## wp18206

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---

### Introduction
- Purpose: Update the comprehensive global database on systemic banking crises in Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2013) to cover all episodes during the period 1970–2017.
- Core methodology: Date systemic banking crises based on the intensity of the policy response to reduce the use of subjective criteria.
- Complementary information: Database includes dates of sovereign debt and currency crises during the same period and information about policy responses, fiscal costs, output losses, and other stylized facts about banking crises.

### Coverage and counts
- Banking crises identified: 151 banking crises.
- Currency crises identified: 236 currency crises.
- Sovereign crises identified: 74 sovereign crises.
- Sample period: 1970–2017.

### Definition of a banking crisis and policy variable definitions
- Banking crisis definition:
  - Two conditions must be met:
    - 1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations).
    - 2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system.
  - The first year that both criteria are met is the year when the crisis became systemic.
  - Severe-loss exception: the first criterion alone suffices when losses are severe, defined as either:
    - (i) nonperforming loans above 20 percent of total loans or bank closures of at least 20 percent of banking system assets; or
    - (ii) fiscal restructuring costs of the banking sector exceed 5 percent of GDP.
- Policy intervention significance: at least three out of six measures must have been used:
  - 1) deposit freezes and/or bank holidays;
  - 2) significant bank nationalizations;
  - 3) bank restructuring fiscal costs (at least 3 percent of GDP);
  - 4) extensive liquidity support (at least 5 percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents);
  - 5) significant guarantees put in place; and
  - 6) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP).
- Policy variable definitions (selected):
  - Deposit freeze and bank holidays: government restrictions on deposit withdrawals or bank holidays; duration and affected instruments collected.
  - Significant nationalizations: government takeovers of systemically important financial institutions, including majority stakes.
  - Significant bank guarantees: government guarantees on bank liabilities beyond deposit insurance coverage.
  - Liquidity support: central bank claims on other depository institutions (from IFS) and Treasury liquidity support, normalized by total deposits and bank liabilities to non-residents; considered extensive when ratio exceeds 5 percent and more than doubles relative to pre-crisis level.
  - Bank restructuring costs: gross fiscal outlays directed to restructuring the financial sector; significant if exceed 3 percent of GDP.
  - Asset purchases: purchases of assets from financial institutions by central bank, treasury, or government entity; significant if exceed 5 percent of GDP.

### Banking crises episodes and sequencing with currency and sovereign debt crises
- Banking crises episodes during 1970–2017:
  - The definition identifies 151 banking crises since 1970.
  - Four episodes started since 2011: Cyprus (2011), Guinea Bissau (2014), Moldova (2014), and Ukraine (2014).
  - Only three countries experienced more than two systemic banking crises during 1970–2017: Argentina (4), Democratic Republic of Congo (3), Ukraine (3).
  - Dataset includes borderline systemic crises; years provided for all cases, and year and month whenever feasible.
- Currency crisis definition and counts:
  - Sharp nominal depreciation vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar meeting either:
    - i) year-on-year depreciation of at least 30 percent; or
    - ii) at least 10 percentage points higher than the rate of depreciation observed in the year before.
  - Currency crises identified during 1970–2017: 236.
- Sovereign debt crises dating and counts:
  - Episodes of sovereign default and restructuring dated using multiple sources; year of default to private creditors and/or restructuring recorded.
  - Sovereign debt crises identified during 1970–2017: 75, of which 11 took place since 2007.
- Sequencing and co-occurrence:
  - Triple crises (simultaneous banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises in a given country): 11.
  - Across 1970–2017, crisis types come in waves.
  - Twin crises: currency/banking and currency/debt pairs are more common than banking/debt pairs.
  - Sequencing relative to banking crisis start year T:
    - Currency and sovereign debt crises, on average, tend to coincide with or follow banking crises.
    - Currency crises peak at one year after the beginning of the banking crisis.
  - Overlap definition:
    - Twin crisis in year T: banking crisis in year T combined with a currency (sovereign debt) crisis during [T-1, T+1].
    - Triple crisis in year T: banking crisis in year T combined with both currency and sovereign debt crises during [T-1, T+1].

### Policy response to banking crises — liquidity support (key statistics)
- Liquidity support measure:
  - Ratio of central bank claims on the financial sector to deposits and foreign liabilities.
  - Two measures reported:
    - Peak liquidity support: the peak of this ratio.
    - Liquidity support (change measure): change between the peak and the average of the ratio during the year before the start of the crisis.
- Key statistics (151 episodes):
  - Median peak liquidity support ratio: 20.2 percent.
  - 100 out of 151 episodes record a positive peak liquidity support value of up to 28 percent.
  - Median peak liquidity support by income group:
    - High-income countries: 12 percent.
    - Low-and middle-income countries: 23 percent.
  - Median liquidity support (change measure): 10.8 percent.
  - 95 out of 151 episodes exhibit a positive liquidity support value of up to 16 percent.

