## MENAP Oil-Exporting Countries: Time to Accelerate Reforms

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---

### Overview
- Economic growth in oil exporters in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (MENAP) bottomed out in 2017 and is expected to accelerate in 2018–19.
- Recovery largely reflects continued recovery in non-oil activity as many countries slow the pace of fiscal consolidation to support domestic demand.
- Risks to the outlook are skewed to the downside, including: a sharp tightening of global financial conditions, growing trade tensions, geopolitical strains, and a subdued and highly uncertain outlook for oil prices.
- Weak growth prospects over the medium term underscore the importance of accelerating planned structural reforms.

### A Sharp Slowdown in 2017
- Overall growth in MENAP oil exporters in 2017: 1.7 percent.
- Comparison to prior year: 2016 growth was 5.4 percent.
- GCC overall GDP change in 2017: fell by 0.2 percent.
- Saudi Arabia: experienced its first economic contraction since 2009.
- Non-GCC oil exporters (excluding Libya and Yemen) overall growth in 2017: 2.6 percent.
- Selected country developments:
  - Saudi Arabia: contraction in 2017; impact of OPEC+ oil production cuts more than offset continued recovery in non-oil growth.
  - United Arab Emirates and Qatar: weaker consumer and investor confidence dampened non-oil GDP growth in 2017 relative to the previous year.
  - Bahrain: stronger non-oil growth supported by GCC-funded projects and robust financial and hospitality sectors more than offset weaker oil output.
  - Iran: growth decelerated significantly relative to 2016; oil GDP growth much slower than previous year, offsetting recovery in non-oil activity supported by public investment.
  - Algeria and Iraq: weaker oil GDP growth (OPEC+ agreement and weaker demand from Europe for Algerian gas) more than offset by pickup in non-oil activity.
  - Libya: stronger-than-expected growth supported by increased oil production, more than offset lower public spending.
  - Yemen: economic contraction much more pronounced than anticipated due to ongoing conflict.

### Recovery in 2018–19: Projections and Drivers
- Overall growth projections:
  - 2018: 2.8 percent (versus 3.0 projected in October).
  - 2019: 3.3 percent (versus 2.7 projected in October).
- Non-oil GDP growth expectations:
  - 2018: 3.2 percent.
  - 2019: 3.4 percent.
  - These are 0.7 and 0.4 percentage point higher, respectively, relative to October forecasts.
- Two opposing forces shaping revisions:
  - Upward revisions to non-oil GDP growth in several countries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq) due to expected completion of investment projects, slower fiscal consolidation, increased public capital spending, and reconstruction.
  - Downward revisions to oil GDP growth in 2018 in most GCC countries and Iraq due to lower oil production consistent with extension of the OPEC+ agreement; for 2019, deferred expiration of agreement implies faster pick-up in oil GDP growth than anticipated in October.

### Adjusting the Pace of Fiscal Consolidation
- Fiscal consolidation adjustments:
  - Saudi Arabia: fiscal adjustment in 2017 was less than initially indicated in the budget—higher expenditures were supported by higher-than-expected non-oil revenues.
  - Qatar: availability of fiscal buffers allowed for more gradual fiscal consolidation.
  - Outside the GCC: fiscal consolidation continued in 2017, especially in Iran and Iraq (in the context of the IMF-supported program).
- Overall expectation: continue fiscal consolidation efforts, although at a slower pace.
- Fiscal outlook concerns:
  - Large increases in expenditures expected to generate significantly larger fiscal deficits in Algeria (consolidation expected to resume in 2019) and in Iran.
- Revenue-side measures:
  - Introduction (January 2018) of a value-added tax (VAT) in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; other GCC countries expected to introduce a VAT this year.
  - Iraq expected to introduce sales and excise taxes on some goods and services in 2018.
  - Key priority: implementation of the VAT in remaining GCC countries to mobilize non-oil revenues.
- Expenditure-side priorities:
  - Improve efficiency of public spending; public investment efficiency indicators show MENAP oil exporters perform better than emerging markets on average but substantially worse than advanced economies.
  - Contain large public wage bills that crowd out other critical public expenditure components.
  - Measures taken so far (including temporary hiring freezes) may be difficult to sustain without additional structural reforms.
  - Other reforms needed: further steps toward full elimination of energy subsidies; changes to pension and social security systems including revisions to retirement age and benefits.
  - To mitigate impact on the most vulnerable and ensure equity, accompany reforms with enhanced targeted social protection mechanisms and improvements in delivery of and access to public services.

