## The Gambia: IMF Technical Assistance Report (tarea2025019-print-pdf) — Extracted Chapter Content ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [The Gambia: IMF Technical Assistance Report (tarea2025019-print-pdf) — Extracted Chapter Content](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/tar/2025/english/tarea2025019-print-pdf.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/tar/2025/english/tarea2025019-print-pdf.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/tar/2025/english/tarea2025019-print-pdf.pdf.json) --- ### Executive summary — mission, mandate, and high-level findings - Mission: IMF Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) CD mission to Banjul, May 20-31, 2024, at request of Mr. Seedy K.M. Keita, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA). - Team leadership and members: - Led by Ms. Dora Benedek (FAD). - Team: Mr. Alberto Garcia Huitron, Ms. Danielle Minnett, Ms. Junko Mochizuki (all FAD), and Ms. Alice Tianbo Zhang (SPR). - Stakeholder engagement: MoFEA, MECCNAR, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Ministry for Agriculture, Ministry for Transport, Works and Infrastructure, Ministry of Fisheries and Water Resources, Ministry for Land and Regional Development, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare, National Social Protection Secretariat, National Disaster Management Agency, NAWEC, PURA; consultations with World Bank, African Development Bank, UNDP, UNEP, French Embassy. - Key climate-fiscal findings: - Sea level rise poses substantial risks; recurring droughts and floods impose large economic and welfare losses. - Increasing temperature and decreasing rainfall threaten rain-fed agriculture. - Salinization, soil degradation, groundwater depletion, and deforestation expected to intensify. - Adaptation currently relies heavily on public investment; private sector participation limited; institutional fragmentation and limited technical capacity constrain planning and implementation. - No cost attached to direct groundwater abstraction; unregulated practices reduce network availability and exacerbate health and coastal risks. - Priority adaptation actions (selected): - Inventory of existing groundwater boreholes and priority monitoring station installation. - Explore groundwater permitting/charges with social protection compensation for vulnerable households. - Address Non-Revenue Water (NRW) and promote rainwater harvesting. - Develop a disaster risk financing (DRF) strategy and complete the social registry to link to DRM systems. - Accelerate Climate Smart Agriculture, nature-based solutions, index-based insurance feasibility, and land policy/cadastre completion. - Mitigation highlights: - Deforestation and agriculture (including livestock) account for 56 percent of GHG emissions; household charcoal/firewood use is a major driver. - Suggested carbon pricing path: introduce USD 5 carbon price per ton of CO2e in 2025, increase linearly by 2030 to around USD 25 (efficient level); complement with social protection compensation. - Remove fossil fuel excise exemptions; align electricity tariffs with cost recovery. - Consider Payment for Environmental Services (PES) financing partly from carbon pricing revenues. - Institutional priorities: - Strengthen long-term planning horizons, clarify roles/responsibilities, legitimize coordination structures (legislative options), and operationalize monitoring and MRV systems. ### Geography, historical trends, and projected hazards - Geography and exposure: - Coastline: around 80km with 200km of sheltered shoreline. - Average elevation: 34m above sea level; Greater Banjul Area at sea level, home to around 1.4 million residents (>60 percent of population). - The Gambia has one of the lowest average country elevations globally. - Historical climate trends: - Tropical savannah climate: rainy season June-September; dry season October-May. - Annual average temperature: 26°C (coast) to 30°C (eastern inland). - Since the 1960s, annual average temperature risen by around 1.0°C relative to 1901-1930. - Average precipitation declined by more than 100mm per year relative to 1901-1930. - Sea level rise (SLR) projections (relative to 2000 levels): - Under RCP 4.5: 0.12-0.41m by 2050; 0.24-1.07m by 2100. - Under 0.2m SLR: Tanbi Wetland National Park (TWNP), ~6,300 hectares, submerged. - Under 1.0m SLR (anticipated under current policies by 2050-2100): - 6,500ha of woodland and 40,900ha of mangroves at risk in North Bank, West Coast, and Central River regions. - Within inundated area, infrastructure at risk includes National Assembly Building, Banjul water treatment plant, Banjul pumping station, ports, schools, cultural sites, tourism development areas. - By some estimates, 60% of mangrove forests, 33% of swamp areas and 20% of rice-growing areas will be inundated with 1m sea level rise. - Coastal erosion and sediment loss: 200,000 to 300,000m of sediment lost annually; land loss rate estimated at 2.5-3ha per year; total land loss could reach 7.65km2 along selected coastal stretches. - Conservative economic cost estimate: SLR-induced storms could reach USD 2 billion by 2090 without adaptation. - Historical disasters and human impacts: - Since 1950: 33 climate-related disasters (Drought 7; Epidemic 4; Flood 11; Infestation 4; Storm 6; Wildfire 1). - Total deaths: 442. - Total affected (injured, affected, or made homeless): 1,506,535. - Example: 2011/2012 and 2014/2015 droughts led to a 50 percent drop in crop output. ### Socioeconomic indicators (Average 2019-2023 unless noted) - Land area (sq. km): 10,120.0 - Population, total (million): 2.71 - Population density (people per sq. km of land area): 254 - Population growth (annual %): 2.5 - Rural population (% of total population): 37.1 - GDP (current USD billion) *: 2.19 - GDP growth (annual %): 3.9 - GNI per capita, PPP (current international $): 2,240.0 - Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) *: 10.4 - Poverty headcount ratio, national poverty lines (% of population): 53.4 - Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP): 21.6 - Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate): 48.2 - Energy imports, net (% of energy use): 63.0 - Access to electricity (% of population): 62.7 - Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (% of population): 1.8 - Annual freshwater withdrawals, agriculture (% of total freshwater withdrawal): 38.6 - Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output): 27.0 - PM2.5 air pollution, exceeding WHO guidelines (% of total): 100.0 - Total greenhouse gas emissions (% change from 1990): 289.4 - Notes: Indicators marked with * reflect the latest available year in 2022. ### Coastal management: options, risks, and recommendations - Short-to-medium term options: engineered, sediment, and ecosystem-based protection; example ecosystem project to restore >10,000ha of degraded forests, savanna, and mangroves. - Proposed USD 30 million coastal infrastructure resilience project with GCF and UNDP. - Caution: soft and hard protection measures do not remove risk; net-benefits evaluation required to avoid stranded assets; past sand replenishment (2003) lost sand by 2009 — cited as maladaptation example. - Medium-to-long term measures: land-use planning, no-development zones (example guidance: 150 meters inland from high-water mark), managed coastal realignment. - Project priority: Coastal Zone Adaptation Project to protect lowland rice areas that constitute 64% of crop land area; recommendation to revise and resubmit to GCF Board. - Coastal recommendations (preserved): - Finalize, enact, and enforce the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Bill and Policy to: 1) Define institutional framework for implementation; 2) Integrate long-term climate change projections; 3) Produce and maintain geospatial data on coastal land and land use; 4) Identify potential stranded assets and communities at risk under projected scenarios; 5) Consider full range of adaptation options, including no-development zone, managed relocation, coastal protection. ### Land management — facts, gaps, and recommendations - Land facts: - Dual land institution: all land officially public yet ~90 percent under customary tenure. - Country size and land cover reported: total land area of 11,300km.2; forest 52% (84% of which is savanna woodland); crop area 32%; protected area 352 km2 (3.3%). - Population projection: doubling of population by 2050. - Key gaps: - Lack of cadastral map; zoning enforcement weak; land information not systematically digitized. - Overlapping legal jurisdictions and weak enforcement of property rights deter private investment (including renewables). - No well-defined rules on permitting to clear forests for agricultural use. - Recommendations (preserved): - MLRGRA, with relevant line ministries, to conduct land surveys and build a cadastral map. - MLRGRA, with relevant line ministries, to complete development and adoption of the National Land Policy. ### Water sector — resources, governance, risks, and recommendations - Basin context: Transboundary Gambian River Basin shared with Senegal, Guinea, Guinea Bissau. - Water statistics (2020, Aquastat-based): - Municipal usage: 41.2 million cubic meters (MCM)/year. - Agriculture: 39.2 MCM/year. - Industrial withdrawal: 21.2 MCM/year (underpinning ~17 percent of GDP). - Groundwater reliance: - ~70 percent of irrigated area equipped with groundwater abstraction. - Total renewable water resources (2020, FAO Aquastat): 8.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) composed of 8.0 BCM renewable groundwater. - Per capita renewable water availability (2020): 3,310 cubic meters (cum)/inhabitant/year (regional average: 10,695 cum/inhabitant/year). - Current water stress: low (<10 percent); projected to increase to medium-high (20 – 40 percent) later in 21st century under SSP3 RCP7.0. - Crop yield projected losses by 2050 (compared to present): - Groundnuts: 1.6 percent presently to 7.9 percent by 2050. - Millet: 2.9 percent presently to 12 percent by 2050. - Rice: 3.9 percent presently to 13.7 percent by 2050. - Urban water supply and NAWEC: - NAWEC provides urban water to 92,000 customers (85,000 active). - Urban water supply fully based on groundwater extraction; routine outages reported. - NRW estimates range between 20-40 percent (2011-2020). - Estimated NAWEC revenue gaps: GMD 1.4 million in 2022; GMD 1.6 million in 2023. - Urban water tariff (per cubic meter, as presented): - Domestic 0-10 cum: 6.84 GMD - Domestic 11-25 cum: 14.15 GMD - Domestic 26-40 cum: 18.86 GMD - Domestic Balance: 23.58 GMD - Commercial: 28.5 GMD - Hotel/Industries: 40.09 GMD - Agriculture: 14.15 GMD - Area Council/Central Government: 19.79 GMD - Exchange rate note: 1 United States Dollar (USD) equals 67 Gambian Dalasi (GMD) as of May 29, 2024. - Groundwater governance: - Around 40 observational boreholes for monitoring (about half in GBA); no complete inventory of boreholes; illegal drilling rampant. - National Water Policy (2006) calls for abstraction and impounding licensing; not implemented. - Recommended phased approach: inventory boreholes; phased permitting (flat licensing fee initially); segment end-users; move towards usage pricing measured by abstraction. - Hydromet and rainwater harvesting: - Meteorological network functioning; hydrological monitoring down due to maintenance shortfalls. - Rainwater harvesting policy under WB-funded project being developed; pilot in Kotu Stream Catchment Areas. - Water sector SDG and cost estimates: - IMF TA estimate: universal safely managed access to water and sanitation at annualized cost of 1.5 percent of GDP by 2030. - Additional climate-resilient water infrastructure cost: 0.1-0.2 percent of GDP. - Sector recommendations (preserved): - NAWEC to implement NRW measures and PURA to monitor. - PURA and NAWEC to achieve full financial cost recovery of water with tariff adjustment. - DWR, with line ministries and local governments, to establish borehole inventory and groundwater abstraction licensing; move long-term to groundwater abstraction fees reflective of full economic cost. ### Agriculture, climate-smart agriculture (CSA), finance, and risk management - Agriculture importance and trade: - Agriculture provides ~half of total employment. - Agriculture generated over 22 percent of GDP in 2022 (WB WDI). - Rice imports: USD 38.4 million (2021); Groundnuts exports USD 2.0 million (2021); Cashew exports USD 1.3 million (2021). - Projected crop yield changes under RCP 8.5 (IMF staff IFAD tool) — relative to 2020: - Groundnuts: 2030 Median -5.04% / 2030 Optimistic +3.9% / 2050 Median -15.14% / 2050 Optimistic -6.53% - Millet: 2030 Median -2.43% / 2030 Optimistic +6.54% / 2050 Median -8.56% / 2050 Optimistic -3.63% - Rice (no irrigation): 2030 Median -3.23% / 2030 Optimistic +1.03 / 2050 Median -14.77% / 2050 Optimistic -7.56% - Rice (with irrigation): 2030 Median -2.77% / 2030 Optimistic -1.15% / 2050 Median -9.62% / 2050 Optimistic -4.85% - Finance and institutional arrangements: - Commercial banks lent only 4 percent of their portfolio to agriculture across five years ending 2017/2018. - Planned instrument: GAMIRSAL (Gambia Incentives-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending) with AfDB seed funding to de-risk agricultural financing. - Feasible options: credit guarantees, index-based insurance, bundling risk management, credit, and technical knowledge. - Bundling example — PULA (Kenya): - Bundles area-yield/weather-index insurance with agricultural inputs and advisory; insured 543,000 farmers in 2020; aims for 8 million by 2025. - Disaster risk management and financing: - Annual average losses from riverine floods estimated at USD 3.2 million. - On average, 350,000 people (19 percent of population) affected by severe droughts annually; drought-affected population expected to increase over 50 percent by 2050 under RCP8.5. - Access to USD 20 million under World Bank DPL with Catastrophe Drawdown Option (CATDDO) between 2024-2027. - Drought coverage of USD 3.76 million under African Risk Capacity (50 percent financing from AfDB). - DRF Diagnostics under AfDB’s ADRiFi Programme to be completed in June 2024. - Operational bottlenecks: ex-post rapid assessments, approval delays (e.g., ARC payout ground-truthing and administrative procedures took ~120 days in 2023). - Recommendations: official guidelines/SOPs for advanced financing requests and budget execution; consider forecast-based financing; integrate social registry with NDMA cash transfer program. - Social protection: - National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) 2015-2025 aims for inclusive system by 2035. - National Social Protection Secretariat (NSPS) established 2019. - Gambia Social Registry (GamSR) under WB assistance: data for 200,533 households across 40 districts (except Banjul); full completion expected by end 2024. - NSPS/NDMA technical working group drafting cash transfer guideline expected Q2/2024. - Agriculture recommendations (preserved): - Add conditionality to social programs in agriculture based on good environmental practices, agroforestry and conservation agriculture. - Identify and prioritize policy options to foster financial inclusion of small farmers as part of National DRF Strategy. - Evaluate/scale credit guarantees, index-based insurance, and other risk-sharing options. ### Emissions, forestry, PES, and clean cooking - Emissions overview (IMF estimates): - Total emissions: 2.74 MtCO2e (2019); 2.76 MtCO2e (2020). - Emissions per capita: 1.28 tCO2e (implied 2019); global average 6.5 tCO2e per capita. - Emission intensity of GDP: 1,654 tons CO2e per million of GDP; global average 560 tons CO2e per million of GDP. - Sectoral emissions composition (2019): - Agriculture: 35.8 percent. - LULUCF: 19.3 percent. - Waste: 17.7 percent. - Energy sector: 27 percent (Power 13 percent; Transport 11 percent; Buildings 3 percent). - NDC2: - Revised NDC2 submitted 2021 with a reduction target of 49.7 percent vs BAU; all objectives conditional on international finance/technology. - IMF BAU projects emissions path slightly above the authorities’ BAU; IMF estimates The Gambia needs relatively small effort to achieve NDC2 — by 2030 emissions projected 1.2 percent above the target by 2030 under IMF estimates. - Forestry and clean cooking: - Biomass = 78 percent of household energy consumption; kerosene 21 percent. - Access to clean cooking: less than 5 percent (other section notes 1.8 percent). - Forest cover: about 40 percent territory; FAO historical: ~60 percent in 1960s (loss ~one third over 60 years). - Forest area distribution: - 38 thousand hectares of forest parks. - 43 thousand hectares of community forests. - ~20 thousand hectares of private forests. - ~300 thousand hectares state parks not protected or properly managed. - MECCNAR target: reach 200 thousand hectares of forest given to communities. - PES effectiveness and design: - International evidence: PES can reduce deforestation by 47 percent in first five years (study of 40 REDD+ projects); Uganda RCT: treatment villages 2-5 percent deforestation vs 7-10 percent non-participating. - Slowing deforestation by 40 percent for five years in The Gambia ≈ 0.25 MtCO2e avoided — sufficient to meet NDC objective under IMF BAU estimates. - PES design and trade-offs: payments based on ecosystem value or opportunity cost; trade-off between payment level (effectiveness) and coverage. - MRV requirement: operational MRV system essential; satellite/drones and hiring additional rangers recommended. - Recommendations (preserved): - Build regulatory/legal framework to operationalize PES; identify stable revenue sources including carbon taxation. - Reach 200 thousand hectares gazetted to communities. - Build vulnerability index for community forests; assess revenue generation potential; scale technology and enforcement capacity. - Create regulatory framework for LPG to increase legal certainty for suppliers. - Operationalize MRV for emissions accounting. ### Waste management — emissions, instruments, and recommendations - Waste sector: - 17.7 percent of total emissions in 2019; expected to grow by 28 percent from 2019 to 2030 (IMF-WB CPAT 2024). - Annual waste produced: as much as 400,000 tons (SPCR 2017). - Plastic waste: 22,800 tons in 2021; >70 percent leaked into environment (Common Seas 2024). - Municipal solid waste (MSW): 702 tons per day with 9 percent plastics (UNDP 2023); dry season open burning common. - GBA has two legal dumpsites (Bakoteh and Mile 2) reaching capacity. - Fiscal instruments and estimates: - Advance disposal fees (ADFs) and advance recycling fees (ARFs) feasible; deposit-refund system (DRS) highly effective. - IMF staff calculation: nominal deposit fee of GMD 0.1- 0.5 on plastic bottles could generate USD 1.1-5.4 million in unclaimed revenue annually (assumes bottled water market ≈ USD 22 million/year and 50 percent return rate). - Recommendation: design/implement environmental taxes including DRS; collect deposit at import stage; use unclaimed refunds to finance integrated waste management and strengthen Anti-Littering Regulation (2008). ### Electricity, NAWEC, renewables, and carbon pricing scenarios - Electricity and generation mix: - In 2021, 37 percent of population lacked access to electricity. - Government objective: universal access by 2025 (progress since 2021 stagnant). - Prior to 2024, generation entirely fossil-fuel based; a 23 MW solar plant (Jambur) started March 2024. - NAWEC: 36 percent of its generation in Q1 2024 from renewables; NAWEC supplies 15 percent of total electricity consumption; renewables therefore ~5 percent of total consumption. - Installed capacity: NAWEC decreased to 81MW; 33 percent of consumption supplied via powership PPA; half of electricity consumption imported (mainly from Senegal). - Average cost per kwh through PPAs is 0.2 USD cents higher than NAWEC’s own production cost. - NAWEC financials and losses: - Non-audited net loss 2023: 2.7 billion GMD (~45 million USD using 2023 average exchange rate). - NAWEC average cost per kwh: 20 USD cents per kwh (regional average 10 USD cent per kwh, ECOWAS). - Technical/commercial losses: 27 percent in 2023. - Gap between tariffs and cost recovery increased from 18 million USD in 2021 to 32 million USD in 2023. - Accumulated arrears as of March 2024: 3 bn GMD (2.28 percent of GDP); 46 percent owed to foreign producers; 33 percent to IPPs. - Renewable policy and constraints: - Government target: 50 percent renewables by 2030. - Planned 150MW solar plant to supply domestic demand and export excess. - Renewable Energy Act (2013) created Renewable Energy Fund (not operational) and fiscal incentives including 15-year tax exemptions. - Constraints: uncertainty on NAWEC honoring PPAs, unresolved land property rights, need for social license to operate (SLO) and community compensation. - Policy recommendations (preserved): - Publish assessment of land rights where renewable projects expected. - Conduct comprehensive study on NAWEC cost recovery tariffs and revise, using social registry to target support. - Consider MoFEA guarantees to private investors and fixing long-term PPAs in USD. - Reform Renewable Energy Act to eliminate 15-year exemptions and replace with accelerated depreciation; consider increasing feed-in tariff. - Carbon pricing (Box 7) — modeled scenarios and quantified impacts (values preserved exactly): - Modeled reform scenarios: - Scenario I: removing all fuel exemptions. - Scenario II: removing exemptions + USD 5 per ton CO2e carbon price in 2025 rising to USD 25 per ton CO2e by 2030. - Fiscal revenue outcomes (2025): - Removing exemptions: additional tax revenues ≈ 0.11 percent of GDP. - USD 5 carbon price in 2025: additional 0.12 percent of GDP. - Cumulative revenue (2025–2030) for Scenario II: 1.7 percent of GDP. - Predicted impact on economic growth (Scenario II): -0.04 percent of GDP in 2025; using 30 percent of additional revenue as productive public investment could offset the -0.04 percent impact. - Distributional assumptions: - Scenario I: 30 percent of additional revenue as cash transfers aimed at bottom 4 deciles. - Scenario II: 25 percent of additional revenue as cash transfers aimed at bottom 4 deciles. - Table 8 (energy price changes in 2030 — values preserved exactly): - Gasoline USD per liter: Baseline 2024 = 1.08; Baseline 2030 = 0.81; Scenario I = 0.84; Scenario II = 0.91. - Diesel USD per liter: Baseline 2024 = 1.18; Baseline 2030 = 0.89; Scenario I = 0.92; Scenario II = 0.99. - Kerosene USD per liter: Baseline 2024 = 1.08; Baseline 2030 = 1.00; Scenario I = 1.00; Scenario II = 1.07. - Heavy fuel oil USD per barrel: Baseline 2024 = 71.60; Baseline 2030 = 62.80; Scenario I = 62.80; Scenario II = 74.50. - Electricity USD per kwh: Baseline 2024 = 0.23; Baseline 2030 = 0.17; Scenario I = 0.17; Scenario II = 0.19. - Table 9 — Summary of main impacts (values preserved exactly): - Reduction of GHG emissions in 2030, % compared to BAU: Elimination of exemptions = 0.1; + carbon tax = 2.1 - Cumulative reduction in GHG emissions in 2024-2030, MtCO2: Elimination of exemptions = 0.006; + carbon tax = 0.23 - Net additional tax revenue collected in 2030, % of GDP: Elimination of exemptions = 0.09; + carbon tax = 0.58 - Cumulative tax revenue collected in 2024-2030, bn USD: Elimination of exemptions = 0.02; + carbon tax = 0.07 - Impact on economic growth in 2030, deviation from inertial growth in % points: Elimination of exemptions = 0.01; + carbon tax = 0.03 - Increase in the price of electricity in 2030, % compared to inertial scenario in 2024: Elimination of exemptions = -26.1; + carbon tax = -18.4 - Increase in the price of gasoline in 2030, % compared to inertial scenario in 2024: Elimination of exemptions = -22.3; + carbon tax = -15.8 - Increase in the price of diesel in 2030, % compared to inertial scenario in 2024: Elimination of exemptions = -22.1; + carbon tax = -14.2 - Cumulative Avoided Deaths Due to Lower Air Pollution and Road Accidents by 2035, Absolute Figure: Elimination of exemptions = 40; + carbon tax = 120 - Policy recommendations (preserved): - Remove duty exemptions and apply VAT for all fuel consumption. - Reform the ad-valorem excise tax and replace with a specific tax. - Introduce a modest carbon price in 2025 with rising ambition towards 2030 building on existing fuel excise structure. - Use the social registry to identify and compensate households most impacted. ### Climate governance, planning, finance, and institutional reform - Constitutional and legislative context: - 1997 Constitution includes environment protection notions; 2020 draft constitution (government-sponsored) attempted to mandate climate recognition but was rejected at first reading; new draft announced in 2023 with referendum expected by end of year and target deadline of 2027. - NEMA (1994) central environmental law; Climate Change Bill in preparation (MECCNAR issued TOR for consultancy funded by World Bank). - EIA Regulations (2014) under NEMA lack formal requirement to assess climate-related impacts or resilience. - National strategies and costings: - NCCP (2016); SPCR (2017); LECRDS (2017); 2050 Climate Vision (2021); NDC2 (2021); LTS 2050 (2022). - Investment needs: SPCR USD 315 million; LTS costed at USD 4 billion. - Institutional bodies and operational gaps: - Four upper-level bodies: National Climate Change Council (NCCC); Inter-ministerial Climate Committee (IMCC); Climate Change Secretariat (MECCNAR); National Climate Committee (NCC). - Overlapping functions, limited funding, sparse operationalization → implementation and coordination gaps; limited climate focal points across ministries. - Planning, data, and budgeting gaps: - DDP to lead NDP implementation; RF-NDP 2023-2027 includes climate in Pillar five but is 5-year horizon. - DDP developing web-based database; MoFEA hired consultant for climate budget tagging (funded by Canada). - Budget not aligned with RF-NDP; Integrated National Financing Framework under development. - Climate finance and private investment: - National Climate Change Fund (MoFEA) established but never operationalized. - No National Climate Finance Policy; need to coordinate domestic and external funds and enable private investment through de-risking and regulatory clarity. - Transboundary coordination: - Use River Basin Organizations to manage shared water resources; concern over downstream impacts from upstream projects. - IMF institutional recommendations (preserved): - Establish long-term climate scenarios and hazard vulnerability maps; disseminate to line ministries. - Incorporate The Gambia 2050 Climate Vision and LTS 2050 into long-term national plans. - Allocate clear roles and responsibilities and legitimize institutional structures through legislation (Climate Change Bill or NEMA update). - Develop a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and National Climate Finance Policy; operationalize National Climate Change Fund. - Require climate change impact and vulnerability assessments for investors/projects. - Re-operationalize IMCC and NCCC and ensure sustained funding. ### Cross-cutting and final policy recommendations (selected timing and priority excerpts) - Climate Adaptation Policy (selected): - Identify and prioritize policy options to foster financial inclusion of small farmers as part of National DRF Strategy — Timing: ST — Priority: H - Develop and adopt National DRF Strategy — ST — H - Establish inventory of boreholes and groundwater abstraction licensing, move towards groundwater abstraction fees reflective of full economic cost — ST-LT — H - Finalize, enact, enforce Integrated Coastal Zone Management Bill and Policy — MT — H - Conduct land surveys and build cadastral map; complete National Land Policy — MT — H - Implement measures to address NRW and monitor progress — MT — H - Achieve full financial cost recovery of water with tariff adjustment — LT — M - Climate Mitigation Policy (selected): - Add conditionality to social programs in agriculture based on environmental practices — ST — H - Build PES framework building on community forests and Community PPPs; identify revenue including carbon taxation — ST — H - Operationalize MRV for emission accounting — MT — H - Implement environmental taxes including DRS on single-use containers — MT — H - Eliminate 15-year exemptions for most relevant taxes and replace with accelerated depreciation — MT — M - Conduct comprehensive study on NAWEC cost recovery tariffs and revise while using social registry to target support — LT — M - Enabling institutions (selected): - Develop a National Adaptation Plan — ST — M - Deepen coordination with neighboring countries on upstream dams and downstream impacts — ST — M - Establish long-term climate scenarios and hazard vulnerability maps and disseminate — MT — M - Incorporate The Gambia 2050 Climate Vision and LTS 2050 into upcoming National 2050 Vision — MT — H - Allocate roles and responsibilities and legitimize institutional structure via legislation — MT — M - Mainstream climate change into sectoral plans and mainstream into MoFEA core functions — LT — H *Source: Excerpts from Preface, Executive Summary, and selected chapters and annexes of the IMF Technical Assistance Report (tarea2025019-print-pdf).* ### Preface _________________________________________________________________________ 8 ### Preface ### Mission and purpose - A capacity development (CD) mission from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) visited Banjul during May 20-31, 2024 to provide a comprehensive diagnostic of climate fiscal policies at the request of Mr. Seedy K.M. Keita, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs (MoFEA). - Mission leadership and team members: - Led by Ms. Dora Benedek (FAD). - Team comprised Mr. Alberto Garcia Huitron, Ms. Danielle Minnett, Ms. Junko Mochizuki (all FAD), and Ms. Alice Tianbo Zhang (SPR). - The mission engaged with Government of The Gambia officials across MoFEA, MECCNAR, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Ministry for Agriculture, Ministry for Transport, Works and Infrastructure, Ministry of Fisheries and Water Resources, Ministry for Land and Regional Development, Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare, National Social Protection Secretariat, National Disaster Management Agency, NAWEC, and PURA. - Development partner consultations included World Bank, African Development Bank, UNDP, UNEP, and the French Embassy. ### Acknowledgements - The mission expressed gratitude to Ms. Isatou Camara for logistical support and to the IMF Resident Representative Mr. Patrick Gitton and his staff, including Mr. Bernard Mendy and Ms. Isatou Njie, for coordination. ### Executive Summary — Key findings (climate impacts and fiscal policy context) - The Gambia’s economic and social development is highly impacted by climate change; sea level rise poses substantial risks and the country is exposed to natural disasters. - Recurring droughts and floods impose large economic and welfare losses. - Climate trends: increasing temperature and decreasing rainfall will challenge heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture. - Salinization and soil degradation are expected to intensify, leading to increased deforestation and declining agricultural productivity. - Groundwater depletion is an emerging risk; water access and agricultural expansion are main drivers of climate-related challenges. - Lack of efficient land policy, planning, and forest protection drives expansion of agricultural and livestock activities into forest areas, reducing incentives to borrow and invest. - Demand for water and electricity is expected to grow, while private investment in these sectors is lacking. - Current fiscal and policy environment: - Adaptation strategies rely heavily on public sector investment with limited private sector participation. - Institutional fragmentation and limited technical capacity complicate coastal resilience and general adaptation planning. - No cost currently attached to directly drawing on groundwater; practices reduce availability for the water network, create health hazards, and exacerbate sea level rise impacts. - Water insecurity drives internal migration, increasing deforestation via agricultural expansion and higher charcoal demand. ### Executive Summary — Priority adaptation and resilience actions - Immediate inventory of existing groundwater boreholes and priority installation of monitoring stations. - Explore charging for groundwater permits (potentially starting with certain consumer classes or usage levels), with vulnerable households compensated through the social protection system. - Address inefficiencies and waste in the water network and promote rainwater harvesting practices. - Develop a disaster risk financing strategy and complete the social registry to link to DRM systems; improve budget approval and execution processes following disasters. - Identify options to accelerate uptake of Climate Smart Agriculture, nature-based solutions, ecosystem-based adaptation, increase agricultural lending, and consider index-based insurance schemes for farmers. - Establish a comprehensive land policy, complete the land registry and cadaster, and enhance land security and zoning. ### Executive Summary — Mitigation findings and recommendations - The Gambia’s conditional NDC target is ambitious; deforestation and agriculture (including livestock) account for 56 percent of GHG emissions, followed by waste management. - Household dependence on charcoal and firewood for cooking is a major driver of deforestation. - Mitigation emphasis: - Increase agricultural productivity and address deforestation through land-use zoning, monitoring, enforcement of permitting for forest clearing, and stronger community forest management. - Consider Payment for Environmental Services (PES) in forestry, potentially financed in part by carbon pricing revenues. - Introduce environmental taxes to incentivize waste reduction, including a deposit and refund system on single-use containers and stricter enforcement (including on a plastic ban). - Energy sector: - Energy is not the main contributor to emissions, but electricity generation lacks diversification and universal access is a strategic objective. - Tariffs are below cost recovery and NAWEC’s financial situation hinders private renewable investment; lack of land rights also constrains projects. - Tariffs should be aligned with cost recovery. - Carbon pricing: - Build on existing fossil fuel taxes by removing all existing exemptions on fossil fuel excise duties. - Introduce a modest USD 5 carbon price per ton of CO2e in 