## Sovereign Climate Debt Instruments: An Overview of the Green and Catastrophe Bond Markets

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### Role of fiscal policy and financing needs
- Fiscal policy complements carbon pricing by:
  - investing in climate-smart infrastructures, such as renewable energy generation, and
  - encouraging climate-smart technology research and development.
- Prepandemic estimate (G20 Foundations Platform): the world needs 2.2 percent of GDP invested annually to deliver commitments from the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement.
- Adapting to climate change and minimizing damage from climate-related natural disasters usually necessitates an increase in government spending, which must be accommodated within a country's overall budgetary structure.

### Financial innovation: green bonds and catastrophe bonds — definitions and market context
- Green bonds:
  - Structured like “plain vanilla” bonds with a “use of proceeds” clause for green investments.
  - Standards: Green Bond Principles (GBPs, 2014, ICMA) and Climate Bonds Standards (CBSs, Climate Bonds Initiative) with CBS categories: energy; transport; water; buildings; land use and marine resources; industry; waste and pollution control; information communications and technology.
  - CBSs require documentation of use of proceeds, evaluation and selection processes, management of proceeds before issuance and annually after issuance; certification requires fees and is voluntary.
  - Data: Eikon aligns with CBSs (CBI-reviewed) and is used in this analysis; Bloomberg tags self-labeled “Green Bond”; Eikon and Bloomberg are comparable for sovereign green bonds.
  - Public sector responses: People’s Bank of China guidelines (2015) and catalog (2021); EU taxonomy regulation (2020) and proposed European green bond standard legislation (2021).
- Catastrophe (CAT) bonds:
  - Debt instruments that provide funding to the cedent if, and only if, catastrophic conditions occur; issued via an SPV; proceeds invested in safe assets and disbursed conditional on trigger.
  - Trigger types: indemnity trigger; industry loss trigger; parametric index trigger.
  - Typical maturity: three to five years.
  - Pricing: investor coupon returns typically around 2 to 4 times the expected loss; traditional reinsurance premiums range from 3 to 5 times the expected loss.
  - World Bank role: since 2016, all sovereign CAT bonds in the Artemis data set have been intermediated by the World Bank.

### Market depth, evolution, and geographic concentration (sovereign green bonds)
- Sovereign green bonds:
  - Make up about 0.2 percent of all government debt securities in the OECD area.
  - In EMDEs, sovereign green bond issuances account for 12 percent of total green bond issuances (OECD 2021).
  - Timeline: central government sovereign green bonds began in 2016 (Poland first in 2016; France in 2017); cumulative issuance recorded nearly $80 billion in 2021.
  - Cumulative issuance 2016–2021 by region:
    - European countries: $161 billion
    - Asian Pacific countries: $9 billion
    - Western hemisphere countries: $8 billion
    - Middle East and Central Asian countries: less than $1 billion
    - African countries: less than $1 billion
  - Largest issuer: France — nearly $48 billion as of February 2022.
  - Highest issuance relative to GDP: Chile — 2.37 percent (relative to its GDP in 2021); others below 2 percent as of February 2022.
  - Average maturity as of issuance: 12.6 years with a standard deviation of 8.4 years.
  - Investor behavior: evidence of long-term buy-and-hold by real money investors (pension funds, sovereign funds, insurance companies) in Europe.

### Uses of proceeds for sovereign green bonds
- Primary Eikon-classified purpose in sample: clean transport.
- Other significant purposes: climate change adaptation and aquatic biodiversity conservation.
- Caveat: Eikon classification may not reflect all purposes of each bond issued.

### Costs, benefits, and market frictions for green bonds
- Costs relative to conventional bonds (Doronzo, Siracusa, and Antonelli 2021):
  1. More disclosure and tracking for use of proceeds (e.g., CBI certification documentation and verifier engagement); net impact ambiguous.
  2. Reputation risk from project failure or perceived greenwashing; green bonds can also act as commitment devices improving planning and governance.
  3. Potential crowding out of conventional bonds, reducing liquidity and raising funding costs; mitigation example: Germany increased conventional bond stock to offset liquidity effects.
- Additional obstacles:
  - Supply constraints: need pipeline of green projects; OECD (2021) suggests technical assistance and aggregation/securitization.
  - Legal frameworks: most sovereign debt legal frameworks do not allow earmarking of proceeds.
- Benefits:
  - Reputational benefits and halo effects (OECD 2017).
  - Market benchmark effects encouraging other issuers.
  - Longer maturities lower refinancing risk and can benefit EMDEs with less stable demand for extra-long maturities.
- Greenium (green premium) concept:
  - Definition: greenium = yield of similar conventional bond - yield of green bond.
  - Sign ambiguous theoretically: smaller issuance/liquidity could lead to negative greenium; ESG demand and transparency can justify positive greenium.

### Evidence on the sovereign greenium
- Literature and empirical findings:
  - Doronzo, Siracusa, and Antonelli (2021): mixed; greenium negative in primary market but slightly positive (0.5 bps) in secondary market (Eikon data).
  - IMF (2021a, 2021b): greenium of 5- and 10-year green bonds around 3 to 5 bps; greenium implied by swap spreads from 1 to 7 bps for six EU countries.
  - Karpf and Mandel (2018): US municipal bonds greenium negative historically but turned positive recently.
  - Baker and others (2021): greenium generally positive except when issued simultaneously with ordinary bonds from same issuer; in that case, a premium emerges over time on the secondary market.
- Summary statistics (2016–2022 averages unless stated):
  - Issuance size: green bond issuance is about 2.0 percent of total issuance, growing from 2.6 percent in 2018 to 3.2 percent in 2021.
  - Share and growth of green bond issuance larger for EMDEs than for advanced economies.
- Germany twin-bond evidence:
  - Germany issues conventional and green bonds sharing the same maturity date and coupon; green issuance typically smaller and issued later.
  - Example: conventional twin with maturity 2030 issued August 2019 size €30 billion; green twin issued May 2021 size €6 billion.
  - Observed greenium: oscillated between 2 to 5 basis points; consistently positive across twin maturities examined.
  - As of February 2020, four twin bonds on market with maturities 2025, 2030, 2031, and 2050; coupons zero for all bonds.
  - Greenium did not seem to react much to large uncertainty shocks such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
  - Finance agency facilitates switch trades allowing investors to exchange green bonds for conventional twins.

