## tarea2025033-print-pdf

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---

### Mission focus and context
- Mission objective: strengthen the Central Bank of Suriname’s (CBvS) communication on monetary policy and financial stability.
- Mission dates and staff: conducted in person from November 4 to November 8, 2024, by Mr. Petr Jakubik (Financial Stability Resident Advisor) and Mr. Marek Petrus (IMF Short-term Expert).
- Policy context: since adopting a floating exchange rate in June 2021, the CBvS has used reserve money as the policy target within a reserve money targeting monetary policy regime.

### Key findings
- Communications and credibility
  - Effective communication is critical to enhancing CBvS credibility, anchoring expectations, and improving policy effectiveness.
  - The CBvS has not yet developed and adopted widely considered minimum-standard tools of monetary policy communication despite introducing the Financial Stability Report (FSR) in 2015 (discontinued then resumed in 2021).
  - The FSR has yet to be actively promoted beyond a press release.
- Operational practices and parameters
  - The CBvS conducts open market operations through auctioning of CBvS term deposits followed by issuance of Central Bank Certificates to meet its reserve money target.
  - Reserve requirements: domestic currency liabilities set at 44%; foreign currency liabilities set at 50%.
- Internal governance and roles
  - The Governor chairs the policy-making Executive Board.
  - The Directorate of Monetary Affairs and the Open Market Operations Department play key monetary roles.
  - The Directorate of Supervision houses the Financial Stability Department responsible for the FSR.

### Recommended institutional and decision-making reforms
- Institutionalize structured decision-making to improve governance, transparency, and predictability:
  - Establish fixed schedules for Monetary Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) and Financial Stability Advisory Committee (FSAC) meetings and Executive Board reviews.
  - Enhanced scheduling with eight monetary policy meetings and four financial stability-focused sessions annually to enable timely responses and operational efficiency.
  - Allow additional ad-hoc meetings for unforeseen circumstances.
- Monetary policy formulation process (specific steps)
  - Convene MPAC meetings at regular intervals—eight times a year under a fixed meeting schedule firm for at least 12 months ahead.
  - Develop and observe a detailed calendar with binding deadlines for submission of all necessary inputs for MPAC consideration.
  - Schedule the regular MPAC meeting ideally not more than one week prior to the policy-setting meeting of the Executive Board.
  - Draft the internal report on monetary policy in advance of each MPAC meeting and finalize it upon the meeting’s conclusion by adding the MPAC’s consensus monetary policy recommendation.
  - Maintain the option for additional ad-hoc MPAC meetings in cases of unforeseen circumstances.

### Monetary policy communication — objectives and core instruments
- Strategic aim and narrative
  - Transition to an inflation-focused communication strategy to manage expectations and build confidence.
  - Adopt key principles: clarity on policy objectives, equal and timely access to information, tailoring messages to diverse audiences, and consistency over time and across speakers.
  - Messaging guidance: use plain language and “sound bites” for general audiences; expert vocabulary and data-driven presentations for analysts; frame projections as conditional and explicitly communicate risks and uncertainties.
- Core communications toolkit and status
  - Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) — Purpose: communicate current policy decision, rationale, and linkage to achieving price stability.
    - Current status: Not yet implemented.
    - Recommendation: introduce a regular MPS and ideally commit to publishing the MPS at a pre–set time on the day of the Board decision.
  - Press conference — Purpose: explain and interpret policy decisions and macro outlook in plain language; led by the Governor.
    - Current status: Not yet implemented.
    - Recommendation: introduce a regular Governor-led press conference following each MPS, with slide deck and Q&A; publish presentation on the website immediately after the event.
  - Monetary Policy Report (MPR) — Purpose: flagship publication presenting forecasts, policy concerns, and how decisions aim to deliver price stability.
    - Current status: Not yet implemented externally; a backward-looking Quarterly Report and an internal “Monetary Policy Report / Monetair beleidsrapport” exist as MPAC input.
    - Recommendation: consolidate the Economic Bulletin and Quarterly Report into an external MPR to be published 4 times a year in sync with 4 of the recommended 8 policy reviews; make the MPR more forward-looking and policy focused.
- MPS, press conference, and MPR timing specifics
  - Publish MPS on the day of the policy decision as soon as possible after Board adoption, ideally at a preset time, in a copyable format.
  - Hold a press conference led by the Governor with a 1-to-2-hour delay from MPS publication; publish slide deck on the website immediately after the event.
  - Publish the MPR ideally within 3 weeks of the policy decision announcement.