2025 and increase linearly by 2030 until reaching an efficient level at around USD 25. - Compensate vulnerable households through the social protection system. ### Executive Summary — Institutional priorities - Government has strategic plans and legislation addressing climate change, but implementation and monitoring are often pending or missing. - Effective climate management requires: - Long-term planning horizons aligned with climate impacts. - Clear roles, responsibilities, and accountability across actors and levels of government. - Strengthened coordination and legitimation of institutional structures (including legislative options). ### Summary of Recommendations (selected items with timing and priority) - Climate Adaptation Policy - Identify and prioritize policy options to foster financial inclusion of small farmers as part of the National Disaster Risk Financing Strategy — Timing: ST — Priority: H - Develop and adopt the National Disaster Risk Financing Strategy covering sustainability of DRF financing, linkage of DRM/DRF/social protection, and risk management of small farmers — ST — H - Strengthen disaster-related budget request, execution and reporting through guidelines and in-depth disaster budget analysis — ST — H - Establish an inventory of boreholes and groundwater abstraction licensing, and in a longer-term move towards groundwater abstraction fees reflective of full economic cost — ST-LT — H - Finalize, enact, and enforce the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Bill and Integrated Coastal Zone Management Policy — MT — H - Conduct land surveys and build a cadastral map — MT — H - Complete development and adoption of the National Land Policy to clarify roles and outline national priorities for land management — MT — H - Implement measures to address Non-Revenue Water and monitor progress — MT — H - Achieve full financial cost recovery of water with tariff adjustment — LT — M - Climate Mitigation Policy - Add conditionality to social programs in the agriculture sector based on good environmental practices, agroforestry and conservation agriculture — ST — H - Build on community forests and Community PPPs to create regulatory and legal framework for a PES scheme, identifying stable revenue sources including carbon taxation — ST — H - Create a regulatory framework for LPG to increase legal certainty for potential suppliers — ST — M - Include mechanisms to ensure social license to operate for renewable energy projects and compensate households/communities in case of resettlement — ST — M - MoFEA should consider providing a guarantee to private sector investors in renewable energy projects and fixing long-term power purchasing agreements in USD to mitigate exchange rate risks — ST — M - Operationalize a Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system for proper emission accounting — MT — H - Implement environmental taxes, including a deposit-refund system (DRS) on single-use containers — MT — H - Eliminate the 15-year exemption for the most relevant taxes and replace with an accelerated depreciation framework to recover capital costs — MT — M - Consider an increasing feed-in tariff to protect fiscal consolidation efforts — MT — L - Conduct a comprehensive study on cost recovery tariffs for NAWEC and revise tariffs accordingly, while using the social registry to target support for vulnerable households — LT — M - Enabling Institutions - Develop a National Adaptation Plan — ST — M - Deepen coordination with neighboring countries to ensure upstream dams account for downstream environmental and climate impacts — ST — M - Establish long-term climate scenarios and hazard vulnerability maps and disseminate them to line ministries — MT — M - Incorporate The Gambia 2050 Climate Vision and the Long-Term Climate-Neutral Development Strategy 2050 into upcoming National 2050 Vision and long-term plans — MT — H - Allocate roles and responsibilities for climate change management clearly among actors and legitimize institutional structure through legislation (e.g., Climate Change Bill or NEMA update) — MT — M - Mainstream adaptation and mitigation into all updated sectoral plans and regulatory frameworks, including mainstreaming climate change management into core functions of MoFEA — LT — H *Source: Preface and Executive Summary, IMF Technical Assistance Report* ### 1. The Gambia is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. A small country located on ### The Gambia is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. ### Geography and physical vulnerability - The Gambia forms a narrow enclave into the Republic of Senegal with around 80km of coastline and 200km of sheltered shoreline. - The Gambia River runs east to west through the entire country; landscape is predominantly a flat flood plain with mangroves near the coastline and savanna inland. - Average elevation: 34m above sea level. - Greater Banjul Area (including Banjul City, Kanifing Municipality and Brikama) is located at sea level and is home to around 1.4 million residents or more than 60 percent of the country’s population. - The Gambia has one of the lowest average country elevations globally. ### Historical climate trends - Climate: tropical savannah with a short rainy season between June-September and a longer dry season between October-May. - Annual average temperature ranges from 26°C near the western coastline to 30°C in the eastern inland. - Since the 1960s, annual average temperature has risen by around 1.0°C relative to 1901-1930 levels. - Average precipitation has declined by more than 100mm per year relative to 1901-1930 levels, exacerbating drought frequency. ### Sea level rise (SLR) projections and coastal inundation risks - Global mean sea level rose by 0.2m between 1901 and 2018. - Under RCP 4.5 (moderate warming, current policies): - Average sea level projected to rise 0.12-0.41m by 2050 relative to 2000 levels in The Gambia. - Average sea level projected to rise 0.24-1.07m by 2100 relative to 2000 levels in The Gambia. - Under 0.2m future SLR, the Tanbi Wetland National Park (TWNP), covering around 6,300 hectares, will be submerged. - Under 1.0m SLR (anticipated under current policies by 2050-2100): - 6,500ha of woodland and 40,900ha of mangroves within the North Bank, West Coast, and Central River regions will be at risk. - Within inundated area, key infrastructure at risk include the National Assembly Building, Banjul water treatment plant, Banjul pumping station, ports, schools, cultural sites, and tourism development areas along the beach. - By some estimates, 60% of mangrove forests, 33% of swamp areas and 20% of rice-growing areas will be inundated with 1m rise of sea levels. - Coastal erosion and sediment loss: - 200,000 to 300,000m of sediment lost annually through coastal erosion between Banjul Point and Sanyang Point. - Rate of land loss estimated at 2.5-3ha per year. - Total land loss could reach 7.65km2 along selected coastal stretches (Banjul, Kanifing, Brikama, and Kerewan). - Economic cost estimates: - Conservative estimates show the cost of SLR-induced storms could reach USD 2 billion by 2090 without adaptation. ### Climate hazards, frequency, and human impacts - Since 1950, The Gambia experienced 33 climate-related disasters: Drought 7, Epidemic 4, Flood 11, Infestation 4, Storm 6, Wildfire 1. - Total deaths from climate-related disasters: 442. - Total affected (people injured, affected, or made homeless): 1,506,535. - Examples of impacts: - The 2011/2012 and 2014/2015 droughts led to a 50 percent drop in crop output and threatened food security. - The July 2011 concurrent windstorm and flash floods affected more than 100,000 Gambians and cost more than ten lives. ### Projected temperature and precipitation changes (SSP2-4.5 / current policies) - Temperature: - Average warming of 1.0-1.6°C by 2030 relative to 1901-1930 levels. - Average warming of 1.5-2.3°C by 2050 relative to 1901-1930 levels. - Precipitation: - Projected to fall by 11-21 percent by 2030 relative to the historical baseline. - Projected to fall by 10-26 percent by 2050 relative to the historical baseline. - Climate change risks are amplified by the country’s high reliance on rain-fed agriculture that: - Provides about one-quarter of gross domestic product (GDP). - Employs close to half of the population. ### Socioeconomic context and vulnerability - Selected indicators (Average 2019-2023 unless otherwise noted): - Land area (sq. km): 10,120.0 - Population, total (million): 2.71 - Population density (people per sq. km of land area): 254 - Population growth (annual %): 2.5 - Rural population (% of total population): 37.1 - GDP (current USD billion) *: 2.19 - GDP growth (annual %): 3.9 - GNI per capita, PPP (current international $): 2,240.0 - Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) *: 10.4 - Poverty headcount ratio, national poverty lines (% of population): 53.4 - Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP): 21.6 - Employment in agriculture (% of total employment) (modeled ILO estimate): 48.2 - Energy imports, net (% of energy use): 63.0 - Access to electricity (% of population): 62.7 - Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (% of population): 1.8 - Annual freshwater withdrawals, agriculture (% of total freshwater withdrawal): 38.6 - Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output): 27.0 - PM2.5 air pollution, exceeding WHO guidelines (% of total): 100.0 - Total greenhouse gas emissions (% change from 1990): 289.4 - Notes: Indicators marked with * reflect the latest available year in 2022. ### Current adaptation planning and institutional context - Government frameworks and plans: - National Climate Change Policy (NCCP, 2016) - Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (SPCR, 2017) - Low Emissions Climate Resilient Development Strategy (LECRDS, 2017) - 2050 Climate Vision (2021) - Second Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC2) - Long-Term Climate-Neutral Development Strategy 2050 (LTS) - National Adaptation Plan (NAP) formulation funded by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (ongoing) - Past and ongoing external support: - Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) process established since 2013 with European Union GCCA/GCCA+ support. - SPCR funded by African Development Bank (AfDB) in collaboration with the World Bank developed a coastal infrastructure vulnerability study. ### Key adaptation challenges identified - Cross-cutting gaps: - High inter-dependency across natural resources (land, forest, water) and feedbacks with climate change. - Increasing human pressure on natural resources driven by population growth and urbanization. - Lack of appropriate institutional and legislative frameworks and implementation capacities to manage pressures on natural resources. - Climate adaptation to date driven primarily by the public sector; private sector engagement remains limited. - Limited fiscal space and high external financing dependence. - Coastal management specific gaps: - Lack of clear institutional framework and long-term planning; coastal management largely ad hoc and project-based. - Outdated land-use policy and limited institutional and technical capacity. - Limited domestic and international investment in coastal adaptation infrastructure. - Risk of maladaptation and stranded assets from short-term or sectorally siloed coastal protection projects (example: Kololi Beach sand replenishment project in 2003 lost sand by 2009). ### Policy considerations and recommended approaches for coastal resilience - Consider the full range of adaptation options and their time horizons to avoid locking into stranded assets: - Non-structural “soft” options: implementation and enforcement of land use regulations, urban planning, wetland preservation, public outreach. - Structural “hard” options: coastal defense structures (seawalls, breakwater systems, embankments). - Managed retreat or relocation and creation of no-development zones to avoid maladaptation or costly overprotection. - Adopt an integrated, multi-sectoral approach that: - Accounts for uncertainty in the rate and magnitude of coastal risks. - Weighs cost and benefit of adaptation actions across time horizons. - Aligns climate adaptation objectives with the macro-fiscal framework and fosters institutional strengthening. - Creates enabling environment for private sector engagement and mobilizes domestic and international finance. *Source: IMF Staff Technical Assistance Report (extracted content).* ### 15. I ### 15. I ### Climate-resilient coastal management: short to medium term - Near-term adaptation options include engineered, sediment, and ecosystem-based protection. - Example: MECCNAR is collaborating with the UNEP to implement a large-scale ecosystem-based adaptation project that will restore and rehabilitate more than 10,000ha of degraded forests, savanna, and mangroves, the latter serving as a protective hydrological barrier against flood risks. - Proposed project: GoTG in collaboration with the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and UNDP is working on a proposed USD 30 million project on enhancing coastal infrastructure resilience against sea level rise and coastal erosion. - Caution: Soft and hard protection measures do not remove coastal risks in the coming decades; net-benefits should be carefully evaluated to avoid overprotecting habitat and infrastructure that will be irreversibly lost. - Note on past maladaptation: The sand replenishment project did not implement recommended hardware measures due to inadequate funds and donor opposition to hard adaptation measures; the GoTG/IDB/Royal Haskoning Beach Nourishment Project (2003-2004) was identified as the worst maladaptation on the coastal zone of The Gambia. ### Coastal management: medium to long term measures and institutional needs - Medium term: Land-use planning and land reclamation could help reduce coastal vulnerability. - Example guidance: Jallow et al. (1996) recommended a no-development zone of 150 meters inland from the high-water mark. - Assessment needs: classification of coastal land based on projected flooding and erosion risks; incorporation into coastal land use policy and zoning regulations; availability of geospatial mapping on coastal land and land use. - Governance need: develop and apply consistent long-term climate change scenarios and projections across sectoral ministries; existing plans often do not specify the scenario considered. - Long term: Principle of managed coastal realignment (suggested by GoTG in the SPCR (2017)) could allow shoreline to find a new alignment naturally, rather than attempting site-specific engineering controls. - Trade-offs: would entail loss of some assets and relocation of some communities but can minimize coastal risks in the long run. - Specific project priority: The proposed Coastal Zone Adaptation Project aims to protect lowland rice cultivation areas around the estuary of The Gambia River, which make up 64% of all the crop land area; these areas are experiencing increased saltwater destruction of rice fields and fishponds. The project also aims to reverse decline in coastal and riverine ecosystem functioning (such as mangroves) and slow coastal erosions of beaches critical to the tourism industry. The GoTG should prioritize the revision and resubmission of this Coastal Zone Adaptation Project to enable its approval by the GCF Board. ### Recommendations (coastal) - MECCNAR and MoFEA, working with other relevant line ministries and local governments, finalize, enact, and enforce the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Bill and Integrated Coastal Zone Management Policy that: 1) Define institutional framework for implementation; 2) Integrate long-term climate change projections; 3) Produce and maintain geospatial data on coastal land and land use; 4) Identify potential stranded assets and communities at risk under projected climate change scenarios and natural hazards in coastal areas; 5) Consider the full range of coastal adaptation options, including but not limited to, no-development zone, managed relocation, and coastal protection. ### B. Land Management — current state and challenges - Effective land management is crucial for adaptation and mitigation across agriculture, forestry, renewable energy, and coastal management. - Current gaps drive agricultural practices leading to deforestation and deter private investment, including in renewables, agriculture, water management, and coastal management. - Individualized rights to land in the agricultural sector are associated with higher propensity to invest and increased yield. - Overlapping legal jurisdictions and weak enforcement of property rights pose significant challenges to coastal management; cost-benefit analysis of coastal protection measures is difficult due to lack of national data on property values. - Forestry: no well-defined rules on permitting to clear forests for agricultural use. - Land tenure clarity constraints renewable energy investment. ### Land tenure and land use facts - The Gambia has a dual land institution: all land is officially public land, yet approximately 90 percent is also under customary tenure. - Rapid expansion of urban settlements with high informality, growth of agricultural land, deforestation and forest