## 2. Inflation in Europe: Assessment, Risks, and Policy Implications

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---

### Recent developments
- Inflation has surged across Europe during the past 18 months.
- Inflation exceeded 5 percent in almost all European economies by late summer 2022.
- Headline inflation reached between 20–25 percent in the Baltic countries.
- Much of the rise in inflation can be traced back to soaring energy and food prices and, to a lesser extent, supply bottlenecks.
- On average, commodity prices contributed about two-thirds of the rise in headline inflation.
- The number of items with price increases exceeding central banks’ inflation targets accounted for 70–90 percent of the core consumer price index basket across broad country groups by late summer 2022.
- Labor markets and activity:
  - Output-based measures indicate closing gaps across much of Europe, though residual slack persists in some large advanced economies.
  - Unemployment rates were below prepandemic lows in two-thirds of economies.
  - Job vacancies per unemployed exceeded prepandemic highs in three-quarters of economies.
  - Hours worked were almost back to pre-COVID-19 levels by mid-2022.
- Wage and expectations developments:
  - Negotiated wage increases in the euro area have generally remained contained but are starting to inch up.
  - Medium-term inflation expectations have risen to or above inflation targets, especially among emerging European economies and among households.
- Policy measures moderated inflation in some countries:
  - Specific tax and regulatory measures (such as price caps or freezes) limited the rise in inflation in some countries (for example, France, Malta, and Spain), though often at sizable fiscal cost.
  - Exchange rate and monetary developments amplified inflation in some emerging Europe economies; for example, in Türkiye, depreciation of the lira amplified the inflationary impact of higher commodity prices.

### Inflation drivers (empirical findings)
- Phillips-curve framework:
  - A Phillips curve was estimated for each of 24 advanced and 7 emerging European economies using data for 2000:Q1–22:Q2.
  - The model relates inflation to past and expected future inflation, economic slack (unemployment gap), and foreign price developments (including global energy and food prices interacted with domestic CPI shares).
- Key empirical relationships:
  - Headline and core inflation rates are strongly associated with lower economic slack and higher past and expected future price developments.
  - In emerging European economies (EE):
    - Inflation increases more sharply when labor markets tighten (when unemployment declines).
    - Price setting appears less forward looking, consistent with weaker anchoring of inflation expectations historically.
    - Inflation responds more strongly to foreign price developments (especially global food prices) than in advanced European economies (AE).
- Role of commodity prices and external pressures:
  - The standard Phillips-curve model confirms the key role played by foreign (especially commodity) price developments in Europe’s inflation surge since 2021.
  - Food and energy prices are statistically significant drivers of inflation, beyond producer-price channels.

### Model explanatory power and residuals
- The standard Phillips-curve model can at most account for 60 percent of the recent surge in inflation.
- The model cannot explain 40 to 50 percent of the rise in inflation in advanced and emerging European economies, as evidenced by sizeable positive residuals in 2022:Q2.
- Several factors likely contribute to the unexplained inflation:
  - Two tail-risk events—the pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine—may have altered structural relationships underpinning inflation.
  - Core inflation appears more backward-looking postpandemic, and pass-through of global commodity prices to domestic inflation has increased postpandemic.
  - Conventional indicators may understate slack because of:
    - Widespread use of short-term work programs.
    - Structural labor market changes (shifts in worker preferences, declines in labor supply, demographic headwinds).
  - Alternative measures of labor market tightness correlate strongly with Phillips-curve residuals:
    - Vacancy-to-unemployment ratio.
    - Share of firms reporting labor shortages as a factor limiting production.
  - Supply bottlenecks also correlate strongly with residuals:
    - Share of firms reporting shortages of intermediate inputs as a factor limiting production.
- Discretionary and administrative policies (temporary tax changes, price-suppressing measures) affected inflation dynamics and tended to contain inflation rises in some countries.

### Risks and policy implications
- The evidence presented reinforces the case for continued policy tightening, with central banks standing ready to respond to emerging risks in both directions.
- The chapter highlights the possibility that inflation may be becoming more entrenched given:
  - Rapid decreases in domestic slack in many countries.
  - Rising wage growth in a number of countries.
  - Higher medium-term inflation expectations in some economies.
- Regulatory, fiscal, and monetary policies influence inflation heterogeneously across countries:
  - Countries with larger shares of administered prices may experience slower inflation changes.
  - Pass-through-suppressing price measures limited inflation rises in some countries but often at sizable fiscal cost.
- Given the incomplete explanatory power of conventional models and mounting upside risks to inflation, policymakers should remain prepared to tighten monetary policies substantially more than currently projected if inflation dynamics warrant such a response.

