## wp18245

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---

### I. Literature Review
- Definition of populism used: “an ideology that considers society ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonist groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’” (Mudde, 2004).
- Key observations:
  - Historic waves: Russia and the U.S. late 19th century; Europe and Latin America in 20th century.
  - Recent peculiarity: spread and dominance in some countries with well-established liberal democracy.
  - Populist discourse treats “the people” as a monolith and claims monopoly of political representation.
  - Liberal democracy contrasted as pluralistic with multiple parties, separation of branches, and checks-and-balances; associations are central (Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835).
- Puzzles and theoretical perspectives:
  - Populism is not generally correlated with economic crisis (Kriese and Pappas, 2015) — e.g., Ireland and Iceland vs. Poland.
  - Economic insecurity vs. cultural backlash debate (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).
  - Economists’ accounts: short-sightedness/misinformation (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1992), misperceptions (Caplan, 2007), signalling by politicians (Acemoğlu et al., 2013), voters’ distaste for betrayal (Di Tella and Rotemberg, 2017), rational responses to globalization shocks (Rodrik, 2017).
  - Social capital literature: Putnam (decline in social capital linked to political apathy) and risks of a “dark side” (Satyanath et al., 2018; Tocqueville warning).

### II. Data
- Primary datasets:
  - European Social Survey (ESS): repeated cross-section, >60,000 individual observations, covers 17 European countries over 2002-16.
  - Latinobarometro: individual-level survey covering 17 Latin American countries from 1996-2008 with many gaps; question asks voting intention if vote were next Sunday.
- Classification of populist parties:
  - Based on 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) indicators; parties scoring >80 on a standardized 100-point scale are classified as populist.
  - Result: 28 parties in Europe and 22 parties in Latin America defined as populist.
- Key variables and definitions:
  - Civil society association membership (ESS) =1 if respondent “worked in another organization or association during the last 12 months” trying to improve things or prevent things going wrong, excluding “contacted a politician”, “worked in a political party”, or “belonging to any particular religion or denomination”.
  - Trade union membership (ESS) =1 if current “member of a trade union or similar organization”.
  - Income sufficient =1 if living comfortably on present income; Income difficult =1 if difficult or very difficult.
  - Sum Don't Know = number of “Don’t Know” answers to 8 questions (including TV watching news/politics, interest in politics, ability/confidence to participate in politics, placement on left-right scale, state of education in country nowadays, state of health services in country nowadays).
  - Populist in power =1 if party in power is a populist party per Allred et al. 2015.
  - Union density = net union membership as proportion of wage earners (Visser (2016)).
- Descriptive trends:
  - Europe: populist vote close to 10 percent in 2002, rising to close to 15 percent by mid-2000s then declining (no clear linear trend 2002–2016).
  - Latin America: populism flat till mid-2000s then increased sharply (1996–2008 series with gaps).
  - Average shares: ESS Populist Vote mean 0.13 (St. Dev. 0.33); Civil Association 0.22 (St. Dev. 0.41); Union only 0.27 (St. Dev. 0.45).
  - LAC summary: Populist Vote mean 0.22 (St. Dev. 0.42); Member of Civil association or union 0.55 (St. Dev. 0.50); Income difficult 0.52 (St. Dev. 0.50).

### III. Empirical Specification
- Baseline estimating equation (Equation (1)):
  - Dependent variable D_{i,c,t} = 1 if individual i in country c at time t votes for a populist party.
  - Main regressor A_{i,c,t} = 1 if individual is member of a civil society association.
  - Controls: income sufficiency indicator, income difficulty indicator, female, young (<30), old (>=65), secondary education (12 years), tertiary education (16+ years).
  - Fixed effects: country (A_c), time (v_t), and country*time interactions (A_c * v_t).
  - Standard errors clustered at the country level.
- Heckman two-step specification to correct for selection into voting:
  - First-stage: probability of participation with instrument(s) = number of “don’t know” answers to politics-related items (proxy for lack of awareness).
  - Second-stage: probability of voting for a populist party conditional on participation.
- Instrumental-variable strategy for trade unions:
  - Instrument = sectoral trade union density in United Kingdom for same sector (used in some IV specifications; UK dropped for IV when required).

