## 3. How Will Trend Growth in China Impact the Rest of Asia?

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### China’s growing importance and the role of GVCs
- China’s share of global trade rose from less than 2½ percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 2022.
- Total research and development expenditures in China (2019, PPP) were second only to the United States.
- China’s share of global GVC exports increased fivefold since the early 1990s.
- China shifted from assembling others’ inputs to increasingly supplying inputs: sourcing of intermediate inputs from China has increased significantly across countries, both as a share of total inputs and as a share of foreign inputs.
- Trade with China as a share of GDP in Asia increased by 9 percentage points between 2000 and 2022.
- Asian economies play an important role in serving Chinese final demand—especially investment—with Korea and ASEAN countries particularly dependent on Chinese final demand.
- Empirical association (panel growth regression): greater gross trade links with China are associated with higher GDP growth on average, but the effect is significantly larger for GVC linkages, particularly backward linkages. Example: moving from the average backward linkages of non-Asian countries to the Asian average is associated with higher growth of about 0.5 percentage point.
- Mechanisms for spillovers include direct demand channels, greater specialization, technology transfers, and knowledge diffusion.

### China’s baseline outlook, catching-up potential, and fragmentation risks
- IMF staff baseline: growth in China is expected to slow, reaching 3.4 percent by 2028, with further declines further into the future.
- Drivers of slower baseline growth: demographic headwinds (working-age population shrinking) and declining productivity growth, including from a slowdown in reform momentum.
- Historical convergence evidence: China’s growth over the past three decades overperformed relative to per capita income levels by an average of 5.5 percent, with a gradual decline in the 2010s.
- Productivity gaps remain very large, with larger gaps in the GVC-intensive sector, implying scope for faster convergence if reform momentum is rebuilt.
- Upside scenario parameters (model experiment): aggregate annual productivity grows about 1 percentage point higher than in the baseline for 15 years; GVC-sector productivity grows twice as fast as nontradables productivity.
- Policy levers that could deliver upside include closing productivity gaps between state-owned enterprises and private firms, opening domestic markets to foreign competition, and other market-oriented reforms.
- Fragmentation / downside risks:
  - Trade-restrictive measures and export controls have resurged and could cause large drops in input quality by blocking access to specific cutting-edge technologies and products.
  - Policies that distort trade and investment (examples noted in the source: recent legislation in the United States, the October 2022 WEO vintage, April 2023 WEO vintage, the European Union’s Green Deal Industrial Plan, and export restrictions of minerals in China and Indonesia) are proliferating and increase the risk of fragmentation.
  - Evidence of firms reshaping supply chains (mentions of “reshoring,” “onshoring,” “nearshoring,” and “friend-shoring” rising in corporate presentations) and greenfield FDI patterns suggest a downside risk of global de-risking: reshoring production home more generally and friend-shoring away from certain partners.

### Model-based spillovers from upside and downside scenarios
- Model used: IMF’s multi-region DSGE GIMF with GVC production (three sectors: tradables, nontradables, and a GVC roundabout-production sector that uses imported and domestic GVC inputs, capital, and labor).
- Upside scenario results (reigniting convergence in China):
  - Long-term GDP level in China is about 21 percent higher in the new steady state.
  - The higher GDP level 15 years out is equivalent to about 1.3 percentage points higher annualized growth for China.
  - Spillovers via trade channels only: GDP in the rest of the world increases by about 1.4 percent (equivalent to 0.1 percentage point higher annualized growth, about 7 percent of the size of the impact on China).
  - Heterogeneity across regions: spillovers are largest in other southeast Asian economies (southeast Asia excluding Indonesia), where GDP increases by about 2.3 percent in the long term (about 11 percent of the size of the impact on China).
- General conclusions from model exercises:
  - Productivity-enhancing reforms in China can lift growth in Asia, especially in smaller and more open economies with strong GVC links to China.
  - Non-OECD Asian countries can benefit from trade diversion effects of friend-shoring by both China and OECD economies, but these benefits largely dissipate once the global slowdown from friend-shoring and reshoring is accounted for.
  - Export restrictions aimed at curtailing access to high-quality inputs have empirically significant potential losses in aggregate and in critical areas (e.g., environmental goods), because the quality frontier is highly product-specific.