### Potentially Large Fiscal and Financing Risks
- Public debt trends:
  - Debt has increased by an average of 10 percentage points of GDP each year since 2013.
- Financing needs and vulnerabilities:
  - Cumulative overall fiscal deficits projected for 2018–22: $294 billion.
  - Cumulative government debt amortizations for 2018–22: $71 billion.
  - Additional non-government-issued international debt coming due over next five years: $312 billion (almost 40 percent corresponds to state-owned enterprises).
  - Impact of interest rate increase example: a 200 basis point increase in interest rates would add between 0.1 and 0.6 percent of GDP a year to interest payments in MENAP oil exporters.
- Risk channels:
  - Sudden tightening of global financial conditions could create significant fiscal and financing pressures, including materialization of fiscal contingent liabilities if international market access halts.

### Financial Sector and Credit Conditions
- Financial sector resilience: broadly resilient despite slowdown in 2016–17.
- Credit growth: subdued in most countries; drivers include weak consumer, government, and government-related enterprise spending and reduced confidence.
- Policy responses and reforms:
  - United Arab Emirates: introduction of a credit registry to help banks manage credit risks.
  - Saudi Arabia: eased capital market restrictions on foreign investors; increased loan-to-value ratio for first-time home buyers.
- Recommendations to promote credit and confidence:
  - Strengthen legal rights of borrowers and lenders.
  - Increase availability of credit-related information.
- Country-specific banking issues:
  - Iran: rapid credit growth effect on non-oil activity has weakened as nonperforming loans (NPLs) continue to increase.
  - Algeria: large accumulation of government arrears led to higher NPLs; these are expected to decrease as arrears are cleared.
  - Iran and Iraq: banking systems continue to face numerous challenges; reforms expected to be implemented this year.
- Other financial developments:
  - Interbank rates have continued to rise as monetary policy tightens in tandem with the United States.
  - Sovereign spreads have narrowed as government cash constraints eased with higher oil prices.
  - Deposit growth remains slow but broadly stable across the GCC.
  - Bank profitability has edged down due to compressed margins in several countries.
  - Financial markets in the region were moderately affected by recent volatility in global asset markets, underscoring importance of improving prudential regulation and oversight.

### Accelerating the Structural Reform Agenda
- Need to move to a new growth model that promotes diversification and private sector development.
- Essential reforms: labor market and education reforms to boost productivity and create opportunities broadly.
- Examples of recent steps:
  - United Arab Emirates: continued investments in education and innovation; introduction of a new corporate bankruptcy law to improve business environment.
  - Iran: developing programs to foster job creation for young individuals and women.
  - Bahrain: introduced a wage protection system and measures to increase job flexibility for expatriates.
  - Qatar: visa-free entry program to stimulate tourism; new law to expand protection of expatriate labor.
- Underpinning requirements: increase transparency and accountability, strengthen institutions and governance.
- Policymaker commitment (as recognized in Marrakesh) to complete these reforms is instrumental to achieving higher and more inclusive growth.

### Risks Remain Skewed to the Downside
- Oil price sensitivity:
  - Each $10 reduction in the price of oil leads to an instantaneous deterioration of 3 percentage points of GDP in the fiscal balance of MENAP oil exporters (excluding Libya and Yemen).
- Other downside risks:
  - Faster-than-expected tightening of financial conditions could trigger abrupt financial market and asset price corrections, pressuring bank asset quality and affecting credit growth.
  - Escalating import tariffs or inward-looking policies could disrupt global trade and investment, result in lower oil prices, and reduce economic activity.
  - Regional conflicts and geopolitical risks persist and could weaken commitment to fiscal measures and structural reforms, especially given observed increases in oil prices.
- Upside channel:
  - Continued commitment to fiscal consolidation, even at a slower pace, could boost investor confidence and result in stronger growth.

