## Industrial Policy: Recent International Trends

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### A. Introduction and recent resurgence of Industrial Policy (IP)
- Since 2021, advanced economies have sharply increased the use of IP:
  - United States: large fiscal support for manufacturing of electric vehicles, clean energy projects, batteries and semi-conductors via the Inflation Reduction Act (2022) and CHIPS Act (2022).
  - European Union: increased use of IP through the state aid framework and EU-level initiatives such as the Green Deal Industrial Plan, Batteries Strategy and European Chips Act.
  - China: continuation of Made in China 2025 to expand advanced manufacturing via state-owned enterprises and targeted subsidies.
- Motivations for the resurgence:
  - Boosting growth amid weak growth, low productivity and ageing populations (reference to IMF2024a).
  - Reinforcing economic security and onshoring critical inputs (example: CHIPS Act).
  - Facilitating the green transition (e.g., EV subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act); about half of non-crisis EU state aid during 2014–2022 directed to green initiatives.
- Recent trends:
  - Advanced economies’ IP use rose sharply since 2019.
  - Trade-restrictive measures have increased globally over the past five years (data through September 03, 2024; incomplete data for 2024 as of 03 Sep noted).

### B. Modern IP instruments and implementation
- Definition: vertical policies targeted at one or more sectors to achieve government objectives and address market failures; contrasts with horizontal policies (e.g., economy-wide tax incentives).
- Common instruments in recent IP programs:
  - Trade policy (tariffs, export subsidies).
  - Production subsidies or grants.
  - Support for R&D via grants and tax incentives.
  - Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
  - Financing on non-commercial terms (concessional loans, equity injections, guarantees).
  - Regulatory policies (local content requirements).
  - Government procurement limited to domestic suppliers.
- Subsidies (grants and loans) account for the majority of new IP in advanced economies.

### C. Recent history of IP in the United Kingdom
- Pre-June 2025 UK approach:
  - Emphasis on economy-wide R&D incentives (noted as among the most generous in the OECD) and full expensing of business investment in plant and machinery.
  - Vertical interventions were limited and included targeted grants for advanced manufacturing, creative industries and a Green Industries Growth Accelerator, with a limited fiscal cost of around 0.1 percent of GDP in FY2023/24.
  - Spatially targeted measures: free ports, 8 Investment Zones and 48 Enterprise Zones.
- Comparative fiscal context:
  - The average EU country spends about 1.5 percent of GDP per year on state aid.
  - Conservative estimates put the total cost of Chinese IP at 1.7 percent of GDP (DiPippo and others, 2022).

### D. The June 2025 UK Industrial Strategy and institutional architecture
- Objectives and process:
  - Strategy aims to boost investment, jobs, the green transition and living standards; a public consultation concluded in November 2024.
  - Focus on eight priority sectors with unrealized growth potential due to market failures:
    - advanced manufacturing; clean energy; creative industries; defense; digital and technologies; financial services; life sciences; professional and business services.
- Implementation and oversight:
  - Sector-specific plans and a ten-year horizon.
  - Industrial Strategy Advisory Council (business community and experts) to oversee monitoring and evaluation.
- Policy mix:
  - Vertical interventions: British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme, British Industry Supercharger.
  - Horizontal policies: skills, access to finance, competition, business regulation, planning, affordable energy.
- Fiscal sizing and commitments:
  - Authorities commit to accommodate medium-term fiscal cost within the spending review’s envelope; total ten-year cost to be assessed precisely over time.
  - Notable initiative: £4.3 bn in public support for advanced manufacturing (0.15 percent of FY2025/26 GDP), including £2.8 bn in funding for R&D.

### E. Role of public financial institutions and the National Wealth Fund (NWF)
- Delivery and fiscal control:
  - Public financial institutions central to delivering the strategy and catalyzing private investment while limiting fiscal costs via the Financial Transactions Control Framework (portfolios required to generate a return at least equal to the cost of government borrowing).
- Institutional endowments and targets:
  - National Wealth Fund (NWF):
    - Successor to the UK Infrastructure Bank.
    - Endowment of around £27.8 billion (approximately 1 percent of 2025 GDP).
    - Uses loans, guarantees and equity to support projects in clean energy, digital and technologies, advanced manufacturing, and transport.
    - Target mobilization ratio: 3:1.
    - Objective: generate “additionality” by unlocking projects that would not otherwise proceed.
  - British Business Bank:
    - Additional £4 bn of capital allocated to support SMEs in the eight priority sectors, targeting a 3:1 mobilization ratio.
    - Total endowment to £25.6 bn.
  - UK Export Finance Agency:
    - Additional £3 bn of lending capacity, bringing total funds to £13 bn to incentivize foreign demand for UK exports.