### Quantitative greenium and maturity findings
- Maturity:
  - Average maturity whole sample: 12.9 years for green bonds and 12.3 years for conventional bonds.
  - For EMDEs, the difference in maturity is almost three years (green longer).
- Yield and greenium summary estimates:
  - Average yield of green bonds lower than conventional bonds.
  - Greenium (average): 3.7 basis points for euro-denominated bonds; 30.4 basis points for USD-denominated bonds.
  - By economy type:
    - Emerging markets: 49.3 basis points for USD-denominated bonds and 12.5 basis points for euro-denominated bonds.
    - Advanced economies: 5 to 6 basis points (for currencies shown in Annex Table 3.5).
- Time-series variation:
  - Greenium increased over time (2018 to 2021): euro-denominated greenium rose from on average –2.0 basis points in 2018 to 6.8 basis points on average in 2021.
- Robustness:
  - Greenium estimates are robust to alternative estimation approaches (see Annex 3 in the source).

### Catastrophe (CAT) bonds — structure, market features, and pricing
- Structure and legal mechanics:
  - SPV setup; cedent pays premium upfront; SPV issues CAT bonds; proceeds held in safe assets and disbursed conditional on trigger; SPV insulation means cedent’s debt does not increase statistically.
  - Economically, SPV-held cash cannot be used by cedent until triggered; CAT bond credit rating differs from cedent.
- Risk modelling:
  - Third-party modelers (e.g., AIR Worldwide/Verisk); expected loss disclosed.
  - Many CAT bonds focus on extreme but nontail events with attachment and exhaustion points bounding investor losses by principal.
- Market evolution and issuance:
  - Public-sector CAT bond issuance increasing over time; largest cumulative public-sector player: United States (~$5.6 billion), followed by Mexico, Chile, Turkey.
  - Typical maturity: three to five years — may not fully reflect long-term climate-change risk.
  - Perils covered: mainly US earthquakes; storms and hurricanes significant; pandemics possible (World Bank pandemic coverage in 2017 paid for COVID-19).
- Pricing, efficiency, and intermediation:
  - Investors’ average coupon return around 2 to 4 times expected loss; cedents generally pay more than expected receipts.
  - Risk spreads widen materially after major catastrophes (examples: 2006 US hurricane; 2012 earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand).
  - Market inefficiencies: some evidence premium depends on cedent characteristics despite SPV insulation; high transaction costs and limited investor base.
  - World Bank intermediation: provides SPV services, simplifies procurement, reputation and experience contribute to narrowing spreads and mitigating legal and market-entry barriers.

### Holders of recent World Bank-intermediated sovereign CAT bonds — investor composition
- Jamaica (2021):
  - By Geography: Europe 60%, North America 24%, Bermuda 15%, Asia 1%.
  - By Investor Type: ILS fund 66%, Insurer/reinsurer 17%, Asset management 14%, Pension fund 3%.
- Mexico (2020):
  - By Geography: Europe 52%, North America 42%, Bermuda 5%, Asia 1%.
  - By Investor Type: ILS specialist fund 61%, Asset management 16%, Pension fund 15%, Insurer/reinsurer 8%.
- Philippines (2019):
  - By Geography: Europe 58%, North America 25%, Asia 13%, Bermuda 4%.
  - By Investor Type: Asset management 50%, ILS fund 29%, Insurer/reinsurer 13%, Pension fund 8%.
- Note: Most investors are in Europe; investor types concentrated among institutional investors with ILS expertise.

### Policy-relevant implications and recommendations
- Complementarity and trade-offs:
  - Green bonds finance mitigation and longer-term projects; CAT bonds transfer disaster risk and improve fiscal insurance.
  - Policymakers should optimize between investing in resilience-enhancing adaptation (which can reduce CAT bond premiums) and buying CAT bonds (which can improve financial sustainability).
- Recommendations for EMDEs and LICs:
  - Foster larger sovereign issuances of green and CAT bonds because these economies are most susceptible to climate change.
  - Implement institutions to prevent greenwashing to increase benefits of green bond issuance.
  - Combine financial innovation with traditional international support (grants and equity financing) for LICs and EMDEs with weak fundamentals.
  - Broaden investor base — including public-sector investors — to internalize geographically dispersed climate risks and improve crisis management by enabling ex ante commitments and timely disbursements.
- Market development actions:
  - Strengthen countries’ debt absorption capacity to realize gains from these instruments given large climate finance needs.
  - Improve transparency, create clearer national guidelines and standards for green definitions, and strengthen peer learning and climate information architecture to reduce issuance costs and increase benefits.
  - Consider technical assistance, aggregation, and securitization to mitigate supply constraints in green project pipelines.

### Empirical dataset note (Annex 1 highlights)
- From Eikon, 50 sovereign green bonds as of March 2022.
- Examples from Annex Table 1.1 (selected entries preserve source figures exactly):
  - France; Coupon: 1.75; Maturity: 6/25/2039; Issue Date: 1/31/2017; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 35,087
  - Germany; Coupon: 0; Maturity: 8/15/2030; Issue Date: 9/9/2020; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 7,371
  - Chile; Coupon: 3.5; Maturity: 1/25/2050; Issue Date: 6/25/2019; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 2,318
  - United Kingdom; Coupon: 0.875; Maturity: 7/31/2033; Issue Date: 9/22/2021; Principal Currency: British pound; Amount Issued (USD million): 13,673
  - Poland; Coupon: 0.5; Maturity: 12/20/2021; Issue Date: 12/20/2016; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 851
- Note on data specifics: some bonds have two ISINs for 144A and Reg S placements; seven such cases excluded from Annex Table 1.1 (four for Hong Kong, one for Egypt, one for Serbia, one for Sweden) or can be filtered by keeping bonds not privately placed.

