## 0.3 million women with high educational attainment in the labor market

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### Women's contribution to growth — empirical findings
- Estimated contribution to productivity: "0.3 percentage point a year."
- Counterfactual impact: "if the current gap of 7 percentage points between male and female labor force participation with high educational attainment were eliminated, the level of real GDP could be about 4 percent higher today."
- Empirical focus: relationship between female labor participation and labor productivity growth (sections II.A and II.B).
- Data and regression outputs summarized in "Regression Results" and "Canada: Calculations of Growth Impacts" (Tables 3 and 4).

### Trends and decomposition
- Female labor force participation trends analyzed for Canada and selected advanced economies (Figures 1 and 2).
- Growth decomposition and hours by education attainment documented (Figures 3; Table 2).
- Population and participation by education achievement presented (Table 5).

### Policy assessment and recommendations
- Government action noted: "The government has appropriately stepped up its efforts to improve gender equality, as part of its growth strategy."
- Positive policy step: "the government’s plan to expand access to affordable child care is a positive step."
- Targeting recommendation under budget constraints: "provision of subsidized child care—including publicly funded child care spaces—should be better targeted to working parents."
- Policy areas analyzed in detail:
  - Family support policy gaps (Section III.A).
  - Case for enhancing public spending on child care (Section III.B).
  - Addressing cultural norms to promote gender equality and increase economic growth (Section III.C).
- Complementary recommendations:
  - Improve the work-life environment for highly educated mothers with young children.
  - Target child care subsidies and publicly funded child care spaces to working parents, parents who study, and parents who take job training.
  - Consider introducing or expanding parental leave for fathers (evidence from Quebec and Nordic countries).
  - Engage private and public sectors to address the glass ceiling and increase women's representation in senior management.

### Box 1 — The Swedish Parental Leave and Child Care System (policy example)
- Policy feature: A “daddy quota” was first introduced in Sweden in 1995.
- Empirical evidence (Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate (2012)):
  - Mothers’ use of parental leave fell 26 days in the first two years of a child’s life.
  - Fathers’ use of parental leave increased by 10 days in the first two years of a child’s life.
- Contextual notes:
  - Sweden cited alongside Quebec and Nordic countries for father-specific parental leave that encourages gender-equal division of parenthood and work.
  - Swedish paternity leave timeline: parental leave for fathers implemented in 1974; one month “daddy month” introduced in 1995; length extended gradually and to 3 months in January 2016.
  - Quebec and Nordic evidence: paternity leave increased fathers’ use of parental leave, stimulated more women to work without decreasing male labor force participation, and dampened gender wage gaps (Johansson 2010).

### Descriptive statistics and sample evidence (Annex I, Table 1)
- Sample frame: Calculations by province from 1980-2015, 5-year averages.
- Selected statistics (Count, Mean, Std.Dev., Min, Max):
  - Labor productivity growth: Count 70; Mean 1.2; Std.Dev. 1.1; Min -1.0; Max 5.4
  - Level of labor productivity: Count 70; Mean 7.7; Std.Dev. 0.2; Min 7.2; Max 8.2
  - R&D stock per hour worked: Count 70; Mean 4.8; Std.Dev. 0.4; Min 4.2; Max 5.7
  - Growth of external exports: Count 70; Mean 6.5; Std.Dev. 4.8; Min -4.7; Max 17.1
  - Growth of intra-provincial trade: Count 70; Mean 4.9; Std.Dev. 3.9; Min -3.1; Max 28.1
  - Growth of capital stock per hour worked: Count 70; Mean 1.3; Std.Dev. 1.6; Min -2.8; Max 6.7
  - Change in net-migration in provinces to population: Count 70; Mean 0.0; Std.Dev. 0.2; Min -0.8; Max 0.3
  - Index of rule of law: Count 70; Mean 1.5; Std.Dev. 0.3; Min 1.0; Max 1.8
  - Fertility rate (births per woman): Count 70; Mean 0.2; Std.Dev. 0.3; Min -0.3; Max 0.7
  - Index of voice and accountability: Count 70; Mean 1.6; Std.Dev. 0.1; Min 1.4; Max 1.6
  - Female legislators, senior officials and managers (% of total): Count 60; Mean 34.8; Std.Dev. 2.2; Min 30.4; Max 36.4
  - Females labor force participation rate: Count 70; Mean 75.3; Std.Dev. 8.4; Min 49.0; Max 87.0
  - Female labor force participation rate with high education attainment: Count 50; Mean 86.4; Std.Dev. 2.3; Min 81.9; Max 91.3
  - Female full-time employed participation rate with high education attainment: Count 50; Mean 65.6; Std.Dev. 4.4; Min 58.6; Max 73.7
  - Female part-time employed participation rate with high education attainment: Count 50; Mean 16.1; Std.Dev. 3.2; Min 10.1; Max 22.9
  - Female labor force participation rate with low education attainment: Count 50; Mean 70.6; Std.Dev. 6.6; Min 49.9; Max 80.2
  - Male labor force participation rate with high education attainment: Count 50; Mean 94.0; Std.Dev. 1.6; Min 88.9; Max 96.2