### F. Conceptual framework: benefits and risks of IP
- Ultimate objective: boost productivity and growth in sectors that will not reach potential without public intervention due to market failures.
- Market failures IP can address:
  - Externalities: positive spillovers and agglomeration effects in nascent, innovation-driven industries (examples: subsidies to EV and semiconductor manufacturers under the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act).
  - Imperfect competition: finance large fixed costs to promote entry and competition.
  - Information asymmetries: public concessional finance can improve access to capital (example: KfW support for the solar panel industry in early 2000s).
  - Delayed returns: grants, guarantees, equity and loans can raise the risk-adjusted return for long-gestation R&D.
  - Coordination failures: government coordination can resolve complex supply-chain bottlenecks (example: establishment of the Airbus Consortium).
- Risks: economic and fiscal risks from poorly designed IP (governance failures, crowding out, fiscal costs, trade distortions).

### Motivation: onshoring critical supply chains
- Rationale:
  - IP can be used to onshore capabilities critical in times of national emergency, including defense industries, energy, food and pharmaceutical supplies.
  - Covid pandemic example: domestic capacity to develop and manufacture vaccines and deliver other critical medical supplies became salient when international supply chains were under stress.
  - Public interventions to onshore capabilities can mitigate human, social and economic costs in times of emergency, such as pandemics.

### Risks and potential downsides of poorly designed IP
- Identified risks:
  - Picking losers:
    - Directing public resources to firms close to the technological frontier can backfire if R&D is unsuccessful and firms fail (Hufbauer and Jung, 2021).
    - Supporting established firms can shield them from competition, disincentivize innovation and displace private investment.
  - Severe market distortions:
    - Favoring particular firms can harm competitors and crowd out unsubsidized projects.
    - IMF staff analysis of IP under the EU state aid framework (including UK pre-2020 data) confirmed these risks (Brandao-Marques and Toprak, 2024).
  - Governance failures:
    - Political pressure can lead to rent-seeking behavior by firms (Criscuolo 2022a).
  - Fiscal costs and inflation:
    - The cost of the US CHIPS Act, Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act will likely be around 0.3 percent of GDP per year on average in direct government spending (Seydl, Matthews and Schaeffer, 2023).
    - The cost of Chinese IP was estimated to be around 1.5 percent of GDP in 2019 (DiPippo and others, 2019).
    - Trade measures such as tariffs can be inflationary.
  - Trade distortions and retaliation:
    - IP can distort the sectoral make-up away from comparative advantage and create supply gluts, prompting retaliation and potentially triggering a ‘subsidy race’ (Hodge and others, 2024; Ossa, 2011).

### Lessons from international experience: design principles for successful IP
- Four key lessons:
  - Lesson #1 — Targeting based on evidence of market failures while managing concentration risks:
    - Use evidence-based targeting and temporary support rather than blanket support.
    - Rigorous evaluation of firms selected for support; avoid “picking winners”.
    - Example: ARPA model — a director from academia or industry selects programs after extensive consultation (Juhasz, Lane and Rodrik, 2023b).
    - Diversify support across multiple recipients to manage concentration risk (e.g., Operation Warp Speed in 2020).
  - Lesson #2 — Strong governance arrangements to avoid discriminatory practices and enhance selection:
    - Enlist academic and industry expertise; consider all firms regardless of age, size or ownership.
    - Examples: ARPA model and Peru’s sectoral roundtables in the mid-2010s (Juhasz, Land and Rodrik 2023b).
  - Lesson #3 — Contain fiscal costs with time-bound support, financial limits and ongoing monitoring:
    - Make support subject to financial limits; prefer grants, equity, loans or guarantees with set limits to contain direct costs.
    - Periodic monitoring and performance benchmarks tied to continued support; design expiry once objectives are met.
    - Under ARPA, supported projects have pre-defined milestones required to ensure continued public support (Juhasz, Lane and Rodrik, 2023b).
  - Lesson #4 — Horizontal policies and structural reforms are pre-requisites and amplifiers:
    - Ensure skills, high-quality public infrastructure, stable tax and regulatory regimes are in place before vertical interventions.
    - Horizontal policies (skills, EV charging infrastructure, ports) complement IP and increase effectiveness.