*Source: IMF STAFF CLIMATE NOTE 2022/004 (Sovereign Climate Debt Instruments: An Overview of the Green and Catastrophe Bond Markets).*

### Introduction

### Introduction

### Role of fiscal policy and financing needs
- Fiscal policy is crucial for dealing with climate change, in addition to carbon pricing, by:
  - investing in climate-smart infrastructures, such as renewable energy generation, and
  - encouraging climate-smart technology research and development.
- The prepandemic research by G20 Foundations Platform calculated that the world needs 2.2 percent of GDP invested annually to deliver commitments from the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement.
- Adapting to the consequences of climate change and minimizing damage from climate-related natural disasters usually necessitates an increase in government spending, which must be accommodated within a country's overall budgetary structure.

### Financial innovation: green bonds and catastrophe bonds
- Green bonds:
  - Structured similarly to traditional “plain vanilla” bonds, with a “use of proceeds” clause stating funds will be utilized for green investments.
  - Allow policymakers to tap wider capital markets for financing Sustainable Development Goal–related projects.
- Catastrophe bonds:
  - Debt instruments that allow the issuer to get funding from the capital market if, and only if, catastrophic conditions (such as a hurricane) occur.
  - Can mitigate stress on debt sustainability after natural disasters.
- Rationale for analyzing both instruments together:
  - Both contribute to resilience to climate risks and have been recently issued at the sovereign level.
  - The financial industry is becoming increasingly important in accelerating the transition to sustainability and carbon neutrality.

### Market depth and recent sovereign issuance
- Sovereign green bonds make up about 0.2 percent of all government debt securities in the OECD area.
- In emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs), sovereign green bond issuances account for 12 percent of total green bond issuances (OECD 2021).
- Sovereign green bond market is likely to expand as countries use green bond issuance to demonstrate moral leadership and fund Paris Agreement commitments.
- A few countries have insured themselves against natural disasters; even large catastrophe bonds cover only a small portion of total possible damage.

### Literature gap and purpose of the note
- Literature on sovereign green and catastrophe bonds is minimal; most sustainable finance literature focuses on corporate and local government issuances.
- This note:
  - Studies developing markets for sovereign green and catastrophe bonds,
  - Examines characteristics of these instruments,
  - Analyzes their costs and benefits,
  - Contributes to understanding markets for climate financing and Fund work to mobilize public and private finance.

### Green bonds: definitions, standards, and data caveats
- Definitions and standards:
  - Green Bond Principles (GBPs) established in 2014 and maintained by ICMA provide guidelines and green project categories.
  - Climate Bonds Standards (CBSs), built on GBPs by Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI), provide sector-specific definitions and are used for CBI certification.
  - CBSs categorize eligible projects into eight groups: energy, transport, water, buildings, land use and marine resources, industry, waste and pollution control, and information communications and technology.
  - CBSs require documentation of use of proceeds, evaluation and selection processes, and management of proceeds before issuance and annually after issuance; certification requires fees to verifier organizations and is voluntary.
- Data differences and source used:
  - Bloomberg tags “Green Bond” when issuer self-labels or declares compliance with GBPs.
  - Environmental Finance lists bonds self-labeled as “Green.”
  - Eikon aligns with CBSs and data are reviewed by CBI; this paper relies on Eikon for consistency with CBSs and literature.
  - For sovereign green bonds, Eikon and Bloomberg are comparable.
- Public sector responses:
  - People’s Bank of China issued guidelines in 2015 and a catalog in 2021 defining eligible projects.
  - EU adopted EU taxonomy regulation in 2020 and proposed European green bond standard legislation in 2021.
  - Many other countries have issued green bond guidelines and frameworks.

### Evolution of sovereign green bonds and geographic concentration
- Timeline and scale:
  - Sovereign green bonds are a recent phenomenon, starting in 2016.
  - International organizations, municipalities, and private sectors increased issuance since 2007; until 2015 no central government issuance recorded.
  - Poland was the first sovereign issuer in 2016, followed by France in 2017.
  - Issuance recorded nearly $80 billion in 2021.
- Geographic concentration (cumulative issuance 2016–2021):
  - European countries: $161 billion
  - Asian Pacific countries: $9 billion
  - Western hemisphere countries: $8 billion
  - Middle East and Central Asian countries: less than $1 billion
  - African countries: less than $1 billion
- Largest issuer and relative issuance:
  - France has issued nearly $48 billion for green projects as of February 2022 and is the largest issuer.
  - Chile has the highest cumulative green bond issuance relative to GDP at the country level: 2.37 percent (relative to its GDP in 2021). Others are all below 2 percent as of February 2022.
- Maturity and investor behavior:
  - The average maturity as of issuance is 12.6 years with a standard deviation of 8.4 years.
  - Evidence suggests real money investors (pension funds, sovereign funds, insurance companies) in Europe invest with a long-term buy-and-hold perspective.

### Uses of proceeds (purposes) for sovereign green bonds
- Main purpose in sample: clean transport (Eikon classification).
- Other significant purposes: climate change adaptation and aquatic biodiversity conservation.
- Caveat: Eikon’s classification may not reflect all purposes of each bond issued.

### Costs of sovereign green bond issuance
- Three types of costs relative to conventional bonds (Doronzo, Siracusa, and Antonelli 2021):
  1. More disclosure and tracking for use of proceeds (e.g., CBI certification requires documentation and engagement with verifiers), with ambiguous net impact due to possible reduced uncertainty for buyers.
  2. Reputation risk if financed projects fail or are perceived as greenwashing; net impact ambiguous because green bonds can act as commitment devices improving planning and governance.
  3. Potential crowding out of conventional bonds, reducing liquidity and raising funding costs for both segments; mitigation examples include Germany increasing its stock of conventional bonds to offset liquidity effects.
- Additional obstacles:
  - Supply constraints: need for a pipeline of green projects to sustain supply and liquidity; OECD (2021) suggests technical assistance and aggregation/securitization to mitigate.
  - Legal frameworks: most sovereign debt legal frameworks do not allow earmarking of proceeds.

