## IMF Technical Assistance Report — Preface and Executive Summary (tarea2026011-source-pdf)

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### Preface, mission background and acknowledgements
- MCM technical assistance mission with the Central Bank of Congo (BCC)’s Financial Stability Directorate (DSF): June 24 to July 3, 2025.
- Wrap-up meeting with Mr. Kavula, Director of the DSF: July 2, 2025.
- Acknowledged BCC staff:
  - Mr. Jean-Marcel Kalubi, Director of the Licensing and Regulation Department (DAR)
  - Mr. Daniel Kavula, Director of the Financial Stability Department
  - Mr. Noël Muyumba, Head of the Resolution Department at the DSF
  - The Directorate for Supervision of Financial Institutions (DSIF) and the Protocol Department and their teams.

### Executive summary — key observations and priorities
- The December 2022 banking law includes a special resolution regime (SRR) for credit institutions.
- Mission focused on operationalizing the existing SRR under the current law while flagging law reform priorities when deviations from international standards were identified.
- Where law reform may not be feasible in the near term, recommendations emphasize operationalization within existing law and identify law reform priorities.

### Developments since 2022 and BCC capacity
- Implemented FSSR recommendations:
  - Established a DSF in charge of banking resolution, separate from DSIF, with separate reporting to the BCC’s decision-making body.
  - Hired financial sector experts; Resolution Division staffed with an experienced manager and five experts.
- Resolution Division workload: resolution planning, drafting resolution manuals, separability analysis, monitoring liquidations, and sustained bank engagement over several years.

### Key legal weakness identified
- Judicial review of resolution decisions:
  - Courts have annulled BCC resolution measures and substituted execution under other legislative provisions favorable to shareholders.
  - International standards (Key Attributes 5.4, 5.5) require that legal remedies should not constrain implementation of, or reverse, resolution measures taken by the resolution authority within its powers and in good faith.
  - Legal framework should provide for monetary compensation where creditors receive less as a result of resolution actions than they would have in liquidation (NCWO — “No creditor worse off” safeguard).
  - Initiation of legal proceedings should not, as a rule, suspend implementation of the resolution authority’s decision; immediate enforceability of resolution measures is a prerequisite for effective resolution.

### Key statistics and sector context (preserved verbatim)
- Total financial assets represent 24.7 percent of GDP (2021).
- Bank assets make up 97 percent of the financial system.
- The banking sector is composed of 15 commercial banks (2025).
- Two banks hold 55 percent of the banking system’s assets.

### Top-level recommendations (excerpt from Table 1)
- Ensure that court decisions against a resolution measure taken within the BCC’s powers in good faith may not be constrained or reversed (¶3). Authority: BCC (with Ministry of Finance). Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- Select a systemic bank and prepare a preferred resolution strategy ("Plan A") based on the partial sale tool (¶4-9). Authority: BCC. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- For the same bank, prepare an alternative resolution strategy ("Plan B") based on the bridge institution tool (¶4; 10-12). Authority: BCC. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- Start drafting resolution plans for the other systemic banks (¶4). Authority: BCC. Priority: High. Timeframe: MT.
- Establish a detailed regime for the bridge bank, including its shareholding, lifespan and the re-transfer power (¶11). Authority: BCC (with Ministry of Finance). Priority: Medium. Timeframe: NT.
- Draft a regulation on resolution valuations (¶13-14). Authority: BCC. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT or before a resolution.
- Draft a legislative proposal on a resolution funding mechanism (¶17-18). Authority: BCC (with Ministry of Finance). Priority: High. Timeframe: NT or before a resolution.
- Establish a framework for the provision of liquidity in resolution (possibly based on emergency liquidity assistance) (¶20). Authority: BCC. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- Adopt the time limit on the closing of liquidation proceedings set out in the relevant OHADA law (¶22). Authority: BCC (with Ministry of Finance). Priority: Medium. Timeframe: NT.
- Continue external training for staff on bank resolution, crisis management and firm restructuring (¶25). Authority: BCC. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT.
- Complement the Financial Stability Committee with an operational body for crisis management coordination that includes the deposit insurance scheme, once established (¶27). Authority: BCC, Ministry of Finance. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: LT or when the DIS is established.
- Finalize a resolution manual and submit it for adoption to the relevant decision-making body (¶28). Authority: BCC. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT.
- Conclude cooperation arrangements on cross-border resolution and crisis management (¶52). Authority: BCC. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: LT.

---

### Priority resolution tools and powers (Part I)

### Summary and main recommendation
- Prioritization criteria: limited bank loss-absorbing capacity, small number of skilled BCC staff, judicial-system shortcomings hindering realization of guarantees.
- Proportionality applied: operationalize the partial sale and bridge institution tools as priority.
- Short-term actions:
  - Select a bank and prepare preferred resolution strategy ("Plan A") based on partial sale, excluding NPLs.
  - For the same bank, prepare alternative strategy ("Plan B") based on bridge institution.
  - Present first draft resolution plan with proposed tools and estimated resolution funding needs.
- Medium-term action:
  - Draft resolution plans for all systemic banks using experience from the first plan.

### A. Two priority tools: Partial sale ("Plan A") and bridge institution ("Plan B")
- Rationale for transfer-to-existing-institution (partial/full sale):
  - Effective for small institutions; transfers good assets and deposits preserving depositor access and payments.
  - Partial sale preferred when buyer unwilling to take entire NPL portfolio; allows transfer of good loans and selected deposits while buyer generally does not assume contingent liabilities.
  - Separability assessments (financial, legal including tax, operational interconnections) required and can span several years.
  - Marketing/buyer selection: prefer financially sound acquirers; confidentiality management and use of robust confidentiality agreements and virtual data rooms for due diligence.
- Bridge institution as fallback:
  - Use only if no buyer and liquidation would pose financial stability risks.
  - Bridge continues viable business and critical functions until sale; capital held by state; residual bank liquidated with losses to shareholders.
  - Bridge as new legal entity avoids contingent/hidden liabilities of failed bank.
  - Good practice: time-limited lifespan (for instance of up to two years, with possible one-year extension), clear shareholding, sound governance, regulatory capital compliance, realistic exit plan.
  - Operational steps: prompt issuance of bank license, approve articles of association, appoint board and senior management; BCC should avoid direct shareholding to prevent conflicts of interest and coordinate capital/composition with Ministry of Finance.

### Valuations in resolution
- Three valuation categories (as in SRR):
  - Valuation 1: to determine triggering of resolution; may be based on Article 122.
  - Valuation 2: to assess losses, resolution strategies and funding needs; may be based on Articles 127 and 130.
  - Valuation 3: assesses losses to shareholders/creditors in liquidation and NCWO; may be based on Article 126, paragraphs 2 and 3.
- Regulation should set minimum conditions of independence and competence for appraisers and set rules on resolution valuations.
- Division of roles: resolution authority informs appraiser for Valuation 2; appraiser forms own judgment; entity in resolution must provide prompt access to data.
- Recommendation: appoint independent appraiser (e.g., audit firm from DRC or another French-speaking African country).
- Provisional valuations by resolution authority acceptable when speed required, with final external appraisal later.

### Resolution funding mechanism
- Need for funding: capital/liquidity erosion at failure; Valuation 2 may reveal larger funding needs; funding needed for transfers or bridge capital.
- Deposit insurance (FGD) role and limits:
  - FGD mandate exists but lacks a “paybox +” mandate to support transfers or capitalization in resolution.
  - A “paybox +” mandate should be conditional: continued depositor access, losses on shareholders/unsecured creditors, and a "least cost" principle.
  - FGD resources insufficient for systemic defaults; mission ran exercises showing how modernized FGD could support resolution subject to statutory conditions.
- Public funding shortcomings in law:
  - Banking law lacks a public resolution funding mechanism consistent with international standards.
  - DRC banks mainly deposit-funded; no funding to support bridge institution capitalization.
  - Law does not specify payment of compensation if Valuation 3 shows creditors fared worse than in liquidation (NCWO recognized in Article 126.3).
- Limitations of Article 20 "special credits":
  - Authorizes BCC to extend "special credits" to insolvent banks on behalf of government with explicit government guarantee.
  - Identified limitations:
    - (i) Not allow capitalization of a bridge institution.
    - (ii) No precondition that losses be imposed on shareholders and unsecured/uninsured creditors before public support.
    - (iii) State position in liquidation hierarchy is very low (see Article 165), making state losses likely.
    - (iv) No ex post recovery from financial industry of state-borne costs.
- Institutional cooperation: Article 22 foresees an agreement between Ministry of Finance and BCC to define cooperation modalities; other authorities may join subject to approval.