degradation increase pressure on scarce land resources. - Population projection: The Gambia foresees doubling of its population by 2050. - Country size and land cover (as reported): total land area of 11,300km.2; dominant land covers include forest (52%, of which 84% is savanna woodland) and crop area (32%); protected area covers 352 km2 (3.3% of country). ### Key policy gaps and opportunities in land management - Legal framework: Lands Act of 1980; Physical Planning and Development Control Act of 1990; Survey Act of 1990; Land Acquisition and Compensation Act of 1991; Land Commission Act of 2007. - Institutional responsibilities: Ministry of Land, Regional Government and Religious Affairs (MLRGRA) responsible for land administration; Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) reviews agricultural land leases; MECCNAR manages forest resources; The Gambia Tourism Board oversees the Tourism Development Area (TDA). - WB Land Governance Assessment Framework (2013): high on legal recognition of land rights and existence of dispute resolution systems; significant gaps include lack of national land use policy, overlaps and unclarity of mandates across agencies, weakness of planning and land administration capacities including land surveys, registration and property tax collection. - Under WB-funded WACA project: technical working groups reviewing legal, policy, and institutional backgrounds; plan to develop the country’s first comprehensive land policy; ongoing technical needs assessment for institutional capacity (land administration, digitalization, satellite-based information). - Cadastral and planning gaps: The Gambia lacks a cadastral map; zoning demarcation in urban areas disregarded due to lack of enforcement. Greater Banjul Area (GBA) 2040 Development Plan exists; most recent Land Use Plan outside GBA was created in 1985 for Brikama, Basse and Farafenni. Land information has not been systematically collected, digitized, maintained, or analyzed. - Geo-spatial technology opportunity: limited use to date of satellite information and drones; international experience shows geo-spatial tech reduces cost of surveys, monitoring, and interoperability of land-related information. Digital parcel boundaries combined with satellite imagery of historical land use can establish creditworthiness records for farmers and enable monitoring of deforestation and forest fire. ### Recommendations (land) - MLRGRA, working with relevant line ministries, to conduct land surveys and build a cadastral map. - MLRGRA, working with relevant line ministries, to complete the development and adoption of the National Land Policy, clarifying roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies and outline national priorities to strengthen land management. ### C. Water Sector Policy — current state and challenges - The Gambia is situated within the transboundary Gambian River Basin, shared with Senegal, Guinea and Guinea Bissau. - Both green and blue water are critical natural resource inputs underpinning fiscal and macro-critical sectors. - Rainfed agriculture accounts for 80 percent of the total grain production in The Gambia. - 2020 sector water withdrawals (Aquastat-based): municipal usage 41.2 million cubic meters (MCM)/year (drinking water for the country’s 2.7 million residents); agriculture 39.2 MCM/year (mainly irrigation for domestically produced rice); industrial withdrawal 21.2 MCM/year underpinning approximately 17 percent of the country’s GDP. - Groundwater reliance: The Gambia relies on groundwater for most drinking water in rural and urban areas; approximately 70 percent of the country’s irrigated area is equipped with groundwater abstraction. - Total renewable water resources (2020, FAO Aquastat): 8.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) composed of 8.0 BCM of renewable groundwater. - Per capita renewable water availability (2020): 3,310 cubic meters (cum)/inhabitant/year, below Sub-Saharan regional average of 10,695 cum/inhabitant/year. - Current water stress (ratio of total water withdrawal to renewable water availability): presently low (<10 percent); projected to increase to medium-high (20 – 40 percent) towards the latter 21st century under the projected high climate scenario (SSP3 RCP7.0). - Major climate risks: erratic rainfalls, droughts, and saline water intrusion, with follow-on consequences including declining agricultural productivity and encroachment of forests. - Spatial salinity facts: Gambia River is permanently saline in the western part where majority of population resides; soil salinity increases within 10 km of The Gambia river and within 50 km from the Atlantic Ocean. - Crop yield impacts under climate change (projected losses by 2050 compared to present): - Groundnuts: 1.6 percent presently to 7.9 percent of production by 2050. - Millet: 2.9 percent presently to 12 percent by 2050. - Rice: 3.9 percent presently to 13.7 percent in 2050. - Consequences: rising salinity has led to abandonment of fields and wells, contributing to deforestation as farmers seek new fields. ### Water sector SDG progress and costs - The Gambia’s overall performance on SDG is slightly above the median for low income and developing countries; the water sector’s underperformance is a concern under climate change. - IMF technical assistance estimate: The Gambia can provide universal safely managed access to water and sanitation at an annualized cost of 1.5 percent of GDP by 2030. - Additional cost to improve climate resilience of water infrastructure against floods and storms: estimated at 0.1-0.2 percent of GDP. _Italic: IMF Technical Assistance Report, excerpt from chapter 15 (provided content)._ ### 27. The Gambia’s water sector is fraught with systematic challenges and the strengthening of ### 27. The Gambia’s water sector is fraught with systematic challenges and the strengthening of ### Legal, policy, and institutional framework - Legal basis: National Water Resources Council Act (1979) gives the Department of Water Resources (DWR) limited mandates for water resources management planning, hydromet monitoring, forecast and provision of rural water supply. - Sector managed by multiple agencies with overlapping/limited mandates: - National Environment Agency (NEA) — water quality - National Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC) — urban water supply and sewerage - Public Utilities and Regulatory Authority (PURA) — regulator of urban water supply and sanitation - Local governments - A Water Bill has been enacted in draft form; the latest version is pending review by the Ministry of Justice. - Progress on selected SDG 6 indicators (Source: Sustainable Development Report Dashboard): - 6.1.1 Proportion of population using safely managed drinking water services: 22 % (2020); 48 % (2022) - 6.2.1a Proportion of population using safely managed sanitation services: 43% (2020); 25% (2022) - 6.3.1 Proportion of wastewater flow (safely) treated: n.a. (2020); 11% (2022) - 6.4.2 Freshwater withdrawal as a proportion of available freshwater resources: 2% (2020); 2% (2022) ### Urban water supply — service delivery and capacity constraints - NAWEC currently provides urban water to 92,000 customers (85,000 of which are active) to Banjul and major cities; limited sewage service primarily for tourist facilities within GBA. - Urban water supply is fully based on groundwater extraction. - Infrastructure capacity limitations force rationing; routine service outages of hours or even days are reported. - Lack of reliable supply has led to widespread and unregulated private drilling of boreholes. - Lack of sewage services in urban areas creates health risks. ### Non-Revenue Water (NRW), metering, and regulation - NRW estimates range between 20-40 percent between 2011-2020. - Likely causes of NRW: leakages, theft, commercial losses, faulty meters. - NAWEC aims to phase out faulty meters to reduce NRW. - Regulatory strengthening by PURA is ongoing (development of technical guidelines; updating quality of service framework). - Current tariff design and cost recovery: - Urban water supply tariff set below financial cost recovery and not reflective of full economic cost. - The Gambia adopts differentiated tariff rates across end-users; domestic tariff further divided by increasing block rate. - WB support provided for tariff adjustment in 2018; current tariff setting guided by PURA guideline to cover staffing cost, operation and maintenance, interest, return on equity and depreciation. - NAWEC initially calculates full financial cost recovery including costs to cover NRW; PURA adjusted this downwards. - A portion of NRW cost (estimated as 35-40 percent) is currently included in the financial cost recovery calculation of the water tariff; this portion will be gradually phased out to incentivize investment in NRW reduction. - Estimated NAWEC revenue gaps: - GMD 1.4 million in 2022 - GMD 1.6 million in 2023 - NAWEC capacity constraints: lack of proper metering, limited staff capacity (e.g., limited understanding of underlying tariff setting model). - NAWEC receiving Agence Française de Développement (AfD) support to strengthen system and planning capacities. ### Urban water tariff table (per cubic meter) — as presented (Source: PURA) - Domestic: - 0-10 cum: 6.84 GMD - 11-25 cum: 14.15 GMD - 26-40 cum: 18.86 GMD - Balance: 23.58 GMD - Commercial: 28.5 GMD - Hotel/Industries: 40.09 GMD - Agriculture: 14.15 GMD - Area Council/Central Government: 19.79 GMD - Exchange rate note: 1 United States Dollar (USD) equals 67 Gambian Dalasi (GMD) as of May 29, 2024. ### Rural water supply and groundwater governance - Rural water supply relies primarily on groundwater extraction; borehole drilling primarily undertaken by private companies. - Illegal/inappropriate siting of boreholes (including proximity to sanitation sites) poses major health hazards and contributes to saline intrusion. - Kombo Peninsula and valley areas in North Bank and West Coast Regions are almost at tipping points; some water points will need relocation. - Groundwater monitoring and inventory: - The Gambia has around 40 observational boreholes for groundwater quality monitoring, around half located in the GBA. - No complete inventory of boreholes; unauthorized drilling rampant, particularly in peri-urban areas of GBA and West Coast Region. - Integrated Water Resources Management roadmap (2008) projected demand versus recharge to surpass 1 (unsustainable groundwater use) by 2020 in urban areas within the Kombos; mission did not obtain updated abstraction rates. - National Water Policy (2006) calls for introduction of abstraction and impounding licensing for ground and surface water; not implemented. - Recommended phased approach to groundwater governance: - Build inventory of existing boreholes. - Set up permitting system (phased, beginning from a flat licensing fee). - Segment end-users (urban/rural consumers; industrial/commercial; agricultural; household). - Move towards pricing based on usage level, requiring measurement of abstraction. - Priority: management of urban groundwater usage. ### Alternative freshwater options and hydrometeorological monitoring - Rainwater harvesting: - The Gambia currently lacks explicit policy/regulatory frameworks for rainwater harvesting. - MECCNAR has begun work to explore locally appropriate options for rainwater harvesting and groundwater recharge. - Under a WB funded project, rainwater harvesting policy is being developed and runoff and rooftop water harvesting systems will be tested in the Kotu Stream Catchment Areas. - Hydromet monitoring system challenges: - DWR provides hydrological, metrological and agro-metrological information; all information currently provided free with no public/private good distinctions. - Meteorological network currently fully functioning; hydrological monitoring system fully down due to lack of maintenance. - Key constraints: lack of maintenance budgetary resources; inability to keep abreast of new technologies; general lack of staffing capacity. - Recommendation to use Total Cost of Ownership approach for hydromet planning and maintenance and to explore alternative ownership/partnership models including private sector engagement. ### Sector recommendations (excerpted) - Note: Effective inter-agency coordination is an important pre-requisite to sector recommendations. - Immediate and medium-term actions: - NAWEC to implement measures to address NRW as per their current NRW reduction target and PURA to monitor its progress. - PURA and NAWEC to achieve full financial cost recovery of water with tariff adjustment. - DWR, working with relevant line ministries and local governments, to establish an inventory of boreholes and groundwater abstraction licensing, as outlined in the National Water Policy 2006 reflecting updates as necessary, and in a longer-term move towards groundwater abstraction fees, reflective of full economic cost of groundwater. --- ### Agriculture — climate vulnerability, impacts, and policy gaps - Agriculture importance: - Agriculture provides approximately half of total employment. - Agriculture generated over 22 percent of GDP in 2022 (WB WDI). - Agricultural production includes crop, horticulture, livestock, forestry and fishery. - Rice remained primary food import item: USD 38.4 million (2021). - Groundnuts exports: USD 2.0 million (2021). - Cashew exports: USD 1.3 million (2021). - Climate-related drivers of risk: - High rainfall dependency, declining land productivity, disruption of seasonal calendar, increasing temperature/evapotranspiration, sea level rise, loss of agricultural lands due to saline intrusion. - Downstream position in the transboundary Gambia River Basin means upstream developments (e.g., hydropower) can decrease freshwater flow downstream. - Yields of main crops expected to decline by 2050 under high emissions scenario (RCP 8.5) — IMF staff analysis using IFAD tool: - Relative to 2020 — 2030 RCP 8.5 Median / 2030 RCP 8.5 Optimistic / 2050 RCP 8.5 Median / 2050 RCP 8.5 Optimistic - Groundnuts: -5.04% / +3.9% / -15.14% / -6.53% - Millet: -2.43% / +6.54% / -8.56% / -3.63% - Rice (no irrigation): -3.23% / +1.03 / -14.77% / -7.56% - Rice (with irrigation): -2.77% / -1.15% / -9.62% / -4.85% - Climate change also adversely impacts agriculture value chains (e.g., risk of aggravating aflatoxin contamination). - Abnormally wet conditions have led to resurgence of Food and Mouth disease outbreak in animals. - Key policy gaps and opportunities: - Legal, policy and institutional frameworks are generally well-established but fragmented across sub-sector planning and project development. - Agriculture guided by NDP and Agriculture and Natural Resource (ANR) Policy 2017-2026; dense set of sub-sector policies incorporate climate change to varying degrees. - Fragmentation is exacerbated by around 80 percent of agriculture sector funding being donor-financed. - Low agricultural productivity drives alternative livelihoods (e.g., charcoal making) that contribute to deforestation. - Decline in cereal yields and expansion of cultivated land since 2000; prevalence of under-nourishment has risen since 2010. - Drivers of low productivity include limited access to modern inputs, inappropriate farming techniques, weak producer organizations, and environmental pressures such as erratic rainfall and saline water intrusion. - Priority cross-sectoral adaptation needs: - Improvement of water resources planning and land management. - Sectoral efforts to improve productivity, climate resilience, financial inclusion and safety-net provision for small farmers. *IMF Technical Assistance Report — excerpted content unit* ### 39. Scaling up of climate smart agriculture will be key to enhancing climate resilience. According ### tarea2025019-print-pdf - 39. Scaling up of climate smart agriculture will be key to enhancing climate resilience. According ### Climate‑smart agriculture: priorities and barriers - Priority technologies identified in The Gambia’s third national communication (2020) include conservation agriculture (CA) and tidal irrigation to supplement rainfed agriculture. - Publicly-funded programs (agricultural extension services and subsidies for agricultural inputs) should prioritize scaling up climate smart solutions including drought resistant crops, tidal irrigation and other means to address salt intrusion and livestock resilience. - Technological Needs Assessment (2018) identified financial and non-financial barriers: high initial cost, lack of access to credit, high interest rate by commercial banks, limited incentives for adoption of climate smart technologies, high staff attrition rate, and incongruent government support for non-climate smart technologies. ### Finance, risk management, and institutional arrangements for agriculture - Agricultural sector financing structure: - Formal sector: commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions, microfinance institutions (regulated by the Central Bank of The Gambia). - Informal sector: financing primarily from development partners channeled via projects/agents or rotating savings and credit schemes. - Performance and planned instruments: - Commercial banks lent only 4 percent of their portfolio to the agricultural sector across the five years ending in 2017/2018. - The Gambia plans to establish The Gambia