## tnmea2024005

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---

### I. Introduction — Background
- Purpose: To provide background information and report recent developments on the semi-autonomous revenue authority (SARA) governance model for revenue administration, with respect to its board of management.
- Definition: a special government entity that administers and enforces the revenue laws of a country.

### Characteristics of an RA and prevalence
- Enabling legislation typically:
  - outlines the RA’s legal form and status;
  - describes its purpose, powers, and functions;
  - establishes a decision-making board of management (usually with private sector representation); and
  - sets out the roles for the board and the chief executive officer (CEO).
- Governance relationships:
  - RA is under the general direction of a minister (normally of finance but sometimes of revenue or economy) who remains responsible and accountable for the administration and enforcement of the country’s main revenue laws.
  - RA has a high degree of administrative or management autonomy, particularly with respect to human resources (HR), budget, organization, and administration generally.
- Prevalence and data source:
  - Some 35 countries (about 20 percent) use this RA governance model.
  - Data and information provided through the International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA).

### Overview and sources of information (2018)
- Functional coverage:
  - Most existing RAs (about 70 percent) are responsible for both tax administration and customs administration; the remainder are responsible for tax administration only.
- Information sources used:
  - Review of enabling legislation/regulations for all 35 RAs of this type.
  - Questionnaire on autonomy sent to 75 revenue administrations that self-identified as “semi-autonomous” in ISORA 2018; responses received from 43 administrations, 25 of which are considered RAs per this note’s definition.
  - International seminars with IMF and regional tax administration forums; participants provided information in a questionnaire on management boards.
- Geographic and membership distribution:
  - 35 RAs meet the study definition.
  - Just over a quarter of the IMF’s low-income developing country members have adopted this governance model.
  - For emerging market economies and advanced economies, proportions are roughly 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
  - RAs are more concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa.
  - In addition to the 35 RAs listed, there are tax administrations with advisory boards (Argentina, Moldova) and one semi-autonomous body with no board of management (South Africa).
  - Approximately 30 other administrations describe themselves in ISORA as a “unified semi-autonomous body” but do not meet the RA definition used in this note.

### Key concepts: evaluating RAs, management autonomy, and accountability
- Evaluating RA success:
  - Historical evaluations focused narrowly on macro-level performance; attempts were largely unsuccessful due to limited long-run panel data and inability to isolate governance-model effects from other factors.
  - Research examined (1) usage/features of the RA governance model and (2) macro outcomes (e.g., revenue levels, tax-to-GDP ratios); causality and attribution remain difficult and findings vary by period studied.
- Management autonomy:
  - Refers to human and financial resources and organizational structure.
  - Difference for RAs is the presence of a decision-making board that approves policies/procedures supporting administrative decision making.
- Accountability and oversight:
  - The RA model is a hybrid: the minister retains general direction; the CEO retains direct accountability to the minister for administering and enforcing revenue laws.
  - The board typically does not have responsibility for operational transactions and is often explicitly excluded from access to confidential taxpayer information.

### Legal form and mandate — frequency and observations
- Four aspects examined: legal form and essential mandate; relationship with government; CEO role; board role.
- Frequency metrics in 35 enabling laws (as reported):
  - Legal form metrics (percent (n = 35)): 74, 54, 14, 11
  - Essential mandate metrics (percent (n = 35)): 100, 100, 77, 51, 43, 40, 37, 34, 26, 6
- Universal references:
  - Assessment and collection of taxes and administration and enforcement of revenue laws are universal in the 35 laws reviewed.
- Observations:
  - Common law language: “Advice to the minister,” “promote compliance,” and “improve service.”
  - Legal form “body corporate” or “separate legal personality” commonly used.
  - Funding policy varies: most RAs funded by normal government appropriation; five RAs contain a provision authorizing funds based on a percentage of revenue collected (subject to government approval in some cases).
  - Clear enabling-legislation language is important; ambiguities can affect roles of minister, board, and CEO.

