## 1. Finland Gross Debt Versus Static Net Worth

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [1. Finland Gross Debt Versus Static Net Worth](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp1878.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp1878.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp1878.pdf.json)

---

### A comprehensive view of public finances: rationale and framework
- Rationale:
  - Broader measures of government net worth often more relevant for policy decisions than gross general government debt (e.g., Maastricht debt).
  - Balance sheet approach accounts for assets, public corporations, existing pension liabilities, and contingent liabilities (the latter considered in stress tests).
- Method: two steps
  - Derive a static balance sheet (data intensive; Annex I describes data and methodology).
  - Augment static balance sheet with future fiscal flows into an intertemporal balance sheet and apply stress tests to determine prudent fiscal buffers.
- Advantages:
  - Separates structural versus non-structural debt reduction.
  - Incorporates public corporations to capture revenues and explicit/implicit support risks.
  - Includes existing pension liabilities related to past work.
  - Facilitates construction of an intertemporal balance sheet by adding net present values of future fiscal balances.

### Finland’s static public sector balance sheet highlights (end-2016)
- Aggregate balance sheet items (percent of GDP):
  - Assets (total): 255.1
  - Nonfinancial assets: 84.6
  - Financial assets: 170.5
  - Liabilities (total): 418.2
  - Financial liabilities (balance-sheet definition): 311.7
  - Maastricht debt: 63.1 percent of GDP (2016)
  - Existing pension liabilities (present value of payments for work performed up to end-2016): 301.1
  - Net Worth (total, including pension liabilities): -163.1
  - Net Worth, excl. all pension liabilities: 138.0
  - Net Financial Worth (Financial assets - Liabilities): -247.7
- Additional descriptive points:
  - Non-financial assets stood at 75 percent of GDP at end-2016.
  - Financial assets are large at 170 percent of GDP; pension funds represent 90 percent of GDP in financial assets and invest about two thirds in equities.
  - Public corporations contribute almost 10 percent of GDP to public sector wealth (two thirds from non-financial SOEs).
  - Existing pension liabilities equal 301 percent of GDP; present values discounted using a real interest rate of 3 percent (with historical revisions noted).

### Historical evolution of public sector net worth (2000–2016)
- Net worth and drivers:
  - Net worth increased from 25 to 63 percent of GDP between end 2000 and end 2007.
  - Drivers of the 2000–2007 increase:
    - Fiscal surpluses contributed +25 percent of GDP to net worth.
    - Positive asset valuation changes contributed +47 percent of GDP.
    - Rise in nominal public pension liabilities reduced net worth by 28 percentage points of GDP.
    - New public investment net of depreciation made a small positive contribution.
- GFC impact (end 2007 → end 2008):
  - Public sector net worth decreased by more than 20 percent of GDP, driven mainly by valuation losses in financial assets (equities).
  - Fiscal balance and investment remained positive in 2008 across the public sector.
  - Pension valuation effects increased public pension liabilities.
- Post-GFC (end 2008 → end 2016):
  - Public net worth excluding private pensions declined slightly from 39 percent of GDP at end 2008 to 35 percent of GDP at end 2016.
  - Net effects:
    - Fiscal deficits decreased net worth by 19 percent of GDP on net.
    - Acquisition of financial assets through pension funds continued: +18 percent of GDP.
    - New debt contraction by general government increased financial liabilities: +37 percent of GDP.
    - Recovery of financial markets produced large positive valuation changes for the general government.
    - Increase in public pension liabilities comparable to pre-crisis period and largely due to pensions near payment.