### Containment and resolution policies — patterns and examples
- Liquidity support:
  - Both high-income and low-and middle-income countries rely extensively on liquidity support.
  - High-income countries use a wider array of instruments, including coordinated deployment of central bank swap facilities during the global financial crisis.
  - Low-and middle-income countries tend to rely on liquidity provision for much longer before introducing bank recapitalization and restructuring measures.
- Institutional differences:
  - Weaker institutions (including non-independent central banks and regulators) in some low and middle-income countries, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, may have led to prolonged reliance on liquidity support and delayed recognition of bank solvency problems.
- Guarantees on bank liabilities:
  - 34 crisis episodes announced blanket guarantees; 19 of these cases corresponded to high-income countries, mostly during the 2008 global financial crisis.
  - Guarantees often left in place for many years and gradually removed (examples provided in source).
  - At end-2016, EU governments collectively still had 120 billion euros in outstanding guarantees issued in support of the financial system (peak 835 billion euros in 2009).
- Deposit freezes and bank holidays:
  - Deposit freezes reported in only 8 episodes (recent cases: Cyprus 2013, Ukraine 2014, Greece 2015).
  - Deposit freeze and bank holiday examples:
    - Cyprus: restrictions to domestic payments removed in May 2014; external payments restrictions remained until April 2015.
    - Ukraine: cash withdrawals from domestic currency accounts lifted in September 2016; from FX accounts in August 2017; some FX restrictions remained as of early 2018.
    - Greece: restrictions gradually relaxed since July 2015 but some restrictions remained as of early 2018 (monthly limit on cash withdrawals; limits on cross-border bank transfers).
  - Bank holidays reported in 6 cases; in 5 of 6 cases duration was between 4 and 8 days; Greece was 21 days; in all 6 instances the bank holiday was followed by a deposit freeze.
- Recapitalization and resolution tools:
  - Recapitalization is used in most crises and is the most important component of direct fiscal costs from government intervention.
  - Government capital injections often combine preferred and common equity and may include conditions (board seats for government representatives; limiting/prohibiting dividend payments).
  - Government majority ownership is classified as nationalization.
  - Database records treasury or central bank asset purchases and establishment of asset management companies.

### Macro policies around crises
- Short-term interest rates:
  - High-income countries: median short-term interest rates declined to a median level very close to zero in the year after the start of the crisis, from a median of about 5 percent.
  - Low-and middle-income countries: median short-term interest rate increases around crises.
  - Explanation: limited room for countercyclical monetary policy in low and middle-income countries and concerns about sharp currency depreciations.
- Primary fiscal balances:
  - Median primary balance tends to deteriorate sharply in high-income countries.
  - Median primary balance improves in low and middle-income countries (forced procyclical fiscal policy due to limited financing options).
- Reserve money and unconventional policy:
  - Laeven and Valencia (2013) report increases in reserve money across episodes, capturing unconventional monetary policy and greater monetary policy use in high-income countries.

### Crisis outcomes — fiscal costs and public debt
- Fiscal costs (direct fiscal outlays linked to interventions):
  - Median gross fiscal cost for crises in high-income countries: 6.7 percent of GDP.
  - Median gross fiscal cost for crises in low and middle-income countries: 10 percent of GDP.
  - Median net fiscal cost (after recoveries) for high-income countries: 3.3 percent of GDP.
  - Median net fiscal cost (after recoveries) for low- and middle-income countries: 9.6 percent of GDP.
  - Fiscal costs relative to financial system assets are higher in low- to middle-income economies.
  - A handful of episodes report fiscal costs of more than 100 percent of financial system assets (hyperinflation measurement anomalies).
- Broader measure — increases in public debt (T-1 to T+3):
  - High-income countries: 21.1 percent of GDP.
  - Low- and middle-income countries: 16.4 percent of GDP.
  - Method note: for crises starting in 2007 or later, pre-crisis projected debt increase from Fall WEO preceding crisis; post-crisis actual from Fall 2017 WEO; ratios to GDP use latest GDP series. For past episodes, actual change in debt reported.

### Crisis outcomes — asset quality, duration, and output losses
- Peak nonperforming loans (NPLs):
  - In about 70 percent of crises in high-income countries, NPLs never surpassed 20 percent of total loans.
  - Median peak NPL in high-income country crises: slightly exceeds 11 percent.
  - Median peak NPL in low and middle-income country crises: 30 percent.
- Crisis duration (end date rule and distribution):
  - End date definition: year before both real GDP growth and real credit growth are positive for at least two consecutive years.
  - Duration truncated at five years (reported five years means five years or more).
  - Distribution:
    - About two-thirds of crises ended in less than five years overall.
    - More than half of episodes in high-income countries lasted five years or more.
    - Most crises in low and middle-income countries lasted four years or less.
- Output losses (cumulative deviations over [T, T+3]):
  - Computed as cumulative deviations of actual GDP from trend, expressed in percent of one year’s trend GDP; trend computed with HP filter (λ=100) on log real GDP over [T-20, T-1].
  - Output losses in high-income countries tend to be much larger than in low and middle-income countries.
  - Persistence: decline in output after banking crises shows persistence and is more pronounced in high-income countries; episodes during the global financial crisis feature prominently in high-income sample.
  - Explanatory factor: sluggish evolution in export volumes after crises in high-income countries versus no slowdown in export volumes for median path among low-and middle-income country episodes.

### Database strengths, contribution, and conclusions
- Strengths: Comprehensive dating of banking crises for a large cross-country sample plus documentation of policy responses during crises.
- Relevance: Enables drawing implications of banking crises beyond advanced economies and large emerging markets.
- Conclusion highlights:
  - Persistent real effects, permanent output losses, elevated levels of public debt, and policy support still to be fully unwound remain legacy issues for many countries after the global financial crisis.
  - High-quality data on banking crises is a key prerequisite to better predict, prevent, and resolve crises.
  - The paper provides a comprehensive database on systemic banking crises during 1970–2017, updating earlier releases and including new events.