### Financial stability communication — processes and outreach
- Institutional process and publications
  - Strengthen FSAC’s role in quarterly financial stability updates, with systematic Executive Board reviews.
  - Regular publication of the Financial Stability Report (FSR) and interim review updates.
  - Follow reviews with press conferences and targeted seminars to promote trust, accountability, and address systemic risks.
- Recommended meeting cadence and transparency
  - Schedule Executive Board meetings four times per year to review financial stability assessments; integrate these meetings into the regular board schedule and ideally precede them with FSAC discussions one week prior.
  - One of the four meetings should focus specifically on the FSR.
  - Publicly communicate key decisions and insights from quarterly Executive Board meetings, publish meeting summaries, key findings, and policy decisions in a timely manner.
- Outreach and stakeholder engagement
  - Issue press releases after each semi-annual review; accompany the annual FSR release with a Governor-led press conference.
  - Organize professional seminars for market participants and targeted seminars for business leaders; host town hall meetings and nationwide seminars for broader economic literacy.
  - Use outreach to both inform and collect stakeholder feedback to build trust and anchor medium–term and long–term inflation expectations.
- Current constraints
  - In the absence of an operational macroprudential framework, communication is the most important tool for addressing systemic risk.
  - A basic macroprudential framework has been prepared and discussed internally but is not yet operational; the CBvS currently has no prudential tools under its control.

### Communication framework, capacity building, and internal practices
- Communication strategy and governance
  - Develop, approve by the Executive Board, adopt, and implement a comprehensive CBvS communication strategy that:
    - Defines main strategic communication goals.
    - Defines main target groups, including CBvS staff.
    - Defines main communication tools, including key CBvS outlets.
    - Defines internal practices governing external communication.
  - Specify the CBvS price stability definition (verbal or numerical) for institutional adoption and repeated public communication.
    - The mission recommends the CBvS authorities go public with their preferred price stability definition as a “single-digit inflation level”.
    - The mission notes risks in publicly announcing a verbal definition within a money targeting framework and proposes a verbal definition (“inflation in single digits”) to be specific enough while preserving room for maneuver.
- Capacity, training, and designated roles
  - Designate dedicated experts from monetary policy and financial stability to liaise with the Communication Department.
  - Establish regular training for media representatives and CBvS staff to interpret monetary policy and financial stability messages.
  - Implement an internal program of regular monetary policy and financial stability training for Communication Department staff.
  - Conduct regular trainings on expert topics for members of Suriname’s media, ideally in quarterly intervals.
  - The mission believes current CBvS communication staff has the capacity to design mechanisms and procedures for gradually developing external communications but recommends further assessment for modelling and forecasting capacities required for a forward-looking MPR.
- Further support
  - Strengthen capabilities through targeted capacity development and technical support, such as CARTAC TA, including hands-on training to CBvS staff and local media and support for launching the MPR.

### Priorities and timeframes (selected)
- Near-term (< 12 months), High priority:
  - Develop, approve, adopt, and implement the comprehensive communication strategy.
  - Define strategic goals, target groups, tools, and internal practices.
  - Specify the CBvS price stability definition.
  - Establish a regular training program for media and CBvS staff.
  - Adopt proactive communication about changes to practices.
  - Streamline monetary policy formulation with the Executive Board meeting eight times per year.
  - Adopt Executive Board practice of meeting four times per year to review financial stability assessments.
  - Designate experts to liaise with the communication team.
  - Provide regular financial stability and monetary policy training for the Communications Department staff.
- Medium-term (12 to 24 months), notable items:
  - Make newly established practices fully transparent.
  - Adopt regular practice of press releases after each decision followed by Governor-led press conferences.
  - Develop and publish a quarterly Monetary Policy Report as a flagship publication.
  - Develop a comprehensive outreach program; publish interim FSR updates and hold seminars.

### Expected outcomes and strategic goals
- Expected outcomes
  - Modernizing communication practices and institutionalizing structured decision-making will strengthen stakeholder confidence.
  - Improved clarity, transparency, and predictability will enhance the CBvS’s ability to guide market expectations and respond to economic and financial developments.
  - These reforms will support the CBvS’s mandate to achieve and maintain price and financial stability and foster a more resilient and sustainable macroeconomic environment in Suriname.
- Strategic communication goals and examples
  - Broaden understanding of CBvS autonomy and mandate; rebuild credibility as committed to price stability; steer inflation expectations to the central bank’s target over the medium term; promote economic literacy; reinforce CBvS image as professional, autonomous, transparent, accountable, and trustworthy.
  - Example core message: "The central bank’s primary objective is to achieve and maintain domestic price stability, which we define as inflation in single digits [between X and X percent]."

