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REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Hard-Won Gains Under Pressure

2026
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Country Groupings

Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings

Oil Exporters	Other Resource-Intensive Countries	Non-Resource-Intensive Countries	Middle-Income Countries	Low-Income Countries	Countries in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations ¹
Angola	Botswana	Benin	Angola	Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso
Cameroon	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Benin	Burundi	Burundi
Chad	Central	Cabo Verde	Botswana	Central	Cameroon
Congo, Republic of	African Republic	Comoros	Cabo Verde	African Republic	Central African Republic
Equatorial Guinea	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Côte d'Ivoire	Cameroon	Chad	Chad
Gabon	Eritrea	Eswatini	Comoros	Congo,	Comoros
Nigeria	Ghana	Ethiopia	Congo, Republic of	Democratic Republic of the	Congo, Democratic Republic of the
South Sudan	Guinea	Gambia, The	Côte d'Ivoire	Eritrea	Congo, Republic of
	Liberia	Guinea-Bissau	Equatorial Guinea	Ethiopia	Eritrea
	Mali	Kenya	Eswatini	Gambia, The	Ethiopia
	Namibia	Lesotho	Gabon	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau
	Niger	Madagascar	Ghana	Guinea-Bissau	Mali
	Sierra Leone	Malawi	Kenya	Liberia	Mozambique
	South Africa	Mauritius	Lesotho	Madagascar	Niger
	Tanzania	Mozambique	Mauritius	Malawi	Nigeria
	Zambia	Rwanda	Namibia	Mali	São Tomé and Príncipe
	Zimbabwe	São Tomé and Príncipe	Nigeria	Mozambique	South Sudan
		Senegal	São Tomé and Príncipe	Niger	Zimbabwe
		Seychelles	Senegal	Rwanda	
		Togo	Seychelles	Sierra Leone	
		Uganda	South Africa	South Sudan	
			Zambia	Tanzania	
				Togo	
				Uganda	
				Zimbabwe	

¹ Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, *Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2026*.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings

The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)	Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC)	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	East African Community (*EAC-5)	Southern African Development Community (SADC)	Southern African Customs Union (SACU)	Economic Community of West African States ¹ (ECOWAS)
Benin	Cameroon	Burundi	*Burundi	Angola	Botswana	Benin
Burkina Faso	Central	Comoros	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Botswana	Eswatini	Cabo Verde
Côte d'Ivoire	African Republic	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	*Kenya	Comoros	Lesotho	Côte d'Ivoire
Guinea-Bissau	Chad	Eritrea	*Rwanda	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Namibia	Gambia, The
Mali	Congo, Republic of	Eswatini	Somalia	Eswatini	South Africa	Ghana
Niger	Equatorial Guinea	Ethiopia	South Sudan	Republic of the		Guinea
Senegal	Gabon	Kenya	*Tanzania	Eswatini		Guinea-Bissau
Togo		Madagascar	*Uganda	Lesotho		Liberia
		Malawi		Madagascar		Nigeria
		Mauritius		Malawi		Senegal
		Rwanda		Mauritius		Sierra Leone
		Seychelles		Mozambique		Togo
		Uganda		Namibia		
		Zambia		Seychelles		
		Zimbabwe		South Africa		
				Tanzania		
				Zambia		
				Zimbabwe		

¹ Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on January 28, 2024.

Assumptions and Conventions

The following conventions are used in this publication:

In tables, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.

An en dash (-) between years or months (for example, 2011-12 or January-June) indicates the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between years or months (for example, 2011/12) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY (for example, FY 2012).

“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.

“Basis points (bps)” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point).

As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.

The boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the part of the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations

AGO	Angola	CPV	Cabo Verde	LSO	Lesotho	SLE	Sierra Leone
BDI	Burundi	ERI	Eritrea	MDG	Madagascar	SSD	South Sudan
BEN	Benin	ETH	Ethiopia	MLI	Mali	STP	São Tomé and Príncipe
BFA	Burkina Faso	GAB	Gabon	MOZ	Mozambique	SWZ	Eswatini
BWA	Botswana	GHA	Ghana	MUS	Mauritius	SYC	Seychelles
CAF	Central African Republic	GIN	Guinea	MWI	Malawi	TCD	Chad
CIV	Côte d'Ivoire	GMB	Gambia, The	NAM	Namibia	TGO	Togo
CMR	Cameroon	GNB	Guinea-Bissau	NER	Niger	TZA	Tanzania
COD	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	NGA	Nigeria	UGA	Uganda
COG	Congo, Republic of	KEN	Kenya	RWA	Rwanda	ZAF	South Africa
COM	Comoros	LBR	Liberia	SEN	Senegal	ZMB	Zambia
						ZWE	Zimbabwe

Executive Summary

Sub-Saharan Africa entered 2026 reaping the benefits of hard-won stabilization gains after a strong 2025. Economic activity accelerated broadly across country groups, with regional growth estimated at about 4.5 percent—the fastest in a decade—reflecting favorable external factors and good policies, particularly in several large economies. Inflation moderated through the end of 2025, because of lower global food and oil prices, easing exchange rate pressures, and appropriately tight monetary stances in many countries. Fiscal positions improved, supported by stronger growth and favorable exchange rate developments.

But the war in the Middle East has clouded the outlook. Oil, gas, and fertilizer prices, together with shipping costs, have risen sharply. Furthermore, the shock has disrupted the trade with Gulf partners, reduced tourist arrivals, and is likely to dent remittances to some countries. Risk appetite has decreased, negatively affecting financing conditions, while buffers in many countries are limited. Regional growth is expected to reach 4.3 percent in 2026, 0.3 percentage point lower than our prewar forecast, with significant heterogeneity across countries. Oil-importing, non-resource-rich countries face a deterioration in trade balance and higher cost of living, while oil exporters will benefit from stronger export revenues but remain exposed to volatility and procyclical policy risks. Median inflation is projected to pick up to 5.0 percent by the end of 2026 from 3.4 percent at the end of 2025. Poverty, food insecurity, and other social indicators, already weakened by the pandemic, face renewed headwinds from declining foreign aid and rising food prices. IMF staff estimates that a 20 percent increase in international food prices can push more than 20 million people into moderate or severe food insecurity across the region.

Downside risks are significant amid high global uncertainty and regional macroeconomic vulnerabilities. A prolonged conflict would further lift oil, fertilizer, and food prices and could trigger a risk-off episode, sharply raising borrowing costs and forcing abrupt adjustment in countries with large refinancing needs. In this scenario, output could decline by 0.6 percent for the region, with more severe impact on oil importers, while inflation could increase by 2.4 percentage points in 2026 relative to prewar baseline.


Policy should focus on addressing the shock in the near term and building resilience over the medium term. Near-term priorities are to keep inflation expectations well anchored and protect the most vulnerable from higher living costs through targeted, time-bound support. Fiscal strategies should balance credibility with flexibility. Oil exporters should treat windfalls as temporary and rebuild buffers. Oil importers should protect priority social and development spending while mobilizing domestic revenues, improving spending efficiency, and strengthening public financial management. Countries should accelerate structural reforms for growth and diversification. Regional integration can boost growth and improve supply-chain resilience in a shifting geopolitical landscape. Deepening domestic financial markets can help unlock greater financing in local currencies. Leveraging artificial intelligence to boost productivity will require widening access to reliable electricity and investments in digital infrastructure, skills, cybersecurity, and data governance.

1. Hard-Won Gains Under Pressure

In 2025 economic activity accelerated broadly across country groups, with regional growth estimated at about 4.5 percent—the fastest in a decade—reflecting favorable external factors and good policies. Inflation moderated through the end of 2025 and fiscal positions improved. After a strong 2025, sub-Saharan Africa entered 2026 reaping the benefits of hard-won stabilization gains. But the war in the Middle East has clouded the outlook. Oil, gas, and fertilizer prices, together with shipping costs, have risen sharply and the shock has disrupted trade. Regional growth is expected to decline by 0.3 percentage point relative to prewar projections to 4.3 percent in 2026 with significant heterogeneity across countries. Oil-importing, non-resource-rich countries face a deterioration in trade balances and higher cost of living, while oil exporters will benefit from stronger export revenues but remain exposed to volatility and procyclical policy risks. Downside risks are significant amid high global uncertainty and regional macroeconomic vulnerabilities. A prolonged conflict could further lift prices and trigger a risk-off episode, sharply raising borrowing costs and forcing abrupt adjustment in countries with large refinancing needs. Policy should focus on addressing the shock in the near term and building resilience over the medium term.

War in the Middle East Tests Resilience

Shock



ENERGY, FERTILIZER, AND SHIPPING PRICES UP

TRADE AND TOURISM DISRUPTED

What Changed

- GROWTH SLOWDOWN
- OIL IMPORTERS TO TAKE A HIT
- + WINDFALL GAIN FOR OIL EXPORTERS
- INFLATION PICKING UP
- FOOD SECURITY AT RISK

What to Do



CAUTIOUS
MACRO POLICY
PURSUE
STABILITY



TARGETED SUPPORT
FOR VULNERABLE
PROTECT FOOD
SECURITY



FASTER
REFORMS
BOOST
PRODUCTIVITY


This chapter of the April 2026 Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa was prepared by an IMF team comprising Saad Quayyum (team lead), Michele Fornino, Cleary Haines, Can Sever, Nikola Spatafora, and Felix Vardy under the guidance of Antonio David, Amadou Sy, and Montfort Mlachila.

2025 Was a Good Year for the Region

Economic activity expanded at the fastest pace in over a decade in 2025, with GDP growth accelerating to 4.5 percent from 4.2 percent in 2024. The improvement was broad-based across resource-intensive, non-resource-intensive, fragile states, and low-income countries (Figure 1.1). Better outturns, compared to the projections in October 2025, reflect stronger performance in large economies, such as Ethiopia and Nigeria, where the effects of sound domestic policy choices were increasingly visible. Growth exceeded 6 percent in 10 economies, and Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda were among the fastest-growing economies globally. Median inflation fell to 3.4 percent at the end of 2025 from 4.8 percent at the end of 2024, because of lower global food and oil prices, the easing of exchange rate pressures, and a tight monetary policy stance in several countries (Figure 1.2). The number of countries with double-digit inflation declined.

Figure 1.1. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth, 2022-25


(Percent)



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Figure 1.2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Headline Inflation, 2015-25

(Percent, year over year)



Sources: Country authorities; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.


The region also made continued progress on the fiscal front. The fiscal deficit for the median country narrowed from 3.4 percent of GDP in 2024 to 3.0 percent in 2025, which, together with stronger growth and favorable exchange rate developments, helped to lower the median public debt from 57.2 percent of GDP in 2024 to 53.1 percent in 2025. Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia made significant progress with sovereign debt restructuring over the course of the year.

Current account balances improved. The median current account deficit narrowed to 3.8 percent of GDP in 2025 from 4.2 percent in 2024 supported by strong export demand and prices, and robust remittance flows in select countries (for example, Ethiopia and Nigeria).

These positive outcomes were driven in part by good policies. Macroeconomic reforms and stabilization efforts, including strengthening of fiscal positions (Figure 1.3), created conditions for stronger growth and lower inflation. Exchange rate realignments after foreign exchange market reforms (Ethiopia and Nigeria), reductions in fuel subsidies (Angola, Ethiopia, and Nigeria), fiscal revenue measures, improved monetary frameworks (South Africa), and structural reforms started to pay off through improved external balances, more stable inflation dynamics, and a clearer path for private investment. These policy efforts contributed to sovereign rating upgrades in several countries, including Ghana, South Africa, and Zambia.

Figure 1.3. Fiscal Balance, 2019-25


(Percent of GDP, weighted means)



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Figure 1.4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Terms of Trade, 2024-25

(Index 2010 = 100)




Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

A supportive external environment helped too. Most countries saw improvements in their terms of trade (Figure 1.4), as export prices of key commodities (such as gold and copper) strengthened or remained buoyant (for example, coffee), while prices of imports (oil, food, and goods from China) declined. The adverse impact of uncertainty caused by US trade policy changes was limited (see Box 1.1). Moreover, accommodative global financial conditions led to increased risk appetite and search for yield among global investors, contributing to lower borrowing rates for African sovereigns. Eurobond issuances reached \$14 billion in 2025 and \$5.5 billion in the first two months of 2026. These factors helped currencies appreciate against the US dollar over the course of the year (Figure 1.5). Most countries in the region (for example, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa) started reducing interest rates as inflationary pressures subsided and central banks judged inflation expectations to be well anchored. These developments, together with money growth, contributed to a steady easing in financial conditions, supporting economic activity (Figure 1.6).

Figure 1.5. Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rates, 2023-26


(Trade-weighted index, December 31, 2023 = 100)



Sources: Bloomberg L.P.; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.

Figure 1.6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Financial Conditions Index

(Below 0 = below average for the period)



Sources: IMF, Monetary and Financial Statistics; Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.


Note: Higher values of the FCI indicate tighter financial conditions. The index combines broad money, credit to the private sector, the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, the EMBI spread, the domestic policy rate, the US 10-year Treasury yield, and the VIX index, using equal weights. All series are within-country Z-scores. The regional FCI is the simple average of indices across 24 countries. EMBI = Emerging Markets Bond Index; FCI = Financial Conditions Index; VIX = Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index.

But the War Has Clouded the Outlook

A new supply shock has hit the region. The war in the Middle East has pushed up oil and gas prices, tightening fuel availability in many countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Zambia, and has led to pump price increases in countries, including Mali, Malawi, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. In some economies, disruptions to fuel supply are affecting electricity generation, transport, and mining. Higher fertilizer prices (Figure 1.7) are adding risks to agricultural output and food inflation, while shipping disruptions have increased costs and impacted trade. Weaker tourism (as in Rwanda and Seychelles) and lower remittances

Figure 1.7. Commodity Prices, January 2024-26

(Index, January 05, 2024 = 100; as of March 27, 2026)




Source: Bloomberg L.P.

Note: Oil price is Brent crude futures price. Fertilizer price is US Gulf NOLA Urea Granular.

Figure 1.8. Sovereign Spreads, February-March, 2026

(Basis points, change since the onset of war in the Middle East)




Sources: Bloomberg L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Data up to March 25, 2026. EMBIG = Emerging Market Bond Index Global.

may further strain external positions in some economies. Financial conditions have also tightened, with higher risk premia and rising sovereign yields—especially among fuel importers (Figure 1.8). Alongside a stronger US dollar, these developments have intensified **exchange rate pressures** in several economies (including Ghana, Mozambique, and South Africa) and are weighing on investment decisions.

Growth for the region is expected to soften to 4.3 percent in 2026, which is 0.3 percentage point lower than the projections in January, while median inflation is expected to pick up to 5.0 percent by the end of 2026. However, there is **significant heterogeneity in the outlook**, with growth accelerating among many oil exporting countries because of stronger export revenues and higher government spending, but decreasing for low-income countries and fragile states, many of whom are oil importers and have limited buffers (Figure 1.9). Although prices of key non-fuel commodities (such as gold and copper) have softened since the start of the war, they remain higher than the average for 2025. Median sovereign spreads for countries in the region are still well below the levels seen in April 2025. These tailwinds have lessened the net impact of the shock thus far. Growth is projected to pick up again to 4.4 percent in 2027, and median inflation to moderate to 3.9 percent by the end of 2027, in line with the assumption under the reference scenario that the shock is expected to be short-lived.

Current account balances are expected to vary across countries. The median current account deficit is projected to narrow by 0.3 percentage point of GDP to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2026. This reflects improvements among oil exporters of about 1.1 percentage points of GDP from higher oil prices and improvements among non-oil resource-intensive countries of 0.7 percentage point of GDP from higher metal prices, compared to 2025. The current account deficit is expected to worsen in non-resource-intensive countries by about 1.4 percentage points of GDP (Figure 1.10).

Figure 1.9. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth (Percent)

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.


Note: SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

Fiscal deficits are projected to worsen in most countries. Median fiscal deficits would reach 3.2 percent of GDP in 2026, higher by 0.2 percent of GDP compared to 2025. However, projections diverge widely across country groups: deficits are expected to widen by about 1 percentage point of GDP in oil exporters, while narrowing by 0.1 percentage point of GDP in non-oil-resource-intensive countries (Figure 1.11).¹ Deficits in non-resource-intensive countries are projected to remain broadly the same as last year. Unchanged administered fuel prices, though, are delaying pass-through, raising fiscal risks and the possibility of expenditure overruns in many countries. For example, in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo, pump prices remain controlled for now, cushioning near-term inflation but increasing subsidy burdens, external financing needs, and the risk of sharper future adjustments.

Beyond the current shock, a key challenge is that living standards are projected to improve at a much slower rate compared to emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) outside the region. Over the medium term, per capita income growth in sub-Saharan Africa is projected at 2.3 percent, compared to 3.6 percent in other EMDEs. In resource-intensive economies, where gains of the resource sectors are often not widely shared across the population, income per capita growth would reach only 1.8 percent. Poverty and other social indicators took a hard hit during the COVID-19 pandemic, and they face further headwinds now from declining foreign aid (see April 2026 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa* Chapter 2). The new shock, if prolonged, can increase food insecurity in the region.

Figure 1.10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Current Account Balance from Previous Year, 2026


(Percentage points of GDP)



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Figure 1.11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Fiscal Balance from Previous Year, 2026

(Percentage points of GDP)



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Significant Downside Risks amid High Uncertainty and Vulnerabilities

Increased commodity price volatility and a reversal in market sentiment would pose near-term material risks. Moreover, intensification of the war in the Middle East would increase oil, fertilizer, and food prices further, weighing down on growth, particularly for oil-importing countries, and push up inflation across the region. On the financial side, several sovereigns face sizable amortizations and hence are planning to rely on market issuance as part of their financing strategy. A sudden tightening of global financial conditions could sharply raise borrowing costs and force abrupt adjustment.

¹ The fiscal deficit in oil exporters without Nigeria is expected to improve from 3.3 percent of GDP in 2025 to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2026.


