## wp17101

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---

### Overview and purpose and database coverage
- The IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD) is described as "the most comprehensive central bank law database in the world."
- Main goals:
  - Enhance technical cooperation and knowledge sharing between the IMF and member country central banks.
  - Provide a law library with the full text of most central bank laws and references to relevant IMF Working Papers (on transparency, financial provisions, governance and organization).
- Management and update:
  - The database was managed by the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department and was updated in 2016.
  - The 2016 update builds on data collected from central banks and monetary unions in the period 2014/2015 and reflects "almost a year’s work" by an IMF team formatting and coding legal texts according to CBLD categories and running tests to filter out errors.
- Coverage and accessibility:
  - The CBLD holds central bank laws and excerpts from constitutions of 142 IMF member countries and monetary unions, grouped in more than 100 categories.
  - Historic laws from the previous update are included for 132 countries and monetary unions.
  - All legal texts are collected in English; if an English version is not available, translated versions are included as received from the authorities, or provided unofficially by the IMF.
  - Of the IMF member countries:
    - 116 submitted updated legislation for the 2016 update.
    - 28 reported no changes compared to the 2012 update.
  - Accessibility: users so far have been internal to the IMF and the World Bank Group, as well as central banks and the authorities of monetary unions. At this point in time, the CBLD is only accessible for staff of central banks, monetary unions, and international financial institutions.

### Structure, classification, and query features
- Historic development (Table 1 timeline highlights):
  - 1997 / n/a / n/a / First CBLD set up in limited form, for internal use
  - 2004 / n/a / n/a / CBLD launched IMF-wide
  - 2006 / n/a / 2008 / Full overhaul (update of coding/creation of categories)
  - 2008 / December 2008 / 2010 / Update
  - 2010 / December 2010 / 2012 / Update
  - 2014 / December 2014 / 2016 / Update
- Classification and tagging:
  - There are 12 main categories, each further divided into subcategories.
  - Tagging process: every single article/section of a law is assigned at least one CBLD subcategory so users can find all relevant articles relating to a particular topic regardless of location in the law.
  - The 12 main categories are:
    1. background information (e.g., foreword and definitions)
    2. establishment, objectives, functions, and powers (e.g., list of objectives, autonomy/independence issues, prohibited activities for the central bank)
    3. organization and administration (e.g., governor, governing bodies, other officers, staff, structure)
    4. financial provisions (e.g., capital, budget, and profit allocation)
    5. monetary unit, banknotes, and coins (e.g., definition of the legal tender, name of the currency)
    6. monetary policy and operations (e.g., how monetary policy is determined, open market operations, reserve requirements)
    7. foreign exchange policy and operations and international reserves
    8. relations between the central bank and the state (e.g., (quasi) fiscal activities)
    9. relations between the central bank and financial institutions (e.g., micro and macro prudential supervision, lender of last resort arrangements, resolution arrangements, AMLCFT arrangements)
    10. payment systems and security settlement systems
    11. accounts, financial statements, audit, and their publication
    12. miscellaneous (e.g., collection of statistics, immunity from taxation)
  - Annex II presents the full list of CBLD (sub)categories.
- Querying and group filters:
  - The CBLD allows queries focused on specific groups of countries, including pre-selected monetary unions, geographical regions, exchange rate arrangement groups, and income-level groups.
  - Listed exchange rate arrangements include: conventional peg; crawling peg; currency board arrangement; exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender; free floating; floating; pegged exchange rate with horizontal bands; crawl-like arrangement; stabilized arrangement; other.
  - Income-level groups: low; lower middle; upper middle; high-income; unclassified.

### Principal areas of legal change (general findings)
- Four principal areas of legal change identified across jurisdictions:
  1. Objectives:
     - Central bank objectives increasingly include financial stability and financial supervision.
     - Financial supervision is sometimes merged into the central bank, sometimes remains with stand-alone agencies.
     - Examples: Russia, Mexico, Georgia, Singapore, and Israel have included or strengthened supervisory functions within the central bank.
     - Laws increasingly introduce links to financial stability and strengthen inter-institutional arrangements (e.g., Financial Stability Commission/Committee in Mauritius and Chile; enhanced powers in Malaysia).
  2. Decision-making:
     - Reforms focus on board member selection criteria, appointment procedures, and Board size.
     - France, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, and Liberia increased Board size between 10-50 percent.
     - Fit-and-proper criteria were made more granular (Macedonia, Pakistan, Turkey); Macedonia includes detailed English proficiency requirements.
     - Specific requirements for the Chairman and measures to prevent conflicts of interest introduced (Russia; extended to board/staff in Georgia, Mauritius).
     - Israel overhauled its top structure, strengthening autonomy and introducing internal oversight.
  3. Accountability:
     - Accountability mechanisms strengthened via expanded Board membership (including employee representatives as in France), stronger accounting rules (Russia, Mauritius), and increased disclosures (Canada, Mexico, Pakistan, Israel, Mauritius).
     - Mauritius introduced a complaint mechanism for commercial banks vis-à-vis the central bank.
     - Malaysia explicitly allows the Secretary General of the Treasury to participate in financial stability meetings relating to individual institutions.
  4. Data collection:
     - Central banks mandated to collect more and more specific data, often linked to expanded objectives/functions.
     - Examples include direct investment data (Russia), and financial stability/financial supervision data and inter-agency cooperation (France, Georgia, Mexico, Singapore, Mauritius).

