## sipea2025162

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---

### Climate trends and projections
- Botswana has warmed by more than 1.2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels.
- Mean annual temperature was equal to 21.9 °C during the 1985–2014 baseline period and is estimated to have exceeded 22.3 °C by 2020.
- Botswana’s annual precipitation totals are around 400–500 mm/year.
- Median projected warming:
  - 1.5–2.2 °C by 2050 (relative to the 1985–2014 baseline).
  - 1.6-4.1 °C by 2085 (relative to the 1985–2014 baseline).
- Under a high-emissions/fast-warming scenario (SSP3-7.0, 90th percentile), temperatures could rise by nearly 5.5 °C by the end of the century.
- Annual rainfall is projected to decline from around 420 mm/year historically to approximately 350 mm/year by 2085 across scenarios.
- Extreme heat indicators:
  - TX35 (days with maximum daily temperature exceeding 35 °C) have increased steadily over the past two decades and are projected to continue increasing under all emissions scenarios.
  - Consecutive dry days (CDD) have shown an average increase of over 30 days relative to historical conditions and are projected to continue increasing throughout the century.
- Heavy rainfall events (Rx1day and Rx5day) have shown upward variability recently but changes remain within natural variability and are not statistically significant; projections do not indicate significant changes in these intense precipitation events.

### Macroeconomic risks and projected impacts
- Projected economic effects of climate-induced shocks:
  - Diminish agricultural yields and labor productivity across sectors.
  - Directly impact economic growth and undermine revenue generation.
  - Sharply reduce growth rates in the near term and contract GDP substantially over the long run if unaddressed.
  - Strain public finances through a shrinking tax base and increased demands for social protection and adaptation spending.
- Interaction with fiscal pressures:
  - Fiscal strain from electricity subsidies further limits the government’s capacity to respond.
- Projected GDP impacts under specified scenarios:
  - A worst-case warming scenario could result in a 10 percent annual economic loss by the end of the century if adaptation is slow (SSP3-7.0 90th percentile, implying +4.1 °C in 2071–2100 compared to 1985–2014).
  - Without adaptation these losses can double.
  - Rapid adaptation could reduce losses to 3 percent of GDP under the same temperature scenario.
  - Moderate global emissions cuts can keep GDP losses under 1 percent (SSP2-4.5 scenario).
- Empirical weather-shock estimates:
  - In years with a higher than usual number of hot days (maximum daily temperature above 35 °C), GDP growth is 2 percentage points below the norm.
  - The increased frequency of hot days over the past four decades in Botswana has reduced GDP by 2.4 percent below its potential without climate change.
    - Two-thirds of this loss are attributable to the increased frequency of hot days.
    - One-third are attributable to the decreased frequency of cool days.
  - Fewer cool days than usual also decrease growth, with a negative effect approximately half that of hot days.
- Caveats and limitations:
  - Estimates focus on temperature-driven impacts and include effects of accelerated evapotranspiration but do not fully account for reduced rainfall, more frequent extreme temperatures, and droughts.
  - Projections do not consider potentially large negative impacts from abrupt climatic changes, environmental collapse, and societal transformations induced by climate change.
  - Estimating macroeconomic impacts involves methodological challenges and long-term projections are inherently uncertain.

### Adaptation policy recommendations and prioritization
- Core fiscal principle:
  - Differentiate between development investments and strictly additional adaptation investments; only additional costs attributable to climate change should be budgeted as adaptation expenses.
- Priority public actions:
  - Public provision of climate services:
    - Expand early warning systems.
    - Expand climate risk mapping.
    - Define a system to measure the impacts of climate change.
    - Integrate climate information into government operations and Public Financial Management (PFM).
  - Boost water sector efficiency:
    - Water transfer schemes.
    - Minimize water losses.
    - Strengthen transboundary agreements on water.
  - Correct market inefficiencies to unlock private adaptation:
    - Improve access to credit markets to enable farmers to invest in adaptation.
    - Implement efficient water pricing to create incentives to conserve water.
  - Address distributional impacts to ensure a just transition.
- Use of the NDC:
  - Botswana’s Second Updated Nationally Determined Contribution lists approximately forty measures across eight areas aimed at reducing vulnerability to weather shocks and climate change; prioritize measures that are strictly additional for climate adaptation and those that strengthen climate services and water resilience.
- Fiscal framing:
  - Incorporate adaptation into macro-fiscal planning using IMF staff guidance; focus public spending where it corrects market failures, provides public goods (climate services), and leverages development investments with marginal adjustments attributable to climate change.

### Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) role in adaptation and development choices
- CBA guidance:
  - Apply CBA to adaptation and all development programs consistently to compare social costs and benefits and maximize social welfare.
  - Use CBA to avoid investing in adaptations with low economic and social returns that could crowd out more impactful development measures.
  - Complement CBA with distributional analysis to reflect societal preferences and ethical trade-offs.