A severe downside scenario envisioning a longer war and a risk-off episode points to even lower output and higher inflation (Figure 1.12).² In addition to the deeper direct effects, the longer duration and severity of the shock engender a global slowdown that contributes to reducing regional output by 0.6 percent in 2026 and by 0.4 percent in 2027, relative to the prewar baseline.

The impact is heterogeneous across countries, with oil exporters seeing large positive direct effects on GDP from higher oil prices, partially mitigated by the negative second-round effects and the consequences of higher financing costs. Oil importers, on the other hand, are hit hard, with real output decreasing by 1.5 percentage points in 2026 and 2.8 percentage points in 2027. Regional inflation jumps by as much as 2.4 percentage points in 2026 and 3.8 percentage points in 2027, with a more pronounced effect in oil-exporting countries because of the projected boom in economic activity and investment. The current account impact will vary, with large improvements in oil-exporting countries (3.4 and 5.7 percentage points of GDP in 2026 and 2027, respectively) and deteriorations in oil-importing countries (-1.2 and -2.8 percentage points of GDP in 2026 and 2027, respectively).

Domestic political and security risks could intensify, especially around election cycles and in fragile settings. The political landscape has been challenging: the peaceful political transition in Malawi stands in sharp contrast to Gen-Z protests in Madagascar, coup attempts in Benin and Guinea-Bissau, security challenges in the Sahel and Democratic Republic of the Congo, and election-related violence in Tanzania. With several elections scheduled for 2026–27, there is a risk that reform efforts slow, and social tensions rise, including from rising fuel and food prices.

Figure 1.12. Additional Impact on GDP Growth and Inflation from Severe Scenario, 2026-27

(Percentage points deviation from baseline)



Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The black dots portray the impact of a severe downside scenario, measured in percentage points deviations from the baseline, on both real GDP and CPI inflation. The total impact is decomposed in a direct effect because of the higher prices of the commodities, a risk-off event component which arises from the widening of risk premia, and a second-round effect which captures higher inflation expectations and tighter monetary policy. See footnote 3 for the full details of the downside scenario.


² Simulations are carried out using the IMF's AFRMOD model (Andrle and others 2015). In particular, oil prices increase by 100 percent starting in the second quarter of 2026, relative to the January 2026 *World Economic Outlook Update* baseline, and stay at that level in 2027 before returning to baseline in 2028, while gas prices for Europe and Asia increase by 200 percent over the same period, and food commodity prices increase by 5 percent in 2026 and 10 percent in 2027; one-year-ahead inflation expectations ratchet up by as much as 100 basis points in advanced economies by 2027 and by as much as 130 basis points in emerging markets excluding China, also by 2027; a significant risk-off episode pushes corporate premiums in advanced economies and in China by 100 basis points in 2026, and they stay at that level in 2027, while emerging markets and developing economies excluding China see a widening in sovereign spreads of 100 basis points over the same period along with an increase in corporate spreads of 200 basis points.

Climate shocks and disruptions to fertilizer supply chains are likely to affect agricultural activity negatively and undermine food security. The recent floods in south eastern Africa are a reminder that the region is highly vulnerable to weather shocks, while shortfalls in the provision of fertilizers may reduce agricultural productivity and increase costs. These shocks can also create significant strains, particularly at a time when foreign assistance is less forthcoming. Models indicate that a 20 percent increase in the international price of key food commodities can translate to an increase of up to 47 percent in the prevalence of child malnutrition in the most affected countries, and a median increase of 28 percent across all countries.³ Overall, two million children under age five could become acutely malnourished, and more than 20 million people could be pushed into moderate or severe food insecurity across the region at peak levels of pass-through from international to domestic prices (IMF staff estimates using Headey and Ruel 2023; FAO and others 2025; and Nguyen and Thévenot, forthcoming).

In addition to risks, macroeconomic vulnerabilities also remain high in much of the region. About one-third of the countries still face overlapping fiscal, external, monetary, and financial vulnerabilities, which limits policy space and complicates responses to the shock (Figure 1.13). For countries facing multiple imbalances, such as Burundi, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, the terms-of-trade improvements in 2025 provided some temporary respite, but deeper reforms are necessary. More than one-third of the region is at high risk of, or already in, debt distress, and in 21 countries, fiscal deficits are larger than what is required to stabilize debt. Debt vulnerabilities reflect both the legacy of previous shocks and policy slippages, as well as the structural challenge of financing large development needs in the context of limited domestic revenues. The debt service burden is also elevated, which risks crowding out priority development expenditures. Higher effective interest rates and the decline in official development assistance (ODA) have raised the share of revenues devoted to interest payments (see April 2026 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa* Chapter 2).

Figure 1.13. Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic Imbalances, 2024-25

(Number of countries)



Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Bars represent 2025 and lines 2024.

Increased reliance on domestic borrowing has deepened the sovereign-bank nexus, and public sector credit has grown faster than private sector credit. This trend is particularly acute in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), where government debt accounts for 43 percent of banks' assets. With such a strong link between the governments and banks, fiscal crises could precipitate financial crises. The new shock can put further strain on the financial sector as higher energy costs will adversely affect balance sheets of households and corporations, while further widening of fiscal deficits can increase sovereign risks for banks.

Policy Priorities to Maintain Stability and Boost Growth

The Middle East war is testing sub-Saharan Africa's hard-won stabilization gains. Many fuel importers face a deterioration in trade balances and inflation risks, whereas fuel exporters remain exposed to volatility and procyclicality. Uncertainty is expected to remain elevated. Coming on top of the numerous shocks over the past few years, this shock illustrates the importance of designing and implementing policies and frameworks that are resilient to frequent external macroeconomic disruptions.

³ Future prices of wheat have increased by about 7 percent since the start of the war.

In this context, the **near-term priority** is to keep macroeconomic policies anchored, protect the most vulnerable from higher living costs where feasible, and avoid procyclical loosening in fuel exporters. At the same time, countries should press ahead with a **coherent medium-term reform agenda** centered on (1) strengthening monetary and exchange rate frameworks; (2) mobilizing domestic revenue and improving spending efficiency; and (3) accelerating governance and business climate reforms to foster private investment and raise productivity.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies: Maintain Price Stability While Adjusting to the New Shock

For most central banks, there will be a difficult balancing act between controlling inflation and supporting growth. The shock could de-anchor inflation expectations. Therefore, central banks will need to monitor price developments carefully and adjust policies if inflation expectations drift up. Central bank independence and clear policy communication will be key to maintaining price stability and anchoring inflation expectations, amid strong exchange rate pass-through to inflation. Whether central banks should look through the commodity supply shock will vary across countries, depending on inflation dynamics.

Where inflation is above the target or accelerating, a restrictive **monetary stance** can help anchor inflation expectations. This may warrant pausing the easing cycle or raising interest rates where inflation expectations are drifting up. The new shock raises the risk of second-round effects, especially where foreign exchange markets are shallow and monetary transmission is weak, and premature easing could prove costly. In some countries, where inflation is entrenched or the monetary framework is less robust, coordination with fiscal policies will be warranted, particularly by reducing reliance on central bank financing (for example, Burundi, Malawi, and South Sudan).

Where inflation is within target or contained, a **cautious approach is also justified**. Although central banks may be able to look through part of the supply shock, they should carefully monitor emerging exchange rate pressures, and energy price pass-through to inflation and stand ready to tighten monetary policy, if needed, to keep inflation expectations well anchored.

Countries will need to calibrate their exchange rate response based on their current regime, taking into consideration reserve buffers and the severity and persistence of the shock:

- **Countries under a pegged regime will have to align monetary policy with that of the peg country** to minimize the risk-adjusted interest rate differential. They will have to rely on fiscal consolidation to address external imbalances and maintain reserve buffers.
- **Non-pegged countries with limited reserve buffers should seek to preserve external sustainability.** Letting the exchange rate depreciate to help the economy adjust to the external shock is the first line of defense. However, this should be coordinated with monetary and fiscal policies to keep inflation expectations well anchored. Seeking international support can help mitigate some of the balance of payments challenges and exchange rate pressures.
- **Non-pegged countries with sufficient reserve buffers** could consider foreign exchange intervention to lean against exchange rate pressures, if there is significant risk of inflation de-anchoring in the presence of a weak monetary framework or shallow foreign exchange markets.⁴ However, reserves can be depleted quickly if exchange rate pressures are elevated. In all cases, foreign exchange interventions cannot be a substitute for necessary macroeconomic adjustments.

⁴ See IMF Integrated Policy Framework and IMF 2022, which discusses how the framework applies to sub-Saharan Africa.

Central banks will also need to carefully monitor emerging risks to the financial sector, especially those operating through bank balance sheets, sovereign-bank linkages, and capital-flow volatility. They should ensure that banks have sufficient capital and liquidity buffers to absorb shocks and that they adhere to macroprudential standards in place.

Fiscal Policy: Balance Credibility with Flexibility

Near-term fiscal priorities should be tailored to country circumstances:

- **Generalized price subsidies or price controls should be avoided** as they are fiscally costly, distortionary, and hard to unwind. When high price increases are expected to be temporary, carefully targeted measures can be justified to limit severe social and economic disruptions, while still allowing price signals to operate as much as possible.
- **For oil exporters**, any windfall should be treated as temporary and used first to strengthen resilience: improving social safety nets, clearing arrears, rebuilding fiscal and external buffers, and reducing expensive domestic debt. This should be supported by well-designed, transparent fiscal rules and stabilization mechanisms to help manage volatility, smooth spending, and bolster credibility (IMF 2012; Eyraud, Gbohoui, and Medas 2023). Procyclical spending surges can be difficult to reverse, and they can feed into inflation or real exchange rate appreciation.
- **Oil importers with greater fiscal space** (such as Rwanda and Tanzania) should generally use targeted, time-bound transfers and scalable, adaptive social protection to cushion the vulnerable population from higher living costs while protecting priority spending. **Oil importers with limited fiscal space** should reprioritize spending toward the most cost-effective social support targeted at the lowest income households, accelerate domestic revenue mobilization, reduce government spending growth outside of social protection (such as real wage increases for civil servants or low-priority government spending), and strengthen expenditure controls to prevent arrears and safeguard debt sustainability.


In countries where debt sustainability is a prominent risk, additional adjustment remains essential (Figure 1.14). However, such measures should protect high-return social and development spending, including education, healthcare, and basic services such as water, sanitation, and energy access. Healthcare, in particular, will require stronger domestic support to preserve critical public health functions and ensure continuity of essential services, as donor-funded programs are withdrawn or scaled back (see April 2026 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa* Chapter 2).

Domestic revenue mobilization remains central to a sound medium-term fiscal strategy. Revenue performance has improved in the region over the last three years, but the overall revenue remains insufficient to meet the region's large development and social needs while also protecting debt sustainability. The October 2025 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa* and Schneider and others (2025) provide guidance on how countries can strengthen revenue collection.

Improving the efficiency of spending can also unlock significant fiscal resources while enhancing service delivery. In education, healthcare, and infrastructure, the issue is not only how much is spent, but also how effectively public resources translate into outcomes. For the median country, efficiency gaps for healthcare and infrastructure are

Figure 1.14. Additional Fiscal Adjustment Needed to Reach Debt-Stabilizing Primary Balance in 2026

(Percent of GDP, number of countries)




Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.

about twice as large in sub-Saharan Africa compared to other EMDEs (Figure 1.15). Within the region, the efficiency gaps are larger for resource-intensive and oil-exporting countries, while non-resource-intensive countries have made some progress in moving closer to the efficiency frontier in recent years. Efficiency gaps reflect weak project selection and execution for infrastructure investment, inadequate maintenance, procurement inefficiencies, fragmented budgeting, and limited accountability for results.

Strengthening public financial management—including commitment controls, cash management, and arrears prevention—can reduce waste and improve budget credibility (Lopez Murphy and others 2026). Public investment management reforms should prioritize rigorous appraisal, transparent selection, and stronger implementation and ex-post evaluation to ensure that infrastructure delivers durable productivity gains. Sectoral measures—such as teacher and health-worker deployment, drug procurement, school inputs, and maintenance planning—can raise outcomes without proportionate increases in spending. Over time, publishing performance indicators and strengthening audit and oversight institutions can reinforce value for money and reduce leakages.

Figure 1.15. Inefficiency of Fiscal Spending in Select Domains, 2000-24

(Index)



Sources: IMF, *Fiscal Monitor* October 2025; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: The bars portray the average value, calculated over the period 2015-24, of the yearly median efficiency gap in each of the selected groups of countries. Efficiency gaps are index numbers that take value between 0, complete efficiency, and 1, complete inefficiency. These indices measure the distance between measurable levels of output achieved by a government in each of the three sectors of education, healthcare, and infrastructure, and those that could be achieved under best practice management, for any given level of expenditure. The best practice benchmark is identified using a framework based on stochastic frontier analysis, as detailed in the [Online Appendix to the Chapter 1 of the October 2025 Fiscal Monitor](#). AE = Advanced economies; EMDE = Emerging markets and developing economies; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

Accelerate Private Sector-Led Growth and Diversification

Structural reforms that lower the cost of doing business, boost competition, and strengthen network sectors help lower sovereign and private risk premia, crowd in investment, and raise productivity, which is especially important in a volatile external environment (see April 2026 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa* Chapter 3). Targeted state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms in network sectors (energy, transport, and telecommunications) should focus on improving governance, transparency, and cost recovery while ensuring adequate regulation and protecting the poor population through well-designed social measures.

Strengthening regional integration can boost growth and improve supply-chain resilience in a shifting geopolitical landscape. Progress on the outstanding African Continental Free Trade Area agenda, including reducing non-tariff barriers, modernizing customs procedures, and deepening trade in services, will help lower trade costs, speed up clearance, and create larger and more diversified markets for local goods and services (ElGanainy and others 2023; Montagnat-Rentier and others 2025). Among the immediate priorities is completion of negotiations on remaining rules of origin and tariff concessions.

Digitalization, including pragmatic, low-cost artificial intelligence applications in revenue administration, service delivery, and financial inclusion, can improve productivity and state capability. However, it must be paired with investments in energy grids, connectivity, skills, cybersecurity, and data governance to build trust and scale adoption (see Box 1.2).

Deepening domestic financial markets can unlock greater financing in local currencies, enhance policy transmission, and bolster financial stability. Countries should adopt measures to develop local currency bond markets and diversify domestic savings instruments, strengthen market infrastructure and transparency, and broaden the investor base. Improvements in collateral registries, credit information systems, and insolvency frameworks can support private credit and reduce risk premia. Increasing sovereign-bank linkages reinforce the need for robust prudential oversight, credible resolution frameworks, and careful monitoring of concentrated exposures to limit systemic risks (October 2025 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa*). Scaling digital financial inclusion through interoperable platforms, proportionate regulation, and consumer protection will mobilize savings, reduce transaction costs, and support small-firm growth.

Build Support for Reform at Home and Abroad

Reform efforts must be paired with clear communication and inclusive consultation to overcome political economy hurdles. Active engagement of stakeholders (such as parliamentary outreach, civil society, labor groups, academia, and the private sector) can improve reform design and legitimacy (April 2025 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa*). Disseminating information on reform objectives, expected benefits, trade-offs, and implementation timelines can reduce uncertainty and build credibility. In parallel, strengthening institutions that support continuity (through medium-term frameworks, fiscal councils, transparent procurement, and independent oversight) can make reforms more resilient to political transitions. Where reforms impose short-term costs, governments can mitigate resistance through careful pacing and compensatory measures for vulnerable groups.

The international community can support these efforts with predictable financing, technical assistance, and stronger coordination. Prioritizing aid for low-income and fragile countries, where alternative sources of financing are limited, and broadening the development finance toolkit including through blended finance, are likely to maximize its impact. When aligned with priorities of each country, support for capacity building, domestic revenue mobilization, public investment management, and social protection can amplify reform impact and help sustain progress through future shocks. Assistance to rebuild institutions and advance social and economic inclusion is particularly important for post-conflict recovery across the region (April 2026 *World Economic Outlook*, Chapter 3). The IMF stands ready to support countries facing acute and emerging balance of payments shortfalls linked to the war. In recent years, the IMF has been a key source of financing for the region, with programs currently benefiting 22 out of 45 countries.

Box 1.1. Update on US Tariffs and Their Impact on Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa¹

US tariffs on sub-Saharan Africa rose sharply during 2025, though the increase varied widely across countries and products. The region's effective tariff rate rose from near zero at the end of 2024 to over 12 percent in October 2025 and fell to 8.5 percent by late February 2026, in part because of retroactive extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) until the end of 2026 and the U.S. Supreme Court decision that invalidates tariffs imposed through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act² (Figure 1.1.1). In general, the current US tariffs affect economies with a larger share of manufactured exports than energy exporters.


The near-term impact on the region's exports has so far been modest, reflecting limited exposure to the US market. In the two quarters after the April 2025 tariff announcement, aggregate exports to the US remained broadly unchanged. For more than 70 percent of economies, changes in exports to the US were within 0.1 percent of GDP, in part because in over three quarters of countries, exports to the US account for less than 1 percent of GDP. Nonetheless, outcomes varied considerably across countries and sectors. South Africa's automotive exports to the US fell by about half in nominal terms, although this decline was more than offset by increased exports to other markets, particularly Europe. Textile exporters such as Lesotho and Kenya recorded higher exports, likely reflecting frontloading ahead of the anticipated AGOA expiration in the end of September, suggesting that longer-term effects may not yet be fully visible.

Partial equilibrium estimates point to modest direct long-term export losses for most countries. Average losses are estimated at about 0.1 percent of GDP, reflecting limited exposure to the US market and the fact that roughly half of exports face only small tariff increases (around half of regional exports to the US face tariff increases of less than 1.6 percentage points and roughly a quarter of exports by value face no increase at all).