### Data definitions and instruments (Annex I)
- Labor productivity growth: In percent. The first difference of the logarithm of real GDP per hour worked (total hours worked, for all jobs, both sexes, from 15 years old and over).
- Level of labor productivity (t–1): In logarithm. Calculated such that for 1990–94 the variable takes the value as of 1989, for 1995–99 takes the value as of 1994, and so on up to 2015.
- R&D stock per hour worked (t–1): In logarithm. Calculated such that for 1990–94 takes the value as of 1989, for 1995–99 takes the value as of 1994, and so on up to 2015.
- Growth of external exports: In percent. The growth rate of exports of goods and services in Canadian dollars to other nations.
- Growth of intra-provincial trade: In percent. The growth rate of exports of goods and services in Canadian dollars to other provinces.
- Growth of capital stock per hour worked: In percent. The first difference of the logarithm of real capital stock (nonresidential) per hour worked.
- Change in net migration in provinces to population: In percentage points. The change in the ratio of net interprovincial migration to population (inflows minus outflows).
- Index of rule of law: Calculated by the Worldwide Governance Indicators for Canada as a whole; proxy for the quality of institutions.
- Fertility rates: In logarithm. The number of births to the female population; used as an instrument for female labor participation variables.
- Index of voice and accountability: Calculated by the Worldwide Governance Indicators for all Canada; used as a proxy for a female-friendly environment and an instrument for female labor participation variables.
- Female legislators, senior officials and managers: In percent. The share of legislators, executives, and managers who are women; used as a proxy for the role model effect and as an instrument for female labor participation variables.
- Female labor force participation variables: measured in percent of total female population in the same age cohort. Groups defined as:
  - High degree: postsecondary certificate, diploma, bachelor's degree, or university degree.
  - Low degree: 0 to 8 years of school, some high school, high school graduate, or some postsecondary.
  - Fully employed: a woman who usually work 30 hours or more per week at her main or only job.
- Tax wedge on secondary earners: Defined following Jaumotte (2003) as the tax wedge between second earner and single individual at 67 percent and 100 percent of average production worker earnings (APW); formula preserving components as defined in the source.

### Population and policy context — "0.3 million" finding
- Today approximately 0.3 million highly educated “stay at home” mothers have at least one child under 5 years.
- Of these, nearly 0.2 million are living in a partner or spouse relationship.
- Canada fares well on most family policy indicators but public spending on early education and care is low.
- If high child care costs make working uneconomical for women, realizing women’s full workforce potential will be difficult.
- Canada’s gender wage gap: described as well above the OECD average (the third highest among 20 advanced OECD economies).
- Women’s representation in senior management: women make up only one in four senior managers.

