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### Key stylized facts on the trade slowdown
- World goods trade volume growth averaged 2.2 percent% in 2012–16, down from 8.1 percent in 1985–2007 and 9.0 percent in 2003–07.
- In real terms, world trade growth slowed since the end of 2011; in nominal U.S. dollar terms, it collapsed since the second half of 2014 due to the sharp drop in the price of oil and the strength of the U.S. dollar.
- The slowdown in real trade growth was widespread:
  - Growth of goods and services imports during 2012–16 slowed in 142 of 169 countries compared with the five years leading to the global financial crisis.
  - When measured relative to GDP growth, the slowdown occurred in 122 countries.
- Sectoral patterns:
  - Services trade remained more resilient than goods trade.
  - Within goods, the decline in real trade growth was most pronounced for capital goods, followed by primary intermediate goods, and durable consumption goods; nondurable consumption goods held up relatively well.
  - The sharper slowdown in capital and durable consumption goods points to the potential role of investment weakness in holding back global trade growth.

### Empirical analysis of import demand (historical, country-level)
- Data and scope:
  - Empirical models estimated separately for 150 economies over 1985–2016.
  - Import-intensity-adjusted aggregate demand (IAD) constructed as a weighted average of private consumption, government consumption, investment, and exports; import content weights from Eora MRIO averaged over 1990–2011.
- Model variants:
  - Full IAD (all four components).
  - Domestic IAD only (DIAD).
  - DIAD plus exports predicted by trading partners’ domestic IAD (DIAD+X).
- Main empirical findings:
  - The empirical import demand models closely track actual import growth until 2012; after 2012, annual growth of real goods imports was consistently lower than model-based benchmarks.
  - Pooling residuals for 1985–2016 and testing for 2012–16 reveals a systematic negative residual for goods imports in 2012–16, indicating “missing” goods import growth at the global level; no robust unexplained slowdown for services at the global level.
  - Magnitude of unexplained “missing” goods import growth (baseline DIAD+X specification):
    - Advanced economies: about 1 percentage point.
    - Emerging market and developing economies: about 3 percentage points.
    - World: about 1¾ percentage point.
  - Counterfactual decompositions:
    - The model that uses all four aggregate demand components can account for 86 percent of the observed decline in import growth between 2003–07 and 2012–16, and 84 percent of the observed decline between 1985–2007 and 2012–16.
    - Over 80 percent of the global goods import slowdown can be traced to slower overall growth, a compositional shift away from import-intensive components (notably investment), and synchronised weakness across countries.
    - The empirical analysis finds that changes in investment and export growth are the principal contributors to the predicted slowdown, especially relative to 2003–07.
  - Counterfactual implication: the level of real global goods trade would have been 8 percent higher in 2016 had it not been for the estimated missing trade growth.

### Structural multicountry, multisector (general equilibrium) analysis
- Model and scope:
  - Multisector, multicountry static Ricardian framework adapted from Eaton et al. (2010), with a new tradable commodities sector added.
  - Estimated for 34 advanced and emerging market economies; sectoral data for 2003–16; the exercise accounts for 75 percent of world trade.
  - Four wedges (time-varying factors) used to allocate observed trade dynamics: (1) composition of demand; (2) trade costs; (3) productivity; (4) trade deficits.
- Identification and counterfactuals:
  - Wedges are sector- and country-specific. Counterfactuals turn on only one wedge at a time to quantify its contribution.
  - Production and trade in commodities modeled like manufacturing sectors; equilibrium solved using exact hat algebra for consecutive year-pairs.
- Main structural findings:
  - Changes in the composition of demand account for almost 60 percent of the slowdown in the growth of nominal goods imports relative to GDP in 2012–16 versus 2003–07 (world).
  - Trade costs account for close to a quarter of the slowdown in the growth of the nominal imports-to-GDP ratio.
  - When demand composition and trade costs are allowed to change together, the model can account for close to 80 percent of the slowdown.
  - Cross-country nuances:
    - In advanced economies, shifts in demand composition were relatively more important.
    - In emerging market and developing economies, falling trade costs helped drive trade growth in 2003–07 (notably China), while a slowdown in the pace of trade-cost reductions contributed to weaker trade growth in 2012–16.
    - China shows a notable rise in the trade costs wedge over the slowdown period; Brazil experienced a large decline in the share of durable manufacturing in final demand, depressing import growth.
  - Sectoral composition dynamics:
    - The slowdown involved a shift in demand toward nontradables and within tradables toward nondurable manufactured goods.
    - The expenditure share of commodities fell significantly due to commodity price declines; the aggregate share of tradable sectors decreased modestly by ½ percentage points during the slowdown after increasing by almost four percentage points prior to the crisis period.

