## 1. G20: Monetary Policy

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### Key shocks and transmission
- Russia’s war in Ukraine led to energy supply disruptions and an energy crisis in Europe:
  - Refugee and displacement: 7.5 million refugees (of which 4.2 million are in the EU) as of end-September; about 7 million internally displaced persons remain within Ukraine.
  - Russian pipeline gas exports fell by 80 percent (year over year) through mid-September 2022.
  - Assumed baseline: natural gas flows from Russia remain very low in 2022–23, averaging 15 percent of normal levels.
- Commodity and energy prices:
  - Natural gas and electricity prices skyrocketed; coal prices more than tripled on a yearly basis through September.
- Weather and bottlenecks:
  - Extreme European summer weather (high temperatures, scant rainfall) led to low river levels, raising inland transportation costs and impairing hydroelectric and nuclear generation in some countries.

### Inflation developments
- Inflation has increased, broadened, and become more entrenched:
  - Yearly inflation through August: advanced European economies reached 9.3 percent; emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye) posted 14.9 percent.
  - Energy and food prices explained about 60 percent of cumulated inflation through August in emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye) and 70 percent in the euro area.
  - Core inflation has risen significantly above central bank targets in advanced and emerging European economies; dispersion of inflation has increased across countries.
  - Inflation particularly high in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, posting more than 20 percent (year over year) on average through August.

### Labor markets and wages
- Labor markets strengthened until recently with employment rates recovering and hours worked broadly returned to prepandemic levels.
- Labor market tightness increased (vacancy ratios significantly above pre-pandemic levels).
- Despite tight labor markets, wage growth has lagged inflation:
  - Real wages decreased in the euro area.
  - Nominal wage growth closer to inflation in countries with stronger cyclical positions (Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania).

### Fiscal stance and public finances
- Economic and social fallout increased pressure on public budgets, with varied impacts across Europe:
  - In emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye), higher energy subsidies and refugee support are expected to add 0.8 percentage point of GDP to the 2022 fiscal deficits compared to projections before the war.
  - In advanced European economies, lower pandemic-related spending and revenue increases have broadly offset new pressures, keeping fiscal policy broadly neutral overall.
  - Some countries implemented sizeable price-suppressing measures with significant fiscal costs (example countries mentioned: Greece and Romania).
  - Fiscal cost of refugee support was about 1 percent of GDP in 2022 in some countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland).

### Financial conditions and credit
- Monetary policy normalization, lower credit availability, and higher price of risk tightened financial conditions across Europe; conditions are more restrictive than before the pandemic in the euro area and emerging European economies.
- Market pressures in emerging Europe:
  - Nonresidents net sellers of securities, especially bonds.
  - Sovereign bond spreads over German bunds rose; credit default swaps increased notably in Romania and Serbia.
  - Some currencies depreciated vis-à-vis the euro (Hungary, Poland); others held up at the cost of international reserve losses (Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia).
  - Access to the Eurobond market became more difficult for several sovereigns.
- Impact on households and firms:
  - Higher energy prices and tighter financial conditions increase household cost of living and debt-servicing costs.
  - For European households, higher energy prices will increase the cost of living by 7 percent in 2022 and 9 percent in 2023, both with respect to 2021.
  - Firms’ interest coverage ratios are decreasing due to deteriorated earnings and tightening credit conditions; energy-intensive firms curtailed or plan to cut production in sectors such as fertilizers, glass, steel, and aluminum.

### Economic activity and near-term outlook
- Activity in first half of 2022 held up better than expected; mobility normalization supported a rebound of contact-intensive services (tourism-related sectors).
  - Real GDP growth in 2022:Q2: advanced European economies reached 4.1 percent (year over year); emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye) posted 5.2 percent (year over year).
  - Euro area composite PMI fell into contractionary territory during the summer.
- Baseline assumptions for the Regional Economic Outlook: Europe:
  1. Sanctions remain in place and natural gas flows from Russia remain very low in 2022–23, averaging 15 percent of normal levels.
  2. The war in Ukraine continues.
  3. Disruptions to supply of critical inputs gradually ease as demand softens; possible additional COVID-19 lockdowns in China are a downside risk; weather-related bottlenecks gradually ease in Europe.
  4. The pandemic’s health and economic impact on Europe fades.
  5. Monetary policy normalization proceeds steadily in advanced European economies, with the policy rate in the euro area reaching a neutral stance by early 2023; in emerging European economies, the pace of rate hikes eases after significant increases through 2021–22.
  6. Fiscal policy consolidates in 2023 in advanced and emerging European economies, but less than envisioned in the July 2022 WEO Update because of recent measures to ease the impact of energy and food price increases.
- Growth projections under these baseline assumptions:
  - Advanced European economies: output growth forecast to decline to 3.2 percent in 2022 and to decrease further to 0.6 percent in 2023 (0.7 percentage point downward revision for 2023 relative to July projections).
    - Several countries expected to experience technical recessions (two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth), including Germany and Italy (projected to see three consecutive quarters of negative growth starting from the third quarter of 2022).
  - Emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye): growth projected to decelerate from 4.3 percent in 2022 to 1.7 percent in 2023 (a downward revision of around 1 percentage point for 2023 relative to July expectations).
    - Examples: Croatia, Poland, and Romania expected to experience technical recessions in the second half of 2022.
- Main drags on growth:
  - Slower consumption driven by weaker consumer confidence, higher inflation, and tighter financial conditions.
  - Corporate investment likely to be held back by uncertainty, higher input and borrowing costs, and lower external demand.
  - The downward revision to China’s growth relative to April 2022 projections (about 1.2 percentage points in 2022 and 0.6 percentage point in 2023) is expected to reduce the EU’s GDP level (specific magnitude truncated in source).

### Consumer and business sentiment
- Private consumption contracted sequentially in 2022:Q1 in France, Italy, and Spain; expected to remain subdued in H2 2022 and in 2023.
- Survey indicators: a larger share of households in the EU-27 plan to revise major purchases downward in the next 12 months.
- Uncertainty and survey measures point to reduced planned major purchases and increased unemployment concerns.

