## 2. Adding to the concern is that the largest increase in skills shortages has been in future growth sectors; 12. Public spending on tertiary education has plummeted in the last decade while private

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---

### Sectors with largest increases in skills shortages
- Sectors with highest increase in skills gaps: information and communications (includes digital, IT and AI), advanced manufacturing, health and social work, education, business services, and wholesale and retail.
- Construction and manufacturing were among sectors with the highest proportion of skill-shortage vacancies in 2022.
- Survey and hard-data indicators:
  - PWC report: shortfall of 200,000 employees with green skills.
  - Gallup and Amazon study: 72 percent of businesses have digital skills vacancies; only 11 percent of UK workers have advanced digital skills.
  - OECD measure of hard-to-find skills shows shortages concentrated in training and education, medical and scientific skills, and digital skills.

### Skills shortages and gaps in the existing workforce; output constraints
- Employers reporting staff not fully proficient:
  - 15 percent of employers report at least one member of staff is not fully proficient in their role (up from around 13 percent in 2017).
- Density of skills gap in existing workforce:
  - Proportion of employees judged not fully proficient increased from 4.4 percent in 2017 to 5.2 percent in 2022.
  - Equivalent counts: 1.72 million employees lacking full proficiency in 2022, compared with 1.27 million in 2017.
- Consequences:
  - Most common: increased workloads for other workers.
  - Nearly a third of companies reported that lack of availability of skilled labor limited firm output.
  - Smaller firms with 2 to 4 employees were more likely to report a major impact.

### Cross-country labor market mismatches (UK vs peers)
- Field-of-study mismatch (2019):
  - UK: almost 40 percent of workers have a field-of-study mismatch.
  - OECD average: 31.7 (2019).
- Qualification mismatch (2019):
  - Underqualification in the UK: 40.5 percent (one of the highest among OECD economies).
  - OECD average: 34.4 percent.
- Macro implications noted by OECD: such mismatches can lower productivity, increase unemployment, and limit global competitiveness.
- Learning and Work Institute estimate: UK skills shortage will cost £120 billion by 2030, with a shortfall of 2.5 million highly skilled workers and an oversupply of more than 8 million people with low skills.

### Factors driving skill shortages
- Evidence points to multiple contributors:
  - Weakening educational outcomes (including adult education).
  - Decline in workplace training and apprenticeships, particularly for the young.
  - Brexit and COVID shocks.
  - Population aging.
- Employer investment in skills:
  - Total employer investment in skills declined 19 percent per employee, in real terms, between 2011 and 2022.
  - Larger businesses: -35 percent.
  - Primary sectors: -44 percent.
  - Public service sectors: -38 percent.
- Migration:
  - Increase in non-EU migrants since Brexit has not directly offset loss of EU workers due to different skillsets and hiring hurdles for non-EU workers, especially for small firms.

### Primary and secondary education: funding and outcomes
- Public spending on primary to post-secondary education:
  - UK average: 3.7 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - OECD average: 3.3 percent of GDP in 2020.
- Spending trends:
  - Spending as percent of GDP declined from 2013 to 2018 with a small increase in 2020.
  - IFS 2023 estimate: 9 percent real terms fall in spending per student from 2010 to 2020.
  - Primary schools: real-term growth in spending per student.
  - Secondary schools: real-term cuts in spending per student.
  - Spending per student projected to increase over the medium term due to extra funding and a decline in student population.
- Student performance:
  - OECD PISA: mean performance in reading, mathematics, and science declined from 2018 to 2022 (partly explained by COVID-19 disruptions).
  - UK experienced a non-significant declining trend in mathematics and science; the 10th percentile in mathematics performed worse over time since 2006, suggesting widening disparities.