### Risks, hedges, and balance sheet features
- Valuation sensitivity and short-run risk:
  - Large equity holdings by social security funds lead to immediate net worth drops in crises; debt liabilities valuations are more stable.
  - If equity prices recover, favorable valuation changes can offset post-crisis fiscal deficits.
- Pension asset–liability mismatch:
  - Pension liabilities increase gradually in nominal terms; pension fund assets fluctuate with markets.
  - Natural hedge: low interest rates increase pension liability PV but also raise asset valuations; Finland experienced offsetting effects post-GFC.
  - Discount factor revisions documented (e.g., change from 4 percent to 3.5 percent between 2009 and 2010; further reduction to 3.0 percent for 2017–26).
- Public corporations and contingent liabilities:
  - SOEs are profitable with solid financial positions; risks from hidden deficits appear low.
  - Stock of government guarantees is high; provisioning and risk management adequate but require close monitoring.
  - Planned relocation of Nordea Group’s headquarters to Helsinki in late 2018 noted to expand implicit contingent liabilities.
- Debt structure and currency exposure:
  - Average maturity of central government debt is 6.5 years.
  - Annual gross financing needs remained below 12½ percent of GDP throughout 2000–16.
  - Around 98 percent of financial liabilities of the general government are issued in euros; remainder hedged by the state treasury.
  - Currency risk exposure limited to financial assets held by social security funds, half of which are foreign equity shares.

### The intertemporal balance sheet and long-run sustainability
- Concept and exclusion:
  - Intertemporal balance sheet (IFNW) adds present values of future revenues and expenditures to the static balance sheet; excludes non-financial assets to avoid double counting tax-generating capacity.
- Projection assumptions:
  - October 2017 WEO projections extended through 2022; long-term beyond 2022 based on:
    - Real GDP growth stabilizes at around 1½ percent (Statistics Finland population projections; constant 15–64 participation rate; labor productivity growth of 1.5 percent).
    - Fiscal revenues remain constant relative to GDP.
    - Expenditure ratio varies with aging costs.
- IFNW interpretation:
  - Negative IFNW indicates fiscal policy changes will be needed to fulfill the budget constraint.
  - Static net worth reported as -160 percent of GDP; under all scenarios IFNW exceeds static net worth and in three of five scenarios IFNW is positive.
  - Successful implementation of health and social services reform would boost IFNW by some 65 percent of GDP.

### Scenario definitions (five long-term fiscal scenarios)
- Baseline:
  - Based on October 2017 WEO projections; assumes achieving a medium-term objective of a structural fiscal deficit of ½ percent of GDP by 2020.
- Baseline with health and social services reform:
  - Baseline plus gradual realization of savings of 1½ percent of GDP between 2023 and 2030.
- Moderated consolidation (2018 budget):
  - 2018 budget proposal medium-term framework with slower consolidation; overall fiscal deficit around 1 percent of GDP in early 2020s.
- Moderated consolidation with health and social services reform:
  - Combines moderated consolidation with long-term reform savings.
- Abandoned consolidation:
  - Expenditure-based consolidation abandoned; overall fiscal deficit assumed at 1¾ percent of GDP throughout 2022 and health and social services reform not implemented.

### Intertemporal results and policy implications
- IFNW outcomes:
  - IFNW highest under baseline including health and social services reform.
  - Baseline without reform: IFNW positive, but barely so.
  - Moderated consolidation: health and social services reform needed to achieve positive IFNW.
  - Abandoning consolidation: comprehensive financial worth negative, increasing vulnerability.
- Policy implications:
  - Ambitious implementation of health and social services reform critical to build a fiscal buffer large enough to absorb major shocks.
  - Continued expenditure-based consolidation, if fully implemented, would ensure positive IFNW; reform remains crucial to create a sizable buffer.

