## Regional Economic Outlook — Asia and Pacific (Executive Summary and Chapter Excerpts)

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### Regional growth and outlook
- Asia and the Pacific is on track to contribute around two-thirds of global growth in 2023.
- Growth projections:
  - 2022: 3.9 percent
  - 2023: 4.6 percent
  - 2024: 4.2 percent
  - Medium term: 3.9 percent
- China and India are projected to contribute jointly about half of world growth in both 2023 and 2024.
- Drivers and near-term dynamics:
  - Upside growth surprises in H1 2023 were driven by robust domestic demand (including a draw-down in excess savings) and by China’s reopening.
  - Growth momentum is slowing due to China’s reopening losing steam and lackluster investment, partly reflecting weaker external demand.
  - The slowdown in China’s property sector will weigh on demand throughout the region.
  - Rotation in global demand from goods to services and from foreign sources to domestic manufacturers reduces the historical offset to regional weakness from U.S. and Japan upgrades.

### Inflation and disinflation
- Headline inflation has declined from postpandemic peaks as global commodity prices receded.
- Inflation projections and country specifics:
  - Inflation is expected to fall in 2024 within central bank target ranges in most countries in the region—a faster pace of disinflation than in other regions.
  - Japan: inflation risen to levels not seen in decades; core inflation expected to stay above 2 percent until early 2025.
  - China: inflation remains low and well-below target; baseline outlook is for a gradual increase as output gaps close.
  - India: headline inflation rose in Q3 due to a weather-related vegetable price shock.
  - Australia and New Zealand: core inflation pressures moderating slowly amid tight labor markets and positive output gaps.
- Recent patterns:
  - Headline inflation generally declining, with renewed price pressures recently in some economies.
  - Core inflation easing more gradually, as in the rest of the world.

### Financial conditions and monetary policy transmission
- Financial conditions and policy stance:
  - Monetary tightening has had heterogeneous effects: financial conditions tightened substantially in advanced economies in the region (excluding Japan).
  - Financial conditions in Asia’s emerging markets remain relatively accommodative; sovereign yields have not increased much since the tightening cycle began.
- Reasons for relatively accommodative conditions in emerging markets:
  - Strong demand from the domestic investor base (financial sector and central banks).
  - Compression in term premiums.
  - Appreciation of many Asian currencies against the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan this year.
  - Bank lending conditions have remained favorable.
- Monetary policy implications:
  - Central banks should carry through with policies to ensure that inflation is anchored at target over the forecast horizon.
  - Despite the tightening cycle, ex ante real policy interest rates are only at about zero, which is close to or still somewhat below neutral levels.
  - Financial conditions, especially in emerging market economies, remain more accommodative than in earlier monetary tightening cycles.
  - Core inflation in a few advanced economies of the region—including Australia, Japan, and New Zealand—is still substantially above target; central banks should stay the course or be ready to tighten until inflation is expected to decline firmly to the target range.
  - Historical pass-through estimates suggest that the recent tightening has contributed to recent disinflation.

### Risks to the outlook
- Overall tilt:
  - Near-term risks remain tilted to the downside but are more balanced than six months ago.
- Key downside risks:
  - Weaker-than-expected recovery in China that could trigger negative spillovers to trading partners.
  - Abrupt financial tightening in the United States or within the region inhibiting growth, especially in highly leveraged economies and sectors.
  - Geoeconomic fragmentation and de-risking by major economies creating a potentially significant drag to growth.
  - Several emerging market and developing economies are in or close to debt distress and face refinancing risks.
  - Rising temperatures and natural disaster costs, particularly for vulnerable countries in Asia.
- Upside scenario:
  - A soft landing—driven by better manufacturing and capital expenditure outcomes, an earlier turning point in the technology cycle, and accelerated disinflation in Asia—is becoming more plausible and would provide scope for easing monetary policy in 2024.
- Structural medium-term risk/benefit:
  - A comprehensive set of reforms in China would boost medium-term growth prospects, especially for smaller and more open economies.

### Headline Inflation — outlook and interactions with growth
- Regional inflation outlook:
  - Inflation is projected to continue the decline toward central bank targets.
  - Except for Japan, inflation is expected to return to within target ranges by the end of 2024.
- China and US growth interactions:
  - China’s growth outlook: expand by 5 percent in 2023 and by 4.2 percent in 2024.
    - Compared to the April 2023 World Economic Outlook, this is a downward revision of 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively.
  - US growth for 2023 and 2024 was upgraded in the October 2023 World Economic Outlook by 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively, compared to April.
  - The net effect of US upgrades and China downgrades is still positive for the rest of Asia, but with a relatively small and short-lived impact.
- Near-term risks to inflation:
  - Downside: more persistent global inflationary pressures requiring further monetary tightening; a deeper downturn in the property sector in China; abrupt tightening of financial conditions.
  - Upside: further commodity price spikes and tighter labor markets; exposure of emerging market and low-income economies to global rice prices and other essential food prices.
- Quantitative points:
  - China growth: 5 percent in 2023; 4.2 percent in 2024 (downward revisions of 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points relative to April 2023 WEO).
  - Japan: core inflation expected to stay above 2 percent until early 2025.
  - ASEAN emerging market economies growth: expected 4.2 percent in 2023 and 4.6 percent in 2024—a 0.3 percentage point downward revision relative to April.
  - China downside scenario: China’s GDP would decline by as much as 1.6 percent relative to the baseline by 2025, while world GDP would decline by 0.6 percent relative to the baseline (October 2023 WEO, Chapter 1).