Incentives-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (GAMIRSAL), a non-financial institution dedicated to de-risking agricultural financing by commercial banks and Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs), with seed funding support of AfDB. - The Gambia plans strategic activities for agricultural risk management including development of a disaster risk financing strategy and implementation of feasibility studies for index-based insurance as part of the National Social Protection Policy. - Feasible options to evaluate and scale: credit guarantees, index-based insurance and/or other risk sharing options within formal and informal financial institutions. ### Bundling risk management, credit, and technical knowledge (Box 3) - Rationale: Small scale, rainfed agriculture is especially prone to climate impacts and farmers often lack credits, inputs, and knowledge to invest in productivity-enhancing technologies. - Example: PULA (Kenya) - Designs area-yield index and weather-index based insurance products bundled with agricultural inputs and agronomic advisory. - Business model: insurance premium paid by private input producers; insurance under-written by third party insurers. - Achievements/targets: insured 543,000 farmers in 2020 (via Central Bank of Nigeria usage); 10,000 farmers insured with WFP support in Kitu, Kenya; bundled products available for 14 food and cash crops plus livestock; aims for a customer-base of 8 million farmers by 2025. - Policy implication: bundling of risk management, credit and agronomical knowledge/inputs could unlock climate smart agriculture uptake. ### Disaster risk management, disaster risk financing, and social protection — key findings - Hazard exposure and impacts: - The Gambia is exposed to riverine, pluvial, and coastal floods, droughts, wildfire, storm and epidemic. - Annual average losses related to riverine floods is estimated at USD 3.2 million. - On average, 350,000 people (19 percent of population) are affected by severe droughts annually. - The number of drought-affected population is expected to increase over 50 percent by 2050 under the high emissions scenario (RCP8.5). - Structural resilience: - The Gambia has well-established legal, policy and institutional frameworks for DRM yet implementation challenges persist (training of emergency managers and first responders, multi-purpose shelters, capacity building, use of geospatial information, coordination of early warning systems). - Financial resilience (DRF): - The MoFEA currently draws on multiple instruments to finance response, recovery and reconstruction. - Fiscal buffer exists as a line item for unforeseen events; PFM Act allows budget reallocation or augmentation with MoFEA approval; currently no regulatory ceiling on virement. - Access to USD 20 million under the WB Development Policy Loan with the Catastrophe Drawdown Option (CATDDO) between 2024-2027. - Drought coverage of USD 3.76 million under the African Risk Capacity (with 50 percent financing from AfDB); payout was channeled via a cash transfer program to farmers. - DRF Diagnostics under AfDB’s ADRiFi Programme to be completed in June 2024; upon completion a DRF strategy will be developed. - Challenges: ensuring continued access to disaster financing beyond current donor-supported arrangements; need to explore sustainability, scale up effective DRF instruments, evaluate/adjust size of fiscal buffers, review eligibility criteria and disbursement mechanisms for contingent budget lines, consider retirement limits and options to raise additional concessional loans. - Operational bottlenecks and opportunities: - Augmentation budget requests rely on ex-post rapid situational assessment; approval may take up to several days, delaying relief. - ARC insurance payout triggers (AfricaRisk View) still require ex-post arrangements; for the 2023 drought, ground-truthing, community targeting and administrative procedures took approximately 120 days. - Recommendations include development of official guidelines and standard operating procedures for advanced financing requests, budget execution and reporting; defining pre-approved essential humanitarian goods and services; using forecast-based requests with real-time monitoring or pre-defined approval triggers; weigh pros and cons of full-fledged forecast-based financing. - Technical working group is defining the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB); integration of the national social registry with NDMA cash transfer program is being planned. ### Social protection and adaptive social protection (ASP) - National Social Protection Policy (NSPP) 2015-2025 aims to establish by 2035 “an inclusive, integrated and comprehensive social protection system.” - Institutional and data progress: - National Social Protection Secretariat (NSPS) established in 2019. - Gambia Social Registry (GamSR) under WB assistance has data registered for 200,533 households across 40 districts except Banjul; full completion expected by end 2024. - Social registry currently includes vulnerability information based on multidimensional asset information and can be enhanced with climate hazard exposure information. - Legislative progress and financing: - Social Protection Bill under deliberation plans to include adaptive social protection aspects. - A social protection expenditure review is underway to ensure sustainable financing; NSSP 2015-2025 calls for development of a revenue mobilization strategy aimed at allocating 10 percent of GDP to social protection by the end of the policy period. - Shock-responsiveness: - Technical working group (NSPS and NDMA) drafting guideline on cash transfer expected to be completed in Q2/2024. - Mobile phone penetration was 88.8 percent in 2020; The Gambia has not fully transitioned to mobile cash transfer; WB supporting evaluation of barriers and enablers for mobile cash-transfer. - National adaptive social protection policy is recommended to clarify roles and responsibilities across agencies. ### Key policy recommendations (selected from the text) - MoFEA and MoA, working with relevant agencies: - Identify and prioritize policy options to foster financial inclusion of small farmers (such as credit guarantees, access to tailored savings accounts, index-based insurance and bundling of inputs) as part of the National Disaster Risk Financing Strategy. - MoFEA, working with relevant line ministries: - Develop and adopt the National Disaster Risk Financing Strategy covering: 1) sustainability of DRF financing, 2) linking of DRM/DRF/social protection actions, and 3) risk management of small farmers. - Strengthen disaster-related budget request, execution and reporting through development of guidelines and in-depth disaster budget analysis. - Evaluate and scale feasible options to support financial inclusion and risk management including credit guarantees, index-based insurance and/or other risk sharing options within formal and informal financial institutions. - Develop official guideline and standard operating procedure for advanced financing requests, budget execution and reporting; clarify pre-defined list of essential humanitarian/emergency preparedness and response goods and services; consider forecast-based financing with pre-defined approval triggers. *IMF Technical Assistance Report* ### 49. The Gambia’s emissions per capita and emission intensity of GDP are slightly below the ### The Gambia’s emissions, agriculture, and forestry (excerpt) ### Emissions overview and intensity - IMF estimates of total emissions: - 2.74 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2019. - 2.76 MtCO2e in 2020. - These amounts account for less than 0.01 percent of global emissions. - Per-capita and intensity metrics: - 1.28 tons of CO2e emissions per capita (The Gambia, implied 2019). - Global average: 6.5 tCO2e per capita. - Emission intensity of GDP in The Gambia: 1,654 tons of CO2e per million of GDP. - Global average emission intensity of GDP: 560 tons of CO2e per million of GDP. - Relative position: - Emissions per capita and emission intensity of GDP are slightly below the regional average but the emission intensity of GDP is above the global average. ### Emissions composition by sector and gas (2019) - Sectoral breakdown of the 2.74 MtCO2e emitted in 2019: - Agriculture: 35.8 percent. - LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry): 19.3 percent. - Waste: 17.7 percent. - Energy sector: 27 percent of total emissions, with subsectors: - Power sector: 13 percent of emissions. - Transport: 11 percent of emissions. - Buildings: 3 percent of emissions. - Energy and gas composition: - Energy-related CO2 emissions and the composition by fuel and gas are presented in Figure 16b and Figure 16c (figures referenced in source). ### Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC2) and IMF projections - NDC2 submission and features: - Revised NDC (NDC2) submitted in 2021 to the UNFCCC. - NDC2 increases mitigation ambition and incorporates adaptation as a key pillar. - NDC2 includes a reduction target of 49.7 percent with respect to business as usual (BAU). - All NDC2 objectives are conditional on financial support from the international community and appropriate technology transfer. - Authorities delineated comprehensive policies to reduce emissions in every sector, including CO2-related emissions and other gases. - IMF BAU vs authorities’ BAU: - IMF BAU emissions estimates differ from those submitted by authorities. - IMF BAU scenario projects an emission path that will be only slightly above the absolute emission target established in NDC2. - Feasibility assessment: - According to IMF estimates, The Gambia needs relatively small effort to achieve the mitigation target in NDC2. - By 2030, The Gambia’s emissions are projected to be 1.2 percent above the target by 2030. - Changing the trend will require targeted policy implementation in forestry, waste, and energy-related emissions. ### Agriculture and livestock — current state, challenges, and policies - Role in emissions: - Agriculture constituted 36 percent of total emissions in 2019, mainly from livestock and rice cultivation. - Development constraints on mitigation: - Mitigation opportunities are limited given critical development challenges: food security, loss of land to saline intrusion and coastal erosion. - Investment in mitigation is not a priority relative to adaptation and food security needs. - Mitigation option considerations: - Selected non-pricing mitigation options exist (e.g., improving livestock feed quality). - Fiscal instruments to tackle methane would require comprehensive data collection and monitoring. - Pricing policies (taxes) in agriculture are not feasible at this stage because they would tax farmers based on asset ownership, harming livelihoods and risking social stability. - Co-benefits of productivity-enhancing investments: - Increasing productivity reduces the need to expand crop area and can lower deforestation pressure. - Presence of forests increases agricultural productivity; declines in productivity can lead to deforestation. - Agroforestry: - Potential for carbon sequestration of at least 14 years after establishment (Kim, Kirschbaum, & Beedy, 2016). - Three of the four main agricultural crops in The Gambia are suitable for agroforestry: sorghum, peanuts and millet. - Agroforestry is harder to integrate for crops grown in flooded conditions (e.g., rice), although upland varieties are more suitable. - Example benefits: cattle grazing under shade are less prone to heat stress and generate higher milk volume (Collier et al, 1981, Roman et al, 2017). - Policy framework and gaps: - Government intervention via corrective incentives can shift outcomes toward low deforestation and high productivity. - Policy tools include Payments for Environmental Services (PES) and support programs for farmers conditioned on sustainable practices and land use management. - The Gambia developed a National Consultation Framework on Agroecology (under ECOWAS Agroecology Program) including stakeholder consultation, capacity building, governance structures, integration of indigenous knowledge with scientific innovation, climate-smart practices, and promotion of agroforestry and organic farming. - Financial constraints have been the major obstacle for plan implementation. - Current subsidies: government subsidizes fertilizers and groundnuts and could introduce environmental conditionality for payout (e.g., engaging in agroforestry, avoiding slash-and-burn, grazing livestock under shade, conservation agriculture). - Conditionality considerations: - Would increase administrative costs for verification; options to reduce costs include randomized verification. - Conditionality would need revision in times of drought or flood and could be lifted during extraordinary circumstances. - Recommendations (from source): - Continue to actively promote climate-smart agriculture practices to generate synergies between food security, productivity, the environment, and preparedness against natural disasters. - Add conditionality to social programs in the agriculture sector based on good environmental practices, agroforestry and conservation agriculture. - Conduct capacity development activities to increase awareness about the positive impact of using smart agricultural practices, including agroforestry. ### Forestry — current state, challenges, and opportunities - Energy use and health impacts: - Biomass represents the main source of household energy consumption: 78 percent of household energy consumption. - Kerosene: 21 percent (mainly used for lighting). - Very limited household access to LPG, mostly high-income urban households. - Biomass use for cooking exacerbates exposure to PM2.5, PM10, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides, increasing respiratory and cardiovascular disease risks and negative externalities. - Forest cover and loss: - About 40 percent of territory covered by woodlands and forests (forests, closed and open woodland, tree and shrub savannah, mangrove and riparian and fringing savannah). - FAO historical comparison: forest cover in the 1960s was around 60 percent of total land area — implying loss of one third of total forest cover over 60 years. - Share of highly dense forests (canopy densities higher than 20) is low, increasing the importance of their protection for carbon sequestration potential. - Main causes of deforestation: - Agriculture expansion. - Use of biomass as cooking fuel. - Urbanization. - Wildfires. - Saline intrusion (direct impact and indirect displacement of farmers). - Forced migration from the GBA (Gambia Basin Area implied) could play a larger role due to coastal erosion and sea-level rise. - Governance and institutional gaps: - Absence of a national land policy heavily impacts deforestation. - No well-defined rules on permitting to clear forests for agricultural use. - MLRGRA lacks enforcement capacity to ensure land is used according to approved use; lack of monitoring and enforcement constrains forest conservation. - Forest types and area distribution (as reported): - 38 thousand hectares of forest parks. - 43 thousand hectares of community forests. - Around 20 thousand hectares of private forests. - Approximately 300 thousand hectares are state parks that are not protected nor properly managed and where most deforestation takes place. - MECCNAR target: reach 200 thousand hectares of forest given to communities. - Community forest management (CFM) — challenges and success factors (Box 5 summary): - Roles: carbon sequestration, conservation, economic opportunities; outcomes depend on sustainable management. - Predictors of positive outcomes: formal community forest management association, local participation in rulemaking. - Success factors: - Forest size and clearly defined boundaries. - Predictable benefit flows. - Local autonomy to design and enforce clear rules; effective monitoring and sanctioning. - Stable technological and policy environment, low intergroup conflict, and management experience. - Challenges: - Institutional and governance capacity constraints. - Need for community capacity building. - Balancing carbon, biodiversity, and livelihood objectives involves trade-offs. - Limited technical and financial resources. - Monitoring and evaluation requirements are resource-intensive. - Community-PPP example and PES integration: - A successful Community-PPP created an eco-touristic zone and wildlife sanctuary along the river Gambia with profit-sharing: - 50 percent of excess profits allocated to the local community. - 35 percent to the Biodiversity Fund. - 15 percent to the Forest Fund. - Community forests coupled with Community PPPs can be foundational for an ambitious conservation policy integrated into a broader PES scheme. - Community forests with well-defined property rights and community involvement tend to be better protected and enable non-timber revenue generation (fruit, nuts, mushrooms, beverages, eco-tourism). *Source: IMF Staff (excerpt from IMF Technical Assistance Report).