### Appendix — selected exact entries from Table 2 (Banking Crises Resolution and Outcomes)
- Austria (Start 2008; End 2012 7/):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 19.2
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 5.2
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 1.6
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 1.6
  - Peak NPLs: 10.0
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 6.4
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 4.1
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 19.8
- Argentina (Start 1980; End 1982 6/):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 58.2
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 55.1
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 55.1
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 213.9
  - Peak NPLs: 64.6
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 62.2
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 9.0
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 33.1
- Cyprus (Start 2011; End 2015 7/):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 76.5
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 18.0
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 18.0
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 2.6
  - Peak NPLs: 20.3
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 14.1
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 47.8
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 21.3
- Greece (Start 2008; End 2012 7/):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 64.9
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 28.7
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 17.1
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 17.1
  - Peak NPLs: 61.7
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 59.8
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 37.1
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 43.9
- Iceland (Start 2008; End 2012 7/):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 34.5
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 37.6
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 3.3
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 14.3
  - Peak NPLs: 33.8
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 28.1
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 61.2
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 67.9
- Ireland (Start 2008; End 2012 7/):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 107.7
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 37.6
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 26.8
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 4.5
  - Peak NPLs: 18.1
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 15.4
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 25.7
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 76.5
- Spain (Start 2008; End 2012 7/):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 38.8
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 5.4
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 4.8
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 2.0
  - Peak NPLs: 33.5
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 31.3
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 9.4
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 31.8
- United Kingdom (Start 2007; End 2011 7/):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 25.3
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 8.8
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 3.8
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 5.8
  - Peak NPLs: 3.4
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 2.5
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 4.0
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 27.0
- United States (Start 2007; End 2011):
  - Output Loss % of trend GDP: 30.0
  - Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 4.5
  - Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 0.6
  - Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 2.2
  - Peak NPLs: 4.7
  - Peak Liquidity Support: 4.7
  - Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 5.0
  - Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 21.9

### Appendix — selected exact entries from Table 3 (Banking Crisis Policy Responses)
- Argentina (Mar-80): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Y; Bank Nationalization: N; Bank Recapitalization: 1983 (IMF Program listed).
- Argentina (Dec-89): Deposit Freeze Date 28-Dec-1989; Bank Holiday Duration 120 (days); Bank Holiday Date 1-Jan-1990; Bank Holiday Duration 4 (days); Bank Nationalization: N; Bank Recapitalization: 0.28 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 1990
- Argentina (Nov-01): Deposit Freeze Date 3-Dec-2001; Deposit Freeze Duration 12 (months); Bank Holiday Date 31-Dec-2001; Bank Holiday Duration 5 (days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Y; Bank Nationalization: N; Bank Recapitalization: 9.58 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2000
- Austria (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Unlimited coverage to depositors, bank and non-bank bonds.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 3.96 (In percent of GDP)
- Belgium (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Deposit-like insurance instruments. Interbank loans and short-term debt. Specific guarantees for Dexia.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 5.80 (In percent of GDP)
- Cyprus (Jun-11): Deposit Freeze Date 28-Mar-2013; Deposit Freeze Duration 14 (months); Bank Holiday Date 18-Mar-2013; Bank Holiday Duration 8 (days); Bank Nationalization: Y; Asset Purchase: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 18.90 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2013
- Iceland (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Unlimited coverage to domestic deposits.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 24.30 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2008
- Ireland (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Unlimited coverage to most liabilities of 10 banks.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Asset Purchase: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 37.13 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2010
- United Kingdom (Sep-07): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Guarantee on short-to-medium term debt; blanket guarantee on Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley wholesale deposits.; Deposit Freeze: Y; Bank Holiday: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 5.00 (In percent of GDP)
- United States (Dec-07): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Money market funds (capped at US$50 billion); full guarantee on transaction deposits; newly issued senior unsecured debt.; Deposit Freeze: Y; Bank Holiday: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 3.60 (In percent of GDP)
- Germany (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Unlimited coverage of household deposits.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Asset Purchase: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 1.80 (In percent of GDP)
- Japan (Nov-97): Bank Holiday Date Nov-97; Bank Holiday Duration 89 (days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: All deposits, including interbank deposits; Bank Nationalization: Y; Asset Purchase: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 6.61 (In percent of GDP)
- Korea (Aug-97): Bank Holiday Date Nov-97; Bank Holiday Duration 37 (days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: All liabilities (excluding shareholders’ capital and subordinated debt) of banks, securities companies, insurance companies, merchant banks, mutual savings and finance companies, and credit unions. Overseas branches were also included.; Deposit Freeze: Y; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 19.31 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 1998
- Turkey (Nov-00): Bank Holiday Date Dec-00; Bank Holiday Duration 43 (days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: All liabilities (including contingent) of domestically incorporated banks except for owners' deposits, deposits linked to criminal activities, subordinated debt, and equity; Deposit Freeze: Y; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 24.50 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2000

*Italic source attribution: Excerpts and figures drawn from the provided IMF working paper content (wp18206).*

### References................................................................................................26

### wp18206 - References................................................................................................26

### Introduction
- Purpose: Update the comprehensive global database on systemic banking crises in Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2013) to cover all episodes during the period 1970–2017.
- Core methodology: Date systemic banking crises based on the intensity of the policy response to reduce the use of subjective criteria.
- Complementary information: Database includes dates of sovereign debt and currency crises during the same period and information about policy responses, fiscal costs, output losses, and other stylized facts about banking crises.

### Coverage and counts
- Banking crises identified: 151 banking crises.
- Currency crises identified: 236 currency crises.
- Sovereign crises identified: 74 sovereign crises.
- Sample period: 1970–2017.

### Major empirical findings
- Policy responses by income level:
  - Use of financial intervention policies in high-income countries tends to be similar to that in low- and middle-income economies, except for guarantees on bank liabilities.
  - Guarantees on bank liabilities have been relatively more common in high-income countries.
  - High-income economies show more extensive use of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies during banking crises compared with low- and middle-income economies.
- Fiscal costs and public debt:
  - Direct fiscal costs of banking crises—defined as fiscal outlays directly related to government intervention measures in the financial sector—tend to be larger in low- and middle-income countries than in high-income countries.
  - Using a broader definition of fiscal costs that includes fiscal outlays not directly targeting the financial sector—measured as the increase in public debt-to-GDP ratios around banking crises—the opposite holds: increases in public indebtedness tend to be more pronounced for high-income countries.
  - Explanation provided: Greater ability of high-income countries to use fiscal stimulus during banking crises increases public debt, combined with larger output losses in high-income countries after banking crises.
- Economic impacts:
  - Systemic banking crises lead to sustained declines in economic activity, financial intermediation, and welfare.
  - Appropriate crisis dating is crucial: using inappropriate dating can obscure true relationships or create spurious causal links between crises and other economic variables.