### Selected country highlights (material and noteworthy changes)
- Sample of substantive legal changes across 15 examined countries (Canada, Chile, France, Georgia, Israel, Korea, Liberia, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, and Turkey):
  - Canada:
    - Article XV (Returns) allows more flexibility for disclosing weekly financial information: from weekly to “as soon as practicable after the last business day of the week.”
    - Article XV (sub 2) amended to post the monthly balance sheet on the Bank’s website rather than transmitting it to the Minister.
  - Chile:
    - Law Number 20.789 of 2014 introduces a Council on Financial Stability (CFS) as “a consultative body reporting to the Ministry of Finance.”
    - CFS purpose: “to facilitate technical coordination and exchange of information… in order to preserve the integrity and financial stability of the economy” (Article 1).
    - Article 11 amends Article 66 to allow a legal exception to central bank secrecy when the CFS needs information “deemed necessary for the performance of its legal duties, for the sole purpose of preventing situations that may imply systemic risk to the stability of the financial system.”
  - France:
    - New Articles L 141-5-1, L 141-6, and L 141-6-1 introduce the Banque de France’s role in financial stability; the 2004 law did not assign this function.
    - General Council expanded from 7 to 11 members (Article L 142-3).
    - Monetary Policy Council (MPC) dissolved; Article L142-2 clarifies the General Council is responsible for issues not within ESCB remit.
  - Georgia:
    - Board size increased from five to seven members; two Vice-Presidents are now Board members (Article 7).
    - National Bank assumes lead role on financial supervision: Article 16 introduces a Financial Sector Supervision Committee; the Bank assumes supervisory functions of the former Financial Supervision Agency (Article 70—Transitional Provisions).
    - Profit distribution rules adjusted; Board may use remaining net profits to fill the general reserve fund until its volume is less than 15 percent of the amount of the base money at the end of the financial year.
  - Israel:
    - Objectives reorganized: main objective changed from currency stabilization to price stability, with secondary objectives on financial stability and supporting other Government economic policy objectives (Article 3, sub a).
    - Establishment of the Bank’s autonomy added (Article 5); Governor’s personal autonomy strengthened (Article 13 regarding reasons for termination).
    - Monetary Committee (Article 15) to determine monetary policy; Administrative Council to supervise management.
    - Government lending cap changed to an absolute cap of NIS 10 billion and not for more than 150 days per year.
  - Korea:
    - Minor changes; Article 32 changes titles of executives/senior staff (Deputy Governor and Assistant Governors replaced by Senior Deputy Governor and Deputy Governors).
  - Liberia:
    - Expanded executive management: Article 10 amended to introduce a second Deputy Governor; provision for a third Deputy Governor by Presidential appointment under conditions.
  - Macedonia:
    - Additional fit-and-proper selection criteria and public notice requirements; English language proficiency minimum scores specified.
  - Malaysia:
    - Scope of financial stability measures broadened: amended Article 31 adds powers to specify measures to “contribute to the resilience of the financial system or limit the accumulation of any risk to financial stability.”
    - Secretary General to the Treasury to be informed of and invited to all Financial Stability Executive Committee meetings, including those relating to individual institutions (amended Article 37 sub 4).
  - Mauritius:
    - Functions expanded to include promotion of public understanding of the financial system and suppression of improper practices (Article 6 sub e and f).
    - Conflict of interest prevention strengthened: Article 15 (sub 4) requires declaration of assets by Governor and Deputy Governors covering spouse, children, and grandchildren to the Minister.
    - New Banking Services Review Panel introduced (Part VIIIA).
  - Mexico:
    - Banco de Mexico Law amendments (2014) strengthen compliance and expand enforcement tools; new supervisory powers introduced (Article 35 bis).
    - Governor appointment changed: Governor is now appointed by the Federal Executive (the Mexican Cabinet) instead of the President.
    - Article 41 requires a report every trimester to the Mexican Congress on inflation, economic evolution, economic indicators, and execution of monetary policy.
  - Pakistan:
    - Bank autonomy strengthened: Article 46 B (sub 2): “[t]he autonomy of the Bank shall be respected at all times.” Old Article 52 repealed.
    - Board composition: Article 9 (sub 2) specifies the Board consists of the Governor, the Finance Secretary, and eight other Board members (seven under the previous version).
    - New Article 9 C requires limitations on federal government borrowing, which “at the end of each quarter... shall be brought to zero.”
    - Open market operations explicitly specified (Article 18).
  - Russia:
    - 2014 law expands Bank of Russia’s objective to include supervising and regulating financial markets; Chapter X introduces regulation, control and supervision over non-credit financial institutions (Article 762; Article 761 defines purpose).
    - Board size expanded from 13 to 15 members, including the Chairman.
    - Direct investment data responsibilities added: Article 3 subsections include compilation of statistical data on direct investment (sub 162) and development of methodology (sub 163).
    - New Article IV1 requires a policy for preventing, detecting and managing conflicts of interests.
  - Singapore:
    - Objectives revised: “Monetary stability” changed to “price stability”; financial stability added as a second listed objective.
    - Functions added: “integrated supervision of the financial services sector”, “financial stability surveillance”, and management of “the official foreign reserves of Singapore.”
    - Board size expanded: Article 7 sub 3 b allows between “not less than four, and not more than 13 Directors” (previously maximum nine).
  - Turkey:
    - Article 22 (sub o) specifies the Central Bank of Turkey’s Board “may delegate part of its powers to other organs.”
    - Audit Committee members to be elected by the General Assembly rather than selected by shareholder groups.
    - Monetary Policy Committee meeting frequency increased: Article 22/A sub 4 specifies meetings “shall be held at least eight times a year upon the call of the Governor.”