### Synthesis and interpretation
- Consistent message from both approaches:
  - Much—though not all—of the trade slowdown since 2012 reflects weak economic activity and compositional shifts (notably weak investment).
  - Empirical analysis: over 80 percent of the decline in trade growth since 2012 relative to 2003–07 can be predicted by weaker activity and composition shifts.
  - Structural analysis: changes in composition of demand account for about 60 percent of the slowdown in the growth of nominal imports relative to GDP; trade costs contribute close to 25 percent; combined account for close to 80 percent.
  - The unexplained residual in goods import growth at the global level is nontrivial (about 1¾ percentage points), implying other factors beyond demand and relative prices are at work.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Priorities to help restore trade’s contribution to productivity and growth:
  - Address constraints to growth, particularly by reviving investment: since much of the trade slowdown is tied to weak investment, policies that raise investment should strengthen trade as a by-product.
  - Resist protectionism and revive trade liberalization: reducing trade costs via dismantling remaining trade barriers remains relevant and could provide support for trade growth and potentially catalyze new global value chain development.
- Interpretation cautions:
  - The empirical approach focuses on the demand → trade link and may overstate the role of output if trade policies and trade itself feed back into growth; robustness checks indicate this bias is likely small.
  - The structural model is static and stylized; it captures general equilibrium feedbacks but cannot capture all channels (e.g., dynamic productivity gains from greater openness).

### 3. Emerging Market and Developing Economies — import growth and composition (selected figures)
- Real goods import growth in Emerging Market and Developing Economies:
  - Average growth 1985–2007: 11.1
  - Average growth 2003–2007: 13.7
  - Average growth 2012–2016: 1.9
  - Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 1985-2007: -9.2
  - Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 2003-2007: -11.8
- Components of aggregate demand (mean import content, average over 1990–2011 across 150 countries):
  - Consumption: 23.3
  - Government spending: 14.9
  - Investment: 29.6
  - Exports: 31.8

### Empirical import-demand model: key coefficients and residuals
- Goods import-demand (full sample, panel estimates, measure = import-intensity-adjusted demand (IAD)):
  - Import Demand coefficient: 1.00 (panel estimate in Table 3, column (1))
  - Relative Prices coefficient: -0.23 (panel estimate in Table 3, column (1))
  - R2: 0.52 (panel estimate in Table 3, column (1))
- Services import-demand (full sample, panel estimates, measure = IAD):
  - Import Demand coefficient: 1.42 (panel estimate in Table 5, column (1))
  - Relative Prices coefficient: 0.04 (panel estimate in Table 5, column (1))
  - R2: 0.08 (panel estimate in Table 5, column (1))
- Residuals for Real Goods Import Growth (weighted by nominal goods import shares, Table 6):
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Indicator 1985–2011:
    - IAD: 0.003 (standard error (0.005))
    - DIAD: 0.000 (standard error (0.007))
    - DIAD+X: 0.002 (standard error (0.006))
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Indicator 2012–16:
    - IAD: -0.017 (standard error (0.006))
    - DIAD: -0.040 (standard error (0.007))
    - DIAD+X: -0.028 (standard error (0.007))
- Residuals for Real Services Import Growth (Table 7):
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Indicator 1985–2011:
    - IAD: 0.010 (standard error (0.012))
    - DIAD: 0.014 (standard error (0.012))
    - DIAD+X: 0.010 (standard error (0.011))
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Indicator 2012–16:
    - IAD: 0.012 (standard error (0.017))
    - DIAD: -0.014 (standard error (0.018))
    - DIAD+X: -0.011 (standard error (0.018))