General equilibrium trade models yield a more nuanced—and in many cases more favorable—assessment.³ About one-fifth of countries could see GDP gains as competing exporters to the US, particularly in Asia and Latin America, face higher tariff increases. Export diversion to other markets and cheaper imports as major US suppliers face excess capacity further offset direct losses. These results should be interpreted with caution, as the analysis does not capture the effects of heightened trade uncertainty or broader global macroeconomic spillovers.

Figure 1.1.1 Trade-Weighted Tariff Rate

(Percent, change from October 1, 2025 to end of February 2026)



Source: WTO-IMF Tariff Tracker; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Top 25 countries with highest tariff. AGOA temporarily expired on September 30, 2025. Dot signifies no change.

¹ This box was prepared by Sergii Meleshchuk.

² The end-February 2026 tariff estimates include tariffs imposed using alternative trade laws to bypass US Supreme Court decision.

³ General equilibrium results are based on multi-country, multi-sector models (Caliendo and Parro 2015; Rotunno and Ruta 2025). Unlike partial equilibrium models, they allow consumption and production to respond to tariffs, which affects the global production and trade networks.

Box 1.2. Harnessing Artificial Intelligence for Development: A Strategic Necessity¹

Artificial intelligence (AI) readiness across sub-Saharan Africa is uneven and, on average, below that of many other emerging markets, reflecting gaps in infrastructure, skills, and governance capacity. Even so, AI adoption is advancing through practical, problem-solving applications in key sectors, offering scope for productivity gains and improved service delivery. Moreover, not ready is not the same as not capable. A bold reform agenda can pave the way for leveraging AI more broadly for medium-term growth and productivity.


AI can raise efficiency in sectors that have constrained growth, from agriculture to public services, by augmenting workers' capabilities, improving decision making, and lowering transaction costs. In public administration, AI-enabled analytics can also strengthen tax and customs compliance, improve risk targeting, and support more effective delivery of social assistance. In finance, alternative data and improved fraud detection can help expand access to credit and deepen financial inclusion, if supported by sound safeguards.

The region's economic structure will shape how quickly gains become broad based. Many AI tools primarily enhance cognitive and information-processing tasks, although employment remains concentrated in sectors—such as agriculture—that appear less exposed in standard measures (Figure 1.2.1). Therefore, realizing economy-wide dividends will require diffusion beyond early adopters and complementary investments in energy, skills, connectivity, and firm capabilities. At the same time, early evidence suggests scope for faster adoption in key sectors even where baseline AI exposure measures are lower:

- **Agriculture.** AI-powered advisory services have raised yields by addressing knowledge gaps in crop management, pest control, and climate resilience (Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and Rwanda).
- **Healthcare.** AI decision-support tools have reduced diagnostic and treatment errors, pointing to potential gains in care quality where clinical capacity is scarce (Kenya).
- **Education.** AI-based tutoring pilots produced learning gains equivalent to 1.5–2 years of business-as-usual schooling, pointing to large payoffs from targeted, scalable interventions (Nigeria).

Figure 1.2.1 Workforce Exposure to Artificial Intelligence, 2024

(Percent of employment, solid dots = sub-Saharan Africa)



Note: The categories follow Cazzaniga and others (2024), and distinguish between occupations that are highly exposed and likely to be complemented by AI (High-complement), highly exposed and likely to be replaced by AI (High-substitute), and only weakly exposed overall. The low-exposure share is omitted from the chart (determined by the other two categories). AEs = Advanced economies; EMs = Emerging markets; LICs = Low-income countries.

¹ This box was prepared by Andrew Tiffin based on Schindler and others (forthcoming).

Box 1.2. continued

Scaling up adoption depends on overlapping preconditions. Limited and unreliable infrastructure remains a binding constraint: only 53 percent of the population has access to electricity and 38 percent to the internet, while high costs and outages constrain both compute and digital service delivery. Rapid progress in foundational and job-relevant digital skills will also be critical to ensure that the workforce can thrive in an AI-augmented labor market. Policy priorities include the following:

- **Closing the infrastructure gap.** Invest in reliable power and affordable broadband, and explore regional approaches to high-performance compute (for example, shared data centers, pooled graphics processing unit (GPU) capacity, or joint cloud procurement).
- **Fostering a local ecosystem.** Support innovation that adapts AI to African contexts, including investments in high-quality local-language datasets.
- **Governing for trust.** Strengthen data protection, cybersecurity, and ethical frameworks to build public confidence, and enable responsible deployment in both private and public services.


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2. Aid Cuts in Sub-Saharan Africa: This Time Is Different

Sub-Saharan Africa is the largest global recipient of aid, with official development assistance playing a critical macro-financial role. Although aid flows have evolved over time, the sharp cuts that began in 2025 differ in scale, nature, and breadth, hitting low-income countries and fragile and conflict-affected states hardest. The 2025 contraction is donor driven, is exogenous to recipient conditions, and occurs across development partners. At the same time, traditional buffers—including multilateral institutions and nongovernmental organizations—are significantly diminished compared to those in previous downturns. Moreover, after six years of successive shocks, domestic fiscal space has become very tight, thereby constraining the room to maneuver. The ultimate macroeconomic impact is dependent on each country's exposure, preexisting buffers, and the policy responses they adopt. Navigating this new environment requires a coherent response from development partners and authorities across three priorities: protecting and prioritizing high-impact aid while strengthening coordination; broadening the development finance toolkit—including scaling blended finance; and deepening domestic and regional capacity to design policies, mobilize resources, and deliver services.

Widespread Cuts, Tough Choices



Going Forward

- ✓ PRIORITIZE HIGH IMPACT AID
- ✓ BROADEN FINANCING MODELS
- ✓ STRENGTHEN DOMESTIC CAPACITY

This chapter of the April 2026 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa* was prepared by an IMF team comprising Athene Laws (team lead), Chie Aoyagi, Maurizio Leonardi, and Hamza Mighri, under the guidance of Antonio David and Amadou Sy.

A Shock Like No Other

In sub-Saharan Africa, a region that is highly dependent on aid, the contraction of aid that began in 2025—starting with an estimated 16–28 percent cut in bilateral aid—stands apart from the past aid shifts: it is larger, more synchronized across countries, and predominantly donor driven rather than based on recipient-side developments. At the same time, many traditional shock absorbers—including multilateral development partners and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—are struggling with their own cuts, and years of successive shocks have left sub-Saharan African countries with limited fiscal space to adjust on their own. Low-income countries (LICs) and fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) are the most exposed yet face the most binding constraints in their response. The impact of the cuts is magnified by how integral aid became to budgets, financial flows, and service provision prior to 2025.

Aid Has Been a Critical Resource for Many


Sub-Saharan Africa is more reliant on aid than any other region in the world. Official development assistance (ODA) comprised nearly 3 percent of regional GDP in 2024, which is more than twice the share of the Middle East and Central Asia, the next most reliant region (Figure 2.1).¹ However, aid is not spread equally across the region, but instead it flows more intensively to the most vulnerable countries: as a fraction of GDP, LICs (6.4 percent) and FCS (6.0 percent) receive substantially more aid than emerging market economies (0.4 percent). At the extreme end, aid represents 36 percent of GDP in South Sudan, largely financing humanitarian needs, especially those arising from the neighboring Sudanese conflict.

Given significant development needs and extremely scarce domestic resources, aid has played a critical development role. More than half of aid to the region is directed toward the health, education, and basic humanitarian assistance sectors (Figure 2.2). Most of the remainder finances infrastructure and other productive investments, including roads, energy projects, and private sector development. Only 19 percent is provided as budget support, with the vast majority delivered as non-budgetary support, often implemented through local and international NGOs. As a result, aid provides not only financing but also delivery systems, capacity, and institutional structures for a sizable fraction of social services.

Aid has also served as a significant source of external financing with important macroeconomic implications (Figure 2.3). Aid tends to act as a stabilizing factor during economic downturns in LICs (Lastauskas and Shang forthcoming). Throughout the cycle, aid remains a key inflow that is larger in magnitude than foreign direct investment (FDI) at the regional level and substantially so for LICs. As countries become wealthier, aid declines and FDI grows more important. Aid is also similar in scale to migrant remittances, which also typically flow proportionately more to LICs and FCS with well-documented poverty-reducing impacts at the household level (Maimbo and Ratha 2005).

Figure 2.1. Sub-Saharan Africa Reliance on Official Development Assistance, 2024

(Percent of GDP)




Sources: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee-Table 2A; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: CAF = Central African Republic; GMB = The Gambia; LIC = low-income countries; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa; SSD = South Sudan.

¹ ODA consists of grants and concessional loans from official sources to support development in poorer countries (OECD definition). ODA is provided both by bilateral donors (individual governments and their agencies) and by multilateral institutions such as international organizations and development banks. ODA includes grants (transfers with no repayment obligation) and concessional loans (repaid on softer-than-market terms, typically featuring low interest rates and long maturities)—only the grant-equivalent concessional portion is measured as ODA.


Figure 2.2. Official Development Assistance Sectoral Distribution, 2024

(By modality, and sector)



Sources: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Credit Reporting System; and IMF staff calculations.

Figure 2.3. Composition of External Financing by Income Level, 2010-24



Sources: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee-Table 2A; World Bank; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Estimates are derived from a pooled Dirichlet regression on period averages (2010-16, 2017-24). Lines show predicted composition of external financing as a function of GDP per capita (2021 PPP USD). FDI = foreign direct investment; LIC = low-income countries; ODA = official development assistance; PPP = purchasing power parity; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

Flows Have Shifted Toward Multilateral Lending and Concessional Loans in the Past Fifteen Years


Aid flows have responded to a mix of crisis-driven surges, postcrisis contractions, and structural shifts in donor priorities. Although most sectors experienced growth over the past fifteen years, the pattern was uneven, dominated by sharp spikes during emergencies, such as health sector ODA during the Ebola crisis and humanitarian assistance during the Sudanese conflict, alongside long-term declines in debt-related assistance. In 2020, the pandemic marked a turning point, with unprecedented increases across most sectors and countries, driven by large-scale emergency financing and macroeconomic support. Financing to the region was concentrated in multilateral channels, with the IMF accounting for more than half of the increase in ODA.² At the beginning of 2022, Russia's invasion of Ukraine absorbed a substantial portion of global ODA resources, and the increased spending on defense led to a shift in donor priorities (April 2026 *World Economic Outlook*, Chapter 2).

Over time, budget constraints, stronger emphasis on borrower ownership and policy discipline, and the graduation of recipients to middle-income status shifted aid modalities away from grants toward concessional loans. In 2010, grants accounted for 97 percent of ODA, but by 2024 they had fallen to 68 percent, whereas concessional loans increased from 3 percent to 32 percent during the same period.

The sources of aid have also evolved (Figure 2.4). Although traditional donors (Development Assistance Committee [DAC] members including the US, the UK, and European countries) historically contributed to the bulk of aid, their share

Figure 2.4. Official Development Assistance Distribution by Donor

(Percent, share of total ODA)



Sources: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee-Table 2A; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: DAC = Development Assistance Committee; EU = European Union; ODA = official development assistance.

² The concessional portion of loans, including IMF concessional lending, is classed as ODA per OECD definitions.

declined from 68 percent in 2010 to 42 percent in 2024. Currently, by contrast, **multilateral agencies account for the majority of aid flows**. This rising reliance on multilateral channels reflects a stronger support for coordinated and pooled responses to increasingly global and cross-border challenges.


The region has also experienced a gradual **diversification of funding sources toward non-traditional donors**. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data, contributions from non-DAC countries grew from a negligible amount in 2010 to \$1.06 billion, or 1.9 percent of the total aid, in 2024. However, limitations in reporting imply that there is an undercount of actual aid flows.³ The most significant non-DAC donors are the Gulf States and China.⁴ The UAE alone accounted for 72 percent of non-DAC flows captured in the OECD data. There are alternative informative sources that capture additional flows that are not reported in the standard ODA statistics. According to AidData (2025), China's grant-based aid to sub-Saharan Africa peaked at \$1.2 billion in 2018 before declining to \$633 million by 2022. Chinese grants flow predominantly to LICs in the region, focusing on health, education, and government and civil society sectors. Additional ODA in the form of concessional loans is primarily directed toward energy, transport, communications, and other infrastructure sectors in emerging markets, and it similarly peaked in 2018. These ODA trends broadly mirror the recent decline in China-Africa financial flows, with overall Chinese lending to Africa turning net negative as repayments now exceed new loans (China Lending to Africa Database 2025; April 2026 *World Economic Outlook*).

2025 Marked a Sharp Break, Particularly for Vulnerable Countries

While aid had gradually declined in post-COVID years, the closure of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), substantial reductions in US development budgets announced in January 2025, and reports of funding cuts from other major donors, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, signaled a sea change.⁵ According to a donor survey conducted by the OECD, **African bilateral aid budgets decreased by 16–28 percent (potentially cutting between \$4 and \$7 billion) in 2025 relative to the 2024 levels** (Figure 2.5)—a range broadly corroborated by other publicly available estimates. In terms of dollar value, the largest losses could hit Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria (between \$240 and \$780 million each). Smaller countries and FCS receive more aid as fraction of GDP and government revenues. Therefore, the impact on these countries could be even more acute: South Sudan and Central African Republic could lose aid exceeding the equivalent of 10 percent of their government revenue, with humanitarian aid most affected.

Figure 2.5. Bilateral Official Development Assistance by Income and Fragility Level, 2015–25

(In percent of GDP, median)



Sources: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee-Table 2A; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: 2025 projections assume 16–28 percent cuts to 2024 bilateral ODA levels with 2025 GDP. FCS = fragile and conflict-affected states; LIC = low-income countries; ODA = official development assistance; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

³ This diversification in donors extends to multilateral financing instruments too, with non-traditional donors increasingly funding the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, and Resilience and Sustainability Facility.

⁴ China and the Gulf States play an even larger role in non-ODA development finance flows to sub-Saharan Africa (Selassie, Hume, and Schipke 2025). Opacity can be an issue in non-ODA lending too, as many financing transactions are not included in standard debt statistics (Horn and others 2023, 2024).

⁵ Policies are still shifting: for example, in December 2025, the US signed several health system-strengthening agreements with several sub-Saharan African countries, including Kenya, Uganda, and Lesotho (United States Department of State 2025a, 2025b). Moreover, not all countries are cutting: Japan, Spain, Italy, and some Nordic donors are maintaining ODA or increasing aid budgets, although the magnitudes do not compensate (Donor Trackers 2026). Overall, the global direction in aid is down.

Some countries and sectors may fare better or worse than the OECD's estimated cuts. **Humanitarian aid has been particularly hard hit.** Initial estimates suggest that humanitarian aid flows to sub-Saharan Africa dropped by 42 percent in 2025 relative to the 2024 levels (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service [UNOCHA FTS]). Chad, the largest host country for refugees per capita in Africa, could face a halving of its aid receipts in the coming year, severely crippling life-saving humanitarian aid for both the hosted refugee camps and its own population (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]). By contrast, other countries will fare much better. For example, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe do not expect large aid reductions because their primary donors still maintain their funding.⁶


These 2025 bilateral cuts are likely only the first wave. Most bilateral donors plan aid on multiannual cycles, and further reductions will occur when new programming periods begin.⁷ Furthermore, many multilateral agencies, which are traditionally shock absorbers for the region, face their own steep budget cuts following decreased contributions from bilateral donors. For example, the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the World Health Organization project 34, 27, and 39 percent less funding in the coming years than in 2023–24, respectively. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that less than half of the people in need of humanitarian assistance can be reached with available resources in 2026. An estimated 3 million children in sub-Saharan Africa may be pushed out of school by 2026, and 75 million children globally may miss routine vaccinations in the next five years (United Nations Children's Fund; Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations).

Although uncertainty remains elevated, driven in part by rapidly evolving donor policy decisions, the direction of travel is clear: significant and widespread reductions in aid envelopes across the region. Moreover, **the countries most affected by the cuts tend to be those already facing multiple sources of vulnerability**, such as conflict, insurgency, high poverty rates, and political instability. Distributionally, the most vulnerable populations within these vulnerable countries will bear the biggest burden.

Countries in the Region Have Faced Sizable Cuts in the Past...

A statistical analysis of "surges" and "collapses" in ODA reveals that, since 1960, there have been 149 recorded episodes⁸ in sub-Saharan Africa, with approximately 55 percent classified as collapses. The average aid reduction was about 40 percent, but tended to be isolated to individual countries. Using local projections methods, the estimated effects of aid collapses on macroeconomic variables indicate **a sharp deterioration in fiscal balances.** This goes beyond a purely mechanical loss in grants: the fiscal balance excluding grants continuously eroded over time and was, on average, 2.6 percent of GDP weaker after five years (Figure 2.6). Decomposing the channels shows that the deterioration was driven by declining non-grant revenues, combined with no significant reduction in expenditures: spending commitments continued after aid was cut, and revenues fell. Impacts on growth and external balances were less consistent across episodes.

Figure 2.6. Fiscal Balance Response to an Official Development Assistance Shock
(Percentage points of GDP, excluding grants)



Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The impulse response is based on Jordà's (2005) local projections and is smoothed across horizons to reduce finite-sample noise; shaded areas denote 95 percent confidence intervals from the original estimates.

⁶ In Cabo Verde, Portugal and Luxembourg are the main providers of aid, with broadly similar magnitudes of support. São Tomé and Príncipe's largest donor is the World Bank.

⁷ For example, the largest cuts to UK aid budgets will likely come in 2026–27, the Netherlands plans large cuts in 2027, and Sweden plans cuts between 2026 and 2028.

⁸ Episodes are identified by detecting structural breaks in ODA flows time-series data (following Combes, Ouedraogo, and Tapsoba 2016).