### Cross-country comparisons and thematic findings
- Independence versus autonomy (legal terminology)
  - The CBLD examines usage of “independence” (including “independent,” “independently”) and “autonomy” (including “autonomous,” “autonomously”) across central bank laws and constitutions.
  - Observations:
    - “Independence” is the legal term used in the majority of central bank legal frameworks.
    - Some countries use “independence” in constitutions but “autonomy” in central bank law (examples: Dominican Republic, Iraq, Slovenia); Macedonia uses the reverse.
    - Some laws combine both terms in the same sentence (example: Liberia — “independent central bank with autonomous regulatory powers”).
    - Adjective forms may refer to narrower contexts; some laws refer to “financial autonomy” only.
- Defining financial stability (terminology and legal ambiguity)
  - No single precise standard definition of financial stability or the macro-prudential function exists in legislation; terminology varies across central bank laws.
  - Examples of terminology recorded:
    - "Stability of the financial system" — Bahamas, Botswana, Chile, EMU (and member states), Ireland, Kosovo, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro (CB Law), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, San Marino, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga (Constitution), Tunisia, United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Namibia, Seychelles, Uruguay, Gambia, Georgia, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, and New Zealand.
    - "Financial stability" — Argentina, EMU (and member states), Iceland, Korea, Malaysia, Montenegro (Constitution), Oman, Singapore, and Tonga (CB Law).
    - "Stability of the banking system" — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan.
    - Other variants include references to "stable and/or competitive market-based financial system," "financial sector confidence," "liquidity and solvency of financial institutions," and “sound financial structure.”
  - Implications:
    - Diversity of formulations indicates variation in how central bank laws frame financial-stability-related objectives and mandates across jurisdictions.
    - Legal ambiguity offers flexibility but can also create uncertainty about responsibilities and remit.
- Price stability as a central bank objective (CBLD 2016 Update findings)
  - Dataset scope and measurement:
    - Of the 154 countries of the 2016 CBLD update, 127 countries have a reference to price stability in their objectives.
  - Prevalence and combinations:
    - "Somewhat more than half (now 57 percent) of central banks have objectives (see figure 6) that include price stability."
    - "Of those, 53 percent have price stability combined with subsidiary macro objectives."
  - Changes since prior update:
    - Of the countries included in the previous (2012) update, only three countries changed their objectives in price-stability-related aspects:
      - Czech Republic and Singapore now included price stability together with other macro objectives (they had only "price stability" in the previous version of the law).
      - Georgia’s law now explicitly refers to price stability, whereas the previous version did not.
- Locus of monetary policy determination (CBLD findings)
  - Primary decision fora:
    - Monetary policy is most commonly determined by either the Board or a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) separate from the Board.
    - Typical MPC composition includes executive management (Governor/President, often Deputy/Vice-Governors), relevant internal managers, and sometimes external experts and/or government representatives.
  - Alternative arrangements and examples:
    - Determination by the Governor: Argentina, Hungary, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and Vietnam specify the Governor’s responsibility.
    - Law assigns determination to the central bank without specifying internal decision forum or person: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cambodia, ECCU, Fiji, Jordan, Malawi, Mexico, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Zambia.
    - Determination assigned to the government: Ecuador.

### Institutional governance, accountability, and safeguards
- Accountability and disclosure examples:
  - Mauritius: MPC Code of Conduct requires annual reporting to the Board on compliance.
  - Mexico: Article 41 requires trimester reporting to Congress on inflation, economic evolution, economic indicators, and execution of monetary policy.
  - Singapore: Board must provide information to the Minister “in respect of the duties and functions of the Authority.”
- Conflict-of-interest and fit-and-proper safeguards:
  - Pakistan: fit and proper criteria introduced for Board members; prohibition of “conflict of interest with the business of the Bank.”
  - Russia: explicit policy requirement for preventing, detecting and managing conflicts of interests; Chairman dismissal grounds expanded to include failures related to conflict-of-interest measures.
- Expanded supervisory and financial-stability mandates:
  - Several jurisdictions explicitly expanded central bank roles in financial stability, supervision, and resolution (Russia, Mexico, Singapore, Mauritius).
  - Institutional mechanisms include statutory creation of Financial Stability Committees, expanded supervisory powers (supervise financial intermediaries, inspections), and powers to approve dispute resolution schemes.

### Conclusion and uses of the CBLD
- The CBLD is a key resource covering most IMF member countries and facilitates research on central bank legal frameworks.
- From a sample of 15 countries and legislative changes since the previous CBLD update, prominent areas of change include:
  - (1) Objectives;
  - (2) Decision-making;
  - (3) Accountability; and
  - (4) Data collection.
- Many legislative changes occurred after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) events of 2008 and may have had large operational and policy effects on central banks.
- The CBLD enables cross-country perspectives on issues confronting central banking: the definition of financial stability, treatment of independence and autonomy, identification of price stability as an objective, and institutional modalities of monetary policy determination.

*Source: wp17101 - IMF Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD) excerpts and analysis.*

### References .............................................................................................................

### References

### Overview and Purpose
- The IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD) is described as "the most comprehensive central bank law database in the world."
- Main goals:
  - Enhance technical cooperation and knowledge sharing between the IMF and member country central banks.
  - Provide a law library with the full text of most central bank laws and references to relevant IMF Working Papers (on transparency, financial provisions, governance and organization).
- The database was managed by the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department and was updated in 2016.

### Coverage and Data Updates
- The CBLD holds central bank laws and excerpts from constitutions of 142 IMF member countries and monetary unions, grouped in more than 100 categories.
- Historic laws from the previous update are included for 132 countries and monetary unions.
- All legal texts are collected in English. If an English version is not available, translated versions are included as received from the authorities, or provided unofficially by the IMF.
- Of the IMF member countries:
  - 116 submitted updated legislation for the 2016 update.
  - 28 reported no changes compared to the 2012 update.
- The 2016 update builds on data collected from central banks and monetary unions in the period 2014/2015 and reflects "almost a year’s work" by an IMF team formatting and coding legal texts according to CBLD categories and running tests to filter out errors.
- Accessibility:
  - Users so far have been internal to the IMF and the World Bank Group, as well as central banks and the authorities of monetary unions.
  - At this point in time, the CBLD is only accessible for staff of central banks, monetary unions, and international financial institutions.

### Historic Development (Table 1: International Monetary Fund’s Central Bank Legislation Database)
- Year of Data Collection / Cut-off Date for Data Submission / Identifying year of update / Comments:
  - 1997 / n/a / n/a / First CBLD set up in limited form, for internal use
  - 2004 / n/a / n/a / CBLD launched IMF-wide
  - 2006 / n/a / 2008 / Full overhaul (update of coding/creation of categories)
  - 2008 / December 2008 / 2010 / Update
  - 2010 / December 2010 / 2012 / Update
  - 2014 / December 2014 / 2016 / Update

### Classification Categories and Tagging
- The CBLD’s classification categories allow tailored search queries; there are 12 main categories, each further divided into subcategories.
- Tagging approach:
  - In the "tagging" process of each central bank law (and excerpt of constitution) contribution, every single article/section of the law is assigned at least one CBLD subcategory.
  - Benefit: users do not need to read through entire laws to find relevant elements; all relevant articles in the law relating to a particular topic (e.g., capital) are highlighted regardless of location in the law.
- The 12 main categories are:
  1. background information (e.g., foreword and definitions)
  2. establishment, objectives, functions, and powers (e.g., list of objectives, autonomy/independence issues, prohibited activities for the central bank)
  3. organization and administration (e.g., governor, governing bodies, other officers, staff, structure)
  4. financial provisions (e.g., capital, budget, and profit allocation)
  5. monetary unit, banknotes, and coins (e.g., definition of the legal tender, name of the currency)
  6. monetary policy and operations (e.g., how monetary policy is determined, open market operations, reserve requirements)
  7. foreign exchange policy and operations and international reserves
  8. relations between the central bank and the state (e.g., (quasi) fiscal activities)
  9. relations between the central bank and financial institutions (e.g., micro and macro prudential supervision, lender of last resort arrangements, resolution arrangements, AMLCFT arrangements)
  10. payment systems and security settlement systems
  11. accounts, financial statements, audit, and their publication
  12. miscellaneous (e.g., collection of statistics, immunity from taxation)
- Annex II presents the full list of CBLD (sub)categories.