### STEM education challenges
- Limited participation and gender gaps:
  - Only 26 percent of UK graduates are from STEM courses (compared with 25 percent in France, 23 percent in Spain, and 20 percent in the U.S.).
  - A-level STEM participation increased from 258,790 in 2019 to 276,641 in 2023.
  - Significant and increasing gender gap in Mathematics, Physics, and Computer Sciences (A-level entries).
- Teacher shortages and pay:
  - Shortages in qualified STEM instructors noted.
  - 2023 Teacher Labour Market in England Annual Report highlights real-term falls in teachers’ pay as a driver of recruitment and retention challenges.
  - Subjects recruiting less than a third of required initial teacher trainees include physics, design and technology, and computer sciences.

### Vocational training and apprenticeships
- Importance:
  - Improving T-level and vocational training is essential for sectors with skills-shortage vacancies (construction, information and communication, manufacturing, health).
- Vocational graduate share and capacity:
  - UK has lower share of vocational graduates in STEM, business, administration, law, and services compared to OECD peers.
  - Upper secondary vocational graduates in in-demand sectors (engineering, manufacturing, construction): 7.9 percent in the UK compared to an average of 31.8 (OECD 2021).
  - Student-to-teacher ratio in vocational: 24.7 to 1 in the UK versus OECD average 15 to 1 (2021).
- T-levels:
  - Introduced in 2020 as two-year post-GCSE technical courses (Level 3) with approximately 45 days industrial placement.
  - Understanding of T-levels is relatively low among learners and employers, constraining uptake.
- Apprenticeships:
  - Apprenticeship starts peaked in 2011 and decreased throughout the 2010s.
  - Apprenticeship starts for ages under 24 almost halved after the pandemic; starts for ages 25+ remained stable.
  - High-level apprenticeships (higher and degree-level, equivalent to at least NQF Level 4) have tripled since 2017.
  - Intermediate-level apprenticeships (equivalent to NQF Level 2) have fallen sharply, reducing overall participation.

---

### Shift in public vs private tertiary education spending
- Overall spending on tertiary education increased in the UK and was higher than other G7 countries except for the US and Canada in 2020, but this masks a shift between public and private spending.
- UK public spending on tertiary education institutions halved from 1 percent of GDP in 2012 to 0.5 percent in 2020.
- Private spending increased from 0.7 to 1.5 percent of GDP (2012 to 2020).
- UK public spending on tertiary education institutions is well below OECD average in 2020.

### Reliance on international students and fiscal/operational implications
- Tuition fees from non-UK students accounted for 42 percent of higher education course fees and 21 percent of all income for universities in England in the 2021–22 financial year.
- Some universities in London received more than three-quarters of higher education fees from non-UK students.
- Increased reliance on international students has made tertiary education finances more volatile and exposed to changes in immigration policy, with potential impacts on research, performance, and skills attainment.

### Graduate Visa Scheme, retention, and labor market integration
- The Graduate Visa Scheme allows students to stay in the UK for 2 years to conduct job searches post-graduation and resulted in a recent influx of visa holders and a large increase in yearly sponsored study.
- If foreign students return to their home countries after education, their direct impact on UK skill shortages is limited (aside from indirect effects of subsidizing UK students).
- The Migration Conservatory’s analysis of ONS population survey in 2022 shows that highly educated migrants are often overqualified: the percent of highly educated foreign-born workers employed in low and medium skilled jobs was above that of UK born workers (Overqualification by Country of Birth, 2022 chart).
- Postgraduate retention and enrollment have been affected by policy changes: postgraduates are now restricted from bringing their families to the UK, and Enroly data points to a decline in enrollment from several countries since 2023.
- Management consultancies and banks (KPMG, Deloitte, and HSBC) have cancelled job offers to non-UK recruits after the threshold for skilled visa workers was raised from £26,200 to £38,700 in 2024.