### IV. Empirical Results — Main Findings and Magnitudes
- Main Europe finding:
  - Individuals belonging to civil associations are less likely to vote for populist parties.
  - Quantitative magnitudes (selected estimates preserved exactly):
    - Panel C. OLS: Civil Associations coefficients: -1.55***, -1.22*, -1.99** (standard errors [0.48], [0.57], [0.73]; Observations 115168, 69727, 45441).
    - Panel D. Probit: Civil Associations coefficients: -2.20***, -1.82***, -2.61*** (standard errors [0.42], [0.47], [0.66]; Observations 97074, 54333, 42741).
    - Table 5 Panel A (No IV): OLS (All) Civil Associations -1.88** ([0.71]; Observations 135705); Probit (All) Civil Associations -2.20*** ([0.69]; Observations 112691); Heckman 2nd (All) Civil Associations -1.83*** ([0.57]); Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.53*** ([0.03]; Observations 178014).
    - Table 5 Panel B (IV using UK): OLS 2nd stage (All) Civil Associations -8.82* ([0.05]; Observations 116540); Probit 2nd stage (All) Civil Associations -10.21** ([5.10]; Observations 102907); Heckman 2nd stage (All) Civil Associations -9.08** ([4.59]); IV 1st-stage: UK UM 0.31*** ([0.01]).
  - Interpretation: membership reduces populist vote by 20 to 30 percent relative to average populist vote shares (~10–15 percent) (textual interpretation in source).
- Trade unions versus other associations:
  - Table 6 Panel A (No IV): OLS (All) Trade Union -1.06 ([0.75]; Observations 135864); Probit (All) Trade Union -1.21 ([0.82]; Observations 112787); Heckman 2nd (All) Trade Union -1.00 ([0.68]); Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.53*** ([0.03]; Observations 178173).
  - Table 6 Panel B (IV): OLS 2nd stage (All) Trade Union -7.71* ([4.03]; Observations 116667); Probit 2nd stage (All) Trade Union -8.86** ([4.39]; Observations 102988); Heckman 2nd (All) Trade Union -7.94** ([3.98]); IV 1st-stage: UK UM 0.36*** ([0.01]).
  - Joint specifications (Table 7) show civil associations retain strongly negative and significant coefficients while trade union coefficients are often smaller and sometimes insignificant.
- Robustness and heterogeneity:
  - Results robust across OLS, Probit, and Heckman specifications and to additional controls: risk aversion, trust, media exposure, unemployment spell, exposure to globalization, immigration preferences, perception of immigrants’ effects, right‑wing ideology.
  - Heckman first-stage (Sum Don’t Know) strongly negative and statistically significant: e.g., Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.53*** ([0.03]) or -0.55*** ([0.04]) in reported tables.
  - Robust to country exclusions: Probit coefficient on civil associations remains negative and significant across leave‑one‑out checks (example: no country excluded coefficient -2.74*** ([0.36]); Austria excluded -3.30*** ([0.50]); Belgium excluded -3.53*** ([0.49]); Germany excluded -3.58*** ([0.54]); Netherlands excluded -3.58*** ([0.49])).
  - Heterogeneity by age (Table 9 Panel A examples, marginal effects):
    - Young OLS (All) -2.51*** ([0.85]); Probit (All) -3.56*** ([0.85]); Heckman (All) -2.70*** ([0.69]).
    - Middle OLS (All) -2.35*** ([0.51]); Probit (All) -3.01*** ([0.48]); Heckman (All) -2.52*** ([0.40]).
    - Old OLS (All) -2.91*** ([0.75]); Probit (All) -3.88*** ([0.61]); Heckman (All) -3.40*** ([0.55]).
  - Heterogeneity by education (Table 9 Panel B examples):
    - Below Sec. OLS (All) -3.21*** ([0.92]); Probit (All) -5.04*** ([1.32]).
    - Secondary OLS (All) -3.28*** ([0.84]); Probit (All) -4.19*** ([0.65]); Heckman (All) -3.27*** ([0.47]).
    - Tertiary OLS (All) -1.27*** ([0.34]); Probit (All) -1.67*** ([0.34]).
- Crisis-period effects:
  - The negative association between civil association membership and populist vote becomes stronger after the global financial crisis (post-2008/9 and particularly post-2012).
  - Self-reported insufficient income coefficient increased 2-3 times in magnitude in the post-crisis period (textual summary).
- Latin America (Table 10):
  - Data limited and treated as suggestive (1996–2008 with gaps).
  - Selected Probit coefficients (All): Union Member -0.53 ([0.91]; Obs. 18736); Income Difficult 1.68** ([0.76]); Old -3.47** ([1.65]).
  - Subperiods show mixed signs for Union Member (e.g., 2007 coefficient 3.60*** ([0.74]; Obs. 4453); 2008 coefficient -2.09 ([1.54]; Obs. 6047)).