### Relationship with the government — oversight, appointments, ministerial role
- Government retains key levers:
  - Ministerial general direction/supervision; appointment powers for board members, board chair, and CEO; government approval of the expenditure budget; ministerial tabling/approval of strategic plans and/or annual reports; performance agreements with the minister.
- Appointment statistics and observations:
  - Nineteen (or 54 percent of RAs where this information is available) indicate the head of state appoints the CEO.
  - Only 2 indicate the minister appoints the CEO.
  - A further 10 indicate CEO appointed by either head of state or minister on recommendation of the management board.
  - Board chair and board members in most cases appointed by head of state or minister.
  - Senior executive staff typically appointed by the board or the CEO rather than the political level.
  - Balance of staffing authority: board (46 percent) or CEO (37 percent); law silent for remainder.
- Minister’s role in law (Figure 4 highlights):
  - General supervision by minister: 51 percent (n = 35).
  - Minister has directive authority in 16 of the 35 laws (requirement that any use of this power be made public is common).
  - Minister often approves/tables annual reports and strategic plans.

### Role and mandate of the CEO — findings and observations
- Findings from enabling legislation (percent (n = 35)):
  - Day-to-day operations responsibility is universal = 100.
  - Management of funds, property, administration, organization: 57.
  - Ability to delegate specific powers from the revenue laws: 57.
  - Actions and decisions subject to board supervision/oversight: 43.
  - Administration and enforcement of revenue laws referenced for the CEO: 40.
  - Implementation of board decisions: 17.
- Observations:
  - CEO’s day-to-day operational responsibility is universal.
  - Delegation of specific powers (determining tax liabilities, collection powers) included in close to 60 percent of RA laws.
  - The board is not in the chain of authority over the CEO’s operational powers.

### Role and mandate of boards of management — composition, powers, practices, limits
- Common board roles (percent (n = 35) referenced for many functions):
  - Adopting policy and supervising implementation; approving organizational structure; directing affairs and operations; formulating and implementing policy; monitoring performance; determining HR policy including remuneration; providing governance and strategic direction; approving major management decisions.
- Size and membership statistics:
  - Range in number of members: 5 to 15.
  - Number of private sector members ranges from 0 to 8; three RAs have no private sector members (Angola, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic).
  - Average board size: nine members.
  - Average private sector membership: five.
  - Average tenure of board chairs: four years.
  - Average tenure of board members: 3.3 years.
  - CEO is a board member: reported as “more than 80 percent of cases” and elsewhere “close to 70 percent of the countries referenced.”
- Committees and functions (percent (n = 25) questionnaire respondents):
  - Power to establish committees exists in 84 percent.
  - Most common committees: HR (95 percent) and audit (80 percent).
  - Governance committees exist in 32 percent of boards.
  - Committee metric references: audit, human resources, finance, governance, other.
- Other board metrics (percent (n = 25)):
  - Board access to taxpayer information prohibited by law.
  - Board access to taxpayer information prohibited by practice and not by law.
  - Board meets with minister.
  - Annual discussion with minister on funding and budget.
  - Board has performance contract with minister.
  - Board has annual performance contract with CEO.
  - Board evaluates own performance; evaluates individual board members.
  - Board develops its own strategic plan/work plan.
  - Board advises government on board composition.
  - Board involved in procurement/investment; board plays role in risk management; board role limited to enterprise/institutional risk.
- Observations on responsibilities and limits:
  - Boards have policy and oversight responsibility; day-to-day operations are left to the CEO.
  - Boards generally do not participate in operational decision making related to taxpayers; members typically have no access to confidential taxpayer information.
  - Procurement and investment often remain subject to general government procurement regulations; 17 RA boards require board approval beyond a minimum procurement/investment value.
  - Boards often approve corporate plans and annual reports; in 19 countries the enabling legislation specifies the minister approves or tables the annual report in the legislature.
  - Of 25 questionnaire respondents, 13 indicated their boards developed their own strategic plan and workplan.
  - Board self-evaluation is emerging: 10 RA boards evaluate their own performance.