### Adult and workplace learning trends and funding
- Participation in adult learning and skills development has declined in the past decade across most qualification levels, with a slight recovery over 2021-2023.
- Total public spending on adult skills has dropped 30 percent from its peak in the early 2000s.
- The Learning and Work Institute estimate that per capita funding for adult skills decreased in real terms by 28 percent.
- Companies reduced the amount of investment by 20 per cent per employee between 2010/11 and 2022/23.
- In England, the decline in the number of adult learners in the most disadvantaged areas was almost 10 times above the decline in the most advantaged.
- Workplace training: over time the proportion of older workers who received workplace training increased 4.5 percent on average for men and 3.0 percent on average for women, while young people’s participation slightly decreased and women received less training overall.
- Occupational declines in workplace training were largest for managerial and professional occupations, public sector, and services.

### Brexit, migration, and labor market composition
- Migrants, including from the EU, have helped fill short-term skills gaps over the past two decades; studying and work are main reasons for visa issuance (Home Office data).
- The gap between non-EU born and EU-born workers has been widening significantly since Brexit, with a surge in non-EU migration suggesting some substitution between EU and non-EU labor.
- Non-EU migrants on average experience higher unemployment rates than EU-born and UK-born workers.
- The current immigration system presents sponsorship hurdles for sectors such as transport and skilled trades that relied on EU workers; many occupation groups that filled requirements by hiring EU workers pre-Brexit have extremely low rates of sponsorship in 2023 relative to their 2016 EU-worker shares.
- Small and medium sized firms that relied on EU labor face complexity and expenses in hiring non-EU workers; large firms dominate in sponsoring foreign workers while small and medium employers largely stay out of the system.

### Policy recommendations
- Address skills gaps by acting across the education lifecycle: primary and secondary education, vocational training, apprenticeships, lifelong learning, and skilled migration in the interim.
- Reforms to primary and secondary education with an emphasis on STEM, ambitious targets to reverse recent declines in STEM outcomes, and schemes to encourage students (particularly women) into growth sectors and technical education.
- More and better-quality vocational training and apprenticeships in high-demand areas, including higher government support, awareness of T-levels, improving vocational program quality, and reversing the decline in apprenticeships for the young (including reforms to the apprenticeship levy).
- Keep a stable student visa regime and encourage high-skilled students with in-demand skills to remain in the UK to protect university financing and integrate graduates into the UK labor market.
- Continued focus on lifelong learning and on-the-job learning, building on the lifelong learning entitlement from 2025 that allows adult learners to access loans equivalent to four years’ worth of higher education to spend flexibly on degree or technical-level qualifications; encourage employer-provided training with public support and distributional focus.
- Simplify the worker visa regime to facilitate hiring of non-EU workers by smaller employers.

### Ongoing initiatives in the skills space
- Adult Skills Fund (ASF): comprises the Adult Education Budget (AEB) and Free Courses for Jobs (FCFJs); funding paid to further education colleges; overall funding and participation have fallen.
- Technical Education Reforms (T levels): launched in 2020, two-year post-GCSE technical courses (Level 3) with approximately 45 days industrial placement; full rollout for 16-18 age group with remaining levels to be introduced.
- Skills Bootcamps and Local Skills Improvement Plans (LSIPs): Skills Bootcamps launched in 2020 to train adult learners in high growth sectors; LSIPs rolled out in 2022 to provide employer/provider/local priorities.
- Digital Skills Training Package: launched in 2023, training delivered through universities and government schemes to target digital and green skills; 200 million announced.
- Institutes of Technology: investing up to £300m to establish a network of 21 Institutes of Technology (19 open, remaining planned for 2024) to deliver higher technical education from level 3 to level 7.
- Lifelong Learning Entitlement: from 2025, post-18 student loan system reformed by merging separate loan systems for further and higher education.
- Apprenticeship Levy: levy on large employers to fund apprenticeship subsidies; measures include a £50m apprenticeship growth sector pilot (£3,000 per-apprentice funding boost for 13 standards), a further £60m to create 20,000 new apprenticeships, removing the 5% SME co-payment for apprentices under 22, and raising the transfer limit for unspent levy funds to 50% from 25%.
- Package for engineering and physical science doctoral skills: announced in May 2024, over £1 billion from government, business, charities and academia to train students in 65 Centers for Doctoral Training, with most opportunities outside the Southeast of England.