### Stress-testing the balance sheet — design and calibration
- Severe shock benchmarked to three past crises (early 1990s Nordic Banking crisis; Global Financial Crisis 2008–09; second dip 2012–14).
- Severe shock assumptions:
  - GDP falls by 5.8 percent in 2018 and 1 percent in 2019; relative to the baseline, GDP 10 percent lower in 2019.
  - Equity prices fall by 40 percent in 2018.
  - Housing prices fall by 25 percent in 2018.
- Contingent liability realizations (in order of increasing severity):
  - (i) Some explicit contingent liabilities called.
  - (ii) Limited recapitalization of banks.
  - (iii) Extreme: full recapitalization of domestic banks (OP and Municipality Finance).
- Alternative calibration (Table III.1 variant):
  - Real GDP: drop by 5.2 percent in 2018 and an additional 0.7 percent in 2019 (10 percent lost growth relative to potential).
  - House prices: fall by 15 percent in 2018.
  - Equity prices: drop by 40 percent in 2018.
  - Contingent liability realizations: assume 15 percent of government guarantee stock converts to liabilities.

### Stress-testing outcomes and required buffers
- Fiscal and stock impacts (selected outcomes):
  - Peak decline of static public sector net worth: peak decline reached in 2019 and amounts to 45 percent of GDP; contingent liability realization in most adverse scenario lowers net worth by an additional 12 percent of GDP.
  - Gross debt dynamics: gross debt stands 20 percent above baseline in 2019 and opens a 30 percent of GDP differential relative to baseline through 2022.
  - Drivers of net worth decline:
    - Adverse asset price fluctuations decrease net worth by 26 percent of GDP by 2019.
    - Pension liabilities increase by a similar amount relative to GDP due to the decrease in GDP.
- IFNW outcomes in 2019:
  - Baseline: 27 percent of GDP.
  - Stress scenario: -80 percent of GDP.
  - Deterioration: 107 percent of GDP (difference between baseline and stress).
- Buffer calculations:
  - Buffer of around 85 percent of GDP:
    - Needed to withstand a severe shock without need for post-crisis fiscal adjustment given IFNW deterioration of 107 percent of GDP.
    - IFNW would increase by about 25 percent of GDP until 2022 if projected asset price recovery materializes; thus, 85 percent of GDP likely sufficient to ensure zero IFNW absent post-crisis adjustments.
  - Buffer of approximately 30 percent of GDP:
    - Sufficient to offset net worth deterioration of the crisis years and withstand the most immediate impacts.
    - Would imply need for post-crisis fiscal consolidation to return fiscal balances back to baseline by 2027.
    - Under the consolidation variation, IFNW would decrease to around 0, a drop of some 26½ percent of GDP compared to the baseline.

### Fiscal flows and dynamics under the stress scenario
- Revenues:
  - Fall in absolute terms but initially increase relative to GDP because labor compensation drops less than GDP as firms retain some labor.
  - Revenues revert back to the baseline as the economy recovers.
- Expenditures:
  - Increase during the crisis due to automatic stabilizers (e.g., unemployment benefits).
  - Remain above the baseline in the long term because GDP in levels suffers a permanent loss and some expenditures (e.g., health care driven by aging) grow independent of GDP.
- Resulting gap:
  - Combination of initial revenue behavior and persistently higher expenditures opens a long-term shortfall in the primary balance.

### Policy recommendations and monitoring
- Priorities:
  - Implement health and social services reform to realize projected savings (1½ percent of GDP in reform scenario) and build buffers.
  - Use the present economic upswing to make early headway in rebuilding buffers.
  - Continue expenditure-based consolidation to the extent feasible.
- Post-shock options:
  - If buffers limited (~30 percent of GDP), pursue sustained post-crisis fiscal consolidation.
  - If buffers large (~85 percent of GDP), can better absorb shocks without immediate adjustment.
- Monitoring and framework:
  - Enhanced monitoring of valuation changes, public pensions, public corporations, and contingent liabilities recommended.
  - Public sector balance sheet approach provides a more comprehensive tool than debt-only analyses and can inform reforms on pensions, health, labor market, and tax/expenditure policy.
  - Governments should avoid immediate policy reactions to transient asset price-induced net worth plunges but stand ready to act if net worth remains persistently depressed.

