## wp18224

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### I. Introduction
- From 1980 onwards, real GDP in Brazil grew at only about 2.6 percent per year.
- Total factor productivity (TFP) has been roughly constant for about 40 years; excluding human capital accumulation using Penn World Tables estimates up to 2014, TFP is today considerably lower than in the early 1980s.
- Paper objectives:
  - Estimate impact of several structural reforms on Brazil’s productivity (Section B).
  - Use survey data to assess public support for specific reforms (Section C).
  - Identify reforms with highest growth payout at lowest political cost, differentiating by legislative requirements and fiscal impact (Section D).
  - Present additional considerations influencing reform priorities (Section E) and summarize key insights (Section F).

### II. Productivity gains from structural reforms
- Structural reform indicators (normalized between zero and one; higher = higher reform level):
  - Banking sector: captures interest rate controls, directed credit, public banks, restrictions to bank competition, and quality of banking supervision/regulation (methodology: Abiad and Mody (2005); Abiad et al. (2010)).
  - Labor market: average of two Global Competitiveness Report indexes (ease of hiring/firing; extent wages freely determined at firm level).
  - Legal system: EFW-Fraser Institute index (rule of law, property rights, independence of judiciary, impartial/effective enforcement).
  - Product market: Economist Intelligence Unit index (extent government policies curb monopoly power and promote competition).
  - Trade Openness: Quinn (1997) index capturing restrictions to payments associated with international trade of goods and services.
- Econometric approach:
  - Growth rate of TFP, gTFP_it, regressed on one-year lagged structural reform indexes SR_{i,t-1}, controlling for TFP level, time and country fixed effects; estimation on 86 advanced and emerging countries, 1970–2011 (dataset from IMF (2015)).
- Empirical findings:
  - Coefficients γ on structural reform indicators are positive and statistically significant.
  - Banking sector and legal system reforms also have positive impact on real investment growth (Columns 6–7).
- Brazil’s structural gaps and estimated impacts:
  - Brazil lags advanced economies across all structural reform indicators.
  - By applying regression coefficients to Brazil’s gaps, predicted one-year-ahead TFP growth increases from raising indicators to advanced-economy averages.
  - Predicted one-year-ahead TFP growth impacts (Figure 3):
    - Banking sector reforms: predicted to raise one-year-ahead TFP growth by almost 1.2 percent.
    - Labor market reforms: significant predicted impact but may overstate scope due to November 2017 labor reform.
    - Legal system reforms: significant productivity boosts and correlated with reductions in corruption.
    - Product market and trade reforms: positive but more limited effects, roughly half the gains of banking sector reforms; fare relatively better for long-term GDP growth.
- Policy focus for banking reforms:
  - Reduce state-intervention in credit markets and promote privatization.
  - Brazil scores poorly because of pervasive state-intervention in credit allocation and large public banks.
  - Brazil fares relatively well in bank supervision, low entry barriers, and free setting of interest rates by private banks.
- Fiscal implications:
  - Around half of total credit to households and non-financial firms is provided by public banks via earmarked programs, often at subsidized rates.
  - Authorities estimate fiscal costs from subsidized lending amounted to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2015.