### Decomposing the slowdown in real goods import growth — emerging market and developing economies (selected table entries)
- Actual overall growth: 1985–2007 = 11.1; 2003–2007 = 13.7; 2012–2016 = 1.9
- Contributions (IAD model, 1985–2007): C = 2.2; G = 1.3; I = 4.5; X = 6.3; Relative Prices = 0.8; Const = -4.6
- Contributions (IAD model, 2012–2016): C = 1.6; G = 1.0; I = 2.4; X = 2.1; Relative Prices = 0.7; Const = -4.1
- Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 1985-2007: -9.2 overall, with -6.8 attributed to predicted components (fraction predicted = 0.74)
- Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 2003-2007: -11.8 overall, with -9.9 attributed to predicted components (fraction predicted = 0.84)
- Interpretation:
  - Investment and exports account for large portions of earlier high import growth and for substantial parts of the subsequent slowdown.
  - A nontrivial unexplained residual remains, larger for Emerging Market and Developing Economies than for Advanced Economies (fraction predicted by model lower for EMDE: 0.74 vs Advanced Economies 0.91 for 1985–2007).

### Structural model results: nominal import-to-GDP ratio and wedges
- Structural model compares actual and model-implied evolution of the gross growth of nominal imports-to-GDP ratio (ratio defined as (Mt/Mt-1)/(Yt/Yt-1)); a value of one indicates nominal imports and GDP grow at the same rate.
- Counterfactual exercises isolate:
  - Demand composition wedge (changes in shares of durables, nondurables, commodities in final demand)
  - Trade cost wedge (declines in trade costs increase the depicted trade wedge and boost model-implied trade values)
- Demand composition wedges plotted for three tradable sectors (Figure 7) show time series of shares in final demand for:
  - Durables
  - Nondurables
  - Commodities
- Panels shown for World, Advanced Economies, and Emerging Market and Developing Economies.

### Country sample and exercises
- Sample classification (Table 1 extract): the chapter’s analytical exercises performed include:
  - I = Import Demand Model
  - II = Structural Model
- Countries listed in the sample include a cross-section of advanced economies (asterisk denotes advanced economy per IMF WEO) and a broad set of Emerging Market and Developing Economies.

_Italic: Source: IMF Working Paper — chapter 10 (Decomposing the Decline in Real Goods Import Growth: Emerging Market and Developing Economies)._

### References .............................................................................................................

### wp17242 - References

### Figures
- 1. World Real Trade and GDP Growth in Historical Perspective ...........................................21
- 2. Trade in Values, Volumes, Across Country Groups, and Types of Products ......................22
- 3. Empirical Model: Actual and Predicted Growth of Real Goods and Services Imports, Full Sample ........................................................................................................................23
- 4. Empirical Model: Difference Between Actual and Predicted Growth of Real Growth Imports ...............................................................................................................................24
- 5. Empirical Model: Decomposing the Slowdown in Real Goods Imports Growth ...............25
- 6. Structural Model: Actual and Model Implied Evolution of Nominal Import-to-GDP Ratio ...................................................................................................................................26
- 7. Structural Model: Demand Composition Wedges ...............................................................27