### Input shortages and core residuals explained by nonconventional drivers
- Findings on input and labor shortages and core Phillips-curve residuals:
  - Input shortages appear to account for a sizable portion of the unexplained inflation in 2022.
  - Using estimated correlations to decompose Phillips curve residuals in recent quarters suggests:
    - Input and, to a smaller extent, labor shortages have exerted significant upward pressure on prices in the post-COVID-19 period.
    - Widespread reported input and labor shortages and high vacancy-to-unemployment ratios in the first half of 2022 might have raised core inflation by about 1.5 percent on average in Europe, or about three-fourths of the 2 percent estimated residual.
  - These findings imply that, beyond the predominant role of commodity prices, the recent surge in inflation in Europe is also at least partly driven by labor market tightness, while supply shortages have played an even larger role than captured by foreign price and commodity price variables included in the Phillips curves.

### Forecasts and uncertainty (Phillips curve–based forecasts and alternative approach)
- Under the October 2022 World Economic Outlook forecasts for global commodity prices, growth, and unemployment, and assuming stable inflation expectations, the empirical model predicts average inflation to decline gradually to:
  - 3–6 percent (headline) and 3–7 percent (core) in both advanced and emerging European economies by the end of 2023.
- In emerging European economies:
  - Despite starting from higher levels and being generally more persistent, inflation would fall more rapidly than in advanced economies because commodity price stabilization would entail larger disinflation gains.
  - Such gains will be more muted, all else equal, in countries where measures that dampened commodity pass-through are gradually phased out.
- These Phillips curve–based forecasts assume that the model’s large underestimation of recent inflation vanishes quickly.
- A more conservative approach, which assumes a slower reduction in recent inflation forecast errors, predicts a slower return to lower inflation rates.
  - The conservative approach assumes that the average of the estimated 2022 residuals declines gradually using a first-order autore-regressive process with autocorrelation coefficient of 0.6.
- Overall assessment:
  - Risks around IMF World Economic Outlook inflation forecasts are tilted to the upside.
  - Uncertainty around inflation forecasts is unusually large.

### Illustrative scenarios and key numerical assumptions
- Scenario shocks used in simulations:
  - Baseline (World Economic Outlook): October World Economic Outlook assumptions (energy inflation 79.6 percent in 2022, 2.9 percent in 2023; food inflation 14.2 percent in 2022, −5.8 percent in 2023). Cost shock raises inflation to World Economic Outlook baseline in the second quarter of 2022.
  - 1 Negative supply shocks: 20 percent rise in energy and food prices. Additional inflationary cost shock matching initial shock in Phillips curve simulation.
  - 2 Positive supply shocks: 20 percent fall in energy and food prices. Additional deflationary cost shock matching initial shock in Phillips curve simulation.
  - 3 Less slack than Estimated: 2 percentage points lower unemployment gap; 2 percentage points lower output gap than assumed by the central bank in its monetary policy rule.
  - 4 More slack than Estimated: 2 percentage points higher unemployment gap; 2 percentage points higher output gap than assumed by the central bank in its monetary policy rule.
  - 5 de-anchoring: 1 percentage point higher expected inflation; sudden rise in expectations increases inflation in the first period by 1 percentage point.
  - 6 More Backward-Looking Price Formation Process: Rise in the coefficient on lagged inflation to 0.8 (about its pre-1990s value). (All shocks persist throughout the simulation periods of six quarters in the Phillips curve simulation exercise.)
- Key numerical highlights preserved exactly:
  - Estimated contribution of input and labor shortages to core inflation in first half of 2022: about 1.5 percent on average in Europe, or about three-fourths of the 2 percent estimated residual.
  - Phillips curve–based forecast range by end of 2023: 3–6 percent (headline) and 3–7 percent (core).
  - WEO baseline commodity assumptions: energy inflation 79.6 percent in 2022, 2.9 percent in 2023; food inflation 14.2 percent in 2022, −5.8 percent in 2023.
  - Conservative residual decay assumption: first-order autore-regressive process with autocorrelation coefficient of 0.6.
  - Scenario shocks: 20 percent rise/fall in energy and food prices for negative/positive supply shocks.
  - Slack shocks in scenarios: 2 percentage points lower/higher unemployment gap; 2 percentage points lower/higher output gap.
  - De-anchoring shock in scenarios: 1 percentage point higher expected inflation (sudden rise increases inflation in the first period by 1 percentage point).
  - More backward-looking price formation: coefficient on lagged inflation rises to 0.8.
  - Potential monetary tightening relative to baseline in upside scenarios: more than 200 basis points.
  - Potential GDP growth reduction from tightening: up to 2 percentage points in the year ahead.