### Annex II — Child Benefit and Day Care Subsidy Programs by Province (As of October 2016, in Canadian dollars)
- Child benefit maxima (selected examples):
  - Quebec first-child maximum: $2,392
  - Newfoundland and Labrador first-child maximum: $379
  - British Columbia per-child benefit (under age 6): $660
- Income thresholds for full benefits (selected examples):
  - Newfoundland and Labrador: Below $17,397 full benefit.
  - Manitoba: Below $15,000 full benefit.
  - Quebec (one child): Below $41,917 full benefit.
  - British Columbia child benefit: Below $100,000 full benefit; separate subsidy available for families earning $40,000 or less.
  - Alberta Child Benefit: Below $25,500 full benefit.
- Quebec regulated child care daily contributions (exact schedule):
  - Basic contribution: $7.55 per day if net family income ≤ $50,545.
  - At income $75,820 daily rate begins rising, reaching $20.70 per day at approximately $158 820.
  - Additional contribution schedule: from $0.70 per day at income $50 545 (daily rate $8.25) to additional $13.15 per day at income $158 820 (maximum daily rate $20.70).
- Ontario Child Benefit monthly amounts by net income thresholds ($20,706; $25,000; $30,000) and number of children (1–4), e.g.:
  - 1 child at $20,706: $113.00; at $25,000: $84.37; at $30,000: $51.04
  - 4 children at $20,706: $452.00; at $25,000: $412.37; at $30,000: $390.04
- Manitoba administratively set maximum daily fees (centers and trained provider):
  - Infants: $30.00; Pre-school: $20.80; School-age (full day): $20.80; School-age (half day): $10.30
  - Family child care: Infants: $22.20; Pre-school: $18.20; School-age (full day): $18.20; School-age (half day): $10.30
- New Brunswick benefit reduction rules:
  - New Brunswick Child Tax Benefit: Below $20,000 full benefit; above $20,000 reduced by 2.5 percent of family net income over $20,000 for one-child families, or 5 percent for families with more than one child.
  - New Brunswick Working Income Supplement: the lesser of $250 annually per family, or 4% of family earned income over $3,750 minus 5% of family net income over $20,921.
- Alberta Family Employment Tax Credit: applies only above $2,760 and phases in up to upper thresholds that depend on the number of children ($60,325–$91,550).

### Conclusions (Section IV)
- Scaling up female labor force participation—especially among highly educated women—has measurable benefits for aggregate GDP and productivity.
- Policy mix emphasis:
  - Better targeting of subsidized child care to working parents.
  - Increased public spending on child care where justified by fiscal and distributional considerations.
  - Complementary measures to change cultural norms that constrain female labor market attachment.

*Source: IMF Working Papers WP/17/166 (content unit: "0.3 million women with high educational attainment in the labor market").*

### 0.3 percentage point a year. This suggests that if the current gap of 7 percentage points

### wp17166 - 0.3 percentage point a year. This suggests that if the current gap of 7 percentage points

### Women's contribution to growth — empirical findings
- Estimated contribution to productivity: "0.3 percentage point a year."
- Counterfactual impact of closing participation gap: "if the current gap of 7 percentage points between male and female labor force participation with high educational attainment were eliminated, the level of real GDP could be about 4 percent higher today."
- Empirical focus: relationship between female labor participation and labor productivity growth (see sections II.A and II.B).
- Data and regression outputs summarized in "Regression Results" and "Canada: Calculations of Growth Impacts" (Tables 3 and 4).

### Trends and decomposition
- Female labor force participation trends analyzed for Canada and selected advanced economies (Figures 1 and 2).
- Growth decomposition and hours by education attainment documented (Figures 3; Table 2).
- Population and participation by education achievement presented (Table 5).