### Evolving developments with RA boards of management
- Human capital and HR autonomy:
  - HR authority is a key manifestation of autonomy: almost half of RAs approve their own organizational structure; 34 percent determine their own HR policy including remuneration; 26 percent determine HR policy alone.
  - HR autonomy allows RAs to manage job classifications, grading, recruitment, promotion, discipline, and sometimes remuneration.
  - Integrity and staff appraisal initiatives are priorities; some RAs collaborate with national anti-corruption agencies.
- Governance and new responsibilities:
  - Board chair or board has regular contact with the minister in 20 of 25 responding countries.
  - Six RA boards have an annual performance contract with the minister.
  - In 18 countries, minister discusses RA funding and budget at least annually with the board.
  - Risk management: 20 of 25 questionnaire responses indicated the management board played a role in risk management; of those 20, just over half (11) are limited to institutional/enterprise risk (not compliance risk).
- Changing attitudes about operations:
  - Some board chairs and CEOs report boards becoming more involved in operational matters; debate exists about the extent of board access to confidential taxpayer information.
  - Seminar survey results: statement “The board should have no role in individual taxpayer-related decisions” scored an average rating of 4.3 (5 = strongly agree to 1 = strongly disagree). The statement “The role of our management board is very clear and there are few ambiguities” scored 3.9.
  - Some enabling laws include specific roles for management boards that may have operational character.
- Formalization of management committees:
  - Boards increasingly establish committees (HR, audit, governance) to manage detailed review and oversight; committees have no decision-making authority but support the board’s work.

### Seminar participant consensus and practical recommendations
- Where serious ambiguities in enabling legislation are apparent, identify appropriate amendments for ministerial consideration.
- Focus on specific autonomy features rather than overall RA governance when making the case for adequate resources.
- Ensure a positive joint working relationship between the board and CEO on appointments of senior RA staff.
- The board should direct development of the vision and overall framework for any corporate or strategic plan from the outset; a governance committee could assume detailed oversight responsibility.
- Political will and ministerial support are critical — the minister’s role (setting revenue targets, deciding on operational budgets) is a major determinant of RA performance.
- Boards need information, briefings, and reports to understand the business they oversee and to make informed decisions about strategy and investment.
- Boards of management should evaluate their own performance on a regular basis to refine direction and advise the government (minister) on membership and capacity needs.

### BOX 1 — Examples of roles for management boards with potential operational character
- Malawi (Malawi Revenue Administration Act, 1998, Section 16 (1)):
  - “The Board shall recommend to the Minister – (a) criteria or factors by reference to which any exemption, mitigation, deferment, or remission of any revenue may be granted and (b) procedures to be followed in granting any objection, mitigation or deferment, or remission of revenue.”
- Zambia (Zambia Revenue Administration Act, 1993, Section 11. 1 (a)):
  - “...to assess, charge, levy and collect all revenue due to the Government under such laws as the Minister may, by statutory instrument, specify.”
- Tanzania (Tanzania Revenue Administration Act, 2008, Section 14.1):
  - “The Board shall recommend to the Minister criteria or factors by reference to which any exemption, mitigation, deferment, or remission may be granted.”
- Nigeria (Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act, 2007, Sec. 7.1, 9, 10):
  - 7. “(1) The Board shall – (a) provide the general policy guidelines relating to the functions of the Service; (b) manage and superintend the policies of the Service on matters relating to the administration of the revenue assessment, collection and accounting system under this Act or any enactment of law; ...”
  - 9. Technical Committee composition and co-option powers described.
  - 10. Technical Committee functions: consider tax matters requiring professional and technical expertise and make recommendations to the Board; advise the Board on any aspect of the functions and powers of the Service under this Act; attend to other referred matters.
- Lesotho (Lesotho Revenue Authority Act, 2001, Section16. (1)):
  - “The Board shall recommend to the Minister – (a) criteria or factors by reference to which any exemption, mitigation, deferment, or remission of any revenue may be granted; and (b) procedures to be followed in granting any exemption, mitigation, deferment or remission of any revenue and the Minister shall by notice published in the Gazette, publish within 60 days of his decision, specify the criteria or factors and the procedures so recommended.”
- Key takeaway:
  - Multiple jurisdictions explicitly task management boards with recommending criteria, factors, or procedures to the minister for exemptions, mitigation, deferment, or remission of revenue; provisions range to broader operational functions and internal governance structures.