*International Monetary Fund | October 2022*

### The fog of war clouds the European outlook — Economic outlook and growth projections
- A moderate fiscal consolidation projected for 2023 will further contribute to cooling down demand.
- Countries affected directly by the war are forecast to see a sharp contraction.
- Russia:
  - After initial hit from sanctions, economy stabilized in Q2 2022, central bank brought policy rates back to prewar levels; GDP contraction of 3.4 and 2.3 percent in 2022 and 2023, respectively, driven by decreases in private demand.
- Ukraine:
  - Widespread destruction in infrastructure and massive refugee outflows; GDP will see a contraction by over a third in 2022 (Box 1.4).
- Output scarring by the end of 2023 is projected at 3.5 percent in both advanced and emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye), resulting from adding war-related output losses to relatively small pandemic losses.

### Inflation projections and persistence
- The fallout from the war will push inflation above summer projections by about 1–3 percentage points in 2022–23.
- Advanced European economies: Headline inflation projected to increase to 8.3 percent in 2022 before declining to 6.2 percent in 2023.
- Emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye): Inflation projected to reach 13.3 percent in 2022 and remain at 11.8 percent in 2023.
- Inflation projected to gradually return to central bank targets: about 2 percent by 2025 in advanced European economies and to below 3 percent by 2026 in emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye).
- More persistent inflation in emerging European economies reflects stronger nominal wage growth and more robust cyclical positions; evidence suggests inflation tends to be more persistent in emerging European economies.

### Risks and scenarios
- Balance of risks: downside for growth and upside for inflation.
- Winter 2022–23 risks: a complete shutoff of remaining Russian gas flows could create further economic pain, especially if a cold winter results in gas shortages and rationing.
- Escalation of the war or intensification of geopolitical tensions in Asia could amplify commodity market disruptions and supply bottlenecks.
- Other war-related risks, including those associated with Ukraine’s nuclear plants, could have devastating effects.
- Projections consider a degree of core inflation persistence at the lower end of ranges predicted by simple empirical models, suggesting upside risks.
- Downside example scenarios:
  - Simultaneous materialization of softer growth in China, a full Russian gas shutoff, increases in oil prices, and more persistent inflation with tighter financial conditions could lead to a decline in the EU’s GDP level of about 1.4 percent in 2023 with respect to the baseline.
  - A full and extended shut-off of Russian gas to Europe combined with a harsh winter could lead to an additional physical shortfall of about 6 percent of typical winter consumption.
  - The most exposed countries could see a GDP loss of some 3 percent with respect to the baseline; other countries (such as Italy) could also see sizable output losses.
- Financial risk: a sharper-than-projected tightening of financial conditions could lead to financial outflows in emerging European economies, higher lending rates, increased vulnerable households and firms, suppressed consumption and investment, and defaults; however, simulations suggest strong European bank balance sheets should keep such risk in check—median Tier 1 ratios of 19 percent across advanced European economies and 21 percent across emerging European economies.

### Monetary policy guidance
- Central banks throughout Europe have continued normalizing monetary policy, with generally earlier and stronger policy rate hikes where the gap between realized and target inflation rates was widest.
- Many emerging European economies (including Hungary, Poland, and Romania) and advanced European economies (the Czech Republic, Iceland, the United Kingdom) increased frequency and magnitude of rate hikes in the last 6–12 months.
- Some central banks have begun to reduce the size of their balance sheets; inflation has reduced the real value of central banks’ financial assets.
- In September, the European Central Bank (ECB) front-loaded a large portion of needed policy normalization and announced the Transmission Protection Instrument to address fragmentation risks.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Given a still broadly accommodative policy stance, central banks should continue to raise policy rates under most scenarios in the next few months.
  - Keep inflation expectations well-anchored and respond to the more persistent component of the energy price shock that will reduce potential output.
  - Be data-dependent and nimble: slow normalization if a global demand slowdown threatened recession and wage increases remain contained; focus on avoiding wage-price spirals and de-anchoring of inflation expectations if additional supply shocks occur.
  - Additional policy rate increases are required in both advanced European economies (including the euro area and the United Kingdom) and some emerging European economies.
  - Tighter monetary policy is particularly needed in most emerging European economies due to higher inflation, less-anchored expectations, stronger cyclical positions, and higher nominal wage growth.
  - In the euro area, monetary policy normalization should continue with a view to reaching a neutral stance by early 2023.
  - Regarding quantitative tightening, the ECB may consider discontinuing some or all of Asset Purchase Program (APP) reinvestments, with flexible Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) reinvestments serving as the first line of defense to address fragmentation risks; TLTRO net repayments are also expected to contribute to decreasing the ECB’s balance sheet size.

### Fiscal policy recommendations
- Fiscal consolidation should proceed during 2023, with its pace temporarily slowed in the coming months to allow governments to support vulnerable households and viable firms through the energy crisis.
- Fiscal consolidation will support monetary policy normalization and help reduce public debt.
- Fiscal deficits should decrease faster in high-debt countries, in those with limited fiscal space, and in countries more vulnerable to tighter financial conditions, including many emerging European economies.
- On current trends, debt ratios would decline mainly in low-debt advanced European economies in the medium term, while in several high-debt economies they would remain stable or increase further.
- In the EU, a reformed fiscal framework that prevents debt distress while allowing sufficient macroeconomic stabilization should ideally be in place before the expiration of the general escape clause at the end of 2023.
- Spending should be reprioritized to assist vulnerable households and viable firms affected by the surge of energy prices.
- Policy on energy prices:
  - Domestic prices should reflect energy market signals as much as possible; targeted and temporary fiscal transfers to low-income households should be given priority.
  - The partly temporary nature of electricity and natural gas price increases cautions against a full immediate pass-through to all end users which could dramatically raise households’ living costs and push viable firms into bankruptcy.
  - Temporary energy subsidies might be considered, sized according to the gap of current to medium-term energy prices and available fiscal space; such subsidies should be limited to maintain fiscal consolidation and preserve price signals for adjustment by households and firms.
  - Increasing progressivity of tariffs for upper consumption levels and peak demand hours could encourage better-off households to reduce demand and create room for critical consumption of vulnerable households and energy-intensive firms.
  - The European Commission’s proposal to tax all revenues above a certain electricity price level (the so-called cap) will bring new fiscal revenues to tackle the energy crisis; the cap should be temporary and well-calibrated to avoid affecting electricity supply, and its impact will likely differ across countries due to uneven generation by inframarginal producers and operational difficulties to share revenues.
- Overall: fiscal consolidation combined with temporary, targeted support is recommended, with greater consolidation efforts in high-debt and high-demand countries (e.g., Hungary and Poland) and precautionary rebuilding of fiscal space.