### Box 1.1 — Summary: Reforming Public Sector Wage Bills in MENAP
- Problem:
  - Public sector wage bills have grown large; public employment is high relative to global peers.
  - Public sector compensation often exceeds private sector compensation (for example, gap about 200 percent in GCC countries).
  - Despite high wage bills, socioeconomic outcomes are weak: persistent high unemployment, distorted labor markets, lower government efficiency, weak business and regulatory environment, weak education quality, and mixed access to and quality of public health care.
- Rationale for reform:
  - Reforming public wage bills can free fiscal space for public investment in infrastructure and human capital.
  - Complemented by energy subsidy reforms and fair taxation, public wage bill reforms can finance improved public service delivery and social protection, help remove labor market distortions, and support private-sector-led job creation to absorb youth entering the labor market.
- Experience and recommendations:
  - Some countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia) have implemented wage and hiring freezes, but international experience suggests such gains are difficult to maintain over the medium term.
  - To achieve lasting effects, deeper reforms are needed.

### Public Employment and Compensation Reforms (Section 2)
- Reform objectives:
  - Ensure public employment and compensation policies are fiscally sustainable by identifying drivers of public wage bills and anchoring their growth in medium-term fiscal plans.
  - Focus compensation and employment policies on providing public services effectively, efficiently, and equitably, by undertaking expenditure reviews and strengthening mechanisms for public service delivery.
  - Strengthen institutions and data, including control over bonuses and allowances, and linking compensation to performance.

### Sequencing, Social Impact, and Private Sector Linkages (Section 2)
- Sequencing guidance:
  - The sequencing of public wage bill reforms should reflect country-specific circumstances and aim at building synergies with other policies.
- Social safeguards and transition management:
  - Pay particular attention to smoothing the transition through early social impact analyses and stronger social protection.
- Private sector and structural complementarities:
  - Strengthen the private sector by diversifying the economy, bolstering governance, and improving the business environment and the functioning of the labor market.

### Box 1.2 — An Action Plan for Inclusive Growth in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan Region
- Regional diagnosis and challenges:
  - The region holds enormous promise, yet protracted regional conflicts, low commodity prices, weak productivity, and poor governance impede performance.
  - Since 2011, regional growth has been three-fourths the previous decade’s average.
  - A staggering 25 percent of young people are jobless, and women are three times less likely than men to seek work.
- Conference context:
  - The “Opportunity for All” Conference in Morocco in January 2018 discussed new sources of growth and policy measures to make growth more inclusive and job-rich.
  - The conference was cohosted by the government of Morocco, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the IMF, and brought together more than 400 representatives from the official and private sectors, youth, and civil society.
  - Attendees agreed to a set of reform priorities summarized as the Marrakesh Call for Action, calling on governments to “ACT NOW.”
- Marrakesh Call for Action priorities:
  - Accountability: Increase transparency and strengthen institutions to improve governance, tackle corruption, and ensure responsibility for inclusive policies.
  - Competition: Foster a more vibrant private sector through improved access to finance and a better business environment with fewer barriers and less red tape.
  - Technology and Trade: Leverage technology and nurture trade to generate new sources of growth, create jobs, and foster prosperity.
  - No one left behind: Build strong safety nets and strengthen legal rights to empower disadvantaged groups, including youth, women, rural populations, and refugees.
  - Opportunity: Increase and improve the quality of social and investment spending and pursue fairer taxation to support growth, lift up citizens, and share the burden of reform more equitably.
  - Workers: Invest in people and reform education to equip workers for the new economy.
- Role of international community and next steps:
  - More external financing, preferably as grants, will be needed to support the region, particularly to help post-conflict countries and people displaced by war.
  - Meaningful reforms will be needed to operationalize the Marrakesh Call for Action and will require strong ownership of reforms and engagement by all parties.
  - The Marrakesh Call for Action will guide the IMF’s engagement with policymakers and other stakeholders in the region, as well as its analytical work. The IMF will work closely with its member countries, private sector civil society, and international financial institutions to help implement reforms in the region to raise growth and living standards, and generate a more prosperous future.
- Attribution:
  - This box was prepared by Peter Kunzel.