### Botswana electricity supply structure and market facts
- Installed capacity and generation mix:
  - Domestic installed capacity is approximately 900 MW, of which around 630 MW is used during peak hours.
  - Coal-fired plants: Morupule B (~600 MW) and Morupule A (~132 MW) account for over 96 percent of domestic power.
  - Diesel generators at Orapa (90 MW) and Matshelagabedi (73 MW) provide roughly 160 MW of contingency generation.
  - Renewable energy installed capacity: 6 MW of solar PV (IRENA, 2021).
  - About 48 percent of final power consumption is generated domestically, while 52 percent is sourced through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP).
  - In 2023, Botswana spent $156 million on electricity imports, ranking it the 55th largest importer of electricity globally.
  - Around 60 percent of SAPP electricity generation comes from coal generation and around 24 percent from hydro.
  - Unit costs of imported power increased by an estimated 166 percent (Timothy, 2025).
- Market structure and operational indicators:
  - Electricity market: single-buyer model with Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) as sole off-taker; BPC is state-owned and responsible for generation, transmission, distribution, and rural electrification implementation.
  - Transmission and distribution losses averaged 15.35 percent in 2021 (World Bank, 2024).
  - National electrification approximately 72–76 percent in recent years.
    - Urban access: around 95.5 percent.
    - Rural access: around 25 percent.
  - Zero-cost connection policy (launched in 2024) provides a ready board for customers earning up to P2,400 per month.
  - Off-grid and decentralized solutions have not yet been mainstreamed (World Bank, 2023).

### Implicit subsidies, tariffs, and fiscal impacts in the power sector
- Implicit fossil fuel subsidies are estimated at around 5 percent of GDP.
- Implicit subsidies include external costs (climate change contributions, health impacts from local pollutants, road fuel externalities) and forgone consumption tax revenue.
- Tariff history and gaps:
  - BPC tariff increases: 10 percent (April 2018), 22 percent (2020), and 3 percent (2021).
  - BPC requests for further 5 percent adjustments in 2022–2023 and 2023–2024 were denied.
  - Tariffs are at 30–32 thebe/kWh (0.021–0.0224 USD/kWh) below actual generation and import costs, contributing to operational losses of P498 million in FY2023 (Timothy, 2025).
  - Confirmed subsidy support to BPC: around P1.2 billion as part of a P3–4 billion package under the Transitional National Development Plan.
  - Estimated shortfall for 2025–2026: P3.4 billion (Timothy, 2025).
  - Current average domestic tariffs: roughly $0.09/kWh.

### IRP, CPAT modelling, and projected emissions impacts
- Government targets:
  - 50 percent share of renewable energy generation in Vision 2036.
  - Universal electricity access and net energy exporter status by 2030.
  - NDC pledge: 15 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions relative to a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario by 2030, conditional on adequate financing.
- IRP features:
  - Updated 2025 Integrated Resource Plan incoming renewable energy installed capacity: 1950 MW.
  - IRP includes continued coal investments:
    - 600 MW Mmamabula power plant, procured and expected to be completed in 2027.
    - Another coal plant in Palapye by 2027 with additional 615 MW.
    - Coal bed methane project reaching 100 MW of installed capacity.
  - Caveat: the IRP is not informed by a least-cost generation analysis or renewable energy feasibility studies.
- CPAT model and findings:
  - CPAT projects fuel use and GHG emissions; parameterized to mid-range fuel price elasticities and linked to input-output tables to infer impacts on production costs, consumer prices, and household burdens.
  - CPAT findings for the IRP:
    - Renewable energy, particularly solar PV, is projected to surpass demand for coal-fired generation within the first year of being introduced since the price for renewable energy is lower than coal-generation.
    - Because the IRP ends in 2027 and no additional renewable energy is planned beyond this horizon, demand for coal-generation increases again as energy demand grows and modelling assumes a reduction of imported electricity.
    - Under the IRP, power sector emissions are expected to fall by approximately 54 percent and overall emissions by 30 percent compared to 2030 baseline levels, thereby exceeding the country’s NDC.
    - Majority of energy-related revenue comes from excise taxes on gasoline and diesel consumption; reduction in coal generation would not significantly diminish government revenue streams.

### Oversupply risks, regional context, and transmission constraints
- Domestic oversupply risk:
  - Bringing over 3000 MW of installed coal and renewable capacity online before 2027 presents a risk of oversupply relative to current peak demand of just 630 MW.
  - Solar capacity factor: around 20 percent.
    - When including capacity factors, additional supply is closer to 1050 MW of capacity, which remains an oversupply of domestic generation.
- Regional SAPP context:
  - In 2024, excess capacity, including reserves, for the region was 6,401 MW.
  - Botswana’s SAPP interconnection allows access to broader markets but raises questions about demand availability for excess generation and regional competition as SAPP members also plan generation expansion.
  - Export potential depends on transmission interconnectors, which require significant time and investment; lagging regional demand growth and connection development could force plants to operate below capacity factors and undermine economic cases for investments.
- Selected regional figures:
  - Total SAPP installed capacity: 67,266 MW; operating capacity: 60,754 MW; current peak demand: 50,865 MW; peak demand plus reserves: 54,964 MW; capacity excess including reserves: 6,401 MW.
  - Botswana (BPC): Installed Capacity 927 MW; Operating Capacity 459 MW; Current Peak Demand 610 MW; Peak Demand Plus Reserves 698 MW; Capacity Excess/Shortfall Including Reserves -239 MW.