*International Monetary Fund | October 2022*

### Europe: General Government Primary Balance — Fiscal outlook and energy measures
- Primary balance charts measured as "Percent of GDP, PPP-GDP weighted average; excluding grants" for 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 show values spanning from –8 to 0 percent of GDP.
- Note: "Panel 1 is consistent with current policies and does not include fiscal measures adopted after the WEO cutoff date of September 26, 2022; emerging European economies exclude Belarus, Russia, Türkiye and Ukraine; the cyclically-adjusted primary balance is expressed in percent of potential GDP."
- Energy price pass-through (Percent, 2022) is shown monthly (Feb., Mar., Apr., May, June, July) and by product: Electricity, Natural gas, Liquid fuels; pass-through computed as the ratio (in percentage) of retail to wholesale year over year inflation; wholesale inflation measured by the TTF Index for natural gas and by the Brent Crude Oil Index for liquid fuels; p20th and p80th refer to the 20th and 80th percentile; all underlying variables are in Euros.
- Energy measures across country groups classified by policy groups:
  - (I) measures that impede price pass-through
  - (II) targeted support for households
  - (III) less/untargeted support for households
  - (IV) support for firms
  - (V) others
- Policy instrument categories include: Price freezes and subsidies; Cuts to VAT/sales taxes for energy products; Cuts to excise taxes on fuel commodities; Energy bill discounts; Tax credit on energy bills; Other taxes; Targeted cash transfers; Vouchers; Other subsidies; PIT relief; Energy efficiency grants and subsidies; Subsidies/grants/loans to firms/specific industries; CIT reliefs; Short-term work/temporary unemployment benefits; Other spending.

### Estimated fiscal cost of Ukrainian refugees
- Staff estimates: "the short-term fiscal cost of refugees in the EU could be €30–€37 billion in 2022 (about 0.2 percent of EU GDP)."
- Methodology notes:
  - Estimates are based on 2017 OECD figure of EUR 10,000 per refugee in main European destination countries updated to May 2022 prices (EUR 11,578).
  - Cross-country values obtained by indexing country nominal GDP per capita to value for Germany, with Luxembourg indexed to Germany, and Ireland to the United Kingdom.
  - Estimates are preliminary.

### Refugee numbers and demographics
- As of end-September (2022): number of Ukrainian refugees in Europe reached 7.5 million (4.2 million in the European Union [EU]); 7 million internally displaced persons remain within Ukraine.
- Registration under EU programs: "As of late September, 4.2 million people have registered under the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive (EU-TPD) or similar non-EU programs."
- Refugee composition: surveys indicate a majority of children and women under age 40; approximately 30 percent of all Ukrainian children, 17 percent of adult Ukrainian women, and about 6 percent of adult Ukrainian men have fled the country so far in 2022.
- Mobility and intentions: a large fraction of refugees (about one-third to one-half) have expressed their intention to return to Ukraine soon.

### Labor market and growth implications of refugees
- Size and distribution:
  - Ukrainian refugees represent about 0.5 percent of Europe’s labor force—about twice the size of the 2015–17 refugee wave.
  - Share by country examples: Czech Republic 2.2 percent, Poland 2.1 percent, Estonia 1.9 percent.
- Potential effects:
  - Refugees could ease labor market tightness in parts of eastern Europe and boost potential growth over the medium term.
  - Medium-term impact depends on speed and quality of labor market integration, risk of skills downgrading, and complementarity or substitution with native workers.
  - Cultural proximity, higher educational attainment, and weaker language barriers in neighboring countries are cited as factors enhancing successful integration.

### Policy recommendations: fiscal, financial, and structural
- Fiscal policy guidance:
  - If additional shocks materialize, countries with available fiscal space should reconsider fiscal consolidation plans and could ease fiscal policy temporarily if needed.
  - Countries with limited fiscal space should let automatic stabilizers work but offset additional support to the vulnerable with tax increases or other spending cuts, avoiding harmful reductions in health, education, and public investment.
  - If further temporary supply shocks occur (e.g., complete cessation of gas supplies from Russia), additional temporary support measures would be needed and would require further reprioritization of spending in countries with limited fiscal space.
  - Nonfiscal tools like well-designed rationing programs could contain output losses if gas supply is insufficient; preparing requires implementing regional gas-sharing agreements.
- Financial policies:
  - Monitor and contain pockets of vulnerabilities to keep credit flowing and mitigate liquidity risks.
  - Supervisors should ensure bank asset classifications and loan loss provisions swiftly and accurately reflect credit risk and losses.
  - Macroprudential policy settings can be kept broadly unchanged under the baseline, with supervisors ensuring cyclical buffers have been rebuilt.
  - Supervisors should stress-test bank balance sheets for the impact of higher interest rates, focusing on exposures to vulnerable households and firms, and on housing market developments (noting countries with adjustable-rate mortgages, such as Poland).
  - Avoid macroprudential policies becoming procyclical; if downside risks materialize, some macroprudential tools may need to be eased to dampen asset price declines and support lending.
- Structural policies:
  - Ensure energy security while accelerating the green transition: secure alternative supply sources, substitute gas where possible, update contingency plans, build storage ahead of heating seasons, encourage energy savings, accelerate rollout of renewables, reduce fossil fuel consumption in industry and transport, ramp up smart investment including in gas connectivity.
  - Reconstructing Ukraine will require massive financing flows, primarily grants, and policies to promote return of refugees; IMF has established a new administered account to facilitate bilateral contributions, with Canada and Germany having disbursed more than $2 billion through this account.
  - Integrating long-term refugees requires targeted active labor market policies, such as temporary wage subsidies.
  - Continue implementation of long-standing structural reforms to boost productivity, accelerate the digital transition, relieve supply constraints, and ease labor and product market reallocation; timely and efficient implementation of recovery and resilience plans will help reap full benefits.