*Middle East and Central Asia Department — REO Update, May 2018 (Section 1 and Section 2).*

### Section 1

### MENAP Oil-Exporting Countries: Time to Accelerate Reforms

### Overview
- Economic growth in oil exporters in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (MENAP) bottomed out in 2017 and is expected to accelerate in 2018–19.
- Recovery largely reflects continued recovery in non-oil activity as many countries slow the pace of fiscal consolidation to support domestic demand.
- Risks to the outlook are skewed to the downside, including: a sharp tightening of global financial conditions, growing trade tensions, geopolitical strains, and a subdued and highly uncertain outlook for oil prices.
- Weak growth prospects over the medium term underscore the importance of accelerating planned structural reforms.

### A Sharp Slowdown in 2017
- Overall growth in MENAP oil exporters in 2017: 1.7 percent (much weaker than 5.4 percent in 2016).
- GCC overall GDP change in 2017: fell by 0.2 percent; Saudi Arabia experienced its first economic contraction since 2009.
- Non-GCC oil exporters (excluding Libya and Yemen) overall growth in 2017: 2.6 percent.
- Country-specific notes:
  - Saudi Arabia: contraction in 2017; impact of OPEC+ oil production cuts more than offset continued recovery in non-oil growth.
  - United Arab Emirates and Qatar: weaker consumer and investor confidence dampened non-oil GDP growth in 2017 relative to the previous year.
  - Bahrain: stronger non-oil growth supported by GCC-funded projects and robust financial and hospitality sectors more than offset weaker oil output.
  - Iran: growth decelerated significantly relative to 2016; oil GDP growth much slower than previous year, offsetting recovery in non-oil activity supported by public investment.
  - Algeria and Iraq: weaker oil GDP growth (OPEC+ agreement and weaker demand from Europe for Algerian gas) more than offset by pickup in non-oil activity.
  - Libya: stronger-than-expected growth supported by increased oil production, more than offset lower public spending.
  - Yemen: economic contraction much more pronounced than anticipated due to ongoing conflict.

### Recovery in 2018–19 Driven by Opposing Forces
- Overall growth projections:
  - 2018: 2.8 percent (versus 3.0 projected in October).
  - 2019: 3.3 percent (versus 2.7 projected in October).
- Non-oil GDP growth expectations:
  - 2018: 3.2 percent.
  - 2019: 3.4 percent.
  - These are 0.7 and 0.4 percentage point higher, respectively, relative to October forecasts.
- Two opposing forces shaping revisions:
  - Upward revisions to non-oil GDP growth in several countries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq) due to factors such as expected completion of investment projects, slower fiscal consolidation, increased public capital spending, and reconstruction.
  - Downward revisions to oil GDP growth in 2018 in most GCC countries and Iraq due to lower oil production consistent with extension of the OPEC+ agreement; for 2019, deferred expiration of agreement implies faster pick-up in oil GDP growth than anticipated in October.

### Adjusting the Pace of Fiscal Consolidation
- Fiscal consolidation has been adjusted in several countries:
  - Saudi Arabia: fiscal adjustment in 2017 was less than initially indicated in the budget—higher expenditures were supported by higher-than-expected non-oil revenues.
  - Qatar: availability of fiscal buffers allowed for more gradual fiscal consolidation.
  - Outside the GCC: fiscal consolidation continued in 2017, especially in Iran and Iraq (in the context of the IMF-supported program).
- Overall expectation: continue fiscal consolidation efforts, although at a slower pace.
- Fiscal outlook concerns: large increases in expenditures expected to generate significantly larger fiscal deficits in Algeria (consolidation expected to resume in 2019) and in Iran.
- Revenue-side measures:
  - Introduction (January 2018) of a value-added tax (VAT) in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; other GCC countries expected to introduce a VAT this year.
  - Iraq expected to introduce sales and excise taxes on some goods and services in 2018.
  - Key priority: implementation of the VAT in remaining GCC countries to mobilize non-oil revenues.
- Expenditure-side priorities:
  - Improve efficiency of public spending; public investment efficiency indicators show MENAP oil exporters perform better than emerging markets on average but substantially worse than advanced economies.
  - Contain large public wage bills that crowd out other critical public expenditure components.
  - Measures taken so far (including temporary hiring freezes) may be difficult to sustain without additional structural reforms.
  - Other reforms needed: further steps toward full elimination of energy subsidies; changes to pension and social security systems including revisions to retirement age and benefits.
  - To mitigate impact on the most vulnerable and ensure equity, accompany reforms with enhanced targeted social protection mechanisms and improvements in delivery of and access to public services.