However, the statistical analysis cannot identify the underlying drivers of aid shocks. Reductions in aid may stem from domestic developments—positive ones, such as countries growing sufficiently to no longer qualify for aid, or negative ones, such as coups. Other reductions reflect the completion of large one-off projects, and yet more arise from external factors, including shifts in donor budgets. A notable example is the conclusion of the debt-restructuring initiatives of the 1990s: because debt relief was classified as aid, the measured ODA fell mechanically once restructurings ended, even though countries emerged with a stronger debt position by design. Clearly, **the nature of the reduction matters for the macroeconomic impact.**

A narrative analysis of IMF and World Bank country documents⁹ highlights several drivers of past aid shocks. Large declines occurred as countries became wealthier (for example, Angola’s above 50 percent cut in the mid-2000s and Equatorial Guinea’s sharp drop in 2010–12 with rising oil exports) or because of domestic conditions (for example, Eritrea’s 2006 reduction after an improved humanitarian situation and a policy decision to limit aid). Other drops reflected the completion of major infrastructure projects (for example, Cabo Verde’s sharp decline in 2018). Favorable economic developments offset the macroeconomic effects of declining aid in the former cases, whereas the predictability and completed projects mitigated the impact in the latter cases. **Most countries adjusted through a combination of revenue mobilization, stronger public financial management, and spending reprioritization.**

...But This Shock Is Different

Several unique, striking features of the current shock stand out:

- Firstly, **the scale and breadth of the cuts are significant.** A large majority of traditional development partners are cutting or re-prioritizing funding in response to shifts in their geopolitical priorities and domestic spending needs. Almost all recipient countries in the region are affected. Although individual countries have experienced aid cuts of a similar magnitude before, they were usually confined to the country in question and were in response to recipient country-specific conditions.
- Secondly, the **speed, simultaneity, and unexpected nature** of the cuts are striking: funds were often withdrawn mid-project with minimal warning, leaving little time for governments or implementing partners to adjust.
- Next, **uncertainty is extremely elevated:** authorities are contending with a severe lack of information regarding the extent, timing, and specific program impacts of the cuts.
- Lastly, **alternative sources of support are limited.** Many UN agencies and other multilateral organizations—historically a stabilizing counterweight—are themselves facing budget cuts and scaled-back operations, which reduces their ability to offset bilateral cutbacks. NGOs also play an active role in aid but are insufficient in scale to compensate for lost bilateral, or multilateral, budgets.

Therefore, it is not feasible to rely too heavily on the past to predict the impact of the current shock.

The Macroeconomic Impact Will Be Most Significant for the Region’s Most Vulnerable...


Although many countries in sub-Saharan Africa receive relatively little aid and will experience limited effects from the cuts, the shock will be significant for a sizable number of countries. These tend to be LICs and FCS: precisely the ones with the least capacity to cope. **Among the 15 countries most reliant on ODA in the region, 73 percent**

⁹ Documents include publicly available IMF Article IV reports and program review documents, and World Bank Public Expenditure Reviews and Systematic Country Diagnostics.

are currently in high debt risk or debt distress, pointing to a worrying overlap between aid dependence and fiscal vulnerability. IMF-administered surveys shed light on the multiple constraints country authorities are facing, the expected macroeconomic implications, and the measures being considered to mitigate the shock (Figure 2.7).¹⁰

A large majority of IMF country teams reported the high degree of uncertainty confronting authorities, particularly regarding off-budget programs. The lack of clarity around the extent, timing, and details of the cuts severely complicates any policymaking response. Nearly all teams raised capacity constraints as binding: be they constraints over collecting information on the programs affected, assuming service-delivery roles previously carried out by development partners, or implementing alternative social support mechanisms.

Figure 2.7. Key Issues Raised by Country Teams



Sources: IMF Country Team Survey Data; IMF, World Economic Outlook database, and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Respondents could select multiple answers.

* "High debt risk" reflects the share of countries with a debt risk status high or in distress from IMF countries debt sustainability analysis.

** "External imbalances" reflects the share of sub-Saharan African countries with either reserves in months of imports less than 3 months or a current account deficit exceeding 10 percent of GDP from World Economic Outlook database.

...And Will Depend Crucially on Policy Choices

Countries entered the crisis with different macroeconomic buffers, and their policy choices will shape the macroeconomic impact of the shock. So far, about one in seven countries have no formal plans to mitigate or replace the lost aid, *de facto* letting programs and services lapse. In these cases, many of which primarily involve off-budget aid cuts, the short-term fiscal effects may be less pronounced than if programs were brought onto the budget. However, the unmitigated humanitarian costs are likely to be high, affecting the most vulnerable members of the population hardest. Over the longer term, the erosion of basic health and education services risks weakening human capital and, consequently, future growth and development outcomes. Sustained cuts also risk undermining economic opportunity and domestic stability in ways that can amplify migration pressures, deepen fragility, and weaken social cohesion within affected countries.

Other countries plan to cover at least some of the lost aid programs. For example, Nigeria—which received over \$440 million from USAID’s health funding in 2024—has increased its domestic health spending by \$200 million (ODI 2026). Others are finding new donors or signing new agreements, such as health system-strengthening agreements with the US. Four in ten countries plan some reprioritization of existing spending: reducing budget allocations in one area to cover some of the shortfall. Of these, nearly two-thirds plan to cut public investment budgets. Although such cuts may be politically easier than more visible spending reductions, they often weigh

¹⁰ Every member country has a dedicated team of IMF economists who engage with authorities and development partners, conduct macroeconomic surveillance, and provide policy advice. Some countries are also in a lending relationship. Surveys on aid cuts were sent to the 45 country teams of the sub-Saharan African Department in November 2025. Twenty-eight teams were able to provide detailed insights on the cuts, drawing on a mix of country data, and discussions with authorities and donor communities.

on long-term growth and development. Of the countries with estimates, on average, approximately 30 percent of the lost ODA budgets will be covered through spending reprioritization, another 30 percent is estimated as no longer needed, and the remaining 40 percent currently remains unfunded. This is roughly in line with anticipated responses to aid cuts in other regions (April 2026 *Fiscal Monitor*, Chapter 1).

In addition, one-third of countries—some overlapping with the reprioritization group—plan to increase borrowing to partially offset the lost aid, which in some cases may raise debt-sustainability risks. Many plan to rely more heavily on domestic debt markets, a growing trend in the region that, in excess, can heighten debt-sustainability risks and intensify sovereign-bank nexus vulnerabilities (Sy and Laws 2026; October 2025 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa*).

Furthermore, about one-quarter of countries—again with some overlap—plan to cover some of the shortfall with domestic revenue mobilization, a long-standing priority in the region. Ethiopia, for example, introduced a temporary tax on public and private workers, with proceeds channeled to a new Disaster Risk Response Fund (ODI 2026).


Partial-equilibrium simulations of a 25 percent bilateral ODA cut illustrate that the overall macroeconomic effects depend critically on policy responses (Figure 2.8). The average emerging market economy is far less aid-dependent and therefore experiences only muted macroeconomic impacts under any scenario. However, the picture differs markedly for poorer countries. If a low-income country replaces half of the lost ODA through the domestic budget, the fiscal deficit is projected to widen by about 1 percent of GDP, growth falls by roughly 0.7 percentage point, and the balance of payments deteriorates by 1.6 percent of GDP. By contrast, replacing none of the aid programs would result in no direct fiscal deterioration, but a larger growth shock and significantly worse humanitarian outcomes.

The preexisting tight fiscal environment further exacerbates policy trade-offs. Aid cuts are only the latest in a six-year sequence of shocks (the global pandemic, tightening of global financial conditions, rising food and energy prices, and geopolitical tensions and tariffs) that have increased debt burdens and eroded fiscal space across the region (April 2025 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa*). As a result, one-third of country teams identified limited fiscal space as a critical constraint, severely restricting the options available to authorities.¹¹ Unfortunately, addressing this challenge remains complex: Abdel-Latif and others (2026) note that efforts to build more fiscal space often result in larger output losses when aid inflows are low because the loss of external financing removes important buffers and weakens the confidence of economic agents.

In summary, aid cuts will deliver the largest macroeconomic blow to LICs and FCS—where heightened uncertainty around the cuts, binding capacity constraints, limited fiscal space, and painful policy trade-offs mean the reductions will translate into steeper growth headwinds, worsened humanitarian conditions, and sharper fiscal pressures than previous shocks. Even those countries with sufficient buffers to offset the cuts will face deteriorating fiscal positions: there are no winners.

Figure 2.8. Sub-Saharan Africa Low-Income Countries: Impact of Official Development Assistance Cuts

(Average impact)



Sources: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Domestic replacement is assumed to be 50 percent less import-intensive than donor funding. BOP = balance of payments.

¹¹ The message of constrained policymaking aligns with Bedasso's (2026) data set of announced responses by African governments. There, the most aid cut-exposed countries face the steepest capacity and fiscal constraints, and are the ones announcing the fewest mitigating measures.

Difficult Choices in a Less-Benign World

Amid a shifting context, the international community and recipient countries have three priorities:

- **The first priority is official development assistance policy itself:** protecting, prioritizing, and coordinating aid to maximize impact. Despite competing demands on scarce development-partner resources, a strong case must be made to protect high-impact aid that measurably improves development outcomes. Aid should flow where its impact is greatest and alternatives are most limited. The poorest LICs and FCS—where the cuts have the steepest consequences—should be prioritized, and essential humanitarian assistance should be preserved.

Coordination is also critical at the recipient, development-partner, and international level. Fragmentation, duplication, and inconsistent processes reduce impact and raise costs. A changing geopolitical landscape may exacerbate the fracturing, placing a greater premium on recipient countries enacting coordination mechanisms. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, intends to strengthen its national reporting system, *Plateforme de Gestion de l'Aide et des Investissements* (PGAI), to track and manage a more complex aid landscape. Predictability and alignment with national development plans remain essential to managing aid transitions effectively.

- **The second priority is to broaden the toolkit.** Although aid may remain the primary source of financing for humanitarian needs and fragile contexts, alternative models are viable for projects with market-based elements. Blended finance—which uses development funds to de-risk and crowd in private investment through guarantees, insurance, first loss capital, and other mechanisms—stands out as one of the few scalable investment tools in today's fiscally constrained global environment (United Nations 2025). Eyraud and others (2021) estimate that including the private sector could raise up to 3 percent of regional GDP in additional finance. Recent examples include Rwanda's 2023 sustainability-linked bond, supported by a World Bank escrow account (World Bank 2023), and a joint Africa-Europe initiative using guarantees to mobilize private capital for energy and local enterprises (European Commission 2026). Clean energy and climate-related investments currently account for about two-thirds of global blended finance flows (Convergence Blended Finance 2025).

Scaling up blended finance, however, faces several barriers. Global volumes remain small relative to aid, and although sub-Saharan Africa hosts nearly half of transactions, most flow to emerging markets rather than LICs (Convergence Blended Finance 2025). High transaction costs hinder scale, and limited scale, in turn, keeps costs high. Expanding the number of transactions can help standardize processes, build best practice knowledge, develop a project pipeline, and lower costs over time. Like traditional aid, **fragmentation, weak coordination, and transparency gaps** remain key obstacles. Moreover, **macroeconomic stability, governance quality, and structural reforms to the business environment** are critical to attracting private capital of all types, including blended finance. Importantly, **blended finance is not a panacea:** although it can increase financing volumes, it is more costly than grants and can add to debt service burdens.

- **The final priority is to draw more on domestic and regional resources while strengthening recipient-country policy design and service-delivery capacity.**¹² In the context of lower aid and increasingly uncertain global economic policies, resilience must increasingly come from within. Other external flows, such as FDI and remittances, remain critical for development and should be supported through appropriate policy (IMF 2023; Ricci and others 2025). However, these flows cannot compensate for aid as they play distinct roles; remittances themselves may decline as global migration policies evolve.

Aid cuts reinforce the criticality of domestic revenue mobilization in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio in the world, with the median country collecting 13.8 percent of GDP. Improved tax administration and policy reforms can raise this figure, but doing so requires strengthening technical

¹² The IMF–World Bank three pillar approach, particularly Pillar 1 (Domestic Revenue Mobilization), provides a useful framework (Pazarbasioglu and Saavedra 2024).

capacity and building public support and trust (October 2025 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa*; Baer and others 2025). Aid-dependent FCS face more urgent revenue needs, yet also contend with very high rates of informality, weaker private sectors, significant governance constraints, and limited economic registries. Progress under these conditions requires tailored technical, institutional, and political solutions (Chen and others 2025; IMF forthcoming).

In a constrained fiscal environment, every dollar must be well spent to shield hard-won development gains. Priority social and capital expenditures must be protected to avoid sacrificing long-term development priorities, such as health and education. Although short-term multipliers could understate their impact, cuts to social and humanitarian spending would generate lasting scars to human capital, growth, and long-term prosperity. Poorly targeted spending, such as energy subsidies, could be redirected toward sectors previously reliant on aid,¹³ and public financial management, governance, and investment efficiency should be strengthened to maximize development returns (Dabla-Norris and others 2011; October 2025 *Fiscal Monitor*). Medium-term fiscal frameworks and effective debt management, can also stabilize public finances and help lower borrowing costs, thereby protecting budget room for social spending (Comelli and others 2023; October 2025 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa*).

Finally, because aid has historically provided not only financing but also policy design and implementation, **bringing services in-house will require sustained investment in domestic institutions and capacity.** Capacity development support from international partners and regional peer learning will be critical to strengthen domestic health, education, and social service delivery in the face of reduced aid. In parallel, the IMF's Global Public Finance Partnership combines donor funding and IMF expertise to strengthen fiscal and public finance capacity. As development-partner delivery systems scale back, there is also scope to minimize duplication, streamline processes, and reduce costs. Ultimately, strengthening the domestic ownership of essential programs is not only a fiscal and development necessity but a pivot away from external aid dependence toward greater domestic resilience, enabling countries to respond directly and sustainably to the needs of their populations.

¹³ World Bank (2025) provides an overview of priorities for health financing in the context of declining aid.

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3. Sub-Saharan Africa Growth Reset: Reforms to Unlock Private Sector Drive

Sub-Saharan Africa's growth remains too weak to deliver income convergence, reflecting persistently low productivity and challenges to a pivot towards private sector-led growth. Past growth spurts—often driven by commodity booms or public investment—have proved transitory, leaving the state as the dominant growth engine amid rising debt, high borrowing costs, and declining aid. This model is no longer viable.

The payoff from reform is large. IMF staff analysis shows that closing half the gap with emerging markets in key “foundational” areas—governance, business regulation, and the external sector—could raise regional output by up to 20 percent over 5-10 years, through higher investment, stronger productivity, and greater labor force participation, provided macroeconomic stability is preserved. Governance reforms, in particular, deliver durable dividends by leveling the playing field, boosting tax compliance, and strengthening state capacity.

Yet reform success hinges as much on how reforms are designed and implemented as on which reforms are chosen. Sequencing foundational reforms first, bundling complementary measures, addressing distributional impacts, and adapting ambition to institutional capacity are critical. State-owned enterprise reform—especially in infrastructure—is central to lowering costs, crowding in private investment, and containing fiscal risks.

Looking ahead, countries should tailor reform strategies to their circumstances: comprehensive, bundled reforms where capacity is strong; foundational governance reforms and early wins where it is weak; and stronger transparency and revenue management in resource-rich economies. With macroeconomic stabilization advancing across the region, the conditions are in place for a renewed reform push. Anchored in a credible social contract and supported by clear communication and broad ownership, cost-effective supply-side reforms can unlock private sector-led, job-rich growth and help the region harness its demographic dividend.

Public to **Private**: **Vast** Potential

Why?

REFORMS
CAN
DELIVER
UP TO

20%

HIGHER
OUTPUT
OVER 5-10
YEARS

What?

- ✓ GOVERNANCE
- ✓ BUSINESS REGULATION
- ✓ STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
- ✓ OPENING TO MARKETS

How?



BUILDING SOCIAL
CONSENSUS



STRENGTHENING
STATE CAPACITY



SEQUENCING/
BUNDLING REFORMS

This chapter of the April 2026 *Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa* was prepared by an IMF team comprising Grace Li (team lead), Amirah Arifin, Hicham Bennouna, Fiona Hesse-Triballi, and Balazs Stadler, under the guidance of Nikola Spatafora and Constant Lonkeng.

The Growth Imperative: Why Reforms Can No Longer Wait


Economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa remains insufficient to achieve income convergence with other regions, despite strong performance in a number of countries, including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. Over the past two decades, growth in real income per capita has lagged well behind that of other developing regions (Figure 3.1). At the region's average real GDP per capita growth rate of the past three years (1.4 percent), incomes would take about half a century to double, implying a further widening of the convergence gap.

This stalled convergence partly reflects weak productivity, a conclusion that is robust across multiple indicators. Average labor productivity in the region has been broadly flat for nearly three decades, diverging markedly from trends in other regions (Figure 3.2). Consistent with this, growth-accounting exercises point to only a modest contribution from total factor productivity (an indicator of economy-wide efficiency), averaging ¼ percentage point over the past quarter century. In resource-intensive economies, total factor productivity has weighed on growth since the end of the commodity boom, further constraining medium-term growth prospects (Figure 3.3).

Many growth spurts in sub-Saharan Africa have proved transitory because the transition to a private sector-led growth model failed to materialize. Output expansions driven by commodity booms or (often inefficient) public investment have frequently fallen short of catalyzing sufficiently strong and durable private investment to sustain growth beyond the boom period (Figure 3.4). As a result, the public sector remained the main growth engine in many countries.

Figure 3.1. GDP per Capita, 1965-2025

(Constant prices, PPP 2021, thousand international dollars)




Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Note: EMDE = emerging market and developing economies; SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 3.2. Labor Productivity Growth, 1991-2024

(GDP per person employed, constant 2021 PPP, thousand international dollars)




Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.

Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENAP = Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan region.

Figure 3.3. Sub-Saharan Africa: Decomposition of GDP Growth, 2000-09

(Percentage)




Sources: IMF staff calculations; and Penn World Table (PWT 11.0).