### III. Public support for structural reforms
- Data sources:
  - Latin Barometer Survey (2003–2016) and Pew Global Attitudes and Trends Survey.
- Support for a market economy:
  - Latin Barometer question: "The market economy is the only system with which the country can become developed."
  - Over 2003−16, 63 percent of the Brazilian public on average agreed (or strongly agreed).
  - Support dropped from 65 to 53 percent in 2009 and reached almost 70 percent in 2016.
- Regression linking growth and support (panel of 18 Latin American countries, 2003–2016):
  - GDP growth coefficient positive and statistically significant across specifications:
    - OLS coefficients: 0.64***, 0.83***, 0.89***, 0.89*** (standard errors: (0.19), (0.25), (0.26), (0.26)).
    - IV (using real global growth as instrument): 1.74*** (0.42).
  - Fiscal impulse may marginally promote support (coefficient 0.76* in one specification).
  - Inflation and unemployment not significant in baseline.
- Mapping survey responses to reform categories:
  - "Integration to the World" → Trade openness.
  - "Rule of Law" and "Quality of Public Institutions" → Legal system.
  - "Productivity" and "Innovation" → Product market and Banking sector reforms.
  - "Equity of opportunity" → Labor market reforms.
- Brazil-specific survey findings:
  - Public support shares in Brazil:
    - Product market/Banking sector: 31 percent.
    - Legal system: 26 percent.
    - Openness (trade): 23 percent.
    - Labor market: 15 percent.
  - Pew survey on institutional influence:
    - More than half consider influence of financial institutions to be “somewhat bad” or “very bad.”
    - More than 70 percent consider the court system influence to be poor.
- Micro-level determinants of support (Latin Barometer 2016):
  - Years of education: positive and statistically significant predictor across all reform categories:
    - Prod.market/Banking 1.46*** (0.39); Legal system 0.56** (0.28); Labor 1.01*** (0.32); Trade 1.16*** (0.35).
  - Employment status:
    - Unemployed and self-employed more supportive of labor market reforms.
  - Age effects:
    - Age negatively associated with support for trade reforms: Age coefficient for Trade -1.03** (0.47); Age squared coefficient 0.01** (0.00).
  - Overall: support relatively homogeneous across population except for education and some employment status effects.
- Political economy caveat:
  - Public support does not necessarily translate into policy action due to special-interest influence; implementation depends on issue prominence, degree of public agreement, intensity of opinions, and organization of interest groups.

### IV. Brazil’s reform priorities (synthesis)
- Framework: scatter-plot with horizontal axis = estimated effects on TFP growth and vertical axis = degree of public support; top-right quadrant = high impact, high support.
- Priority rankings and rationale:
  - Banking sector reforms:
    - Strongest impact on TFP and highest public support; top priority.
    - Focus: improve credit allocation by limiting state intervention; reduce reliance on public banks and earmarked/subsidized lending.
    - Relatively simple to legislate in many instances (government action without congressional approval possible for key measures).
  - Legal system reforms:
    - High priority: significant productivity gains and broad public support.
    - Measures: increase court efficiency (prevent abuse of appeals and statutes of limitations), strengthen legal protections, curb corruption.
    - Typically requires ordinary law (congressional approval).
  - Labor market reforms:
    - Potentially large productivity gains; recommended to wait to fully assess November 2017 labor reform before additional measures.
    - Generally requires ordinary law.
  - Product market and trade reforms:
    - Positive but smaller short-term TFP effects relative to banking reforms; important for long-term GDP growth.
    - Some trade measures can be enacted without congressional approval.
- Legislative requirements (selected measures):
  - Provisional law: TLP reform to reduce subsidies on long-term rates (law 13483).
  - Congress approval not required: Reform of BNDES’s business model; Reform of CAIXA’s governance and business model; OECD accession; Bilateral agreement between Mercosur and European Union.
  - Ordinary law (requires congressional approval): Labor reform (law 13467); Outsourcing of core business activities (law 13429); Migration reform (law 13455); Ten measures against corruption (PLC 27/2017); Bankruptcy law; Limits to cancellation of greenfield contracts (PLS 774); Privatization and PPP reforms (PL 9463); Bolstering of regulatory agencies (PL 6621); SOE governance reforms (PL 9215, PLS 555).
- Fiscal space considerations:
  - Structural reforms boost productivity and growth, improving long-run fiscal sustainability.
  - Some reforms involve short-term fiscal costs (e.g., labor reforms may require higher unemployment benefits or active labor policies).
  - Banking reforms can yield immediate fiscal savings by reducing subsidized lending (estimated fiscal costs from subsidized lending = 2.1 percent of GDP in 2015).