### Targeting UK IP: evidence-based approaches and sectoral priorities
- Quantitative approaches to demonstrate additionality:
  - Direct estimation of additionality via comparison with counterfactual outcomes (econometric models, diff-in-diff) — data intensive and difficult ex ante.
  - Indirect proxies for market failures (ex ante applicable), such as measures of competition or mark-ups.
  - Descriptive diagnostics to clarify specific market failures.
  - Multilateral development banks require additionality and accounts of relevant market failures in project descriptions.
- Application to the UK:
  - Liu (2019) ‘Distortion Centrality (DC)’ metric proxies for market failures via industry mark-ups and linkages; industries with higher DC index (close to 1 and above) propagate distortions throughout the economy (see Annex II).
  - UK data suggest manufacturing of electrical equipment, metal products, paper products, and warehousing (critical for supply chains) have among the largest distortions, indicating market failures and appropriateness for IP targeting.
  - Services such as accommodation, food services and real estate display the least evidence of distortions (Baquie and others, 2025) and likely exhibit fewer market failures, so IP risks crowding out private investment in these sectors.
  - The DC index should be followed by descriptive diagnostics to design appropriate IP.

### Modeling UK IP impact on productivity
- Modeling approach:
  - Structural general equilibrium modeling (Krugman-style model of Lashkaripour and Lugovskyy (2023)) captures industry-specific scale externalities calibrated using micro-data.
- Main modeling findings:
  - Production subsidies targeted at industries with significant scale externalities can overcome market failures and increase productivity by incentivizing firm entry that internalizes externalities.
  - Labor productivity increases are indistinguishable from total factor productivity increases in the model because labor is the only production input.
  - Empirical IMF staff analysis shows IP can have a greater effect on capital accumulation than on total factor productivity of firms.
- Model-simulated sectoral impacts (model-implied impact of externality-correcting IP subsidies in selected UK industries; table entries preserved exactly as in source):
  - Electrical & Optical Equipment551.4
  - Chemicals and Chemical Products230.8
  - Basic Metals & Fabricated Metal210.3
  - Rubber and Plastics140.1
  - Transport Equipment130.2
- Example result:
  - Subsidies correcting market failures in the UK electrical and optical equipment sector increase sector productivity by 1½ percent in the long run and raise economy-wide productivity.
- Caution:
  - Subsidies to sectors with smaller externalities (e.g., transport and plastics, agriculture) tend to expand less-productive industries while failing to significantly increase their productivity, creating adverse cross-industry spillovers.

### International spillovers, spillbacks, and welfare implications
- Mechanisms:
  - Expanding production in targeted sectors can create supply gluts in export markets, depress export prices, and worsen terms of trade.
- Simulation insights:
  - A benchmark simulation where the UK eliminates scale externalities in every sector while other countries maintain zero subsidies shows productivity benefits can be outweighed by trade-channel losses, generating an overall household income loss.
  - Repeating this exercise across EU and G20 countries indicates household income could decline in many countries, particularly those more open to trade, such as the UK, because of spillbacks through trade channels.
  - Retaliation by trading partners, including trade-policy responses, could further reduce welfare.

### Policy design principles and recommendations for UK IP
- Targeting:
  - Focus IP on firms and projects exhibiting market failures; quantitative evidence suggests market failures are most likely in sectors like advanced manufacturing and industries critical to supply chains.
  - Use quantitative metrics to demonstrate additionality and guide selection, with attention to industries close to the technological frontier (digital/technology, green industries, clean energy).
- Institutional arrangements:
  - Harness academic and industry experts via the UK Industrial Advisory Council to design programs, select firms/projects, identify metrics, and oversee performance monitoring.
  - Consider ARPA elements: expert-managed programs with performance milestones that unlock support.
- Fiscal controls:
  - Continue targeted grant programs that are time bound with fixed budget allocations; time-bound lump-sum grants can limit fiscal cost and reduce dependency.
  - Rigorous monitoring with clear performance benchmarks; prefer these over open-ended tax incentives or broad subsidies.
  - Ensure programs fit within the medium-term expenditure envelope announced at the spending review.
- Horizontal policies:
  - Maintain and strengthen planning, skills, and infrastructure reforms to complement IP.
  - Ongoing investment in skills and training (including partnership approaches for eight priority sectors) and continued skilled migration are important.
  - Infrastructure investments (e.g., ports) and planning-law reforms will help targeted firms proceed with investment quickly.
- Realistic expectations:
  - Horizontal reforms and a stable policy environment are likely substantially more important for boosting productivity than IP, which is most effective when narrowly targeted.