Note: The chart presents the decomposition of GDP growth into changes in labor and in the capital stock, with TFP obtained as residuals. TFP = total factor productivity.

Structural reforms are critical to pivot toward a job-rich, private sector-led growth model.¹ With policy space constrained by elevated debt levels, high borrowing costs, and waning aid, transitioning from a public sector-led growth model to one in which the private sector drives investment, innovation, and productivity is essential for fostering sustained growth and job creation.

This chapter focuses on economy-wide (“horizontal”) reforms rather than sector-specific policies or industrial policy (IP). An exception is state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform, given SOEs’ cross-cutting role in infrastructure provision and their economy-wide spillovers. The emphasis on horizontal reforms reflects the evidence that strong, broad-based institutions and rules—covering governance, competition, regulation, and macroeconomic stability—form the essential foundation for effective industrial policies. Where IPs are warranted, for example, to address clearly identified market failures, they tend to be more effective and less distortionary when implemented in the context of robust horizontal policies (IMF 2024a; IMF 2025; Baquie and others 2025).

Figure 3.4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Public and Private Investment and Growth in Resource-Intensive Countries (Excluding Oil Exporters), 2000–24



Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.

Note: The variables are averages over a five-year rolling window. LHS = left-hand side; RHS = right-hand side.

Structural Reforms: Where Does Sub-Saharan Africa Stand?

Based on a comprehensive database of reform indicators, sub-Saharan Africa trails other regions, particularly in governance, despite notable pockets of progress.² Relative to other developing regions, gaps are especially pronounced in “foundational” reforms—governance, business regulation, and external sector.³ Governance indicators have broadly stagnated over time, whereas business-regulation measures have improved only modestly and from a very low base. At the country level, some reformers stand out. Mauritius and Seychelles strengthened government effectiveness and service delivery by improving policy formulation and implementation and insulating the civil service from political pressures. Rwanda and Benin cut red tape and leveraged digitalization to improve the business environment, beginning in 2000 and 2016, respectively.

At the same time, SOEs (which dominate in key infrastructure sectors) have displayed weak financial and operational performance. SOEs are estimated to account for 30–50 percent of GDP in a sample of 14 sub-Saharan African countries (Khasiani and others 2023). However, their weak financial positions and operational inefficiencies impose significant fiscal burden and constrain their ability to deliver reliable services. About 40 percent of SOEs in the region are unprofitable, with an estimated average annual losses of about 1 percent of GDP (Wezel and Carvalho 2022). These losses are partly driven by tariffs set below cost-recovery levels, which erode cash flows and capital, undermine maintenance, and limit investment in new capacity needed to expand service provision to meet rising needs.

¹ Structural reforms are policies that bring regulatory and legal changes to help remove impediments to efficient resource allocation and raise productivity and potential growth, for example, by reshaping the incentives and rules under which markets operate.

² The data source is the Structural Reforms in EMDEs Updated Dashboard, which draws from an IMF Staff Discussion Note (Budina and others 2023).

³ Governance measures institutional quality using the six Worldwide Governance Indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Business regulation measures the extent to which regulations and bureaucratic processes in each country might hamper private sector activity by restricting entry and decreasing competition. External sector reforms describe the extent to which countries can freely exchange goods and services, as well as ideas; it captures the degree of economic freedom in trade and external finance reforms. Of note, “regulatory quality” (under “governance”) and “business regulation” are complementary—not substitutes—in that the former evaluates the overall strength of a country’s regulatory system (*de jure*), whereas the latter deals with tangible rules and requirements that businesses must follow, and their implementation in practice (*de facto*).

Reaping Reform Dividends

Closing half the structural gap with emerging markets in key reform areas could raise sub-Saharan Africa's aggregate output by up to 20 percent over 5-10 years. IMF staff analysis suggests that these gains would be driven by higher investment, stronger productivity growth, and greater labor force participation, conditional on a stable macroeconomic environment (Figure 3.5).


Governance reforms deliver particularly large and durable dividends. Beyond curbing corruption—through enhanced transparency and accountability in public resource management, digitalization, and stronger oversight—they boost tax compliance and strengthen state capacity (IMF 2019a). More fundamentally, improved governance levels the playing field for businesses and households alike, fostering fair competition and confidence in public institutions. Targeted anti-corruption measures—including stronger auditing practices, enhanced transparency in beneficial ownership, robust conflict-of-interest rules, and public asset declaration systems—can help address public concerns regarding the use of public funds and lay the groundwork for broader structural and institutional reforms.

Similarly, sound business regulation and trade-friendly reforms foster competition and firm dynamism by lowering barriers to entry and allowing resources to shift toward most productive activities, thereby lifting productivity (see Hansen-Addy, Parrilli, and Tingbani 2024; World Bank 2024). Effective enforcement is essential, as is regulatory simplicity, often supported by digitalization. Overly complex rules invite discretion and rent-seeking, stifling innovation. Mauritius, for example, bolstered contract enforcement and property rights while streamlining regulation and reducing compliance costs.

The growth dividends from reform vary considerably across countries. Oil exporters and fragile and conflict-affected states are estimated to benefit the most, in part because they start from a lower base and face wider reform gaps (Figure 3.6). While halving the gap with emerging markets represents an ambitious regional goal, several sub-Saharan African countries have demonstrated that deep and sustained reforms are achievable. Botswana's

Figure 3.5. Sub-Saharan Africa: Dividends from Closing Gaps Relative to Emerging Markets in Key Structural Reform Areas

(Cumulative percent change over 5-10 years)




Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: For each reform area identified on the horizontal axis, the bars show the estimated cumulative impact on the output of closing the corresponding percentage of the structural reform gap (25, 33, and 50 percent) compared to emerging markets (the lightest portion of the bar corresponds to growth dividends from closing 25 percent of the gap, and the darkest represents cumulative growth dividends from closing 50 percent of the gap). The reported effects represent the cumulative five-year output response to closing the reform gap, estimated using the local projection method (Jordà 2005), building on previous IMF work (IMF 2019b; Budina and others 2023). A gradual closing of the reform gap would yield the same cumulative effect but over a longer period of time.

Figure 3.6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Distance to Emerging Markets in Selected Structural Policy Areas, 2022

(Distance relative to frontier from 0 = furthest to frontier to 1 = at the frontier)



Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The box shows the interquartile range (25th-75th percentile) of the distribution, and the middle line represents the median. Whiskers extend to one-and-a-half times the interquartile range, with any values beyond this range treated as outliers.

long-standing success in leveraging diamond wealth, underpinned by transparent revenue management, rule of law, and a predictable policy environment, supported a sustained annual growth rate of about 12 percent between independence (1966) and 1990. Among non-resource-intensive countries, Côte d'Ivoire's reform drive after the 2010–11 political crisis restored institutional credibility and investor confidence, helping attract foreign investment—FDI has increased more than tenfold, reaching \$3.3 billion by 2024—and supporting average growth of about 7 percent over the past five years. Since the crisis, the country has closed more than half of its governance gap relative to emerging markets. Earlier episodes of economic liberalization from the mid-1980s to the 1990s yielded substantial growth payoffs in the 2000s (in Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia).

Reforming SOEs can also generate significant dividends. Private firms consistently identify unreliable and costly electricity supply as one of the most binding constraints on their operations, with more than 70 percent experiencing power outages (World Bank 2024). Therefore, SOEs reform is critical to lowering production costs, expanding and improving service delivery, and containing fiscal risks from contingent liabilities. Consistent with this, evidence shows that investors place greater weight on market access (which is tightly linked to infrastructure quality), a stable economic and political environment, and a skilled labor force than on tax incentives (IMF 2015).

“The How”—Making Reforms Work: Design, Sequencing, and Political Economy

Even when constraints are correctly diagnosed, reforms often falter at the design, political, and implementation stage. **Effectiveness hinges as much on the “how” as on the “what” of reform**, for three main reasons. First, reform dividends are frequently backloaded: the benefits materialize with a lag, beyond electoral cycles, discouraging leaders from spending political capital on measures whose payoffs they may not reap, and instead incentivizing visible but low-impact actions. Second, reforms inevitably create winners and losers. Vested interests tend to mobilize against change—even when aggregate gains are large—raising the political cost of reform. Third, implementation is often constrained by technical and administrative capacity or derailed by exogenous shocks, risks that need to be anticipated and mitigated at the design stage. In this context, a central task is to make reforms incentive-compatible, socially acceptable, and credible—by aligning stakeholders incentives and embedding robust monitoring and accountability mechanisms within a broadly shared social contract.

Sequencing matters: foundations first. By easing the most binding constraints, foundational reforms create a stable, market-friendly environment that levels the playing field and attracts domestic and foreign investment. Early progress on such reforms yields two complementary benefits: early wins help build momentum and socio-political support, and stronger foundations raise the payoff from subsequent liberalization by ensuring it occurs in a well-regulated environment. Two mutually reinforcing pillars underpin these foundations: macroeconomic stability—a pre-condition for a sustained, private sector-led growth—and strong institutions with predictable rules. At the same time, implementing “foundational reforms” tends to be most challenging, especially in the presence of powerful vested interests, putting a premium on ownership and social consensus (below).⁴ Moreover, institution-building takes time, suggesting that foundational reforms should be *implemented alongside* measures that generate quicker, visible wins. In business regulation, for example, one-stop online registration platforms have eased firm entry in Benin, Kenya, and Rwanda, creating momentum for deeper reforms such as risk-based inspection (food and standards agencies in Rwanda and Ghana), professionalized inspectorates and public e-registries of regulations ([Ghana's Business Regulatory Reforms portal](#)), and commercial appeals courts (in Benin, Kenya, and Rwanda). More recently, Nigeria has begun addressing long-standing macroeconomic imbalances, laying the foundations for growth.

⁴ South Africa's 2018 Judicial Commission of Inquiry sought to expose and deter state capture by powerful public servants.

Bundling reforms unlocks complementarities. Although sequencing matters, some reform packages yield larger and faster gains when implemented together (Duval and Furceri 2018; Campos, De Grauwe, and Ji 2025). Experiences across sub-Saharan Africa illustrate these (potential) synergies. Pairing SOE reform with pro-competition regulation can foster private sector participation rather than entrench monopolies, as illustrated by the ongoing electricity sector reform in South Africa. In Kenya, competition policy combined with oversight of instant payment systems helped translate mobile-money innovation into broader productivity gains (Paelo and Roberts 2022). On governance, policy and institutional reforms are more effective when complemented by enhanced oversight, monitoring, and accountability mechanisms. At the regional level, harmonizing regulations for goods and services, investment regimes, and digital trade under the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) would help deepen intra-regional trade (ElGanainy and others 2023).

Prioritizing SOE reform can help close the region’s large infrastructure gap. Foundational reforms such as governance and business regulation—discussed earlier—are equally relevant for SOEs, which dominate key infrastructure sectors. SOE reform typically includes strengthening governance and transparency to limit political interference and corruption; hardening budget constraints by making subsidies explicit and limiting contingent liabilities, including through clearer articulation of social mandates; professionalizing management and boards through performance contracts, ideally in the context of a broader public service reform; and opening sectors to appropriately regulated private sector participation. Improving SOE transparency, corporate governance, management, and oversight (such as transparent and timely financial reporting) and reforming pricing—notably alignment with cost-recovery levels—have large productivity dividends, with estimated improvements of 5–10 percent (IMF 2020). These SOE reforms are particularly challenging where SOEs oversight is limited, underlining the importance of transparency and strong governance. International experience, including South Africa’s ongoing power sector reform, suggests a pragmatic playbook: act opportunistically during crises;⁵ map stakeholders and incentives; get prices right (Parry and others 2016); be transparent about social goals such as access expansion; and clearly communicate how net savings will be used.

Distributional considerations should be integral to reform packages. Reform packages should pair economy-wide benefits with targeted measures that cushion near-term costs for vulnerable groups and facilitate adjustment. In South Africa, the *Free Basic Electricity* policy for indigent households and means-tested fee waivers provide a social floor that mitigates affordability pressures. Well-designed cash transfer systems can also be made shock responsive, as in Ethiopia’s *Productive Safety Net Program*, Kenya’s *Hungry Safety Net Program*, and Ghana’s *Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty*. Design details matter: transfers should be well targeted, time bound (for example, clear sunset clauses for temporary compensation), and supported by up-to-date social registries and digital payments that enable quick deployment as seen in Benin, Ghana, and Kenya. Beyond compensation, reform packages typically involve several measures with heterogeneous distributional effects, reinforcing the importance of candid communication.

Go incremental where capacity is weak. Although “high-depth,” first-best reforms (which fundamentally alter incentives and institutions) deliver larger growth dividends (Figure 3.7), the odds of their full implementation are significantly lower—especially in countries with constrained institutional capacity—than those of “low- and medium-depth” reforms.⁶ In such contexts, a phased, second-best approach may be preferable: breaking complex reforms into manageable steps that yield quick, tangible results can build credibility and momentum. For instance, business-regulation reform can start with online firm registration before advancing toward risk-based

⁵ South Africa’s 2024 Electricity Regulation Amendment Act launched a shift to an open market platform for competitive trading and paved the way for the establishment of a Transmission System Operator, a step meant to end decades of vertically integrated monopoly and unlock private capital for new capacity, although careful execution and regulatory clarity will determine the gains.

⁶ The “depth” of structural reforms is a measure of how far-reaching a structural reform is under an IMF-supported program (IMF MONA database; IMF forthcoming). “High-depth” reforms entail permanent institutional changes (for instance, legislative changes requiring parliamentary approval) or other measures with a direct long-lasting impact. “Low-depth” reforms do not in themselves bring about change but constitute steps toward a policy change (for instance, feasibility studies or diagnostics).

oversight, competition, and judicial and insolvency frameworks. Tracking progress transparently through publicly available key performance indicators—such as processing times, costs, and appeals outcomes—is essential to enhance accountability and sustain investor confidence.

Societal ownership is central to reform success. Durable reform requires a credible and binding social contract. Reform coalitions need to map vested interests and understand constraints and broker bargains that can be sustained over time (Dercon 2022). Even with sound diagnostics and technical design, reforms are more likely to endure when they are cross-partisan, extend beyond electoral cycles, and are shaped through early and genuine public consultation. Communication should clearly articulate expected benefits, while being candid about implementation lags, and the cost of inaction. Institutionalized public consultation and systematic stakeholder engagement help foster trust (IMF 2024b). Achieving a balance between state capacity and societal oversight—the “narrow corridor” described by Acemoglu and Robinson (2019)—can support a robust social contract. Jamaica’s *Economic Program Oversight Committee* offers a well-known example outside the region: an independent

body comprising the government, civil society organizations, and private sector representatives to monitor the country’s reform program after debt restructuring. In sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa’s [Operation Vulindlela](#) illustrates how structured engagement with social partners can support difficult reforms in electricity and logistics. Because reforms often entail short-term costs and delayed gains, they are best launched early in political cycles (Gaspar, Gupta, and Mulas-Granados 2017). Crises can also open windows of opportunity, as seen recently in Ethiopia (2020–23), Ghana (2023), South Africa (2023–present), and Zambia (2020).


National development plans (NDPs) should be made actionable. Most countries anchor reforms in NDPs, but these often remain aspirational—characterized by broad objectives, weak prioritization, optimistic financing assumptions, and limited accountability. Strengthening their effectiveness requires translating plans into prioritized, sequenced, and costed actions; aligning them with realistic multiyear financing; and embedding binding monitoring frameworks that assign responsibilities and enforce accountability.

Building state capacity is indispensable. Strong state capacity is critical for meaningful structural transformation, particularly in an increasingly complex economic environment where governments must reconcile competing objectives within a mutually enforceable social contract (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019; Besley, Bucelli, and Velasco 2025). Peer-to-peer learning, better management of institutional knowledge, and robust systems to track implementation and enable mid-course corrections can smooth reform paths. The international community can reinforce these efforts by directing increasingly scarce resources toward sustained state-capacity building.

The Road Ahead

Well-designed, well-sequenced, and broad-based structural reforms can deliver sizable socioeconomic dividends. Beyond raising growth, such reforms improve service delivery by a capable state and translate into higher living standards. Although reform design is complex and political economy constraints are substantial, experiences in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere show that success is more likely when reforms are tailored to each country’s

Figure 3.7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Estimated Growth Dividends for “High-Depth” and “Low- and Medium-Depth” Reforms



Source: IMF staff calculations.

Note: The panel regression comprises annual data from 2001 to 2025 for sub-Saharan African countries with IMF-supported programs in place. The chart reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors from regressions of cumulative per capita GDP growth since program approval, interacted with reform depth indicators (“low and medium” and “high depth”) and controlling for country and year fixed effects. “Low and medium” depth is defined as a mean structural conditionality depth below the 66th percentile (bottom two-thirds of the distribution) at program approval, whereas “high depth” corresponds to reform depth above the 66th percentile (top one-third).

circumstances, carefully sequenced, and supported by inclusive stakeholder engagement and clear, candid communications. Although governments can provide the initial impetus, growth can only be sustained if private investment is crowded in, making supply-side reforms imperative.

Countries with stronger macroeconomic fundamentals and greater institutional capacity should pursue comprehensive, bundled reform packages that build on existing foundations to further catalyze private sector participation. Priorities include deepening financial markets, liberalizing trade, and removing the remaining regulatory barriers that constrain investment, innovation, and firm dynamism.

Fragile and capacity-constrained states should focus on foundational governance and targeted early wins. Strengthening governance, enhancing accountability and integrity, securing property rights, and improving contract enforcement are critical to restoring confidence and enabling private activity. In these contexts, sustained investment in state capacity is a first-order priority to support reform design, implementation, and enforcement.

Resource-rich economies should prioritize enhancing governance and transparency in natural resource management. Deploying resource revenues strategically toward productivity-enhancing infrastructure, improving the business environment, and curbing rent-seeking are essential to foster private sector development and avoid the “resource curse.”

