income multipliers ranging from $1.08 to $2.52 for each dollar transferred via cash transfer programs. - Leverage expertise from development partners: - Consult early with donors and DPs (World Bank, United Nations agencies, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank). - Provide mission chiefs more regular training to address Fund staff expertise concerns. - Avoid reliance on uncertain foreign financing: - Design spending floors so governments have adequate control over resources to meet goals even if foreign financing shocks occur. - Periodically revisit definitions: - Regular revision ensures consistency with the economic environment and appropriateness for social safeguard objectives. - If targets are habitually missed, revisit definitions; if well-designed, focus on corrective measures such as strengthening public financial management. B. Reform Measures to Protect Vulnerable Groups - Given limitations of the IT, complementary social safety net measures should play a stronger role in policy advice: - Give explicit consideration to such options during program design. - Focus during surveillance on developing social safety nets, including with DPs. - At program design stage, options include: - Introducing conditionality or clearly explaining concrete mitigating measures with specific timelines, especially where subsidy elimination or tax hikes will directly impact the poor. - Ideally, savings from subsidy elimination should be used at least in part to introduce targeted social assistance schemes or increase transfers via established programs. - Appropriate phasing and sequencing when time is needed to put in place social safety net measures. - Where social assistance schemes are at an early stage, determine TA and capacity-building needs and ensure gaps are met by the Fund or other DPs. - Program documents should explain how capacity constraints are being tackled, even if requiring a medium-term approach. - If programs get off-track or face unforeseen shocks, program documents should explain how social safeguards needs and goals have been reevaluated and accounted for in program design. - Use of distributional impact analysis: - Ex-ante technical analysis of likely social and distributional impacts of policies (e.g., tax or fuel subsidy reforms) can inform safeguard design. - Such analyses are time- and resource-intensive and should ideally be conducted during surveillance discussions to inform program design. ### Implementation feasibility, next steps, and issues for discussion - The report’s recommendations do not require changes to Fund policies; they draw mainly on existing good practices. - Underlying principle: ensure due consideration is given to social safeguards in program design and surveillance, and document that the program is adequately protecting the poor and vulnerable from the burden of economic adjustment. - Country teams should tailor programs and surveillance to country-specific circumstances; existing policies and procedures have sufficient flexibility. - Next steps: a stocktaking will be followed by a guidance note for staff clarifying expectations on social safeguards in Article IV consultations and program discussions; the guidance note would help strengthen institutional collaboration with the World Bank and other DPs and will be issued to the Executive Board for information. - Issues for Directors: - Whether to strengthen the design of the IT on social and other priority spending, including improving targeting on poverty reduction, collaborating more closely with country authorities and DPs in its design, and revisiting its definition periodically. - Whether to improve incorporation of social safeguards in program design, including relying more often on specific reform measures to strengthen social safety nets. - Whether to improve coverage of social safeguards in program documents, including discussion on measures to protect the poor, challenges, concrete measures to tackle constraints, and improving monitoring and reporting. - Whether to strengthen Fund engagement through more structured and frequent coordination with country authorities and DPs during Article IV cycles and Fund-supported programs. ### Annex highlights — examples and inputs to the review - Annex IV — LIC surveillance examples: - Ethiopia (2015 Article IV): dynamic general equilibrium model used to analyze macroeconomic and distributional impacts; recommendations included enhancing tax collection, updating tax thresholds, continuing pro-poor focus, and promoting financial inclusion. - Republic of Congo (2015 Selected Issues): benefit incidence analysis showed pre-2008 fuel subsidies mostly benefited the wealthy; recommended well-designed energy subsidy reform and targeted compensatory measures (conditional cash transfers, public transport subsidies). - Malawi (2015 Selected Issues): analysis of Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) suggested reform and complementary expansion of cash transfer programs. - Senegal (2014 Article IV): review of about a dozen SSN programs found insufficient coverage, targeting weaknesses, coordination gaps, and heavy reliance on DP financing; recommended moving toward a unified national SSN system and strengthening M&E. - Annex V — GRA program examples: - Jamaica (2013): program includes a floor on social spending; planned reforms to improve targeting under PATH and welfare-to-work strategies. - Jordan (2012): eliminated ill-targeted energy subsidies with conditionality to introduce targeted support to the poor in collaboration with the World Bank. - Romania (2013): mitigation measures included raising Guaranteed Minimum Income and family allowances and temporarily lowering VAT on bread. - Ukraine (2014–2015): conditionality to bring gas and heating prices to cost recovery accompanied by enhanced social assistance and introduction/streamlining of social assistance schemes. - Annex VI — main inputs to the review (preserved counts): - Mission chief survey: 11 questions; responses by 42 (current and former) mission chiefs (out of 79). - PRGT and PSI program request staff reports: 68 program request documents (programs approved since 2010). - PRGT and PSI program review staff reports*: 55 program review documents (where social spending targets were missed). - GRA program request staff reports**: 24 program request documents (programs approved since 2010). - GRA program review staff reports: 9 program review documents (where social spending targets were missed). - FAD data on social spending: Health and education spending for 73 PRGT countries (1995–2015). - FAD TA data on social protection: Fund technical assistance (FY2004–FY2017). - MONA data: Design and implementation of Fund programs. - Notes: *Includes 6 staff reports where a PRGT country blended with GRA resources. **The GRA comparison group is limited to non-PRGT eligible countries who fall into the lower-middle income ($1,026 and $4,035) and upper-middle income ($4,036 and $12,475) groups defined by the World Bank. 1/ Staff report list reflects documents downloaded as of end-May 2016. ### Key empirical and programmatic statistics (preserved exactly) - Review sample: 68 program request documents (programs approved during 2010–2016). - Inclusion of social and other priority spending ITs: 90 percent of LIC programs reviewed included an IT. - Average met rate for ITs across reviews: 68%. - Average met rate for ITs in programs with fiscal consolidation: 71%. - When missed, targets missed by an average margin of 20 percent. - Only about 15 percent of LIC programs with fiscal consolidation included conditionality on strengthening social safeguards (5 out of 34). - A quarter of programs included conditionality on energy subsidy reforms; only 17 percent of these included an explicit program condition to mitigate its impact on the poor. - Mission chief survey: 15 responses (selected reporting); Annex VI reports responses by 42 mission chiefs (out of 79). - World Bank cash transfer income multipliers cited: $1.08 to $2.52 per dollar transferred via cash transfer programs. *International Monetary Fund — Social Safeguards and Program Design in PRGT and PSI-Supported Programs (selected excerpts).* ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ### Introduction and context - The Fund provides considerable support to low-income countries (LICs), including concessional financing from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT), which currently carries an interest rate of zero percent. - Since 2010, over half of Fund-supported arrangements have involved a PRGT facility. - PRGT-eligible members may make use of the Policy Support Instrument (PSI), a non-financial instrument. Since the establishment of the current concessional financing architecture in 2010, 43 Fund members have benefited from 90 PRGT- and PSI-supported programs. The latter represented over 60 percent of Fund-supported programs during this period. - Poverty reduction is a core objective of PRGT and PSI-supported programs; the 2009 PRGT reform called for program design in all PRGT facilities to support policies that safeguard social and other priority spending—and, whenever appropriate, to increase it—using social and other priority spending indicative targets where possible. - “Social safeguards” in this paper comprise: (i) minimum floors for social and other priority spending, typically established using indicative targets (IT); and (ii) specific reform measures designed to protect vulnerable groups (which can be set as prior actions or structural benchmarks under Fund-supported programs). - Social spending is generally defined to include spending on health, education and social safety nets. Vulnerable groups are defined in a country context and could include the poor, elderly, the youth and women. ### Fiscal and social spending goals in LIC programs - Review of 68 staff reports issued since 2010 to assess program goals for fiscal balance and spending. - LIC programs were broadly divided between those entailing fiscal expansion and those seeking fiscal consolidation: - 50 percent of LIC programs involved fiscal consolidation. - 43 percent involved fiscal expansion. - 7 percent were fiscally neutral. - Justifications for fiscal expansion varied; the most prevalent reason cited was to scale up infrastructure and social spending. - At program approval: - The median program aimed for fiscal consolidation (reduction in the deficit) of 1.9 percent of GDP phased over five years. - A quarter of programs encompassed a widening of the deficit. - PRGT and PSI-supported programs generally target a rise in real per capita public spending: - On average, spending was forecast to rise by some 15 percent over five years in such programs, compared to around 4 percent in programs with countries not eligible for concessional financing (where financing is provided from the General Resource Account (GRA)). - Across programs, fiscal consolidation was to be achieved mainly through revenue mobilization efforts. - Analysis suggests that health and education spending have typically been protected in PRGT and PSI-supported programs. ### Experience with social safeguards and main takeaways - Indicative targets (IT) establishing floors on social and other priority spending were included in virtually all PRGT-supported programs; targets were met in more than two-thirds of cases. - There is room to improve the design and the use of program spending floors; recommendations focus on tightening the specification of such targets to better target spending on vulnerable groups. - Specific reform measures designed to protect vulnerable groups have been used sparingly but are often the most effective tool: - Such measures were included in about 15 percent of PRGT and PSI-supported programs that entailed fiscal consolidation. - These measures were often adopted to complement or strengthen existing social safety nets, which are generally underdeveloped in LICs. - Collaboration with other development partners early on, ideally during surveillance, can strengthen program design of social safeguards measures. - Because reform measures to protect vulnerable groups can be complex to design and implement, the paper recommends exploring these issues in non-crisis situations (e.g., as part of Fund surveillance), drawing on the expertise of the World Bank and other development partners. - The paper’s recommendations do not require changes to Fund policies; they draw mainly on existing good practices, which the paper proposes should be adopted more comprehensively. - The stocktaking is intended to be followed by a guidance note for staff on addressing social safeguards concerns in Article IV consultations and Fund-supported programs with LICs. ### Organization of full paper (high-level) - The paper examines fiscal context for social safeguards in LIC programs, summarizes experience with social safeguards conditionality, outlines areas for improvement, and concludes with recommended good practices. - Annexes I–V provide good practice examples of social safeguard design based on a review of program documents. _Executive Summary: SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS AND PROGRAM DESIGN IN PRGT AND PSI-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS (April 21, 2017)_ ### 10. The typical fiscal policy design in LIC programs is markedly different from the ### 10. The typical fiscal policy design in LIC programs is markedly different from the ### Fiscal policy design: LIC programs versus GRA-supported programs - LIC programs are driven largely by balance-of-payments needs linked to enhancing growth and reducing poverty rather than crisis prevention/mitigation. - The average fiscal adjustment in LIC programs over five years, measured in percent of GDP, is twice as large in GRA-supported programs as in LIC programs (Figure 4). - The average GRA-supported program envisages a reduction in real per capita spending for the first three years after program approval, whereas the average LIC program aims at a 15 percent increase over five years. - Cumulative Change in Overall Fiscal Balance / GDP; Real Revenue per Capita; Real Expenditure per Capita are presented against pre-program year levels in Figure 4 (years after program approval shown for up to 4 years). ### Public spending on health and education - Government spending on health and education has generally increased steadily since the mid-1990s across all countries, whether measured as a share of overall spending or as a share of GDP (Figure 5). - World Bank data indicate the increase in health and education spending was the highest in LICs; health and education spending in LICs as a share of GDP has caught up with emerging economies. - Note: Bars represent unweighted cross-country averages. Only countries with observations in both periods are included. 1/ Constant USD, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity. - Short-run behavior: - Health spending is less pro-cyclical in LICs than in more advanced economies (Figure 6). 8 - In LICs, average real expenditure growth is more than 8 percentage points higher in times of high revenue growth than in times of low revenue growth. - Average real growth rate of central government ministry of health expenditure is above 5 percent, irrespective of the pace of revenue growth. - Regression evidence: - A 2013 study by Clements, Gupta, and Nozaki (2013) found public spending on education was significantly higher in LICs implementing Fund-supported programs over 1985-2009. - New staff analysis applying the same methodology to 1988-2014 confirms these findings (Table 1): having a program increases education spending. - The positive effect of programs on health spending is substantially smaller than the 2013 findings and is no longer statistically significant. - Overall, the updated regression analysis yields no evidence that fiscal adjustment policies in LIC programs come at the expense of health and education spending. ### Social and other priority spending indicative targets (ITs) in LIC programs - Since 2009 policy specifying that LIC programs should include an explicit program target to safeguard social and other priority spending wherever possible, the review focuses on programs approved since 2010. - Coverage: - 90 percent of LIC programs reviewed included an IT covering social and other priority spending. - Of the 68 program request documents reviewed, only eight did not include such an IT. - Of these eight, five explained the exclusion as the need to first develop a better tracking system to monitor social spending; three did not offer any explanation. - Performance: - The targets were met in more than two-thirds of the reviews (Figure 7). - Average met is 68% across reviews; isolating programs with fiscal consolidation, average met is 71% (Figure 8). - Fiscal consolidation programs are not necessarily associated with more frequent non-implementation of the IT. - Program design features to protect social spending: - Some programs excluded social and other priority spending from the fiscal deficit target or included an adjustor for social and other priority spending (examples include Malawi (2010) and Grenada (2014)). - Misses and explanations: - 10 countries account for about 65 percent of missed targets. - When missed, the targets were missed by an average margin of 20 percent. - Common explanations: (i) the need to cut spending; (ii) delays in project implementation; (iii) external financing shortfalls. - One-in-five LIC program documents did not provide any explanation of why targets were missed. - A majority of program reviews in such cases did not discuss corrective measures to ensure future program targets would be met. - Target definition and monitoring shortcomings: - Social and other priority spending is often not