### Benefits of sovereign green bond issuance
- Reputational benefits and role as a commitment device (OECD 2017).
- Halo effect: commitment to finance green projects can send signals and improve reputation, potentially raising prices of issuer’s nongreen bonds.
- Market benchmark: sovereign issuance can encourage other issuers to enter the green bond market.
- Longer maturities: green bonds tend to be issued with long maturity, lowering refinancing risk and potentially benefiting emerging or less-developed countries with less stable demand for extra-long maturities.
- Green premium (greenium) concept:
  - Greenium = yield of similar conventional bond - yield of green bond
  - Positive greenium implies green bond yields less than similar conventional bond (higher price).
  - Theoretical sign ambiguous: smaller issuance and liquidity could lead to negative greenium; ESG investor demand and information on proceeds can justify a positive greenium.

### Evidence on sovereign greenium from literature
- Doronzo, Siracusa, and Antonelli (2021): mixed evidence; greenium negative in primary market but slightly positive (0.5 bps) in secondary market using Eikon data.
- IMF (2021a, 2021b): greenium of 5- and 10-year green bonds around 3 to 5 bps; greenium implied by swap spreads from 1 to 7 bps for six EU countries.
- Karpf and Mandel (2018) on US municipal bonds: greenium was negative but turned positive recently.
- Baker and others (2021): greenium generally positive except when issued simultaneously with ordinary bonds from same issuer; in that case, a premium emerges over time on the secondary market.

### How large is the sovereign greenium? — approach overview
- Germany provides twin-bond evidence since it issues conventional and green bonds that share the same maturity date and coupon (difference: use of proceeds and usually smaller green issuance volume issued later).
- Twin-bonds allow a benchmark measurement of greenium; for other countries, additional assumptions and regression analysis are used.
- Note on selection bias: estimation could be subject to selection bias as countries may not issue green bonds if greenium is expected to be negative.

### Germany case: twin bonds and observed greenium
- Germany issued twin bonds starting in 2020 to establish yields of green federal securities as Euro green finance market reference (German Finance Agency 2022).
- Example twin issuance:
  - Twin bonds with maturity in 2030: conventional bond issued in August 2019 with size of €30 billion; green bond issued in May 2021 with size of €6 billion.
- Observed greenium:
  - Germany’s greenium oscillated between 2 to 5 basis points.
  - As of February 2020, four twin bonds on market with maturities 2025, 2030, 2031, and 2050; coupons are zero for all bonds.
  - Although greenium behavior differs across maturities and yields can be positive or negative, the greenium is consistently positive.
  - Greenium does not seem to react much to large uncertainty shocks such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
- Market facilitation: the finance agency facilitates switch trades where investors can exchange their green bonds for the conventional twin.

### Other countries: estimation approach and summary statistics
- Twin bonds are not available for most countries; greenium is estimated using summary statistics and regression analysis.
- Summary statistics highlights (2016–2022 average unless otherwise stated):
  - Issuance size: green bond issuance is about 2.0 percent of total issuance, growing from 2.6 percent in 2018 to 3.2 percent in 2021.
  - The share and growth of green bond issuance are larger for EMDEs than for advanced economies.
- Annexes referenced for detailed statistics (issuance size, yield-to-maturity, spread, maturity) and currency breakdowns, noting that specifics are in Annex Tables 3.1–3.3.

*Source: IMF Staff Climate Notes — Introduction*

### 1. The greenium was small at issuance but has

### 1. The greenium was small at issuance but has increased

### Green bond maturity and yield findings
- Maturity:
  - Average maturity in the whole sample is 12.9 years for green bonds and 12.3 years for conventional bonds.
  - The longer maturity of green bond debt is more pronounced in emerging market and developing countries; the difference is almost three years for EMDEs.
- Yield and greenium:
  - Summary statistics indicate the average yield of green bonds is lower than conventional bonds.
  - Greenium estimates (average):
    - 3.7 basis points for euro-denominated bonds.
    - 30.4 basis points for USD-denominated bonds.
  - Greenium is larger for emerging market and developing economies than advanced economies, for all currencies of debt denomination. Specific estimates:
    - Emerging markets: 49.3 basis points for USD-denominated bonds and 12.5 basis points for euro-denominated bonds.
    - Advanced economies: 5 to 6 basis points (for the currencies shown in Annex Table 3.5).
- Time-series variation:
  - The greenium of both USD- and euro-denominated bonds—though they started small—has been increasing over time (2018 to 2021).
  - Euro-denominated greenium increased from on average –2.0 basis points in 2018 to 6.8 basis points on average in 2021.
- Robustness:
  - The greenium estimates are robust to alternative estimation approaches (see Annex 3).

### Policy-relevant implications for green bonds
- Potential issuer benefits:
  - Demand for green instruments can potentially allow governments to issue bonds with a longer maturity and to borrow at lower costs.
- Open questions and further research needs:
  - Whether administrative costs associated with green bond issuance exceed benefits is country-specific.
  - It remains open whether the purpose of the project associated with the green bond is a key determinant of the greenium, and whether green bonds have resulted in the climate outcomes they intended to achieve.
- Market development recommendations:
  - Strengthening peer learning and climate information architecture could help reduce issuance costs and increase benefits over time.
  - Improving transparency and creating clearer national guidelines and standards relating to eligibility and green definitions could facilitate further development of the green bond market.