### Policy assessment and recommendations
- Government action noted: "The government has appropriately stepped up its efforts to improve gender equality, as part of its growth strategy."
- Positive policy step: "the government’s plan to expand access to affordable child care is a positive step."
- Targeting recommendation under budget constraints: "provision of subsidized child care—including publicly funded child care spaces—should be better targeted to working parents."
- Policy areas analyzed in detail:
  - Family support policy gaps (Section III.A).
  - Case for enhancing public spending on child care (Section III.B).
  - Addressing cultural norms to promote gender equality and increase economic growth (Section III.C).
- Quantitative and policy tools examined: marginal effective benefits decompositions and alternative policy scenarios (Figures 10–14; Tables and Figures on child care assistance by province and parental leave).

### Key statistics and exact numeric values (as presented)
- "0.3 percentage point a year."
- "7 percentage points" (current gap between male and female labor force participation with high educational attainment).
- "about 4 percent higher today" (level of real GDP under the counterfactual).
- JEL Classification Numbers: E24, H24, J13, J21, J24
- Keywords: Canada, female participation, labor productivity, benefit system, taxation

### Data sources, figures and tables referenced in the analysis
- Tables listed: 1. Labor Participation Trends; 2. Hours by Education Attainment; 3. Regression Results; 4. Canada: Calculations of Growth Impacts; 5. Population and Participation by Education Achievement.
- Figures listed: 1. Selected Advanced Economies: Female Labor Force Participation Rate, 1976–2015; 2. Canada: Female Labor Force Participation Rate and Labor Productivity; 3. Growth Decomposition; 4. Labor Productivity Growth and Female Labor Participation; 5–15 (various policy and decomposition figures related to family policy, tax wedges, public spending on early childhood education and care, child care assistance by province, marginal effective benefits, parental leave).

### Conclusions (Section IV)
- Scaling up female labor force participation—especially among highly educated women—has measurable benefits for aggregate GDP and productivity.
- Policy mix emphasis: better targeting of subsidized child care to working parents, increased public spending on child care where justified by fiscal and distributional considerations, and complementary measures to change cultural norms that constrain female labor market attachment.

*Source: IMF Working Papers WP/17/166, © 2017 International Monetary Fund.*

### Box 1. The Swedish Parental Leave and Child Care System ..................................................32

### Box 1. The Swedish Parental Leave and Child Care System

### Policy feature highlighted
- A “daddy quota” was first introduced in Sweden in 1995.

### Empirical evidence on behavioral change
- Source: Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate (2012).
- Observed impacts in the first two years of a child’s life:
  - Mothers’ use of parental leave fell 26 days.
  - Fathers’ use of parental leave increased by 10 days.

### Context within broader discussion
- The Swedish daddy quota is cited as an example of a policy that changed parental leave patterns and contributed to shifting norms on the division of parenthood and work.
- The paper references Sweden’s policy as one of the international examples alongside Quebec and Nordic countries that implemented father-specific parental leave to encourage a more gender-equal distribution of parental responsibilities.

*Source: wp17166 - Box 1. The Swedish Parental Leave and Child Care System (excerpt).*

### 0.3 million women with high educational attainment in the labor market

### 0.3 million women with high educational attainment in the labor market

### Key findings and context
- Today approximately 0.3 million highly educated “stay at home” mothers have at least one child under 5 years, of which nearly 0.2 million are living in a partner or spouse relationship.
- A key element of labor market policies to encourage women to participate in the labor market should be to help improve the work-life environment for these women with young children.
- Canada fares well in comparison with other OECD countries on most family policy indicators, but public spending on early education and care is low.
- If high child care costs mean it is not economically worthwhile for women to work, it will be difficult to realize women’s full potential in the work force.
- Latest policy initiatives to provide more affordable child care spaces are a positive step to encourage more women to participate in the labor market.
- To maximize policy outcomes given a budget constraint, provision of child care subsidies, including publicly funded child care spaces, should be better targeted to working parents, including those who study or take job training to improve their skills to obtain better jobs in the future.
- Bold decisions are needed to change corporate cultures and shift social norms; a glass ceiling apparently remains.
- Canada’s gender wage gap is well above the OECD average (the third highest among 20 advanced OECD economies) and progress in promoting women’s representation in senior management has been slow, with women making up only one in four senior managers.