### V. Additional considerations to identify reform priorities
- Sequencing and interactions:
  - Trade liberalization and domestic financial reforms should generally precede capital account liberalization.
  - Trade liberalization can increase support for domestic financial reforms.
  - Product market reforms can facilitate labor market reforms by increasing competition, lowering prices, raising real wages, and reducing rents captured by incumbent firms.
- Business cycle timing:
  - Some structural reforms (notably labor market reforms) deliver better outcomes in strong economic conditions and can be contractionary in downturns.
  - Current economic recovery in Brazil provides an opportunity to enact reforms.
- Binding-constraint approach:
  - Prioritize reforms addressing the most binding constraints to growth.
  - For Brazil, limited credit supply and high intermediation margins suggest priority for banking sector reforms and fiscal consolidation to reduce crowding out.

### VI. Conclusions and policy recommendations
- Primary recommendation:
  - Prioritize banking sector reforms to limit state intervention in credit markets:
    - Highest impact on productivity (one-year-ahead TFP growth ≈ almost 1.2 percent).
    - Broad public support (31 percent indicated product market/banking priority).
    - Relatively easier to legislate in many instances and capable of generating significant fiscal savings (subsidized lending costs estimated at 2.1 percent of GDP in 2015).
- Secondary recommendations:
  - Legal system reforms to strengthen legal protections, increase court efficiency, and curb corruption — high productivity gains and broad public support (26 percent).
  - Labor market reforms can deliver productivity gains but should be sequenced cautiously pending full assessment of November 2017 labor reform effects; labor reforms generally require ordinary law and may carry short-term fiscal costs.
  - Product market and trade reforms valuable for long-term GDP growth; trade reforms enjoy 23 percent public support in Brazil.
- Timing and sequencing:
  - Leverage the ongoing economic recovery to enact reforms given growth increases public support and some reforms yield better outcomes in stronger macro conditions.
  - Consider sequencing that uses trade and product market reforms to bolster political feasibility and effectiveness of financial and labor reforms.
- Political economy caveat:
  - Public support is necessary but not sufficient — special-interest groups and legislative hurdles may impede implementation; prioritize reforms that deliver quick, visible benefits and that are easier to legislate to build momentum.

*Source: Staff analysis and calculations as presented in the supplied content.*

### REFERENCES _____________________________________________________________________________________ 20

### wp18224 - REFERENCES _____________________________________________________________________________________ 20

### I. Introduction
- From 1980 onwards, real GDP in Brazil grew at only about 2.6 percent per year.
- Total factor productivity (TFP) has been roughly constant for about 40 years; excluding human capital accumulation using Penn World Tables estimates up to 2014, TFP is today considerably lower than in the early 1980s.
- Paper objective:
  - Estimate impact of several structural reforms on Brazil’s productivity (Section B).
  - Use survey data to assess public support for specific reforms (Section C).
  - Identify reforms with highest growth payout at lowest political cost, differentiating by legislative requirements and fiscal impact (Section D).
  - Present additional considerations influencing reform priorities (Section E) and summarize key insights (Section F).

### II. Productivity gains from structural reforms
- Structural reform indicators considered (all normalized between zero and one; higher values = higher levels of reform):
  - Banking sector: captures presence of interest rate controls, directed credit, public banks, restrictions to bank competition, and quality of banking supervision and regulation (methodology: Abiad and Mody (2005); Abiad et al. (2010)).
  - Labor market: average of two Global Competitiveness Report indexes (ease of hiring/firing; extent wages freely determined at firm level).
  - Legal system: EFW-Fraser Institute index (rule of law, property rights, independence of judiciary, impartial/effective enforcement).
  - Product market: Economist Intelligence Unit index (extent to which government policies curb monopoly power and promote competition).
  - Trade Openness: Quinn (1997) index capturing restrictions to payments associated with international trade of goods and services.
- Econometric approach:
  - Growth rate of TFP, gTFP_it, regressed on one-year lagged structural reform indexes SR_{i,t-1}, controlling for TFP level, time and country fixed effects; estimation on sample of 86 advanced and emerging countries, 1970–2011 (dataset from IMF (2015)).
- Regression evidence (Table 1 highlights):
  - Coefficients γ on structural reform indicators are positive and statistically significant.
  - Columns 6–7: banking sector and legal system reforms also have positive impact on real investment growth.
- Brazil’s structural gaps:
  - Brazil lags advanced economies across all structural reform indicators (Figure 2).
  - By multiplying Brazil’s structural gaps by regression coefficients, estimated one-year-ahead TFP growth increases from raising structural indicators to advanced-economy averages.
- Estimated impacts on one-year-ahead TFP growth (Figure 3):
  - Banking sector reforms: predicted to raise one-year-ahead TFP growth by almost 1.2 percent.
  - Labor market reforms: significant impact but analysis may overestimate scope for further reforms because labor indicators predate November 2017 labor reform.
  - Legal system reforms: would boost productivity significantly; also correlated with reductions in corruption.
  - Product market and trade reforms: positive but more limited effects, roughly half the gains of banking sector reforms; product/trade reforms fare relatively better for long-term GDP growth.
- Policy focus for banking reforms:
  - Aim to reduce state-intervention in credit markets and promote privatization.
  - Brazil scores poorly due to pervasive state-intervention in credit allocation and presence of large public banks.
  - Brazil fares relatively well in bank supervision, low entry barriers, and free setting of interest rates by private banks.
- Fiscal implications:
  - Around half of total credit to households and non-financial firms provided by public banks via earmarked programs, often at subsidized rates.
  - Authorities estimate fiscal costs from subsidized lending amounted to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2015.

