## World Economic Outlook — April 2024 (Statistical Appendix excerpts)

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### Global growth and near‑term projections
- Global real GDP growth:
  - 2023: 3.2 percent
  - 2024: 3.2 percent
  - 2025: 3.2 percent
  - Medium‑term (2029): 3.1 percent
- Growth by group:
  - Advanced economies: 2023: 1.7 percent; 2024: 1.8 percent; 2025: 1.9 percent
  - Emerging market and developing economies: 2023: 4.2 percent; 2024: 4.3 percent; 2025: 4.2 percent
- Regional highlights (selected real GDP growth series):
  - Asia emerging and developing: 2023: 4.4 percent; 2024: 5.6 percent; 2025: 2.5 percent
  - Europe emerging and developing: 2023: 1.2 percent; 2024: 3.2 percent; 2025: 3.1 percent
  - Sub‑Saharan Africa: 2023: 4.0 percent; 2024: 3.8 percent; 2025: 4.0 percent

### Inflation and prices
- CPI / GDP deflator summaries (selected):
  - Advanced economies CPI: 2023: 4.6 percent; 2024: 2.6 percent; 2025: 2.0 percent
  - Emerging market and developing economies CPI: 2023: 8.3 percent; 2024: 6.2 percent; 2025: 4.2 percent
- Commodity and trade price assumptions:
  - Average Brent/WTI/Urals oil price path used in assumptions:
    - 2024: $73.68 per barrel
    - 2025: $78.61 per barrel
  - Example manufactured price change:
    - global manufactured price change (value unit of manufactured exports) 2023: 1.6 percent
- Trade price annual % change examples:
  - Oil price (annual % change): 2023: 16.4 percent; 2024: –5.2 percent; 2025: –3.6 percent
  - Nonfuel commodity prices (annual % change): 2023: 4.1 percent; 2024: 3.3 percent; 2025: 2.6 percent

### External sector and trade
- World trade volumes (goods and services):
  - Global trade volume change: 2023: 0.3 percent; 2024: 3.0 percent; 2025: 3.3 percent
- Current account (selected levels and ratios):
  - World current account (USD, selected year): 2023: $403.6 billion
  - Advanced economies current account: 2024: 0.7 percent of GDP
  - Emerging market and developing economies current account: 2024: 0.3 percent of GDP
- External debt indicators (EMDEs examples from tables):
  - External debt totals (index / ratio series examples): 27.3, 30.1, 29.0, 29.8, 28.6 (reported across projection years)
  - Debt service indicator example series: 9.7, 10.3, 10.5, 10.4, 9.7, 5.9, 10.0, 9.4 (table entries across years)

### Financial flows, balances, and external financing
- Financial account summary (flows, USD billions):
  - World financial account net: 2023: positive net financing in several aggregates (detailed consolidated balances presented by region and instrument in tables)
- External debt and debt service (selected):
  - Emerging market and developing economies: debt service level examples include series with values such as 9.7 (see table series)

### Policy assumptions embedded in the projections
- Exchange rates and commodity price assumptions:
  - USD exchange rate averages and country currency series cited in the assumptions tables (example Arabic notation preserved for some series)
  - Oil price path as above: 2024: $73.68 per barrel; 2025: $78.61 per barrel
- Interest rate assumptions:
  - Short‑term policy rate and government bond yields assumed to move consistent with central bank communications and converge toward neutral over the projection horizon in advanced economies
  - Example central tendency assumptions (selected):
    - 3‑month Treasury yields in the United States: 2024: 4.0 percent; 2025: 3.5 percent (assumptions text preserves wording: "3 أشهر السندات الحكومية ذات أجل ... في ٢٠٢٤ ... %4 و ٢٠٢5 ... %3.5")
    - Ten‑year government bond yields examples: United States 2024: 3.7 percent; 2025: 5.2 percent
- Fiscal policy assumptions:
  - Projections assume announced/credible fiscal plans are implemented; where not available, staff assumptions apply to be broadly consistent with announced medium‑term frameworks
  - For many advanced economies, fiscal paths reflect recently announced budgets and medium‑term plans (country notes list sample treated budgets)