### Wage–price spiral risks and empirical drivers
- Two empirical exercises:
  - Response of wages to inflation triggered by oil price shocks (based on Baba and Lee (2022)):
    - Two main factors increase pass-through from price shocks to wages: high prevailing inflation and weak central bank independence (linked to weak monetary policy credibility).
    - When prevailing inflation is already high, an oil-induced increase in prices leads to a larger and more long-lasting increase in wages.
    - The wage response to price shocks is much larger and more persistent when monetary policy lacks credibility.
  - Response of prices to wages (based on Boranova and others (2021)):
    - Pass-through from wages to prices is larger when prevailing inflation is high—it is three times larger in a high-inflation environment than in a low-inflation one.
    - Pass-through from wages to prices is stronger when inflation expectations are not well anchored.
- Implication: Risks of a wage-price spiral are more pronounced when inflation is already high and where monetary policy is not deemed credible.
- Offsetting factors:
  - Prevalence of formal wage indexation to past inflation has fallen across Europe in recent decades, lowering risks of wage-price spirals.
  - Wage growth has been relatively contained in most advanced European economies so far; limited evidence of acceleration in negotiated wages until late summer.
  - European Central Bank analyses indicate:
    - More than half of private sector employees in the euro area do not take inflation into account when setting wages.
    - Where inflation plays a formal role in wage negotiations, forward-looking inflation measures are used predominantly.
    - In the public sector, only about one-fifth of the euro area public wage bill has full or partial price indexation.

### Policy analysis and model simulations (monetary policy focus)
- Model and calibration:
  - A small dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model calibrated to an average advanced and an average emerging European economy is used to examine monetary policy responses and implied inflation and GDP growth paths under the risk scenarios.
  - The baseline replicates inflation and output dynamics observed in the first half of 2022 using a “cost-push shock” related to commodity price inflation.
  - The calibration reflects estimated parameters: a steeper Phillips curve, more backward-looking inflation, and a bigger cost-push in emerging Europe compared with advanced Europe.
- Simulation outcomes and policy implications:
  - If some upside inflation risks materialize, monetary policies could need to be tightened by more than 200 basis points more than under the baseline.
  - Such tightening could reduce GDP growth in the year ahead by up to 2 percentage points in some cases.
  - A further commodity-driven cost shock would lead to higher inflation, tighter monetary policy, and lower output everywhere but particularly in emerging Europe because of:
    - Larger share of food and energy in consumption baskets.
    - Larger role of past inflation in inflation expectation formation.
  - A de-anchoring of inflation expectations would have larger and more persistent effects, especially in emerging Europe, forcing stronger monetary tightening and depressing economic activity for as long as expectations remain elevated.
  - Monetary policy mistakes arising from misjudging slack (over- or underestimating output gaps) would cause undesirably more or less inflation than desirable until corrected; this effect is exacerbated in emerging Europe due to steeper Phillips curves and more backward-looking price setting.
  - An increase in the backward-looking component of price formation (for example, rise in coefficient on lagged inflation to 0.8) would make containing inflation more challenging and increase the likelihood of adverse wage-price feedback loops.