### Tables
- 1. Sample of Economies by Exercise .......................................................................................28
- 2. Import Content of Aggregate Demand Components ...........................................................28
- 3. Empirical Model of Real Imports of Goods and Services ...................................................29
- 4. Empirical Model of Real Imports of Goods ........................................................................29
- 5. Empirical Model of Real Imports of Services .....................................................................30
- 6. Residuals: Real Goods Import Growth ................................................................................31
- 7. Residuals: Real Services Import Growth .............................................................................31
- 8. Decomposing the Decline in Real Goods Import Growth: Full Sample .............................32
- 9. Decomposing the Decline in Real Goods Import Growth: Advanced Economies ..............33

*Source: wp17242 - References (PDF).*

### 10. Decomposing the Decline in Real Goods Import Growth: Emerging Market and

### 10. Decomposing the Decline in Real Goods Import Growth: Emerging Market and Developing Economies

### Key stylized facts on the trade slowdown
- World goods trade volume growth averaged 2.2 percent% in 2012–16, down from 8.1 percent in 1985–2007 and 9.0 percent in 2003–07.
- In real terms, world trade growth slowed since the end of 2011; in nominal U.S. dollar terms, it collapsed since the second half of 2014 due to the sharp drop in the price of oil and the strength of the U.S. dollar.
- The slowdown in real trade growth was widespread:
  - Growth of goods and services imports during 2012–16 slowed in 142 of 169 countries compared with the five years leading to the global financial crisis.
  - When measured relative to GDP growth, the slowdown occurred in 122 countries.
- Sectoral patterns:
  - Services trade remained more resilient than goods trade.
  - Within goods, the decline in real trade growth was most pronounced for capital goods, followed by primary intermediate goods, and durable consumption goods; nondurable consumption goods held up relatively well.
  - The sharper slowdown in capital and durable consumption goods points to the potential role of investment weakness in holding back global trade growth.

### Empirical analysis of import demand (historical, country-level)
- Data and scope:
  - Empirical models estimated separately for 150 economies over 1985–2016.
  - Import-intensity-adjusted aggregate demand (IAD) constructed as a weighted average of private consumption, government consumption, investment, and exports; import content weights from Eora MRIO averaged over 1990–2011.
- Model variants:
  - Full IAD (all four components).
  - Domestic IAD only (퐷퐼퐴퐷).
  - 퐷퐼퐴퐷 plus exports predicted by trading partners’ domestic 퐼퐴퐷 (퐷퐼퐴퐷+푋).
- Main empirical findings:
  - The empirical import demand models closely track actual import growth until 2012; after 2012, annual growth of real goods imports was consistently lower than model-based benchmarks.
  - Pooling residuals for 1985–2016 and testing for 2012–16 reveals a systematic negative residual for goods imports in 2012–16, indicating “missing” goods import growth at the global level; no robust unexplained slowdown for services at the global level.
  - Magnitude of unexplained “missing” goods import growth (baseline 퐷퐼퐴퐷+푋 specification):
    - Advanced economies: about 1 percentage point.
    - Emerging market and developing economies: about 3 percentage points.
    - World: about 1¾ percentage point.
  - Counterfactual decompositions:
    - The model that uses all four aggregate demand components can account for 86 percent of the observed decline in import growth between 2003–07 and 2012–16, and 84 percent of the observed decline between 1985–2007 and 2012–16.
    - Over 80 percent of the global goods import slowdown can be traced to slower overall growth, a compositional shift away from import-intensive components (notably investment), and synchronised weakness across countries.
    - The empirical analysis finds that changes in investment and export growth are the principal contributors to the predicted slowdown, especially relative to 2003–07.
  - Counterfactual implication: the level of real global goods trade would have been 8 percent higher in 2016 had it not been for the estimated missing trade growth.