### Policy recommendations
- Improve the work-life environment for highly educated mothers with young children to boost female labor force participation.
- Target child care subsidies and publicly funded child care spaces to:
  - working parents;
  - parents who study; and
  - parents who take job training to improve future job prospects.
- Consider introducing or expanding parental leave for fathers, following evidence from Quebec and Nordic countries that paternal leave can increase maternal labor supply and help reduce gender wage gaps.
- Engage both private and public sectors in concerted efforts to address the glass ceiling and increase women’s representation in senior management.

### International and subnational policy example — Sweden (Box 1)
- Sweden’s female labor force participation rate and gender equality ranking are among the highest in the world, attributed to deliberate policy measures.
- Paternity leave:
  - Parental leave for fathers implemented in 1974; one month “daddy month” introduced in 1995 under “use it or lose it” conditions.
  - Length of paternity leave extended gradually and was extended to 3 months in January 2016.
  - Paternity leave increased fathers’ use of parental leave, stimulated more women to work without decreasing male labor force participation, and dampened gender wage gaps (Johansson 2010).
- Affordable child care:
  - Supply of child care increased quickly in the 1970s and 1980s.
  - In 2001–03 the federal government offered a large subsidy on child care costs to municipalities and set limits on maximum family out-of-pocket child care payments; no municipality rejected the offer.
  - Monthly limits (noting limits were increased slightly in January 2017):
    - SKr 1,362 for the first child;
    - SKr 908 for the second child;
    - SKr 454 for the third child;
    - no cost for any additional children.
  - Eligibility for subsidized child care is linked to employment or studying, or if the child has special needs; parents searching for jobs or on parental leave are given limited access.
  - The program dramatically lowered household expenditures on child care and aimed to encourage labor force participation; effects on female participation were modest in Sweden (possibly because fees were already fairly low), and stronger male labor supply effects were observed.

### Statistical evidence and descriptive statistics (Annex I, Table 1)
- Sample frame: Calculations by province from 1980-2015, 5-year averages.
- Selected summary statistics (Count, Mean, Std.Dev., Min, Max):
  - Labor productivity growth: Count 70; Mean 1.2; Std.Dev. 1.1; Min -1.0; Max 5.4
  - Level of labor productivity: Count 70; Mean 7.7; Std.Dev. 0.2; Min 7.2; Max 8.2
  - R&D stock per hour worked: Count 70; Mean 4.8; Std.Dev. 0.4; Min 4.2; Max 5.7
  - Growth of external exports: Count 70; Mean 6.5; Std.Dev. 4.8; Min -4.7; Max 17.1
  - Growth of intra-provincial trade: Count 70; Mean 4.9; Std.Dev. 3.9; Min -3.1; Max 28.1
  - Growth of capital stock per hour worked: Count 70; Mean 1.3; Std.Dev. 1.6; Min -2.8; Max 6.7
  - Change in net-migration in provinces to population: Count 70; Mean 0.0; Std.Dev. 0.2; Min -0.8; Max 0.3
  - Index of rule of law: Count 70; Mean 1.5; Std.Dev. 0.3; Min 1.0; Max 1.8
  - Fertility rate (births per woman): Count 70; Mean 0.2; Std.Dev. 0.3; Min -0.3; Max 0.7
  - Index of voice and accountability: Count 70; Mean 1.6; Std.Dev. 0.1; Min 1.4; Max 1.6
  - Female legislators, senior officials and managers (% of total): Count 60; Mean 34.8; Std.Dev. 2.2; Min 30.4; Max 36.4
  - Females labor force participation rate: Count 70; Mean 75.3; Std.Dev. 8.4; Min 49.0; Max 87.0
  - Female labor force participation rate with high education attainment: Count 50; Mean 86.4; Std.Dev. 2.3; Min 81.9; Max 91.3
  - Female full-time employed participation rate with high education attainment: Count 50; Mean 65.6; Std.Dev. 4.4; Min 58.6; Max 73.7
  - Female part-time employed participation rate with high education attainment: Count 50; Mean 16.1; Std.Dev. 3.2; Min 10.1; Max 22.9
  - Female labor force participation rate with low education attainment: Count 50; Mean 70.6; Std.Dev. 6.6; Min 49.9; Max 80.2
  - Male labor force participation rate with high education attainment: Count 50; Mean 94.0; Std.Dev. 1.6; Min 88.9; Max 96.2