### Key risks and scenario framing
- Overall framing:
  - Risks described as more balanced overall but material downside risks remain
- Upside risk:
  - Faster productivity gains and stronger‑than‑expected recovery in some economies
- Downside risks emphasized:
  - Renewed commodity price shocks and geopolitical disruptions that could raise inflationary pressures and push up global interest rates
  - Financial stress from higher borrowing costs and vulnerabilities in commercial real estate and housing markets in some countries
  - Disruptions to capital flows and exchange rate volatility
- Scenario analysis:
  - BASELINE MEDIUM‑TERM SCENARIO: "Summary of the medium‑term global baseline" (table A‑15) — projects modest global growth and gradual convergence of inflation toward targets in advanced economies
  - Alternative scenarios and historical scenario boxes referenced across the appendix (examples include scenarios on trade restrictions, tariff shocks, commodity market fragmentation)

### Policy recommendations and priorities (as presented)
- Monetary policy:
  - Central banks should ensure inflation returns to target and should avoid premature easing; pace of policy normalization should be data‑dependent and country‑specific
  - Communication clarity is important; gradual transition to more neutral policy settings once inflation is near target
- Fiscal policy:
  - Gradual medium‑term fiscal consolidation recommended to restore debt sustainability and rebuild fiscal buffers, while preserving priority public investment and social protection
  - Fiscal adjustment should be embedded in credible medium‑term frameworks and timed to country circumstances
- Financial regulation and supervision:
  - Authorities should use macroprudential tools, stress testing, and enhanced reporting to bolster resilience—especially regarding commercial real estate and housing sector vulnerabilities
  - Implement Basel III reforms fully and strengthen cybersecurity governance in financial institutions
- Structural policies:
  - Implement reforms to raise potential growth: improve allocation of capital and labor, increase female labor force participation, strengthen governance, reduce regulatory burdens, and facilitate AI adoption where productive
  - Support green transition with well‑designed policies that manage transition costs and energy security risks

### Selected exact numeric highlights (from statistical tables and assumptions)
- Global real GDP growth: 2024: 3.2 percent; 2025: 3.2 percent
- Advanced economies growth: 2024: 1.8 percent; 2025: 1.9 percent
- EMDEs growth: 2024: 4.3 percent; 2025: 4.2 percent
- Global CPI (advanced economies): 2023: 4.6 percent; 2024: 2.6 percent; 2025: 2.0 percent
- Global CPI (EMDEs): 2023: 8.3 percent; 2024: 6.2 percent; 2025: 4.2 percent
- Oil price assumptions (USD per barrel): 2024: $73.68; 2025: $78.61
- Example policy yield assumptions referenced in country assumptions: 3‑month government bonds in the United States 2024: %4; 2025: %3.5
- World trade volume: 2024: 3.0 percent; 2025: 3.3 percent
- EMDEs external debt ratio examples (table summary): 27.3; 30.1

*Excerpted numerical projections, assumptions, risks, and policy guidance from the World Economic Outlook — April 2024 (Statistical Appendix excerpts).*