*International Monetary Fund | October 2022*

### Box 1.1. Economic Considerations of the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis — Key points
- Fiscal impact and scale:
  - IMF staff and EUROMOD estimates put the fiscal cost in the EU at between €26–€34 billion.
  - EU and non-EU countries with the largest population shares of refugees would incur fiscal costs of about 1 percent of GDP, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Moldova, and Poland.
  - Poland granted Ukrainian refugees access to healthcare, education and the labor market even earlier than envisaged by the EU-TPD.
- Labor market and integration considerations:
  - Policies should strike the right balance between supporting a return of refugees to Ukraine and recognizing many may not be able to return for a considerable time.
  - Initial response effective for relief; policies should continue providing: language training, job search support, and access to health and childcare services.
  - Regulatory barriers preventing effective labor market integration (for example, skill recognition) should be removed.
  - If integration proves too slow, temporary measures to consider include: temporary exceptions from minimum wage laws (where minimum-to-median wage ratios are particularly high), or temporary wage subsidies to employers (IMF 2016).
- Fiscal and governance arrangements:
  - Central governments will need to fund subgovernments adequately and reward successful integration.
  - At the transnational level, additional mechanisms beyond EU transfers and free transportation could be considered to help distribute the burden of hosting refugees more fairly.
  - Policies should facilitate refugees keeping ties to Ukraine to pave the way to their return and reintegration once the war ends.
- Methodological notes:
  - IMF staff’s methodology updates Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017) costs; EUROMOD estimates use microsimulations covering education, health, housing, and social protection costs.

### Box 1.3. How vulnerable is Europe’s private sector (continued) — Key points
- Bank capital and corporate vulnerabilities:
  - Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets at the end of 2021: 19 percent in advanced economies (ranging from 13–16 percent in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, to 23 percent in the Baltics and Ireland); 21 percent in emerging market economies (ranging from 16 percent in Hungary and Poland, to 25 percent in Croatia).
  - Capital adequacy improved between 2019 and 2021 with few exceptions; considerably higher than by mid-2009.
  - Higher interest rates and steeper yield curves could support banks’ earnings; interest rate risk from maturity transformation could weigh on profitability in the event of large upward interest rate shocks.
  - Earnings gains from higher rates would help offset losses from credit deterioration.
- Corporate sector indicators:
  - Bankruptcies in 2020 were lower than in any year since 2007.
  - The median expected default frequency for European firms started to rise in 2022.
- Ukraine: Human and economic impact of the war:
  - More than 7.5 million Ukrainians have left the country; a similar number is internally displaced.
  - World Bank Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: physical damage of $97 billion (more than 50 percent of Ukraine’s prewar GDP) through June 2022.
  - Flash estimates: GDP level declined by 15.1 and 37.2 percent (year over year) in the first and second quarters of 2022, respectively.
  - Annual projection: GDP is projected to collapse by about 35 percent.
  - Headline inflation: 23.8 percent (year over year) in August 2022 from 10 percent (year over year) in January.
  - Exports declined by 31 percent (year over year) through the end of August; imports have fallen by 20 percent through August (year over year).
  - Fiscal deficit through August (excluding foreign grants) reached 13.9 percent of GDP.
  - International reserves fallen by about $6 billion to $24.9 billion as of early September.
- Russia: Short-term impact, medium-term scarring, and policy response:
  - 2022 GDP projection: Russia’s GDP is now projected to decline by 3.4 percent in 2022.
  - Factors limiting the contraction: crude oil exports redirected to nonsanctioning countries; large government footprint preserved employment; ruble appreciation led to lower-than-projected inflation; authorities abandoned the fiscal rule allowing for fiscal stimulus of about 4 percent of GDP; monetary policy rates returned to prewar levels.
  - Medium-term scarring: IMF staff projects output will be about 10 percent lower than prewar forecasts by 2023.
  - Uncertainties include export restrictions affecting new oil field development, time and investment needed to redirect gas exports, and efficacy of the G7 price cap on Russian oil depending on participation and insurance service bans.

*Prepared by Russia and Ukraine IMF teams.*

*International Monetary Fund | October 2022*

### 1. G20: Monetary Policy

### 1. G20: Monetary Policy

### Key shocks and transmission
- Russia’s war in Ukraine has led to energy supply disruptions and an energy crisis in Europe:
  - Refugee and displacement: 7.5 million refugees (of which 4.2 million are in the EU) as of end-September; about 7 million internally displaced persons remain within Ukraine.
  - Russian pipeline gas exports fell by 80 percent (year over year) through mid-September 2022.
  - Assumed baseline: natural gas flows from Russia remain very low in 2022–23, averaging 15 percent of normal levels.
- Commodity and energy prices:
  - Natural gas and electricity prices skyrocketed; coal prices more than tripled on a yearly basis through September.
- Weather and bottlenecks:
  - Extreme European summer weather (high temperatures, scant rainfall) led to low river levels, raising inland transportation costs and impairing hydroelectric and nuclear generation in some countries.

### Inflation developments
- Inflation has increased, broadened, and become more entrenched:
  - Yearly inflation through August: advanced European economies reached 9.3 percent; emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye) posted 14.9 percent.
  - Energy and food prices explained about 60 percent of cumulated inflation through August in emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye) and 70 percent in the euro area.
  - Core inflation has risen significantly above central bank targets in advanced and emerging European economies; dispersion of inflation has increased across countries.
  - Inflation particularly high in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, posting more than 20 percent (year over year) on average through August.