### Querying and Group Filters
- The CBLD allows queries focused on specific groups of countries, including:
  - Pre-selected groups that are part of an existing monetary union.
  - Groups based on geographical region.
  - Groups based on exchange rate arrangement, with listed arrangements:
    - conventional peg
    - crawling peg
    - currency board arrangement
    - exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender
    - free floating
    - floating
    - pegged exchange rate with horizontal bands
    - crawl-like arrangement
    - stabilized arrangement
    - other
  - Groups based on income level:
    - low
    - lower middle
    - upper middle
    - high-income
    - unclassified

### Structure of the Paper (as provided)
- Section II: describes developments in legal frameworks of a selection of countries.
- Section III: provides cross-country data-examples on topics relevant for multiple countries, in particular:
  - independence versus autonomy;
  - defining financial stability;
  - price stability as a central bank objective;
  - the locus of monetary policy determination within a central bank.
- Listed Tables:
  - Table 1. International Monetary Fund’s Central Bank Legislation Database
  - Table 2. Overview of Legal Terminology Relating to Independence/Autonomy in Central Bank Laws and Constitutions
  - Table 3. Financial Stability Terminology in Central Bank Laws
- Listed Figures:
  - Figure 1. Objectives That Include ‘Price Stability’ (by region) After 2014 Update
  - Figure 2. Objectives that Include ‘Price Stability’ (by region) Before 2014 Update
  - Figure 3. Objectives that Include ‘Price Stability’ (by income level) After 2014 Update
  - Figure 4. Objectives that Include ‘Price Stability’ (by income level) Before 2014 Update
  - Figure 5. ‘Price Stability’ as a Central Bank Objective Before 2014 Update
  - Figure 6. ‘Price Stability’ as a Central Bank Objective After 2014 Update
  - Figure 7. Monetary Policy Determination
- Annexes:
  - Annex I. List of IMF Member Countries and Monetary Unions (not) Included in the CBLD
  - Annex II. Overview of Central Bank Legislation Database (Sub C Categories)

### Glossary (selected acronyms exactly as presented)
- AMLCFT Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism
- CBLD  IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database
- ECB  European Central Bank
- EMU  Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union
- ESCB  European System of Central Banks
- FIU  Financial Intelligence Unit
- FS  Financial Stability
- FSC  Financial Stability Committee
- GFC  Global Financial Crisis
- IMF  International Monetary Fund
- MPC  Monetary Policy Committee
- WB  World Bank

*Source: wp17101 - References (IMF).*

### Section IV provides a brief summary of the paper.

### wp17101 - Section IV provides a brief summary of the paper

### Overview and scope
- The subsections examine legal changes in the frameworks of 15 select countries (Canada, Chile, France, Georgia, Israel, Korea, Liberia, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, and Turkey).
- The selected countries were chosen from those that submitted both the 2012 and 2016 CBLD updates and were selected to represent different regions, country sizes, and monetary unions.
- The paper highlights factual changes to central bank legal frameworks without drawing policy conclusions; it is intended as a starting point for further analyses and research.
- Of the 142 countries and monetary union legal frameworks included in the most recent CBLD update, 114 countries show some form of change; 28 countries show no change to either their central bank law and/or the relevant parts of the national constitution (compared to their submission for the 2012 update).
- The CBLD includes only final, official legislation; some countries may have amendments in process or pending approval that are not reflected. De jure legal changes may differ from de facto practice; such differences are beyond the scope of the CBLD and this paper.

### Four principal areas of legal change (general findings)
- Objectives:
  - Central bank objectives increasingly include financial stability and financial supervision.
  - Financial supervision is sometimes merged into the central bank, sometimes remains with stand-alone agencies.
  - Examples: Russia, Mexico, Georgia, Singapore, and Israel have included or strengthened supervisory functions within the central bank.
  - Laws increasingly introduce links to financial stability and strengthen inter-institutional arrangements (e.g., Financial Stability Commission/Committee in Mauritius and Chile; enhanced powers in Malaysia).
- Decision-making:
  - Reforms focus on board member selection criteria, appointment procedures, and Board size.
  - France, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, and Liberia increased Board size between 10-50 percent.
  - Fit-and-proper criteria made more granular (Macedonia, Pakistan, Turkey); Macedonia includes detailed English proficiency requirements.
  - Specific requirements for the Chairman and measures to prevent conflicts of interest introduced (Russia; extended to board/staff in Georgia, Mauritius).
  - Israel overhauled its top structure, strengthening autonomy and introducing internal oversight.
- Accountability:
  - Accountability mechanisms strengthened via expanded Board membership (including employee representatives as in France), stronger accounting rules (Russia, Mauritius), and increased disclosures (Canada, Mexico, Pakistan, Israel, Mauritius).
  - Mauritius introduced a complaint mechanism for commercial banks vis-à-vis the central bank.
  - Malaysia explicitly allows the Secretary General of the Treasury to participate in financial stability meetings relating to individual institutions.
- Data collection:
  - Central banks mandated to collect more and more specific data, often linked to expanded objectives/functions.
  - Examples include direct investment data (Russia), and financial stability/financial supervision data and inter-agency cooperation (France, Georgia, Mexico, Singapore, Mauritius).