### Annex 2 — Summary of Research Papers (key analytical takeaways)
- Literature overview:
  - Findings on SARAs and revenue administration autonomy are mixed and sometimes contradictory.
  - Common methodological challenges: limited data, difficulty controlling for exogenous variables, lack of rigorous comparable evaluation methodologies.
- Selected evaluations and case studies:
  - Gray and Chapman (2001): DFID evaluation of Uganda and Zambia SARAs; revenue objectives considered a success but no direct causal link to SARA model established.
  - Mann (2004): Used VAT compliance and productivity rates and tax-to-GDP ratios; analysis did not control for all exogenous variables.
  - Taliercio (2004): Series of case studies; recognized lack of rigorous methodology for evaluating tax administrations and measuring autonomy.
- Cross-country empirical studies:
  - Ahlerup and Bigsten (2015): Fixed-effects model across Africa; concluded SARA introduction leads to higher revenues in the short term, effect diminishes over time.
  - Dom (2017): Dynamic panel methods; failed to find systematic relationship between presence of a (semi-autonomous) RA and total tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa.
- ISORA-based quantitative work:
  - Chang and others (IMF 2020): Developed an operational index based on ISORA; concluded tax performance is positively and strongly associated with operational strength of tax administrations (including degree of autonomy).
  - Adan and others (IMF 2023): Built a model to estimate revenue yields using ISORA features, including degree of autonomy.
- Analytical takeaways:
  - Short-run revenue gains following SARA introduction are reported in some studies, but effects are not universally sustained or robust across methodologies.
  - Studies that more comprehensively control for exogenous factors and use dynamic methods tend to find weaker or no systematic revenue effects attributable solely to SARAs.
  - ISORA enables richer operational measurement; analyses using ISORA find strong positive associations between operational strength (including autonomy characteristics) and tax revenue.
  - Data availability and methodological rigor remain central constraints for attributing revenue outcomes to autonomy arrangements.

*Source: IMF technical note tnmea2024005 (content as provided).*

### Annex 1. RA-Enabling Laws and Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

### Revenue Authorities and Their Boards of Management: Recent Developments

### I. Introduction — Background
- Purpose: To provide background information and report recent developments on the semi-autonomous revenue authority (SARA) governance model for revenue administration, with respect to its board of management.
- Definition provided for a revenue authority (RA) for purposes of this technical note: a special government entity that administers and enforces the revenue laws of a country.

### Characteristics of an RA (as defined in the note)
- Enabled through separate legislation that:
  - outlines the RA’s legal form and status;
  - describes its purpose, powers, and functions;
  - establishes a decision-making board of management (usually with private sector representation); and
  - sets out the roles for the board and the chief executive officer (CEO).
- Is under the general direction of a minister (normally of finance but sometimes of revenue or economy) who remains responsible and accountable for the administration and enforcement of the country’s main revenue laws.
- Has a high degree of administrative or management autonomy, particularly with respect to human resources (HR), budget, organization, and administration generally.

### Governance model prevalence and data source
- Some 35 countries (about 20 percent) use this RA governance model (for revenue administration).
- Data and information on these RAs were provided through the International Survey on Revenue Administration (ISORA).

### Abbreviations (as listed)
- CEO: chief executive officer
- HR: human resources
- ISORA: International Survey on Revenue Administration
- RA: revenue authority
- SARA: semi-autonomous revenue authority
- SARS: South African Revenue Service

*Source: tnmea2024005 - Annex 1. RA-Enabling Laws and Regulations — https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/tnm/2024/english/tnmea2024005.pdf*

### 2018. Other countries are actively engaged in establishing an RA or are giving the model serious consider-

### tnmea2024005 - 2018. Other countries are actively engaged in establishing an RA or are giving the model serious consider-

### Overview and sources of information
- Most existing RAs (about 70 percent) are responsible for both tax administration and customs administration; the remainder are responsible for tax administration only.
- Information to prepare this technical note was obtained through:
  - A review of enabling legislation or regulations establishing an RA with a decision-making board of management (laws or regulations for all 35 RAs of this type were reviewed).
  - A questionnaire on autonomy, sent to 75 revenue administrations that self-identified as “semi-autonomous” in ISORA 2018. Responses were received from 43 administrations, 25 of which are considered RAs per this note’s definition.
  - A series of international seminars held in collaboration with the IMF and the African Tax Administration Forum or the Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators, with participants providing information in a questionnaire on management boards.