### Database strengths and contribution
- Advantage over other studies: Comprehensive dating of banking crises for a large cross-country sample plus documentation of policy responses during crises.
- Relevance: Important for drawing implications of banking crises beyond advanced economies and large emerging markets.

### Relation to literature
- Context: Banking crisis dating literature has expanded since the global financial crisis.
- Notable related works mentioned: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Romer and Romer (2017), and Baron and others (2018).
- Distinction emphasized: The database’s breadth and policy-response documentation distinguish it from other contributions.

### Organization of the paper
- Section II: Presents definition of banking crises.
- Section III: Shows the resulting list of crises during the period 1970–2017.
- Additional contents (listed in the document): Figures 1–14 detailing frequencies, types, sequencing, policies, interest rates, fiscal balances, fiscal costs, public debt increases, NPL peaks, crisis duration, and output losses; Appendix Tables 1–3 covering crisis dates, resolution and outcomes, and policy responses.

*Source: wp18206 (excerpt).*

### Section IV complements our banking crises dates with those for currency and sovereign debt

### Section IV complements our banking crises dates with those for currency and sovereign debt

### Definition of a banking crisis
- A banking crisis is defined as an event that meets two conditions:
  - 1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations).
  - 2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system.
- The first year that both criteria are met is considered the year when the crisis became systemic.
- When losses are severe, the first criterion alone is treated as sufficient to date a systemic banking crisis. Losses are considered severe when either:
  - (i) a country’s banking system exhibits significant losses resulting in a share of nonperforming loans above 20 percent of total loans or bank closures of at least 20 percent of banking system assets; or
  - (ii) fiscal restructuring costs of the banking sector exceed 5 percent of GDP.
- For policy interventions to be considered significant, at least three out of the following six measures must have been used:
  - 1) deposit freezes and/or bank holidays;
  - 2) significant bank nationalizations;
  - 3) bank restructuring fiscal costs (at least 3 percent of GDP);
  - 4) extensive liquidity support (at least 5 percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents);
  - 5) significant guarantees put in place; and
  - 6) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP).

### Policy variable definitions (used in the crisis definition)
- Deposit freeze and bank holidays:
  - Indicates whether the government introduced restrictions on deposit withdrawals or a bank holiday; duration and affected instruments collected when implemented.
- Significant nationalizations:
  - Takeovers by the government of systemically important financial institutions, including cases where the government takes a majority stake.
- Significant bank guarantees:
  - A significant government guarantee on bank liabilities (full protection of liabilities or guarantees extended to non-deposit liabilities). Actions that only raise deposit insurance coverage are not included.
- Liquidity support:
  - Measured as central bank claims on other depository institutions (from IFS) and liquidity support directly provided by the Treasury, normalized by total deposits and bank liabilities to non-residents.
  - Considered extensive when the ratio exceeds 5 percent and more than doubles relative to its pre-crisis level.
- Bank restructuring costs:
  - Gross fiscal outlays directed to restructuring of the financial sector (recapitalization costs most important). Significant if they exceed 3 percent of GDP, excluding liquidity assistance provided directly from the treasury. Gross costs preferred; net costs reported when recoveries data available.
- Asset purchases:
  - Purchases of assets from financial institutions by the central bank, the treasury, or a government entity. Significant asset purchases defined as those exceeding 5 percent of GDP.

### Banking crises episodes during 1970–2017
- The definition identifies 151 banking crises since 1970.
- Four episodes started since 2011: Cyprus (2011), Guinea Bissau (2014), Moldova (2014), and Ukraine (2014).
- Most countries experienced at least one systemic banking crisis during 1970–2017; multiple episodes were common.
- Only three countries experienced more than two systemic banking crises during 1970–2017:
  - Argentina (4)
  - Democratic Republic of Congo (3)
  - Ukraine (3)
- The dataset includes borderline systemic crises where the definition is close to being met; years are provided for all cases, and year and month whenever feasible.

### Currency and sovereign debt crises counts and dating
- Currency crisis definition:
  - A “sharp” nominal depreciation vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar meeting either:
    - i) year-on-year depreciation of at least 30 percent; or
    - ii) at least 10 percentage points higher than the rate of depreciation observed in the year before.
  - Bilateral end-of-period official nominal exchange rates from the IMF’s WEO database are used.
  - For continuous years meeting the criteria, the first year of each five-year window is used to identify the crisis.
- Currency crises identified during 1970–2017: 236.
- Sovereign debt crises dating:
  - Episodes of sovereign default and restructuring are dated using Beim and Calomiris (2001), World Bank (2002), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), IMF Staff reports, rating agencies, and media.
  - The year of sovereign default to private creditors and/or restructuring is recorded; if public debt was restructured without suspension of payments, the year of restructuring is recorded.
- Sovereign debt crises identified during 1970–2017: 75, of which 11 took place since 2007.

### Crises sequencing and co-occurrence
- Banking and sovereign debt crises can coincide for multiple reasons, including large common shocks and spillovers:
  - Public-to-banking spillovers via banks’ sovereign exposures.
  - Banking-to-public spillovers via sovereign bailouts of banks.
- Banking and currency crisis linkages:
  - Sharp depreciation can wipe out banks’ capital through open foreign exchange positions.
  - Significant bank failures can provoke depositors to seek foreign assets and trigger a run on the currency.
- Across 1970–2017:
  - All three types of crises (banking, currency, sovereign debt) come in waves.
  - Total triple crises (simultaneous banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises in a given country): 11.
  - Among twin crises, currency/banking and currency/debt pairs are more common than banking/debt pairs.
- Sequencing pattern (relative to the start year T of a banking crisis):
  - Currency and sovereign debt crises, on average, tend to coincide with or follow banking crises.
  - Currency crises peak at one year after the beginning of the banking crisis.
  - Definition used for overlap:
    - Twin crisis in year T: banking crisis in year T combined with a currency (sovereign debt) crisis during [T-1, T+1].
    - Triple crisis in year T: banking crisis in year T combined with both currency and sovereign debt crises during [T-1, T+1].