*Source: tarea2025033-print-pdf*

### Executive Summary

### Executive Summary

### Mission focus and context
- The mission aimed to strengthen the Central Bank of Suriname’s (CBvS) communication on monetary policy and financial stability.
- Conducted in person from November 4 to November 8, 2024, by Mr. Petr Jakubik (Financial Stability Resident Advisor) and Mr. Marek Petrus (IMF Short-term Expert).
- The mission evaluated existing communication frameworks, identified challenges in transparency, consistency, and stakeholder engagement, and provided recommendations aligned with international best practices.
- Since adopting a floating exchange rate in June 2021, the CBvS has used reserve money as the policy target for controlling inflation within a reserve money targeting monetary policy regime.

### Key findings
- Effective communication is critical to enhancing CBvS credibility, anchoring expectations, and improving policy effectiveness.
- The CBvS has not yet developed and adopted widely considered minimum-standard tools of monetary policy communication, despite introducing the Financial Stability Report (FSR) in 2015 (discontinued then resumed in 2021).
- The FSR has yet to be actively promoted beyond a press release.
- The CBvS conducts open market operations through auctioning of CBvS term deposits followed by issuance of Central Bank Certificates to meet its reserve money target.
- Reserve requirements: domestic currency liabilities set at 44%; foreign currency liabilities set at 50%.
- Internal governance: the Governor chairs the policy-making Executive Board; the Directorate of Monetary Affairs and the Open Market Operations Department play key monetary roles; the Directorate of Supervision houses the Financial Stability Department responsible for the FSR.

### Recommended institutional and process reforms
- Institutionalize structured decision-making processes to improve governance, transparency, and predictability.
  - Establish fixed schedules for Monetary Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) and Financial Stability Advisory Committee (FSAC) meetings and Executive Board reviews.
  - Enhanced scheduling with eight monetary policy meetings and four financial stability-focused sessions annually to enable timely responses and operational efficiency.
  - Allow additional ad-hoc meetings for unforeseen circumstances.

### Monetary policy communication recommendations
- Transition to an inflation-focused communication strategy to manage expectations and build confidence.
- Prioritize developing and publishing a Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) following policy decisions.
- Complement MPS with regular press conferences led by the Governor to explain decisions clearly and accessibly.
- Introduce a forward-looking Monetary Policy Report (MPR) as a flagship publication to provide deeper insights into inflation trends, policy rationales, and long-term objectives.
- Shift communication focus away from operational details (open market operations) toward the price stability objective and the policy narrative.

### Financial stability communication recommendations
- Strengthen FSAC’s role in quarterly financial stability updates, with systematic Executive Board reviews.
- Regular publication of the Financial Stability Report (FSR) and interim review updates.
- Follow reviews with press conferences and targeted seminars to promote trust, accountability, and address systemic risks.
- Establish the CBvS as a reliable authority on financial stability through consistent, proactive public engagement.

### Communication framework, capacity building, and outreach
- Develop, approve by the Executive Board, adopt, and implement a comprehensive CBvS communication strategy.
  - Define main strategic communication goals.
  - Define main target groups, including CBvS staff.
  - Define main communication tools, including key CBvS outlets.
  - Define internal practices governing external communication.
- Specify the CBvS price stability definition (verbal or numerical) for institutional adoption and repeated public communication.
- Establish regular training for media representatives and CBvS staff to interpret monetary policy and financial stability messages.
- Adopt proactive communication with key stakeholders about changes to communication practices.
- Invest in capacity development and outreach programs to foster stakeholder engagement and public understanding; targeted outreach to opinion makers, market participants, and the wider public.