### Financial stability and fiscal policy (Chapter 2 highlights)
- Financial stability:
  - Asia’s banking sector has remained resilient, underpinned by strong capital buffers and rising profitability.
  - Risks as interest rates remain higher for longer:
    - Asset quality risk could increase and lead to financial sector stresses.
    - Real estate sectors could become a source of financial stability risks.
      - In China, continued stress in the property sector may lead to material losses for smaller banks.
      - Outside of China, high-leverage property sector segments could face challenging funding conditions and liquidity shortfalls.
    - Regional financial centers such as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Singapore have experienced substantial commercial property price declines recently.
  - Policy recommendations:
    - Strengthen supervision, including through implementation of Basel III standards.
    - Phase out forbearance measures.
    - Closely monitor systemic risks.
    - Facilitate restructuring or bankruptcy proceedings of insolvent developers while protecting buyers’ interests and restoring market confidence (China-specific).
    - Use macroprudential measures preemptively (for example, limits on loan-to-value ratios and debt-service-to-income ratios).
    - For economies with accommodative financial conditions, increase banks’ countercyclical buffers and provisions for sectors with pockets of vulnerabilities.
    - If financial sector stress emerges, deploy liquidity support promptly while mitigating moral hazard to limit contagion.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Fiscal consolidation in Asia continues to support disinflation, although the pace is expected to slow in 2024.
  - Debt service burdens are higher than before the pandemic due to higher debt levels and interest rates—stronger primary balances are needed to ensure debt sustainability.
  - A few frontier market economies (for example, Maldives, Mongolia, and Papua New Guinea) and low-income countries (such as Lao P.D.R.) face high short-term external financing needs or debt servicing costs; stronger fiscal adjustment may be required in some cases.
  - Government revenue in the region remains low compared to international peers; the gap is increasing among both emerging markets and low-income countries.
  - Policy recommendations:
    - Implement revenue-enhancing reforms, including expanding the tax base and strengthening revenue administration.
    - In countries with limited fiscal space, prioritize public spending that protects the most vulnerable households and boosts future productivity by prioritizing subsidy reforms, strengthening weak social safety nets, and augmenting public investment to boost productivity growth.
    - Reduce the region’s large energy subsidies to create fiscal space for investment in renewable energy and to encourage greater energy efficiency.
    - Communicate and implement credible medium-term fiscal frameworks to facilitate necessary fiscal adjustments.

### Structural policies and climate transition
- Structural reform priorities:
  - Targeted and carefully sequenced reforms to boost productivity and mitigate pandemic scarring and fragmentation.
  - Prioritize reforms that alleviate the most critical constraints to activity to front-load output gains and ensure public buy-in.
  - Mitigate adverse distributional effects with complementary policies and targeted support.
  - Specific reform areas: expand health care coverage; increase access to early childhood and higher education; support start-ups and deepen digitalization; improve business environments and regulatory frameworks; increase investment in research and development, education, and skills development.
- Climate transition and adaptation:
  - Temperatures across Asia have risen in recent decades, accompanied by an increasing frequency of natural disasters.
  - Investment in climate change adaptation needs to be scaled up from both public and private sources, including green financing mechanisms—especially in regions most vulnerable to climate shocks.
  - Five of the 10 largest emitters are in Asia.
  - Policy recommendations:
    - Implement carbon pricing to discourage fossil fuel use, promote renewable energy development, and incentivize technological development.
    - Complement carbon pricing with green industrial policies, but design them to avoid distortions to international trade and investment (for example, avoid domestic content provisions), in line with World Trade Organization rules.
    - Enhance climate risk monitoring systems and risk management frameworks.
    - Build stronger safety nets and insurance to enhance climate resilience.

### Inflation measures, shocks, and monetary policy (Chapter 3 and Chapter 1 excerpts)
- Regional inflation patterns and external shocks:
  - From the second half of 2020, shipping costs soared by more than 400 percent from pre-pandemic levels.
  - Global food and fuel costs increased by about 17 percent and 58 percent, respectively, from the start of 2021 to the end of 2022.
  - On average, increases in the prices of food, fuel, and transportation account for nearly 2 percentage points out of 4½ percent inflation for the region in 2022.
  - Import prices respond quickly and strongly, followed by changes in producer prices; responses of core inflation peak at about 8 to 12 months.
  - Exchange rate pass-through in Asian economies is strong and quick to import prices and is especially high during periods of high inflation and elevated uncertainty.
- Pandemic and supply/demand dynamics:
  - Lockdowns generated both supply and demand shocks; negative demand effects from lockdowns in 2020 outweighed upward price pressures from production inefficiencies, pulling inflation down; later demand recovery boosted inflation.
  - Lockdowns were maintained for longer in Asia, contributing to later and weaker recoveries on average.
  - Policy support was generally stronger in advanced than emerging markets within the region and was withdrawn relatively quickly in Asia and Pacific countries compared with other regions.
- Role of monetary policy:
  - Central banks across the Asia and Pacific region eased monetary policy soon after the onset of the pandemic, and later tightened as economies recovered and inflation pressures increased.
  - Some central banks (Korea and New Zealand) started raising policy rates before the Federal Reserve initiated its tightening cycle.
  - Evidence indicates effects of policy rate changes on activity are not statistically different from those in peer countries, implying monetary tightening contributed to moderating inflation, allowing for lags.
- Conclusions on inflation:
  - Inflation outcomes have been on average lower than in other regions, but variation within the region has been wide.
  - Two sets of shocks are important: external cost-push shocks—especially from food prices—and pandemic policies that generated complex demand and supply effects.
  - Policy implications: rather than treating pressures as entirely driven by supply shocks, policymakers eased amid negative demand shocks and tightened as demand recovered, which helped contain inflation.