### V. Populists in Power — Aggregate Feedback to Unions
- Aggregate regression (Equation (2)) on country-year union density (Visser, 2016) with populist-in-power dummy (leader-term populism measure 0–2 based on speech textual analysis).
- Main result (Table 11):
  - Populist party in power coefficients: -3.23*** ([0.87]) and -3.10*** ([0.89]) across two specifications (dependent variable: Union density; Observations 506; R-squared 0.76).
  - Interpretation: trade union densities are lower by about 3 percentage points in countries where populists are in power (controlling for country/time trends and indicators of economic hardship).
  - Note: unions’ relationship with populism is ambiguous, especially in Latin America; dummy for crisis in one specification estimated 2.79 ([2.65]) and is not precisely estimated.

### VI. Conclusions and Open Questions
- Summary conclusions:
  - Membership in civil society associations is negatively associated with voting for populist parties in Europe; evidence is qualitatively similar in Latin America with caveats.
  - The negative association strengthened after the global financial crisis; civil society may have assumed an enhanced role as an ideological anchor and alternative voice mechanism during/post-crisis.
  - Trade unions differ from other associations: weak negative association with populism in Europe and ambiguous historical roles in Latin America.
- Open questions for future research (explicitly listed in source):
  - Why was the protective role of civil associations less important before the global financial crisis?
  - What mechanisms explain how association membership lowers populist vote? Candidate mechanisms: alternative information channels, ideological anchors, promotion of social responsibility, providing voice mechanisms, identity provision moderating migration impacts.
  - Are all associations equivalent in effect, or are some more effective than others?
  - Do associations have similar impacts across demographic groups, or are effects concentrated in certain groups?
  - Suggestion: future research should benefit from data covering the refugee crisis to further investigate these questions.

*Source: wp18245 (selected tables and notes) — IMF working paper content provided in the supplied PDF.*

### REFERENCES _________________________________________________________________________________ 20

### wp18245 - REFERENCES _________________________________________________________________________________ 20

### I. Literature Review
- Definition of populism used: “an ideology that considers society ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonist groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’” (Mudde, 2004).
- Key observations:
  - Populism has historic waves (Russia and the U.S. late 19th century; Europe and Latin America in 20th century).
  - Recent peculiarity: spread and dominance in some countries with well-established liberal democracy.
  - Populist discourse treats “the people” as a monolith and claims monopoly of political representation.
  - Liberal democracy contrasted as pluralistic with multiple parties, separation of branches, and checks-and-balances; associations are central (citing Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835).
- Puzzles and theoretical perspectives highlighted:
  - Populism is not generally correlated with economic crisis (Kriese and Pappas, 2015) — e.g., Ireland and Iceland vs. Poland.
  - Debate between economic insecurity vs. cultural backlash explanations (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).
  - Economists’ accounts of apparent voter “irrationality” include short-sightedness/misinformation (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1992), misperceptions (Caplan, 2007), signalling by politicians (Acemoğlu et al., 2013), voters’ distaste for betrayal (Di Tella and Rotemberg, 2017), and rational responses to globalization shocks (Rodrik, 2017).
  - Social capital literature: Putnam (decline in social capital linked to political apathy) and risks of a “dark side” (Satyanath et al., 2018; Tocqueville warning).