### Labor markets and wages
- Labor markets strengthened until recently with employment rates recovering and hours worked broadly returned to prepandemic levels.
- Labor market tightness increased (vacancy ratios significantly above pre-pandemic levels).
- Despite tight labor markets, wage growth has lagged inflation:
  - Real wages decreased in the euro area.
  - Nominal wage growth closer to inflation in countries with stronger cyclical positions (Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania).

### Fiscal stance and public finances
- The economic and social fallout has increased pressure on public budgets, with varied impacts across Europe:
  - In emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye), higher energy subsidies and refugee support are expected to add 0.8 percentage point of GDP to the 2022 fiscal deficits compared to projections before the war.
  - In advanced European economies, lower pandemic-related spending and revenue increases have broadly offset new pressures, keeping fiscal policy broadly neutral overall.
  - Some countries implemented sizeable price-suppressing measures with significant fiscal costs (example countries mentioned: Greece and Romania).
  - Fiscal cost of refugee support was about 1 percent of GDP in 2022 in some countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland).

### Financial conditions and credit
- Monetary policy normalization, lower credit availability, and higher price of risk tightened financial conditions across Europe; conditions are more restrictive than before the pandemic in the euro area and emerging European economies.
- Market pressures in emerging Europe:
  - Nonresidents net sellers of securities, especially bonds.
  - Sovereign bond spreads over German bunds rose; credit default swaps increased notably in Romania and Serbia.
  - Some currencies depreciated vis-à-vis the euro (Hungary, Poland); others held up at the cost of international reserve losses (Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia).
  - Access to the Eurobond market became more difficult for several sovereigns.
- Impact on households and firms:
  - Higher energy prices and tighter financial conditions increase household cost of living and debt-servicing costs.
  - For European households, higher energy prices will increase the cost of living by 7 percent in 2022 and 9 percent in 2023, both with respect to 2021.
  - Firms’ interest coverage ratios are decreasing due to deteriorated earnings and tightening credit conditions; energy-intensive firms curtailed or plan to cut production in sectors such as fertilizers, glass, steel, and aluminum.

### Economic activity and near-term outlook
- Activity in first half of 2022 held up better than expected; mobility normalization supported a rebound of contact-intensive services (tourism-related sectors).
  - Real GDP growth in 2022:Q2: advanced European economies reached 4.1 percent (year over year); emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye) posted 5.2 percent (year over year).
  - Euro area composite PMI fell into contractionary territory during the summer.
- Baseline assumptions for the Regional Economic Outlook: Europe:
  1. Sanctions remain in place and natural gas flows from Russia remain very low in 2022–23, averaging 15 percent of normal levels.
  2. The war in Ukraine continues.
  3. Disruptions to supply of critical inputs gradually ease as demand softens; possible additional COVID-19 lockdowns in China are a downside risk; weather-related bottlenecks gradually ease in Europe.
  4. The pandemic’s health and economic impact on Europe fades.
  5. Monetary policy normalization proceeds steadily in advanced European economies, with the policy rate in the euro area reaching a neutral stance by early 2023; in emerging European economies, the pace of rate hikes eases after significant increases through 2021–22.
  6. Fiscal policy consolidates in 2023 in advanced and emerging European economies, but less than envisioned in the July 2022 WEO Update because of recent measures to ease the impact of energy and food price increases.
- Growth projections under these baseline assumptions:
  - Advanced European economies: output growth forecast to decline to 3.2 percent in 2022 and to decrease further to 0.6 percent in 2023 (0.7 percentage point downward revision for 2023 relative to July projections).
    - Several countries expected to experience technical recessions (two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth), including Germany and Italy (projected to see three consecutive quarters of negative growth starting from the third quarter of 2022).
  - Emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye): growth projected to decelerate from 4.3 percent in 2022 to 1.7 percent in 2023 (a downward revision of around 1 percentage point for 2023 relative to July expectations).
    - Examples: Croatia, Poland, and Romania expected to experience technical recessions in the second half of 2022.
- Main drags on growth:
  - Slower consumption driven by weaker consumer confidence, higher inflation, and tighter financial conditions.
  - Corporate investment likely to be held back by uncertainty, higher input and borrowing costs, and lower external demand.
  - The downward revision to China’s growth relative to April 2022 projections (about 1.2 percentage points in 2022 and 0.6 percentage point in 2023) is expected to reduce the EU’s GDP level (specific magnitude truncated in source).

### Consumer and business sentiment
- Private consumption contracted sequentially in 2022:Q1 in France, Italy, and Spain; expected to remain subdued in H2 2022 and in 2023.
- Survey indicators: a larger share of households in the EU-27 plan to revise major purchases downward in the next 12 months.
- Uncertainty and survey measures point to reduced planned major purchases and increased unemployment concerns.

*International Monetary Fund | October 2022*

### 0.2 percent. The moderate fiscal consolidation

### 1. ThE FOG OF WAR CLOUds ThE EUROPEAN OUTLOOK

### Economic outlook and growth projections
- A moderate fiscal consolidation projected for 2023 will further contribute to cooling down demand.
- Countries affected directly by the war are forecast to see a sharp contraction.
- Russia: After initial hit from sanctions, economy stabilized in Q2 2022, central bank brought policy rates back to prewar levels; GDP contraction of 3.4 and 2.3 percent in 2022 and 2023, respectively, driven by decreases in private demand.
- Ukraine: Widespread destruction in infrastructure and massive refugee outflows; GDP will see a contraction by over a third in 2022 (Box 1.4).
- Output scarring by the end of 2023 is projected at 3.5 percent in both advanced and emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye), resulting from adding war-related output losses to relatively small pandemic losses.

### Inflation projections and persistence
- The fallout from the war will push inflation above summer projections by about 1–3 percentage points in 2022–23.
- Advanced European economies: Headline inflation projected to increase to 8.3 percent in 2022 before declining to 6.2 percent in 2023.
- Emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye): Inflation projected to reach 13.3 percent in 2022 and remain at 11.8 percent in 2023.
- Inflation projected to gradually return to central bank targets: about 2 percent by 2025 in advanced European economies and to below 3 percent by 2026 in emerging European economies (excluding conflict countries and Türkiye).
- More persistent inflation in emerging European economies reflects stronger nominal wage growth and more robust cyclical positions; evidence suggests inflation tends to be more persistent in emerging European economies.