### The National Wealth Fund (NWF): opportunities and constraints
- Purpose and trade-offs:
  - NWF aims to catalyze “additional” investment, generate returns to cover government financing costs, and minimize fiscal risks (including contingent liabilities and statistical reclassification risks).
  - The range of projects that both meet additionality tests and generate returns covering financing costs is likely narrow; projects that meet return requirements will often be close to commercially viable without public support.
- Implementation recommendations:
  - Rigorous appraisal processes: complement existing impact assessments with ex ante cost-benefit analysis, financial viability studies, and fiscal-risk analyses.
  - Evidence-based demonstration of additionality: use quantitative proxies (e.g., low competition metrics) and direct estimation methods alongside narrative approaches; private investor requests alone do not constitute proof of market failure.
  - Strong risk management and reporting:
    - NWF has quantitative thresholds for risk categories and will inform HMT when thresholds are breached.
    - Current controls (e.g., UK Export Finance Agency benchmarks) include limits on maximum commitment in a single project.
    - Financial transaction control framework provides for at least annual engagement between NWF and HMT to monitor emerging risks.
    - An economic capital limit of £7 billion will ensure losses on unsuccessful projects can be absorbed without requiring additional HMT financial support.
  - Mobilization challenge:
    - Achieving the NWF’s 3:1 catalyzation ratio will be challenging because projects that both demonstrate additionality and cover financing costs are likely to be a narrow subset; a determined effort will be needed.

### Contingent liability and reclassification risk; risk reporting
- Contingent liabilities:
  - Reporting the full range of liabilities associated with each supported project helps reveal the maximum potential liability of the public sector in the event of project failure or statistical reclassification.
- Benefits of detailed and transparent reporting:
  - Reveals maximum potential public sector exposure for each supported project.
  - Improves management of contingent liability risks.
  - Helps anticipate and mitigate statistical reclassification risks.
- Integration with existing frameworks:
  - NWF’s risk reporting could be integrated into HMT reporting.
  - NWF’s risk reporting could also be studied as part of the OBR’s fiscal risks reports.

_Prepared by Andrew Hodge (EUR) and Samuel Pienknagura (RES); content from "Industrial Policy in the UK" (July 1, 2025)._

### 1. Industrial Policy: Recent International Trends ________________________________________ 3

### Industrial Policy: Recent International Trends

### A. Introduction and Recent Resurgence of Industrial Policy (IP)
- Since 2021, advanced economies have sharply increased the use of IP; examples include:
  - United States: large fiscal support for manufacturing of electric vehicles, clean energy projects, batteries and semi-conductors via the Inflation Reduction Act (2022) and CHIPS Act (2022).
  - European Union: increased use of IP through the state aid framework and EU-level initiatives such as the Green Deal Industrial Plan, Batteries Strategy and European Chips Act.
  - China: continuation of Made in China 2025 to expand advanced manufacturing via state-owned enterprises and targeted subsidies.
- Motivations for the resurgence:
  - Boosting growth amid weak growth, low productivity and ageing populations (reference to IMF2024a).
  - Reinforcing economic security and onshoring critical inputs (example: CHIPS Act).
  - Facilitating the green transition (e.g., EV subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act); about half of non-crisis EU state aid during 2014–2022 directed to green initiatives.
- Recent trends highlighted:
  - Advanced economies’ IP use rose sharply since 2019.
  - Trade-restrictive measures have increased globally over the past five years (data through September 03, 2024; incomplete data for 2024 as of 03 Sep noted).

### B. Modern IP Instruments and Implementation
- Modern IP defined as vertical policies targeted at one or more sectors to achieve government objectives and address market failures; contrasts with horizontal policies (e.g., economy-wide tax incentives).
- Common instruments used in recent IP programs include:
  - Trade policy (tariffs, export subsidies).
  - Production subsidies or grants.
  - Support for R&D via grants and tax incentives.
  - Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
  - Financing on non-commercial terms (concessional loans, equity injections, guarantees).
  - Regulatory policies (local content requirements).
  - Government procurement limited to domestic suppliers.
- Subsidies (grants and loans) account for the majority of new IP in advanced economies.