### Selected country highlights (material and noteworthy changes)
- Canada
  - Changes are relatively minor between the 2008 and 2014 Bank of Canada Act versions.
  - Article XV (Returns) allows more flexibility for disclosing weekly financial information: from weekly to “as soon as practicable after the last business day of the week.”
  - Article XV (sub 2) amended to post the monthly balance sheet on the Bank’s website rather than transmitting it to the Minister.
- Chile
  - Law Number 20.789 of 2014 introduces a Council on Financial Stability (CFS) as “a consultative body reporting to the Ministry of Finance.”
  - CFS purpose: “to facilitate technical coordination and exchange of information… in order to preserve the integrity and financial stability of the economy” (Article 1).
  - CFS membership includes the Minister of Finance (chair) and the three relevant financial supervisors, including the Superintendent of Banks and Financial Institutions.
  - The CFS “shall rely on the permanent advisory services of the Central Bank.” The Chairman of the Central Bank may participate in all CFS meetings “with the right to be heard and to be informed.”
  - Article 11 amends Article 66 to allow a legal exception to central bank secrecy when the CFS needs information “deemed necessary for the performance of its legal duties, for the sole purpose of preventing situations that may imply systemic risk to the stability of the financial system.”
  - Any CFS recommendations on powers of the Central Bank must be explained by the Minister of Finance before the Board of the Bank.
- France
  - New Articles L 141-5-1, L 141-6, and L 141-6-1 introduce the Banque de France’s role in financial stability; the 2004 law did not assign this function.
  - High Council for Financial Stability is introduced; the Bank must “monitor... the stability of the financial system” (Article L141-5-1).
  - Requirements for reporting by financial institutions and arrangements for sanctions on non-compliance (L 141-6 sub I–III); data exchange arrangements with statistical and ministerial departments (sub IV).
  - As part of financial stability role, the Bank must “alert as soon as possible” the French prudential and resolution authority (Article L 141-6-1).
  - Decision-making: Monetary Policy Council (MPC) is dissolved; Article L142-2 clarifies the General Council (GC) is responsible for issues not within ESCB remit.
  - General Council expanded from 7 to 11 members (Article L 142-3): Governor, two Deputy Governors, two members appointed by President of the National Assembly, two members appointed by the President of the Senate, two members appointed by Cabinet decree, an elected representative of the Bank’s employees, and the Vice-Chairman of the prudential and resolution authority.
  - Payments system focus: Article L 141-4 adjusts phrasing to require the payments system to “function correctly, and securely, consistent with the smooth functioning.”
- Georgia
  - Board size increased from five to seven members; two Vice-Presidents are now Board members (Article 7).
  - Article 8 clarifies the Board “shall manage and supervise” the National Bank.
  - National Bank assumes lead role on financial supervision: Article 16 introduces a Financial Sector Supervision Committee; the Bank assumes supervisory functions of the former Financial Supervision Agency (Article 70—Transitional Provisions).
  - Conflict of interest arrangements tightened: Article 20 (sub 8) mandates notification when Board members/employees or family provide loans or material liabilities to a “financial sector representative” exceeding a certain threshold.
  - Profit distribution: Article 22 (sub 3) authorizes the Bank to decide on distribution to the reserve fund “in order to facilitate the stability and transparency of the financial system, and sustainable economic growth.”
  - Board may use remaining net profits to fill the general reserve fund until its volume is less than 15 percent of the amount of the base money at the end of the financial year.
  - Time for transferring remaining profits to the Ministry of Finance extended from four to six months after completion of the fiscal year (sub c).
  - Collateral rules: Board can approve lists of qualifying assets for collateral (new Article 31 sub 2).
  - Data authority: Under new Article 33 the Bank may request “statistical and accounting reports for maintaining monetary, financial external sectors statistics” (sub 1), including confidential information (sub 2).
- Israel
  - Substantial overhaul of the Bank of Israel Law (2008 compared to 2010 unofficial translation).
  - Objectives reorganized: clear distinction between objectives and functions (Articles 3 and 4); main objective changed from currency stabilization to price stability, with secondary objectives on financial stability and supporting other Government economic policy objectives (Article 3, sub a).
  - Establishment of the Bank’s autonomy added (Article 5); Governor’s personal autonomy strengthened (Article 13 regarding reasons for termination).
  - Conflicts of interest prohibitions expanded: Article 11 lists extensive prohibited “additional occupations,” including government-related and commercial positions and holdings of securities of corporations registered in Israel.
  - Decision-making structure overhauled: Monetary Committee (Article 15) to determine monetary policy; Administrative Council to supervise management, approve budget, financial statements, and appoint internal auditor. Both bodies include Governor, Deputy Governor, and “members from amongst the public.”
  - Old Advisory Committee and Advisory Council abolished, likely strengthening autonomy.
  - Government lending prohibition maintained but cap changed from a relative provisional advance of 1.6 percent of the total ordinary annual budget (old Article 45 sub a) to an absolute cap of NIS 10 billion and not for more than 150 days per year.
  - Reporting and disclosure strengthened: Article 19 (sub a) requires publication and reporting to Government of the Monetary Policy Committee’s “summary of its deliberations and resolutions, the reasoning behind the resolutions, and the numerical results of voting on the resolutions.” Chapter 11 provides further public reporting details.
  - Paid-up capital references appear removed from the new law (previously set at ten million Pounds).
- Korea
  - Only minor changes between the 2008 amended Bank of Korea Act and the 2010 version.
  - Article 32 changes titles of executives/senior staff: Deputy Governor and Assistant Governors replaced by Senior Deputy Governor and Deputy Governors (removing the title Assistant Governor but not necessarily the position).
- Liberia
  - Legislation largely unchanged except expansion of executive management.
  - Article 10 amended to introduce a second Deputy Governor in addition to the Executive Governor.
  - New sub 3 allows a third Deputy Governor to be appointed by the President if recommended by the Executive Governor and Board of Governors, subject to same terms and conditions as other Deputy Governors.
- Macedonia
  - Additional fit-and-proper selection criteria for Council members introduced.
  - Article 50-a requires a public note for Vice Governor and nonexecutive National Bank Council member positions to be published in “at least three daily newspapers,” with one issued in the language spoken by at least 20 percent of citizens speaking an official language other than Macedonian.
  - Additional requirements include psychological health and integrity tests and specified English language proficiency minimum scores.
  - Article 42-A adds the power to issue coins for collection purposes (in addition to jubilee coins).
- Malaysia
  - Scope of financial stability measures broadened: amended Article 31 adds sub (a) allowing the Bank to specify measures to “contribute to the resilience of the financial system or limit the accumulation of any risk to financial stability” for classes or categories of persons engaging in financial intermediation.
  - Compliance duties established (sub 5), due diligence measures (sub 6), and remuneration for due diligence agents (sub 7).
  - Secretary General to the Treasury is now to be informed of and invited to all Financial Stability Executive Committee meetings, including those relating to individual institutions (amended Article 37 sub 4).
  - “Financial collateral” is specifically defined in amended Article 2 (sub 1) as cash or equivalents, securities, or futures.
- Mauritius
  - Functions expanded: Article 6 adds promotion of public understanding of the financial system and carrying out investigations and measures to suppress illegal, dishonorable and improper practices (sub e and f).
  - New powers include setting up a development fund for small and medium enterprises (Article 6 sub 1 aa), developing foreign exchange and derivatives markets (Article 6 sub 1 ba), and establishing an Islamic money market (Article 6 sub 4).
  - Conflict of interest prevention strengthened: Article 15 (sub 4) requires declaration of assets by Governor and Deputy Governors covering spouse, children, and grandchildren to the Minister.
  - Information-sharing broadened: amended Article 26 confidentiality provisions expand disclosure to enable Statistics Mauritius and assist the Director of Statistics; separate sub 4 (aa) clarifies disclosure “as may be required by the Commission for the purposes of assisting it in the discharge of its functions.”
  - Credit Information Bureau information sharing expanded (Article 52).
  - Accounting/capital arrangements clarified: Article 47 (sub 1(A)) specifies unrealized gains or losses must be respectively credited or debited to the Special Reserve Fund.
  - A Banking Services Review Panel is introduced (Part VIIIA).
- Other selected countries noted in sample (Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Turkey)
  - Identified in overall findings as having material changes in areas such as inclusion or strengthening of supervisory functions, decision-making and board arrangements, accountability and disclosure, or data collection powers. (Detailed country-by-country text for these cases appears in the subsections beyond the excerpted summary.)