### Resolution funding options assessment (KA 6.3)
- Three contemplated forms (KA 6.3):
  - (i) deposit guarantee scheme financed by banking industry;
  - (ii) special resolution fund (prefunded);
  - (iii) financing mechanism with ex post recovery from financial industry of public costs.
- Assessment for DRC:
  - (i) does not exist and has limits;
  - (ii) seems disproportionate because it must be prefunded;
  - (iii) seems most proportionate but requires government agreement and likely legislative action.
- Conditions for any temporary public funding (per KA):
  - (i) necessary to protect financial stability and permit implementation of best resolution option;
  - (ii) private funding sources exhausted or cannot achieve objectives;
  - (iii) losses allocated to shareholders and, as appropriate, to unsecured and uninsured creditors and industry at large.
- Mission emphasis:
  - Central bank should not be tasked with funding resolution actions; its role limited to liquidity provision when appropriate.
- Implementation modalities recommended:
  - BCC to work with Ministry of Finance on modalities for granting and recovering temporary public funding.
  - Ensure remaining costs borne by credit institutions and potentially other financial entities via exceptional contributions levied after resolution completion.
  - Consider banks’ ability to absorb levies; may delay introduction of levies to allow system buffers to recover.

### Liquidity in resolution
- Three successive lines of defense for liquidity in resolution:
  - (i) internal liquidity of recapitalized firm (cash, liquid assets);
  - (ii) financial markets and private liquidity sources, possibly with public guarantees;
  - (iii) credible public sector backstop as last resort, subject to strict conditions.
- Central bank preparedness: provide liquidity under conditions to systemic and viable firms under an implemented resolution plan.
- BCC actions:
  - Ensure liquidity needs are carefully considered in resolution planning.
  - Urgently determine suitable mechanism for liquidity in resolution (e.g., ELA framework consistent with international best practices, including ELA in FX as per AFC TA).

### Power of liquidation
- BCC holds power to liquidate failing banks (Article 135).
- Legal application notes:
  - Only the third situation in law likely applies to liquidating a residual bank in resolution, provided no financial resources injected into bank in resolution before transfers.
- Adoption of OHADA deadlines recommended:
  - Article 216 of OHADA Uniform Act on the Laws of Corporations: liquidation be closed at the maximum within three years.
- BCC preference: delegate liquidator role to professional insolvency practitioner; can find experts in French-speaking OHADA-applying countries.
- Core liquidator powers summarized (align with corporate insolvency practice): prepare payment of insolvency debts; verify and rank claims; represent insolvent estate; sell assets; pay creditors per hierarchy; present final accounts to judge and creditor bodies.
- Practical note: bank liquidations in DRC take years; oldest ongoing liquidation initiated in 1998.

---

### Establishment of the resolution function and procedures (Part II)

### Structural separation, roles and capacity
- BCC implemented structural separation between resolution (DSF/Resolution Division) and supervision (DSIF).
- Resolution Division composition: manager experienced in supervision, five agents, three legal experts and two economists.
- DSF responsibilities:
  - (i) build financial safety net and systemic crisis management framework;
  - (ii) coordinate resolution work for credit institutions;
  - (iii) operationalize the resolution framework.
- Coordination with supervision:
  - Maintain separation but establish protocols for seamless information sharing and close coordination between DSF and DSIF.
  - Suggested practical arrangements: invite DSIF to resolution-plan meetings and vice versa for recovery plans.

### Domestic coordination — Financial Stability Committee (FSC) and crisis management
- FSC composition: Minister of Finance, Governor of BCC, President of Insurance Regulatory Authority, and Technical Secretariat members (~20 advisors/directors).
- FSC functions: coordination between authorities, used to coordinate public injections (“special credits”), analysis of systemic risks and macroprudential policy implementation.
- Recommendation: complement FSC with a more operational crisis management coordination structure—especially needed once a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) is established.
- IADI Core Principle 6.3 cited: deposit insurer should be member of a permanent institutional framework coordinating crisis preparedness/management.

### Resolution manual — purpose, content, maintenance
- Purpose: document policies/procedures, link SRR to individual resolution plans, serve as training material.
- Suggested core content:
  - Confidentiality regime;
  - Legal provisions, delegations of responsibilities, division duties;
  - Policies including interpretations and guidance on legal discretions;
  - Procedures with step-by-step execution of resolution tools, decision trees, crisis room governance.
- Maintenance: living document; management must assign responsibility for updates.
- Possible annexes: procedure flowcharts/timelines, templates for decisions and documents, lists of contacts, relevant legal texts and policy documents.
- Appendices referenced:
  - Appendix II: template for bridge bank transfer decision.
  - Appendix III: example decision tree.

### Front-line staff and management duties (procedures)
- Front-line staff duties include:
  - (i) work to be performed;
  - (ii) factors to consider;
  - (iii) spreadsheets/documents to complete;
  - (iv) reports to prepare;
  - (v) routine reporting to managers;
  - (vi) escalation responsibilities.
- Management duties include authorities, reporting steps to senior management/decision-making body, interaction procedures with official institutions and stakeholders.
- Procedures require steps for documenting work, judgments and decisions of front-line staff and management.

---

### Resolution planning and resolvability (Part III)

### Objective and process
- Purpose: support BCC drafting individual resolution plans and assessing resolvability.
- IMF advised BCC to start drafting bank-specific resolution plans using Appendix I template (based on FSB KAs and guidelines).
- Iterative process requiring numerous meetings with banks over several years; resolution authority needs increased staff and expertise.

### Resolution plan template (Appendix I) — key elements
- Core elements (per FSB recommendations):
  1) Summary of envisaged resolution strategies and operational implementation plan.
  2) Strategic analysis of bank’s business model.
  3) Conditions for intervention and at least two resolution scenarios (idiosyncratic and systemic).
  4) Practical execution options specifying tools/powers for each scenario.
  5) Preparatory actions ensuring timely implementation.
  6) Details of significant impediments to implementation.
  7) Responsibilities for execution of preparatory measures and adoption of resolution measures.
- Strategic analysis to cover legal structure, ownership, governance, balance sheet, income statement, prudential requirements, business lines, critical functions, internal/external interdependencies, IT systems, and participation in financial market infrastructures.

### Resolvability assessment and removal of impediments
- Regular resolvability assessments for systemically important entities; update resolution plans every two years or after significant changes.
- Five-step resolvability assessment process:
  1) Qualitative/quantitative BCC assessment of resolvability.
  2) Share assessment with other authorities for groups/cross-border/listed entities.
  3) Communicate impediments to the institution.
  4) Institution/authorities adopt measures to remove impediments.
  5) Re-assessment by BCC.
- BCC powers if impediments not removed (Article 93): require changes to intra-group financing/service contracts, limit exposures, require additional information, disposal of assets, limit/prohibit activities, and require structural changes.
- Internal loss-absorbing capacity:
  - Long-term objective: require banks, especially systemic ones, to develop internal loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity.
  - Not immediate priority given lack of domestic capital markets and current bank structures.
  - For subsidiaries of foreign groups, Article 93 can be used to require intra-group subordinated debt from parent companies.

### Reporting and regulatory requirements to support planning
- BCC should establish reporting obligations for institutions to provide data for resolution planning.
- Frequent information requests: bank structure and interconnections; proposed transfer perimeter and impediments; operational consequences; processes for information access when resolution triggered.
- Valuations readiness: banks must enable appraiser access to data, personnel, models and forecasts; resolution planning should test banks’ ability to support valuation exercises.
- Use recovery plans to inform resolution plans where possible.
- Sequencing to regulation: gain practical experience from initial plans before drafting a resolvability regulation; later define reporting/data points and update frequency.

### Cross-border resolution planning (subsidiaries in the DRC)
- Need for institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements between BCC and home authorities—more detailed than existing supervision MOUs and include crisis management/resolution dimensions.
- Home authority responsibilities: establish coordination group, invite host authorities of jurisdictions of material importance, exchange recovery and resolution plans.
- BCC should rely on home-jurisdiction recovery measures where appropriate; where absent or insufficient, develop local fallback resolution plan specifying operational continuity, services from parent, and require operational continuity plans from parent and subsidiary.

### Resolution plan — operational and financial aspects to specify
- Financial resources needed: internal sources (liability conversion) and external (resolution funding).
- Operational continuity: detail service contracts (IT), access to financial market infrastructures, access to payments in dollars via correspondent banks.
- Potential sources of liquidity without assuming central bank/public support.
- Implementation of stay power on termination of financial contracts.

---

### Cross-border cooperation, appendices and practical tools

### Cross-border cooperation agreements (¶52)
- Existing BCC cooperation agreements are general and focused on supervision; do not incorporate crisis management.
- Institution-specific agreements should detail cross-border implementation of resolution measures including bridge institution use by host authority.
- If home group plans do not address subsidiary in DRC, BCC should prepare a local fallback plan.

### Appendix I — Structure of a resolution plan for a systemic domestic bank
- Sections include: summary of strategies; strategic business-model analysis; resolution scenarios/triggers; Plan A and Plan B; financial/operational continuity; information/IT and communication plan; resolvability assessment; consultation requirements.
- Resolution plans to be reviewed/updated at least annually and after significant changes.