SOE reform warrants particular attention. In sectors such as electricity and connectivity, reforming SOEs can both limit pressures on the public budget and boost efficiency, lowering cost and expanding access to meet the needs of a growing population. Successful SOE reform requires transparent processes, strong governance, and clear accountability.

Ongoing macroeconomic stabilization efforts across the region provide a solid foundation for a renewed structural reform push. Building on this base, cost-effective supply-side reforms—adapted to an increasingly complex economic environment—can level the playing field among economic agents and help harness the region’s demographic dividend. To be durable, these efforts must be anchored in a robust social contract, informed by structured stakeholder engagement, and supported by clear and candid communications on the *why, what, who,* and *how* of reform.

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Statistical Appendix

Unless otherwise noted, data and projections presented in this *Regional Economic Outlook* are IMF staff estimates as of April 2, 2026, consistent with the projections underlying the April 2026 *World Economic Outlook*.

The data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African countries in the IMF's African Department. Data definitions follow established international statistical methodologies to the extent possible. However, in some cases, data limitations limit comparability across countries.

Country Groupings

- Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive countries, and non-resource-intensive countries (see table on page vi for the country groupings).
- The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports make up 30 percent or more of total exports.
- The other resource-intensive countries are those where nonrenewable natural resources represent 25 percent or more of total exports.
- The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those that are not classified as either oil exporters or other resource-intensive countries.
- Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income, and countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. (see table on page vi for the country groupings).
- The membership of these groups reflects the most recent data on per capita gross national income (averaged over three years) and the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.
- The middle-income countries had per capita gross national income in the years 2021–24 of more than \$1,135.00 (World Bank, using the Atlas method).
- The low-income countries had average per capita gross national income in the years 2021–24 equal to or lower than \$1,135.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).
- The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations are classified based on the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2026.
- The membership of sub-Saharan African countries in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown on page vi: CFA franc zone, comprising the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and CEMAC; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa Community (EAC-5); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates include data for Rwanda and Burundi, which joined the group only in 2007.

Methods of Aggregation

- In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for real GDP growth and broad money are calculated as the arithmetic average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.
- In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer prices are calculated as the geometric average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the WEO database.
- In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a share of total group GDP.

List of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables SA1-SA4

Table SA1.

Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2026, World Economic Outlook database.

¹ Data and projections for 2020–27 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.

² The Zimbabwe authorities redenominated their national accounts statistics mid-2025.

Note: “...” denotes data not available.

Table SA2.

Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2026, World Economic Outlook database.

¹ Data and projections for 2020–27 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.

² Total debt stock reported is for the public sector and is preliminary, pending formal review by authorities.

³ For Zambia, government debt projections for 2026–27 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.

⁴ The Zimbabwe authorities redenominated their national accounts statistics mid-2025.

Note: “...” denotes data not available.

Table SA3.

Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2026, World Economic Outlook database.

¹ Data and projections for 2020–27 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.

² Historical data (2019–24) are provisional, reflecting revisions to official external sector statistics and staff's adjustments.

³ The Zimbabwe authorities redenominated their national accounts statistics mid-2025.

Note: “...” denotes data not available.

Table SA4.

Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, April 2026, World Economic Outlook database.

¹ As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for reserves data.

² As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for reserves data.

³ Data and projections for 2020–27 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.

⁴ For Ethiopia, due to the ongoing debt restructuring, projections are not reported.

⁵ For Zambia, external debt projections for 2026–27 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.

⁶ The Zimbabwe authorities redenominated their national accounts statistics mid-2025.

Note: “...” denotes data not available.

Table SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices

	Real GDP								Consumer Prices, Annual Average									
	(Annual percent change)								(Annual percent change)									
	2011–19	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2011–19	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
Angola	2.2	-4.0	2.1	4.2	1.3	5.0	3.1	2.3	2.6	16.3	22.3	25.8	21.4	13.6	28.2	20.2	12.9	12.8
Benin	5.1	3.8	7.2	6.3	6.4	7.5	7.5	7.0	6.7	1.2	3.0	1.7	1.4	2.7	1.2	1.1	2.0	2.0
Botswana	4.1	-8.7	11.9	5.5	3.2	-3.0	-0.9	4.7	2.2	4.6	1.9	6.7	12.2	5.1	2.8	2.8	5.1	5.7
Burkina Faso	5.8	2.0	6.9	1.6	3.0	4.8	5.0	4.9	4.8	1.0	1.9	3.9	13.8	0.9	4.2	-0.5	1.5	2.1
Burundi	1.9	0.3	3.1	1.8	2.7	4.1	3.9	3.8	4.2	7.0	7.5	8.4	18.9	27.1	20.2	34.2	14.5	15.3
Cabo Verde	3.0	-20.8	7.0	15.8	4.8	7.2	5.5	4.8	5.0	1.1	0.6	1.9	7.9	3.7	1.1	2.3	2.2	2.1
Cameroon	4.4	0.3	3.3	3.7	3.3	3.5	3.1	3.3	3.8	1.9	2.5	2.3	6.3	7.4	4.5	3.4	3.5	3.2
Central African Republic	-0.7	0.9	0.1	0.8	0.1	3.1	4.8	2.6	3.0	4.9	0.9	4.3	5.6	3.0	1.5	1.0	1.5	2.5
Chad	3.0	0.0	2.0	4.7	5.0	5.0	5.6	5.2	4.9	1.1	-2.7	-0.8	5.8	4.1	5.7	-2.6	0.5	3.9
Comoros	3.1	-0.2	2.0	2.6	3.0	3.3	3.8	4.1	4.1	1.8	0.8	-0.0	12.4	8.5	5.0	3.2	3.7	2.5
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	5.6	0.8	6.4	9.3	8.5	6.1	5.7	5.9	5.4	10.2	11.4	9.0	9.3	19.9	17.7	7.4	3.3	6.4
Congo, Republic of	0.3	-6.3	1.1	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.2	2.3	1.4	2.0	3.0	4.3	3.1	2.6	2.8	3.0
Côte d'Ivoire	6.6	0.7	7.1	6.4	6.6	6.0	6.5	6.2	6.3	1.5	2.3	4.2	5.2	4.4	3.4	0.1	1.8	2.0
Equatorial Guinea	-2.7	-4.8	0.9	3.2	-6.1	0.9	-6.4	-2.7	-1.3	2.5	4.8	-0.1	4.9	2.4	3.4	2.8	3.2	2.9
Eritrea ¹	4.6	2.6
Eswatini	3.1	-3.0	4.2	0.4	3.5	3.0	3.6	4.0	3.5	5.9	3.9	3.7	4.8	4.9	4.0	3.1	3.5	3.8
Ethiopia	9.5	6.1	6.3	6.4	7.2	8.1	9.2	9.2	7.9	14.4	20.4	26.8	33.9	30.2	21.0	13.2	11.8	10.7
Gabon	3.7	-1.8	1.5	3.0	2.4	3.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.3	1.7	1.1	4.3	3.6	1.2	2.0	2.5	2.4
The Gambia	2.5	0.6	5.3	5.5	5.9	5.6	6.0	5.1	5.0	6.3	5.9	7.4	11.5	17.0	11.6	7.9	5.8	5.0
Ghana	6.5	0.5	5.1	3.8	3.1	5.8	6.0	4.8	4.9	11.8	9.9	10.0	31.9	39.2	22.9	14.2	5.8	7.8
Guinea	6.2	4.7	5.6	4.0	6.2	6.1	6.7	8.7	9.3	11.4	10.6	12.6	10.5	5.4	4.5	3.1	4.1	5.6
Guinea-Bissau	3.9	1.5	6.2	4.6	5.2	4.8	5.5	4.9	4.9	1.3	1.5	3.3	7.9	7.2	3.7	0.9	2.5	2.1
Kenya	4.7	-0.3	7.6	4.9	5.7	4.7	4.9	4.5	4.7	7.4	5.3	6.1	7.6	7.7	4.5	4.1	5.9	5.9
Lesotho	1.5	-8.6	4.6	1.6	2.5	4.9	1.4	1.1	0.8	5.1	5.4	6.5	8.2	6.5	5.2	4.4	4.2	3.9
Liberia	2.8	-3.0	5.0	4.8	4.6	4.0	5.1	5.1	5.4	12.5	17.0	7.8	7.6	10.1	8.2	8.3	5.7	6.2
Madagascar	3.2	-7.1	4.7	4.1	4.2	4.3	2.8	3.6	4.1	7.0	4.2	5.8	8.2	9.9	7.6	8.0	8.3	7.0
Malawi	4.1	1.0	4.6	0.9	1.9	1.7	2.1	2.2	2.4	17.2	8.6	9.3	20.8	28.8	32.2	28.4	24.4	22.0
Mali	4.5	-1.2	3.1	3.7	4.7	5.0	4.9	5.5	5.7	1.1	0.5	3.8	9.7	2.1	3.2	2.3	2.2	2.0
Mauritius	3.7	-14.5	3.4	8.7	5.0	4.9	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.0	2.5	4.0	10.8	7.0	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.8
Mozambique	5.5	-1.2	2.4	4.4	5.5	2.1	-0.5	0.5	2.7	7.5	0.9	6.6	10.4	7.0	3.2	4.4	4.4	5.2
Namibia	2.8	-8.1	3.6	5.4	4.4	3.7	2.4	2.4	2.7	5.2	2.2	3.6	6.1	5.9	4.2	3.5	3.9	3.4
Niger	5.9	3.5	1.4	11.9	2.4	10.3	6.9	6.7	6.5	0.7	2.9	3.8	4.2	3.7	9.1	-4.6	0.4	2.0
Nigeria	3.0	-6.4	1.1	4.3	3.3	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.3	11.6	13.2	17.0	18.8	24.7	33.2	23.0	16.0	15.9
Rwanda	7.1	-2.8	8.4	9.8	8.6	7.2	7.0	7.2	7.6	3.9	7.7	0.8	13.9	14.0	4.8	7.0	5.6	5.0
São Tomé & Príncipe	3.6	2.6	1.9	0.2	0.4	1.1	2.1	3.4	3.9	8.1	9.8	8.1	18.1	21.1	14.4	0.9	9.6	7.9
Senegal	5.0	1.3	6.5	3.9	4.3	6.1	7.9	2.2	2.3	1.0	2.5	2.2	9.7	5.9	0.8	1.4	2.5	2.2
Seychelles	6.6	-11.8	0.6	9.9	5.2	3.4	5.1	1.5	4.0	3.0	1.2	9.8	2.6	-1.0	0.3	0.3	2.6	1.7
Sierra Leone	4.1	-1.3	5.9	5.3	5.7	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.7	10.0	13.4	11.9	27.2	47.7	28.4	7.6	7.5	9.0
South Africa	1.6	-6.2	4.9	2.1	0.8	0.5	1.1	1.0	1.3	5.3	3.3	4.6	6.9	5.9	4.4	3.2	3.9	3.4
South Sudan	-5.3	-6.5	5.3	-5.2	3.0	-26.1	46.1	4.1	3.3	98.6	24.0	30.2	-3.2	39.7	99.8	97.6	14.0	10.0
Tanzania	6.7	4.5	4.8	4.7	5.1	5.5	5.9	5.9	6.1	7.3	3.3	3.7	4.4	3.8	3.1	3.3	4.0	4.3
Togo	5.4	2.2	5.1	6.3	6.2	6.3	5.9	5.0	5.3	1.4	1.8	4.5	7.6	5.3	2.9	0.4	2.8	2.3
Uganda	5.3	-1.2	5.5	6.2	5.0	6.0	6.7	7.5	8.2	6.8	2.8	2.2	7.2	5.4	3.3	3.6	4.0	4.9
Zambia	4.3	-2.8	6.2	5.2	5.4	3.8	3.8	4.3	4.7	9.0	15.7	22.0	11.0	10.9	15.0	13.9	9.0	8.0
Zimbabwe ²	4.6	-7.8	8.5	6.1	5.3	1.7	7.5	5.0	4.2	30.2	557.2	98.5	193.4	667.4	736.1	81.4	8.0	8.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.7	-3.1	3.9	4.4	3.8	4.2	4.5	4.3	4.4	8.7	12.4	12.3	16.1	19.4	20.7	12.5	8.8	8.8
<i>Median</i>	4.4	-1.2	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.9	4.4	4.3	4.6	3.3	4.5	8.2	6.8	4.5	3.4	4.0	4.1
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa	5.0	-0.2	5.3	5.2	4.8	5.2	5.6	5.2	5.2	8.2	14.7	12.1	17.2	20.4	18.7	9.5	6.2	6.4
Resource-intensive countries	3.1	-4.3	3.2	4.0	3.1	3.6	3.8	3.7	3.9	9.2	13.8	13.2	16.8	21.7	25.1	14.7	9.5	9.7
Oil-exporting countries	2.8	-5.5	1.4	4.1	2.9	4.0	4.0	3.7	4.0	11.2	13.0	16.1	17.3	20.7	28.8	20.2	13.9	13.8
Excluding Nigeria	2.3	-2.8	2.3	3.7	1.9	3.7	3.8	2.7	3.0	10.2	12.2	13.7	13.0	10.2	17.0	12.6	8.0	8.1
Other resource-intensive countries	3.5	-2.8	5.3	3.9	3.2	3.1	3.7	3.7	3.7	6.8	14.9	9.8	16.2	22.8	20.7	8.3	4.4	4.8
Excluding South Africa	5.5	0.0	5.7	5.4	5.0	4.9	5.5	5.4	5.3	8.4	25.7	14.3	24.1	37.3	34.0	11.9	4.7	5.7
Non-resource-intensive countries	6.0	0.8	6.3	5.7	5.9	6.0	6.4	6.1	6.0	7.1	7.7	9.6	13.9	12.7	8.6	6.3	6.6	6.4
Middle-income countries	3.1	-4.6	3.4	4.0	3.0	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.7	8.7	9.3	11.5	14.0	15.7	18.3	13.0	9.7	9.6
Low-income countries	6.0	1.5	5.5	5.7	5.8	5.6	6.8	6.5	6.3	8.9	22.1	14.9	22.1	30.4	27.4	11.2	6.4	6.8
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations	3.9	-3.7	2.6	4.8	4.2	4.6	5.1	4.9	4.9	10.5	18.7	17.6	22.0	30.3	34.6	19.1	12.1	12.1
CFA franc zone	4.4	0.4	4.5	4.8	4.2	5.2	5.1	4.6	4.8	1.5	1.9	2.7	6.4	4.4	3.5	0.8	2.1	2.4
CEMAC	2.5	-1.3	2.2	3.4	2.4	3.3	2.6	3.0	3.4	2.0	1.6	1.4	5.3	5.4	3.9	2.0	2.7	3.1
WAEMU	5.7	1.3	5.9	5.6	5.2	6.3	6.4	5.5	5.5	1.2	2.1	3.5	7.0	3.8	3.3	0.2	1.9	2.1
COMESA (SSA members)	5.9	-0.0	6.5	6.1	6.2	5.6	6.4	6.3	6.0	9.8	26.8	17.6	24.7	35.1	31.0	13.2	7.8	7.8
EAC-5	5.5	1.0	6.3	5.3	5.5	5.3	5.7	5.7	6.0	7.1	4.3	4.3	7.1	6.7	4.1	4.3	5.1	5.3
ECOWAS	3.7	-4.4	2.5	4.5	3.8	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.7	10.3	11.3	14.0	17.8	22.4	26.2	17.7	12.3	12.4
SACU	1.8	-6.3	5.1	2.3	1.1	0.5	1.1	1.3	1.4	5.2	3.2	4.6	7.1	5.9	4.3	3.2	4.0	3.5
SADC	2.8	-4.2	4.8	3.9	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.0	8.1	16.9	12.3	15.5	20.7	22.4	10.5	6.1	6.2

See sources and note on page 39.