### Structural multicountry, multisector (general equilibrium) analysis
- Model and scope:
  - Multisector, multicountry static Ricardian framework adapted from Eaton et al. (2010), with a new tradable commodities sector added.
  - Estimated for 34 advanced and emerging market economies; sectoral data for 2003–16; the exercise accounts for 75 percent of world trade.
  - Four wedges (time-varying factors) used to allocate observed trade dynamics: (1) composition of demand; (2) trade costs; (3) productivity; (4) trade deficits.
- Identification and counterfactuals:
  - Wedges are sector- and country-specific. Counterfactuals turn on only one wedge at a time to quantify its contribution.
  - Production and trade in commodities modeled like manufacturing sectors; equilibrium solved using exact hat algebra for consecutive year-pairs.
- Main structural findings:
  - Changes in the composition of demand account for almost 60 percent of the slowdown in the growth of nominal goods imports relative to GDP in 2012–16 versus 2003–07 (world).
  - Trade costs account for close to a quarter of the slowdown in the growth of the nominal imports-to-GDP ratio.
  - When demand composition and trade costs are allowed to change together, the model can account for close to 80 percent of the slowdown.
  - Cross-country nuances:
    - In advanced economies, shifts in demand composition were relatively more important.
    - In emerging market and developing economies, falling trade costs helped drive trade growth in 2003–07 (notably China), while a slowdown in the pace of trade-cost reductions contributed to weaker trade growth in 2012–16.
    - China shows a notable rise in the trade costs wedge over the slowdown period; Brazil experienced a large decline in the share of durable manufacturing in final demand, depressing import growth.
  - Sectoral composition dynamics:
    - The slowdown involved a shift in demand toward nontradables and within tradables toward nondurable manufactured goods.
    - The expenditure share of commodities fell significantly due to commodity price declines; the aggregate share of tradable sectors decreased modestly by ½ percentage points during the slowdown after increasing by almost four percentage points prior to the crisis period.

### Synthesis and interpretation
- Two complementary approaches (country-level empirical and multicountry structural) deliver a consistent message:
  - Much—though not all—of the trade slowdown since 2012 reflects weak economic activity and compositional shifts (notably weak investment).
  - Empirical analysis: over 80 percent of the decline in trade growth since 2012 relative to 2003–07 can be predicted by weaker activity and composition shifts.
  - Structural analysis: changes in composition of demand account for about 60 percent of the slowdown in the growth of nominal imports relative to GDP; trade costs contribute close to 25 percent; combined account for close to 80 percent.
  - The unexplained residual in goods import growth at the global level is nontrivial (about 1¾ percentage points), implying other factors beyond demand and relative prices are at work.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Priorities to help restore trade’s contribution to productivity and growth:
  - Address constraints to growth, particularly by reviving investment: since much of the trade slowdown is tied to weak investment, policies that raise investment should strengthen trade as a by-product.
  - Resist protectionism and revive trade liberalization: reducing trade costs via dismantling remaining trade barriers remains relevant and could provide support for trade growth and potentially catalyze new global value chain development.
- Interpretation cautions:
  - The empirical approach focuses on the demand → trade link and may overstate the role of output if trade policies and trade itself feed back into growth; robustness checks indicate this bias is likely small.
  - The structural model is static and stylized; it captures general equilibrium feedbacks but cannot capture all channels (e.g., dynamic productivity gains from greater openness).

*Source: IMF Working Paper — chapter 10 (Decomposing the Decline in Real Goods Import Growth: Emerging Market and Developing Economies).*

### 3. Emerging Market and Developing Economies

### 3. Emerging Market and Developing Economies

### Import growth trends and composition
- Real goods import growth in Emerging Market and Developing Economies:
  - Average growth 1985–2007: 11.1
  - Average growth 2003–2007: 13.7
  - Average growth 2012–2016: 1.9
  - Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 1985-2007: -9.2
  - Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 2003-2007: -11.8
- Components of aggregate demand (mean import content, average over 1990–2011 across 150 countries):
  - Consumption: 23.3
  - Government spending: 14.9
  - Investment: 29.6
  - Exports: 31.8
- Product-group import growth: comparison 2003–2007 vs 2012–2015 shows larger earlier growth in Capital, Primary, Intermediate, Durable, Consumer, Processed, Intermediate Nondurable, and Consumer goods (chart categories listed as: Capital; Primary; Interm.; Durable; Cons.; Processed; Interm. Nondur.; Cons.).