### Risks and scenarios
- The war in Ukraine will keep uncertainty high, with balance of risks to the downside for growth and to the upside for inflation.
- Winter 2022–23 risks: a complete shutoff of remaining Russian gas flows could create further economic pain, especially if a cold winter results in gas shortages and rationing.
- Escalation of the war or intensification of geopolitical tensions in Asia could amplify commodity market disruptions and supply bottlenecks, with adverse real income and confidence effects.
- Other war-related risks, including those associated with Ukraine’s nuclear plants, could have devastating effects.
- Projections consider a degree of core inflation persistence at the lower end of ranges predicted by simple empirical models, suggesting upside risks.
- Upside growth factors: faster-than-expected unwinding of supply bottlenecks and greater resilience of private consumption.
- Downside example scenarios:
  - Simultaneous materialization of softer growth in China, a full Russian gas shutoff, increases in oil prices, and more persistent inflation with tighter financial conditions could lead to a decline in the EU’s GDP level of about 1.4 percent in 2023 with respect to the baseline.
  - A full and extended shut-off of Russian gas to Europe combined with a harsh winter could lead to an additional physical shortfall of about 6 percent of typical winter consumption.
  - The most exposed countries could see a GDP loss of some 3 percent with respect to the baseline; other countries (such as Italy) could also see sizable output losses.
- Financial risk: a sharper-than-projected tightening of financial conditions could lead to financial outflows in emerging European economies, higher lending rates, increased vulnerable households and firms, suppressed consumption and investment, and defaults; however, simulations suggest strong European bank balance sheets should keep such risk in check—median Tier 1 ratios of 19 percent across advanced European economies and 21 percent across emerging European economies.

### Monetary policy guidance
- Central banks throughout Europe have continued normalizing monetary policy, with generally earlier and stronger policy rate hikes where the gap between realized and target inflation rates was widest.
- Many emerging European economies (including Hungary, Poland, and Romania) and advanced European economies (the Czech Republic, Iceland, the United Kingdom) increased frequency and magnitude of rate hikes in the last 6–12 months.
- Some central banks have begun to reduce the size of their balance sheets; inflation has reduced the real value of central banks’ financial assets.
- In September, the European Central Bank (ECB) front-loaded a large portion of needed policy normalization and announced the Transmission Protection Instrument to address fragmentation risks.
- Given a still broadly accommodative policy stance, central banks should continue to raise policy rates under most scenarios in the next few months.
- Monetary policy should:
  - Keep inflation expectations well-anchored and respond to the more persistent component of the energy price shock that will reduce potential output.
  - Be data-dependent and nimble: slow normalization if a global demand slowdown threatened recession and wage increases remain contained; focus on avoiding wage-price spirals and de-anchoring of inflation expectations if additional supply shocks occur.
- Additional policy rate increases are required in both advanced European economies (including the euro area and the United Kingdom) and some emerging European economies.
- Tighter monetary policy is particularly needed in most emerging European economies due to higher inflation, less-anchored expectations, stronger cyclical positions, and higher nominal wage growth.
- In the euro area, monetary policy normalization should continue with a view to reaching a neutral stance by early 2023.
- Regarding quantitative tightening, the ECB may consider discontinuing some or all of Asset Purchase Program (APP) reinvestments, with flexible Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) reinvestments serving as the first line of defense to address fragmentation risks; TLTRO net repayments are also expected to contribute to decreasing the ECB’s balance sheet size.

### Fiscal policy recommendations
- Fiscal consolidation should proceed during 2023, with its pace temporarily slowed in the coming months to allow governments to support vulnerable households and viable firms through the energy crisis.
- Fiscal consolidation will support monetary policy normalization and help reduce public debt.
- Fiscal deficits should decrease faster in high-debt countries, in those with limited fiscal space, and in countries more vulnerable to tighter financial conditions, including many emerging European economies.
- On current trends, debt ratios would decline mainly in low-debt advanced European economies in the medium term, while in several high-debt economies they would remain stable or increase further.
- In the EU, a reformed fiscal framework that prevents debt distress while allowing sufficient macroeconomic stabilization should ideally be in place before the expiration of the general escape clause at the end of 2023.
- Spending should be reprioritized to assist vulnerable households and viable firms affected by the surge of energy prices.
- Policy on energy prices:
  - Domestic prices should reflect energy market signals as much as possible; targeted and temporary fiscal transfers to low-income households should be given priority.
  - The partly temporary nature of electricity and natural gas price increases cautions against a full immediate pass-through to all end users which could dramatically raise households’ living costs and push viable firms into bankruptcy.
  - Temporary energy subsidies might be considered, sized according to the gap of current to medium-term energy prices and available fiscal space; such subsidies should be limited to maintain fiscal consolidation and preserve price signals for adjustment by households and firms.
  - Increasing progressivity of tariffs for upper consumption levels and peak demand hours could encourage better-off households to reduce demand and create room for critical consumption of vulnerable households and energy-intensive firms.
  - The European Commission’s proposal to tax all revenues above a certain electricity price level (the so-called cap) will bring new fiscal revenues to tackle the energy crisis; the cap should be temporary and well-calibrated to avoid affecting electricity supply, and its impact will likely differ across countries due to uneven generation by inframarginal producers and operational difficulties to share revenues.
- Overall: fiscal consolidation combined with temporary, targeted support is recommended, with greater consolidation efforts in high-debt and high-demand countries (e.g., Hungary and Poland) and precautionary rebuilding of fiscal space.

*International Monetary Fund | October 2022*

### 1. Europe: General Government Primary Balance

### 1. Europe: General Government Primary Balance

### Fiscal Outlook and Primary Balances
- Charts indicate primary balance measured as "Percent of GDP, PPP-GDP weighted average; excluding grants" for 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 across Advanced economies and Emerging market economies with values spanning from –8 to 0 percent of GDP as shown in the panel.
- Note: "Panel 1 is consistent with current policies and does not include fiscal measures adopted after the WEO cutoff date of September 26, 2022; emerging European economies exclude Belarus, Russia, Türkiye and Ukraine; the cyclically-adjusted primary balance is expressed in percent of potential GDP."