### Deviations from the baseline: Advanced Europe
- Scenario illustrations and inflation dynamics:
  - Cost-push (negative supply) shocks and broader "spiral" scenarios can drive up inflation strongly and more long-lastingly because of their broad-based nature; persistently elevated inflation can depress real wages and trigger higher wage demands, raising firms’ costs and inducing further inflation.
  - Inflation expectations that turn more backward-looking allow past inflation hikes to exert continuing inflation pressure, even after the original shock has faded.
  - Advanced economies may be at greater risk of an increase in the “backward-lookingness” of price formation because their inflation expectations are currently more forward-looking than those in emerging European economies, leaving more scope for deterioration—in other words, their central banks have more hard-won credibility to lose.
  - The simulation assumes that advanced and emerging European economies converge to the same level of backward-looking inflation expectations.
  - Similar to the cost-push shock scenario, central banks would need to tighten monetary policy to contain inflation, but more and more persistent tightening would be needed to cope with a more persistent rise in inflation.
  - A contraction in aggregate demand would exacerbate the decline in output but ease inflation pressures; emerging European economies would see inflation drop by more than advanced economies because of their steeper Phillips curves.
  - For the demand slowdown scenario, the inflation reaction is shown for the quarter after the shock rather than on impact. With flexible exchange rates, a contractionary demand shock triggers a depreciation of the exchange rate on impact, which offsets its direct deflationary effect. The following appreciation allows consumer prices to decline.
- Monetary policy implications:
  - Illustrative scenarios suggest that central banks should keep raising policy rates under most scenarios while remaining nimble and ready to respond to emerging risks in both directions.
  - There are greater chances that policy rate paths may ultimately need to be steeper instead of flatter than expected.
  - Maintaining central bank independence, effective communication, and transparency will be key to preserving hard-won credibility and preventing the unmooring of inflation expectations.
  - The desirable strength and persistence of the monetary policy reaction depend on the risk and vary across economies; for example, emerging European economies would need to react more strongly to a de-anchoring of inflation expectations.
- Fiscal and other policies:
  - Although monetary policy is the main tool to lower inflation, fiscal policy should not complicate its action; fiscal consolidation should proceed under the baseline IMF projections—even if its pace may be temporarily slowed—to avoid boosting aggregate demand and making it harder for monetary policy to tame inflation.
  - The more temporary and targeted the relief measures for energy (and food) price shocks are, the less they will conflict with the monetary policy stance.
  - Europe’s policymakers have responded to the commodity crisis with a wide range of mostly broad-based, price-suppressing measures, including subsidies (for example, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania), tax cuts (most countries), and price controls.
  - About 70 percent of emerging European economies used such measures for food, including tax cuts for food items (for example, Bulgaria, Croatia, North Macedonia, Poland, and Türkiye) and subsidies to farmers (for example, Kosovo and North Macedonia), compared with 12 percent of advanced economies.
  - The fiscal cost of these measures, especially those targeting energy prices, has been sizable. It is estimated to reach about 0.6 and 0.5 percent of GDP on average in advanced and emerging European economies, respectively, by mid-2022, exceeding 1.5 percent of GDP in countries such as Greece and Malta.
  - The extraordinary magnitude and partly temporary nature of the energy price increase caution against a full immediate pass-through to end users. Support measures should remain as temporary and targeted as possible and be designed in the most efficient way possible, with the goal of preserving price signals and encouraging energy savings.
  - Where collective bargaining agreements have a wage indexation clause, authorities could intervene to moderate negotiated wages in the medium term in exchange for one-time wage bonuses rather than outright wage increases.
  - Structural reforms that enhance productivity and investments that expand economic capacity and relieve supply constraints, notably in energy and labor markets, could support monetary policy in the fight against inflation.

### Western Balkans: inflation drivers and policy responses
- Inflation was in double digits in the summer of 2022 in all Western Balkan countries except for Albania, where it was at a two-decade high.
- Food has been the dominant driver for two reasons:
  - Domestic food prices have increased more in the Western Balkans than in the European Union because of a high pass-through from global food prices.
  - Food makes about 40 percent of the average consumption basket in the Western Balkans—twice the EU average.
- Energy price inflation has been below the EU average, helped by domestic electricity generation (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro) and policies that dampened energy price increases at the consumer level.
- More recently, inflation in the Western Balkans has become more broad-based, with a rapid rise in core inflation, a build-up of wage pressures (triggered in some cases by minimum wage increases), and growing inflation expectations in some countries.
- Adapting the Phillips curve model to the Western Balkans finds:
  - International food prices are a strong determinant of headline inflation through their impact on domestic unprocessed and processed food prices and on nonfood inflation.
  - The (nominal effective) exchange rate is another key driver of headline inflation, in line with a large exchange rate pass-through.
  - Strong persistence of both headline and core inflation.
  - Inflation expectations are an important determinant of inflation.
- These findings suggest it could take time for inflation to fall back to its presurge levels, underscore the importance of well-anchored inflation expectations, and support the decision of all Western Balkans central banks with autonomous monetary policy (Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia) to increase key policy rates several times since March.
- Rising inflation has prompted governments in the region to take action:
  - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia implemented one-off assistance packages, most targeted at vulnerable groups.
  - Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced sizable public wage and pension increases.
  - Household electricity tariffs are regulated and have remained unchanged so far in most Western Balkans countries (except for Kosovo and North Macedonia), helping to contain the rise of inflation but at high fiscal costs.
  - Price caps and profit margin limits for critical staple food and fuel items have been introduced in all Western Balkans countries, with limited effectiveness.
  - Some countries introduced export bans (North Macedonia, Serbia), which can worsen the global situation, and value-added tax and excise tax cuts (Montenegro, Serbia) on products such as flour, wheat, and sunflower oil, which are not well targeted and may be difficult to exit in the future.