### Model-based scenarios on China, GVCs, and fragmentation (Chapter 3 excerpts)
- China and GVC linkages:
  - China’s share of global trade rose from less than 2½ percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 2022.
  - China’s trade as a share of GDP increased by 9 percentage points between 2000 and 2022 for the region.
  - Greater gross trade links with China are associated with higher GDP growth on average; the effect is significantly larger for GVC linkages, particularly backward linkages.
- Baseline and upside scenario for China:
  - IMF staff project China’s growth to reach 3.4 percent by 2028, with more declines further into the future.
  - Upside reform assumption: aggregate annual productivity in China grows about 1 percentage point higher than baseline for 15 years; GVC sector productivity grows twice as fast as nontradables productivity.
  - Main quantitative outcomes (upside reform):
    - Level of GDP in China about 21 percent higher in the new steady state.
    - Higher GDP level 15 years out equivalent to about 1.3 percentage points higher annualized growth.
    - Spillovers through trade only: GDP in the rest of the world increases by about 1.4 percent (or 0.1 percentage point higher annualized growth).
    - Other southeast Asian economies — GDP increases by about 2.3 percent in the long term (about 11 percent of the size of the impact on China).
    - Korea sees benefits “about 7.5 percent of the size of the impact on China.”
    - With productivity spillovers included: other Southeast Asia GDP about 4 percent higher in long term (equivalent to up to one-quarter percentage point in annualized growth and about one-fifth the effect within China).
- Downside scenarios: friend-shoring and reshoring
  - Definitions:
    - Friend-shoring: changing between different foreign sources while minimizing change to overall dependence on foreign sourcing.
    - Reshoring: increasing domestic sourcing versus foreign sourcing beyond existing home bias.
  - Calibration and outcomes:
    - Friend-shoring (China and OECD impose NTBs on each other):
      - Global GDP declines by 1.8 percent.
      - China long-term GDP loss: 6.8 percent of GDP.
      - GDP and exports in the rest of the world decline marginally in the long term in the range of –0.2 to –0.7 percent for GDP.
    - Reshoring (OECD and China reduce reliance on imports from all countries):
      - Global output losses about 4.5 percent in the long term.
      - China experiences a 6.9 percent loss.
      - OECD regions’ losses range from 3.8 percent to up to 10.2 percent of GDP.
      - Other Southeast Asia region experiences a large loss of 9.1 percent.
    - Per-percentage-point calibration:
      - For each percentage point of reshoring, long-term global GDP losses are about 1.5 percent.
      - For each percentage point of friend-shoring, long-term global GDP losses are about 0.25 percent.
      - Dialing back these two margins to 2000 levels translates into global GDP losses of 4.5 percent (reshoring) and 1.8 percent (friend-shoring).
- Policy-relevant implications:
  - De-risking that takes the form of reshoring or broad NTBs can impose large, persistent global output losses, amplified by GVC linkages.
  - Friend-shoring focused on opposing blocs reduces but does not eliminate losses; trade diversion can partially offset losses for some economies but is outweighed by demand declines in large economies.
  - Reforms that boost productivity in China (especially in the GVC sector) yield global positive spillovers, larger when technology spillovers raise productivity in trading partners.

*Source: Regional Economic Outlook—Asia and Pacific, Executive Summary and chapter excerpts (text).*

### Executive Summary ...................................................................................................vii

### Executive Summary

### Regional growth and outlook
- Asia and the Pacific is on track to contribute around two-thirds of global growth in 2023.
- Growth projections:
  - 2022: 3.9 percent
  - 2023: 4.6 percent
  - 2024: 4.2 percent
  - Medium term: 3.9 percent
- China and India are projected to contribute jointly about half of world growth in both 2023 and 2024.
- Drivers and near-term dynamics:
  - Upside growth surprises in H1 2023 were driven by robust domestic demand (including a draw-down in excess savings) and by China’s reopening.
  - Growth momentum is slowing due to China’s reopening losing steam and lackluster investment, partly reflecting weaker external demand.
  - The slowdown in China’s property sector will weigh on demand throughout the region.
  - Rotation in global demand from goods to services and from foreign sources to domestic manufacturers reduces the historical offset to regional weakness from U.S. and Japan upgrades.

### Inflation and disinflation
- Headline inflation has declined from postpandemic peaks as global commodity prices receded.
- Inflation outlook:
  - Inflation is expected to fall in 2024 within central bank target ranges in most countries in the region—a faster pace of disinflation than in other regions.
- Recent patterns:
  - Headline inflation generally declining, with renewed price pressures recently in some economies.
  - Core inflation easing more gradually, as in the rest of the world.
  - Country specifics:
    - Japan: inflation risen to levels not seen in decades driven by pent-up domestic demand, still-accommodative policies, and rising tourist arrivals.
    - China: inflation remains low and well-below target, reflecting falling food and fuel prices and sizable economic slack.
    - India: headline inflation rose in Q3 due to a weather-related vegetable price shock.
    - Australia and New Zealand: core inflation pressures moderating slowly amid tight labor markets and positive output gaps.

### Financial conditions and monetary policy transmission
- Monetary tightening has had heterogeneous effects:
  - Financial conditions tightened substantially in advanced economies in the region (excluding Japan).
  - Financial conditions in Asia’s emerging markets remain relatively accommodative; sovereign yields have not increased much since the tightening cycle began.
- Reasons for relatively accommodative conditions in emerging markets:
  - Strong demand from the domestic investor base (financial sector and central banks).
  - Compression in term premiums.
  - Appreciation of many Asian currencies against the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan this year.
  - Bank lending conditions have remained favorable.

### Risks to the outlook
- Overall tilt:
  - Near-term risks remain tilted to the downside but are more balanced than six months ago.
- Key downside risks:
  - Weaker-than-expected recovery in China that could trigger negative spillovers to trading partners.
  - Abrupt financial tightening in the United States or within the region inhibiting growth, especially in highly leveraged economies and sectors.
  - Geoeconomic fragmentation and de-risking by major economies creating a potentially significant drag to growth.
  - Several emerging market and developing economies are in or close to debt distress and face refinancing risks.
  - Rising temperatures and natural disaster costs, particularly for vulnerable countries in Asia.
- Upside scenario:
  - A soft landing—driven by better manufacturing and capital expenditure outcomes, an earlier turning point in the technology cycle, and accelerated disinflation in Asia—is becoming more plausible and would provide scope for easing monetary policy in 2024.
- Structural medium-term risk/benefit:
  - A comprehensive set of reforms in China would boost medium-term growth prospects, especially for smaller and more open economies.