*Excerpted and summarized from the provided section of the source PDF.*

### introduction of an ad hoc panel, tasked with reviewing complaints from financial institutions

### introduction of an ad hoc panel, tasked with reviewing complaints from financial institutions

### Major legal changes and institutional arrangements (country examples)
- Mauritius
  - Introduction of an ad hoc panel, tasked with reviewing complaints from financial institutions that are “dissatisfied with a decision of the Bank” relating to mostly penalties.
  - Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) composition changed: previously consisted of the executives and three outsiders, as well as two Bank Directors; amended law replaces the Bank Directors with “two other persons,” effectively allowing Bank staff (including those below the level of Director) or (additional) outsiders on the MPC.
  - Article 54 sub 2 (A) introduces a Code of Conduct for the MPC and requires the MPC to “report once a year to the Board regarding its compliance with the Code of Conduct.”
  - A Financial Stability Committee (FSC) is introduced (Section IX A), chaired by the Minister, and consisting of the Governor, the Financial Secretary, the Chief Executive of the Financial Services Commission, and the Director of the FIU.

- Mexico
  - Banco de Mexico Law amendments (2014) strengthen compliance and expand enforcement tools:
    - Article 26 (amended) requires financial entities to “must comply with those other provisions of general nature that are issued by the Banco de México.”
    - Article 27 amended to list additional considerations for sanctions, including term of the default and doubled fines for recidivism; allows reprimands and mitigation factors.
    - Articles 36 bis, 36 bis 1, and 36 bis 2 introduce detailed arrangements for administrative penalties.
  - Supervision of financial intermediaries strengthened:
    - New Article 35 bis allows the Banco de Mexico to supervise financial intermediaries, including inspections and surveillance.
    - Article 36 amended to require the Bank to coordinate visits to intermediaries with supervisory committees, without prejudice to its own visits under Article 35 bis.
  - Governor appointment changed: the Governor is now appointed by the Federal Executive (the Mexican Cabinet) instead of the President.
  - Disclosure arrangements strengthened: Article 41 requires a report every trimester to the Mexican Congress on inflation, economic evolution, economic indicators, and execution of monetary policy (replacing the previous once a year).

- Pakistan
  - Bank autonomy strengthened and government influence limited:
    - Article 46 B (sub 2): “[t]he autonomy of the Bank shall be respected at all times.”
    - Old Article 52 (Powers of Government to supersede the Central Board) is repealed.
  - Board size and composition:
    - Article 9 (sub 2) specifies the Board consists of the Governor, the Finance Secretary, and eight other Board members (seven under the previous version).
    - Sub 3 introduces fit and proper criteria and replaces sector representation requirements with “eminent professionals from the fields of economics, finance, banking and accountancy.”
    - Sub 3 stipulates a prohibition of “conflict of interest with the business of the Bank.”
  - Monetary and Fiscal Policies Coordination Board expanded to include “two eminent macro or monetary economists with proven record of research and teaching” (Article 9 B sub 1).
  - Fiscal financing limitations strengthened:
    - New Article 9 C requires limitations on federal government borrowing, which “at the end of each quarter... shall be brought to zero.”
    - Finance Minister obliged (sub 3) to give a detailed justification before Parliament if Article 9 C is not observed.
  - Open market operations explicitly specified (Article 18): Board determines instruments required for monetary control, including Shariah-based instruments.