*International Monetary Fund | Regional Economic Outlook: Europe (October 2022), Chapter 2*

### 2. Inflation in Europe: Assessment,

### 2. Inflation in Europe: Assessment, Risks, and Policy Implications

### Recent developments
- Inflation has surged across Europe during the past 18 months.
- Inflation exceeded 5 percent in almost all European economies by late summer 2022.
- Headline inflation reached between 20–25 percent in the Baltic countries.
- Much of the rise in inflation can be traced back to soaring energy and food prices and, to a lesser extent, supply bottlenecks.
- On average, commodity prices contributed about two-thirds of the rise in headline inflation.
- The number of items with price increases exceeding central banks’ inflation targets accounted for 70–90 percent of the core consumer price index basket across broad country groups by late summer 2022.
- Labor markets and activity:
  - Output-based measures indicate closing gaps across much of Europe, though residual slack persists in some large advanced economies.
  - Unemployment rates were below prepandemic lows in two-thirds of economies.
  - Job vacancies per unemployed exceeded prepandemic highs in three-quarters of economies.
  - Hours worked were almost back to pre-COVID-19 levels by mid-2022.
- Wage and expectations developments:
  - Negotiated wage increases in the euro area have generally remained contained but are starting to inch up.
  - Medium-term inflation expectations have risen to or above inflation targets, especially among emerging European economies and among households.
- Policy measures moderated inflation in some countries:
  - Specific tax and regulatory measures (such as price caps or freezes) limited the rise in inflation in some countries (for example, France, Malta, and Spain), though often at sizable fiscal cost.
  - Exchange rate and monetary developments amplified inflation in some emerging Europe economies; for example, in Türkiye, depreciation of the lira amplified the inflationary impact of higher commodity prices.

### Inflation drivers (empirical findings)
- Phillips-curve framework:
  - A Phillips curve was estimated for each of 24 advanced and 7 emerging European economies using data for 2000:Q1–22:Q2.
  - The model relates inflation to past and expected future inflation, economic slack (unemployment gap), and foreign price developments (including global energy and food prices interacted with domestic CPI shares).
- Key empirical relationships:
  - Headline and core inflation rates are strongly associated with lower economic slack and higher past and expected future price developments.
  - In emerging European economies (EE):
    - Inflation increases more sharply when labor markets tighten (when unemployment declines).
    - Price setting appears less forward looking, consistent with weaker anchoring of inflation expectations historically.
    - Inflation responds more strongly to foreign price developments (especially global food prices) than in advanced European economies (AE).
- Role of commodity prices and external pressures:
  - The standard Phillips-curve model confirms the key role played by foreign (especially commodity) price developments in Europe’s inflation surge since 2021.
  - Food and energy prices are statistically significant drivers of inflation, beyond producer-price channels.

### Model explanatory power and residuals
- The standard Phillips-curve model can at most account for 60 percent of the recent surge in inflation.
- The model cannot explain 40 to 50 percent of the rise in inflation in advanced and emerging European economies, as evidenced by sizeable positive residuals in 2022:Q2.
- Several factors likely contribute to the unexplained inflation:
  - Two tail-risk events—the pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine—may have altered structural relationships underpinning inflation.
  - Core inflation appears more backward-looking postpandemic, and pass-through of global commodity prices to domestic inflation has increased postpandemic.
  - Conventional indicators may understate slack because of:
    - Widespread use of short-term work programs.
    - Structural labor market changes (shifts in worker preferences, declines in labor supply, demographic headwinds).
  - Alternative measures of labor market tightness correlate strongly with Phillips-curve residuals:
    - Vacancy-to-unemployment ratio.
    - Share of firms reporting labor shortages as a factor limiting production.
  - Supply bottlenecks also correlate strongly with residuals:
    - Share of firms reporting shortages of intermediate inputs as a factor limiting production.
- Discretionary and administrative policies (temporary tax changes, price-suppressing measures) affected inflation dynamics and tended to contain inflation rises in some countries.

### Risks and policy implications
- The evidence presented reinforces the case for continued policy tightening, with central banks standing ready to respond to emerging risks in both directions.
- The chapter highlights the possibility that inflation may be becoming more entrenched given:
  - Rapid decreases in domestic slack in many countries.
  - Rising wage growth in a number of countries.
  - Higher medium-term inflation expectations in some economies.
- Regulatory, fiscal, and monetary policies influence inflation heterogeneously across countries:
  - Countries with larger shares of administered prices may experience slower inflation changes.
  - Pass-through-suppressing price measures limited inflation rises in some countries but often at sizable fiscal cost.
- Given the incomplete explanatory power of conventional models and mounting upside risks to inflation, policymakers should remain prepared to tighten monetary policies substantially more than currently projected if inflation dynamics warrant such a response.

*International Monetary Fund | Regional Economic Outlook: Europe (October 2022), Chapter 2*

### 3. Input Shortages4. Core Residuals Explained by Nonconventional Drivers

### 3. Input Shortages4. Core Residuals Explained by Nonconventional Drivers

### Findings on input and labor shortages and core Phillips-curve residuals
- Input shortages appear to account for a sizable portion of the unexplained inflation in 2022.
- Using estimated correlations to decompose Phillips curve residuals in recent quarters suggests:
  - Input and, to a smaller extent, labor shortages have exerted significant upward pressure on prices in the post-COVID-19 period.
  - Widespread reported input and labor shortages and high vacancy-to-unemployment ratios in the first half of 2022 might have raised core inflation by about 1.5 percent on average in Europe, or about three-fourths of the 2 percent estimated residual.
- These findings imply that, beyond the predominant role of commodity prices, the recent surge in inflation in Europe is also at least partly driven by labor market tightness, while supply shortages have played an even larger role than captured by foreign price and commodity price variables included in the Phillips curves.