* ### 66. The PES scheme can be used to incentivize forest conservation and restoration programs. ### The PES scheme can be used to incentivize forest conservation and restoration programs. ### Effectiveness and expected impact - International experience has shown the effectiveness of PES schemes in other African countries (Annex IV). - A recent study of 40 REDD+ projects in nine countries showed that PES schemes can reduce deforestation by 47 percent in the first five years, although the effect becomes somewhat smaller for projects operating for 8 to 10 years. - A study in Uganda using randomized controlled trials showed deforestation rates in treatment villages decreased to 2-5 percent, compared to 7-10 percent in the non-participating villages. - Slowing down deforestation by 40 percent for five years in The Gambia would amount to approximately 0.25 MtCO2e of avoided emissions. - Estimates show that 0.25 MtCO2e would be enough to meet the NDC objective under IMF’s estimates of BAU emissions. ### Targeting, scaling, and financing the PES in The Gambia - The PES should include community forests with high revenue potential and provide payments to forests under high risk of deforestation based on vulnerability assessments. - Revenue potential of community forests needs assessment depending on: type of forest, proximity to export markets, and potential private sector investment. - The Forestry Directorate within the MECCNAR needs to assess vulnerability of community forests based on proximity to urban centers and other criteria, building on international good practices. - The PES can be scaled to cover additional community forests as they are gazetted to achieve the 200 thousand hectares target, as well as lower-revenue potential forests. - Initially, higher-revenue forests can finance payments to communities in lower-revenue forests using profits contributed to the Biodiversity and Forestry Funds generated by activities in high revenue community forests. - As the scheme expands into forests with lower revenue potential (i.e., forests farther away from Banjul), the government will need to mobilize additional sources of funding from domestic taxes and catalyze additional donor funding. - A potential revenue source is the carbon pricing proposed later in this section. ### Payment design and trade-offs - The MECCNAR, in partnership with other agencies, must define appropriate payment levels, balancing effectiveness and coverage. - Payments in PES schemes are calculated based on ecosystem value or opportunity cost. - Payments could equal the amount of revenues the community would obtain if they cleared the forest and used it for agricultural production, by comparing revenues from neighboring farmlands. - The government faces a trade-off between effectiveness and coverage given limited fiscal space: higher payments increase conservation incentives but reduce the number of community forests that can be incorporated. ### Monitoring, Reporting, Verification (MRV) and operational demands - Establishing an MRV system is a condition for the PES's success, along with scaled up technology and satellite data. - MRV enables assessment of whether environmental services paid for by PES are actually in place and allows proper emission accounting in energy sectors, agriculture and waste. - Complementary activities include: - using satellite data to monitor land use changes; - using technologies such as drones to monitor forests and issue deforestation warnings; - hiring additional rangers to patrol and monitor compliance. - Close coordination is needed with other government departments, such as the Ministry of Tourism for ecotourism promotion, and with donor-funded projects integrating local markets with export markets through the Gambia river. ### Risks and complementary policies - Potential risks: over-exploitation by communities and deforestation leakages to other types of forests. - Inclusive decision making and transparency on revenue-sharing and use are critical to avoid over-exploitation and to increase community ownership and agency. - Authorities noted that while deforestation in community forests generally decreases once gazetted, deforestation in other types of forests can increase as a result. - The Directorate of Forestry must scale up monitoring in other types of forests as the amount of community forests increases. - Addressing main drivers of deforestation is critical, including raising agricultural productivity, water availability, land tenure challenges, and providing access to clean cooking devices to 98 percent of The Gambian population. - Less than 5 percent of The Gambian population has access to clean cooking; barriers include higher costs vis-à-vis biomass, lack of infrastructure and distribution networks for fuels such as LPG, and lack of a regulatory framework for LPG in The Gambia. ### Recommendations (PES, forests, and clean cooking) - Building on community forests and Community PPPs, create the appropriate regulatory and legal framework to establish and operationalize a Payment for Environmental Services (PES) scheme, while identifying stable revenue sources to finance it, including through carbon taxation: - Reach 200 thousand hectares of forests whose ownership rights have been transferred to communities and gazette them to ensure their legal protection. - Build a vulnerability index for community forests based on risk of deforestation, including criteria like proximity to urban settlements, population growth, projected increase in arable land to meet food needs, water access, among others. - Assess the revenue generation potential in community forests based on the type of forest, proximity from Banjul or export markets, potential for private sector participation, potential to develop ecotourism, among others. - Ramp up capacity to use technology, hire additional park rangers for community forests and other types of forests (to decrease leakage risks), and improve capacity to collect and process data. - Operationalize a MRV system, which would allow for proper emission accounting and provide data to evaluate the impacts of environmental and climate policies, including the PES. - Create a regulatory framework for LPG to increase legal certainty for potential suppliers. --- ### D. Waste Management — Current state and challenges - The waste sector is a top contributor of GHG emissions in The Gambia, and emissions are expected to grow over the next decade. - GHG emissions from the waste sector, including solid waste and wastewater, represent 17.7 percent of total emissions in 2019 and are expected to grow by 28 percent from 2019 to 2030 (IMF-WB CPAT 2024). - The SPCR (2017) identifies integrated waste management as a top priority for climate resilience in the GBA and population growth centers. - The Gambia produces as much as 400,000 tons of waste annually (SPCR 2017). - Plastic waste is estimated to be 22,800 tons in 2021 with more than 70 percent leaked into the environment (Common Seas 2024). - Municipal solid waste (MSW) is estimated at 702 tons per day with 9 percent plastics (UNDP 2023); during the dry season MSW is often openly burned, producing substantial CO2 and particulate matter. - The GBA has only two legal dumpsites – the Bakoteh and Mile 2 dump sites – and both are reaching their capacity. - Uncontrolled dumping releases methane; an integrated waste management system could better quantify emissions from organic waste and enable solutions such as composting or methane capture. - For wastewater treatment, the GBA has two sewerage systems: one serving Banjul operated by NAWEC and another in Kotu serving the TDA operated by Agua Gambia Ltd. - Only the Kotu system includes treatment of sewage before dumping at sea, but defective pipes and lack of overflow management result in discharge of raw sewage into the Kotu Stream. - The Banjul system disposes raw sewage directly through a diffuser to the ocean at around 1km offshore and suffers from blockage, infiltration, and overflow. - The remainder of the country lacks sewage treatment and relies on septic tanks and pit latrines. - Discharge of untreated wastewater contaminates surface and groundwater sources and marine ecosystems, threatening drinking water quality and the tourism and fishery industries, and compounds fiscal costs of natural disasters. ### Institutional and legislative context - The GoTG has enacted various legislations: National Environmental Management Act (NEMA 1994), Waste Management Bill (2007), Anti-Littering Regulation (2008), Ban on Plastic Bags Order (2015), and a new draft Waste Management Bill under Cabinet consideration. - NEA has partnered with Common Seas to tackle plastics pollution with the goal of reducing plastic waste by 86 percent by 2033 (Common Seas 2024). - Despite legislative efforts, incentives and enforcement mechanisms across the waste management lifecycle are missing. ### Key gaps and fiscal instruments - Given infrastructure and institutional constraints, fiscal instruments are key to internalize negative externalities and help finance waste management. - The Gambia is a net importer of plastics, tires, and consumer durables (UN Comtrade 2024), so fiscal instruments at import, retail, household, or disposal stages are relevant. - For consumer durables and highly polluting products, an excise tax could be imposed at the import stage. - Advance disposal fees (ADFs) and advance recycling fees (ARFs) could prepay the cost of disposal or recycling; ADFs levied on importers are easier to administer but may reduce consumer salience and be passed to consumers; past ADFs are often poorly designed with low fees and exemptions. - A well-designed deposit-refund system (DRS) is highly effective for waste collection, recycling, and reducing littering: - DRS has been implemented in around 40 countries as of 2020 (Statista 2020). - For single-use containers of recyclable materials, DRS substantially increases return rates and reduces plastic waste (OECD 2020; TOMRA 2021; RFF 2011). - A DRS raises prices mainly for consumers who do not recycle and can be progressive if wealthier consumers face higher opportunity costs to return containers. - DRS can provide income for urban scavengers and incentives for recycling microenterprises. - IMF staff calculation shows that a nominal deposit fee of GMD 0.1- 0.5 on plastic bottles could generate USD 1.1-5.4 million in unclaimed revenue annually. - The calculation assumes the Gambian bottled water market size is around USD 22 million each year (Statista 2024) and 50 percent of bottles are returned. - Revenues from unclaimed refunds could be used near-term to strengthen the Anti-Littering Regulation (2008) and medium- to long-term to finance an integrated waste management system. ### Integration with climate-resilient infrastructure and institutional capacity - Waste management should be integrated with climate-resilient infrastructure planning to strengthen interlinkages between water, sanitation, and solid waste service chains. - Institutional and technical capacity of LGAs and area councils to deliver services is a binding constraint; sufficient financial and human resources must be allocated for LGA service provision. - Accountability frameworks with measurable benchmarks are critical; results should be published regularly. - Civil engagement (e.g., hotlines) should be encouraged to enable early identification of waste issues and hazardous conditions. ### Recommendations (Waste Management) - Analyze options, design and implement environmental taxes, including a deposit-refund system (DRS) on single-use recyclable beverage containers with these features: - The deposit could be collected at the import stage, while consumers receive the refund at designated collection locations. - Revenues from the DRS could be used to strengthen the Anti-Littering Regulation (2008) by creating designated waste collection sites and offering a small incentive for waste collected, measured by volume or weight, during the monthly national cleanup exercise. - Unclaimed refund would be earmarked to finance an integrated waste management system over the medium to long-term. *IMF Technical Assistance Report | 45–49* ### 80. In 2021, 37 percent of the Gambian population lacked access to electricity (Figure 21a). The ### Electricity and Energy Policy in The Gambia ### Electricity access and coverage - In 2021, 37 percent of the Gambian population lacked access to electricity (Figure 21a). - The government set the objective of achieving universal access by 2025. - The government estimates progress after 2021 has been stagnant. - The government is exploring the use of mini grids, including private participation for profitable areas, but achieving universal access by 2025 seems unlikely. ### Electricity generation mix and capacity - Until 2024 The Gambia’s electricity generation matrix was entirely dependent on fossil fuels; a major solar plant started operating in 2024. - A windmill operated for some years but is no longer operational. - A 23 MW solar plant was inaugurated in March 2024 (Jambur). - According to NAWEC, 36 percent of the electricity generation in the first quarter of 2024 comes from renewable sources. - NAWEC supplies 15 percent of total electricity consumption; renewables therefore represent about 5 percent of total electricity consumption in The Gambia. - NAWEC’s installed capacity decreased to 81MW due to forced decommissioning of several heavy and light fuel engines in Kotu and Brikama, complemented by the 23MW solar plant in Jambur (Figure 22). - 33 percent of electricity consumption is supplied through a power purchasing agreement (PPA) with a powership. - Half the electricity consumption in The Gambia is imported, mainly from Senegal. - The average cost per kwh provided through PPAs is 0.2 USD cents higher than NAWEC’s own production cost. ### NAWEC financial and operational challenges - NAWEC’s non-audited net loss in 2023 was 2.7 billion GMD or around 45 million USD using the average exchange rate for 2023. - NAWEC’s average cost per kwh is 20 USD cents per kwh, compared to the regional average of 10 USD cent per kwh (ECOWAS estimates). - Technical and commercial losses increased to 27 percent in 2023. - The gap between tariffs and cost recovery increased from 18 million USD in 2021 to 32 million USD in 2023. - Accumulated arrears as of March 2024 amounted to 3 bn GMD or 2.28 percent of GDP, of which 46 percent are owed to foreign producers and 33 percent to IPPs. - Electricity tariffs were reviewed in 2014 and 2023 but remain insufficient to cover current costs. - The tariff methodology incorporates efficiency parameters for transmission and distribution losses of 18 percent—loss beyond 18 percent is not included in the 32 million USD 2023 estimate. - The tariff revision methodology does not consider payment of debt and arrears nor a component for required future investment in generation or transmission and distribution. - PURA is yet to achieve full institutional independence in tariff review and setting. ### Renewable energy potential and policy framework - The government pledged to increase the share of renewables in the energy mix to 50 percent by 2030. - IRENA: most of The Gambian territory has good solar potential; wind potential is more limited but certain coastal areas could be viable. No hydroelectric potential due to low elevation. - NAWEC is relatively close to achieving 50 percent renewable penetration in its production, but NAWEC only supplies 15 percent of total consumption. - The government plans a 150MW solar plant intended to supply local demand during the day and export excess electricity. - The Renewable Energy Act (2013) established a legal, economic and institutional framework, created a Renewable Energy Fund (not operationalized), and defined fiscal incentives including import, value-added and corporate tax exemptions for 15 years. - The Act set the ground for a feed-in tariff and off-grid renewable energy systems. ### Constraints to renewable deployment - Limited private investment appetite due to uncertainty about NAWEC’s capacity to honor PPAs and unresolved land property rights. - A tender for a renewable project was canceled because land property rights had not been secured. - Need for proper planning, stakeholder engagement, guidelines to obtain social license to operate from communities. - Recommendations include considering guarantees to NAWEC and fixing long-term PPA prices in USD to mitigate exchange rate risks, acknowledging guarantees would create additional government liabilities. ### Social License to Operate (Box 6 highlights) - Social License to Operate (SLO) = ongoing acceptance/approval by stakeholders, especially local communities. - Securing SLO prevents conflicts, reduces delays, and supports long-term project success. - Example: Colombia’s ‘Electricity Transfer’ royalty of 1 percent of revenues, with distribution rules for indigenous communities and local governments. ### Policy recommendations (explicit) - Ensure certainty around land rights for renewable energy projects: - Include stakeholder engagement and mechanisms to ensure social license to operate, and mechanisms to properly compensate households and communities in case of resettlement. - Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, in coordination with the Ministry of Land, to publish an assessment of the status of land rights and tenure where future renewable projects are expected to be built. - Improve NAWEC’s financial situation: - Conduct a comprehensive study on cost recovery tariffs for NAWEC and revise tariffs