### Appendix II — Template for bridge bank transfer decision (key provisions)
- Decision elements: citation, entry into force, definitions, transfer of Bridge Institution relevant assets/deposits, legal/operational continuity clauses, mutual assistance, re-transfer powers, timing.
- Template provisions specify the transfer takes effect upon time of transfer and include clauses treating Bridge Institution as same person for Bridge Institution business for continuity.

### Appendices III–IV — Decision tree and coordination matrix
- Appendix III: Decision tree for resolution measures (graphic).
- Appendix IV: Coordination matrix across stages — ongoing supervision, recovery phase, resolution phase (gone concern), liquidation phase — specifying roles for supervision, resolution, and DIS (if separate) and ELA management responsibilities.

### Appendix V — The Ex-Post Financial Sector Levy (Ghana example)
- FINANCIAL SECTOR RECOVERY LEVY ACT, 2021 Act 1067:
  - Purpose: impose Financial Sector Recovery Levy on banks to raise revenue to support reforms.
  - Date of Assent: 31st March 2021.
  - Levy: five percent on profit before tax of a bank (Section 1).
  - Application scope: applies to banks other than rural or community banks (Section 2).
  - Levy not an allowable deduction for chargeable income under Income Tax Act, 2015 (Section 3).
  - Levy payable in respect of profit before tax; Minister may review at expiration of the 2024 year of assessment (Section 4).
  - Assessment/payment mechanics: banks submit estimate with annual income tax estimate; payment quarterly on 31st March, 30th June, 30th September, 31st December; 2021 instalment schedule specified (Section 5–6).
  - Administration and collection: Commissioner-General administers; Ghana Revenue Authority collects; payments to Consolidated Fund (Sections 7–9).
  - Recovery and enforcement: Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915) and Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896) provisions apply (Section 10).
  - Minister may make Regulations for implementation (Section 11).
  - Definitions include "bank", "Commissioner-General", "Levy", "Minister" (Section 12).

---

*IMF Technical Assistance Report — Preface, Executive Summary, Parts I–III, Appendices I–V (excerpts).*

### Preface ____________________________________________________________________________ 5

### Preface

### Preface: mission background and acknowledgements
- An MCM technical assistance mission worked with the Central Bank of Congo (BCC)’s Financial Stability Directorate (DSF) from June 24 to July 3, 2025 to assist the BCC to operationalize the special resolution regime (SRR) incorporated into the banking law adopted in December 2022.
- The mission presented its recommendations during a wrap-up meeting with Mr. Kavula, Director of the DSF, on July 2, 2025.
- The mission expresses thanks to the staff of the BCC, with particular acknowledgment of:
  - Mr. Jean-Marcel Kalubi, Director of the Licensing and Regulation Department (DAR)
  - Mr. Daniel Kavula, Director of the Financial Stability Department
  - Mr. Noël Muyumba, Head of the Resolution Department at the DSF
  - The Directorate for Supervision of Financial Institutions (DSIF) and the Protocol Department and their teams.

### Executive Summary: key observations and priorities
- The banking law adopted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in December 2022 includes a special resolution regime (SRR) for credit institutions to remedy shortcomings of the financial safety net.
- The mission did not undertake a full review of the 2022 banking law or assess full conformity with Fund staff recommendations; when obvious deviations from applicable international standards were identified, they are highlighted in the report.
- The report provides recommendations to operationalize the existing SRR in accordance with applicable international standards and best practices, considering the context of a low-income developing country.
- Many gaps in the banking law may only be addressed through law reform; however, recognizing that law reform may not be feasible in the near term, the mission focuses on operationalizing the SRR under the existing law while flagging law reform priorities.

### Developments since 2022 and BCC capacity
- Since 2022 the BCC has implemented several FSSR recommendations:
  - Established a DSF in charge of banking resolution, separate from DSIF (supervision), with separate reporting to the BCC’s decision-making body.
  - Hired financial sector experts and allocated to the Resolution Division within the DSF an experienced manager and five experts.
- The Resolution Division will undertake resource-intensive activities: resolution planning, drafting resolution manuals, separability analysis of portfolios, monitoring liquidations of credit institutions and microfinance institutions, and regular engagement with banks over several years.

### Key legal weakness identified
- Significant weakness: judicial review of resolution decisions must be adjusted to comply with international standards.
  - In the recent past, courts annulled BCC resolution measures and replaced them with execution of other legislative provisions favorable to shareholders of failing banks.
  - International standards (Key Attributes 5.4, 5.5) require that legal remedies should not constrain implementation of, or reverse, resolution measures taken by the resolution authority within its powers and in good faith.
  - The legal framework should instead provide for monetary compensation where creditors receive less as a result of resolution actions than they would have received in liquidation (“No creditor worse off” safeguard, NCWO).
  - Initiation of legal proceedings should not, as a rule, suspend implementation of the resolution authority’s decision; immediate enforceability of resolution measures is a prerequisite for effective resolution.

### Part I — Priority resolution tools and powers (high-level)
- Priority tools to operationalize the SRR:
  - Operationalize the partial sale tool as the preferred resolution strategy ("Plan A") in resolution plans.
  - Operationalize the bridge institution tool as an alternative strategy ("Plan B") where direct sale to a private buyer is not feasible.
- Valuation and appraisals:
  - A regulation should set out minimum conditions of independence and competence for appraisers and certain rules on resolution valuations.
- Resolution funding:
  - The banking law does not provide for a public resolution funding mechanism consistent with international standards.
  - Given weak internal recapitalization capacity of DRC banks, the banking law should be amended to introduce a modernized resolution funding mechanism.
  - A funding mechanism relying on funding by the state with ex-post recovery of public costs from the financial sector is identified as the most appropriate form given the current DRC situation.
  - After providing funding to support resolution, the state should be legally empowered to impose levies on the financial sector that benefited from financial stability.
- Liquidity in resolution:
  - The mission reiterates the 2022 FSSR recommendation on the urgency of a liquidity assistance instrument in resolution.
  - The BCC should operationalize a mechanism to provide liquidity in resolution, leveraging the BCC’s emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) framework—with additional safeguards as needed.
  - AFRITAC Central (AFC) provided TA on the operationalization of ELA; the mission refers to the AFC report.
- Liquidation power:
  - The report discusses implementation of the liquidation power established as part of the SRR.
  - The BCC should prepare for the decision to liquidate the residual bank in resolution, ensuring careful motivation of initiation of resolution.
  - Adoption of the deadlines provided in the regional acts of OHADA would help prevent liquidation costs from exceeding asset value.
  - The BCC prefers delegating the role of liquidator to a professional insolvency practitioner.

### Part II — Establishment of the resolution function and procedures
- Commendation: BCC established a resolution function separate from supervision to address conflicts of interest.
- Required internal mechanisms:
  - Establish protocols to ensure smooth exchange of information and very close coordination between resolution and supervision functions.
  - Continue strengthening skills of the banking resolution team.
  - Prepare a resolution manual to consolidate procedures and link the SRR to individual resolution plans.
- Domestic coordination:
  - The Financial Stability Committee (FSC) comprises the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the BCC, and the President of the Insurance Regulatory Authority; it facilitates coordination between authorities and has been used to coordinate public injections for resolved banks.
  - The FSC coordinates analysis of systemic risks and macroprudential policy implementation.
  - The FSC could be complemented by a more operational crisis management coordination structure, particularly when a deposit insurance system (DIS) is established.

### Part III — Resolution planning and resolvability
- The mission invited the BCC to start drafting individual resolution plans using the template in Appendix I.
- Near-term actions:
  - Present to the relevant decision-making body a first draft resolution plan for a selected bank, proposing resolution tools and estimates of resolution funding needs.
- Medium-term actions:
  - Draft resolution plans for at least all systemic banks and carry out resolvability assessments for banks concerned.
- Regulation on resolvability:
  - No immediate urgency to adopt a regulation on resolvability; the BCC may draft one later based on experience from initial plans and good practices.
  - Such regulation should set reporting requirements on credit institutions to support resolution planning and valuation work.
- Cross-border groups:
  - Most DRC banks are subsidiaries of pan-African or international groups; strategy should rely primarily on home-jurisdiction resolution authorities.
  - In the long term the BCC should adjust existing cooperation agreements in supervision to incorporate crisis management and cross-border resolution dimensions or conclude new specific cooperation agreements for cross-border resolution.

### Key statistics and sector context (preserved verbatim)
- Total financial assets represent 24.7 percent of GDP (2021).
- Bank assets make up 97 percent of the financial system.
- The banking sector is composed of 15 commercial banks (2025).
- Two banks hold 55 percent of the banking system’s assets.