### Forecasts and uncertainty (Phillips curve–based forecasts and alternative approach)
- Under the October 2022 World Economic Outlook forecasts for global commodity prices, growth, and unemployment, and assuming stable inflation expectations, the empirical model predicts average inflation to decline gradually to:
  - 3–6 percent (headline) and 3–7 percent (core) in both advanced and emerging European economies by the end of 2023.
- In emerging European economies:
  - Despite starting from higher levels and being generally more persistent, inflation would fall more rapidly than in advanced economies because commodity price stabilization would entail larger disinflation gains.
  - Such gains will be more muted, all else equal, in countries where measures that dampened commodity pass-through are gradually phased out.
- These Phillips curve–based forecasts assume that the model’s large underestimation of recent inflation vanishes quickly.
- A more conservative approach, which assumes a slower reduction in recent inflation forecast errors, predicts a slower return to lower inflation rates.
  - The conservative approach assumes that the average of the estimated 2022 residuals declines gradually using a first-order autore-regressive process with autocorrelation coefficient of 0.6.
- Overall assessment:
  - Risks around IMF World Economic Outlook inflation forecasts are tilted to the upside.
  - Uncertainty around inflation forecasts is unusually large.

### Key upside and downside risk channels described
- Upside risks that could sustain or raise inflation:
  - Persistence of supply shocks if bottlenecks and commodity prices ease more slowly than projected, especially as the war in Ukraine drags on.
  - De-anchoring of inflation expectations or wage demands that prompt compensation for high inflation, potentially triggering wage-price feedback loops and making inflation more backward-looking.
  - Tighter-than-estimated labor markets (smaller slack) that increase inflationary pressure.
- Downside risks:
  - Commodity prices could slide if the global economy slows further.
  - Greater-than-estimated slack arising from a sharper growth slowdown or labor market integration of Ukrainian refugees in some economies.

### Illustrative scenarios (Table 2.1 — shocks used in simulations)
- Baseline (World Economic Outlook): October World Economic Outlook assumptions (energy inflation 79.6 percent in 2022, 2.9 percent in 2023; food inflation 14.2 percent in 2022, −5.8 percent in 2023). Cost shock raises inflation to World Economic Outlook baseline in the second quarter of 2022.
- 1 Negative supply shocks: 20 percent rise in energy and food prices. Additional inflationary cost shock matching initial shock in Phillips curve simulation.
- 2 Positive supply shocks: 20 percent fall in energy and food prices. Additional deflationary cost shock matching initial shock in Phillips curve simulation.
- 3 Less slack than Estimated: 2 percentage points lower unemployment gap; 2 percentage points lower output gap than assumed by the central bank in its monetary policy rule.
- 4 More slack than Estimated: 2 percentage points higher unemployment gap; 2 percentage points higher output gap than assumed by the central bank in its monetary policy rule.
- 5 de-anchoring: 1 percentage point higher expected inflation; sudden rise in expectations increases inflation in the first period by 1 percentage point.
- 6 More Backward-Looking Price Formation Process: Rise in the coefficient on lagged inflation to 0.8 (about its pre-1990s value). (All shocks persist throughout the simulation periods of six quarters in the Phillips curve simulation exercise.)

### Wage–price spiral risks and empirical drivers
- Two empirical exercises:
  - Response of wages to inflation triggered by oil price shocks (based on Baba and Lee (2022)):
    - Two main factors increase pass-through from price shocks to wages: high prevailing inflation and weak central bank independence (linked to weak monetary policy credibility).
    - When prevailing inflation is already high, an oil-induced increase in prices leads to a larger and more long-lasting increase in wages.
    - The wage response to price shocks is much larger and more persistent when monetary policy lacks credibility.
  - Response of prices to wages (based on Boranova and others (2021)):
    - Pass-through from wages to prices is larger when prevailing inflation is high—it is three times larger in a high-inflation environment than in a low-inflation one.
    - Pass-through from wages to prices is stronger when inflation expectations are not well anchored.
- Implication: Risks of a wage-price spiral are more pronounced when inflation is already high and where monetary policy is not deemed credible.
- Offsetting factors noted:
  - Prevalence of formal wage indexation to past inflation has fallen across Europe in recent decades, lowering risks of wage-price spirals.
  - Wage growth has been relatively contained in most advanced European economies so far; limited evidence of acceleration in negotiated wages until late summer.
  - European Central Bank analyses indicate:
    - More than half of private sector employees in the euro area do not take inflation into account when setting wages.
    - Where inflation plays a formal role in wage negotiations, forward-looking inflation measures are used predominantly.
    - In the public sector, only about one-fifth of the euro area public wage bill has full or partial price indexation.