accordingly, while using the social registry to provide targeted support for vulnerable households. - In the short term, MoFEA should consider providing a guarantee to private sector investors in renewable energy projects, as well as fixing future long-term PPAs in USD to mitigate exchange rate risks. - Reform the Renewable Energy Act of 2013 and change fiscal incentives: - Eliminate the 15-year exemption for the most relevant taxes and replace with an accelerated depreciation framework to recover capital costs. - Consider implementing an increasing feed-in tariff (well specified in long-term contracts) to provide certainty for investors while limiting short-term fiscal and NAWEC financial impacts. ### Energy pricing, taxes, and carbon pricing options - Fuels are subject to a combination of specific and ad-valorem taxes; the excise tax introduced in 2021 is ad-valorem rather than a specific tax. - About 20 percent of fuel consumption is estimated to be exempted from duty and VAT (including fuels used in donor-funded projects and contractors). - Electricity pricing distinguishes between pre-payment and conventional meters; in practice all households pay according to pre-payment meters. Conventional meters would be subject to an increasing block pricing scheme, but pre-payment users are charged the initial block price. - Electricity prices are heavily regulated and do not reflect market changes, limiting passthrough of input cost increases. - Implicit carbon prices for gasoline and diesel in The Gambia are well below the regional average: - Regional average (excluding countries with negative implicit carbon price): gasoline USD 99 per ton of CO2eq; diesel USD 65 per ton of CO2eq. - The Gambia is USD 56 below average for gasoline and USD 23 below average for diesel. - Efficient fuel prices include production cost, externalities (GHGs and local pollutants), and consumption taxes (excise taxes and VAT). - The price of most fuels in The Gambia is below the efficient level, though final prices are within the regional average. The efficient price for diesel is higher than for gasoline, reflecting higher emission factors for diesel; the gap with efficient prices is higher for diesel than for gasoline. For kerosene the gap is lower. - Carbon pricing design: changes taxable base from liters to carbon content; countries with excises can adjust rates based on carbon content to minimize implementation costs. Evidence shows carbon pricing yields immediate and substantial emission reductions in many jurisdictions. *IMF Staff based on WDI, IRENA, NAWEC, MoFEA, CPAT and described IMF Technical Assistance analysis.* ### Box 7. Carbon Pricing Principles ### Box 7. Carbon Pricing Principles ### Carbon pricing principles - Carbon pricing requires polluters to pay for the costs they impose on others when releasing CO2. - Ideal role: centerpiece of a country’s mitigation strategy to address energy–and combustion–related emissions. - Typical instruments: a carbon tax on the carbon content of fossil fuel supply or an Emission Trading System (ETS). - Key attractions: - Promotes the full range of responses for reducing energy use and shifting to cleaner energy sources across all covered sectors by reflecting the cost of carbon emissions in the prices of fuels, electricity, and goods. - Automatically minimizes the costs of these responses by equalizing the cost of the last ton reduced across fuels and sectors. - Levels the playing field for clean technology investments by establishing a clear price signal. - Mobilizes a valuable source of revenue which can be used to help meet climate, social, or broader fiscal objectives. - Generates domestic environmental co-benefits such as reductions in local air pollution deaths. - Is straightforward to scale-up from an administrative perspective, building off already established capacity for fuel excise taxes. ### Modeled reform scenarios - Two reform scenarios modeled: - Scenario I: removing all fuel exemptions (donor-funded projects currently do not pay duty on fuels, nor VAT). - Scenario II: removing exemptions plus implementation of a USD 5 per ton of CO2e carbon price in 2025, rising gradually to USD 25 per ton of CO2e by 2030. - Fiscal revenue outcomes (2025): - Removing exemptions would generate additional tax revenues of about 0.11 percent of GDP. - Implementation of a USD 5 per ton of CO2e carbon price in 2025 would generate an additional 0.12 percent of GDP. - Note: additional fiscal revenues for the carbon tax assume full pass-through to electricity prices. If not fully passed through, MoFEA would receive some additional tax while NAWEC will assume financial loss on the price increase not passed through to consumers. Fiscal stability clauses with IPPs might limit pass-through until new capacity contracts are signed. ### Revenue and macroeconomic impacts - Cumulative revenue (2025–2030): - Scenario II would cumulatively raise 1.7 percent of GDP in additional revenue from 2025 to 2030. - Impact on economic growth (model predictions): - Scenario II predicted impact: -0.04 percent of GDP in 2025. - Offset possibility: using 30 percent of the additional revenues as productive public investment could offset the -0.04 percent impact. - Impact of exemption removal in 2025 is minimal and could be offset by productive public investment. - Distributional assumptions for compensatory transfers: - Scenario I assumption: 30 percent of additional revenue used as cash transfers aimed at the bottom 4 deciles. - Scenario II assumption: 25 percent of additional revenue used as cash transfers aimed at the bottom 4 deciles. ### Energy price effects (Table 8 and discussion) - Table 8 — Change in the Price of Energy in 2030 Due to Reform Scenario (values preserved exactly): - Gasoline USD per liter: Baseline 2024 = 1.08; Baseline 2030 = 0.81; Scenario I = 0.84; Scenario II = 0.91. - Diesel USD per liter: Baseline 2024 = 1.18; Baseline 2030 = 0.89; Scenario I = 0.92; Scenario II = 0.99. - Kerosene USD per liter: Baseline 2024 = 1.08; Baseline 2030 = 1.00; Scenario I = 1.00; Scenario II = 1.07. - Heavy fuel oil USD per barrel: Baseline 2024 = 71.60; Baseline 2030 = 62.80; Scenario I = 62.80; Scenario II = 74.50. - Electricity USD per kwh: Baseline 2024 = 0.23; Baseline 2030 = 0.17; Scenario I = 0.17; Scenario II = 0.19. - Prices in 2030 are expected to be lower than current (2024) prices despite reforms because international fuel prices are projected to decrease. - Electricity price is less sensitive to carbon pricing due to renewable energy share in generation mix and a large share of imports not affected by domestic policy. ### Emissions, co-benefits, and health impacts - Responsiveness of total emissions: most emissions in The Gambia originate from non-energy sectors (agriculture, forestry, waste), so total emissions are not highly responsive to carbon pricing. - Emissions impacts: - Removing exemptions: minimal impact, mainly from the transport sector. - Scenario II: emissions impact relatively small but sufficient for the country to remain below the NDC target by 2035; most reductions in the power sector, followed by transport. - Health and safety co-benefits: - Proposed reforms will have a positive impact on averted deaths due to reduced air pollution and road accidents. - Figure/Table summary (Table 9) — cumulative avoided deaths due to lower air pollution and road accidents by 2035: - Scenario I: 40 (Absolute Figure). - Scenario II: 120 (Absolute Figure). ### Table 9 — Summary of main impacts of modeled policies (values preserved exactly) - Scenarios compared: Elimination of exemptions; Elimination of exemptions + carbon tax. - Reduction of GHG emissions in 2030, % compared to BAU: - Elimination of exemptions = 0.1 - + carbon tax = 2.1 - Cumulative reduction in GHG emissions in 2024-2030, MtCO2: - Elimination of exemptions = 0.006 - + carbon tax = 0.23 - Net additional tax revenue collected in 2030, % of GDP: - Elimination of exemptions = 0.09 - + carbon tax = 0.58 - Cumulative tax revenue collected in 2024-2030, bn USD: - Elimination of exemptions = 0.02 - + carbon tax = 0.07 - Impact on economic growth in 2030, deviation from inertial growth in % points: - Elimination of exemptions = 0.01 - + carbon tax = 0.03 - Increase in the price of electricity in 2030, % compared to inertial scenario in 2024: - Elimination of exemptions = -26.1 - + carbon tax = -18.4 - Increase in the price of gasoline in 2030, % compared to inertial scenario in 2024: - Elimination of exemptions = -22.3 - + carbon tax = -15.8 - Increase in the price of diesel in 2030, % compared to inertial scenario in 2024: - Elimination of exemptions = -22.1 - + carbon tax = -14.2 - Cumulative Avoided Deaths Due to Lower Air Pollution and Road Accidents by 2035, Absolute Figure: - Elimination of exemptions = 40 - + carbon tax = 120 ### Distributional impacts and policy considerations - Low-income households spend a higher proportion of income on energy despite high-income households spending more on energy in absolute terms. - Fuel and electricity consumption do not represent a high share of total consumption in The Gambia. - Using 30 percent of additional revenues as transfers for households in the bottom four deciles is projected to be enough to counter the average losses stemming from price increases, but authorities should consider variance within deciles and extreme cases. - Suggested use of additional carbon tax revenues: mitigate negative impacts on households and economic growth and finance the PES scheme proposed in the forestry section. ### Recommendations (preserved exactly) - Remove duty exemptions and apply VAT for all fuel consumption. - Reform the ad-valorem excise tax and replace it with a specific tax. - Introduce a modest carbon price in 2025 with rising ambition towards 2030 building on the existing fuel excise structure. - Use the social registry to identify households that would be most impacted by the reforms and compensate them appropriately. *Source: IMF Staff using CPAT.* ### 108. The GoTG is currently considering a re-draft of the constitution which may recognize ### Climate change governance, policy frameworks, and gaps — The Gambia (content unit) ### Constitutional recognition and legislative developments - The 1997 Constitution of The Gambia, amended over 52 times, currently includes notions of protecting the environment and cooperating with other nations and bodies to protect the global environment. - A 2020 draft constitution attempted to mandate “recognition of the adverse effects of climate change on the sustainable use of land, environment and natural resources and the need to build resilience and increase adaptation to these effects.” The government-sponsored bill was rejected at the first reading of the National Assembly. - In 2023, the President announced development of a new draft. A referendum is expected to take place by the end of the year, with a target deadline of 2027. - The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) from 1994 remains the central legislation dealing with the environment; MECCNAR is pursuing a Climate Change Bill called for in the NCCP, the LTS, and Vision 2050. A Terms of Reference has been issued by MECCNAR for a consultancy to help draft the Bill (funded by the World Bank). - Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations of 2014, under authority of NEMA, provide a framework to evaluate potential environmental effects of development projects; there is no formal requirement to assess climate-related impacts or project resilience to climate change. ### National strategies, objectives, and costings - National Climate Change Policy (NCCP, 2016), led by DWR, aims to mainstream climate change into national planning, budgeting, decision-making, and program implementation by 2025. Four strategic focal areas: (1) climate resilient food and landscapes, (2) low emission and resilient economy, (3) climate resilient people, (4) managing coastlines in a changing environment. - Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (SPCR, 2017) (supported by AfDB and WB; MECCNAR national focal point) builds on NCCP and adds a fifth priority: Infrastructure and waste management. The SPCR provides cost estimates for short-, medium-, and long-term financing. - Low Emission Climate Resilient Development Strategy (LECRDS, 2017), co-drafted by MECCNAR and MoFEA, complements the NDC and SPCR with administrative/cross-cutting measures, GHG mitigation strategies, and climate-resilient development initiatives. - Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC2, 2021) updates commitments to reduce GHG and enhance climate resilience; under NDC2, all climate policy issues entrusted to MECCNAR; DWR serves as UNFCCC Focal Point. - The 2050 Climate Vision of The Gambia (2021), led by MECCNAR and MoFEA, defines long-term vision for climate resilience and net zero emissions by mid-century; covers same four strategic focal areas as NCCP. - Gambia’s Long-Term Climate-Neutral Development Strategy 2050 (LTS, 2022) estimates funding needs across five sectors (Energy, Agriculture, Waste Management, Transport, and LULUCF) to reach net-zero emissions by 2050; spearheaded by MECCNAR with MoFEA co-chair of steering committee and DDP co-chairing technical working group. - Identified investment needs: - SPCR expects projects requiring USD 315 million. - LTS to reach vision 2050 is costed at USD 4 billion (at of time of publication). ### Institutional framework, roles, and operational gaps - Four upper-level institutional bodies established by national policies: - National Climate Change Council (NCCC): principal body for climate decision-making and policy formulation; membership spans relevant ministries. Documented functions vary by source; the 2021 NDC assigns implementing the NCCP, coordinating related policy initiatives, enhancing international cooperation on transboundary climate issues, and managing the Gambian Climate Change Fund (GCCF). Earlier 2016 NCCP also mentioned ensuring coherence with national development goals and monitoring NCCP progress—functions that differ across documents. - Inter-ministerial Climate Committee (IMCC): chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MECCNAR and Permanent Secretaries for Planning and Finance; includes Permanent Secretaries and Directors of line ministries reflected in the NCCC. Roles: promote integration of climate change impacts into sectoral strategies, report on integrations, create short- and medium-term goals and incentives/disincentives for non-compliance. The group is supposed to meet every three months. - Climate Change Secretariat: housed under MECCNAR (originally established under DWR). Mandate: help sectors integrate climate change into national and sub-national plans, coordinate NCCP implementation, build capacity, track adaptation and mitigation progress using participatory M&E, develop Expert Thematic Groups and network of Climate Change Focal Points in each sector Ministry. - National Climate Committee (NCC): includes stakeholder representatives from civil groups and advises the Climate Change Secretariat; established under DWR with the NEA serving as secretary. The group is supposed to meet twice a year. - Overlapping functions, limited funding (with exception of the Secretariat), and sparse operationalization have resulted in: - gaps in implementation and coordination between sectors; - limited monitoring of current climate policies; - lack of a consistent forum for ministries to coordinate on climate change; - incomplete selection/appointment of Climate Change Focal Points across sectors. - National strategies are largely seen as MECCNAR’s responsibility; cross-sectoral ownership and accountability across ministries is missing. ### Planning, data, and budgeting challenges - Long-term projections and hazard mapping: - DWR’s meteorological division provides seasonal weather forecasts with up to one-year horizons. - MECCNAR created climate scenarios in the Second National Communications for UNFCCC in 2012: temperature and rainfall scenarios assessed until 2100 and select indicators projected for forestry, agriculture and fisheries. The Third National Communication (2020) focused more on literature review; fewer detailed long-run projections and indicators. - Key data gaps: horticulture production and other sectoral indicators; absence of detailed hazard risk mapping limits shared understanding and long-term decision-making. - Medium-term fiscal planning: MoFEA’s resource envelope determined through the medium-term expenditure framework that relies on trends using 4-year historical cycles of drought to predict agricultural productivity and ten-year cycles of big floods. No longer-term macro-fiscal horizons are assessed. - National Development Plan (NDP) alignment and monitoring: - DDP under MoFEA coordinates, formulates and implements the NDP and conducts mid-term reviews and annual reporting. - An updated NDP for 2023 to 2027 titled the Recovery Focused NDP (RF-NDP) was established. Pillar five includes climate change with more detailed climate goals across forestry, waste, coastline, chemical, energy, water resource management, and DRR than previous NDPs. - Climate Change Planning Officers in each line ministry report to the DDP on NDP implementation progress. - The government is developing a web-based database