Table SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt

	Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants (Percent of GDP)										Government Debt (Percent of GDP)							
	2011-19	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2011-19	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
Angola	-0.5	-3.0	1.4	1.8	-2.5	-1.2	-4.1	-2.4	-3.6	52.6	119.8	75.5	57.4	75.7	57.1	51.3	51.6	53.5
Benin	-2.4	-4.7	-2.5	-5.6	-4.1	-3.1	-2.9	-2.9	-2.9	30.0	46.1	55.6	59.7	61.3	60.5	57.3	57.2	55.6
Botswana	-0.9	-10.9	-2.3	0.0	-4.2	-7.3	-7.4	-10.7	-7.8	23.3	23.5	22.3	21.0	22.5	33.2	38.6	47.0	51.9
Burkina Faso	-3.3	-5.2	-7.4	-10.9	-6.9	-5.8	-3.5	-3.5	-3.0	31.1	43.6	55.5	59.2	56.8	57.2	52.0	48.8	47.1
Burundi	-5.1	-6.6	-4.6	-10.7	-7.7	-4.8	-3.0	-2.5	-2.9	45.1	65.9	63.6	69.8	59.9	53.1	41.2	37.0	37.1
Cabo Verde	-5.0	-9.3	-7.5	-4.3	-0.3	-1.1	1.1	-0.9	-0.0	102.2	149.1	149.5	127.6	117.5	112.8	101.0	95.9	90.7
Cameroon	-3.1	-3.5	-2.9	-1.1	-0.6	-1.5	-2.0	-1.7	-1.4	27.7	44.9	47.2	45.6	43.6	43.4	40.4	39.3	38.6
Central African Republic	-0.9	-3.2	-5.7	-5.1	-3.4	-5.0	-5.5	-5.0	-6.2	44.9	42.4	46.3	48.9	55.6	59.9	61.8	64.0	66.5
Chad	-0.7	1.2	-1.3	3.8	-1.3	-2.0	-1.3	-1.4	-1.3	30.8	41.6	41.7	32.1	32.2	31.4	30.4	29.9	29.9
Comoros	0.5	-0.5	-2.8	-3.9	-1.3	-2.7	-2.3	-1.1	-1.7	18.2	25.5	27.9	30.2	31.5	30.0	29.5	32.4	33.8
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	0.2	-3.5	-1.6	-0.9	-1.6	-1.7	-2.8	-3.5	-2.4	8.9	11.6	14.0	14.7	15.7	15.8	20.2	24.6	27.8
Congo, Republic of	-2.1	-1.1	1.6	8.9	5.8	3.6	0.3	0.4	2.9	59.6	102.5	97.8	93.5	102.9	98.0	96.8	91.3	85.8
Côte d'Ivoire	-2.4	-5.4	-4.9	-6.7	-5.1	-4.0	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0	32.4	46.3	50.2	56.0	56.7	59.5	56.3	55.1	54.0
Equatorial Guinea	-5.0	-1.8	2.7	11.7	2.4	-0.6	-2.5	-1.7	-3.7	25.1	49.4	42.3	29.8	39.1	36.4	40.6	39.1	42.3
Eritrea ¹	-2.3	235.6
Eswatini	-3.8	-4.2	-4.6	-5.3	-0.7	-1.1	-6.1	-6.9	-5.1	19.3	37.7	37.3	39.5	39.4	40.1	44.9	50.0	52.7
Ethiopia	-2.3	-2.8	-2.8	-4.2	-2.6	-2.0	-1.2	-1.8	-1.0	49.2	53.2	53.8	46.9	38.7	33.4	43.1	40.4	36.1
Gabon	0.5	-2.2	-1.9	-0.9	1.8	-3.3	-8.5	-10.0	-11.2	44.7	83.0	72.9	65.6	70.6	70.9	78.9	86.1	94.3
The Gambia	-4.2	-2.4	-4.8	-5.7	-3.6	-4.0	-2.9	-1.0	-0.4	70.1	85.9	83.1	83.9	77.4	78.5	73.9	68.3	61.6
Ghana	-6.6	-17.4	-12.0	-11.8	-3.4	-6.2	-1.3	-2.3	-1.8	50.2	79.1	86.9	92.7	79.1	70.3	48.8	53.0	50.7
Guinea	0.7	-3.1	-1.7	-1.9	-3.9	-5.0	-7.0	-5.0	-4.2	37.8	45.3	40.6	37.2	39.8	48.3	48.1	44.7	41.4
Guinea-Bissau	-2.9	-9.6	-5.9	-6.1	-8.2	-7.3	-6.7	-4.0	-3.5	54.9	77.6	78.8	80.7	79.4	82.4	75.3	73.6	71.8
Kenya	-6.2	-8.1	-7.2	-6.0	-5.6	-5.7	-6.4	-6.4	-6.0	46.7	68.0	68.2	67.8	73.4	67.3	69.3	71.6	72.4
Lesotho	-3.0	1.4	-4.8	-6.3	7.4	8.2	2.2	4.2	4.5	43.7	54.7	58.0	64.4	61.1	52.8	49.1	49.0	48.6
Liberia	-3.9	-4.0	-2.5	-5.8	-8.5	-1.8	-1.4	-1.6	-1.1	28.5	58.5	53.5	54.4	57.2	56.4	54.9	53.8	53.3
Madagascar	-2.1	-4.0	-2.8	-5.5	-4.2	-2.5	-2.2	-4.6	-3.9	38.1	52.9	49.4	49.8	52.1	49.8	48.7	49.3	50.4
Malawi	-3.8	-8.0	-8.3	-9.3	-7.8	-11.0	-11.5	-10.5	-12.0	34.7	53.9	66.5	75.7	86.7	87.6	78.4	74.5	72.6
Mali	-2.3	-4.6	-4.1	-4.0	-3.0	-2.2	-1.6	-2.4	-2.3	26.4	39.8	43.2	42.9	44.3	44.0	41.9	40.8	39.7
Mauritius	-3.3	-10.5	-4.1	-3.1	-4.5	-6.8	-3.7	-3.1	-1.9	61.8	91.9	86.1	81.8	81.5	86.1	86.5	86.5	85.0
Mozambique	-4.2	-6.2	-5.2	-5.2	-4.3	-6.2	-4.0	-6.5	-7.3	78.0	120.0	104.3	100.4	90.8	91.4	102.5	106.1	113.3
Namibia	-6.1	-8.1	-8.7	-6.3	-3.1	-3.8	-6.5	-6.1	-5.4	38.2	64.3	69.6	70.1	67.9	69.8	70.2	70.5	71.2
Niger	-3.7	-4.8	-6.1	-6.8	-5.4	-4.3	-3.3	-3.7	-3.0	27.8	45.0	51.3	50.7	51.8	47.7	45.4	45.5	44.9
Nigeria	-2.2	-4.0	-4.0	-4.0	-3.1	-1.3	-1.8	-4.4	-2.9	16.2	25.7	26.6	29.8	36.3	39.3	35.5	32.3	33.1
Rwanda	-2.6	-9.3	-6.9	-5.6	-4.9	-6.2	-4.5	-4.3	-3.0	35.3	66.7	66.2	59.0	61.4	63.4	64.6	66.8	67.4
São Tomé & Príncipe	-5.2	2.9	-1.5	-2.2	-2.1	0.9	-2.5	1.0	1.6	89.7	91.0	85.1	86.8	73.2	65.2	55.7	50.4	47.4
Senegal ²	-5.0	-9.6	-13.7	-16.1	-14.8	-13.4	-7.9	-6.7	-5.7	49.2	90.1	98.7	104.7	118.4	132.4	130.2	132.3	133.4
Seychelles	1.0	-15.7	-5.8	-0.8	-1.2	-0.7	-1.0	-2.1	-1.2	66.4	77.4	71.0	60.6	55.1	56.1	51.5	55.0	54.0
Sierra Leone	-3.3	-3.5	-4.3	-5.9	-5.0	-5.2	-4.2	-2.2	-0.2	33.3	46.4	47.1	54.0	49.4	46.7	45.2	44.3	41.2
South Africa	-4.1	-9.6	-5.5	-4.2	-5.6	-5.7	-5.8	-4.9	-4.3	44.9	68.9	68.8	70.7	73.2	76.0	78.6	78.9	79.7
South Sudan	-5.8	-5.5	-9.3	4.4	9.1	11.5	3.5	1.4	-0.2	50.9	48.3	56.4	42.1	62.0	53.4	62.1	57.3	49.9
Tanzania	-2.7	-2.6	-3.5	-3.9	-3.7	-3.0	-3.0	-3.2	-3.2	36.6	41.3	43.4	44.9	47.8	49.9	49.7	48.7	47.5
Togo	-3.8	-7.0	-4.5	-7.8	-6.3	-6.8	-3.2	-6.7	-3.0	48.9	61.4	63.3	63.0	64.1	66.2	63.0	64.7	63.1
Uganda	-3.0	-7.8	-7.8	-5.4	-4.9	-3.9	-7.1	-5.9	-4.9	27.8	46.8	50.3	49.9	50.4	51.8	54.2	55.0	54.4
Zambia ³	-6.3	-13.8	-8.1	-7.8	-5.5	-3.5	-3.8	-4.9	-4.4	53.3	140.0	111.0	99.5	129.1	125.2	86.0
Zimbabwe ⁴	-2.7	0.5	-1.8	-1.0	-9.5	-0.8	0.1	-0.8	-0.9	35.3	56.8	39.9	66.8	76.1	70.4	43.8	42.3	41.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	-2.9	-5.9	-4.6	-4.0	-4.0	-3.7	-3.8	-4.0	-3.5	33.4	51.6	51.5	52.1	56.8	58.7	57.0	56.1	55.9
Median	-3.0	-4.6	-4.5	-5.2	-3.8	-3.4	-3.0	-3.2	-3.0	38.5	54.3	56.0	59.1	60.5	57.2	53.1	53.0	52.7
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa	-3.0	-5.8	-4.6	-3.9	-3.8	-3.6	-3.6	-3.7	-3.4	40.9	61.9	59.0	57.8	59.9	57.2	54.8	54.8	54.2
Resource-intensive countries	-2.8	-5.9	-4.3	-3.4	-3.7	-3.3	-3.5	-3.8	-3.3	31.3	48.7	48.3	49.2	55.4	57.9	54.0	52.8	53.1
Oil-exporting countries	-2.0	-3.7	-3.1	-2.2	-2.3	-1.1	-2.5	-3.5	-3.0	23.7	38.0	35.9	36.8	45.5	46.8	43.4	40.9	41.8
Excluding Nigeria	-1.5	-2.6	-0.4	2.2	-0.5	-0.9	-3.3	-2.5	-3.0	44.5	82.8	64.7	54.3	64.4	54.5	51.8	51.6	52.6
Other resource-intensive countries	-3.8	-8.3	-5.4	-4.6	-4.9	-4.6	-4.1	-4.0	-3.5	41.2	60.7	60.5	62.7	64.2	64.3	60.2	60.3	60.1
Excluding South Africa	-3.4	-6.9	-5.3	-5.0	-4.3	-3.6	-2.8	-3.4	-2.8	36.3	52.5	51.7	54.8	56.2	54.1	45.4	45.7	45.2
Non-resource-intensive countries	-3.7	-6.2	-5.7	-6.1	-4.9	-4.6	-4.5	-4.5	-4.0	43.7	61.4	62.8	62.2	60.8	60.7	64.6	64.6	63.1
Middle-income countries	-3.1	-6.6	-4.9	-4.1	-4.0	-4.0	-4.1	-4.3	-3.7	32.7	52.8	53.0	53.5	60.8	64.7	61.5	60.5	61.0
Low-income countries	-2.5	-3.7	-3.8	-3.8	-3.9	-3.0	-3.1	-3.4	-2.9	36.7	47.8	46.9	47.7	47.2	46.2	46.8	45.9	45.0
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations	-2.2	-3.6	-3.6	-3.4	-3.0	-1.8	-1.8	-3.2	-2.3	22.7	34.1	34.5	36.8	41.0	42.2	40.5	38.3	38.2
CFA franc zone	-2.7	-4.5	-4.4	-4.1	-3.9	-3.9	-3.4	-3.4	-3.1	34.4	54.5	57.8	58.2	60.8	62.1	60.3	59.5	58.9
CEMAC	-2.2	-2.1	-1.4	2.4	0.7	-1.3	-2.8	-2.8	-2.7	35.2	57.9	56.5	51.1	53.4	52.1	52.0	51.6	52.2
WAEMU	-3.1	-5.9	-6.2	-8.2	-6.5	-5.4	-3.7	-3.8	-3.3	34.3	52.6	58.5	62.6	65.1	67.7	64.6	63.6	62.3
COMESA (SSA members)	-3.4	-5.5	-4.7	-4.4	-4.3	-3.4	-3.9	-4.2	-3.5	40.2	57.2	54.2	54.7	55.3	52.3	52.1	51.6	50.9
EAC-5	-4.4	-6.5	-6.2	-5.3	-4.9	-4.6	-5.4	-5.2	-4.7	39.4	56.3	57.6	57.3	60.1	58.6	59.8	60.6	60.3
ECOWAS	-2.6	-5.5	-5.1	-5.3	-4.0	-3.7	-2.6	-3.9	-2.9	21.7	35.8	38.7	41.5	48.4	56.0	49.7	47.4	47.2
SACU	-4.0	-9.5	-5.5	-4.1	-5.3	-5.6	-5.8	-5.1	-4.5	43.6	66.5	66.5	68.1	70.3	73.4	76.2	76.8	77.7
SADC	-3.1	-7.1	-4.1	-3.0	-4.7	-4.1	-4.5	-4.2	-3.9	43.3	68.0	61.7	61.7	67.1	65.5	63.3	63.2	63.9

See sources and note on page 39.