### Top-level recommendations (excerpt from Table 1)
- Ensure that court decisions against a resolution measure taken within the BCC’s powers in good faith may not be constrained or reversed (¶3). Authority: BCC (with Ministry of Finance). Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- Select a systemic bank and prepare a preferred resolution strategy ("Plan A") based on the partial sale tool (¶4-9). Authority: BCC. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- For the same bank, prepare an alternative resolution strategy ("Plan B") based on the bridge institution tool (¶4; 10-12). Authority: BCC. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- Start drafting resolution plans for the other systemic banks (¶4). Authority: BCC. Priority: High. Timeframe: MT.
- Establish a detailed regime for the bridge bank, including its shareholding, lifespan and the re-transfer power (¶11). Authority: BCC (with Ministry of Finance). Priority: Medium. Timeframe: NT.
- Draft a regulation on resolution valuations (¶13-14). Authority: BCC. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT or before a resolution.
- Draft a legislative proposal on a resolution funding mechanism (¶17-18). Authority: BCC (with Ministry of Finance). Priority: High. Timeframe: NT or before a resolution.
- Establish a framework for the provision of liquidity in resolution (possibly based on emergency liquidity assistance) (¶20). Authority: BCC. Priority: High. Timeframe: NT.
- Adopt the time limit on the closing of liquidation proceedings set out in the relevant OHADA law (¶22). Authority: BCC (with Ministry of Finance). Priority: Medium. Timeframe: NT.
- Continue external training for staff on bank resolution, crisis management and firm restructuring (¶25). Authority: BCC. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT.
- Complement the Financial Stability Committee with an operational body for crisis management coordination that includes the deposit insurance scheme, once established (¶27). Authority: BCC, Ministry of Finance. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: LT or when the DIS is established.
- Finalize a resolution manual and submit it for adoption to the relevant decision-making body (¶28). Authority: BCC. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: MT.
- Conclude cooperation arrangements on cross-border resolution and crisis management (¶52). Authority: BCC. Priority: Medium. Timeframe: LT.

*IMF Technical Assistance Report — Preface and Executive Summary (excerpts).*

### 4. The BCC should prioritize the resolution tools and powers best suited to the current

### 4. The BCC should prioritize the resolution tools and powers best suited to the current

### Summary and main recommendation
- The BCC should prioritize resolution tools that fit the DRC banking system’s structure, taking into account:
  - limited loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity of banks in the DRC;
  - the small number of BCC staff with requisite skills; and
  - shortcomings in the judicial system that hinder realization of guarantees held by banks.
- Applying proportionality, the mission recommended operationalizing the partial sale and bridge institution tools as a priority.
- Short-term actions:
  - Select a bank and prepare a preferred resolution strategy ("Plan A") based on the partial sale tool, excluding nonperforming loans (NPL).
  - For the same bank, prepare an alternative resolution strategy ("Plan B") based on the bridge institution tool.
  - Present a first draft resolution plan to the relevant decision-making body, proposing resolution tools and estimates of resolution funding needs.
- Medium-term action:
  - Using experience from the first resolution plan, begin drafting resolution plans for all systemic banks.

### A. Two Priority Resolution Tools: Partial Sale and Bridge Institution
- Rationale for transfer-to-existing-institution tool:
  - Highly effective, especially for small institutions where identifying potential acquirers is less complex.
  - Another bank takes all or part of deposits together with “good” assets, preserving depositor access to deposits and payment transactions.
  - Transfer can be a relatively cheap method for acquirers to increase market share or enter the market.
- Partial sale as preferred "Plan A":
  - Priority: operationalize the partial sale instrument, which should become the preferred resolution strategy ("Plan A").
  - Choice between full or partial sale depends on size and valuation of doubtful assets or NPLs.
  - Full sale may be difficult because it requires a buyer willing to take the entire NPL portfolio.
  - Partial sale allows transfer of only good loans and selected deposits; buyer generally does not assume contingent liabilities (including litigation risks).
  - Expert assessment (including the banking supervisor) is required to determine if a full sale is advisable; if not realistic, prepare partial sale tool.
- Separability and preparation:
  - Resolution authority should operationalize the partial transfer instrument and work with banks on separability of assets and liabilities.
  - Separability defined as ability to transfer: i) legal entities (in groups), ii) business lines, or iii) portfolios of assets and liabilities at short notice to third parties.
  - Separability assessment covers financial, legal (including tax), and operational interconnections; barriers must be addressed during resolvability assessment and resolution planning.
  - Work on separability requires numerous meetings with banks and can span several years.
- Marketing and buyer selection:
  - Ideally, transfers open to many potential buyers (financially sound domestic entities larger than the defaulting bank, or foreign entities).
  - BCC should only allow financially sound banks to act as acquirers.
  - In small systems like the DRC, confidentiality is difficult; head of resolution may approach largest institutions informally (without disclosing confidential information) to gauge interest, later using robust confidentiality agreements for actual due diligence.
  - Non-interested institutions should be advised not to disclose such discussions.
- Due diligence:
  - Potential buyers should be allowed due diligence on assets and liabilities to be transferred, subject to robust confidentiality agreements.
  - Banks should provide swift access to necessary data via a ‘virtual data room’ to facilitate due diligence.
- Bridge institution as alternative "Plan B":
  - Use only if no buyer for partial sale and liquidation would pose financial stability risks.
  - Bridge institution continues viable business and critical functions (e.g., deposits and good assets) until a private buyer is found.
  - Transfer good assets and part of liabilities to a temporary bridge institution whose capital is held by the state; residual failing bank placed in liquidation with losses absorbed by shareholders.
  - As a new legal entity, a bridge institution does not carry contingent or hidden liabilities of the defaulting bank.
  - Template decision on transfer to a bridge institution provided in Appendix II (as a basis for BCC work).
- Legal and governance considerations for bridge institutions:
  - Banking law SRR lacks specific provisions naming or specifying bridge institution functioning, governance, and execution modalities, though Article 130.5 gives power to establish a new institution and transfer assets/liabilities.
  - Good practice: bridge institution lifespan limited (for instance of up to two years), with possible extension (for instance, for one year).
  - Good practice: clear shareholding structure, sound governance, regulatory capital compliance, and a realistic exit plan to transfer state participation to private sector as soon as feasible.
- Operationalization steps and safeguards:
  - BCC must issue a bank license to the bridge institution promptly, approve articles of association, and appoint board and senior management.
  - Law leaves timing of these decisions undefined; BCC must operationalize the bridge institution tool drawing on the sequence/timeline of resolution actions prepared with the mission.
  - BCC should not become a shareholder or participate in bridge institution capital to avoid conflicts of interest with its roles as resolution authority and supervisor.
  - BCC should coordinate with the Ministry of Finance to clarify bridge institution capital composition and operational procedures (e.g., pre-draft articles of association and identify potential managers meeting fit and proper criteria).

### Valuations in resolution
- Three categories of valuations (already in SRR though not named as such):
  - Valuation 1: serves to determine that resolution should be triggered; may be based on Article 122 of the banking law.
  - Valuation 2: serves to accurately assess losses, possible resolution strategies and resolution funding needs; may be based on Articles 127 and 130 of the banking law.
  - Valuation 3: assesses losses that would have been incurred by shareholders and creditors if the bank had been liquidated and whether they should be compensated; may be based on Article 126, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the banking law. Used to determine NCWO ("no creditor worse off than in liquidation").
- Regulation and appraiser independence:
  - A regulation should set minimum conditions of independence and competence for appraisers and rules on resolution valuations.
  - Clear division of roles between resolution authority, appraiser and entity in resolution is essential for timely, robust valuations.
  - Resolution authority should inform appraiser to prepare Valuation 2 and ensure an acceptable valuation process.
  - Appraiser should form own judgment on assumptions/methodologies; regulation should stipulate valuations be fair, prudent, realistic, and based on conservative assumptions.
  - Entity in resolution must provide prompt access to data, information and personnel.
  - Recommendation: BCC appoint an independent appraiser (e.g., an audit firm from the DRC or another French-speaking African country) meeting criteria for independence and necessary skills/resources.
  - When Valuations 1 and 2 must be done in a very short timeframe, provisional valuation by resolution authority can be followed by a final external appraisal later.

### B. Resolution Funding Mechanism
- Need for resolution funding:
  - By failure, a bank’s capital and liquidity are often seriously eroded; Valuation 2 or disclosure of adverse transactions may reveal larger funding needs than expected.
  - Resolution funding needed to support transfers (e.g., when loans transferred are significantly lower than deposits transferred) or to capitalize a bridge institution.
  - Resolution funding mechanism is separate from central bank liquidity support (possibly through ELA) and requires adequate safeguards.
- Role and limits of deposit insurance (FGD):
  - A prefunded deposit insurance system may contribute financially to support resolution measures, but its resources will be insufficient for a systemic institution default.
  - Banking law includes a mandate for the FGD, but not a “paybox +” mandate to support transfers or capitalization in resolution.
  - A “paybox +” mandate should attach statutory conditions: continued access to deposits, imposition of losses on shareholders and unsecured creditors, and a "least cost" principle for the FGD.
  - The mission ran practical exercises showing how a modernized FGD could provide financial support in compliance with statutory conditions consistent with international standards (such statutory conditions are not yet in place in the DRC).
  - Financial contribution by FGD should be complemented by a temporary and exceptional public funding mechanism.
- Shortcomings in law regarding public resolution funding:
  - Banking law does not provide a public resolution funding mechanism consistent with international standards, despite weak internal recapitalization capacities of DRC banks.
  - DRC banks: mainly deposit-funded; no funding available to support establishment of a bridge institution in resolution.
  - Law does not specify how to pay compensation to shareholders/creditors if Valuation 3 shows they fared worse than in liquidation (NCWO principle recognized in Article 126.3).
- Limitations of existing "special credits" mechanism (Article 20 of BCC Law of 2018):
  - Article 20 authorizes the BCC to extend "special credits" to insolvent banks on behalf of the government, with an explicit government guarantee to the BCC.
  - Several limitations identified:
    - (i) They do not allow capitalization of a bridge institution, risking indefinite existence of undercapitalized institutions.
    - (ii) No precondition that all losses have been imposed on shareholders and, where appropriate, on unsecured and uninsured creditors before public support.
    - (iii) In practice, the state has no effective guarantees and its position in liquidation creditor hierarchy is very low for this financing (see Article 165), making state losses likely.
    - (iv) No ex post recovery from the financial industry of costs borne by the state.
- Institutional cooperation (Article 22):
  - Article 22 foresees an agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank to define cooperation and modalities of execution relating to financial system stability; other national authorities may join subject to approval.