### II. Data
- Primary datasets:
  - European Social Survey (ESS): repeated cross-section, >60,000 individual observations, covers 17 European countries over 2002-16.
  - Latinobarometro: individual-level survey covering 17 Latin American countries from 1996-2008 with many gaps; question asks voting intention if vote were next Sunday.
- Classification of populist parties:
  - Based on 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) indicators; parties scoring >80 on a standardized 100-point scale are classified as populist.
  - Result: 28 parties in Europe and 22 parties in Latin America defined as populist.
- Key variables:
  - Civil society association membership: defined by ESS responses indicating “worked in another organization or association during the last 12 months” trying to improve things or prevent things going wrong, excluding “contacted a politician”, “worked in a political party”, or “belonging to any particular religion or denomination”.
  - Trade union membership: self-reported current “member of a trade union or similar organization”.
  - Controls: age, gender, income indicators, education categories (secondary = 12 years; tertiary = 16 or more years).
- Descriptive trends:
  - Europe: no clear linear trend in populist vote between 2002 and 2016; close to 10 percent in 2002 rising to close to 15 percent by mid-2000s then declining.
  - Latin America: clear break with populism flat till mid-2000s then increased sharply.
  - Union membership displays higher time variation and a declining trend; civil association membership relatively stable on average.
  - Some country-level patterns: Turkey (populists in power associated with declining association membership); Brazil and Argentina (years with populists in power coincided with declines in association membership).

### III. Empirical Specification
- Baseline estimating equation (linear probability, logit, probit; Equation (1)):
  - Dependent variable D_{i,c,t} = 1 if individual i in country c at time t votes for a populist party.
  - Main regressor A_{i,c,t} = 1 if individual is member of a civil society association.
  - Included controls: income sufficiency indicator, income difficulty indicator, female, young (<30), old (>=65), secondary education (12 years), tertiary education (16+ years).
  - Fixed effects: country (A_c), time (v_t), and country*time interactions (A_c * v_t).
  - Standard errors clustered at the country level.
- Heckman two-step specification to correct for selection into voting:
  - First-stage: probability of participation (instrument(s) = proxies for lack of awareness measured by number of “don’t know” answers to politics-related items).
  - Second-stage: probability of voting for a populist party conditional on participation.

### IV. Empirical Results
- Main finding (Europe, ESS):
  - Individuals belonging to associations are less likely to vote for populist parties.
  - Quantitative magnitude: coefficient on civil association membership about 3 percent (table evidence).
  - Interpreted as membership reducing populist vote by 20 to 30 percent relative to average populist vote shares (~10–15 percent).
- Robustness and heterogeneity:
  - Result robust across OLS, Probit, and Heckman specifications; robust to additional controls including risk aversion, trust, media exposure, unemployment spell, exposure to globalization, immigration preferences, perception of immigrants’ effects, and right-wing ideology (where included).
  - Heckman first-stage instrument (number of “don’t know” responses) is strongly negative and statistically significant—less aware individuals are less likely to participate.
  - Women and tertiary-educated are consistently less likely to vote for populist parties.
  - Income: self-reporting sufficient income negatively correlated with voting for populists; reporting income difficulties generally positively associated with voting for populists (strengthening post-crisis).
  - Age: older individuals more likely to participate; conditional on voting, older age tends to reduce populist vote in some specifications.
- Crisis-period effects:
  - The negative association between civil association membership and populist vote becomes stronger after the global financial crisis (post-2008/9 and particularly post-2012).
  - Self-reported insufficient income coefficient increased 2-3 times in magnitude in the post-crisis period.
  - Interpretations: (i) civil associations provide ideological anchors and voice mechanisms especially salient post-crisis; (ii) crisis unhinged individual beliefs making non-members more open to new parties; (iii) civil society acts as social-responsibility buffer against populism; (iv) crisis affected supply of populist parties making vote more responsive to associations.
- Trade unions versus other associations:
  - Average trade union membership ~27 percent and association membership ~22 percent (Table A4).
  - Trade union membership shows steady decline since 2002; civil association membership relatively stable.
  - Including both types: civil association membership drives the negative association; trade union membership often insignificant.
  - Instrumental variables approach for trade unions: instrument = sectoral trade union density in United Kingdom for same sector; IV results maintain negative and significant coefficients on association or trade union membership in some specifications (UK dropped for IV).
  - Focusing exclusively on trade unions: little significant effect except wave 2014; historical role ambiguous (e.g., Argentina).
- Robustness to country exclusions:
  - Heckman specifications excluding one country at a time leave coefficients on association membership highly significant in every year.
  - Results unchanged when restricting to countries present in all survey waves.
- Latin America (Latinobarometro):
  - Data limited (1996-2008 with gaps) and treated as suggestive.
  - Qualitatively similar patterns: trade union membership positively associated with populist vote in 1996-2005, but turns negative and significant during 2007-2008.
  - Heckman not implemented due to lack of instruments; voting is compulsory in many Latin American contexts reducing selection concerns.