### Geographic and membership distribution
- 35 RAs meet the study definition; Table 1 lists them and Figure 1 shows geographic distribution.
- Most existing RAs have been established in low-income developing countries — just over a quarter of the IMF’s low-income developing country members have adopted this governance model.
- For emerging market economies and advanced economies, these proportions are roughly 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
- RAs are more concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa.
- In addition to the 35 RAs listed, there are tax administrations with advisory boards (Argentina, Moldova) and one semi-autonomous body with no board of management (South Africa).
- There are approximately 30 other administrations that describe themselves in ISORA as a “unified semi-autonomous body” but do not meet the RA definition used in this note.

### Key concepts: evaluating RAs, management autonomy, and accountability
- Evaluating RA success:
  - Historical evaluations focused narrowly on whether the RA governance model performed better at a macro level; attempts were largely unsuccessful due to limited long-run panel data and inability to isolate governance-model effects from other factors (tax policy, resourcing, taxpayer behavior).
  - Research generally examined (1) usage/features of the RA governance model and (2) macro outcomes (e.g., revenue levels, tax-to-GDP ratios); causality and attribution remain difficult and findings vary by period studied.
- Management autonomy:
  - Refers to human and financial resources and organizational structure.
  - All revenue administrations, RA or not, have some level of management autonomy; difference for RAs is the presence of a decision-making board that approves policies/procedures supporting administrative decision making.
- Accountability and oversight in the RA model:
  - The RA model is a hybrid: the minister retains general direction over the RA; the head of the RA (CEO) retains direct accountability to the minister for administering and enforcing revenue laws.
  - The board of management typically does not have responsibility for operational transactions that give effect to revenue laws and is often explicitly excluded from access to confidential taxpayer information.

### Detailed analysis of the RA framework — legal form and mandate
- Four key aspects examined:
  - Legal form and essential mandate.
  - Relationship with the government (oversight, appointments, role of minister).
  - Role and mandate of the CEO (operations, dual accountability, enabling environment).
  - Role and mandate of the decision-making board of management.
- Frequency of specific references in 35 enabling laws (Figure 3):
  - Legal form metrics (percent (n = 35)): 74, 54, 14, 11
  - Essential mandate metrics (percent (n = 35)): 100, 100, 77, 51, 43, 40, 37, 34, 26, 6
  - Assessment and collection of taxes and administration and enforcement of revenue laws are universal in the 35 laws reviewed.
- Observations on legal form and mandate:
  - “Advice to the minister,” “promote compliance,” and “improve service” are common features in enabling laws.
  - Clear and unequivocal enabling-legislation language is important; ambiguities can affect roles of minister, board, and CEO.
  - The legal form “body corporate” or “separate legal personality” is commonly used and treated as comparable across jurisdictions.
  - Funding policy varies: most RAs are funded by normal government appropriation; five RAs contain a provision authorizing funds based on a percentage of revenue collected (subject to government approval in some cases).

### Relationship with the government — oversight, appointments, and ministerial role
- Government retains key levers:
  - Specific references to ministerial general direction/supervision.
  - Power of appointment of board members, board chair, and CEO.
  - Government approval of the expenditure budget.
  - Ministerial tabling/approval of strategic plans and/or annual reports.
  - Performance agreements with the minister.
- Appointment observations:
  - Nineteen (or 54 percent of RAs where this information is available) indicate the head of state appoints the CEO.
  - Only 2 indicate the minister appoints the CEO.
  - A further 10 indicate that the CEO is appointed by either the head of state or the minister on the recommendation of the management board.
  - For board chair and board members, in most cases the head of state or the minister appoints them.
  - Senior executive staff are typically appointed by the board or the CEO rather than the political level.
  - Balance of staffing authority: board (46 percent) or CEO (37 percent); the law is silent for the remainder.
- Minister’s role in law (Figure 4):
  - General supervision by minister: 51 percent (n = 35).
  - Minister has directive authority in 16 of the 35 laws (requirement that any use of this power be made public is common).
  - Other ministerial references: minister approves/tables annual reports and strategic plans in notable numbers.