### Empirical import-demand model: key coefficients and residuals
- Goods import-demand (full sample, panel estimates, measure = import-intensity-adjusted demand (IAD)):
  - Import Demand coefficient: 1.00 (panel estimate in Table 3, column (1))
  - Relative Prices coefficient: -0.23 (panel estimate in Table 3, column (1))
  - R2: 0.52 (panel estimate in Table 3, column (1))
- Services import-demand (full sample, panel estimates, measure = IAD):
  - Import Demand coefficient: 1.42 (panel estimate in Table 5, column (1))
  - Relative Prices coefficient: 0.04 (panel estimate in Table 5, column (1))
  - R2: 0.08 (panel estimate in Table 5, column (1))
- Residuals for Real Goods Import Growth (weighted by nominal goods import shares, Table 6):
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Indicator 1985–2011:
    - IAD: 0.003 (standard error (0.005))
    - DIAD: 0.000 (standard error (0.007))
    - DIAD+X: 0.002 (standard error (0.006))
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Indicator 2012–16:
    - IAD: -0.017 (standard error (0.006))
    - DIAD: -0.040 (standard error (0.007))
    - DIAD+X: -0.028 (standard error (0.007))
- Residuals for Real Services Import Growth (Table 7):
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Indicator 1985–2011:
    - IAD: 0.010 (standard error (0.012))
    - DIAD: 0.014 (standard error (0.012))
    - DIAD+X: 0.010 (standard error (0.011))
  - Emerging Market and Developing Economies, Indicator 2012–16:
    - IAD: 0.012 (standard error (0.017))
    - DIAD: -0.014 (standard error (0.018))
    - DIAD+X: -0.011 (standard error (0.018))

### Decomposing the slowdown in real goods import growth
- Full-sample decomposition (Table 8, IAD model):
  - Actual overall growth: 1985–2007 = 8.1; 2003–2007 = 9.0; 2012–2016 = 2.2
  - Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 1985-2007: -5.9 (overall)
  - Fraction of the import growth decline predicted by the IAD model:
    - 1985–2007 comparison: 0.84
    - 2003–2007 comparison: 0.86
- Emerging Market and Developing Economies decomposition (Table 10):
  - Actual overall growth: 1985–2007 = 11.1; 2003–2007 = 13.7; 2012–2016 = 1.9
  - Contributions (IAD model, 1985–2007): C = 2.2; G = 1.3; I = 4.5; X = 6.3; Relative Prices = 0.8; Const = -4.6
  - Contributions (IAD model, 2012–2016): C = 1.6; G = 1.0; I = 2.4; X = 2.1; Relative Prices = 0.7; Const = -4.1
  - Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 1985-2007: -9.2 overall, with -6.8 attributed to predicted components (fraction predicted = 0.74)
  - Average Growth in 2012-16 minus average growth in 2003-2007: -11.8 overall, with -9.9 attributed to predicted components (fraction predicted = 0.84)
- Decomposition interpretation:
  - Investment and exports account for large portions of earlier high import growth and for substantial parts of the subsequent slowdown.
  - A nontrivial unexplained residual remains, larger for Emerging Market and Developing Economies than for Advanced Economies (fraction predicted by model lower for EMDE: 0.74 vs Advanced Economies 0.91 for 1985–2007).

### Structural model results: nominal import-to-GDP ratio and wedges
- Structural model compares actual and model-implied evolution of the gross growth of nominal imports-to-GDP ratio (ratio defined as (Mt/Mt-1)/(Yt/Yt-1)); a value of one indicates nominal imports and GDP grow at the same rate.
- Counterfactual exercises isolate:
  - Demand composition wedge (changes in shares of durables, nondurables, commodities in final demand)
  - Trade cost wedge (declines in trade costs increase the depicted trade wedge and boost model-implied trade values)
- Demand composition wedges plotted for three tradable sectors (Figure 7) show time series of shares in final demand for:
  - Durables
  - Nondurables
  - Commodities
  - Panels shown for World, Advanced Economies, and Emerging Market and Developing Economies.