### Key projections and selected quantitative tables (baseline and stress highlights)
- Baseline key variables (percent or EUR billions):
  - Real GDP growth: 2017 2.8; 2018 2.3; 2019 1.8; 2020 1.6; 2021 1.5; 2022 1.5
  - Fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2017 -1.5; 2018 -1.2; 2019 -0.9; 2020 -0.5; 2021 -0.4; 2022 -0.3
  - General government gross debt (Maastricht): 2017 63.3; 2018 62.6; 2019 61.8; 2020 60.6; 2021 59.5; 2022 58.3
  - PS static net worth (percent of GDP): 2017 36.4; 2018 36.6; 2019 37.8; 2020 39.9; 2021 42.7; 2022 45.6
  - PS static net worth including private pensions (percent of GDP): 2017 -159.9; 2018 -158.4; 2019 -156.9; 2020 -154.9; 2021 -152.5; 2022 -149.8
  - Memorandum: Nominal GDP (EUR billions): 2017 223.0; 2018 231.1; 2019 239.3; 2020 247.9; 2021 256.6; 2022 265.5
- Stress scenario key outcomes (percent or EUR billions):
  - Real GDP growth under stress: 2017 2.8; 2018 -5.2; 2019 -0.7; 2020 1.5; 2021 2.2; 2022 2.6
  - Fiscal balance under stress (percent of GDP): 2017 -1.5; 2018 -5.6; 2019 -7.2; 2020 -6.8; 2021 -5.5; 2022 -4.2
  - General government gross debt under stress (Maastricht): 2017 63.3; 2018 73.2; 2019 80.7; 2020 85.6; 2021 88.2; 2022 88.5
  - PS static net worth under stress (percent of GDP): 2017 36.4; 2018 -5.7; 2019 -8.4; 2020 -3.3; 2021 3.2; 2022 8.9
  - PS static net worth including private pensions under stress (percent of GDP): 2017 -159.9; 2018 -196.1; 2019 -197.1; 2020 -191.0; 2021 -185.0; 2022 -180.4
  - Memorandum: Nominal GDP (EUR billions) under stress: 2017 223.0; 2018 209.7; 2019 210.5; 2020 216.8; 2021 226.4; 2022 238.1
- Historical balance-sheet snapshots (selected years, percent of GDP):
  - Static Public Sector Net Worth A (2000): -114.6; (2007): -82.3; (2008): -114.3; (2016): -163.1
  - General Government B — Assets (2000): 147.3; (2007): 176.7; (2008): 157.7; (2016): 203.4
  - Existing Pension Liabilities F (2000): 216.1; (2007): 225.0; (2008): 238.5; (2016): 301.1
  - Intertemporal Financial Net Worth L (2000): 36.5; (2007): 42.1; (2008): 15.0; (2016): 23.9

*Source — IMF working paper chapter: “1. Finland Gross Debt Versus Static Net Worth” (wp1878).*

### 1. Finland Gross Debt Versus Static Net Worth...........................................................................

### 1. Finland Gross Debt Versus Static Net Worth

### A comprehensive view of public finances: rationale and framework
- Most fiscal sustainability analyses focus on gross general government debt (e.g., Maastricht debt), but broader measures of government net worth are often more relevant for policy decisions.
- Balance sheet approach advantages:
  - Accounts for assets, distinguishing structural versus non-structural debt reduction.
  - Incorporates public corporations to capture revenues and explicit/implicit support risks.
  - Includes existing pension liabilities related to past work.
  - Facilitates construction of an intertemporal balance sheet by adding net present values of future fiscal balances (the “comprehensive balance sheet”).
- Method: two steps
  - Derive a static balance sheet (data intensive; Annex I describes data and methodology).
  - Augment static balance sheet with future fiscal flows into an intertemporal balance sheet and apply stress tests to determine prudent fiscal buffers.

### Key elements included beyond gross debt
- Assets: allow separation of structural vs. non-structural debt reduction and reduce incentives for “creative accounting.”
- Public corporations: include financial and non-financial public corporations under state control to avoid shifting deficits outside standard government statistics.
- Existing pension liabilities: reflect obligations for work already performed (in Finland, pension liabilities related to work up to end-2016 are treated as statutory obligations in the analysis).
- Contingent liabilities: not on the static balance sheet but considered in subsequent fiscal stress tests.