- Russia
  - Bank of Russia’s legal objective expanded to include supervising and regulating financial markets:
    - Chapter X (2014 law) introduces the Bank’s role in financial market regulation, control and supervision; Article 762: Bank shall exercise regulation, control and supervision over non-credit financial institutions (defined in Article 761).
    - Article 761: main objective of this function is to “maintain stable development of the financial market of the Russian Federation and effectively manage risks emerging on financial markets.”
    - Law stresses Bank “shall not interfere in the day-to-day activities of non-credit financial institutions.”
  - Objectives expanded in 2014 law: retains protection of the ruble and banking system and payment system functions, and adds development and ensuring stability of the financial market.
  - Accounting rules role refined:
    - 2014 law replaces previous Article 14 (sub 14) with provisions to “approve sectoral accounting standards for credit institutions, the Bank of Russia and non-credit financial institutions, a chart of accounts for the accounting of credit institutions and the procedure for its application, a chart of accounts for the Bank of Russia and the procedure for its application.”
  - Direct investment data responsibilities added: Article 3 subsections include compilation of statistical data on direct investment (sub 162) and development of its own statistical methodology for direct investment (sub 163).
  - Conflicts of interest prevention explicitly required: new Article IV1 requires a policy for preventing, detecting and managing conflicts of interests.
  - Chairman dismissal grounds expanded to include “failure to take measures for prevention or settlement of conflict of interest,” including issues related to “incomplete or unreliable information on his/her income, expenses, property or property-related obligations,” and those of spouse and underage children.
  - Board size expanded from 13 to 15 members, including the Chairman.

- Singapore
  - Monetary Authority objectives and functions revised (2013 amendment compared to 1999 law):
    - “Monetary stability” changed to “price stability”; deletion of promoting stability within context of the “general economic policy of the Government.”
    - Financial stability added as a second listed objective; emphasis on fostering Singapore as a “sound and reputable” financial center.
    - Functions added: “integrated supervision of the financial services sector”, “financial stability surveillance”, and management of “the official foreign reserves of Singapore” (article 4, sub 2 (b) and (c)).
    - Part IVA: “control over financial institutions.” Part IVB: resolution regime clarified.
  - Board of Directors size expanded: Article 7 sub 3 b allows between “not less than four, and not more than 13 Directors” (previously maximum nine).
  - Disclosure: Board required to present the Minister with any information he/she might require “in respect of the duties and functions of the Authority.” (sub 4).
  - Loans to government clarified (Article 23 sub 1 ea): Authority may “grant any loan, advance, overdraft or other credit facility to the Government on such terms and conditions as the Authority thinks fit,” limited to “required by the Government to meet unexpected and temporary shortfall in the Government’s revenue relative to its expenditure.” (sub 4).
  - Anti-money laundering powers: Article 27B (sub 1) allows the Authority to issue directions and regulations on the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism; sub 2 allows sanctioning institutions that fail to comply.
  - Issuance of own securities added (Article 23 sub 1 ga) for “purposes of money market operations.”
  - Dispute resolution schemes: Article 28A allows approval of “any dispute resolution scheme for the resolution of disputes arising from or relating to the provision of financial services by financial institutions.”

- Turkey
  - Operational decision-making adjustments:
    - Article 22 (sub o) specifies the Central Bank of Turkey’s Board “may delegate part of its powers to other organs.”
  - Audit Committee selection changed: Article 23 specifies the four members of the Audit Committee shall be elected by the General Assembly (shareholders) rather than selected by four shareholder groups as before.
  - Vice-Governor qualifications expanded (Article 29) to include “finance, engineering, public administration, political science, international relations and statistics or in faculties of economics and administrative sciences,” in addition to previous areas.
  - Monetary Policy Committee meeting frequency increased: Article 22/A sub 4 specifies meetings “shall be held at least eight times a year upon the call of the Governor.”

### Cross-country comparisons and thematic findings
- Independence versus autonomy (legal terminology)
  - The CBLD examines usage of “independence” (including “independent,” “independently”) and “autonomy” (including “autonomous,” “autonomously”) across central bank laws and constitutions.
  - Observations:
    - “Independence” is the legal term used in the majority of central bank legal frameworks, with variations (e.g., ESCB Statute uses “independence” as a section title).
    - Some countries use “independence” in constitutions but “autonomy” in central bank law (examples: Dominican Republic, Iraq, Slovenia); Macedonia uses the reverse.
    - Some laws combine both terms in the same sentence (example: Liberia — “independent central bank with autonomous regulatory powers”).
    - Adjective forms (“independent,” “autonomous”) may refer to narrower contexts; some laws refer to “financial autonomy” only.
    - Lybek (2004) distinction noted: autonomy could entail operational freedom; independence could indicate a lack of institutional constraints.
  - Data: Table 2 (excerpted) lists numerous country examples under categories:
    - 1 Independence/independent (selected examples include Albania, Armenia, ECB/EMU, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, CAMU, China, Congo (DRC) (1), Croatia (1), Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic (1-Constitution), Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq(1-Constitution), Ireland, Italy (1), Kazakhstan, Korea (1), Kosovo (1), Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia (2), Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg (1), Macedonia (1-CB law), Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Oman, Paraguay (1), Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia (1-Constitution & CB law), Slovak Republic, Slovenia (1-Constitution), South Africa, Spain (1), Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, UK, Yemen (1)).
    - 2 Autonomy/autonomous (selected examples include Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Congo (DRC) (2), Croatia (2), Dominican Republic (2-CB law), Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Iraq (2-CB law), Israel, Italy (2), Japan, Jordan, Korea (2), Kosovo (2), Latvia (2), Luxembourg (2), Macedonia(2-Constitution), Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay (2), Peru, Serbia (2-CB law), Slovenia (2-CB law), Solomon Islands, Spain (2), Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen (2)).
    - 3 Other terminology: “Self-administered” (Argentina); “Administrative and budget autonomy” (Ecuador).
- Defining financial stability (terminology and legal ambiguity)
  - No single precise standard definition of financial stability or the macro-prudential function exists in legislation; terminology varies across central bank laws.
  - Common formulations include “stability of the financial system” and “financial stability”; other formulations focus on stability of the banking system or “a stable market-based financial system.”
  - The legal lack of precise definition has trade-offs:
    - Allows flexibility for central banks.
    - May create ambiguity about the central bank’s responsibilities and remit.
  - Table 3 referenced for financial stability terminology in central bank laws (selected country examples not enumerated in the supplied excerpt).