### Renewable procurement framework, auction history, and procurement credibility
- Renewable Energy PPA Framework features:
  - Sealed-bid, location-specific, two-stage tenders; pre-developed project sites by BPC; rigorous pre-qualification; bid bonds (up to US $1M) and performance bonds (US $4M); 25-year PPA with BPC; PPA price partially indexed to local inflation and Pula/USD exchange rate; government support via a three-month liquidity facility and a government-issued letter of comfort; expected 40% local equity where market capacity exists; dual evaluation criteria (price and economic development impact).
- Auction rounds (selected):
  - Round 1: Initiation Year 2015, relaunched 2017, and again in 2019; Volume Requested (MW) 100; Project-Size Limits (MW) 50; Technology Requested CSP or PV; Capacity Procured (MW) 50.
  - Round 2: Initiation Year 2015; Volume Requested (MW) 100; Project-Size Limits (MW) 100; Technology Requested CSP; Capacity Procured (MW) Nil.
  - Round 3: Initiation Year 2018; Technology Requested Solar PV; Capacity Procured (MW) Nil.
  - Round 4: Initiation Year 2022; Technology Requested Solar PV; Capacity Procured (MW) Nil.
  - Round 5: Initiation Year 2022; Volume Requested (MW) 200; Project-Size Limits (MW) 100; Technology Requested CSP; Capacity Procured (MW) Nil.
- Procurement credibility recommendations:
  - Base energy planning on least-cost generation analysis and renewable energy feasibility studies.
  - Commit to a clear, consistent auction schedule with transparent rules to rebuild investor trust and secure long-term renewable energy investment.
  - Address past auction disruptions and cancellations and ensure auctions are transparent, consistent, and timely.

### Grid integration, tariffs, subsidies, and institutional capacity
- Grid integration and institutional capacity:
  - Current grid code lacks comprehensive technical standards for integrating renewable energy, storage, and distributed generation, and lacks clarity on grid access protocols and interconnection requirements for IPPs.
  - BPC’s workforce includes only a limited number of engineers skilled in transmission and connection planning, hindering integration of renewable energy (Kruger, Alao, and Betz, 2024).
  - Policy recommendations: update the grid code to explicitly incorporate RE requirements; build institutional capacity for timely grid connection approvals and compliance monitoring; adopt provisions for forecasting, curtailment protocols, and ancillary services.
- Tariff reform and investment signals:
  - Increasing tariffs to cost-reflective levels enables utilities to recover operating expenses, maintain infrastructure, and attract private investors.
  - Recommendation: move tariffs toward cost-reflective levels while phasing out subsidies and design tariff reforms with measures to protect affordability for vulnerable consumers.
- Cross-subsidization and rural electrification:
  - Use cross-subsidies from main-grid customers to support consumers served by solar mini-grids, with design elements including transparent tariff setting, metering (including AMI), participation criteria, cost recovery calculations, periodic reviews, and long-term planning.
  - Alternative: use additional urban tariff revenues to subsidize green technologies in rural areas (solar mini-grids, battery storage, efficient appliances) to target cost reduction rather than direct consumer subsidies.

### Large users, tax alignment, carbon pricing, and mineral development
- Large electricity users:
  - The mining sector accounts for approximately half of all productive electricity usage in Botswana.
  - Copper and nickel operations account for 49 percent of the mining sector’s electricity consumption; the diamond subsector accounts for 45 percent (World Bank Group, 2016).
  - Policy recommendation: hold large users accountable for their energy mix through distributed energy policies and self-generation requirements with annual increases in renewable shares until 2030, with unmet targets triggering compensatory investments in rural electrification.
- Tax and carbon pricing findings:
  - Zero-rated VAT on diesel and petrol avoids the standard 14 percent rate.
  - Applying the standard VAT to diesel and petrol could generate an additional 0.25 percent of GDP in revenues by 2035.
  - South Africa’s Carbon Tax Act (introduced June 2019) initially featured tax-free allowances between 60–95%; in 2022 the carbon tax generated approximately R1.6 billion. The tax is 13USD/tCO2 but expected to rise to 30USD/tCO2 by 2030.
  - If Botswana imposed a 5USD/tCO2 carbon tax escalating to 25USD/tCO2 by 2030, additional fiscal revenues could increase over 1.2 percent of GDP (by 2035) with only a small change in electricity prices, of 11 percent, over the next five years.
  - The modeled carbon tax impact on GDP is negligible and would complement the IRP to reduce emissions, particularly in the industrial sector.
  - Distributional note: carbon pricing is inherently progressive in Botswana because poorer households typically have lower fossil fuel consumption; recycling revenues to the general budget or targeted support can produce positive and highly progressive consumption effects.
- Trade policy and mineral strategy:
  - Targeted import duty exemptions for renewable technologies (solar PV panels, batteries, inverters) can lower upfront costs but may forgo tariff revenues and, if not well-targeted, disproportionately benefit wealthier households.
  - Strategic opportunity: responsibly develop critical minerals (cobalt, copper, manganese, nickel) to position Botswana in the clean energy transition while avoiding Dutch Disease through diversification, prudent resource revenue management, and environmental safeguards.

### Conclusions and priority reforms
- Key findings:
  - Climate trends and fiscal pressures from electricity subsidies raise macroeconomic risks for Botswana.
  - Extreme heat events have been shown to lower growth by up to 2 percentage points in the short term.
  - A sustained warming trend could lead to as much as a 10 percent reduction in GDP by the century’s end compared to projections under current conditions.
  - The updated IRP’s renewable energy expansion could cut power sector emissions by over 50 percent compared to a business-as-usual scenario for 2030.
- Priority reforms:
  - Refine adaptation measures in the Second Updated NDC: invest in climate services (early warning systems, climate risk mapping, impact measurement) to integrate climate into PFM.
  - Improve water sector efficiency and reduce market inefficiencies to crowd-in private adaptation investment and reduce fiscal risks.
  - Implement energy sector reforms: least-cost generation planning, apply the standard VAT rate to diesel and petrol, and gradually introduce a low-level carbon price to strengthen fiscal position and emissions outcomes.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in "1. Growing macroeconomic risks from observed climate trends and projections, alongside fiscal strain from electricity subsidies" and related sections of sipea2025162.*

### 1. Growing macroeconomic risks from observed climate trends and projections, alongside fiscal

### 1. Growing macroeconomic risks from observed climate trends and projections, alongside fiscal strain from electricity subsidies, call for effective adaptation policies and energy sector reforms.