### C. The Recent History of IP in the United Kingdom
- Prior to the June 2025 industrial strategy, the UK pursued a more limited, relatively horizontal approach to IP:
  - UK emphasized economy-wide R&D incentives (noted as among the most generous in the OECD) and full expensing of business investment in plant and machinery.
  - Vertical interventions were limited and included targeted grants for advanced manufacturing, creative industries and a Green Industries Growth Accelerator, with a limited fiscal cost of around 0.1 percent of GDP in FY2023/24.
  - The average EU country spends about 1.5 percent of GDP per year on state aid; conservative estimates put the total cost of Chinese IP at 1.7 percent of GDP (DiPippo and others, 2022).
- Spatially targeted measures in the UK have included free ports, 8 Investment Zones and 48 Enterprise Zones.

### D. The June 2025 UK Industrial Strategy and Institutional Architecture
- The June 2025 strategy aims to boost investment, jobs, the green transition and living standards; a public consultation concluded in November 2024.
- The strategy focuses on eight priority sectors assessed as having unrealized growth potential due to market failures:
  - advanced manufacturing; clean energy; creative industries; defense; digital and technologies; financial services; life sciences; professional and business services.
- Implementation and oversight:
  - Sector-specific plans and a ten-year horizon.
  - An Industrial Strategy Advisory Council (business community and experts) to oversee monitoring and evaluation.
- Policy mix:
  - Vertical interventions targeted at the eight priority sectors (e.g., British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme, British Industry Supercharger).
  - Horizontal policies: skills, access to finance, competition, business regulation, planning, affordable energy.
- Fiscal sizing and commitments:
  - Authorities commit to accommodate medium-term fiscal cost within the spending review’s envelope; total ten-year cost to be assessed precisely over time.
  - Notable initiative: £4.3 bn in public support for advanced manufacturing (0.15 percent of FY2025/26 GDP), including £2.8 bn in funding for R&D.

### E. Role of Public Financial Institutions and the National Wealth Fund (NWF)
- Public financial institutions are central to delivering the strategy and catalyzing private investment while limiting fiscal costs via the Financial Transactions Control Framework (portfolios required to generate a return at least equal to the cost of government borrowing).
- Institutional endowments and targets:
  - National Wealth Fund (NWF):
    - Successor to the UK Infrastructure Bank.
    - Endowment of around £27.8 billion (approximately 1 percent of 2025 GDP).
    - Uses loans, guarantees and equity to support projects in clean energy, digital and technologies, advanced manufacturing, and transport.
    - Target mobilization ratio: 3:1.
    - Objective: generate “additionality” by unlocking projects that would not otherwise proceed.
  - British Business Bank:
    - Additional £4 bn of capital allocated to support SMEs in the eight priority sectors, targeting a 3:1 mobilization ratio.
    - Total endowment to £25.6 bn.
  - UK Export Finance Agency:
    - Additional £3 bn of lending capacity, bringing total funds to £13 bn to incentivize foreign demand for UK exports.

### F. Conceptual Framework: Benefits and Risks of IP
- Ultimate objective: boost productivity and growth in sectors that will not reach potential without public intervention due to market failures.
- Successful IP must overcome market failures to crowd in private investment and raise sectoral productivity; however, IP also poses economic and fiscal risks.
- Examples of market failures that IP can address:
  - Externalities: positive spillovers and agglomeration effects in nascent, innovation-driven industries (example: subsidies to EV and semiconductor manufacturers under the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act).
  - Imperfect Competition: natural monopolies arising from high fixed costs (e.g., utilities); IP can finance large fixed costs to promote entry and competition.
  - Information Asymmetries: uncertainty about new technologies deters private finance; public concessional finance can improve access to capital (example: KfW support for the solar panel industry in early 2000s).
  - Delayed Returns: long and uncertain payoffs from R&D can deter investors; grants, guarantees, equity and loans can raise the risk-adjusted return.
  - Coordination Failures: complex supply chains in nascent industries may require government coordination (example: establishment of the Airbus Consortium by UK and European governments).

_Italic: Prepared by Andrew Hodge (EUR) and Samuel Pienknagura (RES); content from "Industrial Policy in the UK" (July 1, 2025)._

### 11.      Another motivation for IP is onshoring supply chains that are critical for national

### 11.      Another motivation for IP is onshoring supply chains that are critical for national

### Motivation: onshoring critical supply chains
- IP can be used to onshore capabilities that are critical in times of national emergency, including defense industries, energy, food and pharmaceutical supplies.
- Covid pandemic example: domestic capacity to develop and manufacture vaccines and deliver other critical medical supplies, like personal protective equipment, became salient when international supply chains were under stress.
- Public interventions to onshore these capabilities can mitigate human, social and economic costs in times of emergency, such as pandemics.