*IMF Technical Assistance Report | 12-16*

### 18. The BCC should clarify with the government the use of a modernized resolution funding

### 18. The BCC should clarify with the government the use of a modernized resolution funding mechanism

### Resolution funding options and assessment
- KA 6.3 contemplates three alternative forms of resolution financing mechanisms:
  - (i) a deposit guarantee scheme financed by the banking industry;
  - (ii) a special resolution fund; and
  - (iii) a financing mechanism with ex post recovery from the financial industry of the public costs of temporary financing provided by the official sector (i.e., the government).
- Assessment for the DRC:
  - The first mechanism does not exist in the DRC and the mission stressed its limits.
  - The second mechanism seems disproportionate, in particular because it must be prefunded.
  - The third option seems the most proportionate but requires the government’s agreement and, probably, legislative action.
- The mission shared the experience of exceptional contributions levied on the financial sector following the Ghana banking crisis (see Appendix V).

### Conditions for any temporary public funding (as per the KA)
- Any provision of temporary funding by the government should be subject to strict conditions that minimize the risk of moral hazard and should include determinations that:
  - (i) the provision of temporary funding is necessary to protect financial stability and will permit implementation of a resolution option that is best able to achieve resolution objectives;
  - (ii) private sources of funding have been exhausted or cannot achieve these objectives; and
  - (iii) losses are allocated to shareholders and, as appropriate, to unsecured and uninsured creditors and the industry at large.
- The mission emphasized:
  - The central bank should not be tasked with funding resolution actions.
  - The central bank’s role should be strictly circumscribed to providing liquidity when appropriate.

### Implementation modalities recommended for the BCC and Ministry of Finance
- The BCC should work out with the Ministry of Finance how to:
  - Set up modalities for granting and then recovering temporary public funding.
  - Ensure the remaining costs of resolution are borne by credit institutions and potentially other financial entities established in the DRC, through exceptional contributions levied after the completion of the resolution procedure.
  - Duly consider the ability of banks to absorb the levies, which may imply delayed introduction of the levies, to ensure that the shocks that contributed to bank failures have waned and the financial system retains adequate buffers after the levies have been paid.

### Liquidity in resolution
- International standards recommend liquidity in resolution rely on three successive “lines of defense”:
  - (i) in resolution, a recapitalized firm’s internal liquidity sources should be used to meet funding needs to the extent possible (e.g., cash and other liquid assets available for sale or use as collateral that are held by the firm);
  - (ii) secondly, financial markets and private sources of liquidity should be the preferred source of liquidity in resolution, if necessary with public guarantees; and
  - (iii) ultimately, to the extent market access to funding is not available or sufficient, a credible public sector backstop mechanism should be in place to enable the temporary funding needs of the firm to be met to the extent necessary to maintain the continuity of critical functions in resolution, subject to strict conditions that minimize the risk of moral hazard.
- The central bank must be prepared to provide liquidity, under certain conditions, to a bank which is considered systemic and viable under the resolution plan being implemented.
- The BCC should:
  - Ensure potential liquidity needs are carefully considered in resolution planning and resolution decisions.
  - Urgently determine a suitable mechanism for providing liquidity support in a resolution context (e.g., via an ELA framework consistent with international best practices, including with respect to ELA in FX, as recommended by AFC’s technical assistance on the topic).

### Power of liquidation
- The BCC is vested with the resolution power to liquidate failing banks (banking law; Article 135).
- Legal considerations:
  - Of the three situations provided by the law, the first two would not apply to liquidating the residual part of a bank in resolution.
  - The third situation could apply ("the credit institution is no longer able to meet their financial obligations and no longer able to find a source of funding on the markets") provided that no financial resources have been injected into the bank in resolution before transferring its assets/liabilities to a buyer or to the bridge bank.
- The adoption of the deadlines provided for in the relevant OHADA acts would help prevent the cost of bank liquidation from exceeding the value of the assets:
  - Article 216 of the OHADA Uniform Act on the Laws of Corporations requires that liquidation be closed at the maximum within three years.
- The BCC prefers to delegate the role of liquidator of residual banks to a professional insolvency practitioner and should be able to find bank liquidation experts in French-speaking countries applying OHADA.
- Core powers typically available to liquidators (should not depart significantly from corporate insolvency practice):
  - (i) prepare the payment of the insolvency’s debts and preserve the rights of the insolvent estate;
  - (ii) verify and rank claims according to the creditor hierarchy;
  - (iii) represent the insolvent estate in all legal acts and proceedings;
  - (iv) sell and choose the method of selling the assets of the insolvent estate;
  - (v) pay creditors (according to the creditor hierarchy in the applicable law); and
  - (vi) prepare and present the final insolvency accounts to the judge and the bodies representing the creditors.
- In practice, bank liquidation in the DRC takes years to be closed; the oldest ongoing liquidation at the time of the FSSR had been initiated in 1998.

### Establishment of the resolution function and coordination
- Structural separation and organization:
  - The BCC implemented the FSSR recommendation on structural separation between resolution and supervision.
  - A new BCC directorate, the Financial Stability Directorate (which includes a Resolution Division), is responsible for handling failing institutions and reports hierarchically to the BCC Board, which is chaired by the Governor (the Governor alone being the decision-making body on resolution matters).
  - The Resolution Division is led by a manager experienced in bank supervision issues and composed of five agents, three legal experts and two economists.
  - The DSF/Resolution Division has taken over the monitoring of liquidations of credit and microfinance institutions from the DSIF, and is responsible for:
    - (i) building the safety net for the financial sector, primarily the resolution of ailing banks and the systemic crisis management framework;
    - (ii) coordinating the work relating to the resolution of credit institutions; and
    - (iii) operationalizing the framework for the resolution of credit institutions.
- Coordination with supervision:
  - Supervisory and resolution functions must be separated but internal mechanisms and protocols must be established for the smoothest possible exchange of information and very close coordination between DSF and DSIF.
  - Ideally, there should be seamless information sharing and a sharing of databases between supervisory and resolution functions, including sharing of individual information on each bank, both quantitative and qualitative.
  - Practical arrangements suggested include inviting DSIF to participate in meetings with a bank regarding preparation of its resolution plan and vice versa for recovery plans.
- Capacity building:
  - The BCC should continue to strengthen the skills of its team in bank resolution and restructuring and in crisis management.
  - In 2025 the DSF teams completed the virtual training provided by the BROC online course and the DSF director completed the in-person training offered by the African Training Institute on the management of banking crises.

### Domestic coordination (Financial Stability Committee) and crisis management
- A Financial Stability Committee (FSC) was established by agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the BCC:
  - Committee composition includes the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the BCC, the President of the Insurance Regulatory Authority, and members of the Technical Secretariat of the FSC (some 20 advisors and directors from the BCC and the Ministry).
  - The FSC is intended to be expanded to include future financial sector authorities, in particular when a capital markets authority is formed.
  - The FSC facilitates coordination between authorities and has been used to coordinate between the BCC and the Ministry of Finance the treatment of previously resolved banks, including the injection of public funds (“special credits”).
  - The FSC’s establishing text also assigns it the function of coordinating the authorities in the analysis of systemic risks and the implementation of macroprudential policies.
- Recommendation:
  - The FSC could be complemented by another, more operational, crisis management coordination structure—particularly needed when a deposit insurance system is established.
  - International standards (Core Principle 6.3 of the IADI Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems) state that "The deposit insurer shall be a member of any permanent institutional framework coordinating the actions and communication of financial safety net members regarding crisis preparedness and management at the system level."
  - IMF staff typically recommend such a committee have two standing groups: one on macroprudential policies and another on crisis management, including the deposit insurer.