### Country sample and exercises
- Sample classification (Table 1 extract): the chapter’s analytical exercises performed include:
  - I = Import Demand Model
  - II = Structural Model
- Countries listed in the sample include a cross-section of advanced economies (asterisk denotes advanced economy per IMF WEO) and a broad set of Emerging Market and Developing Economies.

_Italic: Source: IMF staff calculations (content unit: "3. Emerging Market and Developing Economies")._

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Empirical studies on the global trade slowdown
- Alessandria, George and Horag Choi. 2016. “The Dynamics of the U.S. Trade Balance and Real Exchange Rate: The J Curve and Trade Costs?” mimeo.  
- Alessandria, George, Joseph Kaboski, and Virgiliu Midrigan. 2013. “Trade Wedges, Inventories and International Business Cycles.” Journal of Monetary Economics 60: 1-20  
- Amiti, Mary, Tyler Bodine-Smith, Colin Hottman, and Logan Lewis (2016) “What’s driving the recent slump in US imports?” Federal Reserve Board, IFDP note.  
- Boz, Emine, Matthieu Bussière, Clément Marsilli, 2015. “Recent slowdown in global trade: Cyclical or Structural?” In Bernard Hoekman. 2015. The Global Trade Slowdown: A New Normal? Vox EU E-book, Chapter 3 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research) http://www.voxeu.org/article/recent-slowdown-global-trade  
- Bussière, Matthieu, Giovanni Callegari, Fabio Ghironi, Giulia Sestieri, and Norihiko Yamano. 2013. “Estimating Trade Elasticities: Demand Composition and the Trade Collapse of 2008–09.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5 (3): 118–51.  
- Hong, Gee Hee, Jaewoo Lee, Wei Liao and Dulani Seneviratne. 2016. “China and Asia in the Global Trade Slowdown.” IMF Working Paper 16/105 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
- Jääskelä, Jarkko and Thomas Mathews. 2015. "Explaining the Slowdown in Global Trade." Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, September, 39-46.  
- Levchenko, Andrei, Logan Lewis, and Linda Tesar. 2010. “The Collapse of International Trade during the 2008–09 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun.” IMF Economic Review, 58(2): 214–253.  
- Lewis, Logan, and Ryan Monarch (2016) “Causes of the global trade slowdown”, Federal Reserve Board, IFDP Note, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November.  
- Martinez-Martin, Jaime. 2016. “Breaking Down World Trade Elasticities: A Panel ECM Approach.” Bank of Spain Working Paper No. 1614.  
- Morel, Louis. 2015. “Sluggish Exports in Advanced Economies: How Much is Due to Demand” Bank of Canada Discussion Paper No. 2015-3.  
- Slopek, Ulf. 2015. “Why has the Income Elasticity of Global Trade Declined?” Deutsch Bundesbank, Economics Department, unpublished manuscript.  
- Timmer, Marcel P., Bart Los, Robert Stehrer and Gaaitzen J. de Vries. 2016. “An anatomy of the global trade slowdown based on the WIOD 2016 release”, GGDC research memorandum number 162, University of Groningen.

### Theoretical and methodological contributions
- Chari, Varadarajan V., Patrick J. Kehoe, Ellen McGrattan, 2007. “Business Cycle Accounting.” Econometrica 75 (3): 781:836.  
- Dekle, Robert, Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum, 2007. “Unbalanced Trade.” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 67 (4): 351-5.  
- Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum, 2002. “Technology, Geography, and Trade.” Econometrica 70 (5): 1741-79.  
- Eaton, Jonathan, Samuel Kortum, Brent Neiman, John Romalis, 2010. “Trade and the Global Recession.” National Bank of Belgium Working Paper Research No. 196, October, Brussels.  
- Eaton, Jonathan, Samuel Kortum, Brent Neiman, John Romalis, 2016. “Trade and the Global Recession.” American Economic Review, 106(11): 3401-38.  
- Levchenko, Andrei, Logan Lewis, and Linda Tesar. 2010. “The Collapse of International Trade during the 2008–09 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun.” IMF Economic Review, 58(2): 214–253. (also relevant for empirical-methodological linkage)

