## Building A More Food-Secure Sub-Saharan Africa

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### Current situation and scale of the problem
- Sub-Saharan Africa remains the most food-insecure region in the world.
- By the end of 2022, at least 123 million people or 12 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population will face acute food insecurity (two-thirds of the total globally).
- One-third of the 123 million have become acutely food-insecure since the start of the pandemic.
- The share of undernourished people in sub-Saharan Africa has been steadily increasing since 2012, reversing progress made during the 2000s.
- Acute food insecurity data source: Global Network Against Food Crises (2022).

### Key drivers of food insecurity
- Climate change-induced weather extremes (droughts, floods, cyclones):
  - One-third of global droughts occur in the region.
  - Food insecurity increases by 5–20 percentage points with each flood or drought.
- Conflict and security challenges that disrupt farming; food insecurity itself can drive conflict.
- Food price shocks and high dependence on imported staples:
  - Cereal import dependency ratio has remained elevated at about 40 percent on average since 2012.
  - Lower international food aid and increased dependence on imported staples (rice and wheat) have contributed to rising undernourishment.
- Other correlates (statistical analysis, 2001–20): higher rural population share and higher food inflation associated with higher undernourishment; greater food aid per capita, higher agricultural value added, greater political stability, more arable land, and higher cereal production correlate with lower undernourishment.

### Recent shocks and persistence of the crisis
- The pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine have depressed incomes, disrupted global supply chains, and driven up prices of food and agricultural inputs (particularly fertilizers).
- Domestic food inflation typically peaks after six to 12 months following international food price shocks, with an almost one-for-one pass-through for imported staples.
- Domestic price pressure is likely to persist at least through the end of the year (2022).
- An unprecedented four-season drought has hit Ethiopia and Kenya, eroding household access to food.
- Higher fertilizer prices are disrupting domestic food supplies for current and future harvest seasons, even for some net food exporters.

### Country policy responses and fiscal cost
- IMF survey: 35 of 43 sub-Saharan African countries that responded have implemented more than 100 policy measures since January 2022 in response to the food and fuel price shocks.
- Most measures are temporary and untargeted; measures are divided equally between improving food security and stabilizing fuel prices.
- Common measures: cutting taxes on food or fuel; foregoing import tariff revenues; deferring tax payments; introducing new food, fuel, and fertilizer subsidies; adjusting wage bills; price controls and export bans in some cases.
- The cost of new measures implemented since January 2022 to address the surge in food and energy prices stands at 0.9 percent of GDP on average.
- Only half of the countries surveyed had included these costs in their national budgets at the time of the survey.
- Financing approaches used: drawing on revenue windfalls; borrowing and running arrears; expenditure reprioritization; financial support from donors or international financial institutions.

### Structural constraints and opportunities for domestic production
- The share of cultivated arable land and cereal yields are low compared with other parts of the world.
- Even a modest expansion of arable land and narrowing of the yield gap could have significant implications for food security.
- Key reforms and investments needed to increase domestic climate-resilient agricultural capacity and productivity:
  - Substantial investment (for example, improving irrigation infrastructure).
  - Structural reforms (for example, securing land rights).
  - Improving access to finance and digitalization to step up private investment in agricultural resilience and boost productivity.
  - Greater regional trade integration and resilient transport infrastructure to enhance food availability and affordability.
- Contingency planning tools: contingent loans, catastrophe insurance, and social protection programs that can be scaled up during natural disasters.
- In line with the 2014 Maputo Declaration, African nations committed to at least 10 percent of public spending to food and agriculture, but only a few countries have met this target.

### Policy recommendations: short-term, medium-term, and contingency
- Short-term:
  - Protect the most vulnerable from rising food prices through temporary and preferably targeted fiscal measures.
  - Phase out costly short-term measures gradually given limited fiscal space.
- Medium-term:
  - Increase domestic climate-resilient agricultural capacity and productivity through substantial investment and structural reforms.
  - Improve access to finance and digitalization to mobilize private investment in agricultural resilience.
  - Enhance regional trade integration and resilient transport infrastructure.
- Contingency planning:
  - Strengthen scalable social protection programs and contingency financing (contingent loans, catastrophe insurance) to respond more effectively to food security shocks.

### Role of international support and climate finance
- Short-term international role: channel food aid to the region; help scale up existing social safety nets and fast-track targeted interventions.
- Recent initiatives mentioned as emergency support sources include the Global Alliance for Food Security (expected to mobilize $14 billion in 2022), the UN Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy, and Finance, and the IFI Action Plan to Address Food Insecurity.
- Climate finance to Africa has been insufficient:
  - Of the $73 billion per year in climate finance disbursed by advanced economies during 2016−19, only a quarter went to Africa, and part of that replaced previously committed development finance (OECD 2021).
  - Climate finance disbursed by advanced economies stood at $83 billion in 2020 (OECD 2022).
  - Urgent progress is needed toward the $100 billion climate finance per year pledged by advanced economies.
  - The composition of climate finance should be revisited (for example, increase the ratio of grants to loans).
- Ongoing dialogue with regional and international stakeholders is needed to design an effective, finance-feasible, and climate-resilient food security agenda.

*International Monetary Fund. Building A More Food-Secure Sub-Saharan Africa. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—October 2022. Analytical Note.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/reo/afr/2022/october/english/foodsecuritynote.pdf_