### Policy response to banking crises — liquidity support (key statistics)
- Liquidity support is pervasive during systemic banking crises.
- Liquidity support measure:
  - Ratio of central bank claims on the financial sector to deposits and foreign liabilities.
  - Two measures reported:
    - Peak liquidity support: the peak of this ratio (reported in Table 2 in the appendix).
    - Liquidity support: change between the peak and the average of the ratio during the year before the start of the crisis.
- Key statistics (151 episodes):
  - Median peak liquidity support ratio: 20.2 percent.
  - 100 out of 151 episodes record a positive peak liquidity support value of up to 28 percent.
  - Median peak liquidity support by income group:
    - High-income countries: 12 percent.
    - Low-and middle-income countries: 23 percent.
  - Median liquidity support (change measure): 10.8 percent.
  - 95 out of 151 episodes exhibit a positive liquidity support value of up to 16 percent.

*Source: wp18206 - Section IV complements our banking crises dates with those for currency and sovereign debt*

### 6.4 percent, is less than half of the 14.8 percent corresponding to low and middle-income

### wp18206 - 6.4 percent, is less than half of the 14.8 percent corresponding to low and middle-income

### Containment and resolution policies
- High-income and low-and middle-income countries both rely extensively on liquidity support when hit by a crisis, but:
  - High-income countries use a wider array of instruments, including coordinated deployment of central bank swap facilities during the global financial crisis.
  - Low and middle-income countries tend to rely on liquidity provision for much longer before introducing bank recapitalization and restructuring measures.
- Weaker institutions (including non-independent central banks and regulators) in some low and middle-income countries, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, may have led to prolonged reliance on liquidity support and delayed recognition of bank solvency problems.
- Bank recapitalization measures (e.g., TARP in the United States) were deployed much quicker during the global financial crisis compared to earlier episodes in predominantly low and middle-income countries.
- Guarantees on bank liabilities:
  - In our database, 34 crisis episodes announced blanket guarantees; 19 of these cases corresponded to high-income countries, mostly during the 2008 global financial crisis.
  - Guarantees are often left in place for many years and only gradually removed (examples: Mexico 1993 removed in 2003; Malaysia 1998 removed in 2005).
  - At end-2016, European Union governments collectively still had 120 billion euros in outstanding guarantees issued in support of the financial system (peak 835 billion euros in 2009).
- Deposit freezes and bank holidays:
  - Deposit freezes reported in only 8 episodes (recent cases: Cyprus 2013, Ukraine 2014, Greece 2015).
  - Cyprus: restrictions to domestic payments removed in May 2014; external payments restrictions remained until April 2015.
  - Ukraine: cash withdrawals from domestic currency accounts lifted in September 2016; from FX accounts in August 2017; some FX restrictions remained as of early 2018.
  - Greece: restrictions gradually relaxed since July 2015 but some restrictions remained as of early 2018 (monthly limit on cash withdrawals; limits on cross-border bank transfers).
  - We report 6 bank holidays; in 5 of 6 cases duration was between 4 and 8 days; Greece was 21 days; in all 6 instances the bank holiday was followed by a deposit freeze.
- Recapitalization and resolution tools:
  - Recapitalization is used in most crises in the database and is the most important component of direct fiscal costs from government intervention.
  - Government capital injections often combine preferred and common equity and may include conditions (board seats for government representatives; limiting/prohibiting dividend payments).
  - When governments own a majority share of a bank’s capital, the intervention is classified as a nationalization.
  - Database also records treasury or central bank asset purchases and establishment of asset management companies to administer or resolve assets.

*Source: Authors’ calculations and database evidence presented in the source text.*

### Macro policies (monetary and fiscal)
- Short-term interest rates around systemic banking crises:
  - In high-income countries, median short-term interest rates declined to a median level very close to zero in the year after the start of the crisis, from a median of about 5 percent.
  - In low and middle-income countries, the median short-term interest rate increases around crises.
  - Explanation: limited room for countercyclical monetary policy in low and middle-income countries; concerns about sharp currency depreciations and exchange-rate-related balance-sheet effects often force rate increases.
- Primary fiscal balances around crises:
  - Median primary balance tends to deteriorate sharply in high-income countries.
  - Median primary balance improves in low and middle-income countries (forced procyclical fiscal policy due to limited financing options).
- Use of monetary policy and reserve money:
  - Laeven and Valencia (2013) report increases in reserve money across episodes, capturing unconventional monetary policy and greater monetary policy use in high-income countries.

*Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, IFS, and authors’ calculations as cited in the source text.*