### 102219.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .jimonfin .2020 .102219.

### text - 102219.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .jimonfin .2020 .102219.

### Referenced works (selected from the excerpt)
- Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review 103  (6(:  2121–68.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .1257/ aer .103 .6 .2121.
- Bachmann, Rudiger, David Baqaee, Christian Bayer, Moritz Kuhn, Andreas Löschel, Benjamin Moll, Andreas Peichl, Karen Pittel, and Moritz Schularick. 2022. “What If? The Economic Effects for Germany of a Stop of Energy Imports from Russia.” ECONtribute Policy Brief 28, ECONtribute: Markets & Public Policy, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany, and University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany. https:// www .econtribute .de/ RePEc/ ajk/ ajkpbs/ ECONtribute _PB _028 _2022 .pdf.
- Baffes, John, Alain Kabundi, Peter Nagle, and Franziska Ohnsorge. 2018. “The Role of Major Emerging Markets in Global Commodity Demand.” Policy Research Working Paper 8495, World Bank, Washington DC. http:// hdl .handle .net/ 10986/ 29948.
- Bahar, Dany, Prithwiraj Choudhury, and Hillel Rapoport. 2020. “Migrant Inventors and the Technological Advantage of Nations.” Research Policy 49 (9(: 103947. https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .respol .2020 .103947.
- Baldwin, Richard. 2013. “Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They Are Going.” In Global Value Chains in a Changing World, edited by Deborah K. Elms and Patrick Low, 13–59. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Baldwin, Richard. 2024. “China Is the World’s Sole Manufacturing Superpower: A Line Sketch of the Rise.” VoxEU, January 24. https:// cepr .org/ voxeu/ columns/ china -worlds -sole -manufacturing -superpower -line -sketch -rise.
- Baldwin, Richard, Rebecca Freeman, and Angelos Theodorakopoulos. 2023. “Hidden Exposure: Measuring US Supply Chain Reliance.” NBER Working Paper 31820, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. https:// doi .org/ 10    .3386/ w31820.
- Baniya, Suprabha, Nadia Rocha, and Michele Ruta. 2020. “Trade Effects of the New Silk Road: A Gravity Analysis.” Journal of Development Economics 143: 102467. https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .jdeveco .2020 .102467.
- Bastos, Paulo. 2020. “Exposure of Belt and Road Economies to China Trade Shocks.” Journal of Development Economics 143: 102474.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .jdeveco .2020 .102474.
- Beirne, John, Nuobu Renzhi, and Ulrich Volz. 2023. “When the United States and the People’s Republic of China Sneeze: Monetary Policy Spillovers to Asian Economies.” Open Economies Review  34:  519–40.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .1007/ s11079 -022 -09695 -1.
- Bergant, Katharina, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, and Martin Schmitz. 2023. “Cross-Border Investment in Emerging Market Bonds: Stylized Facts and Security-Level Evidence from Europe.” Hutchins Center Working Paper 84, Brookings Institution, Washington DC. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/WP84-Bergant-et-al_2.21.pdf.
- Bernard, Andrew, Bradford Jensen, and Peter Schott. 2006. “Survival of the Best Fit: Exposure to Low-Wage Countries and the (Uneven( Growth of U.S. Manufacturing Plants.” Journal of International Economics 68 (1(: 219–37. https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .jinteco .2005 .06 .002.
- Bertaut, Carol, Beau Bressler, and Stephanie Curcuru. 2019. “Globalization and the Geography of Capital Flows.” FEDS Notes,  September  6.  https:// www .federalreserve .gov/ econres/ notes/ feds -notes/ globalization -and -the -geography -of -capital -flows -20190906 .html.
- Boeckelmann, Lukas, Jean Imbs, and Laurent Pauwels. 2024. “(Most( Global and Country Shocks Are in Fact Sector Shocks.” Unpublished, New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
- Bonadio, Barthélémy, Zhen Huo, Andrei A. Levchenko, and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar. 2021. “Global Supply Chains in the Pandemic.” Journal of International Economics 133: 103534. https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .jinteco .2021 .103534.
- Bonadio, Barthélémy, Zhen Huo, Andrei A. Levchenko, and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar. 2023. “Globalization, Structural Change and International Comovement.” NBER Working Paper 31358, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,  MA.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .3386/ w31358.
- Bosetti, Valentina, Cristina Cattaneo, and Elena Verdolini. 2015. “Migration of Skilled Workers and Innovation: A European Perspective.” Journal of International Economics 96 (2(: 311–22.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .jinteco .2015 .04 .002.
- Broner, Fernando, Tatiana Didier, Sergio Schmukler, and Goetz von Peter. 2023. “Bilateral International Investments: The Big Sur?” Journal of International Economics 145: 103795. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103795.
- Caselli, Francesco, Miklos Koren, Milan Lisicky, and Silvana Tenreyro. 2020. “Diversification through Trade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 135 (1(: 449–502. https:// doi .org/ 10 .1093/ qje/ qjz028.
- Cashin, Paul, Kamiar Mohaddes, and Mehdi Raissi. 2017. “China’s Slowdown and Global Financial Market Volatility: Is World Growth Losing Out?” Emerging Markets Review  31:  164–75.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .ememar .2017 .05 .001.
- Cerutti, Eugenio, Catherine Casanova, and Swapan-Kumar Pradhan. 2023. “Banking across Borders: Are Chinese Banks Different?” Journal of Banking & Finance 154: 106920. https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .jbankfin .2023 .106920.
- Cesa-Bianchi, Ambrogio, Hashem Pesaran, Alessandro Rebucci, and Tengteng Xu. 2012. “China’s Emergence in the World Economy and Business Cycles in Latin America.” Economia 12  (2(:  1–75.  https:// www .jstor .org/ stable/ 41575894.
- Chen, Wenjie, Michele Fornino, and Henry Rawlings. 2024. “Navigating the Evolving Landscape between China and Africa’s Economic Engagements.” IMF Working Paper 24/37, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. https:// www .imf .org/ en/ Publications/ WP/ Issues/ 2024/ 02/ 23/ Navigating -the -Evolving -Landscape -between -China -and -Africas -Economic -Engagements -545104.
- Copestake, Alexander, Melih Firat, Davide Furceri, and Chris Redl. 2023. “China Spillovers: Aggregate and Firm-Level Evidence.” IMF Working Paper 23/206, International Monetary  Fund,  Washington,  DC.  https:// www .imf .org/ en/ Publications/ WP/ Issues/ 2023/ 09/ 28/ China -Spillovers -Aggregate -and -Firm -Level -Evidence -539668.
- Coppola, Antonio, Matteo Maggiori, Brent Neiman, and Jesse Schreger. 2021. “Redrawing the Map of Global Capital Flows: The Role of Cross-Border Financing and Tax Havens.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 136 (3(: 1499–556. https:// doi .org/ 10 .1093/ qje/ qjab014.
- Corneli, Flavia, Fabrizio Ferriani, and Andrea Gazzani. 2023. “Macroeconomic News, the Financial Cycle and the Commodity Cycle: The Chinese Footprint.” Economics Letters 231:

### Other excerpted element
- مطرد  لكنه  بطيء:  القدرة  على  الصمود  في  ظل  التباعد
ٍ
  تعافآفاق الاقتصاد العالمي  -
108
2024إبريل 
 | صندوق النقد الدولي

*Excerpted bibliography and page content from the provided PDF content unit.*

### 111269.  https:// doi .org/ 10 .1016/ j .econlet .2023 .111269.

### World Economic Outlook — April 2024 (Statistical Appendix excerpts)

### Global growth and near-term projections
- Global real GDP growth:
  - 2023: 3.2 percent
  - 2024: 3.2 percent
  - 2025: 3.2 percent
  - Medium‑term (2029): 3.1 percent
- Growth by group:
  - Advanced economies: 2023: 1.7 percent; 2024: 1.8 percent; 2025: 1.9 percent
  - Emerging market and developing economies: 2023: 4.2 percent; 2024: 4.3 percent; 2025: 4.2 percent
- Regional highlights (real GDP growth, selected):
  - Asia emerging and developing: 2023: 4.4 percent; 2024: 5.6 percent; 2025: 2.5 percent (table displays multi‑period numbers across years)
  - Europe emerging and developing: 2023: 1.2 percent; 2024: 3.2 percent; 2025: 3.1 percent
  - Sub‑Saharan Africa: 2023: 4.0 percent; 2024: 3.8 percent; 2025: 4.0 percent

### Inflation and prices
- Global CPI / GDP deflator summaries:
  - Advanced economies: CPI (2023): 4.6 percent; (2024): 2.6 percent; (2025): 2.0 percent
  - Emerging market and developing economies: CPI (2023): 8.3 percent; (2024): 6.2 percent; (2025): 4.2 percent
- Commodity and trade price assumptions:
  - Average Brent/WTI/Urals oil price path used in assumptions (selected): 2024: $73.68 per barrel; 2025: $78.61 per barrel (explicitly noted in assumptions section)
  - Unit value of manufactured exports (advanced economies): various series; global manufactured price change example: 2023: 1.6 percent (table: "value unit of manufactured exports" series)

### External sector and trade
- World trade (volumes, goods and services):
  - Global trade volume change: 2023: 0.3 percent; 2024: 3.0 percent; 2025: 3.3 percent (from "trade summary")
- Current account (levels and ratios):
  - World current account (USD, selected years): 2023: $403.6 billion (table: "summary current account balances")
  - Advanced economies: current account roughly 0.7 percent of GDP in 2024 (table shows 0.7)
  - Emerging markets and developing economies: current account ~0.3 percent of GDP in 2024 (table shows 0.3)
- Trade price developments (selected series):
  - Oil price (annual % change): 2023: 16.4 percent; 2024: –5.2 percent; 2025: –3.6 percent (annual % change series in trade price tables)
  - Nonfuel commodity prices (annual % change): 2023: 4.1 percent; 2024: 3.3 percent; 2025: 2.6 percent

### Financial flows, balances, and external financing
- Financial account summary (flows, USD billions):
  - World financial account net (selected totals): 2023: positive net financing in several aggregates; detailed table shows consolidated financial account balances by region and instrument
- External debt and debt service (selected):
  - Emerging market and developing economies: total external debt (level index in table A‑15 type summary): example ratio series reported around late 20s to 30s percent of GDP across projections (table: "external debt total — EMDEs": 27.3, 30.1, 29.0, 29.8, 28.6)
  - Debt service indicators: EMDEs debt service ~9.7 percent (table shows "service of debt" series: 9.7, 10.3, 10.5, 10.4, 9.7, 5.9, 10.0, 9.4 depending on year)