### Key quantitative findings and projections
- UK public tertiary spending: 1 percent of GDP in 2012 → 0.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
- Private tertiary spending: 0.7 percent of GDP in 2012 → 1.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
- Non-UK student tuition share: 42 percent of higher education course fees; 21 percent of all income for universities in England (2021–22).
- Graduate Visa Scheme duration: 2 years.
- Skilled visa threshold change: from £26,200 to £38,700 in 2024.
- Total public spending on adult skills dropped 30 percent from its peak in the early 2000s.
- Per capita funding for adult skills decreased in real terms by 28 percent (Learning and Work Institute).
- Companies reduced investment by 20 per cent per employee between 2010/11 and 2022/23.
- Decline in adult learners in most disadvantaged areas was almost 10 times above the decline in the most advantaged (England).
- Change in workplace training for older workers (2005–2023): +4.5 percent on average for men; +3.0 percent on average for women.
- Projected job fills due to sectoral change and retirements, 2020–2035:
  - Science, research, engineering, and technology professionals: 1.9 million
  - Business, media, and public service professionals: 1.8 million
  - Caring personal service occupations: 1.7 million
  - Administrative occupations: 1.6 million
  - Health and social care associate professionals: 1.2 million
- Projected structural qualification shifts: 3.5 million fewer jobs needing qualifications below A-level or equivalent and 6 million more jobs needing higher education qualifications.

*Source: IMF Selected Issues Paper (sipea2024030).*

### 2.      Adding to the concern is that the largest increase in skills shortages has been in future

### 2. Adding to the concern is that the largest increase in skills shortages has been in future growth sectors

### Sectors with largest increases in skills shortages
- Sectors with highest increase in skills gaps: information and communications (includes digital, IT and AI), advanced manufacturing, health and social work, education, business services, and wholesale and retail.
- Construction and manufacturing were among sectors with the highest proportion of skill-shortage vacancies in 2022.
- Survey and hard-data indicators:
  - PWC report: shortfall of 200,000 employees with green skills.
  - Gallup and Amazon study: 72 percent of businesses have digital skills vacancies; only 11 percent of UK workers have advanced digital skills.
  - OECD measure of hard-to-find skills shows shortages concentrated in training and education, medical and scientific skills, and digital skills.

### Skills shortages and gaps in the existing workforce; output constraints
- Employers reporting staff not fully proficient:
  - 15 percent of employers report at least one member of staff is not fully proficient in their role (up from around 13 percent in 2017).
- Density of skills gap in existing workforce:
  - Proportion of employees judged not fully proficient increased from 4.4 percent in 2017 to 5.2 percent in 2022.
  - Equivalent counts: 1.72 million employees lacking full proficiency in 2022, compared with 1.27 million in 2017.
- Consequences:
  - Most common: increased workloads for other workers.
  - Nearly a third of companies reported that lack of availability of skilled labor limited firm output.
  - Smaller firms with 2 to 4 employees were more likely to report a major impact.

### Cross-country labor market mismatches (UK vs peers)
- Field-of-study mismatch (2019):
  - UK: almost 40 percent of workers have a field-of-study mismatch.
  - OECD average: 31.7 (2019).
- Qualification mismatch (2019):
  - Underqualification in the UK: 40.5 percent (one of the highest among OECD economies).
  - OECD average: 34.4 percent.
- Macro implications noted by OECD: such mismatches can lower productivity, increase unemployment, and limit global competitiveness.
- Learning and Work Institute estimate: UK skills shortage will cost £120 billion by 2030, with a shortfall of 2.5 million highly skilled workers and an oversupply of more than 8 million people with low skills.