### Energy Price Pass-through and Energy Measures
- Observed pass-through of energy prices (Percent, 2022) is shown monthly (Feb., Mar., Apr., May, June, July) and by product: Electricity, Natural gas, Liquid fuels; pass-through is computed as the ratio (in percentage) of retail to wholesale year over year inflation; wholesale inflation measured by the TTF Index for natural gas and by the Brent Crude Oil Index for liquid fuels; p20th and p80th refer to the 20th and 80th percentile, respectively; all underlying variables are in Euros.
- Energy measures across country groups are classified by policy groups:
  - (I) measures that impede price pass-through
  - (II) targeted support for households
  - (III) less/untargeted support for households
  - (IV) support for firms
  - (V) others
- Policy instrument categories shown include: Price freezes and subsidies; Cuts to VAT/sales taxes for energy products; Cuts to excise taxes on fuel commodities; Energy bill discounts; Tax credit on energy bills; Other taxes; Targeted cash transfers; Vouchers; Other subsidies; PIT relief; Energy efficiency grants and subsidies; Subsidies/grants/loans to firms/specific industries; CIT reliefs; Short-term work/temporary unemployment benefits; Other spending.

### Estimated Fiscal Cost of Ukrainian Refugees
- Fiscal cost panel reports "Euros and percent of GDP" and "Euro per refugee" scales; cross-country euro-per-refugee values range on the horizontal axis from 0 to 16,000 and percent of GDP vertical axis spans 0.0 to 1.2 percent.
- Staff estimates in text: "the short-term fiscal cost of refugees in the EU could be €30–€37 billion in 2022 (about 0.2 percent of EU GDP)."
- Notes on methodology:
  - Estimates are based on 2017 OECD figure of EUR 10,000 per refugee in main European destination countries updated to May 2022 prices (EUR 11,578).
  - Cross-country values obtained by indexing country nominal GDP per capita to value for Germany, with Luxembourg indexed to Germany, and Ireland to the United Kingdom.
  - Estimates are preliminary.

### Refugee Numbers and Demographics
- As of end-September (2022): number of Ukrainian refugees in Europe reached 7.5 million (4.2 million in the European Union [EU]); 7 million internally displaced persons remain within Ukraine.
- Registration under EU programs: "As of late September, 4.2 million people have registered under the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive (EU-TPD) or similar non-EU programs."
- Refugee composition: surveys indicate a majority of children and women under age 40; approximately 30 percent of all Ukrainian children, 17 percent of adult Ukrainian women, and about 6 percent of adult Ukrainian men have fled the country so far in 2022.
- Mobility and intentions: a large fraction of refugees (about one-third to one-half) have expressed their intention to return to Ukraine soon.

### Labor Market and Growth Implications of Refugees
- Size and distribution:
  - Ukrainian refugees represent about 0.5 percent of Europe’s labor force—about twice the size of the 2015–17 refugee wave.
  - Share by country examples: Czech Republic 2.2 percent, Poland 2.1 percent, Estonia 1.9 percent.
- Potential effects:
  - Refugees could ease labor market tightness in parts of eastern Europe and boost potential growth over the medium term.
  - Medium-term impact depends on speed and quality of labor market integration, risk of skills downgrading, and complementarity or substitution with native workers.
  - Cultural proximity, higher educational attainment, and weaker language barriers in neighboring countries are cited as factors enhancing successful integration.

### Policy Recommendations: Fiscal, Financial, and Structural
- Fiscal policy guidance:
  - If additional shocks materialize, countries with available fiscal space should reconsider fiscal consolidation plans and could ease fiscal policy temporarily if needed.
  - Countries with limited fiscal space should let automatic stabilizers work but offset additional support to the vulnerable with tax increases or other spending cuts, avoiding harmful reductions in health, education, and public investment.
  - If further temporary supply shocks occur (e.g., complete cessation of gas supplies from Russia), additional temporary support measures would be needed and would require further reprioritization of spending in countries with limited fiscal space.
  - Nonfiscal tools like well-designed rationing programs could contain output losses if gas supply is insufficient; preparing requires implementing regional gas-sharing agreements.
- Financial policies:
  - Monitor and contain pockets of vulnerabilities to keep credit flowing and mitigate liquidity risks.
  - Supervisors should ensure bank asset classifications and loan loss provisions swiftly and accurately reflect credit risk and losses.
  - Macroprudential policy settings can be kept broadly unchanged under the baseline, with supervisors ensuring cyclical buffers have been rebuilt.
  - Supervisors should stress-test bank balance sheets for the impact of higher interest rates, focusing on exposures to vulnerable households and firms, and on housing market developments (noting countries with adjustable-rate mortgages, such as Poland).
  - Avoid macroprudential policies becoming procyclical; if downside risks materialize, some macroprudential tools may need to be eased to dampen asset price declines and support lending.
- Structural policies:
  - Ensure energy security while accelerating the green transition: secure alternative supply sources, substitute gas where possible, update contingency plans, build storage ahead of heating seasons, encourage energy savings, accelerate rollout of renewables, reduce fossil fuel consumption in industry and transport, ramp up smart investment including in gas connectivity.
  - Reconstructing Ukraine will require massive financing flows, primarily grants, and policies to promote return of refugees; IMF has established a new administered account to facilitate bilateral contributions, with Canada and Germany having disbursed more than $2 billion through this account.
  - Integrating long-term refugees requires targeted active labor market policies, such as temporary wage subsidies.
  - Continue implementation of long-standing structural reforms to boost productivity, accelerate the digital transition, relieve supply constraints, and ease labor and product market reallocation; timely and efficient implementation of recovery and resilience plans will help reap full benefits.