### Priorities and timeframes (selected entries from Table 1)
- Near-term (defined as < 12 months) high-priority items:
  - Develop, approve, adopt, and implement the comprehensive communication strategy.
  - Define strategic goals, target groups, tools, and internal practices (all High, Near-term).
  - Specify the CBvS price stability definition (High, Near-term).
  - Establish a regular training program for media and CBvS staff (High, Near-term).
  - Adopt proactive communication about changes to practices (High, Near-term).
  - Streamline monetary policy formulation with the Executive Board meeting eight times per year (High, Near-term).
  - Adopt Executive Board practice of meeting four times per year to review financial stability assessments (High, Near-term).
  - Designate experts to liaise with the communication team (High, Near-term).
  - Provide regular financial stability and monetary policy training for the Communication Department staff (High, Near-term).
- Medium-term (defined as 12 to 24 months) items of note:
  - Make newly established practices fully transparent (High, Medium-term).
  - Adopt regular practice of press releases after each decision followed by Governor-led press conferences (High, Medium-term).
  - Develop and publish a quarterly Monetary Policy Report as a flagship publication (Medium, Medium-term).
  - Develop comprehensive outreach program (Medium, Medium-term).
  - Financial stability communication actions including seminars, interim updates, and press conferences (various priorities and timeframes listed in Table 1).
  - Provide communication training for designated experts and regular trainings on expert topics for Suriname’s media (Medium/High; Near-term/Medium-term as specified).

### Expected outcomes
- Modernizing communication practices and institutionalizing structured decision-making will strengthen stakeholder confidence.
- Improved clarity, transparency, and predictability will enhance the CBvS’s ability to guide market expectations and respond to economic and financial developments.
- These reforms will support the CBvS’s mandate to achieve and maintain price and financial stability and foster a more resilient and sustainable macroeconomic environment in Suriname.

*Source: tarea2025033-print-pdf - Executive Summary*

### 8. The mission’s recommendations cover the full scope of monetary and  financial  policy decision-

### 8. The mission’s recommendations cover the full scope of monetary and financial policy decision-making, from decision-making practices to transparency about decisions and their communications.

### Existing communication practices on monetary policy and financial stability
- Since a June 2021 policy regime change, the CBvS has faced challenges in effectively communicating its policies and actions to the market and the public, including:
  - a lack of clarity and transparency in monetary policy decision-making and subsequent communications;
  - insufficient engagement with stakeholders; and
  - difficulties in conveying the rationale behind monetary policy decisions, leading to misunderstandings and misinterpretations that may undermine policy effectiveness and central bank credibility.
- The CBvS has communicated sparingly and irregularly, particularly regarding monetary policy:
  - No press releases on the outcomes of periodic monetary policy reviews.
  - No regular press conferences.
  - No focused reports that could lay the groundwork for a future Monetary Policy Report (MPR).
  - The CBvS has adopted a reactive approach to public perception rather than proactively shaping expectations about its inflation-oriented policies.
- Financial stability communication and processes have improved since 2022:
  - A regular detailed production plan for the Financial Stability Report (FSR) was established.
  - The FSR is produced on an annual basis; first published in 2015, discontinued, and regular annual releases resumed in 2021.
  - The Financial Stability Department created a detailed production plan adopted by all relevant department heads; the plan includes specific dates/deadlines and responsible persons for data, drafts, review/comments.
  - Key FSR issues and focus are discussed with all relevant departments before and during drafting, based on quarterly financial stability updates.
  - A midway drafting meeting is organized to implement a coherent risk story with a macrofinancial narrative and to ensure synergies across drafting contributors.

### Enhancing overall communication framework and strategy
- The mission recommends developing an explicit Strategy for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Communication as a subcomponent of the CBvS’s overall Strategy to:
  - articulate specific goals, messages, tools, and audiences for monetary policy and financial stability communication;
  - systematically evaluate the Strategy’s effectiveness.
- The Strategy’s primary aims:
  - Inform the public about the primacy of the CBvS's price stability objective and its secondary financial stability aim.
  - Broaden understanding of the CBvS's status, mandate, and objective as a central bank committed to pursuing and maintaining price and financial stability.
  - On monetary policy, steer markets’ and public's inflation expectations to the CBvS's definition of price stability.
- The mission recommends the CBvS authorities go public with their preferred price stability definition as a “single-digit inflation level”.
  - The mission notes challenges in publicly announcing a verbal definition of price stability within a money targeting framework (MTF), including risks of public confusion between the money target and the price stability objective and credibility risks if the definition is overly precise.
  - A verbal definition (“inflation in single digits”) is proposed to be specific enough while preserving room for maneuver.
- Strategy adoption and governance:
  - The Strategy should be adopted as a CBvS document and approved by the Board.
  - The document should set strategic communication goals, main strategic messages, target stakeholder groups, and tactics/tools for each group.
  - The Strategy should ensure CBvS employees understand policy aims and conduct to serve as informal ambassadors.
- Organizational and operational recommendations:
  - The Communication Department should function as a central hub for media inquiries and public requests, seeking expert advice from relevant departments.
  - Develop and continuously update an internal Q&A and message handbook as a “living document”.
  - Communication Department staff should be regularly involved in drafting and reviewing press releases on policy to ensure accessibility and message consistency.
  - Develop a reference document within the Communications Department with speaking guidelines and suggested key messages for public engagements.
  - Clarify guidelines for monetary policy communication by Executive Board members and CBvS staff, including authorized public speakers and possible quiet (or blackout) periods around key decisions.