### Fiscal, financial stability, and structural policy implications
- Monetary policy:
  - Central banks should carry through with policies to ensure that inflation is anchored at target over the forecast horizon.
- Financial stability:
  - Because tight monetary conditions can place strains on financial stability, policies should strengthen financial supervision, require vigilant monitoring of systemic risks, and modernize resolution frameworks.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Credible medium-term fiscal frameworks and consolidation could safeguard budgetary room for maneuver and debt sustainability.
- Structural/longer-term reforms:
  - Medium-term output losses relative to prepandemic trends are sizable and inequality remains high, calling for a multipronged regional growth strategy.
  - Strengthening multilateral cooperation and mitigating the effects of fragmentation are vital for Asia’s medium-term outlook.
  - Structural policies are needed to boost productivity growth, facilitate the green transition, and secure inclusive and sustained growth—this urgency is amplified by the risks posed by de-risking strategies across the region.

*Source: Regional Economic Outlook—Asia and Pacific, Executive Summary (text).*

### 1. Headline Inflation

### 1. Headline Inflation

### Outlook for Inflation in Asia and the Pacific
- Inflation is projected to continue the decline toward central bank targets.
- Except for Japan, inflation is expected to return to within target ranges by the end of 2024.
- China: baseline outlook is for a gradual increase in inflation as output gaps close, driven by expected increases in food and fuel prices.
- Japan: core inflation has reached a historically high level due to strong domestic demand and rising wages, and it is expected to stay above 2 percent until early 2025.
- Even in economies where output is still above potential (Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand), gaps will narrow until 2024, and core inflation is expected to moderate.

### Regional Growth and Inflation Interactions
- China’s growth outlook: expand by 5 percent in 2023 and by 4.2 percent in 2024.
  - Compared to the April 2023 World Economic Outlook, this is a downward revision of 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively.
  - The revision reflects mainly renewed weakness in the property sector despite more policy support than previously assumed.
- The global demand rotation toward services is a headwind for the region despite a stronger US growth outlook.
  - US growth for 2023 and 2024 was upgraded in the October 2023 World Economic Outlook by 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points, respectively, compared to April.
  - The net effect of US upgrades and China downgrades is still positive for the rest of Asia, but with a relatively small and short-lived impact.

### Near-Term Risks to Inflation
- Key downside risks include:
  - More persistent global inflationary pressures requiring further monetary tightening.
  - A deeper downturn in the property sector in China and an abrupt tightening of financial conditions.
- Upside risks to inflation:
  - Further commodity price spikes and tighter labor markets.
  - Inflation in Asia’s emerging market and low-income economies is particularly exposed to global rice prices and other essential food prices.
  - Core inflation in emerging Asia is particularly susceptible to global commodity shocks.
- Financial-condition risk:
  - The relatively accommodative financial conditions in both the United States and emerging market Asia come with the risk of a sharp reversal, which could tighten global and regional financial conditions and put growth at risk.

### Medium-Term Risks Affecting Inflation Dynamics
- Medium-term potential growth in China is projected to slow amid uncertainty about productivity and labor force growth; weaker medium-term growth in China will weigh on regional growth.
- Geoeconomic fragmentation pressures (increased restrictions on trade, impacts on cross-border portfolio and FDI flows, concentrated availability of critical minerals) could reduce growth in Asia and the Pacific and affect inflation dynamics.
- Natural disasters and rising economic losses could affect vulnerable populations and pose a risk to food security, with implications for inflation.

### Monetary Policy Implications
- Most central banks in Asia and Pacific (except the Bank of Japan and the People’s Bank of China) have tightened monetary policy stances in line with price stability mandates.
- Compared with previous monetary tightening cycles in the new millennium, the pace of nominal policy rate increases has been faster in both advanced and emerging market economies.
- Going forward, central banks in the region should guard against easing monetary policy prematurely:
  - Despite the tightening cycle, ex ante real policy interest rates are only at about zero, which is close to or still somewhat below neutral levels.
  - Financial conditions, especially in emerging market economies, remain more accommodative than in earlier monetary tightening cycles.
  - This possible disconnect between financial conditions and policy rates could reduce both the disinflationary impact of hikes and their negative impact on growth and employment.
  - Core inflation in a few advanced economies of the region—including Australia, Japan, and New Zealand—is still substantially above target; central banks should stay the course or be ready to tighten until inflation is expected to decline firmly to the target range.
- Historical pass-through estimates suggest that the recent tightening has contributed to recent disinflation.

### Key Quantitative Points and Projections
- China growth: 5 percent in 2023; 4.2 percent in 2024 (downward revisions of 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points relative to April 2023 WEO).
- US growth upgrades in October 2023 WEO: 0.5 and 0.4 percentage points for 2023 and 2024, respectively, compared to April.
- Japan: core inflation expected to stay above 2 percent until early 2025.
- ASEAN emerging market economies growth: expected 4.2 percent in 2023 and 4.6 percent in 2024—a 0.3 percentage point downward revision relative to April.
- China downside scenario: China’s GDP would decline by as much as 1.6 percent relative to the baseline by 2025, while world GDP would decline by 0.6 percent relative to the baseline (October 2023 WEO, Chapter 1).