*Sources: Eurostat; Haver Analytics; IMF, World Economic Outlook; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); UN High Commissioner for Refugees; and IMF staff calculations.*

### Box 1.1. Economic Considerations of the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis

### Box 1.1. Economic Considerations of the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis

### Fiscal impact and scale
- IMF staff and EUROMOD estimates put the fiscal cost in the EU at between €26–€34 billion.  
- EU and non-EU countries with the largest population shares of refugees would incur fiscal costs of about 1 percent of GDP, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Moldova, and Poland.  
- Poland granted Ukrainian refugees access to healthcare, education and the labor market even earlier than envisaged by the EU-TPD.

### Labor market and integration considerations
- Policies should strike the right balance between supporting a return of refugees to Ukraine, which remains the key priority, and recognizing that many may not be able to do so for a considerable time.  
- The initial response has been effective to provide relief, but policies should continue providing:
  - language training,  
  - job search support, and  
  - access to health and childcare services.  
- Regulatory barriers preventing effective labor market integration (for example, skill recognition) should be removed.  
- If integration proves too slow, temporary measures to consider include:
  - temporary exceptions from minimum wage laws (where minimum-to-median wage ratios are particularly high), or  
  - temporary wage subsidies to employers (IMF 2016).

### Fiscal and governance arrangements
- Central governments will need to fund subgovernments adequately and reward successful integration, given responsibility for education, health care, social welfare, housing, and active labor market policies.  
- At the transnational level, additional mechanisms beyond EU transfers and free transportation could be considered to help distribute the burden of hosting refugees more fairly.  
- Policies should facilitate refugees keeping ties to Ukraine to pave the way to their return and reintegration once the war ends.

### Methodological notes and data sources
- IMF staff’s methodology for assessing fiscal costs updates the costs of processing and accommodating asylum seekers of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017).  
- EUROMOD estimates use microsimulations based on survey data and cover education, health, housing, and social protection costs.  
- Sources cited for estimates include the European Commission; Eurostat; UN High Commissioner for Refugees; Organization for co-operation and development; IMF World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.

*Prepared from Box 1.1, "Economic Considerations of the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis," Regional Economic Outlook: Europe, October 2022.*

### Box 1.3. How Vulnerable Is Europe’s Private Sector (continued)

### Box 1.3. How Vulnerable Is Europe’s Private Sector (continued)

### Bank Capital and Corporate Vulnerabilities
- Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets at the end of 2021:
  - 19 percent in advanced economies (ranging from 13–16 percent in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, to 23 percent in the Baltics and Ireland).
  - 21 percent in emerging market economies (ranging from 16 percent in Hungary and Poland, to 25 percent in Croatia).
- Capital adequacy trends:
  - With few exceptions (for instance, Greece), capital adequacy improved between 2019 and 2021.
  - Capital adequacy is considerably higher than by mid-2009 and ahead of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis.
- Interest rate environment:
  - Higher interest rates, particularly when accompanied by steeper yield curves, could help support banks’ earnings.
  - Interest rate risk from maturity transformation could weigh on profitability in the event of large upward interest rate shocks.
  - Earnings gains from higher rates would help offset losses from credit deterioration.
- Corporate sector indicators:
  - Bankruptcies in 2020 were lower than in any year since 2007.
  - The median expected default frequency for European firms started to rise in 2022.

### Ukraine: Human and Economic Impact of the War
- Human displacement and damage:
  - More than 7.5 million Ukrainians have left the country.
  - A similar number is internally displaced.
  - World Bank Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: physical damage of $97 billion (more than 50 percent of Ukraine’s prewar GDP) through June 2022.
- GDP and activity:
  - Flash estimates: GDP level declined by 15.1 and 37.2 percent (year over year) in the first and second quarters of 2022, respectively.
  - Annual projection: GDP is projected to collapse by about 35 percent (Box Figure 1.4.1).
  - Economic activity in noncombat zones has stabilized as workers and firms adjust to function in war mode.
- Inflation and trade:
  - Headline inflation: 23.8 percent (year over year) in August 2022 from 10 percent (year over year) in January.
  - Exports: preliminary estimates suggest exports declined by 31 percent (year over year) through the end of August, led by decreases in metals and agricultural products.
  - Imports: have fallen by 20 percent through August (year over year).
  - Current account: remains in surplus as significant external transfers more than offset the large and widening trade balance.
- Fiscal and reserve pressures:
  - Fiscal deficit through August (excluding foreign grants) reached 13.9 percent of GDP.
  - Deficit financing: financed through a mix of external and (increasingly) central bank treasury financing.
  - International reserves: fallen by about $6 billion to $24.9 billion as of early September.

### Russia: Short-Term Impact, Medium-Term Scarring, and Policy Response
- 2022 GDP projection:
  - Russia’s GDP is now projected to decline by 3.4 percent in 2022.
  - This contraction is about one-half the size of the contraction that was anticipated initially.
- Factors limiting the contraction:
  - Crude oil exports were largely redirected from sanctioning to nonsanctioning countries.
  - The large government footprint helped preserve employment, which has remained at prewar levels.
  - Ruble appreciation led to lower-than-projected inflation and thus a lower decline in real incomes and domestic demand.
  - Substantial policy support: authorities abandoned the fiscal rule, allowing for a fiscal stimulus of about 4 percent of GDP; monetary policy rates have returned to prewar levels.
- Medium-term scarring and uncertainties:
  - IMF staff projects output will be about 10 percent lower than prewar forecasts by 2023 (Box Figure 1.4.1).
  - Drivers of scarring include a large exodus of multinationals, loss in human capital, isolation from global financial markets, and impaired access to advanced technology and know-how.
  - Uncertainties highlighted:
    - Extent to which export restrictions will complicate exploration and development of new oil fields.
    - Time and investment needed to redirect gas exports from Europe to other destinations, including investment in liquid natural gas and pipeline capacity.
    - Efficacy of the G7 price cap on Russian oil: depends on which countries agree to the price cap and the extent to which the ban on insurance services will limit Russia’s ability to redirect oil flows.

*Prepared by Russia and Ukraine IMF teams.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/reo/eur/2022/october/english/reoeur-fall-2022ch1final.pdf_