### Current decision-making practices on monetary policy and financial stability
- Monetary policy formulation:
  - Conducted on the platform of the Monetary Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC), an advisory body chaired by the Head of the Statistics Department and consisting of heads of Research, Open Market Operations, Banking Supervision, Financial Markets, and Financial Stability.
  - The MPAC provides advice on operational targets and method of policy implementation; the Executive Board is the ultimate policy decision-making body, reaching decisions by consensus. (Article 29, Central Bank Act 2022 (S.B. 2023 no.65))
  - The MPAC is intended to meet monthly but meetings have been rather irregular with no fixed calendar; monetary policy stance is not subject to regular, periodic review.
  - The MPAC’s policy recommendation is presented in an internal report submitted to the Director of the Directorate of Monetary Affairs (DMZ), who is a member of the Executive Board and a policy maker.
  - The CBvS has not yet established a routine for externally communicating its monetary policy stance.
- Financial stability decision processes:
  - The Financial Stability Advisory Committee (FSAC), led by the Head of the Financial Stability Department, was created in 2016 and convenes quarterly to review short financial stability updates prepared by the Financial Stability Department.

### Enhancing monetary policy decision-making
- The mission recommends streamlining internal monetary policy formulation and establishing a routine that leads to a monetary policy stance decision:
  - Convene MPAC meetings at regular intervals—eight times a year as opposed to the current intended monthly frequency—under a fixed meeting schedule that should be firm for at least 12 months ahead.
  - Develop and observe a detailed calendar with binding deadlines for submission of all necessary inputs for MPAC consideration.
  - Schedule the regular MPAC meeting at a pre-determined interval, ideally not more than one week, prior to the policy-setting meeting of the Executive Board.
  - Draft the internal report on monetary policy in advance of each MPAC meeting and finalize it upon the meeting’s conclusion by adding the MPAC’s consensus monetary policy recommendation.
  - Maintain the option for additional ad-hoc MPAC meetings in cases of unforeseen circumstances.
- These steps are presented as essential groundwork for future implementation of regular external communication regarding monetary policy decisions.

*Source: tarea2025033-print-pdf - 8. The mission’s recommendations cover the full scope of monetary and  financial  policy decision-making*

### 29. The Executive Board should review the CBvS’s policy stance eight times a year. This is in line with the

### 29. The Executive Board should review the CBvS’s policy stance eight times a year. This is in line with the

### Meeting frequency and internal process
- Recommendation: The Executive Board should review the CBvS’s policy stance eight times a year.
- Rationale:
  - This is in line with the prevailing practice of inflation-oriented central banks.
  - The schedule facilitates frequent reassessment of the adequacy of the policy stance and enables prompt response to economic developments.
  - It optimizes staff workload by reducing the need to prepare inputs for monthly decision meetings while ensuring timely preparation of all relevant inputs.
- Transitional cycle:
  - The eight-meeting calendar allows a future smooth transition to a standard monetary policy cycle with:
    - four meetings with full-fledged policy reviews, complemented by four interim reviews between the major meetings (typically aligned with quarterly national accounts releases).
  - Ad-hoc review meetings should be reserved for major unexpected shocks that clearly warrant significant policy revisions.
- Decision output and follow-up:
  - Each Executive Board policy meeting should conclude with:
    - the adoption of a directive on the desired monetary policy stance, and
    - a discussion of policy-consistent communication messages.
  - The directive should give relevant departments guidelines for operational implementation of the desired monetary policy direction for the upcoming period.
  - Expert staff will report back to the Board on results of policy implementation as input for forthcoming meetings.
- Timeline snippet preserved from source:
  - D – 2-3 weeks; D – 1 week; Day of decision (D); D and D – 1-2 weeks

### Transparency of decision-making and role of MPAC
- Recommendation: Enhance transparency of monetary policy decision-making.
- Specific measures:
  - Publicly describe the deliberation process that leads to monetary policy decisions once internal decision practices are set.
  - Communicate externally the role of MPAC as an advisory body charged with making recommendations to the Executive Board.
  - Publish a detailed description of the decision–making process in a dedicated section on the CBvS website.
  - Include a permanent preface in the CBvS’s economic reports to explicitly outline the policy formulation framework and all steps leading to a monetary policy decision.
- Communication of calendar:
  - Announce the calendar of regular policy meetings well in advance (publish a calendar with regular meeting dates for the entire year) to ensure transparency and predictability and to reduce market uncertainty and volatility.