### Data definitions and instruments (Annex I)
- Labor productivity growth: In percent. The first difference of the logarithm of real GDP per hour worked (total hours worked, for all jobs, both sexes, from 15 years old and over).
- Level of labor productivity (t–1): In logarithm. Calculated such that for 1990–94 the variable takes the value as of 1989, for 1995–99 takes the value as of 1994, and so on up to 2015.
- R&D stock per hour worked (t–1): In logarithm. Calculated such that for 1990–94 takes the value as of 1989, for 1995–99 takes the value as of 1994, and so on up to 2015.
- Growth of external exports: In percent. The growth rate of exports of goods and services in Canadian dollars to other nations.
- Growth of intra-provincial trade: In percent. The growth rate of exports of goods and services in Canadian dollars to other provinces.
- Growth of capital stock per hour worked: In percent. The first difference of the logarithm of real capital stock (nonresidential) per hour worked.
- Change in net migration in provinces to population: In percentage points. The change in the ratio of net interprovincial migration to population (inflows minus outflows).
- Index of rule of law: Calculated by the Worldwide Governance Indicators for Canada as a whole; proxy for the quality of institutions.
- Fertility rates: In logarithm. The number of births to the female population; used as an instrument for female labor participation variables.
- Index of voice and accountability: Calculated by the Worldwide Governance Indicators for all Canada; used as a proxy for a female-friendly environment and an instrument for female labor participation variables.
- Female legislators, senior officials and managers: In percent. The share of legislators, executives, and managers who are women; used as a proxy for the role model effect and as an instrument for female labor participation variables.
- Female labor force participation variables: measured in percent of total female population in the same age cohort. Groups defined as:
  - High degree: postsecondary certificate, diploma, bachelor's degree, or university degree.
  - Low degree: 0 to 8 years of school, some high school, high school graduate, or some postsecondary.
  - Fully employed: a woman who usually work 30 hours or more per week at her main or only job.
- Tax wedge on secondary earners: Defined following Jaumotte (2003) as the tax wedge between second earner and single individual at 67 percent and 100 percent of average production worker earnings (APW); formula preserving components as defined in the source.

*Source: IMF Working Paper (content unit: "0.3 million women with high educational attainment in the labor market").*