### V. Populists in Power (feedback to unions)
- Aggregate analysis using country-year trade union density (Visser, 2016) and a novel database on populists in power (leader-term populism measure 0–2 based on speech textual analysis).
- Regression (Equation (2)):
  - Dependent variable: change in trade union density (first differences).
  - Key regressor: dummy D_{pop;in power} = 1 if party in power is populist in country c at time t.
  - Controls: country fixed effects, time fixed effects, crisis indicators from Laeven and Valencia (2013).
- Result:
  - Populists in power associated with lower trade union densities.
  - Estimated magnitude: trade union densities are lower by about 3 percentage points in countries where populists are in power (controlling for country/time trends and indicators of economic hardship).
  - Caution noted: unions’ relationship with populism is ambiguous—especially in Latin America.

### VI. Conclusions and Open Questions
- Summary conclusions:
  - Membership in civil society associations is negatively associated with voting for populist parties in Europe; evidence is qualitatively similar in Latin America (with caveats).
  - The negative association strengthened after the global financial crisis; civil society may have assumed an enhanced role as an ideological anchor and alternative voice mechanism during/post-crisis.
  - Trade unions differ from other associations: weak negative association with populism in Europe and ambiguous historical roles in Latin America.
- Open questions for future research (explicitly listed):
  - Why was the protective role of civil associations less important before the global financial crisis?
  - What mechanisms explain how association membership lowers populist vote? Candidate mechanisms: alternative information channels, ideological anchors, promotion of social responsibility, providing voice mechanisms, identity provision moderating migration impacts.
  - Are all associations equivalent in effect, or are some more effective than others?
  - Do associations have similar impacts across demographic groups, or are effects concentrated in certain groups?
  - Suggestion: future research should benefit from data covering the refugee crisis to further investigate these questions.

*Italicized: Source — wp18245 - REFERENCES _________________________________________________________________________________ 20*

### part in politics, (iii) Placement on left right scale, (iv) State of education in country nowadays, (v) State of health 

### wp18245 - part in politics, (iii) Placement on left right scale, (iv) State of education in country nowadays, (v) State of health services in country nowadays

### Main empirical findings: association membership and populist vote
- Panel estimates (various specifications) show a negative relationship between membership in civil associations (or trade unions) and voting for populist parties:
  - Panel C. OLS: Civil Associations coefficient estimates: -1.55***, -1.22*, -1.99** (standard errors [0.48], [0.57], [0.73]; Observations 115168, 69727, 45441).
  - Panel D. Probit: Civil Associations coefficient estimates: -2.20***, -1.82***, -2.61*** (standard errors [0.42], [0.47], [0.66]; Observations 97074, 54333, 42741).
- Note on controls and interpretation:
  - All regressions include the controls in Table 1.
  - Additional controls in Panels C and D follow Guiso et al. (2017): indicators for risk aversion, watching television, watching politics news and programs, unemployment spell over the last 5 years, exposure to globalization, preference for lower immigration, perception of negative effect of immigrants, trust in parties and institutions, and right-wing ideology.
  - Probit and Heckman coefficient estimates indicate marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

### Table 5: Populist Vote and Civil Associations / Trade Union Membership (selected coefficients)
- Panel A. No IV:
  - OLS (All): Civil Associations -1.88** ([0.71]; Observations 135705).
  - Probit (All): Civil Associations -2.20*** ([0.69]; Observations 112691).
  - Heckman 2nd (All): Civil Associations -1.83*** ([0.57]); Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.53*** ([0.03]; Observations 178014).
- Panel B. IV using sectoral union membership rates in UK:
  - OLS 2nd stage (All): Civil Associations -8.82* ([0.05]; Observations 116540).
  - Probit 2nd stage (All): Civil Associations -10.21** ([5.10]; Observations 102907).
  - Heckman 2nd stage (All): Civil Associations -9.08** ([4.59]); 2nd stage Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.55*** ([0.04]; Observations 154367).
  - IV 1st-stage: UK UM 0.31*** ([0.01]).