### Financial stability review process
- Recommendation: Adopt regular Executive Board meetings for financial stability.
- Specific schedule:
  - Schedule Executive Board meetings four times per year to review financial stability assessments.
  - Integrate these meetings into the regular board meeting schedule and ideally precede them with FSAC discussions one week prior.
  - Plan the four meetings a year in advance.
  - One of the four meetings should focus specifically on the FSR.
  - Ad-hoc FSAC and Board meetings may be scheduled in response to unforeseen circumstances.
- Transparency and outputs:
  - Publicly communicate key decisions and insights from quarterly Executive Board meetings based on FSAC discussions.
  - Publish meeting summaries, key findings, and policy decisions in a timely manner.
  - Use press releases, public statements, and regular website updates to explain rationale and progress.
  - Include a detailed description of the financial stability review process on the CBvS website and a permanent preface in the CBvS’s FSR to support transparency and facilitate decision-making once the macroprudential framework is operational.

### Monetary policy communication — objectives and narrative
- Strategic aim:
  - Adopt key principles of sound and effective monetary policy communication: clarity on policy objectives, equal and timely access to relevant information, tailoring messages to diverse audiences, and consistency over time and across speakers.
  - Develop a policy narrative focused on achieving and maintaining price stability in Suriname.
- Messaging guidance:
  - Regularly and consistently emphasize the importance of achieving low inflation for long–term growth and prosperity and the value of a transparent and operationally autonomous central bank.
  - Tailor language to audience: plain language and “sound bites” for press/TV; expert vocabulary and data-driven presentations for analyst meetings.
  - Avoid strong commitments to a specific future course of action; frame projections as conditional (e.g., “… based on our current knowledge and assessments, the favorable trends in inflation are likely to continue ...”).
  - Explicitly and consistently communicate both risks and uncertainties surrounding outlooks and policy actions.

### Communications toolkit — recommended instruments and targets
- General recommendation: Develop standard instruments for monetary policy communication aligned with practices of inflation-focused central banks.
- Key tools (overview of purpose, current status at CBvS, and recommendation/target status):
  - Monetary Policy Statement (Press release)
    - Purpose: Communicate current policy decision, rationale, and linkage to achieving price stability.
    - Current status: Not yet implemented; brief messages on monetary policy and inflation trends and short/term inflation projections included in publications such as the Economic Bulletin and Quarterly Report.
    - Recommendation: Introduce a regular Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) and ideally commit to publishing the MPS at a pre–set time on the day of the Board decision.
  - Press conference
    - Purpose: Explain and interpret the most recent policy decision and macro outlook in plain language; led by the Governor, usually with MPS publication.
    - Current status: Not yet implemented.
    - Recommendation: Introduce a regular press conference following each MPS, open with a slide deck by the Governor or Deputy Governor, conduct a Q&A, and publish the presentation on the website immediately after the event.
  - Monetary Policy Report (MPR)
    - Purpose: Flagship monetary policy publication presenting a consistent story behind forecasts, policy concerns, and how decisions aim to deliver price stability.
    - Current status: Not yet implemented externally; CBvS publishes a backward-looking Quarterly Report and an internal “Monetary Policy Report / Monetair beleidsrapport” as MPAC input.
    - Recommendation: Consolidate Economic Bulletin and Quarterly Report into an external MPR to be published 4 times a year in sync with 4 of the recommended 8 policy reviews; make the MPR more forward-looking and policy focused.
- MPS specifics:
  - Publish an MPS in the form of a press release following each regular policy review meeting.
  - The MPS should clearly articulate reasons for policy decisions, tie them to the outlook and risks for achieving price stability, and over time include forward-looking statements and hints at future stance.
  - Publish the MPS on the day of the policy decision as soon as possible after Board adoption, ideally at a preset time, and post it on the CBvS website in a copyable format to reduce risk of leaks and improve accurate media reporting.
- Press conference specifics:
  - Hold a press conference led by the Governor in conjunction with MPS release, with a 1-to-2-hour delay from MPS publication to allow media to prepare.
  - Use the press conference to deliver a high-level slide presentation with core headline messages; publish the slide deck on the website immediately after the event.
  - Prepare the slide deck to provide visual materials (including charts) for Communications Department use across website and social media, and to enable information layering for different audiences.
- Monetary Policy Report (MPR) specifics:
  - Introduce an MPR as a precursor to a flagship publication, in addition to the FSR.
  - Draft and discuss the precursor MPR within MPAC as an internal document to support Board deliberations; convert it into a public MPR after Board decision, incorporating necessary changes.
  - Publish the MPR ideally within 3 weeks of the policy decision announcement.
  - Form the MPR by merging the existing backward-looking Quarterly Report and the Economic Bulletin; replace policy-relevant content of the Economic Bulletin with the MPS and supersede the Quarterly Report with the MPR.
  - Gradually make the MPR more forward-looking and policy focused, adopting a “top-down” approach with forecasts and policy implications up front and backward-looking details later.