### Spillovers from China’s reforms and productivity gains
- Korea sees sizable benefits from productivity improvements in China: about 7.5 percent of the size of the impact on China.
- All regions see larger spillovers if China’s reforms also result in direct productivity gains in other regions.
- Amplification of spillovers from productivity gains is larger for countries that:
  - are further from the technological frontier, and
  - have stronger trade links with China.
- Quantitative example for other Southeast Asia:
  - GDP in the long term is about 4 percent higher,
  - which is as high as one-quarter percentage point in annualized growth terms,
  - and about one-fifth the effect within China.

### De-risking: definitions, simulation setup, and calibration
- “De-risking” is defined along two margins:
  - Friend-shoring: changing between different foreign sources while minimizing change to overall dependence on foreign sourcing.
  - Reshoring: increasing reliance on domestic sourcing versus foreign sourcing, beyond already-high home bias.
- The downside analysis focuses on relationships between China and OECD regions (European Union plus Switzerland, Japan, Korea, the United States, and the other advanced economies region).
- Calibration example based on Eora Global Supply Chain Database:
  - In 2000, OECD countries procured about 10 percent of their investment goods from abroad.
  - As of 2021, that figure had risen to about 13 percent.
  - In the reshoring simulations, nontariff barriers (NTBs) are increased for OECD countries to reduce reliance on foreign sourcing by 3 percentage points.
  - In the friend-shoring simulation, NTBs are adjusted to alter the mix between foreign sources by dialing back changes between 2000 and 2021 (for OECD, against China and in favor of other non-OECD economies).

### Friend-shoring scenario: impacts and mechanisms
- Policy action in scenario:
  - OECD and China impose NTBs on each other to reduce mutual interdependence but do not restrict trade with other countries.
- Quantitative impacts:
  - Global GDP declines by 1.8 percent.
  - China: long-term GDP loss of 6.8 percent of GDP.
  - OECD countries: large GDP losses, extent depending on dependence on Chinese inputs (which become more costly).
  - Rest of world: GDP and exports decline marginally in the long term (in the range of –0.2 to –0.7 percent for GDP).
- Mechanisms:
  - Reduced demand for Chinese goods by key trading partners and amplification through GVCs as higher input costs cascade through supply chains.
  - Trade diversion benefits to other countries are partially offset by large demand losses in China and the OECD.

### Reshoring scenario: impacts and mechanisms
- Policy action in scenario:
  - China and the OECD increase NTBs on all countries to reduce dependence on foreign inputs.
- Quantitative impacts:
  - Global output losses of about 4.5 percent in the long term.
  - China: long-term GDP loss of 6.9 percent.
  - OECD regions: losses range from 3.8 percent to up to 10.2 percent of GDP (larger losses for more open economies with stronger China linkages).
  - Other Southeast Asia region: long-term GDP loss of 9.1 percent.
- Mechanisms:
  - Additional distortions from higher NTBs lead to less-efficient resource allocation and higher input costs that are amplified through GVC linkages.
  - Trade diversion effects present in friend-shoring are absent because the rest of the world also faces higher NTBs from China and the OECD.

### Comparative magnitudes and summary calibration
- Long-term global GDP losses per percentage point of policy change:
  - Reshoring: about 1.5 percent (per percentage point).
  - Friend-shoring: about 0.25 percent (per percentage point).
- Dialing back sourcing to 2000 levels (the calibration used in the chapter):
  - Reshoring translates into global GDP losses of 4.5 percent.
  - Friend-shoring translates into global GDP losses of 1.8 percent.
- Relative note:
  - These losses are smaller than potential losses from extreme fragmentation, but they underscore that de-risking can still present a nontrivial drag on growth in Asia and beyond.