### IMF, OECD, central bank, and policy reports
- Aslam, Aqib, Emine Boz, Eugenio Cerutti, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro and Petia Topalova (forthcoming) “Explaining the Global Trade Slowdown: The Role of Trade Costs and Global Value Chain Participation.” IMF Working Paper, forthcoming.  
- Constantinescu, Cristina, Aaditya Mattoo, and Michele Ruta, 2015. “The Global Trade Slowdown: Cyclical or Structural?” IMF Working Paper No. 15/6 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
- European Central Bank, IRC Trade Task Force (2016) “Understanding the weakness in global trade: What is the new normal?”, ECB Occasional Paper, No 178.  
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2015a. April 2015 World Economic Outlook (Box 1.2. “Understanding the Role of Cyclical and Structural Factors in the Global Trade Slowdown.”) Washington.  
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2015b. April 2015 World Economic Outlook, “Private Investment: What is the Holdup?” Chapter 4, Washington.  
- _____. 2016a. April 2016 World Economic Outlook, “Understanding the Slowdown in Capital Flows to Emerging Markets,” Chapter 2, Washington.  
- _____. 2016b. October 2016 World Economic Outlook, Chapter 2, “Global Trade: What’s Behind the Slowdown?” Chapter 2, Washington.  
- OECD (2016) “Cardiac arrest or dizzy spell: Why is world trade so weak and what can policy do about it?”, OECD, Economic Policy Paper, 18.  
- Ollivaud, Patrice, and Cyrille Schwellnus, 2015. “Does the Post-Crisis Weakness in Global Trade Solely Reflect Weak Demand?” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1216.  
- Powell, Jerome H. 2016. “The global trade slowdown and its implications for emerging Asia”, speech delivered at CPBS 2016 Pacific Basin Research Conference.  
- Kindberg-Hanlon, Gene, and David Young. 2016. “The world trade slowdown (redux)”, Bank of England Blog.  
- Freund, Caroline, 2016. “The Global Trade Slowdown and Secular Stagnation,” Peterson Institute of International Economics blog, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/global-trade-slowdown-and-secular-stagnation

### Trade costs, global value chains, and related analyses
- Alessandria, George and Horag Choi. 2016. “The Dynamics of the U.S. Trade Balance and Real Exchange Rate: The J Curve and Trade Costs?” mimeo.  
- Alessandria, George, Joseph Kaboski, and Virgiliu Midrigan. 2013. “Trade Wedges, Inventories and International Business Cycles.” Journal of Monetary Economics 60: 1-20  
- Amiti, Mary, Tyler Bodine-Smith, Colin Hottman, and Logan Lewis (2016) “What’s driving the recent slump in US imports?” Federal Reserve Board, IFDP note.  
- Aslam, Aqib, Emine Boz, Eugenio Cerutti, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro and Petia Topalova (forthcoming) “Explaining the Global Trade Slowdown: The Role of Trade Costs and Global Value Chain Participation.” IMF Working Paper, forthcoming.  
- Timmer, Marcel P., Bart Los, Robert Stehrer and Gaaitzen J. de Vries. 2016. “An anatomy of the global trade slowdown based on the WIOD 2016 release”, GGDC research memorandum number 162, University of Groningen.  
- Slopek, Ulf. 2015. “Why has the Income Elasticity of Global Trade Declined?” Deutsch Bundesbank, Economics Department, unpublished manuscript.

*Source: wp17242 - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2017/wp17242.pdf_