*IMF | CARTAC Suriname*

### 49. To support the introduction of new communication practices and tools, the CBvS should develop a

### tarea2025033-print-pdf - 49. To support the introduction of new communication practices and tools, the CBvS should develop a

### Outreach program for monetary policy
- Recommendation: Develop a comprehensive outreach program for a diverse set of audiences to support new communication practices and tools.
- Key elements:
  - Routinely reach out to the media, markets, and the wider public with messages about policy decisions and their relation to the primary objective of price stability within a framework with a floating exchange rate.
  - Proactive and frequent communication on social media about policy-relevant topics.
  - Panel or roundtable discussions of Board members and heads of relevant departments with key stakeholders.
- Engagement with outside experts and stakeholders:
  - Organize nationwide seminars and develop economic literacy programs tailored to young generations and other public segments.
  - Facilitate focused seminars for business leaders to address industry-specific concerns and discuss the macroeconomic outlook.
  - Host town hall meetings to foster direct dialogue and transparency.
  - Regular interactions would anchor medium–term and long–term inflation expectations by detailing policy motivations, macroeconomic assumptions, and the CBvS’s near-term inflation projections.
- Stakeholder feedback:
  - Use outreach events to both inform and to hear stakeholders’ concerns to build trust and prepare the ground for future decisions to be better understood and more likely to be accepted.
- Institutional profile:
  - Gradually enhance the CBvS profile as an open and accountable public institution that listens to its external audiences.

### Financial stability communication
- Regular practices:
  - Establish regular communication practices, including issuing press releases after each semi-annual review.
  - The annual review based on the release of the FSR should be accompanied by a press conference led by the Governor.
  - In the medium term, establish the practice of publishing an interim update to the FSR, followed by a Governor-led press conference.
- Professional seminars:
  - Organize regular seminars targeting professional audiences after each semi-annual review; make these accessible to relevant CBvS staff.
  - Use events as a platform for dialogue with market participants to gather insights to shape future FSR focus.
- Current constraint and communication role:
  - In the absence of an operational macroprudential framework, communication is the most important tool for addressing systemic risk.
  - A basic macroprudential framework has been prepared and discussed internally but is not yet operational; the CBvS currently has no prudential tools under its control.
  - Following each semi-annual review, the Executive Board should identify key vulnerabilities to be communicated to influence the behavior of relevant economic agents; this should be reflected in published press releases.
- Mandate and internal resources:
  - Monitoring and maintaining financial stability are the sole responsibilities of the CBvS; the central bank is fully in charge of the entire financial system.
  - The CBvS produces internal macroeconomic projections that could be used to design adverse macroeconomic scenarios for financial stability assessments.
- Outreach parallels with monetary policy:
  - Develop a comprehensive outreach program tailored to diverse audiences over the medium term, ensuring regular communication with media, markets, and the general public to convey key financial stability messages.
  - Include proactive and frequent use of social media and enhanced engagement with external experts and influencers to broaden understanding of financial stability concepts and CBvS responsibilities.
  - Increased stakeholder engagement can raise awareness and positively influence economic agents’ behavior.