### Table 6: Populist Vote and Trade Union Membership (selected coefficients)
- Panel A. No IV:
  - OLS (All): Trade Union -1.06 ([0.75]; Observations 135864).
  - Probit (All): Trade Union -1.21 ([0.82]; Observations 112787).
  - Heckman 2nd (All): Trade Union -1.00 ([0.68]); Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.53*** ([0.03]; Observations 178173).
- Panel B. IV using UK sectoral union membership:
  - OLS 2nd stage (All): Trade Union -7.71* ([4.03]; Observations 116667).
  - Probit 2nd stage (All): Trade Union -8.86** ([4.39]; Observations 102988).
  - Heckman 2nd (All): Trade Union -7.94** ([3.98]); Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.55*** ([0.04]; Observations 154494).
  - IV 1st-stage: UK UM 0.36*** ([0.01]).

### Table 7: Joint membership (Trade Union and Civil Associations)
- Panel A. No IV (All):
  - OLS: Civil Associations -2.49*** ([0.56]); Trade Union -0.93 ([0.72]); Observations 135623.
  - Probit: Civil Associations -3.24*** ([0.46]); Trade Union -1.03 ([0.79]); Observations 112628.
  - Heckman 2nd: Civil Associations -2.70*** ([0.35]); Trade Union -0.85 ([0.66]); Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.53*** ([0.03]); Observations 177932.
- Panel B. IV (All):
  - OLS 2nd stage: Civil Associations -2.59*** ([0.61]); Trade Union -6.98 ([4.09]); Observations 116471.
  - Probit 2nd stage: Civil Associations -3.30*** ([0.50]); Trade Union -8.00* ([4.29]); Observations 102852.
  - Heckman 2nd: Civil Associations -2.96*** ([0.41]); Trade Union -7.22* ([3.92]); Heckman 1st “Don’t know” -0.55*** ([0.04]); Observations 154298.
  - IV 1st-stage: UK UM 0.36*** ([0.01]).

### Robustness to outliers (Table 8)
- Probit coefficient on civil associations remains negative and statistically significant across country exclusion robustness checks:
  - Coefficient when no country excluded: -2.74*** ([0.36]; All).
  - Examples of exclusion results:
    - Austria excluded: -3.30*** ([0.50]).
    - Belgium excluded: -3.53*** ([0.49]).
    - Germany excluded: -3.58*** ([0.54]).
    - Netherlands excluded: -3.58*** ([0.49]).
  - Notes: All regressions include the controls in Table 1. Coefficient estimates indicate marginal effects. Several Heckman specifications fail to converge and are not reported.

### Heterogeneity in relationship between populist vote and association membership (Table 9)
- Panel A. By Age Group (examples, Probit and OLS):
  - Young:
    - OLS (All): -2.51*** ([0.85]).
    - Probit (All): -3.56*** ([0.85]).
    - Heckman (All): -2.70*** ([0.69]).
  - Middle:
    - OLS (All): -2.35*** ([0.51]).
    - Probit (All): -3.01*** ([0.48]).
    - Heckman (All): -2.52*** ([0.40]).
  - Old:
    - OLS (All): -2.91*** ([0.75]).
    - Probit (All): -3.88*** ([0.61]).
    - Heckman (All): -3.40*** ([0.55]).
- Panel B. By Education Group (examples):
  - Below Sec.:
    - OLS (All): -3.21*** ([0.92]).
    - Probit (All): -5.04*** ([1.32]).
  - Secondary:
    - OLS (All): -3.28*** ([0.84]).
    - Probit (All): -4.19*** ([0.65]).
    - Heckman (All): -3.27*** ([0.47]).
  - Tertiary:
    - OLS (All): -1.27*** ([0.34]).
    - Probit (All): -1.67*** ([0.34]).
    - Heckman: selected coefficients reported (e.g., -1.15***).

### Latin America (Table 10: Probit estimates)
- Selected coefficients (dependent variable =1 if individual votes for a populist party):
  - Union Member (All): -0.53 ([0.91]; Obs. 18736).
  - Union Member by subperiods show mixed signs; example: 2007 (column for 2007) coefficient 3.60*** ([0.74]; Obs. 4453) while 2008 coefficient -2.09 ([1.54]; Obs. 6047).
  - Income Sufficient (All): -0.58 ([1.29]).
  - Income Difficult (All): 1.68** ([0.76]).
  - Female (All): -0.67 ([0.81]).
  - Young (All): 1.84 ([1.16]).
  - Old (All): -3.47** ([1.65]).
  - Secondary Education (All): 1.8 ([1.16]).
  - Tertiary Education (All): 0.77 ([2.86]).
- Notes: “Union member” definition varies regionally (see Variable definitions). Country*Year fixed effects included. Standard errors clustered at country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