### Resolution manual: purpose, content and suggested outline
- Purpose and role:
  - A resolution manual (also called "handbooks" or "playbooks") is a document, to be endorsed by the decision-making body on resolution matters, setting out policies and procedures for undertaking the key organizational functions of a resolution authority.
  - It makes the operational link between the statutory resolution regime and individual resolution plans, avoids repetition across plans, and provides training material and guidance for staff.
- Core content and structure (suggested):
  - a) Confidentiality level: determine the confidentiality regime for documents used or produced by the resolution authority.
  - b) Background: citation of legal provisions; internal delegations of institutional responsibilities; overview of division responsibilities and duties; general responsibilities and authorities of managers and staff.
  - c) Policies: description of the policies adopted by the resolution authority or division, including interpretations of statutory provisions and guidance on use of legal discretions.
  - d) Procedures: detailed step-by-step procedures for execution of resolution tools and powers internally, with domestic authorities and outside stakeholders; may include decision trees and contingency procedures; preparation and operation of a virtual or physical “crisis room” (membership and governance, infrastructures, rules on management and sharing of confidential information).

*IMF Technical Assistance Report | excerpt.*

### 33. From the perspective of front-line staff (i.e., experts), the procedures specify their duties

### 33. From the perspective of front-line staff (i.e., experts), the procedures specify their duties and responsibilities, including (i) work that must be performed; (ii) factors that need to be considered or assessed; (iii) spreadsheets or documents that need to be completed; (iv) reports that need to be prepared; (v) required routine reporting to managers; and (vi) responsibilities for escalating issues, concerns, or problems to managers. The procedures also address steps for documenting the work, judgments, and decisions of front-line staff.

### Front-line staff duties and documentation
- Procedures specify duties and responsibilities for front-line staff, including:
  - (i) work that must be performed;
  - (ii) factors that need to be considered or assessed;
  - (iii) spreadsheets or documents that need to be completed;
  - (iv) reports that need to be prepared;
  - (v) required routine reporting to managers; and
  - (vi) responsibilities for escalating issues, concerns, or problems to managers.
- Procedures address steps for documenting the work, judgments, and decisions of front-line staff.

### Management duties and documentation
- Procedures specify duties and responsibilities for management, including:
  - (i) the authorities of the managers (e.g., who decides what, who approves what, etc.);
  - (ii) requirements and steps for reporting upward to, and for obtaining required authorizations and approvals from, the senior management and the relevant decision-making body.
- Procedures specify requirements and steps for interacting with official institutions outside the authority and with other stakeholders.
- Procedures address steps for documenting the work, judgments, and decisions of managers.

### Resolution manual maintenance and possible annexes
- Resolution manual maintenance:
  - The resolution manual is a living document.
  - The management of the resolution authority should determine who is responsible for updating it and keeping it current. This may be an individual or a small team.
- Possible annexes could include:
  - (i) procedure flowcharts or maps, such as a timeline of actions to implement resolution tools (like the timelines prepared with the support of this mission);
  - (ii) templates for legal documents, such as decisions to be taken by the resolution authority (e.g., the decision to trigger the resolution of a bank, considering that the conditions set out in the law have been met; or the decision to transfer assets/liabilities to a bridge institution) ;
  - (iii) templates for other documents (e.g., documents to be completed when undertaking analyses to ensure procedures are followed and relevant information has been considered, documents for notifications and reporting, documents for recording work, etc.);
  - (iv) lists of relevant individuals, titles and contact information;
  - (v) legal texts relevant to the resolution manual; and
  - (vi) list of relevant policy documents (if not included in a separate section of the resolution manual).
- Appendix III contains an example of decision tree.
- Appendix II contains a template for bridge bank transfer decision.

---

### III. Drafting of Individual Resolution Plans

### Objective and process
- Purpose: support the BCC in the drafting of individual resolution plans for financial institutions, including the process of assessing the resolvability of each financial institution.
- At the end of the mission, IMF staff advised the BCC to start drafting bank-specific resolution plans, using the resolution plan template in Appendix I as guidance.
- The template follows international standards (KAs of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and FSB guidelines) and best practices.
- The drafting of resolution plans and the process of assessing the resolvability of each financial institution is an iterative process which will require numerous meetings with the banks for the staff of the resolution function, over several years.
- To perform these new and resource-intensive activities the resolution authority needs to increase its staff and expertise.

### A. Resolution Plan Template based on Best Practices
- Structure should follow existing international standards and best practices.
- Purpose of a resolution plan: facilitate the effective use of resolution tools and powers to preserve critical functions, with the objective of making it feasible for any entity to be resolved, without causing severe disruption and without exposing taxpayers to losses.
- Resolution plans are not normally made public.
- The resolution plan template in Appendix I includes the elements recommended by the FSB:
  1) A summary of the envisaged resolution strategies and an operational plan for their implementation; it is important to pay particular attention to the summary of the plan to ensure a good understanding within the resolution authority of the issues related to the resolution plan and its credibility;
  2) A strategic analysis of the bank’s business model that supports the proposed resolution strategies;
  3) The conditions for intervention by the resolution authority, describing the conditions required to trigger the resolution procedure; these conditions should consider at least two resolution scenarios: an idiosyncratic scenario (specific to the bank alone) and a systemic scenario (broader crisis);
  4) Practical options for executing resolution actions, specifying which resolution tools and powers would be adopted in response to each resolution scenario;
  5) Preparatory actions to ensure that resolution measures can be implemented in an efficient and timely manner;
  6) Details of any significant impediments to the effective and timely implementation of the plan; and
  7) Responsibilities in the execution of preparatory measures triggering the implementation of the plan and adopting resolution measures.

- Strategic analysis of the bank’s business model should include:
  1) Identification of critical functions related to the legal entities that perform them;
  2) The actions necessary to maintain these critical functions, including the funding needed to maintain them (see also the Section on the resolution funding mechanism);
  3) An assessment of the viability of any critical function, line of business, or legal entity that could be separated into a resolution scenario, as well as the impact of such separation on the residual legal entity or group and its viability;
  4) An assessment of the likely impact of the liquidation of business lines that are not considered critical functions, including the potential impact on clients, financial sector counterparties, and market confidence;
  5) Significant potential obstacles to an effective separation of these critical functions or lines of business; and
  6) Processes for determining the value and likelihood of being able to sell critical functions and significant lines of business, operations, and assets.

- Resolution strategies:
  - The resolution plan should develop a preferred resolution strategy (“Plan A”) and an alternative resolution strategy (“Plan B”).
  - Strategies should be consistent with resolution tools and powers in the legislative regime.
  - Under the SRR applicable in the DRC, the preferred resolution strategy will likely be based on the partial sale tool.
  - If the preferred strategy cannot be implemented—due to lack of time, data, or an acceptable acquirer—the creation of a bridge bank could be a suitable alternative for systemically important banks.

- Application of resolution tools:
  - The plan should specify how the resolution authority would apply the resolution tools and implement recommended resolution tools and powers.
  - Given the very simple structure of most financial institutions in the DRC, resolution tools will generally be applied at the level of a single institution (“single point of entry” strategy) but subsidiaries of foreign banking groups in the DRC require a specific strategy.

- Key operational and financial aspects to cover:
  - Financial resources needed: internal (e.g., conversion of certain liabilities to replenish equity) or external (use of the resolution funding mechanism).
  - Operational continuity: detail service contracts for the provision of IT services.
  - Whether the entity in resolution will maintain all of its holdings in financial market infrastructures and how (e.g., participation in the local payment system, access to payments in dollars via correspondent banks).
  - Potential sources of liquidity provision to the resolution entity, without assuming central bank or public entity support.
  - How the ‘stay’ power on termination of a large number of financial contracts would be implemented.

### B. Resolvability Assessment and Removal of Impediments to Resolvability
- Regular resolvability assessments:
  - The BCC should regularly undertake resolvability assessments of, at least, the systemically important entities under their responsibility as resolution authority.
  - The banking law provides for “regular updates” of the resolution plans (Article 89) - an update every two years or after a significant change in the entity's activity would be an adequate periodicity for the DRC.
  - Periodic resolvability assessments should assess the feasibility of resolution strategies and their credibility in relation to the likely impact on the financial system and the real economy.
  - Assess effectiveness of information systems used by financial institutions to identify and report most significant assets and liabilities for resolution planning.
  - Conduct assessments in coordination with other relevant authorities and assess in particular (KA 10.2):
    1) To what extent can critical functions continue to be performed;
    2) The nature and size of intra-group exposures and their impact on resolution, if they were to be reduced and cancelled;
    3) The capability of the institution to deliver sufficiently reliable and detailed information in a timely manner to support resolution, whether such information relates to assets or liabilities; and
    4) Robust cross-border cooperation and information exchange agreements.

- Five-step resolvability assessment process encouraged for the BCC:
  1) A qualitative and quantitative assessment by the BCC, of the extent to which the financial institution is resolvable, given its structure and the resolution regime to which it is subject;
  2) In cases where the institution belongs to a group, is listed on a stock exchange, or operates on a cross-border basis, the BCC shares that assessment with other relevant authorities;
  3) The BCC communicates to the institution the impediments it must address to enhance resolvability;
  4) The institution and/or one or more competent authorities adopt measures to remove any identified impediments; and
  5) Re-assessment of resolvability by the BCC as resolution authority.