*International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook — Asia and Pacific, October 2023.*

### Chapter 2). There is also considerable uncertainty around lags of policy transmissions and the relative size of

### Chapter 2

### Financial Stability
- Asia’s banking sector has remained resilient, underpinned by strong capital buffers and rising profitability (Figure 1.13, panel 1).
- Risks as interest rates remain higher for longer:
  - Associated asset quality risk could increase and lead to financial sector stresses in Asia.
  - Real estate sectors could become a source of financial stability risks in a tighter-for-longer environment.
    - In China, continued stress in the property sector may lead to material losses for smaller banks.
    - Outside of China, high-leverage property sector segments could face challenging funding conditions and liquidity shortfalls (April 2023 Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific).
  - Regional financial centers such as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Singapore have experienced substantial commercial property price declines recently.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Strengthen supervision, including through implementation of Basel III standards.
  - Phase out forbearance measures.
  - Closely monitor systemic risks.
  - Regulators should facilitate restructuring or bankruptcy proceedings of insolvent developers while protecting buyers’ interests and restoring market confidence (China-specific).
  - Use macroprudential measures preemptively to address emerging risks in banks and nonbanks, including those linked to highly indebted corporate borrowers and increasingly vulnerable real estate sectors (for example, limits on loan-to-value ratios and debt-service-to-income ratios).
  - For economies with accommodative financial conditions, increase banks’ countercyclical buffers and provisions for sectors with pockets of vulnerabilities.
  - If financial sector stress emerges, deploy liquidity support promptly while mitigating moral hazard to limit contagion.
- Data and methodological notes:
  - Figure 1.12 results are derived from a sample of nine Asian economies—AUS, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, MYS, NZL, PHL, and THA—following the methodology in Deb and others (2023). Dotted lines show 90 percent confidence intervals.

### Fiscal Policy
- Fiscal consolidation in Asia continues to support disinflation, although the pace is expected to slow in 2024.
- Debt service burdens are higher than before the pandemic due to higher debt levels and interest rates (Figure 1.14, panel 1)—hence stronger primary balances are needed to ensure debt sustainability.
  - This is a particular concern for countries with limited fiscal space for priority spending or increased risks of debt distress.
  - A few frontier market economies (for example, Maldives, Mongolia, and Papua New Guinea) and low-income countries (such as Lao P.D.R.) face high short-term external financing needs or debt servicing costs; stronger fiscal adjustment may be required in some cases to achieve debt stabilization at a sustainable level.
- Government revenue in the region remains low compared to international peers; the gap is increasing among both emerging markets and low-income countries (Figure 1.14, panel 2).
- Policy recommendations:
  - Implement revenue-enhancing reforms, including expanding the tax base and strengthening revenue administration.
  - In countries with limited fiscal space, prioritize public spending that protects the most vulnerable households and boosts future productivity by:
    - Prioritizing subsidy reforms.
    - Strengthening weak social safety nets.
    - Augmenting public investment to boost productivity growth.
  - Reduce the region’s large energy subsidies (Figure 1.14, panel 3) to create fiscal space for investment in renewable energy and to encourage greater energy efficiency.
  - Communicate and implement credible medium-term fiscal frameworks to facilitate necessary fiscal adjustments.

### Structural Policies
- Targeted and carefully sequenced structural reforms are needed to boost productivity and mitigate pandemic scarring and fragmentation.
- Prioritization and sequencing:
  - Prioritize reforms that alleviate the most critical constraints to activity to front-load output gains and ensure public buy-in.
  - Mitigate potentially adverse distributional effects of structural reforms across economic groups (including gender and age) through complementary policies and targeted support so benefits are shared.
- Specific reform areas:
  - Expand health care coverage.
  - Increase access to early childhood and higher education.
  - Support start-ups and deepen digitalization.
  - Improve business environments and regulatory frameworks to attract foreign and domestic investment.
  - Increase investment in research and development, education, and skills development to enhance innovation and productivity.

### Climate Transition and Adaptation
- Speeding up the green transition would help mitigate the effects of climate change.
  - Temperatures across Asia have risen in recent decades, accompanied by an increasing frequency of natural disasters.
  - Investment in climate change adaptation needs to be scaled up from both public and private sources, including green financing mechanisms (Figure 1.15)—especially in regions most vulnerable to climate shocks.
- Asia’s role in emissions:
  - Five of the 10 largest emitters are in Asia (Lim and others, forthcoming).
- Policy recommendations:
  - Implement carbon pricing to discourage fossil fuel use, promote renewable energy development, and incentivize technological development.
  - Complement carbon pricing with green industrial policies, but design them to avoid distortions to international trade and investment (for example, avoid domestic content provisions), in line with World Trade Organization rules.
  - Enhance climate risk monitoring systems and risk management frameworks.
  - Build stronger safety nets and insurance to enhance climate resilience.
- Data note:
  - Figure 1.15 shows climate adaptation needs (Percent of GDP); hollow circles are weighted averages of country groups.

### Recent Inflation Experiences in Asia and the Pacific
- Key facts about inflation in the region (Figure 2.1):
  - The Asia and Pacific region overall saw a noticeable increase in inflation, but inflation on average has been lower through this period than in other regions.
  - Country experiences vary considerably—some countries have experienced historically high inflation, and others have experienced markedly low inflation.
  - Transportation, food, and fuel costs also increased substantially, though the increase in food costs was less than in other regions, and fuel costs increased by a smaller amount in Asian emerging markets.
- Regional groupings and patterns:
  - In the advanced economies of Australia, Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore, inflation patterns are similar to those in the United States and the euro area (though varying in amplitude):
    - Headline CPI inflation dipped early in the pandemic, then increased steadily.
    - Producer price index and imported inflation led CPI inflation.
    - There is little sign that wage-price spirals drove the inflation cycle.
- Analytical focus and questions:
  - Why was inflation lower on average in Asia and the Pacific compared with economies elsewhere?
  - What explains the differences in inflation outcomes across the region?
  - What are the implications for monetary policy—how should policy have reacted to the shocks that drove inflation, and was it effective?
- Structure of the chapter:
  - Section 1 summarizes inflation experiences for the entire region and within the region.
  - Section 2 considers potential explanations of inflation in relation to inflation pressures and their propagation, concentrating on external price pressures.
  - Section 3 evaluates monetary policy.
  - Section 4 presents conclusions.