### Populist parties in power and union membership (Table 11)
- OLS estimates at (country, year) level; dependent variable: Union density
  - Populist party in power coefficients: -3.23*** ([0.87]) and -3.10*** ([0.89]) across two specifications.
  - Dummy for crisis coefficient in second specification: 2.79 ([2.65]).
  - Country fixed effects: Y; Year fixed effects: Y.
  - Observations 506; R-squared 0.76 in both columns.
- Notes: “Union density” defined as net union membership as a proportion of wage earners in employment at (country, year) level (Vissier (2016)). “Populist party in power” defined per Allred, Nathaniel, Kirk A. Hawkins, and Saskia P. Ruth. 2015. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

### Data coverage, variable definitions, and summary statistics
- Data coverage (examples):
  - European sample years: columns for 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 with country-level Y indicators (e.g., Belgium Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y; Germany Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y).
  - Latin American sample years: 1996, 1998, 2005, 2007, 2008 with country-level Y indicators (e.g., Argentina Y Y Y Y Y).
- Key variable definitions (Table A2):
  - Populist Vote =1 if someone votes to a populist party (ESS uses Inglehart and Norris list; LAC uses top 25 percent in CHES score).
  - Civil Associations (ESS) =1 if someone worked in a civil organization or association last 12 months.
  - Union Member (ESS) =1 if someone is a current union member.
  - Association Member (LAC) =1 if member of trade or labor union or other organization/group.
  - Income sufficient =1 if living comfortably on present income; Income difficult =1 if difficult or very difficult.
  - Sum Don't Know = number of “Don’t Know” answers to 8 questions including: TV watching news/politics, interest in politics, ability/confidence to participate in politics, placement on left-right scale, state of education in country nowadays, state of health services in country nowadays.
  - Populist in power =1 if party in power is a populist party per Allred et al. 2015.
  - Union density = net union membership as proportion of wage earners (Vissier (2016)).
- Summary statistics (Table A3):
  - ESS: Populist Vote mean 0.13 (St. Dev. 0.33); Civil Association 0.22 (St. Dev. 0.41); Member of Civil association or union 0.41 (St. Dev. 0.49); Union only 0.27 (St. Dev. 0.45); Income sufficient 0.36 (St. Dev. 0.48); Income difficult 0.19 (St. Dev. 0.39); Female 0.52 (St. Dev. 0.50); Young 0.12 (St. Dev. 0.32); Old 0.24 (St. Dev. 0.43); Secondary education 0.62 (St. Dev. 0.49); Tertiary education 0.32 (St. Dev. 0.47).
  - LAC: Populist Vote mean 0.22 (St. Dev. 0.42); Member of Civil association or union 0.55 (St. Dev. 0.50); Income sufficient 0.09 (St. Dev. 0.29); Income difficult 0.52 (St. Dev. 0.50); Female 0.49 (St. Dev. 0.50); Young 0.35 (St. Dev. 0.48); Old 0.08 (St. Dev. 0.27); Secondary education 0.21 (St. Dev. 0.41); Tertiary education 0.07 (St. Dev. 0.26).

*Source: wp18245 (selected tables and notes) — IMF working paper content provided in the supplied PDF.*

### References

### References

### Populism: Theory, Definitions, and Overviews
- Acemoğlu Daron, Geory Egorov, and Konstantin Sonin. 2013. “A Political Theory of Populism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128: pp. 771-805.  
- Ionescu Ghita and Ernest Gellner, eds. 1969. Populism: its Meanings and National Characteristics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.  
- Mudde, Cas. 2004. The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition. 39: pp. 541-63.  
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press.  
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.  
- Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What is Populism? Pennsylvania University Press.  
- Judis, John B. 2016. The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics. Columbia Global Reports.  
- Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira, and Lina Zanotti. 2016. “The Comparative (Party) Politics of the Great Recession: Causes, Consequences and Future Research Agenda.” Comparative European Politics pp. 1 -14.