*Source: IMF, Regional Economic Outlook—Asia and Pacific, October 2023 (Chapter 3).*

### 3. How Will Trend Growth in China

### 3. How Will Trend Growth in China Impact the Rest of Asia?

### China’s growing importance and the role of GVCs
- China’s share of global trade rose from less than 2½ percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 2022.
- Total research and development expenditures in China (2019, PPP) were second only to the United States.
- China’s share of global GVC exports increased fivefold since the early 1990s.
- China shifted from assembling others’ inputs to increasingly supplying inputs: sourcing of intermediate inputs from China has increased significantly across countries, both as a share of total inputs and as a share of foreign inputs.
- Trade with China as a share of GDP in Asia increased by 9 percentage points between 2000 and 2022.
- Asian economies play an important role in serving Chinese final demand—especially investment—with Korea and ASEAN countries particularly dependent on Chinese final demand.
- Empirical association (panel growth regression): greater gross trade links with China are associated with higher GDP growth on average, but the effect is significantly larger for GVC linkages, particularly backward linkages. Example: moving from the average backward linkages of non-Asian countries to the Asian average is associated with higher growth of about 0.5 percentage point.
- Mechanisms for spillovers include direct demand channels, greater specialization, technology transfers, and knowledge diffusion.

### China’s baseline outlook, catching-up potential, and fragmentation risks
- IMF staff baseline: growth in China is expected to slow, reaching 3.4 percent by 2028, with further declines further into the future.
- Drivers of slower baseline growth: demographic headwinds (working-age population shrinking) and declining productivity growth, including from a slowdown in reform momentum.
- Historical convergence evidence: China’s growth over the past three decades overperformed relative to per capita income levels by an average of 5.5 percent, with a gradual decline in the 2010s.
- Productivity gaps remain very large, with larger gaps in the GVC-intensive sector, implying scope for faster convergence if reform momentum is rebuilt.
- Upside scenario parameters (model experiment): aggregate annual productivity grows about 1 percentage point higher than in the baseline for 15 years; GVC-sector productivity grows twice as fast as nontradables productivity.
- Policy levers that could deliver upside include closing productivity gaps between state-owned enterprises and private firms, opening domestic markets to foreign competition, and other market-oriented reforms.
- Fragmentation / downside risks:
  - Trade-restrictive measures and export controls have resurged and could cause large drops in input quality by blocking access to specific cutting-edge technologies and products.
  - Policies that distort trade and investment (examples noted in the source: recent legislation in the United States, the October 2022 WEO vintage, April 2023 WEO vintage, the European Union’s Green Deal Industrial Plan, and export restrictions of minerals in China and Indonesia) are proliferating and increase the risk of fragmentation.
  - Evidence of firms reshaping supply chains (mentions of “reshoring,” “onshoring,” “nearshoring,” and “friend-shoring” rising in corporate presentations) and greenfield FDI patterns suggest a downside risk of global de-risking: reshoring production home more generally and friend-shoring away from certain partners.

### Model-based spillovers from upside and downside scenarios
- Model used: IMF’s multi-region DSGE GIMF with GVC production (three sectors: tradables, nontradables, and a GVC roundabout-production sector that uses imported and domestic GVC inputs, capital, and labor).
- Upside scenario results (reigniting convergence in China):
  - Long-term GDP level in China is about 21 percent higher in the new steady state.
  - The higher GDP level 15 years out is equivalent to about 1.3 percentage points higher annualized growth for China.
  - Spillovers via trade channels only: GDP in the rest of the world increases by about 1.4 percent (equivalent to 0.1 percentage point higher annualized growth, about 7 percent of the size of the impact on China).
  - Heterogeneity across regions: spillovers are largest in other southeast Asian economies (southeast Asia excluding Indonesia), where GDP increases by about 2.3 percent in the long term (about 11 percent of the size of the impact on China).
- General conclusion from model exercises:
  - Productivity-enhancing reforms in China can lift growth in Asia, especially in smaller and more open economies with strong GVC links to China.
  - Non-OECD Asian countries can benefit from trade diversion effects of friend-shoring by both China and OECD economies, but these benefits largely dissipate once the global slowdown from friend-shoring and reshoring is accounted for.
  - Export restrictions aimed at curtailing access to high-quality inputs have empirically significant potential losses in aggregate and in critical areas (e.g., environmental goods), because the quality frontier is highly product-specific.