### Policy assumptions embedded in the projections
- Exchange rates and commodity price assumptions:
  - USD exchange rate averages cited: e.g., 2024–2025 averages embedded for yen and euro (explicit values in assumptions: dollar versus yen and euro series given as example values such as "1,331" and "1,329" for unspecified units in the Arabic assumptions text; oil price path as above).
- Interest rate assumptions:
  - Short‑term policy rate and government bond yields assumed to move consistent with central bank communications and convergence toward neutral over the projection horizon in advanced economies.
  - Example central tendency assumptions (selected): 3‑month Treasury yields in the United States: 2024: 4.0 percent; 2025: 3.5 percent (assumptions text: "3 أشهر السندات الحكومية ذات أجل ... في ٢٠٢٤ ... %4 و ٢٠٢5 ... %3.5" — preserved wording).
  - Ten‑year government bond yields examples: United States 2024: 3.7 percent; 2025: 5.2 percent (tables list country yield series across years).
- Fiscal policy assumptions:
  - Public finances projections assume announced/credible fiscal plans are implemented; where not available, fiscal balances follow staff assumptions to be broadly consistent with announced medium‑term frameworks.
  - For many advanced economies, fiscal paths reflect recently announced budgets and medium‑term plans (country notes list sample treated budgets: Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, etc.).
  - Structural balance definitions and computation: structural balance equals cyclically adjusted net lending/borrowing as percent of potential GDP (text defines gap measure and structural balance calculations).

### Key risks and scenario framing
- Risks are described as more balanced overall but material downside risks remain:
  - Upside risk: faster productivity gains and stronger‑than‑expected recovery in some economies.
  - Downside risks emphasized:
    - Renewed commodity price shocks and geopolitical disruptions that could raise inflationary pressures and push up global interest rates.
    - Financial stress from higher borrowing costs and vulnerabilities in commercial real estate and housing markets in some countries.
    - Disruptions to capital flows and exchange rate volatility.
- Scenario analysis:
  - Baseline MEDIUM‑TERM SCENARIO: summarized in "Summary of the medium‑term global baseline" (table A‑15) — projects modest global growth and gradual convergence of inflation toward targets in advanced economies.
  - Alternative scenarios and historical scenario boxes are referenced across the appendix (e.g., scenarios on trade restrictions, tariff shocks, commodity market fragmentation), and the statistical annex provides the data basis for scenario quantification.

### Policy recommendations and priorities (as presented)
- Monetary policy:
  - Central banks should ensure inflation returns to target and should avoid premature easing; pace of policy normalization should be data‑dependent and country‑specific.
  - Communication clarity is important; gradual transition to more neutral policy settings once inflation is near target.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Gradual medium‑term fiscal consolidation recommended to restore debt sustainability and rebuild fiscal buffers, while preserving priority public investment and social protection.
  - Fiscal adjustment should be embedded in credible medium‑term frameworks and timed to country circumstances.
- Financial regulation and supervision:
  - Authorities should use macroprudential tools, stress testing, and enhanced reporting to bolster resilience—especially regarding commercial real estate and housing sector vulnerabilities.
  - Implement Basel III reforms fully and strengthen cybersecurity governance in financial institutions.
- Structural policies:
  - Implement reforms to raise potential growth: improve allocation of capital and labor, increase female labor force participation, strengthen governance, reduce regulatory burdens, and facilitate AI adoption where productive.
  - Support green transition with well‑designed policies that manage transition costs and energy security risks.

### Selected exact numeric highlights (from statistical tables and assumptions)
- Global real GDP growth: 2024: 3.2 percent; 2025: 3.2 percent.
- Advanced economies growth: 2024: 1.8 percent; 2025: 1.9 percent.
- EMDEs growth: 2024: 4.3 percent; 2025: 4.2 percent.
- Global CPI (advanced economies): 2023: 4.6 percent; 2024: 2.6 percent; 2025: 2.0 percent.
- Global CPI (EMDEs): 2023: 8.3 percent; 2024: 6.2 percent; 2025: 4.2 percent.
- Oil price assumptions (USD per barrel): 2024: $73.68; 2025: $78.61.
- Example policy yield assumptions referenced in country assumptions: 3‑month government bonds in the United States 2024: %4; 2025: %3.5 (preserved hedged/formulaic wording as in source).
- World trade volume: 2024: 3.0 percent; 2025: 3.3 percent (goods and services).
- EMDEs external debt ratio examples (table summary): levels shown around "27.3" and "30.1" (exact entries retained in tables).

*This overlay summarizes numerical projections, key assumptions, risks, and policy guidance as presented in the World Economic Outlook — April 2024 (Statistical Appendix excerpts).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2024/april/arabic/text.pdf_