### Climate trends and projections
- Botswana has warmed by more than 1.2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels.
- Mean annual temperature was equal to 21.9 °C during the 1985–2014 baseline period and is estimated to have exceeded 22.3 °C by 2020.
- Botswana’s annual precipitation totals are around 400–500 mm/year.
- Median projected warming:
  - 1.5–2.2 °C by 2050 (relative to the 1985–2014 baseline).
  - 1.6-4.1 °C by 2085 (relative to the 1985–2014 baseline).
- Under a high-emissions/fast-warming scenario (SSP3-7.0, 90th percentile), temperatures could rise by nearly 5.5 °C by the end of the century.
- Annual rainfall is projected to decline from around 420 mm/year historically to approximately 350 mm/year by 2085 across scenarios.
- Extreme heat indicators:
  - Days with maximum daily temperature exceeding 35 °C (TX35) have increased steadily over the past two decades and are projected to continue increasing under all emissions scenarios.
  - Consecutive dry days (CDD) have shown an average increase of over 30 days relative to historical conditions and are projected to continue increasing throughout the century.
- Heavy rainfall event trends (Rx1day and Rx5day) have shown upward variability in recent years, but changes remain within natural variability and are not statistically significant; projections do not indicate significant changes in these intense precipitation events.

### Macroeconomic risks and projected impacts
- Climate-induced shocks are projected to:
  - Diminish agricultural yields and labor productivity across various sectors.
  - Directly impact economic growth and undermine revenue generation.
  - Sharply reduce growth rates in the near term and contract GDP substantially over the long run if unaddressed.
  - Strain public finances through a shrinking tax base and increased demands for social protection and adaptation spending.
- Interaction with fiscal pressures:
  - Fiscal strain from electricity subsidies further limits the government’s capacity to respond.
- Projected GDP impacts under different assumptions:
  - A worst-case warming scenario could result in a 10 percent annual economic loss by the end of the century if adaptation is slow (SSP3-7.0 90th percentile, implying +4.1 °C in 2071–2100 compared to 1985–2014).
  - Without adaptation these losses can double.
  - Rapid adaptation could reduce losses to 3 percent of GDP under the same temperature scenario.
  - Moderate global emissions cuts can keep GDP losses under 1 percent (SSP2-4.5 scenario).
- Empirical estimates of weather-shock impacts:
  - In years with a higher than usual number of hot days (maximum daily temperature above 35 °C), GDP growth is 2 percentage points below the norm.
  - The increased frequency of hot days over the past four decades in Botswana has reduced GDP by 2.4 percent below its potential without climate change.
    - Two-thirds of this loss are attributable to the increased frequency of hot days.
    - One-third are attributable to the decreased frequency of cool days.
  - Fewer cool days than usual also decrease growth, with a negative effect approximately half that of hot days.
- Caveats:
  - Estimates focus on temperature-driven impacts and include effects of accelerated evapotranspiration but do not fully account for reduced rainfall, more frequent extreme temperatures, and droughts.
  - Projections do not consider potentially large negative impacts from abrupt climatic changes, environmental collapse, and societal transformations induced by climate change.
  - Estimating macroeconomic impacts involves methodological challenges and long-term projections are inherently uncertain.

### Adaptation policy recommendations and prioritization
- Core principle: Differentiate between development investments and strictly additional adaptation investments.
  - Adaptation investments are those driven exclusively by climate change; only the additional costs attributable to climate change should be budgeted as adaptation expenses.
  - This distinction prevents double counting and enables more accurate estimation of budgetary pressures.
- Priority areas for government action to maximize impact and efficiency:
  - Public provision of climate services:
    - Expand early warning systems.
    - Expand climate risk mapping.
    - Define a system to measure the impacts of climate change.
    - Integrate climate information into government operations and Public Financial Management (PFM).
  - Boost water sector efficiency:
    - Water transfer schemes.
    - Minimize water losses.
    - Strengthen transboundary agreements on water.
  - Promote reforms to correct market inefficiencies and policy failures that limit private adaptation:
    - Improve access to credit markets to enable farmers to invest in adaptation.
    - Implement efficient water pricing to create incentives to conserve water.
  - Address distributional impacts to ensure a just transition.
- Use of the country’s NDC:
  - Botswana’s Second Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs) lists approximately forty measures across eight areas aimed at reducing vulnerability to weather shocks and climate change, but not all are strict adaptation measures.
  - Prioritize measures that are strictly additional for climate adaptation and those that strengthen climate services and water resilience.
- Fiscal framing:
  - Incorporate adaptation into macro-fiscal planning using guidance developed by IMF staff to integrate climate change into macro-fiscal planning.
  - Focus public spending where it corrects market failures, provides public goods (climate services), and leverages development investments with marginal adjustments attributable to climate change.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in "1. Growing macroeconomic risks from observed climate trends and projections, alongside fiscal strain from electricity subsidies" (selected issues paper).*

### 14. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can play an important role in selecting public adaptation projects.

### 14. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can play an important role in selecting public adaptation projects.

### Role of CBA in adaptation and development choices
- Adaptation investment yields beneficial effects, but investing in adaptations with low economic and social returns may crowd out investment in more impactful development measures.
- Trade-offs—e.g., climate resilient infrastructure, improved drainage systems, water desalination, rooftop rainfall catchment—are best evaluated by systematically comparing social costs and benefits.
- What to do, when, how, and at what cost ultimately relies on ethical choices that should reflect societal preferences.
- CBA, complemented by analysis and correction of distributional impacts, can help decision makers maximize overall social welfare by avoiding wasting scarce resources.
- To achieve this, CBA should be applied to adaptation as well as to all other development programs in a consistent manner (Bellon and Massetti, 2022).