### Factors driving skill shortages
- Evidence points to multiple contributors:
  - Weakening educational outcomes (including adult education).
  - Decline in workplace training and apprenticeships, particularly for the young.
  - Brexit and COVID shocks.
  - Population aging.
- Employer investment in skills:
  - Total employer investment in skills declined 19 percent per employee, in real terms, between 2011 and 2022.
  - Larger businesses: -35 percent.
  - Primary sectors: -44 percent.
  - Public service sectors: -38 percent.
- Migration:
  - Increase in non-EU migrants since Brexit has not directly offset loss of EU workers due to different skillsets and hiring hurdles for non-EU workers, especially for small firms.

### Primary and secondary education: funding and outcomes
- Public spending on primary to post-secondary education:
  - UK average: 3.7 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - OECD average: 3.3 percent of GDP in 2020.
- Spending trends:
  - Spending as percent of GDP declined from 2013 to 2018 with a small increase in 2020.
  - IFS 2023 estimate: 9 percent real terms fall in spending per student from 2010 to 2020.
  - Primary schools: real-term growth in spending per student.
  - Secondary schools: real-term cuts in spending per student.
  - Spending per student projected to increase over the medium term due to extra funding and a decline in student population.
- Student performance:
  - OECD PISA: mean performance in reading, mathematics, and science declined from 2018 to 2022 (partly explained by COVID-19 disruptions).
  - UK experienced a non-significant declining trend in mathematics and science; the 10th percentile in mathematics performed worse over time since 2006, suggesting widening disparities.

### STEM education challenges
- Limited participation and gender gaps:
  - Only 26 percent of UK graduates are from STEM courses (compared with 25 percent in France, 23 percent in Spain, and 20 percent in the U.S.).
  - A-level STEM participation increased from 258,790 in 2019 to 276,641 in 2023.
  - Significant and increasing gender gap in Mathematics, Physics, and Computer Sciences (A-level entries).
- Teacher shortages and pay:
  - Shortages in qualified STEM instructors noted.
  - 2023 Teacher Labour Market in England Annual Report highlights real-term falls in teachers’ pay as a driver of recruitment and retention challenges.
  - Subjects recruiting less than a third of required initial teacher trainees include physics, design and technology, and computer sciences.

### Vocational training and apprenticeships
- Importance:
  - Improving T-level and vocational training is essential for sectors with skills-shortage vacancies (construction, information and communication, manufacturing, health).
- Vocational graduate share and capacity:
  - UK has lower share of vocational graduates in STEM, business, administration, law, and services compared to OECD peers.
  - Upper secondary vocational graduates in in-demand sectors (engineering, manufacturing, construction): 7.9 percent in the UK compared to an average of 31.8 (OECD 2021).
  - Student-to-teacher ratio in vocational: 24.7 to 1 in the UK versus OECD average 15 to 1 (2021).
- T-levels:
  - Introduced in 2020 as two-year post-GCSE technical courses (Level 3) with approximately 45 days industrial placement.
  - Understanding of T-levels is relatively low among learners and employers, constraining uptake.
- Apprenticeships:
  - Apprenticeship starts peaked in 2011 and decreased throughout the 2010s.
  - Apprenticeship starts for ages under 24 almost halved after the pandemic; starts for ages 25+ remained stable.
  - High-level apprenticeships (higher and degree-level, equivalent to at least NQF Level 4) have tripled since 2017.
  - Intermediate-level apprenticeships (equivalent to NQF Level 2) have fallen sharply, reducing overall participation.