### Potentially Large Fiscal and Financing Risks
- Public debt trends:
  - Debt has increased by an average of 10 percentage points of GDP each year since 2013.
- Financing needs and vulnerabilities:
  - Cumulative overall fiscal deficits projected for 2018–22: $294 billion.
  - Cumulative government debt amortizations for 2018–22: $71 billion.
  - Additional non-government-issued international debt coming due over next five years: $312 billion (almost 40 percent corresponds to state-owned enterprises).
  - Impact of interest rate increase example: a 200 basis point increase in interest rates would add between 0.1 and 0.6 percent of GDP a year to interest payments in MENAP oil exporters.
- Risk channels:
  - Sudden tightening of global financial conditions could create significant fiscal and financing pressures, including materialization of fiscal contingent liabilities if international market access halts.

### Financial Sector and Credit Conditions
- Financial sector resilience: broadly resilient despite slowdown in 2016–17.
- Credit growth: subdued in most countries; drivers include weak consumer, government, and government-related enterprise spending and reduced confidence.
- Policy responses and reforms:
  - United Arab Emirates: introduction of a credit registry to help banks manage credit risks.
  - Saudi Arabia: eased capital market restrictions on foreign investors; increased loan-to-value ratio for first-time home buyers.
- Recommendations to promote credit and confidence: strengthen legal rights of borrowers and lenders; increase availability of credit-related information.
- Country-specific banking issues:
  - Iran: rapid credit growth effect on non-oil activity has weakened as nonperforming loans (NPLs) continue to increase.
  - Algeria: large accumulation of government arrears led to higher NPLs; these are expected to decrease as arrears are cleared.
  - Iran and Iraq: banking systems continue to face numerous challenges; reforms expected to be implemented this year.
- Other financial developments:
  - Interbank rates have continued to rise as monetary policy tightens in tandem with the United States.
  - Sovereign spreads have narrowed as government cash constraints eased with higher oil prices.
  - Deposit growth remains slow but broadly stable across the GCC.
  - Bank profitability has edged down due to compressed margins in several countries.
  - Financial markets in the region were moderately affected by recent volatility in global asset markets, underscoring importance of improving prudential regulation and oversight.

### Accelerating the Structural Reform Agenda
- Need to move to a new growth model that promotes diversification and private sector development.
- Essential reforms: labor market and education reforms to boost productivity and create opportunities broadly.
- Examples of recent steps:
  - United Arab Emirates: continued investments in education and innovation; introduction of a new corporate bankruptcy law to improve business environment.
  - Iran: developing programs to foster job creation for young individuals and women.
  - Bahrain: introduced a wage protection system and measures to increase job flexibility for expatriates.
  - Qatar: visa-free entry program to stimulate tourism; new law to expand protection of expatriate labor.
- Underpinning requirements: increase transparency and accountability, strengthen institutions and governance.
- Policymaker commitment (as recognized in Marrakesh) to complete these reforms is instrumental to achieving higher and more inclusive growth.

### Risks Remain Skewed to the Downside
- Oil price sensitivity: each $10 reduction in the price of oil leads to an instantaneous deterioration of 3 percentage points of GDP in the fiscal balance of MENAP oil exporters (excluding Libya and Yemen).
- Other downside risks:
  - Faster-than-expected tightening of financial conditions could trigger abrupt financial market and asset price corrections, pressuring bank asset quality and affecting credit growth.
  - Escalating import tariffs or inward-looking policies could disrupt global trade and investment, result in lower oil prices, and reduce economic activity.
  - Regional conflicts and geopolitical risks persist and could weaken commitment to fiscal measures and structural reforms, especially given observed increases in oil prices.
- Upside channel:
  - Continued commitment to fiscal consolidation, even at a slower pace, could boost investor confidence and result in stronger growth.