### Crisis outcomes — fiscal costs
- Definition and measurement:
  - Fiscal costs measured as sum of fiscal outlays directly linked to government interventions to stabilize the banking system (capital injections, operating costs of agencies/AMCs, exercised public guarantees excluded as they are not outlays).
  - Fiscal costs normalized by nominal GDP of the year in which outlays are incurred; also reported as percent of financial system assets (measured as of the year before the crisis).
  - Recoveries (sales of financial assets, fees on guarantees, dividends, interest, other cash inflows) are collected for a subset of episodes to compute net fiscal costs (outlays minus recoveries).
- Median fiscal cost statistics:
  - Median gross fiscal cost for crises in high-income countries: 6.7 percent of GDP.
  - Median gross fiscal cost for crises in low and middle-income countries: 10 percent of GDP.
  - Median net fiscal cost (after recoveries) for high-income countries: 3.3 percent of GDP.
  - Median net fiscal cost (after recoveries) for low- and middle-income countries: 9.6 percent of GDP.
- Fiscal costs relative to financial system assets:
  - Fiscal costs are comparatively much higher relative to financial system assets in low- to middle-income economies than in high-income countries.
  - Note: A handful of episodes report fiscal costs of more than 100 percent of financial system assets, attributed to hyperinflation measurement anomalies.
- Broader measure — increases in public debt:
  - Median increase in public debt over T-1 to T+3 (T = crisis start):
    - High-income countries: 21.1 percent of GDP.
    - Low- and middle-income countries: 16.4 percent of GDP.
  - Method: for crises starting in 2007 or later, pre-crisis projected debt increase (T-1 to T+3) from fall WEO preceding crisis; post-crisis actual from Fall 2017 WEO; ratios to GDP use latest GDP series. For past episodes, actual change in debt reported.

*Source: Authors’ calculations and methodology notes from the source text.*

### Crisis outcomes — asset quality, duration, and output losses
- Peak nonperforming loans (NPLs):
  - In about 70 percent of crises in high-income countries, NPLs never surpassed 20 percent of total loans.
  - Median peak NPL in high-income country crises: slightly exceeds 11 percent.
  - Median peak NPL in low and middle-income country crises: 30 percent.
  - Cross-country differences in NPL definitions complicate direct comparisons, but systematic difference is sizable.
- Crisis duration (definition and findings):
  - End date defined as the year before both real GDP growth and real credit growth are positive for at least two consecutive years (using bank credit to private sector in national currency from IFS, deflated by CPI from WEO; GDP in constant prices from WEO).
  - Duration truncated at five years (reported five years means five years or more).
  - Distribution:
    - About two-thirds of crises ended in less than five years overall.
    - More than half of episodes in high-income countries lasted five years or more.
    - Most crises in low and middle-income countries lasted four years or less.
  - Possible explanations: crisis severity (global financial crisis episodes concentrated in high-income countries), larger financial systems/institutions add complexity, and availability of monetary/fiscal policy in high-income countries may discourage active bank restructuring and prolong crises.
- Output losses:
  - Output losses computed as cumulative deviations of actual GDP from trend over [T, T+3], expressed in percent of one year’s trend GDP; trend computed with HP filter (λ=100) on log real GDP over [T-20, T-1] or longest available series with at least 4 pre-crisis observations.
  - Findings:
    - Output losses in high-income countries tend to be much larger than in low and middle-income countries.
    - Larger output losses in high-income countries may reflect larger and deeper financial systems whose disruption has stronger real effects.
  - Caveat: losses may include impact of other shocks around crises and are sensitive to trend computation, but rankings are robust per Laeven and Valencia (2013).

*Source: Authors’ calculations and methodology notes in the source text.*

*Italic source attribution: Excerpts and figures drawn from the provided IMF working paper content.*

### 14. This stylized fact is consistent with new and old empirical work assessing the real

### 14. This stylized fact is consistent with new and old empirical work assessing the real

### Persistence of real effects after banking crises
- Empirical work highlights persistent real effects of banking crises (references cited: Cerra and Saxena, 2008, 2017; Abiad and others, 2014; Jorda and others, 2015; Romer and Romer, 2017, 2018).
- Cerra and Saxena (2017) argue that, on average, all types of recessions, not just those associated with financial and political crises, lead to permanent output losses.24
- The stylized fact presented: output decline after banking crises shows persistence.

### Differences by income group (high-income vs low- and middle-income)
- The persistence in the decline of output in the aftermath of banking crises appears to be much more pronounced, on average, in high-income countries than in low- and middle-income countries, as suggested by Figure 14.25
- Aslam and others (forthcoming) find that output remains below trend for longer in advanced economies than in emerging economies, consistent with the stylized fact here.
- High-income country episodes comprise mostly episodes during the global financial crisis.

### Role of export volumes in post-crisis output paths
- One additional element that could explain the difference in output paths is the evolution of export volumes.
- Consistent with the slowdown in trade volumes documented in IMF (2016), Figure 14 shows a sluggish evolution in export volumes in the aftermath of banking crises in high-income countries.
- In contrast, the median path among crisis episodes in low-and middle-income countries does not show a slowdown in export volumes.
- Low- and middle-income country episodes, comprising episodes mostly prior to the global financial crisis, often benefited from a boost from external demand that resulted in a faster recovery after the banking crisis.

### Conclusions and data contribution
- A decade since the start of the global financial crisis has allowed sufficient time for some crisis episodes to end, but many countries face legacy issues: permanent output losses, elevated levels of public debt, policy support still to be fully unwound, and significant government ownership of financial assets.
- Much remains to be learned about predicting, preventing, and resolving banking crises; a key prerequisite is high-quality data on banking crises.
- This paper provides a comprehensive database on systemic banking crises during the period 1970–2017, reflecting updates to outcomes from banking crises reported in earlier releases (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, 2010, and 2013) and new events since then.
- The authors express the hope that these data will assist academics and policymakers in improving understanding of the causes and consequences of banking crises, and how best to resolve them.
- Noted caution: while only a few countries have experienced a crisis in recent years, this period may be the lull before the storm.