### Annex II. Child Benefit and Day Care Subsidy Programs by Province

### Annex II. Child Benefit and Day Care Subsidy Programs by Province

### Child Benefit Programs (maximum benefit (annual) and income thresholds)
- Newfoundland and Labrador (The Newfoundland and Labrador Child Benefit) — Under age 18
  - Maximum Benefit (annual): 1 child: $379; 2 children: $781; 3 children: $1,213; 4 children: $1,676
  - Income thresholds: Below $17,397: full benefit; Between $17,397 and $24,877, reduced amount
- Prince Edward Island (Child Care Subsidy Program) — Not available
  - Income thresholds: Income tested; The subsidy rate varies, depending on the size of the family, age of children, and the household’s income
- Nova Scotia (Nova Scotia Child Benefit) — Under age 18
  - Maximum Benefit (annual): 1st child: $625; 2nd child: $825; 3rd and each additional child: $900
  - Income thresholds: Below $18,000: full benefit; Between $18,000 and $26,000, reduced amount
- New Brunswick (New Brunswick Child Tax Benefit and New Brunswick Working Income Supplement) — Under age 18
  - New Brunswick Child Tax Benefit: $250 for each dependent child
  - New Brunswick Working Income Supplement: $250 for each dependent child
  - Income thresholds:
    - New Brunswick Child Tax Benefit: Below $20,000: full benefit; Above $20,000, less 2.5 percent of family net income over $20,000 for one child families; or 5 percent of family net income over $20,000 for families with more than one child.
    - New Brunswick Working Income Supplement: the lesser of, $250 annually per family, or 4% of family earned income over $3,750 minus 5% of family net income over $20,921.
- Quebec (Child Assistance Payment) — Under age 18
  - Maximum Benefit (annual): 1st child: $2,392; 2nd child: $1,195; 3rd child: $1,195; 4th and each additional child: $1,793
  - Income thresholds: For the case of one child, below $41,917: full benefit
  - Minimum benefit regardless of income: 1st child: $671; 2nd child: $620
- Ontario (Ontario Child Benefit) — Under age 18, and income tested
  - Income thresholds / Monthly amounts by Net income ($20,706, $25,000, $30,000) and Number of children:
    - 1 child: $113.00; $84.37; $51.04
    - 2 children: $226.00; $197.37; $164.04
    - 3 children: $339.00; $310.37; $277.04
    - 4 children: $452.00; $412.37; $390.04
- Manitoba (Manitoba Child Benefit) — Under age 18
  - Maximum Benefit (annual): 1 child: $420; 2 children: $840; 3 children: $1,260; 4 children: $1,680; 5 children: $2,100; 6 children: $2,520
  - Income thresholds: Below $15,000: full benefit; Between $15,001 and $20,435–$25,864 (depending on the number of children), reduced amount
- Saskatchewan — (No child benefit figures provided in table)
- Alberta (Alberta Child Benefit and Alberta Family Employment Tax Credit) — Under age 18
  - Alberta Child Benefit maximums: 1 child: $1,100; 2 children: $1,650; 3 children: $2,200; 4 children and more: $2,750
  - Alberta Family Employment Tax Credit maximums: 1 child: $763; 2 children: $1,457; 3 children: $1,873; 4 children and more: $2,012
  - Income thresholds:
    - Alberta Child Benefit: Below $25,500: full benefit; Between $25,500 and $41,220, reduced amount.
    - Alberta Family Tax Credit: Below $2,760: no benefit; Between $2,760 and $60,325–$91,550 (depending on the number of children).
- British Columbia (B.C. Early Childhood Tax Benefit) — Under age 6
  - Maximum Benefit (annual): $660 per child
  - Income thresholds: Below $100,000: full benefit; Between $100,00 and $150,000, reduced amount
  - A separate child care subsidy is available for low-income families earning $40,000 or less.