### Background: Botswana’s current electricity supply structure
- Domestic installed capacity is approximately 900 MW, of which around 630 MW is used during peak hours.
- Coal-fired plants, Morupule B (~600 MW) and Morupule A (~132 MW), account for over 96 percent of domestic power.
- Diesel generators at Orapa (90 MW) and Matshelagabedi (73 MW) provide roughly 160 MW of contingency generation.
- Renewable energy installed capacity: 6 MW of solar PV (IRENA, 2021).
- About 48 percent of final power consumption is generated domestically, while 52 percent is sourced through the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP).
- In 2023, Botswana spent $156 million on electricity imports, ranking it the 55th largest importer of electricity globally.
- Around 60 percent of SAPP electricity generation comes from coal generation and around 24 percent from hydro.
- Unit costs of imported power increased by an estimated 166 percent (Timothy, 2025).

### Market structure, operational challenges, and access disparities
- Electricity market: single-buyer model with Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) as sole off-taker; BPC is state-owned and responsible for generation, transmission, distribution, and rural electrification implementation.
- Transmission and distribution losses averaged 15.35 percent in 2021 (World Bank, 2024).
- National electrification approximately 72–76 percent in recent years.
  - Urban access: around 95.5 percent.
  - Rural access: around 25 percent.
- Zero-cost connection policy (launched in 2024) provides a ready board for customers earning up to P2,400 per month.
- Off-grid and decentralized solutions have not yet been mainstreamed (World Bank, 2023).

### Implicit subsidies, tariffs, and fiscal impacts
- Implicit fossil fuel subsidies are estimated at around 5 percent of GDP.
- Implicit subsidies include external costs (climate change contributions, health impacts from local pollutants, road fuel externalities) and forgone consumption tax revenue.
- Tariff adjustments: BPC tariff increases of 10 percent (April 2018), 22 percent (2020), and 3 percent (2021).
- BPC requests for further 5 percent adjustments in 2022–2023 and 2023–2024 were denied.
- Tariffs are at 30–32 thebe/kWh (0.021–0.0224 USD/kWh) below actual generation and import costs, contributing to operational losses of P498 million in FY2023 (Timothy, 2025).
- Confirmed subsidy support to BPC: around P1.2 billion as part of a P3–4 billion package under the Transitional National Development Plan.
- Estimated shortfall for 2025–2026: P3.4 billion (Timothy, 2025).
- Current average domestic tariffs: roughly $0.09/kWh.

### Targets, the IRP, and CPAT modeling results
- Government targets:
  - 50 percent share of renewable energy generation in Vision 2036.
  - Universal electricity access and net energy exporter status by 2030.
  - NDC pledge: 15 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions relative to a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario by 2030, conditional on adequate financing.
- Updated 2025 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) incoming renewable energy installed capacity: 1950 MW.
- IRP includes continued coal investments:
  - 600 MW Mmamabula power plant, procured and expected to be completed in 2027.
  - Another coal plant in Palapye by 2027 with additional 615 MW.
  - Coal bed methane project reaching 100 MW of installed capacity.
- Caveat: the IRP is not informed by a least-cost generation analysis or renewable energy feasibility studies.
- CPAT (Climate Policy Assessment Tool) characteristics:
  - Spreadsheet-based model projecting fuel use and GHG emissions for major energy sectors in over 200 countries.
  - Parameterized to mid-range of existing modelling literature on fuel price elasticities and linked to input-output tables to infer impacts on production costs, consumer prices, and burdens on household income groups.
  - CPAT is developed jointly by IMF and World Bank staff.
- CPAT findings for the IRP:
  - Renewable energy, particularly solar PV, is projected to surpass demand for coal-fired generation within the first year of being introduced since the price for renewable energy is lower than coal-generation.
  - Because the IRP ends in 2027 and no additional renewable energy is planned beyond this horizon, demand for coal-generation increases again as energy demand grows and modelling assumes a reduction of imported electricity.
  - Under the IRP, power sector emissions are expected to fall by approximately 54 percent and overall emissions by 30 percent compared to 2030 baseline levels, thereby exceeding the country’s NDC.
  - Majority of energy-related revenue comes from excise taxes on gasoline and diesel consumption; reduction in coal generation would not significantly diminish government revenue streams.

### Oversupply risks, regional context, and transmission constraints
- Bringing over 3000 MW of installed coal and renewable capacity online before 2027 presents a risk of oversupply relative to current peak demand of just 630 MW.
- Solar capacity factor: around 20 percent.
  - When including capacity factors, additional supply is closer to 1050 MW of capacity, which remains an oversupply of domestic generation.
- Regional SAPP context:
  - In 2024, excess capacity, including reserves, for the region was 6,401 MW (see Table 1).
  - Botswana’s SAPP interconnection allows access to broader markets and monetization of excess generation but raises questions about demand availability for excess generation.
  - Regional competition: SAPP members are also planning generation expansion (see Table 2), potentially reducing market opportunities for exports.
- Infrastructure constraints: export potential depends on transmission interconnectors, which require significant time and investment; lagging regional demand growth and connection development could force Botswana to operate plants below capacity factors and undermine the economic case for investments.