effectively targeted on vulnerable groups; coverage varies significantly across countries and often extends beyond vulnerable groups. - Spending floors are frequently defined to cover total spending on health and education. - In other cases, other priority spending includes infrastructure projects without specifying their contribution to poverty reduction. - TMUs often lack details on coverage, monitoring, and reporting arrangements. - Mission chief survey views (15 responses): - Two-thirds of mission chiefs considered the IT to be useful. - A significant majority saw a need for a better targeted specification of the IT focused on critical sectors. - Two-thirds suggested seeking expertise from the World Bank and other development partners. - About half suggested including adjustors to the program target so external financing shortfalls would not cause misses. - Selected suggested improvements (percent of respondents): - More targeted specification of spending floors: 67% - Seeking expertise from the World Bank and others: 53% - More input from authorities on design of the targets: 47% - Improving the quality of fiscal data: 47% - Including adjustors in the design of target to account for shocks: 40% - Adopting contingency plans to preserve spending from fiscal shocks: 40% - Revisiting and revising these targets more frequently: 20% - Making the target a binding conditionality: 20% - Other: 20% ### Reforms and conditionality to protect vulnerable groups - Rationale: - Specific reform measures can protect vulnerable groups where economic reforms have adverse distributional impacts and social safety nets are underdeveloped. - World Bank (State of Social Safety Nets, 2015) findings: - Social safety nets cover only a quarter of the extreme poor in low-income and lower-middle-income countries, compared to 64 percent in upper-middle-income countries. - Coverage gap is particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia: only one-tenth and one-fifth of the poorest 20 percent are reached by social safety nets, respectively. - World Bank recommendations include: (i) invest in integrated systems; (ii) adopt a social and beneficiary registry; (iii) improve spending efficiency by strengthening institutional capacity, coordination, and program administration and evaluation. - Use of conditionality in LIC programs: - Only a minority of LIC programs with fiscal consolidation or energy subsidy reform included specific conditionality measures to protect vulnerable groups. - Only about 15 percent of LIC programs with fiscal consolidation included such conditionality, mostly as benchmarks on measures to strengthen social safety nets (Table 2). - Of 68 program requests, 34 involved fiscal consolidation; o/w included conditionality on strengthening social safeguards: 5. - o/w did not include conditionality on strengthening social safeguards but included a substantive assessment of social safeguards issues: 15. - While a quarter of programs included conditionality on energy subsidy reforms, only 17 percent of these included an explicit program condition to mitigate its impact on the poor (Table 3). - Most supporting conditionalities focused on improving targeting, tracking, and monitoring of the social safety net. - Measures to improve safety nets by increasing transfers, expanding coverage, or introducing new programs were rare. - Examples of rare measures: Yemen (2014) structural benchmark to use freed-up fiscal space to increase transfers to the poor; Madagascar (2015) structural benchmark to approve national social protection policy. - Reasons for rarity: underdeveloped social safety net systems, limited financial resources, and implementation constraints in many PRGT-eligible members. - Comparison: GRA-supported programs more often included conditionality to introduce new social assistance schemes increasing transfers to groups affected by adjustment measures (examples: Jordan (2012), Tunisia (2013), Ukraine (2014)). ### Key empirical and programmatic statistics (preserved exactly as in source) - Review sample: 68 program request documents (programs approved during 2010–2016). - Inclusion of social and other priority spending ITs: 90 percent of LIC programs reviewed included an IT. - Average met rate for ITs across reviews: 68%. - Average met rate for ITs in programs with fiscal consolidation: 71%. - When missed, targets missed by an average margin of 20 percent. - Only about 15 percent of LIC programs with fiscal consolidation included conditionality on strengthening social safeguards (5 out of 34). - A quarter of programs included conditionality on energy subsidy reforms; only 17 percent of these included an explicit program condition to mitigate its impact on the poor. - Mission chief survey: 15 responses. *International Monetary Fund — Social Safeguards and Program Design in PRGT and PSI-Supported Programs (selected excerpts).* ### 22. The mission chief survey indicated that the limited use of specific reform measures to ### 22. The mission chief survey indicated that the limited use of specific reform measures to ### Mission Chief Survey Findings - The limited use of specific reform measures to help protect vulnerable groups reflected a variety of factors, with a key challenge being the absence of a pre-existing social safety net framework. - Where countries have safety nets (as is often the case with GRA-supported programs), these can be used at short notice to deliver support to vulnerable groups; when missing, it generally takes considerable time to design and implement new social safety net tools. - Importance of early collaboration with country authorities and other DPs (development partners), such as during surveillance discussions, to allow sufficient time to identify affordable and effective social safety net tools. - Most mission chiefs view weak capacity in the country as a key constraint to effectively implement social safety net programs. - Respondents indicated that lack of social indicators data hampers carrying out an impact assessment of specific social safety net measures. - Technical assistance (TA) from the Fund or other DPs can improve administrative and implementation capacity and assist in improving data availability. - The Fund’s Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD), often with joint missions with the World Bank, supports countries through TA missions on social safety nets that focus on measures to mitigate possible adverse effects of fiscal reforms (Boxes 4 and 6). - More than half of mission chiefs noted that limited financial resources to fund new social safety net programs was an issue, highlighting the importance of enhancing spending efficiency to create fiscal space. - One in three respondents cited a lack of Fund staff expertise on social safety nets as a constraint. - Total number of program requests with conditionalities on energy subsidy reform18 - o/w included conditionality on social safeguards3 - o/w did not include conditionality on social safeguards15 - o/w included assessment on social safety net measures4 - Figure 10. Mission Chief Views on Obstacles in Program Design (reflects 28 respondents) - 21% — Other - 86% — Lack of social policy instruments - 75% — Lack of administrative capacity of the authorities - 61% — Lack of social indicators data - 57% — Inadequate resources to finance new programs - 32% — Lack of expertise in Fund staff in social policies - 18% — Lack of commitment from authorities - 11% — Inadequate collaboration between Fund and World Bank ### Coverage in Program Documents - Program documents do not consistently discuss how fiscal adjustment or other economic reforms may adversely impact poor and vulnerable groups, nor the scope for measures to mitigate such impacts. - Improving coverage of social safeguards in program documents would provide a useful record of how concerns were addressed in policy discussions with national authorities, including when existing safeguards are considered adequate. - Only half of LIC program request documents discuss social safety net issues, compared to nearly 90 percent for GRA-supported programs. - The most common discussions were related to expanding social protection programs and increasing social transfers. - Program documents infrequently mentioned direct collaboration with other DPs; one-quarter of LIC program requests discuss ongoing or planned DP support on social protection issues, compared to about half in GRA-supported programs. - For LIC programs with fiscal consolidation, the coverage figure increases to 60 percent (Table 2). - Figure 11 (Number of LIC program requests between January 2010 and May 2016) — Mitigating measures discussed in LIC programs with fiscal consolidation included: - Protecting the key social spendings from any spending cuts - Fixing the total social spendings at certain percent of GDP - Expanding social protection programs and increasing transfers - Revamping the social safety net programs - Sequencing of reforms, and gradual removal of subsidies - Improve data/reporting system for social safeguard services - Institute law/legal framework on social protection services - Program categories shown: PSI, SCF, RCF, ECF ### Recommendations — Summary of Policy Guidance A. Social and Other Priority Spending Indicative Targets (IT) - Effectiveness of the social and other priority spending IT can be improved to protect poor and vulnerable groups from bearing an undue burden of adjustment costs. - Core principles: flexibility in IT design to accommodate country-specific circumstances; clarity in discussion of how the IT achieves social safeguard goals to avoid box-ticking. Recommended good practices: - Focus on safeguarding resources for vulnerable groups: - Narrowly define spending floors to cover needs of the most vulnerable when reforms have adverse distributional consequences. - Current policy allows country teams to focus program targets on social spending or on social and other priority spending combined, depending on country needs. - Select social spending with the biggest impact: - Improve targeting and quality of spending; prioritize critical sectors and deliver targeted assistance through social safety net programs. - Targeted cash or near-cash transfers are usually seen as preferred to compensate for adverse impact of energy subsidy removal (Box 6). - Fiscal space for increased spending can be created through domestic revenue mobilization or increasing spending efficiency (e.g., eliminating inefficient spending such as on energy subsidies). - Complementary program conditions could strengthen social safety nets; social safeguard spending can have other economic benefits, including through relatively high fiscal multipliers.19 - World Bank (2015) found income multipliers ranging from $1.08 to $2.52 for each dollar transferred via cash transfer programs. - Leverage expertise from development partners: - Consult early with donors and DPs (World Bank, United Nations agencies, regional development banks such as African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank). - Provide mission chiefs more regular training opportunities to address concerns about Fund staff expertise in social safeguards.20 - Avoid reliance on uncertain foreign financing: - Design spending floors so governments have adequate control over resources to meet goals even if foreign financing shocks occur. - Periodically revisit the definition of social and other priority spending: - Regular revision ensures consistency with changes in the economic environment and appropriateness for social safeguard objectives. - If targets are habitually missed, revisit definitions; if target is well-designed, focus on corrective measures such as strengthening public financial management (PFM). B. Reform Measures to Protect Vulnerable Groups - Given limitations of the IT, complementary social safety net measures should play a stronger role in policy advice: - Give more explicit consideration to such options during program design. - Focus during surveillance on developing social safety nets, including in conjunction with DPs. - At program design stage, options to strengthen social safeguards include: - Introducing conditionality or clearly explaining concrete mitigating measures with specific timelines for introduction and implementation, especially where conditionality on eliminating subsidies or tax hikes is expected to directly impact the poor (Box 6).21 - Ideally, savings from subsidy elimination should be used at least in part to introduce targeted social assistance schemes or increase transfers via established social programs. - Appropriate phasing and sequencing of reform measures when time is needed to put in place social safety net measures. - Where social assistance schemes are at an early stage, determine TA and capacity-building needs and ensure identified gaps are met by the Fund or other DPs. - Program documents should explain how capacity constraints affecting implementation of social safety nets are being tackled, even if requiring a medium-term approach. - If programs get off-track or face unforeseen shocks, program documents should explain how social safeguards needs and goals have been reevaluated and accounted for in program design. - Early engagement and Article IV discussions should cover: - Adequacy of existing social policy instruments and scope for strengthening the institutional framework via TA or safety net reforms in collaboration with the World Bank and other DPs. - Fiscal sustainability and ensuring social safeguards are timely and affordable; options include domestic revenue mobilization and boosting spending efficiency.22 - Use of distributional impact analysis: - Ex-ante technical analysis of likely social and distributional impacts of policies (e.g., tax or fuel subsidy reforms) can inform design of safeguards (Boxes 4 and 5). - Such analyses are time- and resource-intensive and should ideally be conducted during surveillance discussions to inform program design (see Annex IV for good practice examples).23 *Italic line: Source: Extracted content from the provided IMF chapter text.* ### 30. More broadly, close collaboration with development partners is warranted in program ### SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS AND PROGRAM DESIGN IN PRGT AND PSI-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS ### Collaboration with development partners - Close collaboration with development partners (DPs) is warranted in program and surveillance discussions when weaknesses in social safety net measures are identified. - Program conditionality can assist in addressing some weaknesses; however, technical assistance (TA) by the Fund or other DPs would need to support these efforts. - Given resource constraints at the Fund, close engagement with development partners and donors at both the surveillance and the program design stage will be critical. - Program documents should include a discussion on how weaknesses identified will be addressed and how the Fund is collaborating with key stakeholders to provide assistance to the authorities. ### Core objective and role of social safeguards - Durable poverty reduction and economic growth is a core objective of LIC programs. - Protecting the poor and vulnerable from bearing an undue burden of adjustment in LIC programs is a priority. - Social safeguards have an important role to play in LIC programs, especially where adjustment measures could adversely impact the poor and vulnerable. ### Findings on fiscal consolidation and spending - LIC programs involving fiscal consolidation need to pay due regard to protecting the vulnerable from the burden of adjustment. - Nearly half of programs build in fiscal expansions, and real per capita spending is forecast to rise on average by some 15 percent in the four years following the program. - Empirical evidence continues to suggest that LIC programs are successful in protecting health and education spending. - Many programs do contain fiscal consolidations and other measures (such as the removal of subsidies) that could hurt the poor; programs should incorporate sufficiently strong social safeguards measures. ### Shortcomings and opportunities for improvement - There is room for improvement in how LIC programs address social safeguards issues. - The definition of the social and other priority spending indicative target (IT) could be designed to better target the poor, requiring careful discussions with country authorities, the World Bank and other DPs. - Program documents should more thoroughly and consistently explain: - the challenges in the design of the target, - collaboration with other DPs, - any slippages, and - corrective measures. - Targets should be revisited periodically. - Complementary conditionality on reform measures to protect vulnerable groups have been used quite sparingly, though they can often be the most effective way to protect the poor, especially in LICs with rudimentary social safety net systems. - Article IV consultations could be used to take an in-depth look at social safety nets and discuss how an expansion of such programs can be financed in a fiscally prudent way, with World Bank or other DP support, and identify a roadmap for reform (including supporting TA). ### Implementation feasibility and next steps - The recommendations in this report can be implemented without changes in policies and procedures; many are based on existing good practices. - Underlying principle: ensure due consideration is given to social safeguards in the design of programs and in surveillance, and document that the program is adequately protecting the poor and vulnerable from the burden of economic adjustment. - Country teams should tailor program—and surveillance—to country-specific circumstances; existing policies and procedures have sufficient