### Policy analysis and model simulations (monetary policy focus)
- A small dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model calibrated to an average advanced and an average emerging European economy is used to examine monetary policy responses and implied inflation and GDP growth paths under the risk scenarios.
  - The baseline replicates inflation and output dynamics observed in the first half of 2022 using a “cost-push shock” related to commodity price inflation.
  - The calibration reflects estimated parameters: a steeper Phillips curve, more backward-looking inflation, and a bigger cost-push in emerging Europe compared with advanced Europe.
- Simulation outcomes and policy implications:
  - If some upside inflation risks materialize, monetary policies could need to be tightened by more than 200 basis points more than under the baseline.
  - Such tightening could reduce GDP growth in the year ahead by up to 2 percentage points in some cases.
  - A further commodity-driven cost shock would lead to higher inflation, tighter monetary policy, and lower output everywhere but particularly in emerging Europe because of:
    - Larger share of food and energy in consumption baskets.
    - Larger role of past inflation in inflation expectation formation.
  - A de-anchoring of inflation expectations would have larger and more persistent effects, especially in emerging Europe, forcing stronger monetary tightening and depressing economic activity for as long as expectations remain elevated.
  - Monetary policy mistakes arising from misjudging slack (over- or underestimating output gaps) would cause undesirably more or less inflation than desirable until corrected; this effect is exacerbated in emerging Europe due to steeper Phillips curves and more backward-looking price setting.
  - An increase in the backward-looking component of price formation (for example, rise in coefficient on lagged inflation to 0.8) would make containing inflation more challenging and increase the likelihood of adverse wage-price feedback loops.

### Key numerical highlights and model assumptions preserved exactly
- Estimated contribution of input and labor shortages to core inflation in first half of 2022: about 1.5 percent on average in Europe, or about three-fourths of the 2 percent estimated residual.
- Phillips curve–based forecast range by end of 2023: 3–6 percent (headline) and 3–7 percent (core).
- WEO baseline commodity assumptions: energy inflation 79.6 percent in 2022, 2.9 percent in 2023; food inflation 14.2 percent in 2022, −5.8 percent in 2023.
- Conservative residual decay assumption: first-order autore-regressive process with autocorrelation coefficient of 0.6.
- Scenario shocks: 20 percent rise/fall in energy and food prices for negative/positive supply shocks.
- Slack shocks in scenarios: 2 percentage points lower/higher unemployment gap; 2 percentage points lower/higher output gap.
- De-anchoring shock in scenarios: 1 percentage point higher expected inflation (sudden rise increases inflation in the first period by 1 percentage point).
- More backward-looking price formation: coefficient on lagged inflation rises to 0.8.
- Potential monetary tightening relative to baseline in upside scenarios: more than 200 basis points.
- Potential GDP growth reduction from tightening: up to 2 percentage points in the year ahead.

*International Monetary Fund | October 2022*

### 1. Deviations from the Baseline: Advanced Europe

### 1. Deviations from the Baseline: Advanced Europe

### Scenario illustrations and inflation dynamics
- Cost-push (negative supply) shocks and broader "spiral" scenarios can drive up inflation strongly and more long-lastingly because of their broad-based nature; persistently elevated inflation can depress real wages and trigger higher wage demands, raising firms’ costs and inducing further inflation.
- Inflation expectations that turn more backward-looking allow past inflation hikes to exert continuing inflation pressure, even after the original shock has faded.
- Advanced economies may be at greater risk of an increase in the “backward-lookingness” of price formation because their inflation expectations are currently more forward-looking than those in emerging European economies, leaving more scope for deterioration—in other words, their central banks have more hard-won credibility to lose.
- The simulation assumes that advanced and emerging European economies converge to the same level of backward-looking inflation expectations.
- Similar to the cost-push shock scenario, central banks would need to tighten monetary policy to contain inflation, but more and more persistent tightening would be needed to cope with a more persistent rise in inflation.
- A contraction in aggregate demand would exacerbate the decline in output but ease inflation pressures; emerging European economies would see inflation drop by more than advanced economies because of their steeper Phillips curves.
- For the demand slowdown scenario, the inflation reaction is shown for the quarter after the shock rather than on impact. With flexible exchange rates, a contractionary demand shock triggers a depreciation of the exchange rate on impact, which offsets its direct deflationary effect. The following appreciation allows consumer prices to decline.