to house key development indicators for monitoring and annual reporting. - The RF-NDP is limited to a 5-year horizon; the DDP is still developing a Gambia 2050 vision and long-term NDP strategy. - Budget and finance alignment: - The current budget does not align with RF-NDP goals; RF-NDP and the budget act in silo, risking neglect of climate objectives included in RF-NDP. - The GoTG is developing an Integrated National Financing Framework to align national financing resources to the RF-NDP and the SDGs. - MoFEA hired a consultant to support a climate budget tagging process (funding from Canada) to better understand climate expenditure. ### Climate finance, private investment, and project appraisal - Domestic and sectoral funds: - National Climate Change Fund (housed under MoFEA and governed by NCCC) established to support Local Government Action Plans but financing has never operationalized the fund. - Existing sectoral funds: National Forestry Fund, Biodiversity Trust Fund, Renewable Energy Fund, and DRM Funds at national, regional and district levels. - International climate finance accessed: Global Climate Fund (GCF), Climate Investment Fund (CIF), Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), Adaptation Fund, and bilateral/multilateral development partners. - Gaps: - No National Climate Finance Policy and no coherent overarching climate finance strategy to coordinate across funds and link with planning and budgeting. - Substantial investment needs (SPCR USD 315 million; LTS USD 4 billion) exceed fiscal capacity, highlighting need for enabling environment for private investment. - Institutional framework does not require investors to perform climate change impact assessments or climate vulnerability assessments; no formal requirement to assess alignment with national climate objectives (such as emissions) or project resilience. - Measures to unlock private investment (identified needs): - provide the right incentives; - de-risk investments; - improve access to finance; - remove regulatory barriers to investments; - improve macroeconomic stability to reduce currency and inflation risk. ### Transboundary coordination - Transboundary River Basin Organizations (Gambia River Basin Organization and Senegal River Basin Organization united) provide a vessel to coordinate management of water resources across international boundaries. - Persistent concerns about downstream impacts from neighboring country projects (example: sediment blockage from an upstream hydro plant impacting waterflows and downstream erosion). ### IMF assessment and recommended actions (policy gaps and priorities) - Data, projections, and planning: - Establish long-term climate scenarios and hazard vulnerability maps and disseminate them to line ministries to improve public sector planning. - Conduct an assessment to identify inputs each line ministry needs to effectively plan for climate change. DDP should harmonize the list of needed inputs and identify an agency to establish projections (examples: Meteorological Division, a university, MECCNAR, a consultancy). - DDP to lead ensuring projections are created, disseminated, and updated; DDP to ensure projections are incorporated into sectoral plans under supervision and support from line ministries’ Planning Officers. - Institutional integration and ownership: - Incorporate The Gambia 2050 Climate Vision and the Long-Term Climate-Neutral Development Strategy 2050 into upcoming long-term national plans to mainstream climate ambitions and monitor progress. - Align the upcoming national 2050 vision with existing climate-specific long-term plans so these plans benefit from the DDP’s institutional structure and build ministry ownership. - Ensure climate-related data necessary to measure progress on the long-term climate vision are collected by DDP (using the upcoming online database) for reporting and oversight. - Strengthen clarity of roles across NCCC, IMCC, Climate Change Secretariat, and NCC and ensure adequate, sustained funding for consistent operation and coordination. - Legal and fiscal measures: - Enshrine mitigation targets and adaptation objectives in legislation (Climate Change Bill/Act) and clearly assign responsibility for their management to create accountability for achieving climate-related objectives. - Develop a National Climate Finance Policy and a coherent overarching climate finance strategy to coordinate domestic and external funds and link them with planning and budgeting. - Operationalize the National Climate Change Fund and coordinate sectoral funds to support Local Government Action Plans and sector priorities. - Project assessment and investor safeguards: - Require climate change impact assessments and climate vulnerability assessments for investors and development projects to evaluate alignment with national climate objectives and project resilience. - Design measures to incentivize private investment (including de-risking instruments, improved access to finance, regulatory reforms, and macroeconomic stability measures). *IMF Technical Assistance Report — content unit extracted from the supplied source.* ### 123. Encouraging a long-term, forward-looking perspective in policy and project planning is ### 123. Encouraging a long-term, forward-looking perspective in policy and project planning is ### Long-term, forward-looking planning for climate resilience - Align planning and assessment horizons for policies and projects with the timeframe over which their effects will be felt, such as the entire lifespan of infrastructure assets. - Anticipate future conditions, integrate climate projections, and implement adaptive measures to safeguard investments and public welfare over time. - Formalize requirements by moving beyond the environmental impact assessment under the NEMA to also require: - a climate change impact assessment; and - a climate vulnerability assessment - These would determine the impacts and resilience of large projects and would require updating the regulatory framework through NEMA or a Climate Change Bill. ### Institutional framework for managing climate change and coordination procedures - Allocate roles and responsibilities clearly among actors and legitimize structures and procedures through the regulatory framework to expedite implementation of national climate policies. - The DDP should lead in establishing roles and expectations for stakeholders. - Legalize responsibilities (including incorporation of climate change impacts into planning and NDC commitments) via a potential Climate Change Bill or an updated Environmental Management Act to signal importance to line ministries. - Revive a consistent high-level structure to implement national climate strategies, monitor climate action, and establish cross-sectoral collaboration: - Re-operationalize the IMCC to provide a conversation platform and reporting structure. - Re-operationalize the NCCC as the main policy body to set policy, help sectors implement national climate plans, and monitor progress. - Conduct an assessment of funding required to maintain consistent IMCC and NCCC efforts and consider adequate funding to improve operationalization. ### National Adaptation Planning and climate finance - Develop a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) to move from project-based adaptation planning to an integrated approach across all vulnerable sectors. - A costed adaptation strategy can align national, sub-national and sectoral adaptation plans and identify national adaptation priorities. - A NAP can facilitate access to international funding and technical support by demonstrating commitment to adaptation. - Establish a climate finance policy to coordinate resource mobilization in a project-finance oriented environment: - Provide a framework for funding mitigation and adaptation projects aligned with national climate goals. - Enhance transparency and accountability in financial flows. - Include provisions for strengthening institutional and technical capacities to manage and deploy climate finance effectively. ### Enabling the private sector and regional coordination - Build an enabling environment for the private sector to unlock climate investments: - Provide incentives (tax breaks and subsidies), de-risking mechanisms (guarantees), improved access to finance, clear land rights, and removal of regulatory barriers. - Build macroeconomic stability to reduce currency and inflationary risks. - Coordinate with neighboring countries to ensure upstream dams account for downstream environmental and climate impacts: - Use Transboundary River Basin Organizations or higher-level coordination via the NCCC. - Maintain formal cooperative forums with upstream neighbors for sustainable water resource management and shared climate risk mitigation. ### Mainstreaming climate change into national and sub-national agendas - Continue mainstreaming climate change ambitions into upcoming NDPs and leverage the institutional structure of the DDP to embed climate change into national priorities and sectoral plans. - Climate Change Focal Points should work closely with DDP officers to ensure NDP-related climate planning is actioned. - Mainstream climate change management into the core functions of the MoFEA to: - Integrate climate considerations into macro-fiscal forecasting, tax policy, expenditure planning, and debt management. - Develop capacity for handling aspects of green and climate change financing. - Harmonize adaptation and mitigation into sectoral plans and regulatory frameworks: - Ensure upcoming sectoral legislation and policies clearly define roles and responsibilities, authority to impose climate mechanisms, and collaboration vessels for climate challenges. ### Recommendations (as listed) - Establish long-term climate scenarios and hazard vulnerability maps and disseminate them to line ministries to improve public sector planning. - Incorporate The Gambia 2050 Climate Vision and the Long-Term Climate-Neutral Development Strategy 2050 into upcoming long-term national plans (ex. National 2050 Vision) to mainstream climate ambitious and monitor progress. - Allocate roles and responsibilities for climate change management clearly among actors and legitimize the institutional structure, responsibilities and targets through legislation (ex. a Climate Change Bill or NEMA update). - Develop a National Adaptation Plan to help transition the country from a project-based adaptation planning system to an integrated approach across all vulnerable sectors. - Deepen coordination with neighboring countries to ensure upstream dams properly account for downstream environmental and climate change impacts. - Harmonize adaptation and mitigation into upcoming sectoral plans and regulatory frameworks including mainstreaming climate change management into the core functions of the MoFEA (i.e., incorporate climate change implications in macro-fiscal forecasting, tax policy, expenditure planning, and debt management, and develop the capacity for handling aspects of green and climate change financing). ### Annex summaries and key statistics from related sections - Floods (Annex II: 2022 Flood in The Gambia) - July-August Flashflood of 2022 was the largest rainfall event recorded in more than 30 years in The Gambia. - Preliminary direct damage estimate: USD 82 million (or equivalent of 4.3 percent of The Gambia’s 2020 GDP). - Direct damage to buildings/contents by sector: - Residential 70.2 (USD mln) - Commercial 10.3 (USD mln) - Industrial 0.9 (USD mln) - Total damage all buildings and contents 81.5 (USD mln) - Rapid urban expansion increased settlement areas exposed to pluvial and fluvial flood hazards. - DRM Coordination (Annex III) - National Disaster Management Act 2008 established multi-level DRM institutions headed by the National Disaster Management Council (chaired by the Vice President). - NDMA serves as the secretariat; contingency plans cover five major hazards (floods, bushfires, oil spill, disease outbreak, population movement). - NDMA has facilitated seven regional contingency plans, 18 community action plans, a health contingency plan, and an oil spill contingency plan. - Gaps include need for multi-purpose shelters, capacity building for emergency managers/first responders/communities, and further use of geospatial technologies. - National Early Warning Strategy 2021-2026 aims to build an integrated EWS; formal coordination mandate rests with NDMA per DRM Act 2008. NCCRM was created by Executive Order No. 88 in 2019. Sufficient information on effective implementation of the National Early Warning Strategy 2021-2026 was not obtained by the mission. - Payment for Environmental Services — Tanzania case (Annex IV) - PES schemes for forest conservation have been implemented in multiple African countries, including Tanzania where pilots started in 2009. - Tangible benefits observed in pilots (e.g., village offices, grants for phones/bicycles, conservation agriculture, improved charcoal stoves, bee-keeping). - Challenges observed in Tanzania pilots: - Land rights: slow process to obtain land certificates and demarcate village borders (up to 6 years in some cases); demarcation led to border conflicts. - Land use planning: conflicts from relocation and setting aside land for protective purposes. - Leakage: increased deforestation outside pilot areas; NGOs lacked enforcement power. - Long-term effects: pilots were time-limited with no studies on long-term impacts; sustainability of payments is uncertain. - Compensation misunderstandings: participants expected compensation for lost income; conflicts arose between charcoal burners and other villagers. *IMF Technical Assistance Report | Excerpts from the provided chapter and annexes.* ### Annex V. Climate Policy Assessment Tool ### Annex V. Climate Policy Assessment Tool ### Overview - The IMF-World Bank (WB) Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) is a spreadsheet-based "model of models". - CPAT allows for the rapid estimation of effects of mitigation policies for over 200 countries. - CPAT is being made available to governments for internal use. ### Capabilities: impacts quantified - Quantifies impacts on: - energy production, consumption, trade, and prices; - emissions of local and global pollutants including reductions needed to achieve NDCs; - GDP and economic welfare; - revenues; - industry incidence (across many sectors); - household incidence (across deciles, urban vs. rural samples, and horizontal equity); - development co-benefits (local air pollution and health impacts). - Enables assessment of tradeoffs (e.g., among efficiency, equity, or administrative burden) and tailoring of policy design to country context. ### Capabilities: policies evaluated - CPAT can evaluate: - carbon taxes; - ETSs; - fossil fuel subsidy reform; - energy price liberalization; - electricity and fuel taxes; - removals of preferential VAT rates for fuels; - energy efficiency and emission rate regulations; - feebates; - clean technology subsidies; - combinations of these policies ("policy mixes"). ### Coverage and data completeness - CPAT covers over 200 countries accounting for more than 95 percent of global GHG emissions. - CPAT’s input data is complete and there is no need for external data inputs. - CPAT converts most signatories' quantifiable emissions targets into a single comparable metric (required emissions reductions vs. BAU) and allows consistent comparisons of mitigation ambition for over 200 countries, including all signatories of the 2015 Paris Agreement (194 countries). ### Transparency, usability, and speed - Results are presented rapidly via a chart-driven interface, allowing experimentation and sensitivity analyses. - The model is streamlined, with transparent underlying parameters that are readily adjustable for sensitivity analyses. ### Equity and distributional focus - Emphasizes the importance of a "just transition" by estimating impacts on poverty, equity, and welfare across income groups and between urban and rural households. - Estimates impacts on households from changes in energy and non-energy prices: - across consumption deciles (vertical equity); - within deciles (horizontal equity); - between urban and rural sub-groups. ### Scientific grounding and comparability - CPAT is parametrized to be broadly in the mid-range of ex ante models and parameterized to ex post empirical literature. - Allows cross-country analysis and quantitative comparisons of all NDCs. - Collates new, comprehensive datasets, including: - energy consumption and prices; - GHGs; - local air pollutants; - price and income elasticities; - environmental costs; - NDCs. - Includes comparable decile-level data on household consumption of energy and non-energy goods for 84 countries. ### Contributions to national and global analysis - Supports governments in designing and implementing climate mitigation strategies by providing rapid, comparable estimates to inform policy design, including assessment of policy mixes and distributional effects. - Contributes datasets to the IMF’s Climate Change Indicators Dashboard and spreadsheets accompanying IMF products. *Source: Annex V. Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT), IMF Technical Assistance Report.* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/tar/2025/english/tarea2025019-print-pdf.pdf_