*Source: IMF, Regional Economic Outlook—Asia and Pacific, October 2023 (Chapter 3).*

### 3. How Will Trend Growth in China Impact the Rest of Asia?

### 3. How Will Trend Growth in China Impact the Rest of Asia?

### Spillovers from China’s reforms and productivity gains
- Korea sees sizable benefits from productivity improvements in China: about 7.5 percent of the size of the impact on China.
- All regions see larger spillovers if China’s reforms also result in direct productivity gains in other regions.
- Amplification of spillovers from productivity gains is larger for countries that:
  - are further from the technological frontier, and
  - have stronger trade links with China.
- Quantitative example for other Southeast Asia:
  - GDP in the long term is about 4 percent higher,
  - which is as high as one-quarter percentage point in annualized growth terms,
  - and about one-fifth the effect within China.

### De-risking: definitions, simulation setup, and calibration
- “De-risking” is defined along two margins:
  - Friend-shoring: changing between different foreign sources while minimizing change to overall dependence on foreign sourcing.
  - Reshoring: increasing reliance on domestic sourcing versus foreign sourcing, beyond already-high home bias.
- The downside analysis focuses on relationships between China and OECD regions (European Union plus Switzerland, Japan, Korea, the United States, and the other advanced economies region).
- Calibration example based on Eora Global Supply Chain Database:
  - In 2000, OECD countries procured about 10 percent of their investment goods from abroad.
  - As of 2021, that figure had risen to about 13 percent.
  - In the reshoring simulations, nontariff barriers (NTBs) are increased for OECD countries to reduce reliance on foreign sourcing by 3 percentage points.
  - In the friend-shoring simulation, NTBs are adjusted to alter the mix between foreign sources by dialing back changes between 2000 and 2021 (for OECD, against China and in favor of other non-OECD economies).

### Friend-shoring scenario: impacts and mechanisms
- Policy action in scenario:
  - OECD and China impose NTBs on each other to reduce mutual interdependence but do not restrict trade with other countries.
- Quantitative impacts:
  - Global GDP declines by 1.8 percent.
  - China: long-term GDP loss of 6.8 percent of GDP.
  - OECD countries: large GDP losses, extent depending on dependence on Chinese inputs (which become more costly).
  - Rest of world: GDP and exports decline marginally in the long term (in the range of –0.2 to –0.7 percent for GDP).
- Mechanisms:
  - Reduced demand for Chinese goods by key trading partners and amplification through GVCs as higher input costs cascade through supply chains.
  - Trade diversion benefits to other countries are partially offset by large demand losses in China and the OECD.

### Reshoring scenario: impacts and mechanisms
- Policy action in scenario:
  - China and the OECD increase NTBs on all countries to reduce dependence on foreign inputs.
- Quantitative impacts:
  - Global output losses of about 4.5 percent in the long term.
  - China: long-term GDP loss of 6.9 percent.
  - OECD regions: losses range from 3.8 percent to up to 10.2 percent of GDP (larger losses for more open economies with stronger China linkages).
  - Other Southeast Asia region: long-term GDP loss of 9.1 percent.
- Mechanisms:
  - Additional distortions from higher NTBs lead to less-efficient resource allocation and higher input costs that are amplified through GVC linkages.
  - Trade diversion effects present in friend-shoring are absent because the rest of the world also faces higher NTBs from China and the OECD.

### Comparative magnitudes and summary calibration
- Long-term global GDP losses per percentage point of policy change:
  - Reshoring: about 1.5 percent (per percentage point).
  - Friend-shoring: about 0.25 percent (per percentage point).
- Dialing back sourcing to 2000 levels (the calibration used in the chapter):
  - Reshoring translates into global GDP losses of 4.5 percent.
  - Friend-shoring translates into global GDP losses of 1.8 percent.
- Relative note:
  - These losses are smaller than potential losses from extreme fragmentation, but they underscore that de-risking can still present a nontrivial drag on growth in Asia and beyond.

*Source: ch3 - 3. How Will Trend Growth in China Impact the Rest of Asia? (PDF chapter).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/reo/apd/2023/october/english/ch3.pdf_