### Risks and potential downsides of poorly designed IP
- IP can create economic distortions, technological failures, governance failures and large fiscal costs.
- Specific risks identified:
  - Picking losers:
    - Directing public resources to firms close to the technological frontier can backfire if R&D is unsuccessful and firms fail, providing no boost to productivity (Hufbauer and Jung, 2021).
    - Providing public support to established firms may shield them from competition, disincentivize innovation and displace private investment, particularly if the firms do not face barriers associated with market failures.
  - Severe market distortions:
    - IP that favors particular firms through grants or subsidies can draw resources towards these firms and provide competitive advantages, potentially harming competitors and crowding out unsubsidized projects.
    - IMF staff analysis of IP under the EU state aid framework, which included UK data pre-2020, confirmed these risks (Brandao-Marques and Toprak, 2024).
  - Governance failures:
    - Political pressure to support particular industries or sectors can lead to rent-seeking behavior by firms (Criscuolo 2022a), distorting allocation away from where support would be most beneficial.
  - Fiscal costs and inflation:
    - The cost of the US CHIPS Act, Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act will likely be around 0.3 percent of GDP per year on average in direct government spending (Seydl, Matthews and Schaeffer, 2023).
    - The cost of Chinese IP was estimated to be around 1.5 percent of GDP in 2019 (DiPippo and others, 2019).
    - Trade measures such as tariffs can be inflationary.
  - Trade distortions and retaliation:
    - IP can distort the sectoral make-up away from comparative advantage and create supply gluts, prompting retaliation and potentially triggering a counter-productive ‘subsidy race’ (Hodge and others, 2024; Ossa, 2011).

### Lessons from international experience: design principles for successful IP
- Four key lessons for policymakers about IP targeting, governance, fiscal costs and the supporting role of horizontal policies:
  - Lesson #1 — Targeting based on evidence of market failures while managing concentration risks:
    - IP is most likely to support productivity if implemented using evidence-based targeting and temporary support rather than blanket support.
    - Firms selected for IP support should be chosen via rigorous evaluation, including analysis of where market failures exist.
    - Example of best practice: the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) model, with a director from academia or industry selecting programs after extensive consultation (Juhasz, Lane and Rodrik, 2023b).
    - Avoid “picking winners”; diversifying support across multiple potential recipients (e.g., Operation Warp Speed in 2020) can manage concentration risk.
  - Lesson #2 — Strong governance arrangements to avoid discriminatory practices and enhance selection:
    - Enlist academic and industry expertise when selecting firms to improve targeting and effectiveness.
    - Consider all firms irrespective of age, size or ownership to avoid politically driven discrimination and to reduce crowding out.
    - Examples: ARPA model and Peru’s sectoral roundtables in the mid-2010s (Juhasz, Land and Rodrik 2023b).
  - Lesson #3 — Contain fiscal costs with time-bound support, financial limits and ongoing monitoring:
    - Make IP support subject to financial limits rather than open-ended commitments; grants, equity, loans or guarantees with set limits help contain direct costs, though contingent liabilities remain a risk.
    - Open-ended subsidy programs make fiscal costs difficult to project; EV subsidy programs in China and the US proved more popular and costly than envisaged (IMF 2024a).
    - Periodic monitoring and performance benchmarks tied to continued financial support, with designed expiry once objectives are met, facilitate eventual independence from public support.
    - Under the ARPA model, supported projects have pre-defined milestones required to ensure continued public support (Juhasz, Lane and Rodrik, 2023b).
  - Lesson #4 — Horizontal policies and structural reforms are pre-requisites and amplifiers:
    - Strong horizontal policies (skills, high-quality public infrastructure, stable tax and regulatory regimes) should be in place before vertical IP interventions.
    - Vertical IP should be considered only if horizontal policies are present and insufficient to address market failures.
    - Horizontal policies that boost skills and deliver critical infrastructure (e.g., electricity grid, EV charging infrastructure) complement IP and increase its effectiveness; examples include nation-wide public investment in EV charging infrastructure that complements EV purchase subsidies in the US and China.