### Box 1.1 — Summary: Reforming Public Sector Wage Bills in MENAP
- Problem:
  - Public sector wage bills have grown large; public employment is high relative to global peers.
  - Public sector compensation often exceeds private sector compensation (for example, gap about 200 percent in GCC countries).
  - Despite high wage bills, socioeconomic outcomes are weak: persistent high unemployment, distorted labor markets, lower government efficiency, weak business and regulatory environment, weak education quality, and mixed access to and quality of public health care.
- Rationale for reform:
  - Reforming public wage bills can free fiscal space for public investment in infrastructure and human capital.
  - Complemented by energy subsidy reforms and fair taxation, public wage bill reforms can finance improved public service delivery and social protection, help remove labor market distortions, and support private-sector-led job creation to absorb youth entering the labor market.
- Experience and recommendations:
  - Some countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia) have implemented wage and hiring freezes, but international experience suggests such gains are difficult to maintain over the medium term.
  - To achieve lasting effects, deeper reforms are needed.

*Source: Middle East and Central Asia Department — REO Update, May 2018 (Section 1).*

### Section 2

### menap0518-oe - Section 2

### Public employment and compensation reforms
- Objectives of reforms:
  - Ensure that public employment and compensation policies are fiscally sustainable by identifying drivers of public wage bills and anchoring their growth in medium-term fiscal plans.
  - Focus compensation and employment policies on providing public services effectively, efficiently, and equitably, by undertaking expenditure reviews and strengthening mechanisms for public service delivery.
  - Strengthen institutions and data, including control over bonuses and allowances, and linking compensation to performance.

### Sequencing, social impact, and private sector linkages
- Sequencing guidance:
  - The sequencing of public wage bill reforms should reflect country-specific circumstances and aim at building synergies with other policies.
- Social safeguards and transition management:
  - Particular attention should be paid to smoothing the transition through early social impact analyses and stronger social protection.
- Private sector and structural complementarities:
  - The private sector should be strengthened by taking steps to diversify the economy, bolster governance, and improve the business environment and the functioning of the labor market.

### Box 1.2. An Action Plan for Inclusive Growth in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan Region
- Regional diagnosis and challenges:
  - The Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan region holds enormous promise, yet protracted regional conflicts, low commodity prices, weak productivity, and poor governance impede the region’s performance.
  - Since 2011, regional growth has been three-fourths the previous decade’s average, a rate insufficient to significantly reduce unemployment.
  - A staggering 25 percent of young people are jobless, and women are three times less likely than men to seek work.
- Conference context:
  - The “Opportunity for All” Conference in Morocco in January 2018 discussed how to identify new sources of growth and policy measures to make growth more inclusive and job-rich.
  - The conference was cohosted by the government of Morocco, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the IMF, and brought together more than 400 representatives from the official and private sectors, youth, and civil society.
  - Conference attendees agreed to a set of reform priorities, summarized as the Marrakesh Call for Action, calling on governments to “ACT NOW.”
- Marrakesh Call for Action priorities (as agreed at the conference):
  - Accountability: Increase transparency and strengthen institutions to improve governance, tackle corruption, and ensure responsibility for inclusive policies.
  - Competition: Foster a more vibrant private sector through improved access to finance and a better business environment with fewer barriers and less red tape.
  - Technology and Trade: Leverage technology and nurture trade to generate new sources of growth, create jobs, and foster prosperity.
  - No one left behind: Build strong safety nets and strengthen legal rights to empower disadvantaged groups, including youth, women, rural populations, and refugees.
  - Opportunity: Increase and improve the quality of social and investment spending and pursue fairer taxation to support growth, lift up citizens, and share the burden of reform more equitably.
  - Workers: Invest in people and reform education to equip workers for the new economy.
- Role of international community and next steps:
  - The importance of the international financial community in this process was recognized, noting that more robust and inclusive growth is a shared responsibility and vitally important for the region and the rest of the world.
  - More external financing, preferably as grants, will be needed to support the region, particularly to help post-conflict countries and people displaced by war.
  - Looking ahead, meaningful reforms will be needed to operationalize the Marrakesh Call for Action and will require strong ownership of reforms and engagement by all parties.
  - The Marrakesh Call for Action will guide the IMF’s engagement with policymakers and other stakeholders in the region, as well as its analytical work. The IMF will work closely with its member countries, private sector civil society, and international financial institutions to help implement reforms in the region to raise growth and living standards, and generate a more prosperous future.
- Attribution:
  - This box was prepared by Peter Kunzel.

*menap0518-oe - Section 2*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/reo/mcd-cca/2018/may/english/menap0518-oe.pdf_