### III. Public support for structural reforms
- Data sources:
  - Latin Barometer Survey (2003–2016) and Pew Global Attitudes and Trends Survey.
- Support for a market economy:
  - Latin Barometer question: "The market economy is the only system with which the country can become developed."
  - Over 2003−16, 63 percent of the Brazilian public on average agreed (or strongly agreed).
  - Brazil’s support among highest in Latin America; support dropped from 65 to 53 percent in 2009 and reached almost 70 percent in 2016.
- Regression linking growth and support (Table 2):
  - Panel of 18 Latin American countries, 2003–2016.
  - GDP growth coefficient positive and statistically significant across specifications:
    - OLS coefficients: 0.64***, 0.83***, 0.89***, 0.89*** (standard errors: (0.19), (0.25), (0.26), (0.26)).
    - IV (using real global growth as instrument): 1.74*** (0.42).
  - Fiscal impulse may marginally promote support (coefficient 0.76* in one specification).
  - Inflation and unemployment not significant in baseline.
- Inferring public support for specific reforms:
  - Latin Barometer question: "What is most important for the development of Brazil?" (respondents can select multiple choices from a list including Integration to the world, Rule of law, Productivity, Innovation, Equity of opportunity, Quality of public institutions, etc.).
  - Matching survey responses to reform categories (Table 3):
    - "Integration to the World" → Trade openness.
    - "Rule of Law" and "Quality of Public Institutions" → Legal system.
    - "Productivity" and "Innovation" → Product market and Banking sector reforms (assumes product/banking reforms bolster productivity and innovation).
    - "Equity of opportunity" → Labor market reforms.
  - Validation:
    - Cross-country correlations: support for "Innovation" and "Productivity" higher where product and banking reforms are weak; support for "Equity of opportunity" higher where labor market reforms are weaker (Figure 6).
- Brazil survey findings (Figure 7 and Figure 8):
  - Public support shares in Brazil:
    - Product market/Banking sector: 31 percent.
    - Legal system: 26 percent.
    - Openness (trade): 23 percent.
    - Labor market: 15 percent.
  - Pew survey on institutional influence:
    - More than half consider influence of financial institutions to be “somewhat bad” or “very bad.”
    - More than 70 percent consider the court system influence to be poor.
- Micro-level determinants of support (Table 4; 2016 Latin Barometer microdata):
  - Years of education: positive and statistically significant predictor across all reform categories:
    - Coefficients: Prod.market/Banking 1.46*** (0.39); Legal system 0.56** (0.28); Labor 1.01*** (0.32); Trade 1.16*** (0.35).
  - Employment status:
    - Unemployed and self-employed more supportive of labor market reforms (supports mapping "Equity of opportunity" to labor reforms).
  - Age effects:
    - Age negatively associated with support for trade reforms: Age coefficient for Trade -1.03** (0.47); Age squared coefficient 0.01** (0.00).
  - Overall: support for reforms relatively homogeneous across population except for education and some employment status effects.
- Political economy caveat:
  - Public support does not necessarily translate into policy action due to special interest influence; balance depends on issue prominence, degree of public agreement, intensity of opinions, and organization of interest groups.