*Source: wp18206 - 14. This stylized fact is consistent with new and old empirical work assessing the real (IMF working paper content).*

### Chapter 2, October.

### Chapter 2, October.

### Key references cited
- IMF, 2017, “Spain—Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation—Technical Note on Impaired Assets and Nonperforming Loans,” IMF country report No. 17/343.
- Jorda, Oscar, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor, 2015, “Leveraged Bubbles,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 76, pp. S1–S20.
- Kaminsky, Graciela and Carmen Reinhart, 1999, “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems,” American Economic Review, Vol. 89, pp. 473–500.
- Kohlscheen, Emanuel, Fernando Avalos, and Andreas Schrimpf, 2017, “When the Walk Is Not Random: Commodity Prices and Exchange Rates,” International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 13(2), pp. 121–158.
- Kroszner, Randall, Luc Laeven, and Daniela Klingebiel, 2007, “Banking Crises, Financial Dependence, and Growth,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 187–228.
- Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia, 2008, “Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database,” IMF Working Paper No. 08/224.
- Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia, 2010, “Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,” IMF Working Paper No. 10/44.
- Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia, 2012, “The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises”, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 1(5), pp. 1220–248.
- Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia, 2013a, “Systemic Banking Crises Database,” IMF Economic Review, Vol. 61 (2), pp. 225–270.
- Laeven, Luc and Fabian Valencia, 2013b, “The Real Effects of Financial Sector Interventions during Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 45(1), pp. 147–177.
- Mishkin, Frederic, 1996, “Understanding Financial Crises: A Developing Country Perspective”, NBER Working Paper No. 5600.
- Peek, Joe, and Erik Rosengren, 1997, “The International Transmission of Financial Shocks: The Case of Japan,” American Economic Review, Vol. 87(4), pp. 495–505.
- Philippon, Thomas and Philipp Schnabl, 2013, “Efficient Recapitalization,” Journal of Finance.
- Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff, 2009, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
- Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff, 2011, “From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis,” American Economic Review, Vol. 101, pp. 1676–1706.
- Romer, David and Christina Romer, 2017, “New Evidence on the Aftermath of Financial Crises in Advanced Countries,” American Economic Review, Vol. 107(10), pp. 3072–3118.
- Romer, David and Christina Romer, 2018, “Phillips Lecture – Why Some Times are Different: Macroeconomic Policy and the Aftermath of Financial Crises,” Economica, Vol. 85, pp. 1–40.
- Sandri, Damiano and Fabian Valencia, 2013, “Financial Crises and Recapitalizations,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol 45(S2), pp. 59–86.
- Schularick, Moritz, and Alan M. Taylor, 2012, “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008,” American Economic Review, Vol. 102(2), pp. 1029–1061.
- Stone, M., K. Fujita, and K. Ishi, 2011, “Should Unconventional Balance Sheet Policies Be Added to the Central Bank Toolkit?” IMF Working Paper 2011/145.
- Sturzenegger, Federico and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2006, Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Valencia, Fabian, 2014, “Banks’ Precautionary Capital and Credit Crunches,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol. 18(8), pp. 1726–1750.
- Van Den Heuvel, Skander, 2006, “The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy,” University of Pennsylvania unpublished manuscript.
- World Bank, 2002, Global Development Finance. Appendix on Commercial Debt Restructuring. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

### Appendix — Table 1. Crisis Dates (structure and examples)
- Table 1 lists Crisis Dates by country across four crisis categories: Banking, Currency, Sovereign, Sovereign (Restructuring).
- Example country entries as given:
  - Albania: Banking 1994; Currency 1997; Sovereign 1990; Sovereign (Restructuring) 1992
  - Argentina: Banking 1980, 1989, 1995, 2001; Currency 1975, 1981, 1987, 2002, 2013; Sovereign 1982, 2001, 2014; Sovereign (Restructuring) 1993, 2005, 2016
  - Spain: Banking 1977, 2008; Currency 1983
  - United Kingdom: Banking 2007
  - United States: Banking 1988, 2007
- Notes embedded in Table 1:
  - Some country rows include multiple episodes; blank cells indicate no episode recorded in that column for that country.
  - Transition-economy crises and asterisks for borderline cases appear in the full table.

### Appendix — Table 2. Banking Crises Resolution and Outcomes (table structure and selected exact entries)
- Table columns (as labeled): Country; Crisis Dates (Start, End); Output Loss % of trend GDP; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net; Liquidity Provision % of GDP and % of Financial Sector Assets; Peak NPLs (in percent of total loans); Increase in Public Debt (in percent of GDP).
- Definitions/footnotes (verbatim from source):
  - 1/ In percent of GDP. Output losses are computed as the cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real GDP over the period [T, T+3], expressed in percent of trend real GDP, with T denoting the starting year of the crisis. The trend is computed by applying an HP filter (λ=100) to the GDP series over [T-20, T-1]. No output losses are reported for crises in transition economies that took place during the period of transition to market economies.
  - 2/ Fiscal costs refer to outlays directly related to the restructuring of the financial sector.
  - 3/ Liquidity is measured as the ratio of central bank claims on deposit money banks (line 12 in IFS) and liquidity support from the Treasury to total deposits and liabilities to non-residents. Total deposits are computed as the sum of demand deposits (line 24), other deposits (line 25), and liabilities to non-residents (line 26).
  - 4/ In percent of total loans.
  - 5/ In percent of GDP. For episodes starting in 2007 and later, the increase in public debt is measured as the change in debt projections, over [T-1, T+3], relative to the pre-crisis debt projections, where T is the starting year of the crisis.
  - 6/ Credit data missing. For these countries, end dates are based on GDP growth only.
  - 7/ We truncate the duration of crises at 5 years, starting with the first crisis year.
  - 8/ Borderline cases.
- Selected exact rows (preserving all numeric values exactly as in source for each listed row):
  - Austria (Start 2008; End 2012 7/): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 19.2; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 5.2; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 1.6; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 1.6; Peak NPLs: 10.0; Peak Liquidity Support: 6.4; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 4.1; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 19.8
  - Argentina (Start 1980; End 1982 6/): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 58.2; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 55.1; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 55.1; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 213.9; Peak NPLs: 64.6; Peak Liquidity Support: 62.2; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 9.0; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 33.1
  - Cyprus (Start 2011; End 2015 7/): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 76.5; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 18.0; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 18.0; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 2.6; Peak NPLs: 20.3; Peak Liquidity Support: 14.1; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 47.8; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 21.3
  - Greece (Start 2008; End 2012 7/): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 64.9; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 28.7; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 17.1; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 17.1; Peak NPLs: 61.7; Peak Liquidity Support: 59.8; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 37.1; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 43.9
  - Iceland (Start 2008; End 2012 7/): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 34.5; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 37.6; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 3.3; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 14.3; Peak NPLs: 33.8; Peak Liquidity Support: 28.1; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 61.2; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 67.9
  - Ireland (Start 2008; End 2012 7/): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 107.7; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 37.6; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 26.8; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 4.5; Peak NPLs: 18.1; Peak Liquidity Support: 15.4; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 25.7; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 76.5
  - Spain (Start 2008; End 2012 7/): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 38.8; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 5.4; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 4.8; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 2.0; Peak NPLs: 33.5; Peak Liquidity Support: 31.3; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 9.4; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 31.8
  - United Kingdom (Start 2007; End 2011 7/): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 25.3; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 8.8; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 3.8; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 5.8; Peak NPLs: 3.4; Peak Liquidity Support: 2.5; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 4.0; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 27.0
  - United States (Start 2007; End 2011): Output Loss % of trend GDP: 30.0; Fiscal Costs % of GDP Net: 4.5; Liquidity Provision % of GDP: 0.6; Liquidity Provision % of Financial Sector Assets: 2.2; Peak NPLs: 4.7; Peak Liquidity Support: 4.7; Increase in Public Debt % of GDP: 5.0; Increase in Public Debt (Peak) 21.9
- Source line for Table 2: “Source: WEO, IFS, IMF Staff reports, IMF Financial Soundness Indicators, Laeven and Valencia (2013), and authors’ calculation.”