Table SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants

	Broad Money (Percent of GDP)								External Current Account, Including Grants (Percent of GDP)									
	2011–19	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2011–19	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
Angola	30.5	33.2	22.0	17.7	20.2	15.8	13.8	14.2	14.6	2.7	1.3	10.1	8.5	3.7	5.3	0.4	2.2	1.0
Benin	28.0	30.5	32.7	33.4	30.2	28.1	28.1	28.1	28.1	-4.8	-1.7	-4.2	-5.7	-8.2	-6.0	-5.7	-5.0	-4.9
Botswana	44.7	52.5	45.3	40.1	41.7	43.9	49.4	49.1	48.6	2.0	-9.8	-1.8	-0.6	1.5	-4.2	3.7	-1.9	-1.4
Burkina Faso	32.4	43.9	48.4	46.7	43.1	40.2	42.3	40.4	39.3	-5.1	4.2	0.4	-7.5	-5.1	-3.5	6.7	8.6	8.4
Burundi	28.1	46.2	49.7	56.6	48.6	47.9	39.4	40.0	40.5	-14.4	-11.2	-12.6	-16.8	-14.8	-8.6	-6.1	-5.5	-5.3
Cabo Verde	85.5	116.9	111.3	95.6	93.9	92.9	94.3	94.5	93.9	-6.3	-15.4	-12.1	-3.5	-2.7	3.9	3.6	-0.4	-1.2
Cameroon	21.7	26.6	29.3	29.7	28.5	28.7	30.5	31.3	31.4	-3.3	-3.7	-4.0	-3.4	-4.1	-3.3	-3.8	-5.1	-5.8
Central African Republic	22.8	28.9	31.8	30.6	31.8	34.2	33.9	33.7	33.4	-5.7	-7.6	-12.4	-12.9	-8.2	-9.1	-3.8	-3.4	-3.6
Chad	10.8	15.1	16.2	17.1	19.5	20.6	21.4	21.0	19.3	-3.2	-2.5	-0.5	6.3	1.6	1.4	0.2	0.8	0.3
Comoros	25.1	31.2	37.1	37.1	38.2	36.9	36.6	35.8	35.9	-3.1	-1.8	-0.3	-0.4	-1.5	-2.3	-2.9	-4.2	-4.4
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	11.8	21.1	21.2	18.3	21.2	21.4	17.0	17.0	16.9	-4.5	-2.3	-1.0	-3.7	-5.3	-4.2	-3.7	-2.0	-1.6
Congo, Republic of	26.6	32.7	30.8	27.5	31.9	35.7	33.0	38.1	40.1	-2.4	12.6	12.8	17.0	-5.0	-3.0	-5.9	-6.0	-5.8
Côte d'Ivoire	27.8	36.9	39.2	39.0	36.3	38.5	43.8	46.5	46.5	-0.3	-3.1	-3.9	-7.6	-8.0	-4.5	-1.1	-1.1	-3.1
Equatorial Guinea	13.2	17.5	14.8	14.1	19.2	19.2	20.4	21.3	22.0	-8.2	-0.8	5.7	6.6	0.9	-0.6	-3.0	-1.6	-2.4
Eritrea ¹	207.6	14.9
Eswatini	27.2	31.1	29.9	28.4	27.5	27.4	31.6	36.1	36.1	6.1	6.8	2.6	-2.7	2.2	1.6	-0.6	-1.8	-0.5
Ethiopia	29.2	30.8	31.1	27.9	24.9	21.1	22.2	21.9	22.2	-7.1	-4.6	-3.2	-4.3	-2.9	-4.2	-0.9	-2.4	-1.9
Gabon	23.7	27.9	24.1	23.5	27.0	25.5	25.5	25.5	25.5	5.2	-0.5	3.3	8.8	3.0	1.7	-3.1	-4.3	-5.5
The Gambia	38.6	56.0	59.2	55.3	49.9	48.3	44.0	42.0	40.1	-7.6	-5.8	-4.2	-4.2	-5.4	-6.5	-4.9	-5.1	-4.1
Ghana	24.1	30.8	29.4	29.3	28.2	27.9	26.8	26.8	26.8	-5.6	-2.5	-2.8	-2.3	-0.8	1.8	7.9	10.1	9.5
Guinea	24.2	27.8	25.5	29.1	26.3	32.6	34.0	33.4	34.5	-16.3	-16.1	4.1	-5.7	-9.7	-14.7	-22.3	-3.6	0.1
Guinea-Bissau	38.5	45.6	50.6	46.6	40.6	39.6	35.6	34.5	34.0	-2.4	-2.6	-0.8	-8.6	-6.7	-4.4	-6.2	-6.3	-5.1
Kenya ²	36.8	37.2	35.2	33.6	36.6	33.8	34.2	34.3	34.4	-6.0	-3.7	-5.1	-5.0	-3.6	-2.3	-2.7	-4.1	-3.7
Lesotho	35.6	41.1	38.8	39.6	42.3	42.1	40.9	40.0	39.4	-9.5	-5.7	-9.1	-14.0	-0.8	2.1	-3.3	-3.4	-2.3
Liberia	20.2	25.5	24.6	25.0	26.8	28.0	31.0	31.2	31.7	-19.4	-23.9	-13.0	-15.9	-20.1	-8.1	-6.3	-12.0	-11.1
Madagascar	23.4	28.7	29.0	28.8	27.7	28.3	27.7	27.1	26.6	-2.7	-5.4	-4.9	-5.4	-4.0	-5.3	-5.8	-8.0	-6.6
Malawi	17.2	17.5	20.1	23.6	23.8	26.3	29.2	31.2	37.2	-10.2	-14.1	-15.2	-18.2	-15.6	-18.5	-16.5	-15.4	-13.4
Mali	22.5	26.6	33.9	34.0	31.5	29.7	30.9	30.9	30.9	-4.4	-1.8	-6.4	-6.5	-6.5	-4.3	-0.8	-1.5	1.6
Mauritius	104.3	156.7	159.9	141.3	135.5	139.9	141.7	140.6	141.5	-5.8	-8.9	-13.1	-11.1	-3.0	-6.4	-6.4	-6.9	-5.1
Mozambique	44.7	59.0	56.2	53.6	50.1	53.5	60.3	62.9	63.7	-30.3	-26.5	-21.2	-33.7	-10.6	-11.0	-14.2	-43.0	-39.6
Namibia	58.3	71.5	70.9	63.2	62.8	64.4	64.5	64.1	64.4	-8.1	3.9	-10.8	-12.6	-15.2	-14.2	-13.2	-15.7	-13.6
Niger	17.5	19.2	20.1	19.4	18.1	16.4	16.9	17.5	17.5	-12.6	-13.2	-14.1	-16.2	-13.9	-5.6	-5.0	-6.1	-4.0
Nigeria	17.3	18.2	18.3	19.0	25.2	31.9	30.9	31.0	29.3	0.8	-2.7	-0.5	0.2	1.3	6.8	5.1	5.8	3.1
Rwanda	22.5	24.4	25.7	24.8	25.5	26.1	26.9	27.5	28.3	-10.6	-11.7	-10.7	-9.0	-11.4	-12.1	-13.0	-13.4	-11.7
São Tomé & Príncipe	41.1	32.5	29.5	28.2	23.9	20.2	21.3	20.6	19.9	-17.0	-11.2	-13.1	-14.5	-12.3	-2.2	-6.3	-4.7	-5.1
Senegal	34.6	45.3	48.3	51.7	52.8	51.3	51.7	51.6	51.5	-7.2	-11.9	-12.1	-19.9	-19.8	-11.3	-5.6	-6.2	-5.8
Seychelles	64.4	101.6	93.4	82.8	82.1	82.9	87.2	86.3	88.9	-10.9	-12.5	-10.5	-7.6	-6.4	-7.9	-6.5	-7.8	-5.6
Sierra Leone	14.5	17.9	19.2	20.4	19.8	20.3	21.8	22.4	22.8	-14.2	-5.8	-7.3	-6.3	-9.5	-6.9	-5.1	-3.3	-2.9
South Africa	66.4	74.0	70.1	70.7	72.3	73.9	74.7	74.7	74.7	-3.5	2.0	3.7	-0.3	-1.1	-0.7	-0.5	-0.9	-1.4
South Sudan	21.9	17.8	17.6	15.3	14.6	26.8	17.8	16.9	14.7	-2.8	-31.7	-0.1	-7.9	-18.4	53.7	-4.0	3.2	4.8
Tanzania	22.2	21.7	22.0	22.7	23.8	24.8	26.5	28.1	29.2	-7.1	-2.3	-3.5	-7.4	-3.8	-2.8	-2.4	-2.3	-2.1
Togo	37.2	46.0	47.0	47.4	46.2	45.8	45.8	45.8	45.8	-4.9	-0.3	-2.2	-3.3	-3.8	-2.4	-1.0	-3.2	-2.8
Uganda	17.4	22.5	21.7	20.6	20.5	19.7	21.1	21.9	22.4	-5.6	-9.5	-8.4	-8.6	-7.5	-7.3	-6.2	-3.9	-2.7
Zambia	21.7	31.2	24.3	27.1	29.9	31.0	31.1	31.1	31.1	0.3	11.8	11.9	3.7	-3.0	-4.4	-3.5	0.9	1.9
Zimbabwe ³	16.7	9.9	10.2	12.6	11.2	9.6	7.5	8.1	9.0	-5.6	1.7	0.7	0.6	0.3	1.0	4.0	3.7	3.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	31.8	34.3	33.1	32.7	34.6	36.2	36.0	36.1	35.5	-2.3	-2.4	-0.7	-1.9	-2.4	-1.3	-0.9	-0.6	-1.1
<i>Median</i>	26.4	30.9	30.4	29.2	29.2	30.4	31.1	31.2	32.6	-5.3	-3.7	-4.0	-5.7	-5.0	-4.2	-3.8	-3.5	-3.0
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa	28.3	32.3	30.9	29.7	29.7	28.8	29.2	29.6	29.9	-4.2	-3.8	-2.6	-3.7	-4.3	-3.1	-2.2	-2.1	-2.0
Resource-intensive countries	31.5	33.3	31.7	31.6	34.5	37.0	36.3	36.3	35.5	-1.5	-1.3	0.9	-0.1	-1.0	0.5	0.4	1.2	0.5
Oil-exporting countries	19.3	20.8	19.6	19.5	24.6	29.1	28.2	28.4	27.2	0.7	-2.3	0.8	1.9	1.0	4.9	1.9	3.0	1.1
Excluding Nigeria	25.3	29.0	23.3	21.0	22.9	21.1	20.3	21.0	21.2	0.5	-0.9	4.9	6.2	0.5	2.9	-1.4	-0.6	-1.5
Other resource-intensive countries	46.9	48.8	46.3	46.0	46.2	46.5	46.2	45.9	45.6	-4.3	-0.1	0.9	-2.3	-2.8	-2.1	-0.6	0.1	0.2
Excluding South Africa	25.0	27.5	27.0	26.7	26.6	26.8	26.5	26.7	27.0	-5.5	-2.2	-2.0	-4.3	-4.3	-3.3	-0.6	0.9	1.3
Non-resource-intensive countries	32.6	37.5	37.5	36.0	35.0	33.8	35.1	35.4	35.5	-6.7	-6.2	-6.3	-8.2	-6.3	-5.4	-4.1	-5.5	-5.1
Middle-income countries	33.8	36.8	35.3	35.0	38.0	40.5	40.3	40.4	39.5	-1.2	-1.4	0.4	-0.4	-1.2	0.3	0.4	0.7	-0.3
Low-income countries	24.1	26.5	26.9	26.0	25.1	24.5	24.8	25.0	25.4	-7.5	-5.6	-4.3	-6.6	-5.4	-4.6	-3.8	-3.6	-2.8
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations	19.9	21.7	22.2	22.1	25.5	29.1	28.4	28.4	27.4	-1.3	-3.1	-1.5	-1.7	-1.5	0.4	0.7	0.5	-0.3
CFA franc zone	24.8	32.0	34.0	34.0	33.3	33.3	35.3	36.2	36.1	-3.3	-2.9	-3.3	-4.5	-6.7	-4.1	-2.2	-2.4	-2.7
CEMAC	19.6	24.9	25.2	24.9	26.4	26.9	27.7	28.7	28.7	-2.3	-0.8	0.7	3.9	-1.7	-1.5	-3.2	-3.7	-4.3
WAEMU	28.3	36.0	39.2	39.3	37.2	36.9	39.3	40.1	39.9	-4.2	-4.1	-5.7	-9.7	-9.6	-5.5	-1.7	-1.7	-1.8
COMESA (SSA members)	29.6	31.8	30.7	29.0	29.0	27.5	27.2	27.2	27.5	-5.3	-3.7	-3.5	-4.6	-4.2	-4.3	-3.3	-3.1	-2.5
EAC-5	27.9	29.0	28.3	27.6	29.1	28.1	28.9	29.6	30.1	-6.6	-4.8	-5.6	-6.8	-5.1	-4.1	-4.0	-4.0	-3.5
ECOWAS	19.6	22.6	23.0	23.8	27.8	32.9	32.6	32.8	31.6	-0.5	-3.3	-1.6	-1.7	-1.7	0.9	2.0	3.5	1.8
SACU	64.6	72.3	68.3	68.3	69.7	71.3	72.4	72.4	72.3	-3.4	1.6	3.0	-0.8	-1.3	-1.2	-0.8	-1.4	-1.8
SADC	48.1	51.9	47.3	46.1	47.0	46.9	46.6	46.6	46.6	-3.2	-0.1	1.8	-1.1	-1.7	-1.4	-1.6	-2.1	-2.2

See sources and note on page 39.

Table SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves

	External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based (Percent of GDP)										Reserves (Months of imports of goods and services)							
	2011-19	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2011-19	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
	Angola	29.5	78.8	62.4	38.1	44.5	40.3	35.9	34.7	36.1	9.3	9.5	6.5	7.4	7.8	7.9	7.4	7.7
Benin ¹	15.5	30.3	40.2	43.3	45.5	45.9	50.7	51.6	51.1
Botswana	15.9	12.5	10.6	9.4	10.5	10.7	13.7	15.0	15.3	11.4	6.4	6.5	7.1	7.0	5.7	5.0	4.7	4.4
Burkina Faso ¹	21.0	23.0	24.5	26.4	26.4	24.7	22.0	19.4	19.1
Burundi	19.5	17.4	17.1	18.7	18.5	15.3	10.4	9.0	8.2	2.5	1.0	2.3	1.5	1.1	1.6	1.6	1.8	2.1
Cabo Verde	78.8	134.0	119.6	106.2	97.0	87.2	75.6	66.7	61.2	5.7	7.1	6.4	5.6	6.0	5.9	7.3	7.6	7.5
Cameroon ²	18.5	32.5	30.5	31.0	28.7	27.5	25.9	24.6	24.0
Central African Republic ²	28.1	33.4	33.7	31.5	31.3	31.5	28.7	25.8	23.0
Chad ²	18.7	22.5	20.6	17.7	16.7	16.0	15.5	15.8	17.5
Comoros	17.1	23.6	26.0	28.4	29.7	28.2	28.3	30.1	31.5	7.1	7.9	8.6	6.7	7.3	7.2	7.6	8.7	9.2
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	18.0	16.5	16.0	14.0	15.7	14.0	13.6	14.0	14.5	1.0	0.4	1.4	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.7
Congo, Republic of ²	42.2	63.6	53.2	43.3	39.7	36.3	39.3	33.5	31.1
Côte d'Ivoire ¹	19.6	33.8	30.6	35.6	36.3	37.3	35.7	34.3	33.3
Equatorial Guinea ²	8.2	12.2	9.7	7.5	8.6	6.8	5.0	3.9	3.9
Eritrea ³	62.2	2.7
Eswatini	10.3	18.6	16.1	19.3	21.3	21.9	26.9	29.2	31.5	3.7	3.0	2.9	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.4
Ethiopia ⁴	25.4	28.8	29.1	24.0	18.1	22.8	32.5	29.8	26.8	2.0	2.0	1.5	0.8	0.5	0.7	1.8
Gabon ²	29.8	48.9	37.5	35.6	36.1	31.5	30.4	27.5	26.0
The Gambia	37.3	49.4	47.2	48.2	48.0	48.6	50.8	46.4	41.1	3.6	5.8	7.7	4.0	3.7	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.0
Ghana	29.9	42.0	41.8	41.7	38.9	36.2	26.8	25.8	24.6	3.0	3.7	4.2	1.2	2.2	3.0	4.5	5.5	6.0
Guinea	23.2	27.3	24.7	21.9	21.1	19.5	19.6	21.0	22.1	2.2	2.3	2.9	3.2	2.3	1.2	3.1	3.4	4.0
Guinea-Bissau ¹	29.9	43.7	38.4	39.2	35.6	33.6	29.4	26.9	26.0
Kenya	22.6	31.2	32.6	33.7	39.4	31.3	29.9	29.0	27.1	4.5	4.1	4.1	3.7	3.2	4.1	4.6	4.9	4.1
Lesotho	35.4	47.5	42.8	45.0	46.0	41.6	38.5	38.4	38.1	4.8	4.1	5.0	4.2	4.6	5.2	6.2	6.9	7.6
Liberia	18.1	40.9	37.5	35.5	35.4	35.9	35.8	36.8	39.7	2.1	2.2	3.9	3.0	2.6	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.5
Madagascar	23.4	36.0	33.6	33.1	36.3	35.1	36.0	38.0	39.7	3.4	4.8	4.5	4.6	5.6	5.6	6.1	5.6	5.3
Malawi	18.6	30.9	37.4	32.0	31.7	37.2	30.2	25.5	22.1	2.4	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3
Mali ¹	19.1	26.7	23.2	22.5	22.7	20.0	18.5	16.2	15.0
Mauritius	13.3	20.2	23.2	19.4	18.2	17.8	16.8	16.0	15.1	8.4	14.4	12.8	11.4	9.9	11.4	13.0	12.9	13.0
Mozambique	63.1	90.2	79.8	69.0	66.2	62.4	65.9	70.6	70.6	3.4	4.6	2.6	3.1	4.0	4.1	2.9	2.2	2.1
Namibia	12.2	18.8	13.8	16.6	16.7	15.2	9.8	6.5	5.8	3.4	4.0	4.5	3.9	3.7	4.1	3.4	3.3	3.3
Niger ¹	18.4	33.0	31.5	33.0	31.9	26.1	25.3	24.7	24.6
Nigeria	2.7	6.4	7.1	7.1	9.7	18.3	17.8	15.8	16.8	6.1	6.5	6.3	6.7	6.9	7.4	7.8	9.4	9.6
Rwanda	28.1	53.1	52.5	45.1	49.7	56.7	57.1	60.1	61.9	3.9	5.3	4.6	3.6	3.4	4.3	2.9	3.3	3.7
São Tomé & Príncipe	55.7	46.1	41.6	40.7	35.4	33.5	30.6	26.8	25.1	3.8	4.3	3.5	2.9	2.1	2.0	2.5	2.7	3.1
Senegal ¹	36.3	69.5	73.9	73.1	84.1	91.4	87.1	83.8	85.6
Seychelles	35.8	35.3	38.3	28.9	26.6	28.9	28.5	35.0	32.2	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.1	3.4	3.6	4.2	3.7	3.8
Sierra Leone	20.6	29.3	27.9	27.4	31.6	28.4	25.6	24.1	23.2	3.3	4.5	5.5	3.3	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.7	2.9
South Africa	15.0	23.4	18.6	18.7	19.6	20.1	20.3	18.9	19.6	5.8	6.3	5.4	5.9	6.3	6.2	6.2	6.4	6.1
South Sudan	42.6	40.0	40.5	30.6	41.9	44.6	37.1	34.5	30.2	1.7	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.8	1.2
Tanzania	26.0	29.4	29.6	29.2	30.2	33.3	32.7	31.5	30.4	4.9	5.4	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.9
Togo ¹	13.4	29.1	25.4	24.4	24.7	27.1	29.0	29.4	28.9
Uganda	16.6	30.0	29.4	26.9	26.8	26.4	24.9	23.4	21.9	4.6	4.3	4.7	3.1	2.8	1.8	2.4	2.8	3.5
Zambia ⁵	28.6	78.9	66.6	53.2	57.9	50.4	63.7	2.7	1.3	2.8	3.0	2.5	2.8	2.8	3.3	3.5
Zimbabwe ⁶	25.8	34.4	32.0	33.6	37.3	31.2	28.5	27.0	26.5	0.5	0.1	1.1	0.7	0.1	0.5	1.0	1.2	1.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	15.0	24.6	23.4	22.3	24.7	27.2	26.8	24.9	24.9	5.3	5.2	4.8	4.9	4.6	4.5	4.8	5.3	5.3
<i>Median</i>	21.9	31.8	31.8	31.2	31.6	31.2	28.8	27.0	26.0	3.6	4.2	4.1	3.3	3.3	3.7	3.2	3.4	3.8
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa	24.2	36.7	34.6	31.8	32.3	31.2	30.6	28.9	28.2	4.5	4.1	3.8	3.5	3.2	3.4	3.7	4.0	4.1
Resource-intensive countries	13.1	21.7	20.3	19.1	21.8	24.6	23.6	21.6	22.0	5.6	5.5	5.1	5.4	5.3	5.1	5.3	5.9	5.8
Oil-exporting countries	8.9	16.4	16.2	14.7	18.2	25.5	24.1	21.6	22.4	6.3	6.3	5.8	6.5	6.6	6.6	6.7	7.7	7.6
Excluding Nigeria	26.3	53.0	44.4	33.7	36.0	32.9	30.5	28.9	29.2	6.8	5.7	4.5	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.5	5.5	5.0
Other resource-intensive countries	18.7	27.7	24.3	23.9	25.0	24.0	23.3	21.6	21.8	4.7	4.7	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.8
Excluding South Africa	23.6	32.0	30.3	29.0	29.8	27.5	25.6	23.7	23.4	3.2	3.1	3.2	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.1	3.4	3.7
Non-resource-intensive countries	24.0	34.2	34.2	33.3	32.7	33.4	35.1	33.7	32.2	3.9	4.2	4.0	3.1	2.7	3.1	3.6	3.9	3.9
Middle-income countries	13.0	22.6	21.3	20.6	24.0	27.2	26.3	24.2	24.5	5.9	6.0	5.5	5.8	5.8	5.7	5.9	6.5	6.4
Low-income countries	24.0	30.8	29.8	27.4	26.5	27.1	28.0	26.5	25.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.4	2.7	3.0
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations	9.3	15.4	15.8	14.9	17.2	22.8	23.3	21.0	21.0	5.0	5.0	4.8	4.9	4.4	3.9	4.5	5.4	5.5
CFA franc zone	21.3	33.3	31.2	32.2	32.8	32.1	31.1	29.3	28.8	4.7	4.8	4.4	4.1	3.7	4.4	5.9	6.0	6.1
CEMAC	22.5	35.3	30.8	28.4	27.3	25.3	24.6	22.7	22.2	4.3	3.4	3.3	4.0	4.2	4.0	3.8	3.6	3.1
WAEMU	20.8	32.1	31.4	34.6	35.9	35.9	34.6	32.8	32.2	4.9	5.5	5.0	4.1	3.5	4.6	7.0	7.3	7.6
COMESA (SSA members)	22.3	31.4	31.1	28.7	28.5	27.3	29.1	27.0	25.9	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.4	2.0	2.4	3.1	3.3	3.4
EAC-5	22.6	31.3	31.9	31.5	34.3	32.0	30.6	29.6	28.2	4.6	4.6	4.1	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.8	4.0	3.9
ECOWAS	7.4	14.4	15.4	15.5	19.7	28.7	26.5	24.3	24.7	5.6	6.0	5.8	5.7	5.6	5.2	5.7	7.0	7.2
SACU	15.0	22.9	18.2	18.4	19.2	19.7	19.9	18.5	19.2	5.9	6.2	5.4	5.8	6.2	6.0	6.0	6.2	5.9
SADC	20.1	32.8	27.8	25.7	27.5	26.5	26.3	24.6	25.0	5.7	5.5	4.7	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.2	5.3	5.2

See sources and note on page 39.