### Monetary policy implications
- Illustrative scenarios suggest that central banks should keep raising policy rates under most scenarios while remaining nimble and ready to respond to emerging risks in both directions.
- There are greater chances that policy rate paths may ultimately need to be steeper instead of flatter than expected.
- Maintaining central bank independence, effective communication, and transparency will be key to preserving hard-won credibility and preventing the unmooring of inflation expectations.
- The desirable strength and persistence of the monetary policy reaction depend on the risk and vary across economies; for example, emerging European economies would need to react more strongly to a de-anchoring of inflation expectations.

### Fiscal and other policies
- Although monetary policy is the main tool to lower inflation, fiscal policy should not complicate its action; fiscal consolidation should proceed under the baseline IMF projections—even if its pace may be temporarily slowed—to avoid boosting aggregate demand and making it harder for monetary policy to tame inflation.
- The more temporary and targeted the relief measures for energy (and food) price shocks are, the less they will conflict with the monetary policy stance.
- Europe’s policymakers have responded to the commodity crisis with a wide range of mostly broad-based, price-suppressing measures, including subsidies (for example, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania), tax cuts (most countries), and price controls.
- About 70 percent of emerging European economies used such measures for food, including tax cuts for food items (for example, Bulgaria, Croatia, North Macedonia, Poland, and Türkiye) and subsidies to farmers (for example, Kosovo and North Macedonia), compared with 12 percent of advanced economies.
- The fiscal cost of these measures, especially those targeting energy prices, has been sizable. It is estimated to reach about 0.6 and 0.5 percent of GDP on average in advanced and emerging European economies, respectively, by mid-2022, exceeding 1.5 percent of GDP in countries such as Greece and Malta.
- The extraordinary magnitude and partly temporary nature of the energy price increase caution against a full immediate pass-through to end users. Support measures should remain as temporary and targeted as possible and be designed in the most efficient way possible, with the goal of preserving price signals and encouraging energy savings.
- Where collective bargaining agreements have a wage indexation clause, authorities could intervene to moderate negotiated wages in the medium term in exchange for one-time wage bonuses rather than outright wage increases.
- Structural reforms that enhance productivity and investments that expand economic capacity and relieve supply constraints, notably in energy and labor markets, could support monetary policy in the fight against inflation.

### Western Balkans: inflation drivers and policy responses
- Inflation was in double digits in the summer of 2022 in all Western Balkan countries except for Albania, where it was at a two-decade high.
- Food has been the dominant driver for two reasons:
  - Domestic food prices have increased more in the Western Balkans than in the European Union because of a high pass-through from global food prices.
  - Food makes about 40 percent of the average consumption basket in the Western Balkans—twice the EU average.
- By contrast, energy price inflation has been below the EU average, helped by domestic electricity generation (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro) and policies that dampened energy price increases at the consumer level.
- More recently, inflation in the Western Balkans has become more broad-based, with a rapid rise in core inflation, a build-up of wage pressures (triggered in some cases by minimum wage increases), and growing inflation expectations in some countries.
- Adapting the Phillips curve model to the Western Balkans finds:
  - International food prices are a strong determinant of headline inflation through their impact on domestic unprocessed and processed food prices and on nonfood inflation.
  - The (nominal effective) exchange rate is another key driver of headline inflation, in line with a large exchange rate pass-through.
  - Strong persistence of both headline and core inflation.
  - Inflation expectations are an important determinant of inflation.
- These findings suggest it could take time for inflation to fall back to its presurge levels, underscore the importance of well-anchored inflation expectations, and support the decision of all Western Balkans central banks with autonomous monetary policy (Albania, North Macedonia, Serbia) to increase key policy rates several times since March.
- Rising inflation has prompted governments in the region to take action:
  - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia implemented one-off assistance packages, most targeted at vulnerable groups.
  - Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced sizable public wage and pension increases.
  - Household electricity tariffs are regulated and have remained unchanged so far in most Western Balkans countries (except for Kosovo and North Macedonia), helping to contain the rise of inflation but at high fiscal costs.
  - Price caps and profit margin limits for critical staple food and fuel items have been introduced in all Western Balkans countries, with limited effectiveness.
  - Some countries introduced export bans (North Macedonia, Serbia), which can worsen the global situation, and value-added tax and excise tax cuts (Montenegro, Serbia) on products such as flour, wheat, and sunflower oil, which are not well targeted and may be difficult to exit in the future.

*Prepared by IMF staff; chapter excerpt from Regional Economic Outlook: Europe, October 2022.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/reo/eur/2022/october/english/reoeur-fall-2022ch-2final.pdf_