- If measures proposed by the institution do not remove impediments, BCC options (Article 93 of the banking law) include:
  - (i) require changes to intra-group financing or service contracts to ensure the continuation of critical functions;
  - (ii) limit exposures;
  - (iii) require additional information;
  - (iv) require the disposal of specific assets;
  - (v) require the limitation or sale of certain current or planned activities;
  - (vi) restrict or prohibit the development of new or current activities; and
  - (vii) require changes in the legal, economic, legal or operational structure of the credit institution or of its subsidiaries.

- Internal loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity:
  - Over the long term, the BCC should require banks to develop their internal loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity.
  - The banking law does not mention the possibility for the resolution authority to require the institution to increase its loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity for resolution purposes.
  - Implementation of these requirements is not a priority given the current structure of the DRC’s financial system (banks do not issue negotiable debt securities and there is no financial market).
  - Over the long term, the BCC should require, at least for systemically important banks, development of internal loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity to reduce reliance on publicly funded resolution funding mechanism.
  - This would imply development of domestic primary and secondary capital debt markets to enable issuance and trading of loss absorbing capacity debt instruments.
  - For subsidiaries in the DRC of foreign banking groups, internal absorption capacity within the group can be implemented without waiting for local financial market development, as Article 93 provides power to "require changes to intra-group financing (...) to ensure the continuation of critical functions."
  - This power would allow implementation of a group resolution strategy organized with home authorities, based on subordinated debt subscribed by the parent companies of the banking subsidiaries in the DRC.

### C. Reporting and Regulatory Requirements to Support Resolution Planning
- Use of financial institutions to provide necessary information:
  - The BCC should rely as much as possible on financial institutions to provide necessary information to facilitate preparation of resolution plans.
  - The resolution authority shall have unhindered access to financial institutions for resolution planning and preparation for implementation of resolution actions.
  - Establish in advance reporting obligations for financial institutions (e.g., resolution planning reporting forms).
  - Ensure institutions have effective information systems to provide timely and reliable information for resolution planning or implementation of resolution decisions.

- Most frequent information requests for resolution planning relate to:
  1) Information related to the bank’s structure, critical functions, or interconnections (e.g., intra-group guarantees or credits, or the institution’s dependence on other entities in a group for liquidity, own funds, or support functions such as legal, IT, or human resources functions);
  2) Proposals for the transfer perimeter and potential impediments to this transfer;
  3) An analysis of the operational consequences of a resolution strategy (i.e., the challenges to ensure the operational continuity of critical functions); and
  4) A description of the processes to be implemented in order for the resolution authority to have access to particular information when resolution is triggered.

- Valuations:
  - Use the resolvability assessment exercise to strengthen the framework around valuations.
  - Banks must be able to assist with preparation of valuations by the independent valuer by:
    - (i) giving the valuer rapid access to data, information, and documents;
    - (ii) facilitating the valuer’s access to competent personnel; and
    - (iii) applying models and producing activity forecasts based on assumptions and levels of granularity requested by the valuer.
  - Resolution authorities should assess and test banks’ ability to support valuation exercises as part of resolution planning; shortcomings may lead authority to demand changes to improve resolvability.

- Use of recovery plans:
  - Use elements from recovery plans for developing resolution plans and assessing resolvability.
  - Common elements between recovery and resolution planning include separability of critical functions, continuity of contracts supporting critical functions, crisis communication, identification of potential acquirers, determination of assets to be sold and their indicative valuation, crisis governance, and identification of critical employees.

- Sequencing to regulation:
  - Before adopting a regulation on resolvability, the BCC must gain practical experience in resolvability analysis.
  - First step: start working on individual resolution plans and resolvability discussions with institutions to build expertise.
  - Later: draft a regulation on this topic using experience from initial resolution plan work and international good practices.
  - A regulation could define information needed for development and updating of resolution plans.
  - Develop a list of data points in coordination with the supervision function to avoid duplications and rely on existing and available data points.
  - Data points should be reported to the BCC at the same frequency as the resolution plan update.
  - Information can be delivered as a self-assessment by banks of their resolvability in the context of a partial sale to a third party or a bridge institution (good practice in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union).

### D. Cross-border Resolution Planning (Subsidiaries in the DRC)
- (Section header preserved; substantive detail in source continues beyond provided excerpt.)

*IMF Technical Assistance Report | 23–27*

### 52. Cross-border situations related to subsidiaries in the DRC of foreign banking groups call

### 52. Cross-border situations related to subsidiaries in the DRC of foreign banking groups call for the establishment of institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements between the BCC and relevant home authorities.

### Cross-border cooperation agreements and coordination
- Cross-border situations related to subsidiaries in the DRC of foreign banking groups call for the establishment of institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements between the BCC and relevant home authorities.
- Such agreements should be more specific than the existing memoranda of understanding, in particular they should provide an appropriate level of detail with regard to the cross-border implementation of specific resolution measures, including with respect to the use of a bridge institution by the host authority (KA 9.1(viii)).
- The existing cooperation agreements of the BCC are general agreements that only cover the supervision of banks and do not incorporate the crisis management dimension (see the MCM report to the BCC: “Desk review of cooperation agreements of the Central Bank of Congo”, 2022).
- International standards require the home authority to:
  - establish the appropriate coordination group to discuss recovery and resolution plans;
  - invite the host authorities of jurisdictions of material importance; and
  - demonstrate sufficient progress in terms of exchanging recovery and resolution plans.
- In the case of a subsidiary in the DRC of a foreign bank, the BCC should rely as much as possible on recovery measures adopted in the home jurisdiction, at the level of the parent.
- This cooperative approach is conditioned upon the group recovery plan addressing specifically the situation of the subsidiary in the DRC; if this were not the case, the BCC could require the subsidiary to identify credible recovery measures to be implemented in the absence of support from the parent company.
- The group resolution plan developed by the home resolution authority should specify the treatment of the subsidiary in the DRC.
- In the absence of specific consideration by the resolution authority of the home country, or when these group-level resolution plans do not consider the operations of the subsidiary in the DRC, the BCC should develop, as a "fallback plan," a local resolution plan for the subsidiary under its jurisdiction.

### Local resolution plan content for subsidiaries and operational continuity
- If the BCC develops a local resolution plan for a subsidiary under its jurisdiction, this plan should specify the operational issues in the context of a cross-border group.
- The plan should identify all services provided by the parent bank that support critical functions of the subsidiary in the DRC.
- Once these services are identified, and as with services provided by third parties, the BCC should ask the bank to develop operational continuity plans in resolution for the services supporting critical functions.
- These operational continuity plans must be discussed with the parent bank as well as its resolution authority.

### Appendix I — Structure of a Resolution Plan for a Systemic Domestic Bank (Bank not listed on a stock exchange)
- 1. Summary of the resolution strategies envisaged and the plan for their implementation.
- 2. Strategic analysis of the business model of the bank supporting the proposed resolution strategies:
  - Legal structure of the institution/group;
  - Owners/composition of the shareholding;
  - Governance;
  - Balance sheet;
  - Income statement;
  - The most important prudential requirements;
  - Business lines;
  - Critical functions:
    - Article of the banking law on resolution plan: “ All the measures put in place by the Central Bank of the Congo to allow, in the event of the failure of a credit institution, to clean up the banking sector, in particular through the restructuring or the preservation of critical functions or the orderly liquidation of a credit institution.”
  - Internal interdependence;
  - External interdependencies (including shared critical services);
  - IT systems; and
  - List of financial market infrastructures (payments, securities settlement, clearing house) in which the bank participates.
- 3. Resolution scenarios and resolution triggers: at least two resolution scenarios, an idiosyncratic (specific to the bank alone) and a systemic scenario (broader crisis).
  - Resolution scenarios; and
  - Events triggering the resolution decision.
- 4. Preferred Resolution Strategy (“Plan A”) and Alternative Resolution Strategy (“Plan B”).
  - The Preferred Resolution Strategy is guided by the determination/delineation of critical functions;
  - Loss-absorbing capacity; and
  - Analysis of separability (e.g., separability of the bank’s business units, credit portfolios, a subsidiary).
- 5. Financial and operational continuity in resolution
  - Operational Continuity: in particular, service-level agreements have already been concluded by the bank with other entities in the same group, or other parties, for the provision of services, including IT services. Operational continuity should be based as much as possible on the business continuity procedures already in place in the bank.
  - Access to financial market infrastructures: whether and how the bank would maintain this access.
  - Liquidity: describes potential sources of liquidity to support the bank in resolution. Should not take for granted the provision of liquidity by a public entity, in particular by the central bank.
  - Power to “freeze” financial obligations (“stay”)/moratorium: where the defaulting bank has signed a significant number of financial contracts, the resolution plan should specify how the stay power on early termination of the financial contracts would be implemented.
- 6. Information/IT and communication plan
  - Data management/IT systems; and
  - Communication framework/communication plan.
- 7. Assessment of resolvability—details of any potential significant impediments to the effective and timely implementation of the resolution plan, following a five-step process:
  1) The resolution authority shall carry out a qualitative and quantitative assessment to conclude whether the bank is resolvable, or to what extent it would be resolvable, looking at its structure and the applicable resolution regime; assessment of the possibility of liquidation under normal insolvency proceedings: credibility (potential contagion if the bank was liquidated) and feasibility (e.g., how would depositors be reimbursed if the bank was liquidated?); and the choice between a liquidation strategy or a resolution strategy.
  2) When the bank belongs to a group, or operates cross-border, sharing this assessment with other relevant authorities. Feasibility and credibility of the resolution strategy (impediments to the resolution strategy).
  3) Presentation to the bank of the points on which the bank must act. Feasibility and credibility of the resolution strategy (impediments to the resolution strategy).
  4) Measures adopted by the bank or by the relevant authorities to remove or mitigate impediments to resolvability (e.g., access to bank information or systems; impediments dependent on other public authorities).
  5) Re-assessment of resolvability by the resolution authority.
- 8. Consultation of the bank. The bank must be able to give its opinion on (a summary of) the resolution plan. The bank’s opinion is part of the resolution plan.
- The resolution plan shall be reviewed, updated—if necessary—at least annually, and after each significant change that affects the bank.