### Catastrophe (CAT) bonds: structure and use
- Definition and function:
  - A catastrophe bond is a debt instrument that allows the cedent (the insured) to get funding from the capital market if and only if catastrophic conditions occur; it insures the cedent by shifting risk to holders who bet on nonoccurrence of catastrophic events.
- Trigger types:
  - Indemnity trigger: based on actual monetary losses to the cedent; advantage—insures against actual loss; disadvantage—time-consuming loss verification.
  - Industry loss trigger: based on industrywide losses.
  - Parametric index trigger: based on noneconomic catastrophic conditions (e.g., earthquake magnitude, hurricane wind speed); advantage—speedy settlement; disadvantage—may not insure actual loss amount.
  - Concept extends to noncatastrophic conditions (e.g., mortality rates) as insurance-linked securities (ILS).
- Legal and financial mechanics:
  - An SPV (special purpose vehicle) is set up; the cedent pays premiums upfront to the SPV in exchange for future reimbursement conditional on catastrophic events.
  - The SPV issues catastrophe bonds to investors; proceeds are kept in safe assets and disbursed either to cedent or investors depending on trigger occurrence.
  - Financially, CAT bonds are insulated from the cedent’s financial condition; credit rating differs from the cedent.
  - Statistically, issuance by the SPV means the cedent’s debt does not increase.
  - Economically, SPV-held cash cannot be used by the cedent until triggered.

### CAT bond risk modelling and market features
- Risk modeling:
  - Performed by third-party risk modelers (for example AIR Worldwide/Verisk); expected loss is disclosed in offering documentation.
  - Modeling often focuses on extreme but nontail events; many CAT bonds impose an attachment point and an exhaustion point bounding investor losses by principal.
- Typical maturity:
  - Typical maturity is three to five years, so long-term climate-change risk may not be fully reflected.
- Market evolution and issuance:
  - Public sector catastrophe bond issuance is increasing over time; nominal issuance amount and number of cedent countries trend upward.
  - Largest cumulative public-sector player is the United States, accounting cumulatively for nearly $5.6 billion, followed by Mexico, Chile, Turkey, etc.
  - Some cedents are local state agencies; central governments have issued CAT bonds (examples noted include Jamaica (2021), Mexico (2020), the Philippines (2019)).
- Perils covered:
  - Mainly US earthquakes; climate-related events such as storms and hurricanes also constitute a significant share.
  - Pandemics can be perils (World Bank issued five-year pandemic coverage in 2017 and received payment for COVID-19).

### Pricing, efficiency, and intermediation of CAT bonds
- Pricing and expected returns:
  - Aggregated data show investors’ average return to catastrophe bonds in coupon is around 2 to 4 times the expected loss.
  - Empirical evidence suggests cedents pay more than they receive in expectation.
  - Risk spreads have widened materially following major catastrophes (examples: 2006 US hurricane; 2012 earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand).
- Benchmarks and comparisons:
  - Self-insurance can avoid coupon payments but requires dedicated funds that cannot be used for other purposes; for countries with large opportunity costs, self-insurance can be more expensive than CAT bonds.
  - Traditional reinsurance premiums range from 3 to 5 times the expected loss, which is not very different from catastrophe bonds.
- Market inefficiencies and barriers:
  - Some literature argues the CAT bond market is inefficient; premium reportedly depends on cedent characteristics despite SPV insulation, creating higher premiums for new cedents.
  - High transaction costs and limited investor base are obstacles to wider sovereign use.
- Role of the World Bank:
  - Since 2016, all sovereign CAT bonds in the Artemis-compiled data set have been intermediated by the World Bank.
  - World Bank intermediation provides SPV services, simplifies procurement, and the institution’s reputation and experience contribute to narrowing spreads.
  - World Bank intermediation mitigates legal and market-entry barriers for countries seeking CAT bond coverage.

### Holders of recent sovereign catastrophe bonds (World Bank-intermediated issuances)
- Jamaica (2021):
  - By Geography: Europe 60%, North America 24%, Bermuda 15%, Asia 1%.
  - By Investor Type: ILS fund 66%, Insurer/reinsurer 17%, Asset management 14%, Pension fund 3%.
- Mexico (2020):
  - By Geography: Europe 52%, North America 42%, Bermuda 5%, Asia 1%.
  - By Investor Type: ILS specialist fund 61%, Asset management 16%, Pension fund 15%, Insurer/reinsurer 8%.
- Philippines (2019):
  - By Geography: Europe 58%, North America 25%, Asia 13%, Bermuda 4%.
  - By Investor Type: Asset management 50%, ILS fund 29%, Insurer/reinsurer 13%, Pension fund 8%.
- Note: Most investors are in Europe; investor types are concentrated among institutional investors with ILS expertise.

### Policy recommendations and conclusions
- Complementarity and trade-offs:
  - Green bonds and catastrophe bonds can complement each other: green bonds can finance mitigation and longer-term projects; catastrophe bonds transfer disaster risk and improve fiscal insurance.
  - Policymakers need to optimize use between investing in resilience-enhancing adaptation and buying catastrophe bonds; adaptation can reduce disaster risks and thus CAT bond premiums, while CAT bonds can improve financial sustainability.
- For EMDEs and LICs:
  - Emerging and developing economies should foster larger sovereign issuances of these instruments since they are most susceptible to climate change.
  - Greater green bond issuance (with institutions to prevent greenwashing) would facilitate financing of climate-related projects and the transition to low-carbon economies.
  - Increasing market size could make the greenium more sizable, as observed in advanced economies.
  - EMDEs often face higher premiums and volatility in regular bond markets and could benefit from green bond issuance to access wider capital markets at reasonable rates.
  - Catastrophe bonds could be critical for EMDEs with high climate risks but low adaptive capacities (for example, small islands).
  - LICs and EMDEs with weak fundamentals have limited access; combining financial innovation with traditional international support (grants and equity financing) would be useful.
- Market development actions:
  - Strengthen countries’ debt absorption capacity to realize gains from these instruments given large climate finance needs.
  - Improve transparency, create clearer national guidelines and standards for green definitions, and strengthen peer learning and climate information architecture to reduce costs and increase benefits.
  - Broaden investor base—including public-sector investors—to help internalize geographically dispersed climate risks and improve crisis management by enabling ex ante commitments and timely disbursements.