*Source: IMF Selected Issues Paper (sipea2024030).*

### 12.      Public spending on tertiary education has plummeted in the last decade while private

### 12.      Public spending on tertiary education has plummeted in the last decade while private

### Shift in public vs private tertiary education spending
- Overall spending on tertiary education increased in the UK and was higher than other G7 countries except for the US and Canada in 2020, but this masks a shift between public and private spending.
- UK public spending on tertiary education institutions halved from 1 percent of GDP in 2012 to 0.5 percent in 2020.
- Private spending increased from 0.7 to 1.5 percent of GDP (2012 to 2020).
- UK public spending on tertiary education institutions is well below OECD average in 2020.

### Reliance on international students and fiscal/operational implications
- Tuition fees from non-UK students accounted for 42 percent of higher education course fees and 21 percent of all income for universities in England in the 2021–22 financial year.
- Some universities in London received more than three-quarters of higher education fees from non-UK students.
- Increased reliance on international students has made tertiary education finances more volatile and exposed to changes in immigration policy, with potential impacts on research, performance, and skills attainment.

### Graduate Visa Scheme, retention, and labor market integration
- The Graduate Visa Scheme allows students to stay in the UK for 2 years to conduct job searches post-graduation and resulted in a recent influx of visa holders and a large increase in yearly sponsored study.
- If foreign students return to their home countries after education, their direct impact on UK skill shortages is limited (aside from indirect effects of subsidizing UK students).
- The Migration Conservatory’s analysis of ONS population survey in 2022 shows that highly educated migrants are often overqualified: the percent of highly educated foreign-born workers employed in low and medium skilled jobs was above that of UK born workers (Overqualification by Country of Birth, 2022 chart).
- Postgraduate retention and enrollment have been affected by policy changes: postgraduates are now restricted from bringing their families to the UK, and Enroly data points to a decline in enrollment from several countries since 2023.
- Management consultancies and banks (KPMG, Deloitte, and HSBC) have cancelled job offers to non-UK recruits after the threshold for skilled visa workers was raised from £26,200 to £38,700 in 2024.

### Adult and workplace learning trends and funding
- Participation in adult learning and skills development has declined in the past decade across most qualification levels, with a slight recovery over 2021-2023.
- Total public spending on adult skills has dropped 30 percent from its peak in the early 2000s.
- The Learning and Work Institute estimate that per capita funding for adult skills decreased in real terms by 28 percent.
- Companies reduced the amount of investment by 20 per cent per employee between 2010/11 and 2022/23.
- In England, the decline in the number of adult learners in the most disadvantaged areas was almost 10 times above the decline in the most advantaged.
- Workplace training: over time the proportion of older workers who received workplace training increased 4.5 percent on average for men and 3.0 percent on average for women, while young people’s participation slightly decreased and women received less training overall.
- Occupational declines in workplace training were largest for managerial and professional occupations, public sector, and services.

### Brexit, migration, and labor market composition
- Migrants, including from the EU, have helped fill short-term skills gaps over the past two decades; studying and work are main reasons for visa issuance (Home Office data).
- The gap between non-EU born and EU-born workers has been widening significantly since Brexit, with a surge in non-EU migration suggesting some substitution between EU and non-EU labor.
- Non-EU migrants on average experience higher unemployment rates than EU-born and UK-born workers.
- The current immigration system presents sponsorship hurdles for sectors such as transport and skilled trades that relied on EU workers; many occupation groups that filled requirements by hiring EU workers pre-Brexit have extremely low rates of sponsorship in 2023 relative to their 2016 EU-worker shares.
- Small and medium sized firms that relied on EU labor face complexity and expenses in hiring non-EU workers; large firms dominate in sponsoring foreign workers while small and medium employers largely stay out of the system.