### Role and mandate of the CEO
- Findings from enabling legislation (Figure 5):
  - Day-to-day operations responsibility is universal (percent (n = 35) = 100).
  - Management of funds, property, administration, organization: 57 percent.
  - Ability to delegate specific powers from the revenue laws: 57 percent (close to 60 percent referenced elsewhere).
  - Actions and decisions subject to board supervision/oversight: 43 percent.
  - Administration and enforcement of revenue laws referenced for the CEO in 40 percent of laws (about half).
  - Implementation of board decisions: 17 percent.
- Observations:
  - CEO’s day-to-day operational responsibility is universal.
  - Delegation of specific powers (determining tax liabilities, collection powers) is included in close to 60 percent of RA laws.
  - The board is not in the chain of authority over the CEO’s operational powers.

### Role and mandate of boards of management — composition, powers, and practices
- Board roles and references (Figure 6 highlights percent (n = 35) for many functions):
  - Common board roles include adopting policy and supervising implementation; approving organizational structure; directing affairs and operations; formulating and implementing policy; monitoring performance; determining HR policy including remuneration; providing governance and strategic direction; and approving major management decisions.
- Board size and membership:
  - Range in number of members: 5 to 15.
  - Number of private sector members ranges from 0 to 8; three RAs have no private sector members (Angola, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic).
  - Average board size: nine members.
  - Average private sector membership: five.
  - Average tenure of board chairs: four years.
  - Average tenure of board members: 3.3 years.
  - CEO is a board member: two statements in source — “more than 80 percent of cases” and elsewhere “close to 70 percent of the countries referenced.”
- Board committees and functions:
  - Power to establish committees exists in 84 percent (of n = 25 questionnaire respondents); most common committees: HR (95 percent) and audit (80 percent). Governance committees exist in 32 percent of boards.
  - Figure 7 (percent (n = 25)) shows committee references: audit, human resources, finance, governance, other.
  - Figure 8 (percent (n = 25)) reports other board metrics:
    - Board access to taxpayer information prohibited by law.
    - Board access to taxpayer information prohibited by practice and not by law.
    - Board meets with minister.
    - Annual discussion with minister on funding and budget.
    - Board has performance contract with minister.
    - Board has annual performance contract with CEO.
    - Board evaluates own performance; evaluates individual board members.
    - Board develops its own strategic plan/work plan.
    - Board advises government on board composition.
    - Board involved in procurement/investment; board plays role in risk management; board role limited to enterprise/institutional risk.
- Observations on board responsibilities and limits:
  - Boards have policy and oversight responsibility; day-to-day operations are left to the CEO.
  - Boards generally do not participate in operational decision making related to taxpayers, and members typically have no access to confidential taxpayer information.
  - Procurement and investment often remain subject to general government procurement regulations; 17 RA boards require board approval beyond a minimum procurement/investment value.
  - Boards often approve corporate plans and annual reports; in 19 countries the enabling legislation specifies the minister approves or tables the annual report in the legislature.
  - Many RA boards prepare their own board strategic plan and workplan; of 25 questionnaire respondents, 13 indicated their boards developed their own strategic plan and workplan.
  - Board self-evaluation is emerging: 10 RA boards evaluate their own performance.