### Institutional governance and accountability themes
- Accountability and disclosure
  - Mauritius: MPC Code of Conduct requires annual reporting to the Board on compliance.
  - Mexico: Article 41 requires trimester reporting to Congress on inflation, economic evolution, economic indicators, and execution of monetary policy.
  - Singapore: Board must provide information to the Minister “in respect of the duties and functions of the Authority.”
- Conflict-of-interest and fit-and-proper safeguards
  - Pakistan: fit and proper criteria introduced for Board members; prohibition of “conflict of interest with the business of the Bank.”
  - Russia: explicit policy requirement for preventing, detecting and managing conflicts of interests; Chairman dismissal grounds expanded to include failures related to conflict-of-interest measures.
- Expanded supervisory and financial-stability mandates
  - Several jurisdictions explicitly expanded central bank roles in financial stability, supervision, and resolution (Russia, Mexico, Singapore, Mauritius).
  - Mechanisms include statutory creation of Financial Stability Committees, expanded supervisory powers (supervise financial intermediaries, inspections), and powers to approve dispute resolution schemes.

*Source: IMF CBLD excerpts and country-law comparison material in the supplied content.*

### 1. Stability of the financial system Bahamas, Botswana, Chile, EMU (and member states),

### 1. Stability of the financial system Bahamas, Botswana, Chile, EMU (and member states),

### Definitions and usages of "financial stability" in central bank legislation
- The phrase "stability of the financial system" or variants appear across numerous country laws; specific formulations recorded include:
  - "Stability of the financial system" — Bahamas, Botswana, Chile, EMU (and member states), Ireland, Kosovo, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro (CB Law), Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, San Marino, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga (Constitution), Tunisia, United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Namibia, Seychelles, Uruguay, Gambia, Georgia, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, and New Zealand.
  - "Financial stability" — Argentina, EMU (and member states), Iceland, Korea, Malaysia, Montenegro (Constitution), Oman, Singapore, and Tonga (CB Law).
  - "Stability of the banking system" — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan.
  - "Stable and/or competitive market-based financial system" — Afghanistan, Iraq, Macedonia, Moldova, and Yemen.
  - "Stable market-based banking system" — Albania.
  - "Financial sector confidence" — Bahrain.
  - "Liquidity and solvency of financial institutions" — Brazil.
  - "Stability/functioning of the banking and financial system/sector" — Djibouti, Nepal, and Qatar.
  - "Functioning of the system" — Dominican Republic.
  - "Sound financial structure" — ECCU, Malawi, and Maldives.
  - "Integrity of the monetary and banking system" — Egypt (Constitution).
  - "Banking system soundness" — Egypt (CB Law) and Sudan.
  - "Banking and credit systems (plural)" — Ghana.
  - "Stability of the financial intermediary system" — Hungary.
  - "Financial institution system stability" — Thailand.
  - "Financial systems stability (plural)" — Zambia.
- Source attribution for this compilation: IMF staff.

### Implications
- The diversity of formulations indicates variation in how central bank laws frame financial-stability-related objectives and mandates across jurisdictions.
- Some jurisdictions embed financial stability as an explicit central bank objective; others use closely related terms focusing on banking system soundness, liquidity/solvency, or broader market-based system stability.

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### Price Stability as a central bank objective (CBLD 2016 Update findings)
- Dataset scope and measurement:
  - Of the 154 countries of the 2016 CBLD update, 127 countries have a reference to price stability in their objectives.
- Prevalence and combinations:
  - "Somewhat more than half (now 57 percent) of central banks have objectives (see figure 6) that include price stability."
  - "Of those, 53 percent have price stability combined with subsidiary macro objectives."
- Changes since prior update:
  - Of the countries included in the previous (2012) update, only three countries changed their objectives in price-stability-related aspects:
    - Czech Republic and Singapore now included price stability together with other macro objectives (they had only "price stability" in the previous version of the law).
    - Georgia’s law now explicitly refers to price stability, whereas the previous version did not.
- Notes on measurement:
  - For the Section, EMU countries were counted both as individual entries and as the EMU (noting that EMU Statute wording on price stability may differ from member states’ domestic legislation).
  - The term "price stability" and similar phrasings (e.g., "stability of price," "stability of prices," "stable price") were treated as equivalent for the purpose of the dataset.

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### Locus of monetary policy determination (CBLD findings)
- Primary decision fora:
  - Monetary policy is most commonly determined by either the Board (highest decision-making authority within the central bank) or a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) separate from the Board.
  - Typical MPC composition includes executive management (Governor/President, often Deputy/Vice-Governors), relevant internal managers, and sometimes external experts and/or government representatives.
- Alternative arrangements:
  - Determination by the Governor: Five countries specify the Governor’s responsibility for determining monetary policy — Argentina, Hungary, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and Vietnam.
  - Law assigns determination to the central bank without specifying internal decision forum or person: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cambodia, ECCU, Fiji, Jordan, Malawi, Mexico, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Zambia.
  - Determination assigned to the government: Ecuador is the only country assigning monetary policy determination to the government (consistent with the central bank being part of the executive branch in that country).
- CBLD category used: 6.01 (Monetary Policy Determination).

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### Cross-cutting observations and methodological notes
- The CBLD permits filtering central bank laws for:
  - Explicit references to "price stability."
  - Legal text specifying arrangements for monetary policy determination.
- Regional and income-level breakdowns were presented in Figures 1–4 (after/before 2014 update) and Figures 5–6 (before/after 2014 update), illustrating regional and income-level patterns in legislative references to price stability.
- The paper treats central bank legislation as a crucial source for assessing:
  - Mandate/objectives, functions, and tasks of central banks and monetary unions.
  - Broad tendencies and developments in central banking over time.

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### Conclusion: Uses and trends identified
- The IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD) is a key resource covering most IMF member countries and facilitates research on central bank legal frameworks.
- From a sample of 15 countries and legislative changes since the previous CBLD update, prominent areas of change include:
  - (1) Objectives;
  - (2) Decision-making;
  - (3) Accountability; and
  - (4) Data collection.
- Many of these legislative changes occurred after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) events of 2008 and may have had large operational and policy effects on central banks.
- The CBLD enables cross-country perspectives on issues confronting central banking: the definition of financial stability, treatment of independence and autonomy, identification of price stability as an objective, and institutional modalities of monetary policy determination.

*Source: IMF staff, Central Bank Legislation Database (CBLD) — content from wp17101 (CBLD update and analysis).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2017/wp17101.pdf_