### Appendix — Table 3. Banking Crisis Policy Responses (structure and selected exact entries)
- Table columns (as labeled): Country; Start Date; Deposit Freeze (Date, Duration in months); Bank Holiday (Date, Duration in days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities (Start, Duration in months, Coverage); Bank Nationalization; Asset Purchase (In percent of GDP); Bank Recapitalization (In percent of GDP); IMF Program (year).
- Selected exact rows (preserving numeric values and textual labels exactly):
  - Argentina (Mar-80): Deposit Freeze: (blank); Bank Holiday: (blank); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Y; Bank Nationalization: N; Bank Recapitalization: 1983 (as listed under IMF Program column for Argentina Mar-80 row).
  - Argentina (Dec-89): Deposit Freeze Date 28-Dec-1989; Bank Holiday Duration 120 (days); Bank Holiday Date 1-Jan-1990; Bank Holiday Duration 4 (days); Bank Nationalization: N; Asset Purchase: N; Bank Recapitalization: 0.28 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 1990
  - Argentina (Nov-01): Deposit Freeze Date 3-Dec-2001; Deposit Freeze Duration 12 (months); Bank Holiday Date 31-Dec-2001; Bank Holiday Duration 5 (days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Y; Bank Nationalization: N; Bank Recapitalization: 9.58 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2000
  - Austria (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Unlimited coverage to depositors, bank and non-bank bonds.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: N; Bank Recapitalization: 3.96 (In percent of GDP)
  - Belgium (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Deposit-like insurance instruments. Interbank loans and short-term debt. Specific guarantees for Dexia.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: N; Bank Recapitalization: 5.80 (In percent of GDP)
  - Cyprus (Jun-11): Deposit Freeze Date 28-Mar-2013; Deposit Freeze Duration 14 (months); Bank Holiday Date 18-Mar-2013; Bank Holiday Duration 8 (days); Bank Nationalization: Y; Asset Purchase: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 18.90 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2013
  - Iceland (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Unlimited coverage to domestic deposits.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: N; Bank Recapitalization: 24.30 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2008
  - Ireland (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Unlimited coverage to most liabilities of 10 banks.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Asset Purchase: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 37.13 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2010
  - United Kingdom (Sep-07): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Guarantee on short-to-medium term debt; blanket guarantee on Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley wholesale deposits.; Deposit Freeze: Y; Bank Holiday: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 5.00 (In percent of GDP)
  - United States (Dec-07): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Money market funds (capped at US$50 billion); full guarantee on transaction deposits; newly issued senior unsecured debt.; Deposit Freeze: Y; Bank Holiday: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 3.60 (In percent of GDP)
  - Germany (Sep-08): Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: Unlimited coverage of household deposits.; Bank Nationalization: Y; Asset Purchase: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 1.80 (In percent of GDP)
  - Japan (Nov-97): Deposit Freeze: (blank); Bank Holiday Date Nov-97; Bank Holiday Duration 89 (days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: All deposits, including interbank deposits; Bank Nationalization: Y; Asset Purchase: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 6.61 (In percent of GDP)
  - Korea (Aug-97): Bank Holiday Date Nov-97; Bank Holiday Duration 37 (days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: All liabilities (excluding shareholders’ capital and subordinated debt) of banks, securities companies, insurance companies, merchant banks, mutual savings and finance companies, and credit unions. Overseas branches were also included.; Deposit Freeze: Y; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 19.31 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 1998
  - Turkey (Nov-00): Bank Holiday Date Dec-00; Bank Holiday Duration 43 (days); Guarantees on Bank Liabilities: All liabilities (including contingent) of domestically incorporated banks except for owners' deposits, deposits linked to criminal activities, subordinated debt, and equity; Deposit Freeze: Y; Bank Nationalization: Y; Bank Recapitalization: 24.50 (In percent of GDP); IMF Program: 2000
- Source line for Table 3: “Source: Laeven and Valencia (2013), and authors' calculations.”

*Italic: Source: wp18206 - Chapter 2, October. (Source PDF filename: wp18206 - Chapter 2, October.)*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp18206.pdf_