*Source: IMF staff climate note (Eikon and IMF staff calculations; World Bank and Artemis data cited within).*

### Annex 1. List of Green Bonds Used in the Analysis

### Annex 1. List of Green Bonds Used in the Analysis

### Overview
- From Eikon, there were 50 sovereign green bonds as of March 2022.
- One thing to note is that there might be two International Securities Identification Numbers for the same bond from Eikon since one International Securities Identification Number is under 144A and another is under Reg S in the United States, despite the same underlying security.
- There are seven cases in our sample (four for Hong Kong, one for Egypt, one for Serbia, and one for Sweden), which are excluded from Annex Table 1.1. Alternatively, one can filter them out by keeping only bonds that are not privately placed.

### Annex Table 1.1. List of sovereign green bonds (numbered entries)
- 1 — Issuer: Belgium; Coupon: 1.25; Maturity: 4/22/2033; Issue Date: 3/5/2018; ISIN: BE0000346552; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 11,828
- 2 — Issuer: Chile; Coupon: 3.5; Maturity: 1/25/2050; Issue Date: 6/25/2019; ISIN: US168863DL94; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 2,318
- 3 — Issuer: Chile; Coupon: 0.83; Maturity: 7/2/2031; Issue Date: 7/2/2019; ISIN: XS1843433639; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 2,231
- 4 — Issuer: Chile; Coupon: 2.55; Maturity: 1/27/2032; Issue Date: 1/27/2020; ISIN: US168863DN50; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,500
- 5 — Issuer: Chile; Coupon: 1.25; Maturity: 1/29/2040; Issue Date: 1/29/2020; ISIN: XS2108987517; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,448
- 6 — Issuer: Colombia; Coupon: 7; Maturity: 3/26/2031; Issue Date: 9/29/2021; ISIN: COL17CT03797; Principal Currency: Colombian peso; Amount Issued (USD million): 374
- 7 — Issuer: Denmark; Coupon: 0; Maturity: 11/15/2031; Issue Date: 1/21/2022; ISIN: DK0009924375; Principal Currency: Danish krone; Amount Issued (USD million): 763
- 8 — Issuer: Egypt; Coupon: 5.25; Maturity: 10/6/2025; Issue Date: 10/6/2020; ISIN: US038461AS83; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 750
- 9 — Issuer: Fiji; Coupon: 4; Maturity: 11/1/2022; Issue Date: 11/1/2017; ISIN: FJ0406990624; Principal Currency: Fijian dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 9
- 10 — Issuer: Fiji; Coupon: 6.3; Maturity: 11/1/2030; Issue Date: 11/1/2017; ISIN: FJ0406990632; Principal Currency: Fijian dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 38
- 11 — Issuer: France; Coupon: 1.75; Maturity: 6/25/2039; Issue Date: 1/31/2017; ISIN: FR0013234333; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 35,087
- 12 — Issuer: France; Coupon: 0.5; Maturity: 6/25/2044; Issue Date: 3/23/2021; ISIN: FR0014002JM6; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 12,930
- 13 — Issuer: Germany; Coupon: 0; Maturity: 8/15/2030; Issue Date: 9/9/2020; ISIN: DE0001030708; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 7,371
- 14 — Issuer: Germany; Coupon: 0; Maturity: 10/10/2025; Issue Date: 11/6/2020; ISIN: DE0001030716; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 5,707
- 15 — Issuer: Germany; Coupon: 0; Maturity: 8/15/2050; Issue Date: 5/18/2021; ISIN: DE0001030724; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 6,804
- 16 — Issuer: Germany; Coupon: 0; Maturity: 8/15/2031; Issue Date: 9/10/2021; ISIN: DE0001030732; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 7,371
- 17 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 2.5; Maturity: 5/28/2024; Issue Date: 5/28/2019; ISIN: US43858AAB61; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,000
- 18 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 0.625; Maturity: 2/2/2026; Issue Date: 2/2/2021; ISIN: US43858AAC45; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,000
- 19 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 1.375; Maturity: 2/2/2031; Issue Date: 2/2/2021; ISIN: US43858AAD28; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,000
- 20 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 2.375; Maturity: 2/2/2051; Issue Date: 2/2/2021; ISIN: US43858AAE01; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 500
- 21 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 0; Maturity: 11/24/2026; Issue Date: 11/24/2021; ISIN: HK0000789849; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,427
- 22 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 1; Maturity: 11/24/2041; Issue Date: 11/24/2021; ISIN: HK0000789856; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 571
- 23 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 1.75; Maturity: 11/24/2031; Issue Date: 11/24/2021; ISIN: HK0000789823; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,000
- 24 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 2.8; Maturity: 11/30/2024; Issue Date: 11/30/2021; ISIN: HK0000789864; Principal Currency: Chinese yuan; Amount Issued (USD million): 394
- 25 — Issuer: Hong Kong; Coupon: 3; Maturity: 11/30/2026; Issue Date: 11/30/2021; ISIN: HK0000789872; Principal Currency: Chinese yuan; Amount Issued (USD million): 394
- 26 — Issuer: Hungary; Coupon: 1.75; Maturity: 6/5/2035; Issue Date: 6/5/2020; ISIN: XS2181689659; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,701
- 27 — Issuer: Hungary; Coupon: 1.03; Maturity: 9/17/2027; Issue Date: 9/18/2020; ISIN: JP534800CL92; Principal Currency: Japanese yen; Amount Issued (USD million): 136
- 28 — Issuer: Hungary; Coupon: 1.29; Maturity: 9/18/2030; Issue Date: 9/18/2020; ISIN: JP534800DL91; Principal Currency: Japanese yen; Amount Issued (USD million): 39
- 29 — Issuer: Hungary; Coupon: 4; Maturity: 4/28/2051; Issue Date: 4/28/2021; ISIN: HU0000404991; Principal Currency: Hungarian forint; Amount Issued (USD million): 301
- 30 — Issuer: Hungary; Coupon: 3.28; Maturity: 12/16/2024; Issue Date: 12/14/2021; ISIN: CND10004QFJ7; Principal Currency: Chinese yuan; Amount Issued (USD million): 157
- 31 — Issuer: Hungary; Coupon: 4.5; Maturity: 5/27/2032; Issue Date: 1/26/2022; ISIN: HU0000405535; Principal Currency: Hungarian forint; Amount Issued (USD million): 66
- 32 — Issuer: Ireland; Coupon: 1.35; Maturity: 3/18/2031; Issue Date: 10/17/2018; ISIN: IE00BFZRQ242; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 7,816
- 33 — Issuer: Italy; Coupon: 1.5; Maturity: 4/30/2045; Issue Date: 3/10/2021; ISIN: IT0005438004; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 15,309
- 34 — Issuer: Korea; Coupon: 2.5; Maturity: 6/19/2029; Issue Date: 6/19/2019; ISIN: US50064FAQ72; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,000
- 35 — Issuer: Korea; Coupon: 0; Maturity: 10/15/2026; Issue Date: 10/15/2021; ISIN: XS2376820259; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 799
- 36 — Issuer: Latvia; Coupon: (blank); Maturity: 1/23/2030; Issue Date: 12/13/2021; ISIN: (blank); Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 566
- 37 — Issuer: Lithuania; Coupon: 1.2; Maturity: 5/3/2028; Issue Date: 5/3/2018; ISIN: LT0000610305; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 78
- 38 — Issuer: Netherlands; Coupon: 0.5; Maturity: 1/15/2040; Issue Date: 5/23/2019; ISIN: NL0013552060; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 12,143
- 39 — Issuer: Nigeria; Coupon: 13.48; Maturity: 12/22/2022; Issue Date: 12/22/2017; ISIN: NGFGB2022S13; Principal Currency: Nigerian naira; Amount Issued (USD million): 26
- 40 — Issuer: Nigeria; Coupon: 14.5; Maturity: 6/13/2026; Issue Date: 6/13/2019; ISIN: NGFGB2026S27; Principal Currency: Nigerian naira; Amount Issued (USD million): 36
- 41 — Issuer: Poland; Coupon: 0.5; Maturity: 12/20/2021; Issue Date: 12/20/2016; ISIN: XS1536786939; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 851
- 42 — Issuer: Poland; Coupon: 1.125; Maturity: 8/7/2026; Issue Date: 2/7/2018; ISIN: XS1766612672; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,134
- 43 — Issuer: Poland; Coupon: 1; Maturity: 3/7/2029; Issue Date: 3/7/2019; ISIN: XS1958534528; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,701
- 44 — Issuer: Poland; Coupon: 2; Maturity: 3/8/2049; Issue Date: 3/7/2019; ISIN: XS1960361720; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 571
- 45 — Issuer: Serbia; Coupon: 1; Maturity: 9/23/2028; Issue Date: 9/23/2021; ISIN: XS2388558889; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 1,134
- 46 — Issuer: Seychelles; Coupon: 6.5; Maturity: 10/11/2028; Issue Date: 10/11/2018; ISIN: XS1885544236; Principal Currency: US dollar; Amount Issued (USD million): 15
- 47 — Issuer: Spain; Coupon: 1; Maturity: 7/30/2042; Issue Date: 9/14/2021; ISIN: ES0000012J07; Principal Currency: Euro; Amount Issued (USD million): 5,670
- 48 — Issuer: Sweden; Coupon: 0.125; Maturity: 9/9/2030; Issue Date: 9/9/2020; ISIN: XS2226974413; Principal Currency: Swedish krona; Amount Issued (USD million): 2,218
- 49 — Issuer: United Kingdom; Coupon: 0.875; Maturity: 7/31/2033; Issue Date: 9/22/2021; ISIN: GB00BM8Z2S21; Principal Currency: British pound; Amount Issued (USD million): 13,673
- 50 — Issuer: United Kingdom; Coupon: 1.5; Maturity: 7/31/2053; Issue Date: 10/22/2021; ISIN: GB00BM8Z2V59; Principal Currency: British pound; Amount Issued (USD million): 8,204