### Evolving developments with RA boards of management
- Trends identified:
  - Increasing importance of human capital:
    - HR authority is a key manifestation of autonomy: almost half of RAs approve their own organizational structure; 34 percent determine their own HR policy including remuneration; 26 percent determine HR policy alone.
    - HR autonomy allows RAs to manage job classifications, grading, recruitment, promotion, discipline, and sometimes remuneration.
    - Integrity and staff appraisal initiatives are priorities; some RAs collaborate with national anti-corruption agencies.
  - Focus on governance and new responsibilities:
    - Boards increasingly meet with ministers; board chair or board has regular contact with the minister in 20 of 25 responding countries.
    - Six RA boards have an annual performance contract with the minister.
    - In 18 countries, minister discusses RA funding and budget at least annually with the board.
    - Risk management: 20 of 25 questionnaire responses indicated the management board played a role in risk management; of those 20, just over half (11) are limited to institutional/enterprise risk (not compliance risk).
  - Changing attitudes about operations:
    - Some board chairs and CEOs report boards becoming more involved in operational matters; debate exists about the extent of board access to confidential taxpayer information.
    - Seminar survey results: statement “The board should have no role in individual taxpayer-related decisions” scored an average rating of 4.3 (5 = strongly agree to 1 = strongly disagree). The statement “The role of our management board is very clear and there are few ambiguities” scored 3.9.
    - Some enabling laws include specific roles for management boards that may have operational character, opening the possibility of greater board involvement in operations.
  - Formalization of management committees:
    - Boards increasingly establish committees (HR, audit, governance) to manage detailed review and oversight; committees have no decision-making authority but support the board’s work.

### Seminar participant consensus and practical recommendations
- Seminar participants reached consensus on several recommendations:
  - Where serious ambiguities in enabling legislation are apparent, identify appropriate amendments for ministerial consideration.
  - Focus on specific autonomy features rather than overall RA governance when making the case for adequate resources.
  - Ensure a positive joint working relationship between the board and CEO on appointments of senior RA staff.
  - The board should direct development of the vision and overall framework for any corporate or strategic plan from the outset; a governance committee could assume detailed oversight responsibility.
  - Political will and ministerial support are critical — the minister’s role (setting revenue targets, deciding on operational budgets) is a major determinant of RA performance.
  - Boards need information, briefings, and reports to understand the business they oversee and to make informed decisions about strategy and investment.
  - Boards of management should evaluate their own performance on a regular basis to refine direction and advise the government (minister) on membership and capacity needs.

*Source: IMF technical note tnmea2024005 (content as provided).*

### BOX 1. Examples of Roles for Management Boards with Potential Operational Character

### BOX 1. Examples of Roles for Management Boards with Potential Operational Character

### Country examples and quoted enabling-law provisions
- Malawi  
  (Malawi Revenue Administration Act, 1998, Section 16 (1)) “The Board shall recommend to the Minister – (a) criteria or factors by reference to which any exemption, mitigation, deferment, or remission of any revenue may be granted and (b) procedures to be followed in granting any objection, mitigation or deferment, or remission of revenue.”

- Zambia  
  (Zambia Revenue Administration Act, 1993, Section 11. 1 (a)) “...to assess, charge, levy and collect all revenue due to the Government under such laws as the Minister may, by statutory instrument, specify.”

- Tanzania  
  (Tanzania Revenue Administration Act, 2008, Section 14.1) “The Board shall recommend to the Minister criteria or factors by reference to which any exemption, mitigation, deferment, or remission may be granted.”

- Nigeria  
  (Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act, 2007, Sec. 7.1, 9, 10):  
  7.  “(1)  The  Board  shall  –  (a)  provide  the  general  policy  guidelines  relating  to  the  functions  of  the  Service; (b) manage and superintend the policies of the Service on matters relating to the administration of the revenue assessment, collection and accounting system under this Act or any enactment of law; ...”  
  9. “(1) There shall be a Technical Committee of the Board (in this Act referred to as 'the Technical Committee') which shall consist of (a) the Executive Chairman of the Service as Chairman; (b) all the Directors and heads of departments of the Service; (c) the Legal Adviser of the Service; and (d) the Secretary to the Board. (2) The Technical Committee may co-opt from the Service such staff as it may deem necessary for the effective performance of its functions under this Act.”  
  10.  “The  Technical  Committee  shall  (a)  consider  all  tax  matters  that  require  professional  and  technical expertise and make recommendations to the Board; (b) advise the Board on any aspect of the functions and powers of the Service under this Act; and (c) attend to such other matters as may from time to time be referred to it by the Board.”

- Lesotho  
  (Lesotho Revenue Authority Act, 2001, Section16. (1))  “The Board shall recommend to the Minister – (a) criteria or factors by reference to which any exemption, mitigation, deferment, or remission of any revenue may be granted; and (b) procedures to be followed in granting any exemption, mitigation, deferment or remission of any revenue and the Minister shall by notice published in the Gazette, publish within 60 days of his decision, specify the criteria or factors and the procedures so recommended.”