### Key regional capacity and Botswana’s position (selected figures from Table 1)
- Total SAPP installed capacity: 67,266 MW; operating capacity: 60,754 MW; current peak demand: 50,865 MW; peak demand plus reserves: 54,964 MW; capacity excess including reserves: 6,401 MW.
- Botswana (BPC): Installed Capacity 927 MW; Operating Capacity 459 MW; Current Peak Demand 610 MW; Peak Demand Plus Reserves 698 MW; Capacity Excess/Shortfall Including Reserves -239 MW.

### Renewable energy procurement framework and auction history
- Key features of Botswana’s Renewable Energy PPA Framework:
  - Sealed-bid, location-specific, two-stage tenders; pre-developed project sites by BPC; rigorous pre-qualification; bid bonds (up to US $1M) and performance bonds (US $4M); 25-year PPA with BPC; PPA price partially indexed to local inflation and Pula/USD exchange rate; government support via a three-month liquidity facility and a government-issued letter of comfort; expected 40% local equity where market capacity exists; dual evaluation criteria (price and economic development impact).
- Renewable Energy Auction Rounds:
  - Round 1: Initiation Year 2015, relaunched 2017, and again in 2019; Volume Requested (MW) 100; Project-Size Limits (MW) 50; Technology Requested CSP or PV; Capacity Procured (MW) 50.
  - Round 2: Initiation Year 2015; Volume Requested (MW) 100; Project-Size Limits (MW) 100; Technology Requested CSP; Capacity Procured (MW) Nil.
  - Round 3: Initiation Year 2018; Volume Requested (MW) N/A; Project-Size Limits (MW) N/A; Technology Requested Solar PV; Capacity Procured (MW) Nil.
  - Round 4: Initiation Year 2022; Volume Requested (MW) N/A; Project-Size Limits (MW) N/A; Technology Requested Solar PV; Capacity Procured (MW) Nil.
  - Round 5: Initiation Year 2022; Volume Requested (MW) 200; Project-Size Limits (MW) 100; Technology Requested CSP; Capacity Procured (MW) Nil.

### Policy recommendations and enabling environment priorities
- Evidence-based planning:
  - Base energy planning on least-cost generation analysis and renewable energy feasibility studies to ensure economic efficiency and technical viability.
  - Least-cost and feasibility analyses are crucial to allocate resources optimally, ensure technical achievability, and meet demand reliably at lowest cost.
- Procurement credibility:
  - Commit to a clear, consistent auction schedule with transparent rules to rebuild investor trust and secure long-term renewable energy investment.
  - Address past disruptions and cancellations of auctions that have undermined investor confidence (multiple utility-scale solar auctions canceled or delayed).
  - Ensure procurement auctions are rolled out in a transparent, consistent, and timely manner.

*Source: sipea2025162 - 14. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can play an important role in selecting public adaptation projects.*

### 27. Incorporating clear methodologies to remunerate and integrate generation from variable

### 27. Incorporating clear methodologies to remunerate and integrate generation from variable

### Grid integration, standards, and institutional capacity
- Findings:
  - The current grid code lacks comprehensive technical standards for integrating renewable energy, storage, and distributed generation, and lacks clarity on grid access protocols and interconnection requirements for IPPs.
  - BPC’s workforce includes only a limited number of engineers skilled in transmission and connection planning, which hinders integration of renewable energy (Kruger, Alao, and Betz, 2024).
- Policy recommendations:
  - Update the grid code to explicitly incorporate renewable energy (RE) requirements.
  - Build institutional capacity to provide timely grid connection approvals, and to monitor and enforce compliance.
  - Adopt robust provisions for managing variable renewable energy (forecasting, curtailment protocols, ancillary services) to maintain grid stability as solar and wind capacity grows.

### Electricity tariffs, subsidies, and investment signals
- Findings:
  - Increasing electricity tariffs to cost-reflective levels enables utilities to recover operating expenses, maintain infrastructure, and invest in grid upgrades or new generation capacity, making the sector more attractive to private investors.
  - Example: Namibia implemented cost-reflective tariffs following a national tariff and cost-of-service study, enabling NamPower to operate without external subsidies and attracting IPPs—renewable—that now contribute 25 percent of installed capacity (Baker and Bischof-Niemz, 2022).
- Policy recommendations:
  - Move tariffs toward cost-reflective levels while phasing out subsidies to reduce fiscal burden and attract private investment.
  - Design tariff reforms with measures to protect affordability for vulnerable consumers.

### Cross-subsidization and rural electrification
- Proposals and design elements:
  - Use cross-subsidies where revenues from main-grid customers subsidize electricity for consumers in areas served by solar mini-grids to support rural electrification and narrow urban–rural access gaps.
  - Key design requirements: transparent tariff setting, consumption metering (including advance metering infrastructure, AMI), clear participation criteria for compensation mechanisms, cost recovery calculations for mini-grids, studies on tariff impacts, periodic tariff reviews, long-term planning for mini-grid sites, and addressing operational losses.
- Alternative approach:
  - Instead of revenue transfers to consumers, use additional revenues from urban tariffs to subsidize green technologies (solar mini-grids, battery storage systems, efficient appliances) in rural areas—targeting cost reduction rather than direct consumer subsidies.
  - Both approaches require careful assessment of impacts on urban consumers and periodic program reviews.

### Large electricity users and sectoral measures
- Findings:
  - The mining sector accounts for approximately half of all productive electricity usage in Botswana.
  - Copper and nickel operations account for 49 percent of the mining sector’s electricity consumption; the diamond subsector accounts for 45 percent (World Bank Group, 2016).
- Policy recommendations:
  - Hold large users accountable for their energy mix through distributed energy policies and self-generation requirements (e.g., decrees by MME) requiring an annual increase in renewable-based electricity shares until 2030, with unmet targets triggering compensatory investments in rural electrification.
  - Leverage commitments from industry leaders (e.g., Debswana aiming for carbon neutrality by 2030) to accelerate private-sector-driven investment.