### IV. Brazil’s reform priorities (synthesis)
- Scatter-plot framework (Figure 9): horizontal axis = estimated effects on TFP growth; vertical axis = degree of public support. Top-right quadrant = highest priority (high impact, high support).
- Priority findings:
  - Banking sector reforms:
    - Strongest impact on TFP and highest public support → top of agenda.
    - Policy focus: improve credit allocation by limiting state intervention; reduce reliance on public banks and earmarked/subsidized lending.
    - Relatively simple to legislate (government action without congressional approval possible for key measures, e.g., BNDES and CAIXA reforms).
  - Legal system reforms:
    - High priority: significant productivity gains and broad public support.
    - Measures: increase efficiency of court system (prevent abuse of appeals and statutes of limitations), strengthen legal protections, curb corruption.
    - Typically requires ordinary law (congressional approval).
  - Labor market reforms:
    - Can generate large productivity gains, but recommend waiting to fully assess impact of November 2017 labor reform before further measures.
    - Labor reforms generally require ordinary law.
  - Product market and trade reforms:
    - Positive but smaller short-term TFP effects relative to banking reforms; larger role for long-term GDP growth.
    - Some trade-related measures are easier to legislate (government can enact without congressional approval in some cases).
- Legislative requirements (selected measures, Table 5):
  - Provisional law: TLP reform to reduce subsidies on long-term rates (law 13483).
  - Congress approval not required: Reform of BNDES’s business model; Reform of CAIXA’s governance and business model; OECD accession; Bilateral agreement between Mercosur and European Union.
  - Ordinary law (requires congressional approval): Labor reform (law 13467); Outsourcing of core business activities (law 13429); Migration reform (law 13455); Ten measures against corruption (PLC 27/2017); Bankruptcy law; Limits to cancellation of greenfield contracts (PLS 774); Privatization and PPP reforms (PL 9463); Bolstering of regulatory agencies (PL 6621); SOE governance reforms (PL 9215, PLS 555).
- Fiscal space considerations:
  - Structural reforms boost productivity and growth, improving long-run fiscal sustainability.
  - Some reforms involve significant short-term fiscal costs (e.g., labor reforms may require higher unemployment benefits or active labor policies).
  - Banking reforms can yield immediate fiscal savings by reducing subsidized lending (estimated fiscal costs from subsidized lending = 2.1 percent of GDP in 2015).

### V. Additional considerations to identify reform priorities
- Sequencing matters:
  - Evidence suggests trade liberalization and domestic financial reforms should generally precede capital account liberalization (McKinnon (1973); Ostry et al. (2009)).
  - Trade liberalization can increase support for domestic financial reforms (Rajan and Zingales (2003); Hauner et al. (2013)).
  - Product market reforms can facilitate labor market reforms by increasing competition, lowering prices, raising real wages, and reducing rents captured by incumbent firms (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)).
- Business cycle timing:
  - Some structural reforms (notably labor market reforms) tend to have more beneficial effects in strong economic conditions; they can be contractionary in downturns (IMF (2016)).
  - Current economic recovery in Brazil provides an opportunity to enact reforms.
- Binding-constraint approach:
  - Prioritize reforms addressing the most binding constraints to growth (Hausmann et al. (2008)).
  - For Brazil, limited credit supply and high intermediation margins suggest priority for banking sector reforms and fiscal consolidation to reduce crowding out.