### Targeting UK IP: evidence-based approaches and sectoral priorities
- Identifying market failures and demonstrating ‘additionality’ is sound in theory but challenging in practice; quantitative methods can guide policymakers, the NWF and other public financial institutions.
- Quantitative approaches:
  - Direct estimation of additionality by comparing IP-supported firms versus counterfactual outcomes (e.g., using econometric models, diff-in-diff) — data intensive and difficult ex ante.
  - Indirect proxies for market failures (ex ante applicable), such as measures of competition or mark-ups.
  - These quantitative methods can be supplemented by descriptive diagnostics clarifying specific market failures.
  - Multilateral development banks require additionality and typically include accounts of relevant market failures in project descriptions (African Development Bank and others, 2018).
- Application to the UK:
  - The Liu (2019) ‘Distortion Centrality (DC)’ metric proxies for market failures via industry mark-ups and linkages; industries with higher DC index (close to 1 and above) propagate distortions throughout the economy (see Annex II).
  - UK data suggest manufacturing of electrical equipment, metal products, paper products, and warehousing (critical for supply chains) have among the largest distortions, indicating market failures and appropriateness for IP targeting.
  - Services such as accommodation, food services and real estate display the least evidence of distortions (Baquie and others, 2025) and likely exhibit fewer market failures, so IP risks crowding out private investment in these sectors.
  - The DC index should be followed by descriptive diagnostics identifying the specific form of market failures to design appropriate IP.

### Modeling UK IP impact on productivity
- Structural modeling indicates that IP can be effective if well-targeted at firms facing market failures, contributing to higher productivity in these sectors.
- IP can also introduce distortions that need to be managed by limits on scale and cost of IP.

*Source: UNITED KINGDOM — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (excerpt from sipea2025113).*

### 25.      The UK’s weak productivity is a significant constraint on growth, and IP has the

### 25.      The UK’s weak productivity is a significant constraint on growth, and IP has the

### Overview: productivity slowdown and role for industrial policy (IP)
- The UK has experienced a sharp slowdown in trend growth of per capita income since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), leaving the level of UK GDP about a quarter below what the pre-GFC trend would imply.
- A key driver is a drop in labor productivity growth from around 2 percent pre-GFC to approximately ½ percent since then.
- Part of the productivity decline is attributed to chronic under-investment and a lack of innovation at the firm level.
- Well-designed IP has the potential to address under-investment and firm-level innovation shortfalls.

### Modeling approach and main findings
- Structural general equilibrium modeling (Krugman-style model of Lashkaripour and Lugovskyy (2023)) is used to assess UK IP impacts on productivity and household income, capturing cross-industry and international spillovers and spillbacks.
- The model embodies industry-specific scale externalities of firm entry (agglomeration effects and knowledge spillovers) that differ by industry and are calibrated using micro-data.
- Key model implications:
  - Production subsidies targeted at industries with significant scale externalities can overcome market failures and increase productivity by incentivizing firm entry that internalizes externalities.
  - In the model, labor productivity increases are indistinguishable from total factor productivity increases because labor is the only production input (a modeling simplification).
  - Empirical IMF staff analysis shows IP can have a greater effect on capital accumulation than on total factor productivity of firms.

- Model-simulated sectoral impacts (model-implied impact of externality-correcting IP subsidies in selected UK industries; table entries preserved exactly as in source):
  - Electrical & Optical Equipment551.4
  - Chemicals and Chemical Products230.8
  - Basic Metals & Fabricated Metal210.3
  - Rubber and Plastics140.1
  - Transport Equipment130.2
- Example sectoral result: subsidies correcting market failures in the UK electrical and optical equipment sector (an advanced manufacturing industry with large externalities) increase sector productivity by 1½ percent in the long run and raise economy-wide productivity.
- Subsidies directed to sectors with smaller externalities (e.g., transport and plastics, agriculture) tend to expand less-productive industries while failing to significantly increase their productivity, creating adverse cross-industry spillovers.

### International spillovers, spillbacks, and welfare implications
- IP can cause international spillovers and spillbacks through trade channels: expanding production in targeted sectors can create supply gluts in export markets, depress export prices, and worsen terms of trade.
- A hypothetical benchmark simulation where the UK eliminates scale externalities in every sector while other countries maintain zero subsidies shows productivity benefits can be outweighed by trade-channel losses, generating an overall household income loss.
- Repeating this exercise across EU and G20 countries indicates household income could decline in many countries, particularly those more open to trade, such as the UK, because of spillbacks through trade channels.
- Retaliation by trading partners, including trade-policy responses, could further reduce welfare.