### Tax alignment, carbon pricing, and fiscal impacts
- Findings:
  - There is a zero-rated VAT on diesel and petrol, avoiding the standard 14 percent rate.
  - Applying the standard VAT to diesel and petrol could generate an additional 0.25 percent of GDP in revenues by 2035.
  - South Africa’s Carbon Tax Act: introduced June 2019; initial generous tax-free allowances between 60–95%; in 2022 the carbon tax generated approximately R1.6 billion. The tax is 13USD/tCO2 but expected to rise to 30USD/tCO2 by 2030.
  - If Botswana imposed a 5USD/tCO2 carbon tax that escalates to 25USD/tCO2 by 2030, additional fiscal revenues could increase over 1.2 percent of GDP (by 2035) with only a small change in electricity prices, of 11 percent, over the next five years.
  - The impact on GDP from the modeled carbon tax is negligible; the carbon tax would complement the IRP to reduce emissions further, particularly in the industrial sector.
- Distributional and recycling considerations:
  - Carbon pricing is inherently progressive in Botswana because poorer households typically have lower fossil fuel consumption.
  - Recycling carbon tax revenues into the general budget or targeted support (cash transfers, adaptation needs) can produce positive and highly progressive consumption effects and improve political acceptability.

### Trade policy for clean technologies and mineral development
- Findings and trade-offs:
  - Targeted import duty exemptions for renewable energy technologies (solar PV panels, batteries, inverters) can lower upfront costs and boost adoption but may forgo tariff revenues and, if not well-targeted, disproportionately benefit wealthier households.
  - Reducing tariffs on green technologies would lower imports of more expensive, fossil-based electricity which is currently subsidized.
- Strategic opportunity:
  - Botswana can position itself as a key supplier in the global clean energy transition by responsibly developing critical minerals (cobalt, copper, manganese, nickel).
  - To avoid Dutch Disease and maximize benefits, Botswana should diversify beyond resource exports into manufacturing and services, invest resource revenues prudently, and pair mineral development with robust environmental safeguards and governance.

### Conclusions: macroeconomic risks and priority reforms
- Key findings:
  - Climate trends and fiscal pressures from electricity subsidies raise macroeconomic risks for Botswana.
  - Extreme heat events have been shown to lower growth by up to 2 percentage points in the short term.
  - A sustained warming trend could lead to as much as a 10 percent reduction in GDP by the century’s end compared to projections under current conditions.
  - The updated Integrated Resource Plan’s renewable energy expansion could cut power sector emissions by over 50 percent compared to a business-as-usual scenario for 2030.
- Priority actions:
  - Refine adaptation measures in the Second Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): invest in climate services (early warning systems, climate risk mapping, impact measurement) to integrate climate into PFM.
  - Improve water sector efficiency and reduce market inefficiencies to crowd-in private adaptation investment and reduce fiscal risks.
  - Implement energy sector reforms: least-cost generation planning, apply the standard VAT rate to diesel and petrol, and gradually introduce a low-level carbon price to strengthen fiscal position and emissions outcomes.

*Source: sipea2025162*

### References

### References

### Major themes covered
- Estimation of macro-fiscal effects of climate shocks and integration of climate impacts into fiscal and macro projections.
  - Akyapi, B., M. Bellon and E. Massetti (2025). “Estimating Macro-Fiscal Effects of Climate Shocks From Billions of Geospatial Weather Observations.” American Economic Journal, Macroeconomics, 17(3): 114-59.
  - Bellon, M. and E. Massetti. 2022. “Economic Principles for Integrating Adaptation to Climate Change into Fiscal Policy.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2022.001, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
  - Centorrino, S., E. Massetti, M. Raissi, and F. Tagklis. 2025. How to Include the Effects of Rising Temperatures in Macro-Fiscal Projections. IMF How To Notes, forthcoming.
  - Mohaddes, K., and Raissi, M., 2025. “Rising Temperatures, Melting Incomes: Country-Specific Macroeconomic Effects of Climate Scenarios,“ PLOS Climate 4(9), e0000621.
  - Kahn, Matthew E., Kamiar Mohaddes, Ryan NC Ng, M. Hashem Pesaran, Mehdi Raissi, and Jui-Chung Yang (2021). “Long-term macroeconomic effects of climate change: A cross-country analysis.” Energy Economics 104: 105624.

- Physical climate impacts, labor productivity, and sectoral effects (agriculture, crops, labor).
  - Kjellstrom, Tord, R. Sari Kovats, Simon J. Lloyd, Tom Holt, and Richard SJ Tol. (2009). "The direct impact of climate change on regional labor productivity." Archives of environmental & occupational health 64, no. 4: 217-227.
  - Schlenker, Wolfram, and Michael J. Roberts. (2009). "Nonlinear temperature effects indicate severe damages to US crop yields under climate change." Proceedings of the National Academy of sciences 106, no. 37: 15594-15598.
  - Serdeczny, Olivia, Sophie Adams, Florent Baarsch, Dim Coumou, Alexander Robinson, William Hare, Michiel Schaeffer, Mahé Perrette, and Julia Reinhardt. (2017). "Climate change impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa: from physical changes to their social repercussions." Regional Environmental Change 17, no. 6: 1585-1600.
  - Kurukulasuriya, Pradeep, Robert Mendelsohn, Rashid Hassan, James Benhin, Temesgen Deressa, Mbaye Diop, Helmy Mohamed Eid et al. (2006). "Will African agriculture survive climate change?." The World Bank Economic Review 20, no. 3: 367-388.
  - Malhi, Gurdeep Singh, Manpreet Kaur, and Prashant Kaushik. (2021). "Impact of climate change on agriculture and its mitigation strategies: A review." Sustainability 13, no. 3: 1318.