### VI. Conclusions and policy recommendations
- Primary recommendation:
  - Prioritize banking sector reforms to limit state intervention in credit markets:
    - Highest impact on productivity (one-year-ahead TFP growth ≈ almost 1.2 percent).
    - Broad public support (31 percent indicated product market/banking priority).
    - Relatively easier to legislate in many instances and capable of generating significant fiscal savings (subsidized lending costs estimated at 2.1 percent of GDP in 2015).
- Secondary recommendations:
  - Legal system reforms to strengthen legal protections, increase court efficiency, and curb corruption — high productivity gains and broad public support (26 percent).
  - Labor market reforms can deliver productivity gains but should be sequenced cautiously pending full assessment of November 2017 labor reform effects; labor reforms generally require ordinary law and may carry short-term fiscal costs.
  - Product market and trade reforms valuable for long-term GDP growth; trade reforms enjoy 23 percent public support in Brazil.
- Timing and sequencing:
  - Leverage the ongoing economic recovery to enact reforms given growth increases public support and some reforms yield better outcomes in stronger macro conditions.
  - Consider sequencing that uses trade and product market reforms to bolster political feasibility and effectiveness of financial and labor reforms.
- Political economy caveat:
  - Public support is necessary but not sufficient — special-interest groups and legislative hurdles may impede implementation; prioritize reforms that deliver quick, visible benefits and that are easier to legislate to build momentum.

*Source: Staff analysis and calculations as presented in the supplied content.*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Financial reform, financial development, and regulation
- Abiad, Abdul and Ashoka Mody, 2005, “Financial Reform: What Shakes it? What Shapes it?”, American Economic Review, Vol. 95 (January), pp. 66−88.
- Abiad, Abdul, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel, 2010, “A New Database of Financial Reforms,” Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, Vol. 57 (February), pp. 281−302.
- Hauner, David, Alessandro Prati, and Cagatay Bircan, 2013, "The Interest Group Theory of Financial Development: Evidence from Regulation," Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 37 (March), pp. 895−906.
- McKinnon, Ronald I., 1973, “Money and Capital in Economic Development,” Brookings Institution.
- Quinn, Dennis, 1997, “The Correlated of Change in International Financial Integration,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91 (March), pp. 531−51.
- Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales, 2003, “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 5–50.

### Structural reforms, macroeconomic performance, and growth
- Blanchard, Olivier and Francesco Giavazzi, 2003, “Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118 (March), pp. 879−907.
- Bouis, Romain, and Romain Duval. 2011, “Raising Potential Growth after the Crisis: A Quantitative Assessment of the Potential Gains from Various Structural Reforms in the OECD Area and Beyond,” OECD Working Paper No. 835 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development).
- International Monetary Fund, 2015, “Structural Reforms and Macroeconomic Performance: Initial Considerations for the Fund—Staff Report,” IMF Policy Paper (Washington).
- International Monetary Fund, 2016, “Time for a Supply-Side Boost? Macroeconomic Effects of Labor and Product Market Reforms in Advanced Economies,” World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3 (Washington).
- International Monetary Fund, 2017, “Labor and Product Market Reforms in Advanced Economies: Fiscal Costs, Gains and Support,” Staff Discussion Note No. 17/03 (Washington).
- Ostry, Jonathan D., Alessandro Prati and Antonio Spilimbergo, 2009, “Structural Reforms and Economic Performance in Advanced and Developing Countries,” IMF Occasional Paper No. 268 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Prati, Alessandro, Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato, and Chris Papageorgiou, 2013, “Which Reforms Work and under What Institutional Environment? Evidence from a New Data Set on Structural Reforms,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 95 (March), pp. 946−68.

### Political economy, public opinion, and policy processes
- Baker, Andy, 2000, “Economic Policy Debates and Voter Choice in Brazil: Issues and Economy in the 1998 Presidential Elections,” paper presented at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Miami (March).
- Hausmann, Ricardo, Dani Rodrik, and Andres Velasco, 2008, “Growth Diagnostics,” in J. Stiglitz and N. Serra, eds., The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Kingdon, John W., 2003, “Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies” (2nd ed.), New York: Longman.
- Monroe, Alan D., 1998, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980−1993.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, No. 62 (January), pp. 6−28.
- Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro, 1992, “The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences,” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Stimson, James A., Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson, 1995, “Dynamic Representation,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89 (March), pp. 543−65.
- Zaller, John, 1992, “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion,” (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press).

### Country survey
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2018, OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil.

*Source: wp18224 - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp18224.pdf_