### Policy design principles and recommendations for UK IP
- Carefully targeted IP, strict financial controls, and international cooperation on IP design can help manage spillovers/spillbacks and maximize benefits.
- Key design elements:
  - Targeting
    - Focus IP on firms and projects exhibiting market failures; quantitative evidence suggests market failures are most likely in sectors like advanced manufacturing and industries critical to supply chains.
    - Use quantitative metrics to demonstrate additionality and guide selection, with attention to industries close to the technological frontier (digital/technology, green industries, clean energy).
  - Institutional arrangements
    - Harness academic and industry experts via the UK Industrial Advisory Council to design programs, select firms/projects, identify metrics, and oversee performance monitoring.
    - Consider elements of the ARPA model: expert-managed programs with performance milestones that unlock support.
  - Fiscal controls
    - Continue targeted grant programs that are time bound with fixed budget allocations; time-bound lump-sum grants can limit fiscal cost and reduce dependency on ongoing support.
    - Rigorous monitoring with clear performance benchmarks to limit costs and ensure effectiveness; prefer these over open-ended tax incentives or broad subsidies.
    - Ensure programs fit within the medium-term expenditure envelope announced at the spending review.
  - Horizontal policies
    - Maintain and strengthen planning, skills, and infrastructure reforms to provide a stable business environment and complement IP.
    - Ongoing investment in skills and training (including partnership approaches for eight priority sectors) and continued skilled migration are important to supply firms targeted by IP.
    - Infrastructure investments (e.g., ports) and planning-law reforms will help targeted firms proceed with investment quickly.
- Realistic expectations:
  - Other policies (horizontal reforms, stable policy environment) are likely substantially more important for boosting productivity than IP, which is most effective when narrowly targeted.

### The National Wealth Fund (NWF): opportunities and constraints
- Purpose and trade-offs:
  - The NWF aims to catalyze “additional” investment, generate returns to cover government financing costs, and minimize fiscal risks (including contingent liabilities and statistical reclassification risks).
  - The range of projects that both meet additionality tests and generate returns covering financing costs is likely narrow; projects that meet return requirements will often be close to commercially viable without public support.
- Implementation recommendations to enhance NWF effectiveness:
  - Rigorous appraisal processes: complement existing impact assessments with ex ante cost-benefit analysis, financial viability studies, and fiscal-risk analyses.
  - Evidence-based demonstration of additionality: use quantitative proxies (e.g., low competition metrics) and direct estimation methods alongside narrative approaches; private investor requests alone do not constitute proof of market failure.
  - Strong risk management and reporting:
    - The NWF has quantitative thresholds for risk categories and will inform HMT when thresholds are breached.
    - Current controls (e.g., UK Export Finance Agency benchmarks) offer guidance, including limits on maximum commitment in a single project.
    - The financial transaction control framework provides for at least annual engagement between NWF and HMT to monitor emerging risks.
    - An economic capital limit of £7 billion will ensure losses on unsuccessful projects can be absorbed without requiring additional HMT financial support.
  - Ambitious mobilization target:
    - Achieving the NWF’s 3:1 catalyzation ratio will be challenging because projects that both demonstrate additionality and cover financing costs are likely to be a narrow subset; a determined effort will be needed.

*Source: IMF Selected Issues Paper "The UK’s weak productivity is a significant constraint on growth, and IP has the" (content unit sipea2025113).*

### 6.      A detailed and transparent risk reporting regime will help manage contingent liability

### 6.      A detailed and transparent risk reporting regime will help manage contingent liability

### Contingent liability and reclassification risk
- Reporting the full range of liabilities associated with each supported project helps reveal the maximum potential liability of the public sector, in the event of project failure (contingent liability risks) or if the statistical agency classifies the entire project as within the public perimeter (reclassification risks).

### Benefits of detailed and transparent reporting
- Reveals maximum potential public sector exposure for each supported project.
- Improves management of contingent liability risks.
- Helps anticipate and mitigate statistical reclassification risks.

### Integration with existing reporting frameworks
- The NWF’s risk reporting could be integrated into HMT reporting.
- The NWF’s risk reporting could also be studied as part of the OBR’s fiscal risks reports, which are at the frontier of sound risk management practices.

*Source: sipea2025113 - 6.      A detailed and transparent risk reporting regime will help manage contingent liability*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/selected-issues-papers/2025/english/sipea2025113.pdf_