*International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook—Asia and Pacific, October 2023*

### 3. Inflation Measures

### 3. Inflation Measures

### Regional inflation patterns and notable country experiences
- Food inflation was relatively low in Asia and Pacific compared with the rest of the world; fuel price increases were higher than peers for advanced economies but lower than peers for emerging markets.
- Several low-income and emerging markets in the region (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, and Thailand) show similar inflation patterns, though inflation increases are less striking compared with previous cycles.
- In India, Maldives, and Vietnam, headline inflation has been only slightly higher than before the pandemic period, without clear troughs or peaks.
- In Japan, the inflation cycle has been later than the other advanced economies. Inflation has been above the 2 percent target since the middle of 2022, with core inflation currently above headline measures (mainly due to large energy subsidies), following currency depreciation and wage growth.
- In China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and Macao Special Administrative Region, inflation rates have been lower during the pandemic than before it.
- Inflation rates have been much higher than the rest of the region in countries experiencing heightened economic stress (Lao P.D.R., Myanmar, and Sri Lanka), mostly associated with substantial exchange rate depreciations.

### External shocks and contributions to CPI inflation
- From the second half of 2020, shipping costs soared by more than 400 percent from pre-pandemic levels.
- Global food and fuel costs increased sharply, by about 17 percent and 58 percent, respectively, from the start of 2021 to the end of 2022.
- On average, increases in the prices of food, fuel, and transportation account for nearly 2 percentage points out of 4½ percent inflation for the region in 2022.
  - The largest contribution was from food, which has a high weight—considerably higher for emerging markets and higher in Asia and Pacific advanced economies than other advanced peers—whereas fuel and transportation carry a lower weight.
- Core inflation responses to import price and external shocks:
  - Import prices respond quickly and strongly, followed by changes in producer prices; the responses of core inflation peak at about 8 to 12 months.
  - Exchange rate pass-through in Asian economies is within the range of pass-through estimates for other countries; it is strong and quick to import prices and is especially high during periods of high inflation and elevated uncertainty.

### Accounting, propagation, and model findings
- The direct accounting of food, fuel, and transport contributions does not fully capture broader propagation through the economy or the impact of economic slack.
- A canonical open economy Phillips curve analysis indicates that propagation of shocks (effects of output gaps, import prices, and inflation expectations on core CPI) in Asia and Pacific economies is quite similar to that in advanced and emerging market peers.
- The fitted model attributes significant effects from external price pressures to core inflation in recent years, but much remains unexplained or attributed to lags.
- Producer price index (PPI) inflation modeling shows how lockdowns generated both supply and demand shocks and how those shocks, along with policy stimulus and external shocks (transportation, fuel, and exchange rates), contributed to inflation.

### Pandemic repercussions: demand, supply, and other factors
- Lockdowns and supply/demand shocks:
  - Negative demand effects from lockdowns in 2020 outweighed upward price pressures from production inefficiencies, pulling inflation down; later demand recovery boosted inflation.
  - Lockdowns were maintained for longer in Asia, contributing to later and weaker recoveries on average.
- Policy support:
  - Policymakers acted quickly with monetary and fiscal support measures; policy support persisted into 2021 in other regions but was withdrawn relatively quickly in Asia and Pacific countries.
  - Within the region, policy support was generally stronger in advanced than emerging markets.
- Supply chains, transportation costs, and commodity prices contributed substantially to inflation in the region, more so in absolute terms than in the rest of the world on average.
  - The model implies fuel prices had a slightly larger impact on inflation dynamics for Asian countries than the rest of the world, associated with the larger size of manufacturing sectors in the region.
  - Weaker positive demand shocks offset these price pressures because lockdowns were typically lifted later than in other regions.
- As a result, PPI inflation was lower in Asia and the Pacific than in the rest of the world, especially in Asian emerging market economies, which suffered more persistent effects on output than advanced economies.

### Additional factors assessed
- Shifts in consumption patterns:
  - Strong shifts in US consumer demand contributed to inflation pressures early in the pandemic; similar patterns occurred in Asia and Pacific advanced economies but not as strongly, and the hypothesis does not carry over to Asia and Pacific emerging market economies, where demand for both goods and services fell.
  - The ratio of goods to services personal expenditures in the United States was 10–15 percent higher than its prepandemic level from the second quarter of 2020 onward, but the ratio for Asia and Pacific increased by about 5 percent in 2020 and reverted afterward.
- Labor markets:
  - Labor markets in the United States were very tight in 2021; by contrast, employment and participation rates bounced back strongly in the region (except for East and Southeast Asia), with firms adjusting hours worked.
  - Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and more recently Australia and New Zealand suffered from a lack of migrant workers while borders were closed, but wage increases remained relatively weak.
- Inflation expectations:
  - Firms’ earnings reports show a noticeable increase in concerns over future price pressures from the onset of the pandemic through the middle of 2022, suggesting that had global commodity prices not fallen, the expectations mechanism might have proved stronger.

### Role of monetary policy
- Central banks across the Asia and Pacific region eased monetary policy soon after the onset of the pandemic, and later tightened as economies recovered and inflation pressures increased.
  - Some central banks (Korea and New Zealand) started raising policy rates before the Federal Reserve initiated its tightening cycle. Most central banks followed and have maintained rates.
- Conventional wisdom that policymakers can “look through” supply-driven inflation if expectations remain anchored is discussed, but lockdowns caused both supply and demand shocks over time.
- Evidence on monetary transmission shows the effects of policy rate changes on activity are not statistically different from those in peer countries, implying monetary tightening contributed to moderating inflation, allowing for lags.
- Central banks’ response—easing amid negative demand shocks and tightening as demand recovered—appears to have been appropriate and helped contain inflation.