### Strengthening the communication function (capacity and training)
- Institutional arrangements:
  - Designate dedicated experts from both monetary policy and financial stability roles to act as liaisons with the Communication Department as primary points of contact.
  - Ensure technical details and objectives are accurately and effectively conveyed to the communication team.
- Training:
  - Organize tailored internal communication training for designated experts to translate complex technical information into accessible language while maintaining accuracy and consistency.
  - Implement an internal program of regular monetary policy and financial stability training for the Communication Department staff to enhance understanding of key technical concepts and developments.
  - Conduct regular trainings on expert topics for members of Suriname’s media, ideally in quarterly intervals, to improve their understanding of the price and financial stability mandate, including the primacy of price stability and a reserve money targeting regime with a floating exchange rate.
- Current capacity assessment:
  - The mission team believes current CBvS communication staff has the capacity to design mechanisms and procedures for gradually developing external communications.
  - The bank's capacity appears sufficient to begin gradually implementing the proposed recommendations; however, detailed modelling and forecasting capacities were outside the scope of the mission.
  - The CBvS will need to conduct a further assessment of its capacity to determine what policy analyses and forecasts can be included in a forward-looking MPR, including understanding data processing capabilities, forecasting tools, and staff expertise.
- Further support:
  - Strengthening capabilities through targeted capacity development and technical support, such as CARTAC TA, would help implement the enhanced communication strategy.
  - Future TA could provide hands-on training to CBvS staff and local media representatives and support implementation of mission-recommended measures, including development and launch of the MPR.

### Conclusions and institutional reforms
- Communication as central to credibility and policy effectiveness:
  - Enhancing communication practices is critical to strengthening the CBvS’s credibility and policy effectiveness in both monetary policy and financial stability.
  - Adopt international best practices including a comprehensive communication strategy, regular policy review and communication, and forward-looking publications.
- Institutionalizing decision-making:
  - Establish a fixed calendar for Monetary Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) meetings and Executive Board reviews to institutionalize monetary policy decision-making.
  - Align with best practices, such as holding eight policy-setting meetings annually, to allow timely reassessments and improve transparency.
- Transition to inflation-focused communication:
  - Shift external communication to emphasize inflation control as the primary policy objective.
  - Publish a regular Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) as soon as possible after policy decisions and host press conferences led by the Governor.
  - Develop a forward-looking Monetary Policy Report (MPR) as a flagship publication to provide insights into inflation trends and policy rationales.
- Financial stability processes:
  - Reinforce financial stability processes through regular Executive Board meetings dedicated to financial stability, transparent communication of the FSR and interim updates, and proactive stakeholder engagement via press conferences and seminars.
- Capacity development and outreach:
  - Focus on capacity building for staff and external stakeholders via regular training for staff and media representatives.
  - Targeted outreach to policymakers, market participants, and the general public will foster awareness and support for CBvS objectives.

### Annex highlights: strategic framework and international transparency practices
- Strategic communication goals and messages:
  - Goals include broadening understanding of CBvS autonomy and mandate; rebuilding credibility as committed to price stability; steering inflation expectations to the central bank’s target over the medium term; promoting economic literacy (urban and rural); and reinforcing the CBvS image as professional, autonomous, transparent, accountable, and trustworthy.
  - Example core message: "The central bank’s primary objective is to achieve and maintain domestic price stability, which we define as inflation in single digits [between X and X percent]."
- Target groups (examples):
  - General public (young generations including school children; teachers; rural area residents), Parliament, Financial market professionals, Business leaders (incl. bank CEOs, and company CEOs), Employees of the central bank.
- Main communication tools (examples):
  - Central bank’s website with sections on mandate and decision-making framework; Monetary Policy press release; Monetary Policy press conference; Monetary Policy Report; direct outreach via speeches, media interviews, roundtable debates; regular regional visits with sample agenda items.
- Internal regulations:
  - Enforce a stiff internal communications policy and set clear internal rules for staff on public and media communications.
  - Equip authorized public speakers with a reference document providing speaking guidelines and suggested key messages.
- Measuring communications:
  - Conduct public opinion surveys to measure attitudes toward the central bank and the level of public knowledge to refine strategic messages.
- Selected transparency practices in leading central banks (table excerpts):
  - Australia — Policy Meetings (Next 12 months): 11; Publish MPR (per year): 4; Publish Inflation Forecasts: ✓
  - Canada — Policy Meetings (Next 12 months): 8; Publish MPR (per year): 4; Publish Inflation Forecasts: ✓
  - Sweden — Policy Meetings (Next 12 months): 5; Publish MPR (per year): 5; Publish Inflation Forecasts: ✓
  - U.S. — Policy Meetings (Next 12 months): 8; Publish MPR (per year): 4; Publish Inflation Forecasts: ✓
- Source note in annex: Sources: Central bank websites (as of December 2023).

*IMF | CARTAC Suriname | 20–29*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/tar/2025/english/tarea2025033-print-pdf.pdf_