### Populism and Political/Economic Consequences
- Di Tella, Rafael and Julio Rotemberg. 2016. Populism and the Return of the "Paranoid Style": Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal.” NBER Working Paper No. 22975.  
- Dornbusch, Rudiger and Sebastian Edwards, Editors. 1991. The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America. Chicago University Press.  
- Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch. 2016. “Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870–2014.” European Economic Review 88: pp. 227-60.  
- Houle, Christian and Paul D. Kenny. 2016. The Political and Economic Consequences of Populist Rule in Latin America. Government and Opposition.  
- Rodrik, Dani. 2017. Populism and the Economics of Globalization. Mimeo. August https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf

### Populism, Trust, and Public Opinion in Europe
- Algan Yann, Sergei Guriev, Elias Papaioannou, and Evegenia Passari. 2017. “The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism.” Brookings Papers of Economic Activity.  
- Dustmann Christian, Barry Eichegreen, Sebastian Otten, André Sapir, Guido Tabellini and Gylfi Zoega. 2017. Europe’s Trust Deficit. Causes and Remedies. CEPR Press.  
- The European Economy Advisory Group and CESifo. 2017. EEAG Report on the European Economy no. 16: Economics of Populism. https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen-Archiv/2017/Q1/press-20170301-EEAG.html  
- Hobbolt Sara B. and Catherine De Vries. 2016. “Turning Against the Union? The Impact of the Crisis on the Eurosceptic Vote in the 2014 European Parliament Elections.” Electoral Studies 44: pp. 504-14.  
- Inglehart, Charles and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. HKS Working Paper No. RWP16-026.  
- Hatton, Timothy J. 2016. “Immigration, Public Opinion and the Recession in Europe.” Economic Policy 31: pp. 205-46.  
- Viandas, Tim and Daphne Halikiopoulou. 2016. “Why Far Right Parties Do Well at Times of Crisis: The Role of Labour Market Institutions. Working Paper 2016.7 European Trade Union Institute.

### Populism and Social Movements, Extremism, and Historical Studies
- Aslanidis, Paris. 2016. “Populist Social Movements of the Great Recession” Mobilization: International Quarterly 21: pp. 301-21.  
- Satyanath, Shanker, Nico Voigtländer, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2017. “Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33" Journal of Political Economy, 2017, 125(2): pp. 478-526.  
- Guiso, Luigi, Helios Herrea, Massimo Morelli and Tommaso Sonno. 2017. Demand and Supply of Populism. EIEF Working Paper 17/03.  
- Coffé, Hilde, Bruno Heyndels and Jan Vermeir. 2007. “Fertile grounds for extreme right-wing parties: Explaining the Vlaams Blok’s electoral success, Electoral Studies 26: pp. 142-55.  
- Mayer, N. 2014. “The Electoral Impact of the Crisis on the French Working Class.” In N. Bermeo and L. Bartels (eds.) Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes, and Protest in the Great Recession Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 266-96.  
- Laeven, L. & Valencia, F. 2013. IMF Econ Rev. 61: p. 225. https://doi.org/10.1057/imfer.2013.12

### Regional and Party-Level Analyses
- Kriesi, Hanspeter and Takis S. Pappas, eds. 2015. European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: ECPR Press.  
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 2017. “State of the Field. Party politics in hard times: Comparatives on the European and Latin American Economic Crises.” European Journal of Political Research. 56: pp. 218-33.  
- Allred, Nathaniel, Kirk A. Hawkins, and Saskia P. Ruth. 2015. “The Impact of Populism on Liberal Democracy.” 8o Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, Lima, Peru.

### Historical and Classical Works Referenced
- de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835. Democracy in America, edited and translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. University of Chicago Press.  
- Di Tella, Torcuato S. 1965. “Populism and Reform in Latin America.” In Obstacles to Changes in Latin America, edited by Claudio Véliz, pp. 47-74. London: Oxford University Press.  
- Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton University Press.

### Data Sources and Working Papers
- J. Visser. 2016. ICTWSS Data base. version 5.1. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), University of Amsterdam. September.  
- Di Tella, Rafael and Julio Rotemberg. 2016. Populism and the Return of the "Paranoid Style": Some Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal.” NBER Working Paper No. 22975.  
- Guiso, Luigi, Helios Herrea, Massimo Morelli and Tommaso Sonno. 2017. Demand and Supply of Populism. EIEF Working Paper 17/03.  
- Rodrik, Dani. 2017. Populism and the Economics of Globalization. Mimeo. August https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf

*Content extracted from "wp18245 - References."*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp18245.pdf_