### Conclusions
- Inflation outcomes have been on average lower than in other regions, but variation within the region has been wide.
- Inflation has been higher in most of the region’s advanced economies than in emerging markets.
- Two sets of shocks are important:
  - External cost-push shocks—especially from food prices—are important to both headline CPI inflation and core CPI.
  - Pandemic policies generated complex effects: lockdowns caused demand and supply shocks, constrained production, and generated migrant labor shortages in some countries; overall, longer lockdowns in Asia and the Pacific dampened demand and inflation relative to other regions.
- The impact of food price pressures was generally lower in Asian emerging markets than in other regions, despite relatively high weights on food in headline CPI, partly because of compositional effects and policy measures.
- Policy implications:
  - Rather than treating pressures as entirely driven by supply shocks, policymakers eased monetary conditions amid negative demand shocks and tightened as demand recovered, which helped contain inflation.

*Source: Regional Economic Outlook — Asia and Pacific, International Monetary Fund, October 2023 (chapter text excerpt).*

### References

### References

### Selected referenced works
- Abraham, Katharine, and Lea Rendell. 2023. “Where Are the Missing Workers?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
- Albrizio, Silvia, Allan Dizioli, and Pedro Vitale Simon. 2023. “Mining the Gap: Extracting Firms’ Inflation Expectations from Earning Calls.” IMF Working Paper 23/202, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Baba, Chikako, Romain Duval, Ting Lan, and Petia Topalova. 2023. “The 2020–2022 Inflation Surge across Europe: A Phillips-Curve-Based Dissection.” IMF Working Paper 23/30, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Bernanke, Ben, and Olivier Blanchard. 2023. “What Caused the US Pandemic-Era Inflation?” Hutchins Center Working Paper 86, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
- Brainard, Lael. 2022. “What Can We Learn from the Pandemic and the War about Supply Shocks, Inflation, and Monetary Policy?” Remarks prepared for the 21st Bank for International Settlements Annual Conference, “Central Banking after the Pandemic: Challenges Ahead,” Basel, Switzerland, June 24.
- Carrière-Swallow, Yan, Pragyan Deb, Davide Furceri, Daniel Jiménez, and Jonathan D. Ostry. 2022. “Shipping Costs and Inflation.” Journal of International Money and Finance 130 (February): 102771.
- Carrière-Swallow, Yan, Melih Firat, Davide Furceri, and Daniel Jiménez. 2023. “State-Dependent Exchange Rate Pass-Through.” IMF Working Paper 23/86, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Causa, Orsetta, Michael Abendschein, Nhung Luu, Emilia Soldani, and Chiara Soriolo. 2022, “The Post-COVID-19 Rise in Labour Shortages.” OECD Economics Department Working Paper 1721, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
- Chau, Vu, Marina Conesa Martinez, Taehoon Kim, and John Spray. Forthcoming. “Global Value Chains and Inflation Dynamics.” IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Deb, Pragyan, Julia Estefania-Flores, Melih Firat, Davide Furceri, and Siddharth Kothari. 2023. “Monetary Policy Transmission Heterogeneity: Cross-Country Evidence.” IMF Working Paper 23/204, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Firat, Melih, and Otso Hao. 2023. “Demand versus Supply: Decomposition of Inflation and Some Applications.” IMF Working Paper 23/205, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Gopinath, Gita. 2022. “How Will the Pandemic and War Shape Future Monetary Policy?” Remarks prepared for the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, “Structural Shifts in the Global Economy,” Jackson Hole, WY, August 24–26.
- Guerrieri, Veronica, Guido Lorenzoni, Ludwig Straub, and Iván Werning. 2022. “Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages?” American Economic Review 112 (5): 14 37–74.
- International Labour Organization (ILO). 2022. Asia-Pacific Employment and Social Outlook 2022: Rethinking Sectoral Strategies for a Human-Centered Future of Work. Geneva.
- Koch, Christoffer, and Diaa Noureldin. 2023. “How We Missed the Inflation Surge: An Anatomy of Post-2020 Inflation Forecast Errors.” IMF Working Paper 23/102, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Redl, Chris. 2023. “Monitoring Demand and Supply in Asia.” IMF Working Paper 23/203, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

### Findings and analysis in Chapter 3 — “How Will Trend Growth in China Impact the Rest of Asia?”
- China’s role and GVCs
  - China’s share of global trade rose from less than 2½ percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 2022.
  - China’s share of global GVC exports increased fivefold since the early 1990s.
  - China’s sourcing of intermediate inputs has increased significantly across countries, both as a share of total inputs and as a share of foreign inputs.
  - China’s trade as a share of GDP increased by 9 percentage points between 2000 and 2022 for the region.
  - Korea and Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries are particularly dependent on Chinese final demand for investment and exports.
- Empirical growth spillovers
  - Greater gross trade links with China are associated with higher GDP growth on average; the effect is significantly larger for GVC linkages, particularly backward linkages.
  - Moving from the average backward linkages of non-Asian countries to the Asian average is associated with higher growth of about 0.5 percentage point.
  - A panel regression finds greater exposure via backward and forward GVC linkages and total demand exposure yields positive percentage point impacts on growth (see Figure 3.3 for detailed bar estimates).
- Baseline projections and catching-up potential
  - IMF staff project China’s growth to reach 3.4 percent by 2028, with more declines further into the future.
  - A standard convergence regression indicates China’s past overperformance was 5.5 percent on average relative to what its per capita income would predict.
  - Sectoral productivity gaps with the frontier remain large, with the GVC-intensive sector having larger gaps, implying scope for faster convergence if reform momentum is rebuilt.
  - Specific reforms could close productivity gaps: closing productivity gaps between state-owned enterprises and private firms could lift total factor productivity by about 6 percent (Jurzyk and Ruane 2021).
- Fragmentation and downside risks
  - Baseline assumes fragmentation pressures remain contained to specific products and sectors and do not rise to a macro-critical level.
  - A resurgence in export controls could cause large drops in input quality for major economies by blocking access to specific cutting-edge technologies and products.
  - Trade-distorting policies and components of recent legislation in major economies could amplify de-risking impacts, including reshoring, onshoring, nearshoring, and friend-shoring dynamics.
- Model-based spillover assessment (chapter approach)
  - The chapter uses a macroeconomic model with GVC production to assess spillovers from an upside scenario of domestic reforms in China and a downside scenario from de-risking between China and OECD economies.
  - Productivity-enhancing reforms in China can lift growth in Asia, especially in smaller and more open economies with strong GVC links to China.
  - Non-OECD Asian countries can initially benefit from trade diversion effects of “friend-shoring” by China and the OECD, but benefits largely dissipate once the global slowdown from friend-shoring and reshoring is accounted for.
  - Export restrictions aimed at curtailing access to high-quality inputs can cause empirically significant potential losses in aggregate outcomes and in critical areas such as environmental goods, because the quality frontier is highly product-specific.