### Policy recommendations
- Address skills gaps by acting across the education lifecycle: primary and secondary education, vocational training, apprenticeships, lifelong learning, and skilled migration in the interim.
- Reforms to primary and secondary education with an emphasis on STEM, ambitious targets to reverse recent declines in STEM outcomes, and schemes to encourage students (particularly women) into growth sectors and technical education.
- More and better-quality vocational training and apprenticeships in high-demand areas, including higher government support, awareness of T-levels, improving vocational program quality, and reversing the decline in apprenticeships for the young (including reforms to the apprenticeship levy).
- Keep a stable student visa regime and encourage high-skilled students with in-demand skills to remain in the UK to protect university financing and integrate graduates into the UK labor market.
- Continued focus on lifelong learning and on-the-job learning, building on the lifelong learning entitlement from 2025 that allows adult learners to access loans equivalent to four years’ worth of higher education to spend flexibly on degree or technical-level qualifications; encourage employer-provided training with public support and distributional focus.
- Simplify the worker visa regime to facilitate hiring of non-EU workers by smaller employers.

### Ongoing initiatives in the skills space (summary of initiatives listed)
- Adult Skills Fund (ASF): comprises the Adult Education Budget (AEB) and Free Courses for Jobs (FCFJs); funding paid to further education colleges; overall funding and participation have fallen.
- Technical Education Reforms (T levels): launched in 2020, two-year post-GCSE technical courses (Level 3) with approximately 45 days industrial placement; full rollout for 16-18 age group with remaining levels to be introduced.
- Skills Bootcamps and Local Skills Improvement Plans (LSIPs): Skills Bootcamps launched in 2020 to train adult learners in high growth sectors; LSIPs rolled out in 2022 to provide employer/provider/local priorities.
- Digital Skills Training Package: launched in 2023, training delivered through universities and government schemes to target digital and green skills; 200 million announced.
- Institutes of Technology: investing up to £300m to establish a network of 21 Institutes of Technology (19 open, remaining planned for 2024) to deliver higher technical education from level 3 to level 7.
- Lifelong Learning Entitlement: from 2025, post-18 student loan system reformed by merging separate loan systems for further and higher education.
- Apprenticeship Levy: levy on large employers to fund apprenticeship subsidies; measures include a £50m apprenticeship growth sector pilot (£3,000 per-apprentice funding boost for 13 standards), a further £60m to create 20,000 new apprenticeships, removing the 5% SME co-payment for apprentices under 22, and raising the transfer limit for unspent levy funds to 50% from 25%.
- Package for engineering and physical science doctoral skills: announced in May 2024, over £1 billion from government, business, charities and academia to train students in 65 Centers for Doctoral Training, with most opportunities outside the Southeast of England.

### Key quantitative findings and projections (preserve source numerics)
- UK public tertiary spending: 1 percent of GDP in 2012 → 0.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
- Private tertiary spending: 0.7 percent of GDP in 2012 → 1.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
- Non-UK student tuition share: 42 percent of higher education course fees; 21 percent of all income for universities in England (2021–22).
- Graduate Visa Scheme duration: 2 years.
- Skilled visa threshold change: from £26,200 to £38,700 in 2024.
- Total public spending on adult skills dropped 30 percent from its peak in the early 2000s.
- Per capita funding for adult skills decreased in real terms by 28 percent (Learning and Work Institute).
- Companies reduced investment by 20 per cent per employee between 2010/11 and 2022/23.
- Decline in adult learners in most disadvantaged areas was almost 10 times above the decline in the most advantaged (England).
- Change in workplace training for older workers (2005–2023): +4.5 percent on average for men; +3.0 percent on average for women.
- Projected job fills due to sectoral change and retirements, 2020–2035:
  - Science, research, engineering, and technology professionals: 1.9 million
  - Business, media, and public service professionals: 1.8 million
  - Caring personal service occupations: 1.7 million
  - Administrative occupations: 1.6 million
  - Health and social care associate professionals: 1.2 million
- Projected structural qualification shifts: 3.5 million fewer jobs needing qualifications below A-level or equivalent and 6 million more jobs needing higher education qualifications.

*Source: IMF — chapter "Public spending on tertiary education has plummeted in the last decade while private" (sipea2024030).*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/selected-issues-papers/2024/english/sipea2024030.pdf_