*Source: clnea2022004 - Annex 1. List of Green Bonds Used in the Analysis (IMF Staff Climate Notes).*

### References

### References

### Covered topics and thematic grouping
- Green bonds and standards
  - Baker, Malcolm, Daniel Bergstresser, George Serafeim, and Jeffrey Wurgler. 2021. “The Pricing and Ownership of U.S. Green Bonds.” Annual Review of Financial Economies.
  - Cortellini, Giuseppe, and Ida Panetta. 2021. “Green Bond: A Systematic Literature Review for Future Research Agendas.” Journal of Risk and Financial Management 14 (12): 589.
  - Climate Bonds Initiative. 2019. “Climate Bonds Standard Version 3.0.” https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/climate-bonds-standard-v3-20191210.pdf
  - International Capital Market Association. 2017. “The GBP Databases and Indices Working Group – Summary of Green Bond Database Providers.” https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/Green-Bond-Databases-Summary-Document-190617.pdf
  - International Capital Market Association. 2021. “Green Bond Principles Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Green Bonds.” https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Sustainable-finance/2021-updates/Green-Bond-Principles-June-2021-140621.pdf
  - Doronzo, Raffaele, Vittorio Siracusa, and Stefano Antonelli. 2021. “Green Bonds: the Sovereign Issuer’s Perspective.” Bank of Italy, Markets, Infrastructures, Payment Systems Working Paper 3, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3854966#
  - Karpf, Andreas, and Antoine Mandel. 2018. “The Changing Value of the ‘Green’ Label on the US Municipal Bond Market.” Nature Climate Change 8: 161–65.
  - Rose, Paul. 2021. “Debt for Climate: Green Bonds and Other Instruments.” Research Handbook on Climate Finance and Investment Law.
  - World Bank. 2015. “What Are Green Bonds (English).” https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/400251468187810398/pdf/99662-REVISED-WB-Green-Bond-Box393208B-PUBLIC.pdf
  - People’s Bank of China. 2021. “List of Eligible Green Bond Categories 2021 (绿色债券支持项目目录 2021).” http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/4236341/2021042115215612655.pdf
  - German Finance Agency. 2022. “Federal Republic of Germany Green Bond Investor Presentation.”
  - Green Finance Platform. 2022. “Policies and Regulations.” https://www.greenfinanceplatform.org/financial-measures/browse
  - European Commission. 2021. “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Green Bonds.” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0391
  - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2021. “Scaling Up Green, Social, Sustainability and Sustainability-linked Bond Issuances in Developing Countries.” OECD Publishing, Paris