*International Monetary Fund — Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific (October 2023) — References and Chapter 3 excerpts.*

### 4. Mentions of Key Terms in Corporate Presentations

### 4. Mentions of Key Terms in Corporate Presentations

### Data on mentions in corporate presentations
- Chart axis shows number of mentions with tick marks: 0, 200, 400, 600, 800, 1,000, 1,200, 1,400, 1,600.
- Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; document search and analytics tool; and IMF staff calculations.
- Note: For 2023, numbers are rescaled to account for the availability of data only through July.

### Context: growing policy fragmentation and firm behavior
- Policy developments cited as proliferating: European Union’s Green Deal Industrial Plan, export restrictions of minerals (China, Indonesia).
- Evidence of firms “exploring options to reshape their supply chains,” echoing greenfield FDI signs of fragmentation.
- Characterization: downside risk is “global de-risking” (reshoring and friend-shoring), rather than extreme fragmentation.

### Model-based spillovers — model setup
- Model used: IMF’s GIMF (Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model) with added GVC sector.
- Three sectors in model: tradables, nontradables, and a GVC sector using imported and domestic GVC inputs plus capital and labor.
- Spillovers quantified through trade channels and through productivity (technology) spillovers.

### Upside scenario: reigniting convergence in China
- Assumption: aggregate annual productivity in China grows about 1 percentage point higher than baseline for 15 years.
- GVC sector productivity assumed to grow twice as fast as nontradables productivity in China.
- Main quantitative outcomes:
  - Level of GDP in China about 21 percent higher in the new steady state.
  - Higher GDP level 15 years out equivalent to about 1.3 percentage points higher annualized growth.
  - Spillovers through trade only: GDP in the rest of the world increases by about 1.4 percent (or 0.1 percentage point higher annualized growth).
  - Largest spillovers: other southeast Asian economies (southeast Asia excluding Indonesia) — GDP increases by about 2.3 percent in the long term (about 11 percent of the size of the impact on China).
  - Korea sees benefits “about 7.5 percent of the size of the impact on China.”
- Amplification: productivity spillovers (technology embodied in imports and dissemination) raise long-term gains further; example: other Southeast Asia GDP about 4 percent higher in long term when productivity spillovers included (equivalent to up to one-quarter percentage point in annualized growth and about one-fifth the effect within China).

### Downside scenarios: de-risking, friend-shoring and reshoring
- Definitions:
  - Friend-shoring: changing between different foreign sources while minimizing change to overall dependence on foreign sourcing.
  - Reshoring: increasing domestic sourcing versus foreign sourcing beyond existing home bias.
- Scenario calibration details:
  - Reshoring: OECD and China reduce reliance on imports from all countries by dialing back observed changes in foreign sourcing between 2000 and 2021.
  - Example calibration: OECD increase in reliance on foreign-sourced investment goods from about 10 percent in 2000 to about 13 percent in 2021; reshoring simulation reduces this reliance by 3 percentage points via increased nontariff barriers (NTBs).
  - Friend-shoring: China and OECD impose NTBs on each other to reduce mutual interdependence but do not restrict trade with other countries.
- Quantitative outcomes — friend-shoring:
  - Global GDP declines by 1.8 percent.
  - China long-term GDP loss: 6.8 percent of GDP.
  - GDP and exports in the rest of the world decline marginally in the long term in the range of –0.2 to –0.7 percent for GDP.
  - Mechanism: trade diversion boosts some other countries’ exports short term, but reduced demand from China and OECD dampens those gains.
- Quantitative outcomes — reshoring:
  - Global output losses about 4.5 percent in the long term.
  - China experiences a 6.9 percent loss.
  - OECD regions’ losses range from 3.8 percent to up to 10.2 percent of GDP, with larger losses for more open economies with stronger China linkages.
  - Other Southeast Asia region experiences a large loss of 9.1 percent.
  - Mechanism: higher NTBs on all countries raise input costs and distort resource allocation; trade diversion benefits disappear because rest of world also faces higher NTBs.
- Per-percentage-point calibration:
  - For each percentage point of reshoring, long-term global GDP losses are about 1.5 percent.
  - For each percentage point of friend-shoring, long-term global GDP losses are about 0.25 percent.
  - Dialing back these two margins to 2000 levels translates into global GDP losses of 4.5 percent (reshoring) and 1.8 percent (friend-shoring).

### Key policy-relevant implications (from the analysis)
- De-risking that takes the form of reshoring or broad NTBs can impose large, persistent global output losses, amplified by GVC linkages.
- Friend-shoring focused on opposing blocs reduces but does not eliminate losses; trade diversion can partially offset losses for some economies but is outweighed by demand declines in large economies.
- Reforms that boost productivity in China (especially in the GVC sector) yield global positive spillovers, larger when technology spillovers raise productivity in trading partners.

*Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Eora Global Supply Chain Database; IMF staff calculations; Regional Economic Outlook—Asia and Pacific, October 2023, International Monetary Fund.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/reo/apd/2023/october/english/text.pdf_