### Child Day Care Subsidy Programs (major subsidy programs and parent fees)
- Newfoundland and Labrador
  - Major subsidy programs: Set up and equipment grants; Early Learning and Child Care Supplement: wage subsidies; Capacity Initiative: funding child care in rural and underserves communities; Operating Grant Program: more affordable child care
  - Parent fees: No administratively set fee except for child care centers participating in the Operating Grant Program.
- Prince Edward Island
  - Major subsidy program: Early Years Center Funding: fee subsidies
  - Parent fees (administratively set daily fees (per day) for Early Years Centers): Age 0–2: $34; Age 2–3: $28; Age 3–school entry: $27
- Nova Scotia
  - Major subsidy program: Early Childhood Enhancement Grants: wage and operating costs subsidies
  - Parent fees: No administratively set fee
- New Brunswick
  - Major subsidy programs: Capita funding and start-up funding; Training assistance; Quarterly improvement funding: wage subsidies
  - Parent fees: No administratively set fee
- Quebec
  - All regulated child care centers (Centre de la Petite Enfance) and day care centers (Garderies) are publicly funded.
  - Parent fees (daily contributions): Basic contribution: $7.55 per day, per child, if net family income ≤ $50,545. At an income of $75,820, the daily rate starts rising gradually, reaching $20.70 per day at an income of approximately $158 820.
  - Additional contributions: as of an income of $50 545, the additional contribution is $0.70 per day, for a daily rate of $8.25. As of an income of $75 820, the additional contribution increases gradually until it reaches $13.15 per day, which corresponds to an income of $158 820, for a maximum daily rate of $20.70.
- Ontario
  - Major subsidy programs: Capital Funding for New Construction of Child Care; Operating funding
  - Parent fees: No administratively set fee
- Manitoba
  - Major subsidy programs: Capita grants: start-up assistance; Operating grants
  - Parent fees: Maximum daily fees are administratively set for provincially funded child care services.
    - Centers and trained provider:
      - Infants: $30.00
      - Pre-school: $20.80
      - School-age (full day): $20.80
      - School-age (half day): $10.30
    - Family child care:
      - Infants: $22.20
      - Pre-school: $18.20
      - School-age (full day): $18.20
      - School-age (half day): $10.30
- Saskatchewan
  - Major subsidy programs: Capital and start-up grants; Early Childhood Services Grants: wages and operating costs subsidies
  - Parent fees: No administratively set fee
- Alberta
  - Major subsidy programs: Accreditation Funding for Child Care programs: includes staff support funding, benefit contribution grant, and professional development grant.
  - Parent fees: No administratively set fee
- British Columbia
  - Major subsidy programs: Child Care Minor Capital Funding; Child Care Operating Fund; Supported Child Development Fund: including staff training subsidies
  - Parent fees: No administratively set fee

### Key numeric points and program design features (as of October 2016, in Canadian dollars)
- Benefit maxima vary widely across provinces, e.g. Quebec first-child maximum: $2,392; Newfoundland and Labrador first-child maximum: $379; British Columbia per-child benefit (under age 6): $660.
- Income thresholds for full benefits vary by province and program, examples:
  - Newfoundland and Labrador: Below $17,397 full benefit.
  - Manitoba: Below $15,000 full benefit.
  - Quebec (one child): Below $41,917 full benefit.
  - British Columbia child benefit: Below $100,000 full benefit; separate subsidy available for families earning $40,000 or less.
  - Alberta Child Benefit: Below $25,500 full benefit.
- Quebec regulated child care daily contributions are explicitly graduated by income with exact rates and thresholds:
  - Basic contribution: $7.55 per day if net family income ≤ $50,545.
  - At income $75,820 daily rate begins rising, reaching $20.70 per day at approximately $158 820.
  - Additional contribution schedule: from $0.70 per day at income $50 545 (daily rate $8.25) to additional $13.15 per day at income $158 820 (maximum daily rate $20.70).
- Manitoba specifies administratively set maximum daily fees with exact amounts for centers and family child care (see figures above).
- Ontario’s Ontario Child Benefit schedule lists monthly amounts by net income thresholds ($20,706; $25,000; $30,000) and by number of children (1–4), with values given to two decimal places (e.g., 1 child at $20,706: $113.00).
- New Brunswick’s benefit reduction rules specify percentage reductions tied to family net income above $20,000 (2.5 percent for one-child families; 5 percent for families with more than one child).
- Alberta’s Family Employment Tax Credit applies only above $2,760 and phases in up to upper thresholds that depend on the number of children ($60,325–$91,550).

*Source: Annex II. Child Benefit and Day Care Subsidy Programs by Province (As of October 2016, in Canadian dollars).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2017/wp17166.pdf_