flexibility to achieve this without changes. - A stocktaking will be followed by a guidance note to staff to clarify expectations on how to treat social safeguards measures in both Article IV consultations and program discussions for LIC programs. - The guidance note would help strengthen and formalize institutional collaboration with the World Bank and other DPs on social safeguards and will be issued to the Executive Board for information. ### Issues for discussion posed to Directors - Whether to strengthen the design of the IT on social and other priority spending, including improving targeting on poverty reduction, collaborating more closely with country authorities and other DPs in its design, and revisiting and revising its definition more periodically. - Whether to improve incorporation of social safeguards issues in program design, including relying more often on specific reform measures to strengthen social safety net systems to more effectively protect the poor from economic adjustment. - Whether to improve the coverage of social safeguards issues in program documents, including discussion on measures incorporated to protect the poor, challenges faced, concrete measures proposed to tackle constraints, and improving monitoring and reporting of social spending and intermediate objectives. - Whether to strengthen Fund engagement in social safeguards policies through more structured and frequent coordination with country authorities and DPs during both Article IV consultation cycles and Fund-supported programs. *Source: Excerpt from "SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS AND PROGRAM DESIGN IN PRGT AND PSI-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS"* ### Box 3. Social Safeguards in GRA-Supported Programs (concluded) ### Box 3. Social Safeguards in GRA-Supported Programs (concluded) ### Findings - About half of GRA-supported programs discuss support already given or pledged to country authorities on social safety net measures by various DPs. - Other DPs, the World Bank in particular, take the lead in assisting country authorities on social safety nets; direct collaboration between the Fund and others is rarely discussed in program documents, though support provided by other DPs is covered. 7/ - Where social and other priority spending targets were included in reviewed GRA program requests, the following country cases were identified: Armenia (2014); Jamaica (2013), Pakistan (2013), Suriname (2016), and Tunisia (2013 and 2016). 1/ - Explanations provided for missing targets included better targeting (Armenia 2014); and technical and administrative challenges in electronic payment mechanism and weak absorptive capacity or delays in expenditure for the poor (Tunisia 2013). 2/ - Other social safety net (SSN) conditionalities referenced included issuing a study on policy options for targeted protection for vulnerable groups (Armenia (2014)) and establishing a databank on vulnerable households (Tunisia (2016)). 3/ - Specific program references cited as illustrative of GRA collaboration or discussion with other DPs include Iraq (2010), Romania (2013), Sri Lanka (2016), and Suriname (2016). 7/ ### Footnote-derived program references and specifics - Footnote 1/ — The following GRA program requests reviewed included a social and other priority spending target: Armenia (2014); Jamaica (2013), Pakistan (2013), Suriname (2016), and Tunisia (2013 and 2016). - Footnote 2/ — Explanations for missing targets: better targeting (Armenia 2014); technical and administrative challenges in electronic payment mechanism and weak absorptive capacity or delays in expenditure for the poor (Tunisia 2013). - Footnote 3/ — Other SSN conditionalities: issuing a study on policy options for targeted protection for vulnerable groups (Armenia (2014)) and establishing a databank on vulnerable households (Tunisia (2016)). - Footnote 4/ — Albania 2014, Armenia 2014, Georgia 2014 and Jamaica 2013. - Footnote 5/ — Armenia 2014, Jamaica 2013 and Serbia 2015. - Footnote 6/ — Armenia 2014 and Bosnia 2012. - Footnote 7/ — Examples of collaboration between country authorities and other DPs to strengthen the social safety net scheme are discussed in Iraq (2010), Romania (2013), Sri Lanka (2016), Suriname (2016). *Box 3. Social Safeguards in GRA-Supported Programs (concluded).* ### Annex IV. Good Practice Examples in LIC Surveillance Work: ### Annex IV–VI. Good Practice Examples in LIC Surveillance Work; GRA-Supported Programs; Main Source of Inputs to the Review ### Annex IV — Discussion of Social Safety Net Issues: Country Examples - Ethiopia (2015 Article IV) - Ethiopia was a pilot case for the Fund’s project to operationalize its work on inequality because issues related to equitable growth were deemed macro-critical. - Staff used a dynamic general equilibrium model tailored to Ethiopia to analyze macroeconomic and distributional impacts of economic and financial reforms. - Analysis examined how policy measures contribute to sectoral growth and promote structural transformation (e.g., in manufacturing and services and agriculture) and how structural transformation would change poverty and inequality. - Specific recommendations to sustain equitable growth: - (i) enhancing tax collection and lowering tax exemptions that would increase the fiscal space for poverty reduction; - (ii) updating nominal income tax thresholds; - (iii) continuing the pro-poor focus; - (iv) promoting financial inclusion via mobile banking and encouraging banks and microfinance institutions to increase their outreach. - Republic of Congo (Selected Issues Paper issued in conjunction with the 2015 Article IV) - Using benefit incidence analysis, staff estimate that prior to the 2008 adjustment in petroleum product prices, the fuel subsidies (except kerosene) mostly benefited the wealthy. - Conclusion: reducing or eliminating fuel subsidies is likely to improve the progressivity of public spending. - To mitigate impacts on the poor from removing subsidies, staff advised: - well-designed energy subsidy reform that takes into consideration impacts on vulnerable households; - interventions in the form of conditional cash transfers and subsidies for public transportation. - Staff recommended rebalancing expenditures in favor of social programs to mitigate potential adverse impacts of fiscal consolidation. - Paper documents government steps being started at the time: introducing a cash transfer system (with World Bank assistance) and developing a Universal Health Coverage program. - Malawi (Selected Issues Paper issued in conjunction with the 2015 Article IV) - The Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) is one of the largest social expenditure items in Malawi, aimed at improving food security and reducing poverty. - While initially successful when started in 2005, the program became increasingly costly without accompanying improvements in maize production or poverty reduction. - Authorities considered reforming FISP; FISP is also a component of the social and other priority spending indicative target under the ECF program. - Study focuses on macroeconomic and distributional impacts of reducing the subsidy rate for FISP. - Complementary policies discussed include expanding the existing cash transfer program to compensate the poor and foster equitable growth. - Senegal (Selected Issues Paper issued in conjunction with the 2014 Article IV) - Fund team reviewed the social safety net system and outlined strategies to strengthen it, relying extensively on previous World Bank analysis. - Review describes about a dozen social safety net programs in place in 2011 and analyzes average costs and why programs were insufficient to protect the poor. - Main issues identified: - insufficient coverage of the poor; - weaknesses in the targeting system; - large variation in cost of beneficiary per program with some likely having only minor impact; - lack of coordination across various programs; - lack of standardized monitoring of program implementation; - heavy reliance on development partner financing. - Important steps authorities have taken to strengthen the system are described. - Concrete recommendations included: - strengthening coordination between programs and moving towards a unified national social safety net system; - designing a medium-term expenditure framework and integrating it into the budget process; - developing central monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that inform strategic decision-making and allow program evaluation; - improving targeting and further strengthening the institutional framework. ### Annex V — Good Practice Examples in GRA-Supported Programs - Jamaica (2013 SBA Request) - Program includes a floor on social spending to safeguard the category and discusses authorities’ commitment to reduce adverse impacts of adjustment by improving social protection. - Authorities intend to: - improve training and certification for labor market participants to tackle high unemployment; - enhance benefits and improve effectiveness of targeting under PATH (a conditional cash transfer programme); - implement welfare-to-work exit strategies for vulnerable households. - Program includes reforms to improve efficiency and effectiveness of social spending, ensuring better targeting to the poor (e.g., in health and education), building on FAD technical assistance. - Jordan (2012 SBA Request) - Fiscal adjustment relied heavily on eliminating costly and ill-targeted energy subsidies. - An earlier electricity tariff increase had been reversed due to heightened social tensions. - Program addressed challenges by adding conditionality to introduce targeted support to the poor should fuel prices increase drastically, to accompany conditionality to increase fuel prices; conditionality to be carried out in collaboration with the World Bank. - Staff noted many social assistance programs suffer from waste and inefficiencies: only 15 percent of beneficiaries would be classified as poor according to the national poverty line, indicating need for better targeting. - Romania (2013 SBA Request) - No conditionality on social spending or social safety nets, but program document discusses authorities’ plan to mitigate adverse impacts of energy subsidy reform. - Revised budget allocates additional spending to mitigate impact of gas and energy price liberalization through: - raising the Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) and family allowances and increasing eligibility thresholds, consistent with the authorities’ social assistance reform program to consolidate benefits and improve means testing; - temporarily lowering VAT on bread; - extending existing legislation by three years to provide a top-up to unemployment benefits for some SOE layoffs. - Ukraine (2014 SBA and 2015 EFF Requests) - Program conditionality includes measures to bring gas and heating prices to cost recovery based on international prices as part of comprehensive energy sector reform. - Program documents include extensive discussion of mitigating measures for increases in energy prices on the poor. - Increases in energy prices to be accompanied by enhanced social assistance from the budget to cover most vulnerable. - The 2014 SBA includes a prior action for government to introduce a new social assistance scheme to protect vulnerable households not covered by the existing scheme. - The 2015 EFF explains how existing social assistance programs are being streamlined to improve targeting and notes that the energy subsidy benefit formula will be revised in consultation with IMF and World Bank. ### Annex VI — Main Source of Inputs to the Review (Key Inputs and Counts) - Mission chief survey (11 questions) - Responses by 42 (current and former) mission chiefs (out of 79) - PRGT and PSI program request staff reports 1/ - 68 program request documents (programs approved since 2010) - PRGT and PSI program review staff reports* 1/ - 55 program review documents (where social spending targets were missed) - GRA program request staff reports** 1/ - 24 program request documents (programs approved since 2010) - GRA program review staff reports 1/ - 9 program review documents (where social spending targets were missed) - FAD data on social spending - Health and education spending for 73 PRGT countries (1995–2015) - FAD TA data on social protection - Fund technical assistance (FY2004–FY2017) - MONA data - Design and implementation of Fund programs - Notes in source: - *Includes 6 staff reports where a PRGT country blended with GRA resources. - **The GRA comparison group is limited to non-PRGT eligible countries who fall into the lower-middle income. ($1,026 and $4,035) and upper-middle income ($4,036 and $12,475) groups defined by the World Bank. - 1/ Staff report list reflects documents downloaded as of end-May 2016. *Source: Annex IV–VI. Good Practice Examples in LIC Surveillance Work.* ### Annex VII. List of Program Documents Reviewed ### Annex VII. List of Program Documents Reviewed ### Program requests, staff reports, and reviews (selected) - Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, Seventh Review Under the Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion, and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2011 — 8/19/2010 - Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2011 — 11/3/2011 - Republic of Armenia—Request for Three-Year Arrangements Under the Extended Fund Facility and the Extended Credit Facility, and Cancellation of the Stand-By Arrangement — EFF-ECF — 2010 — 6/14/2010 - Bangladesh—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 3/29/2012 - Benin—Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 5/28/2010 - Burkina Faso—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 6/1/2010 - Burkina Faso—Seventh Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for a New Three-Year Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — ECF — 2013 — 12/3/2013 - Burundi—Seventh Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for a New Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 12/30/2011 - Cape Verde—Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation and Request for a 15-Month Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2010 — 11/10/2010 - Central African Republic—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 6/12/2012 - Central African Republic—Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility and Cancellation of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — RCF — 2014 — 5/1/2014 - Chad—Request for Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2014 — 7/24/2014 - Union of the Comoros—Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility; and Staff-Monitored Program — RCF; SMP — 2015 — 12/2/2015 - Côte d'Ivoire—Cancellation of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility — RCF — 2011 — 6/27/2011 - Côte d'Ivoire—Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation and Requests for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and for Additional Interim Assistance Under the Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries — ECF — 2011 — 10/21/2011 - The Gambia—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 5/10/2012 - The Gambia—Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility, Cancellation of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, and Proposal for a Staff-Monitored Program — RCF; SMP — 2015 — 3/9/2015 - Georgia—Request for Stand-By Arrangement and an Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SBA-SCF — 2012 — 3/29/2012 - Ghana—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2015 — 3/23/2015 - Grenada—Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility, Request for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Financing Assurances Review — ECF — 2010 — 3/25/2010 - Grenada—Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV Consultation and Request for an Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — ECF — 2014 — 6/13/2014 - Guinea—Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation and Requests for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and for Additional Interim Assistance Under the Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries — ECF — 2012 — 2/13/2012 - Guinea—Requests for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility and for Modification of Performance Criteria Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — RCF — 2014 — 9/19/2014 - Guinea-Bissau—Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and for Additional Interim Assistance Under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative — ECF — 2010 — 3/25/2010 - Guinea-Bissau—Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Financing Assurances Review — ECF — 2015 — 6/26/2015 - Haiti—Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation and Request for Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 7/8/2010 - Haiti—Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2015 — 5/7/2015 - Honduras—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement and an Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SBA-SCF — 2010 — 9/17/2010 - Honduras—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement and an Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SBA-SCF — 2014 — 11/20/2014 - Kenya—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2011 — 1/18/2011 - Kenya—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement and an Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SBA-SCF — 2015 — 1/20/2015 - Kenya—Second Reviews Under the Stand-By Arrangement and the Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility, and Requests for a New Twenty-Four Month Stand-By Arrangement, and a New Twenty-Four Month Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SBA-SCF — 2016 — 3/1/2016 - Kyrgyz Republic—Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2011 — 6/3/2011 - Kyrgyz Republic—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2015 — 3/26/2015 - Kingdom of Lesotho—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 5/18/2010 - Liberia—Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation and Request for Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 11/6/2012 - Republic of Madagascar—Staff-Monitored Program and Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility — RCF; SMP — 2015 — 11/5/2015 - Malawi—Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 2/9/2010 - Malawi—Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation and Request for New Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 7/10/2012 - Mali—Seventh Review Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for a New Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2011 — 11/28/2011 - Mali—Request for Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2013 — 12/4/2013 - Mali—Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility, and Cancellation of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — RCF — 2013 — 1/18/2013 - Islamic Republic of Mauritania—Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 3/1/2010 - Republic of Mozambique—Sixth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, Second Review Under the Arrangement Under the Exogenous Shocks Facility, and Request for a Three-Year Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2010 — 5/28/2010 - Republic of Mozambique—Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation, Sixth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, Request for a Three-Year Policy Support Instrument and Cancellation of Current Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2013 — 6/11/2013 - Republic of Mozambique—Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation, Fifth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria, De Minimis Misreporting of Information Under the Policy Support Instrument, and Request for an 18-Month Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SCF — 2015 — 12/7/2015 - Niger—Request for a New Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 3/5/2012 - Republic of South Sudan—Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility and Staff-Monitored Program — RCF; SMP — 2013 — 6/26/2013 - Rwanda—Request for a Three-Year Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2010 — 6/1/2010 - Rwanda—Seventh Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, Request for a Three-Year Policy Support Instrument and Cancellation of Current Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2013 — 11/15/2013 - Rwanda—Fifth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Extension, and Request for an Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SCF — 2016 — 5/25/2016 - Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 7/6/2012 - Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Cancellation of the Current Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2015 — 6/26/2015 - Senegal—Sixth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, Request for a Three-Year Policy Support Instrument and Cancellation of Current Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2010 — 11/15/2010 - Senegal—Request for a Three-Year Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2015 — 6/10/2015 - Sierra Leone—Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion, Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Financing Assurances Review — ECF — 2010 — 5/20/2010 - Sierra Leone—Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2013 — 10/8/2013 - Solomon Islands—Request for an Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SCF — 2010 — 5/24/2010 - Solomon Islands—Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation, Third Review Under the Standby Credit Facility, and Request for Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SCF — 2011 — 11/9/2011 - Solomon Islands—Second Review Under the Standby Credit Facility and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2012 — 11/15/2012 - United Republic of Tanzania—Seventh Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, Second Review Under the Exogenous Shocks Facility, and Request for a New Three-Year Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2010 — 5/20/2010 - United Republic of Tanzania—Fourth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for an Arrangement Under the Standby Credit Facility — SCF — 2012 — 6/22/2012 - United Republic of Tanzania—Request for a Three-Year Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2014 — 6/30/2014 - Uganda—Seventh Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, Request for a New Policy Support Instrument and Cancellation of Current Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2010 — 4/28/2010 - Uganda—Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation, Sixth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, Request for a Three-Year Policy Support Instrument and Cancellation of Current Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2013 — 6/17/2013 - Republic of Yemen—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 7/20/2010 - Republic of Yemen—Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility and Cancellation of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — RCF — 2012 — 3/21/2012 - Republic of Yemen—Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2014 — 7/7/2014 ### PRGT Program Reviews (where SSIT were missed) - Republic of Armenia—Third Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility and Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria — EFF-ECF — 2010 — 11/28/2011 - Republic of Armenia—Sixth Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement and the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — EFF-ECF — 2010 — 6/10/2013 - Bangladesh—First Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion — ECF — 2012 — 1/30/2013 - Bangladesh—Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 5/15/2013 - Bangladesh—Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation and Third Review Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 11/12/2013 - Benin—Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for a Waiver of the Nonobservances of a Continuous Performance Criterion — ECF — 2010 — 8/24/2011 - Benin—Third Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — ECF — 2010 — 3/13/2012 - Benin—Sixth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for a Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion — ECF — 2010 — 5/9/2014 - Burkina Faso—First Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criterion — ECF — 2010 — 11/18/2010 - Burkina Faso—Fourth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria and Augmentation of Access — ECF — 2010 — 5/25/2012 - Burkina Faso—Second and Third Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, and Request for Augmentation of Access and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2013 — 5/15/2015 - Burkina Faso—Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2010 — 6/30/2011 - Burkina Faso—Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV Consultation, First Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Request for Waiver and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2013 — 6/20/2014 - Burundi—Second Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — ECF — 2012 — 1/31/2013 - Burundi—Third Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 8/23/2013 - Ghana—First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Waiver and Modifications of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2015 — 8/18/2015 - Kenya—Fifth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for a Waiver and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2011 — 4/2/2013 - Kyrgyz Republic—Sixth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2011 — 6/12/2014 - Kingdom of Lesotho—Sixth Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 8/22/2013 - Liberia—First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 6/18/2013 - Malawi—First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Waiver of Performance Criterion, and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 12/6/2012 - Malawi—Second Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 3/29/2013 - Malawi—Third Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Requests for Waiver of Performance Criterion, Extension of the Arrangement, Rephasing of Disbursements, and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 9/30/2013 - Malawi—Fifth and Sixth Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Waivers for Non-Observance of Performance Criteria, Extension of the Arrangement, Modification of Performance Criterion, and Rephasing of Disbursements — ECF — 2012 — 3/9/2015 - Islamic Republic of Mauritania—First Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2010 — 11/4/2010 - Islamic Republic of Mauritania—Second Review Under the Three-Year Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — ECF — 2010 — 6/8/2011 - Islamic Republic of Mauritania—Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, Fourth Review Under the Three-Year Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, and Requests for Waivers of Nonobservance and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2010 — 6/18/2012 - Republic of Mozambique—Third Review Under the Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2013 — 12/16/2014 - Republic of Mozambique—Third Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria — PSI — 2010 — 11/21/2011 - Republic of Mozambique—Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation, Second Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria — PSI — 2010 — 5/26/2011 - Niger—First Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility and Request for a Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion — ECF — 2012 — 3/14/2013 - Niger—Second and Third Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Requests for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria and for Extension of the Program Period and Arrangement, Rephasing of Disbursements, and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 3/14/2014 - Niger—Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV Consultation and Fourth and Fifth Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 12/4/2014 - Niger—Sixth and Seventh Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria, Request for Augmentation of Access, and Extension of the Current Arrangement — ECF — 2012 — 11/16/2015 - Republic of Moldova—Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation, First Reviews Under the Extended Arrangement and Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Request for Modification of a Performance Criterion — ECF — 2010 — 7/2/2010 - Republic of Mozambique—First Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria — PSI — 2010 — 11/17/2010 - Rwanda—Third Review Under the Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2013 — 5/13/2015 - Sierra Leone—First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Review — ECF — 2013 — 6/5/2014 - Sierra Leone—Third and Fourth Reviews Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Financing Assurances Review, Requests for Waivers for Nonobservance of Performance Criteria and Modification of Performance Criteria, and Requests for Rephasing and Augmentation of Access Under the Extended Credit Facility — ECF — 2013 — 11/2/2015 - Solomon Islands—First Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion and Modification of Performance Criteria — ECF — 2012 — 6/14/2013 - Solomon Islands—Fourth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement — ECF — 2012 — 3/20/2015 - Uganda—Second Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Waiver of Assessment Criteria — PSI — 2010 — 6/16/2011 - Uganda—Third Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of an Assessment Criterion, and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria — PSI — 2010 — 12/21/2011 - Uganda—Fifth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument and Request for Program Extension — PSI — 2010 — 12/27/2012 - Uganda—First Review Under the Policy Support Instrument — PSI — 2013 — 12/4/2013 ### GRA Program Requests - Albania—Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation and Request for Extended Arrangement — EFF — 2014 — 2/24/2014 - Republic of Armenia—Request for Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility — EFF — 2014 — 2/21/2014 - Bosnia and Herzegovina—Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2012 — 9/12/2012 - El Salvador—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement and Cancellation of Current Arrangement — SBA — 2010 — 3/3/2010 - Georgia—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2014 — 7/16/2014 - Iraq—Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2010 — 2/17/2010 - Jamaica—Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2010 — 1/29/2010 - Jamaica—Request for an Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility — EFF — 2013 — 4/18/2013 - Jordan—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2012 — 7/27/2012 - Republic of Kosovo—Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2010 — 7/8/2010 - Republic of Kosovo—Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2012 — 4/13/2012 - Republic of Kosovo—Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2015 — 7/10/2015 - Pakistan—Staff Report for the 2013 Article IV Consultation and Request for an Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility — EFF — 2013 — 8/22/2013 - Romania—Seventh Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, Cancellation of the Current Stand-By Arrangement, and Request for a New Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2011 — 3/11/2011 - Romania—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2013 — 9/13/2013 - Republic of Serbia—Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2011 — 9/16/2011 - Republic of Serbia—Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2015 — 2/9/2015 - Sri Lanka—Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility — EFF — 2016 — 5/20/2016 - Suriname—Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2016 — 5/18/2016 - Tunisia—Request for Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2013 — 5/24/2013 - Tunisia—Request for an Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility — EFF — 2016 — 5/3/2016 - Ukraine—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement and Cancellation of the Current Arrangement — SBA — 2010 — 7/16/2010 - Ukraine—Request for a Stand-By Arrangement — SBA — 2014 — 4/22/2014 - Ukraine—Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility and Cancellation of Stand-By Arrangement — EFF — 2015 — 2/27/2015 ### GRA Program Reviews (where SSIT were missed) - Republic of Armenia—Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV Consultation and First Review Under the Extended Arrangement — EFF — 2014 — 12/8/2014 - Republic of Armenia—Second Review Under the Extended Arrangement and Request for Waivers of Nonobservance and Rephasing — EFF — 2014 — 10/23/2015 - Pakistan—First Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility, Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion and Modification of Performance Criteria — EFF — 2013 — 12/11/2013 - Pakistan—Second Review Under the Extended Arrangement and Request for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria — EFF — 2013 — 3/10/2014 - Pakistan—Eighth Review Under the Extended Arrangement and Request for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria — EFF — 2013 — 9/16/2015 - Tunisia—First and Second Reviews Under the Stand-By Arrangement, Request for Waivers of Applicability and Nonobservance of Performance Criteria — SBA — 2013 — 1/24/2014 - Tunisia—Third Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria and Waivers of Applicability — SBA — 2013 — 4/11/2014 - Tunisia—Fifth Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, Request for Modification of Performance Criteria, and Rephasing of Access — SBA — 2013 — 12/5/2014 - Tunisia—Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation, Sixth Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, and Request for Rephasing — SBA — 2013 — 9/17/2015 ### PRGT Surveillance Examples - Republic of Congo—Selected Issues — 7/1/2015 - The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: 2015 Article IV Consultation — 9/4/2015 - Malawi—Selected Issues — 11/30/2015 - Senegal—Selected Issues — 12/3/2014 *Annex VII. List of Program Documents Reviewed — pp042117social-safeguard* ### Annex VIII. List of Current PRGT-Eligible Countries ### Annex VIII. List of Current PRGT-Eligible Countries ### List of PRGT-Eligible Countries - Afghanistan, I.S. of Maldives - Bangladesh Mali - Benin Marshall Islands - Bhutan Mauritania - Burkina Faso Micronesia, Fed. States of - Burundi Moldova - Cambodia Mozambique - Cameroon Myanmar - Cape Verde Nepal - Central African Republic Nicaragua - Chad Niger - Comoros Papua New Guinea - Congo, Dem. Rep. of Rwanda - Congo, Republic of Samoa - Côte d'Ivoire São Tomé and Príncipe - Djibouti Senegal - Dominica Sierra Leone - Eritrea Solomon Islands - Ethiopia Somalia - Gambia, The South Sudan - Ghana St. Lucia - Grenada St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Guinea Sudan - Guinea-Bissau Tajikistan - Guyana Tanzania - Haiti Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of - Honduras Togo - Kenya Tonga - Kiribati Tuvalu - Kyrgyz Republic Uganda - Lao PDR Uzbekistan - Lesotho Vanuatu - Liberia Yemen, Republic of - Madagascar Zambia - Malawi Zimbabwe *Annex VIII. List of Current PRGT-Eligible Countries* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/pp042117social-safeguard.pdf_