### Energy, renewable deployment, and regional electricity planning (Southern Africa)
- Country and regional integrated resource plans, renewable project reports, and energy sector updates.
  - Namibia Ministry of Mines & Energy. (2022, October). National Integrated Resource Plan (NIRP) 2022 for the Electricity Supply Industry, Namibia (Final Report).
  - South Africa Department of Mineral Resources & Energy. (2019, October). Integrated Resource Plan 2019 (IRP 2019). Republic of South Africa.
  - Southern African Power Pool. (2021). SAPP Annual Report 2021.
  - Zambia Ministry of Energy. (n.d.). About the IRP project – Integrated Resource Plan (IRP).
  - Global Transmission Report. (2025, July 11). Zambia: Planned generation and transmission capacity.
  - Enerdata. (2025). South Africa approves the South African Renewable Energy Masterplan.
  - Jowett, P. (2025). South Africa targeting up to 5 GW of new renewables per year. pv magazine.
  - Reuters.  (2025). Zambia launches  100  megawatt  solar  plant  supplying  First  Quantum  Minerals.
  - Reuters. (2024a). Chinese firms to build Namibia’s largest solar power plant.
  - Reuters. (2024b). World Bank approves US$138.5 million loan to Namibia.
  - Bungane, B. (2018). Mozambique plans 700 % increase in output capacity by 2043. Green Building Africa.
  - Kruger, W., Alao, O., & Betz, S. (2024). Driving growth: Effective renewable energy tendering in Africa: Success factors for private power investment and procurement.
  - Baker, L., & Bischof-Niemz, T. (2022). A quiet transition: The role of Namibia's state-owned power utility in enabling renewable energy investment. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 157, 112014. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2022.112014

- Country-specific data and indicators relevant to electricity access and trade.
  - SDG 7.1.1 Electrification Dataset, World Bank ( WB ), uri: trackingsdg7.esmap.org/downloads, note: Data is downloaded from ESMAP website. Data is released when a new Tracking SDG7 report is released., publisher: World Bank ( WB ), data accessed: 2024-05-16, date published: 2023.
  - World Bank. (n.d.). Access to electricity (% of population) (total, urban, rural) – Botswana. Retrieved August 25, 2025, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locationsBW
  - The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). (2023). Electricity in Botswana trade. Retrieved August 25, 2025, from https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/electricity/reporter/bwa
  - SADC Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency. (n.d.). Botswana. Retrieved August 25, 2025, from https://www.sacreee.org/member-state/botswana
  - International Energy Agency. (n.d.). Botswana – Electricity. Retrieved August 25, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/countries/botswana/electricity
  - International Renewable Energy Agency. (2021). Renewables Readiness Assessment: Botswana. International Renewable Energy Agency.

### Climate and meteorological data sources, datasets, and reference guides
- Global and gridded climate datasets cited.
  - Copernicus Climate Change Service, Climate Data Store, (2021): CMIP6 climate projections. Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S) Climate Data Store (CDS). DOI: 10.24381/cds.c866074c
  - Harris I, Osborn TJ, Jones P and Lister D (2020). Version 4 of the CRU TS Monthly High-Resolution Gridded Multivariate Climate Dataset. Scientific Data (https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-020-0453-3).
  - Massetti, E. and F. Tagklis (2024). FADCP Climate Dataset: Temperature and Precipitation. Reference Guide, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
  - IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies Database, 2023 Update. IMF Climate Change Indicators Dashboard.

### Empirical methods, modeling, and sectoral analyses
- Studies on temperature effects on productivity, energy demand, and labor supply.
  - Isaac, Morna, and Detlef P. Van Vuuren. (2009). "Modeling global residential sector energy demand for heating and air conditioning in the context of climate change." Energy policy 37, no. 2: 507-521.
  - Somanathan, Eswaran, Rohini Somanathan, Anant Sudarshan, and Meenu Tewari. (2021). "The impact of temperature on productivity and labor supply: Evidence from Indian manufacturing." Journal of Political Economy 129, no. 6: 1797-1827.
  - Kjellstrom et al. (2009) and Schlenker & Roberts (2009) (see above) for labor and crop productivity nonlinear temperature impacts.
  - Kahn et al. (2021) and Mohaddes & Raissi (2025) for cross-country and country-specific macroeconomic climate impacts.

### Regional climate risk and policy assessments
- Southern Africa-focused risk reports and country diagnostics.
  - Richardson, K., Calow, R., Mayhew, L., Jobbins, G., Daoust, G., Waterson, A., Griffith, H., Fox, C., Amato, R., Dyer, E., Osborne, R., & Burgin, L. (2022). Climate Risk Report for the Southern Africa Region. Met Office, ODI, and FCDO. Final delivery version: February 2023.
  - World Bank. (2023). At a crossroads: Reigniting efficient and inclusive growth – Botswana Systematic Country Diagnostic Update [PDF]. World Bank Document.
  - World Bank. (2024a). Renewable Energy Support and Access Accelerator Project (P181221) – Project Information Document [PDF]. World Bank. World Bank Document.
  - Timothy, L. (2025). Gov’t weighs options as tariffs become ‘unsustainable’. Mmegi Online.

*Source: sipea2025162 - References*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/selected-issues-papers/2025/english/sipea2025162.pdf_