### Key takeaway from the compilation
- The cited enabling-legislation provisions show management boards in multiple jurisdictions explicitly tasked with recommending criteria, factors, or procedures to the minister for exemptions, mitigation, deferment, or remission of revenue.
- Provisions range from recommending criteria and procedures (Malawi, Tanzania, Lesotho) to broader operational functions including assessment, charging, levying, and collecting revenue (Zambia) and internal governance structures such as Technical Committees with decision-support and advisory roles (Nigeria).

*Source: Compilation by IMF staff drawn from enabling legislation.*

### Annex 2. Summary of Research Papers

### Annex 2. Summary of Research Papers

### Overview
- The literature on Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities (SARAs) and revenue administration autonomy yields mixed and sometimes contradictory findings.
- Common methodological challenges include limited data availability, difficulty controlling for exogenous variables (macroeconomic developments, tax policy changes), and lack of rigorous, comparable evaluation methodologies across studies.

### Evaluations and case studies (qualitative and project evaluations)
- Gray and Chapman (2001)
  - Department for International Development evaluation of revenue projects focused on SARAs in Uganda and Zambia.
  - Key objectives: increase the revenue/GDP ratio for Uganda and prevent deterioration of the ratio from poor macroeconomic conditions.
  - Both revenue objectives were considered a success, but no direct link was made to the SARA model being the cause of the revenue performance improvements.
- Mann (2004)
  - Used value-added tax compliance and productivity rates and general tax-to-GDP ratios to compare pre- and post-SARA performance.
  - The paper explicitly states that this analysis does not control for all exogenous variables in addition to tax administration efforts that affect outcomes.
- Taliercio (2004)
  - Covered revenue collection, compliance, taxpayer registration and services, tax revenues as a share of GDP, growth rates in arrears, value-added tax productivity, audit coverage, and similar indicators.
  - Recognized inherent difficulties in measuring tax administration results and the general lack of a rigorous methodology for evaluating tax administrations and measuring autonomy.
  - Presented a series of case studies rather than a detailed quantitative analysis that controls for exogenous variables.

### Cross-country empirical studies and panel analyses
- Ahlerup and Bigsten (2015)
  - Used a fixed-effects model across Africa.
  - Concluded that on average the introduction of a SARA leads to higher revenues in the short term, but the effect diminishes over time.
- Dom (2017)
  - Used dynamic panel methods to account for revenue dynamics and examined total tax revenue and main individual taxes (direct, indirect, trade taxes).
  - Failed to find evidence of a systematic relationship between the presence of a (semi-autonomous) RA and total tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa.
  - Concluded that after almost three decades, the net effect of SARAs on tax revenue is still unclear.

### ISORA-based quantitative work and models estimating revenue yields
- Chang and others (IMF 2020)
  - Does not focus on RA governance model per se; uses the ISORA data set where autonomy characteristics are one element among many.
  - Developed an operational index of good tax administration practices and characteristics based on ISORA.
  - Controlled for other factors (for example, macroeconomic developments and tax policy changes).
  - Concluded that tax performance (revenue) is positively and strongly associated with the operational strength of tax administrations (which included degree of autonomy).
- Adan and others (IMF 2023)
  - Built on the ISORA-based study above.
  - Developed a model to estimate revenue yields using various tax administration features covered in ISORA, including the degree of autonomy.

### Key analytical takeaways
- Short-run revenue gains following SARA introduction are reported in some studies, but effects are not universally sustained or robust across methodologies.
- Studies that control more comprehensively for exogenous factors and use dynamic methods tend to find weaker or no systematic revenue effects attributable solely to SARAs.
- The ISORA dataset enables richer operational measurement of tax administration strength; analyses using ISORA find strong positive associations between operational strength (including autonomy characteristics) and tax revenue.
- Data availability and methodological rigor remain central constraints for confidently attributing revenue outcomes to autonomy arrangements.

*Source: Annex 2. Summary of Research Papers (tnmea2024005 - Annex 2. Summary of Research Papers).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/tnm/2024/english/tnmea2024005.pdf_