- Catastrophe bonds, catastrophe financing, and market efficiency
  - Chatoro, Marian, Athanasios A. Pantelous, and Jia Shao. 2021. “Exploring Inefficiencies in the Primary Catastrophe Bond Market: Focus on the Issuer Effect.” SSRN Working Paper.
  - Difiore, Peter, Cedric Drui, and Sophie Ware. 2021. “Catastrophe Bonds: Natural Diversification.” Neuberger Berman White Paper.
  - Gotze, Tobia, and Marc Gurtler. 2020. “Hard Markets, Hard Times: On the Inefficiency of the CAT Bond Market.” Journal of Corporate Finance 62: 101553.
  - White, Harry. 2020. “Modeling Fundamental: So You Want to Issue a Cat Bond.” https://www.air-worldwide.com/publications/air-currents/2020/modeling-fundamentals-so-you-want-to-issue-a-cat-bond/
  - Michael-Kerjan, Erwann, Ivan Zelenko, Victor Cardenas, and Daniel Turgel. 2011. “Catastrophe Financing for Governments: Learning from the 2009-2012 MultiCat Program in Mexico.” OECD Working Papers on Finance Insurance and Private Pensions 9, OECD Publishing, Paris.
  - World Bank. 2019. “World Bank Catastrophe Bond Transaction Insures the Republic of Philippines against Natural Disaster-related Losses Up to US$225 Million.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/11/25/world-bank-catastrophe-bond-transaction-insures-the-republic-of-philippines-against-natural-disaster-related-losses-up-to-usd225-million
  - World Bank. 2020a. “Case Study Insuring Mexico against Natural Disaster.” https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/737151585254940284-0340022020/original/FONDENMexicoCatBondCaseStudy3.4.2020final.pdf
  - World Bank. 2020b. “World Bank Catastrophe Bond Provides Financial Protection to Mexico for Earthquakes and Named Storms.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/03/09/world-bank-catastrophe-bond-provides-financial-protection-to-mexico-for-earthquakes-and-named-storms
  - World Bank. 2021. “World Bank Catastrophe Bond Provides Jamaica $185 Million in Storm Protection.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/07/19/world-bank-catastrophe-bond-provides-jamaica-185-million-in-storm-protection

- Sovereign debt instruments, state-contingent debt, and fiscal resilience
  - Cohen, Charles, Ali Abbas, Myrvin Anthony, Tom Best, Peter Breuer, Hui Miao, Alla Myrvoda, and Eriko Toga. 2020. “The Role of State-Contingent Debt Instruments in Sovereign Debt Restrucruings.” IMF Staff Discussion Note 20/06, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
  - International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2019. “Building Resilience in Developing Countries Vulnerable to Large Natural Disasters.” IMF Policy Paper, Washington, DC.
  - International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2021a. “ESG Monitor 2021 Q1.” Washington, DC.
  - International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2021b. “ESG Monitor 2021 Q2.” Washington, DC.
  - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Bank. 2019. “Fiscal Resilience to Natural Disasters: Lessons from Country Experiences.” OECD Publishing, Paris.
  - Ferreira, Caio, David Lukas Rozumek, Ranjit Singh, and Felix Suntheim. 2021. “Strengthening the Climate Information Architecture.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/003, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

- Case studies, implementation challenges, and reconstruction
  - Becerra, Oscar, Eduardo Cavallo, and Ilan Noy. 2012. “Foreign Aid in the Aftermath of Large Natural Disasters.” IDB Working Paper 333, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC.
  - U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2011. “Haiti Reconstruction: Factors Contributing to Delays in USAID Infrastructure Construction.” Washington, DC.
  - World Wildlife Fund. 2018. “Annual report 2018.” Washington, DC: WWF.

- Cross-cutting analysis, market infrastructure, and data
  - International Capital Market Association. 2017. “The GBP Databases and Indices Working Group – Summary of Green Bond Database Providers.” https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/Green-Bond-Databases-Summary-Document-190617.pdf
  - Climate Bonds Initiative. 2019. “Climate Bonds Standard Version 3.0.” https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/climate-bonds-standard-v3-20191210.pdf
  - International Capital Market Association. 2021. “Green Bond Principles Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Green Bonds.” https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Sustainable-finance/2021-updates/Green-Bond-Principles-June-2021-140621.pdf
  - Green Finance Platform. 2022. “Policies and Regulations.” https://www.greenfinanceplatform.org/financial-measures/browse

### Key numeric and document identifiers preserved from the references
- IMF Staff Discussion Note 20/06
- IMF Staff Climate Note 2021/003
- IMF STAFF CLIMATE NOTE 2022/004
- IDB Working Paper 333
- Journal volume and article identifiers: Journal of Risk and Financial Management 14 (12): 589; Journal of Corporate Finance 62: 101553
- Named monetary amounts: US$225 Million; $185 Million
- Relevant years explicitly cited: 2011, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022

*Sovereign Climate Debt Instruments: An Overview of the Green and Catastrophe Bond Markets — IMF STAFF CLIMATE NOTE 2022/004 (References).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/staff-climate-notes/2022/english/clnea2022004.pdf_