### Appendix II — Template For Bridge Bank Transfer Decision (key provisions)
- Decision on transfer of assets and liabilities of [Name of institution under resolution]
  - Form and elements: Decision adopted by the BCC in the exercise of the powers conferred by Articles [references to relevant statutory provisions on resolution].
  - BCC satisfied that— [Name of institution under resolution] fails, or is likely to fail, to satisfy the conditions for authorization as defined by [relevant legislation], for which the BCC is treated as responsible; and having regard to timing and other relevant circumstances it is not reasonably likely that measures will be taken by or with respect to [Name of institution under resolution] that would enable it to meet the [conditions for authorization].
  - BCC satisfied that this decision is necessary in light of the public interest considerations specified in [reference to the relevant section of the law].
  - In accordance with Article [xx] of that law, the BCC has had regard to the resolution objectives.
- Part 1 — General: Citation and entry into force
  - This decision may be referred to as the [Name of institution under resolution] Transfer Decision for assets and liabilities of [date].
  - This decision shall take effect upon the time of transfer.
- Definitions include: "Law", "Bridge Institution", "Bridge Institution transfer", "Bridge Institution business", "Bridge Institution relevant assets", "Bridge Institution relevant deposits", "Deposit", "the BCC", "time of transfer", "[Name of institution under resolution]".
- Part 2 — Bridge Institution transfer
  - Paragraph 3: Pursuant to this document, the Bridge Institution relevant assets and Bridge Institution relevant deposits of [Name of institution under resolution] (including brand name) are transferred to the Bridge Institution. They make up the Bridge Institution business.
  - Paragraph 4: The Bridge Institution transfer takes place at the time of transfer.
  - Paragraphs 5–6: Bridge Institution relevant assets and Bridge Institution relevant deposits are specified ([●]).
  - Legal and operational continuity clauses (Paragraphs 7–11): treat the Bridge Institution as the same person as the failed institution for the Bridge Institution business; contracts, payments, and references operate as if by or in relation to the Bridge Institution.
  - Provision of assistance (Paragraphs 12–13): mutual information and assistance obligations between the failed institution and the Bridge Institution.
  - Re-transfer powers (Paragraph 14): BCC may transfer or re-transfer assets, liabilities, off-balance-sheet items and assets under management between the Bridge Institution and [Name of institution under resolution], within the time limits set out in the [law/SRR].

### Appendices III–IV — Decision tree and coordination of actions (supervision–resolution)
- Appendix III: Decision Tree for Resolution Measures (graphic/flow structure included in source).
- Appendix IV: Coordination of Actions Supervision – Resolution
  - Defines roles across BCC/Supervisory function, BCC/Resolution function, and DIS (if separate) across stages:
    - Before Identification as a Problem Bank: Ongoing Supervision (designation as a systemic institution; exchange of information; recovery plan cycle; resolution planning).
    - Identification as a Problem Bank: Recovery Phase (initial identification mechanisms; formalized designation as a problem bank; require updates to recovery plan; corrective actions; on-site examinations; emergency measures including Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA); appointment of an administrator; quantify additional capital needs).
      - Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) managed by Department of monetary policy operations (“Département des opérations bancaires et des marchés”) in charge (with the Supervisory function in charge of assessing the bank’s ELA eligibility in terms of viability and solvency).
    - Gone Concern: Resolution Phase (asset valuation review specialist; administrator information collection; bid package development; bidders’ review and selection; negotiation; set up of bridge bank requiring recapitalization resources; submission of final resolution plan to the board for approval).
    - Gone Concern: Liquidation Phase (appoint DIS as liquidator; closing date; revoke license on closing date; develop pro forma balance sheet as of closing date; publish liquidation decision in the Official Gazette; pay compensation to depositors; borrow funds or apply for grants if needed; liquidate the failed institution; take necessary legal measures; approve external consultants; monitor liquidation procedures; establish liquidation committee).
  - The coordination matrix specifies which function is "In charge", "Consultation", "Notification", "Input", or "Information" at each step.

*IMF Technical Assistance Report | selected excerpts*

### Appendix V. The Ex-Post Financial Sector Levy

### Appendix V. The Ex-Post Financial Sector Levy

### Act overview and purpose
- Title: FINANCIAL SECTOR RECOVERY LEVY ACT, 2021 Act 1067
- Purpose: to impose a special levy known as the Financial Sector Recovery Levy on banks to raise revenue to support the financial sector reforms and to provide for related matters.
- Date of Assent: 31st March 2021.
- Date of Gazette notification: 31st March, 2021.

### Imposition of the Levy
- Section 1: There is imposed by this Act a Financial Sector Recovery Levy of five percent on the profit before tax of a bank.
- Section 2 (Application of Levy): Despite any provision to the contrary in an enactment relating to a tax holiday or an exemption from a direct tax or an indirect tax applicable to a bank, the Levy imposed under section 1 applies to a bank other than a rural bank or a community bank.
- Section 3 (Levy not an allowable deduction): The Levy is not an allowable deduction for the purpose of ascertaining the chargeable income of a person under the Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896).
- Section 4 (Profits affected by Levy):
  - (1) The Levy is payable in respect of profit before tax.
  - (2) The Minister may, at the expiration of the 2024 year of assessment, review the Levy.

### Assessment and payment mechanics
- Section 5 (Assessment of Levy payable):
  - (1) A bank covered under this Act shall submit an estimate of the Levy due for that year of assessment together with the annual income tax estimate of that bank.
  - (2) Where the bank has not
    - (a) been assessed for tax in the two preceding years of assessment, or
    - (b) furnished
      - (i) a return or an estimate in accordance with the Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896), or
      - (ii) a statement of the estimated Levy payable in accordance with subsection (1),
    the Commissioner-General may proceed to make an assessment of the Levy payable by that bank.
- Section 6 (Payment period of Levy):
  - (1) The Levy assessed for a year of assessment is payable on or before the following dates of each quarter of the year of assessment:
    - (a) 31st March;
    - (b) 30th June;
    - (c) 30th September; and
    - (d) 31st December.
  - (2) Despite subsection (1), payment of the Levy for the 2021 year of assessment shall be made in three instalments on or before
    - (a) 30th June, 2021;
    - (b) 30th September, 2021; and
    - (c) 31st December, 2021.

### Administration, collection, and recovery
- Section 7 (Administration of Levy): The Commissioner-General shall administer the Levy in accordance with the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915).
- Section 8 (Collection of Levy): The Ghana Revenue Authority is responsible for the collection of the Levy.
- Section 9 (Payment of Levy into Consolidated Fund): The Commissioner-General shall pay the Levy collected under this Act into the Consolidated Fund.
- Section 10 (Recovery of Levy): For the purpose of enforcing the payment of the Levy, the provisions of the Revenue Administration Act, 2016 (Act 915) and the Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896) relating to collection, enforcement, refund and penalties shall apply to the collection of the Levy as if the Levy is collected under the specified enactments.

### Miscellaneous provisions and definitions
- Section 11 (Regulations): The Minister may, by legislative instrument, make Regulations to provide for the efficient and effective implementation of this Act.
- Section 12 (Interpretation) definitions preserved in the Act:
  - "bank" means a bank regulated under the Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930);
  - "Commissioner-General" means the Commissioner-General appointed under section 13 of the Ghana Revenue Authority Act, 2009 (Act 791);
  - "Levy" means the Financial Sector Recovery Levy imposed under section 1; and
  - "Minister" means the Minister responsible for Finance.

*Source: Appendix V. The Ex-Post Financial Sector Levy — FINANCIAL SECTOR RECOVERY LEVY ACT, 2021 Act 1067.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/tar/2026/english/tarea2026011-source-pdf.pdf_