### Finland’s static public sector balance sheet highlights (end-2016)
- Aggregate balance sheet items (percent of GDP, as reported):
  - Assets (total): 255.1
  - Nonfinancial assets: 84.6
  - Financial assets: 170.5
  - Liabilities (total): 418.2
  - Financial liabilities (balance-sheet definition): 311.7
  - Maastricht debt: 63.1 percent of GDP (2016)
  - Existing pension liabilities (present value of payments for work performed up to end-2016): 301.1
  - Net Worth (total, including pension liabilities): -163.1
  - Net Worth, excl. all pension liabilities: 138.0
  - Net Financial Worth (Financial assets - Liabilities): -247.7
- Non-financial assets stood at 75 percent of GDP at end-2016 (text description).
- Financial assets are large at 170 percent of GDP, reflecting a partially funded pension system; pension funds represent 90 percent of GDP in financial assets and invest about two thirds in equities.
- Public corporations contribute almost 10 percent of GDP to public sector wealth (two thirds from non-financial SOEs).
- Existing pension liabilities equal 301 percent of GDP; these present values are discounted using a real interest rate of 3 percent (with a note that this real rate was 4 percent in 2007 and revised down gradually).

### Evolution and interpretation: debt versus net worth
- Finland’s gross debt (Maastricht) rose from 33 percent of GDP in 2008 to 63 percent of GDP in 2016, driven by post-crisis deficits and subdued growth.
- Real GDP remained some 4½ percent below its pre-GFC peak in 2016.
- Despite rising gross debt, static net worth remained relatively stable due to sizable asset positions and valuation gains.
- General government net debt was -53 percent of GDP in 2016 (i.e., a positive net asset position), illustrating how net debt measures can be deceptive when pension liabilities and nonfinancial assets are excluded.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Finland’s fiscal position is assessed as solid, but continued reforms and early rebuilding of fiscal buffers are important given risks.
- Priority reforms:
  - Health and social services reform to address future spending pressures from rising health and long-term care needs.
- Recommendation: Use the present economic upswing to make early headway in rebuilding buffers, given macroeconomic risks and uncertainty about realizing projected savings from reforms.
- Intertemporal balance sheet: Finland’s projected future fiscal balances can offset negative static net worth if reform implementation continues as planned; intertemporal analysis lends itself to scenario analysis and stress testing to quantify policy impacts on sustainability.

### Data and methodological notes
- Constructing the public sector balance sheet required consolidating data from multiple sources and assistance from Finnish authorities; public corporations’ data cover over 90 percent of assets of nonfinancial public corporations owned by the central government, while local government-owned corporations could not be covered due to data constraints.
- Pension liability valuation: present value of payments discounted using a real interest rate of 3 percent (up to 2026) and 3.5 percent from 2027 forward per ETK Finnish Centre for Pensions calculations (source text note).
- The stock of financial liabilities included in the balance sheet (75 percent of GDP in some references) differs from Maastricht debt because Maastricht excludes accounts payable and financial derivatives (6.4 percent of GDP at end-2016) and evaluates debt at nominal rather than market value.

_Italic: Source — IMF working paper chapter: “1. Finland Gross Debt Versus Static Net Worth” (wp1878)._

### 12.      The historical analysis focuses on the evolution of public sector net worth before,

### 12.      The historical analysis focuses on the evolution of public sector net worth before,

### Historical evolution of public sector net worth (2000–2016)
- Net worth increased from 25 to 63 percent of GDP between end 2000 and end 2007.
- Drivers of the 2000–2007 increase:
  - Fiscal surpluses contributed +25 percent of GDP to net worth.
  - Positive asset valuation changes contributed +47 percent of GDP.
  - Rise in nominal public pension liabilities reduced net worth by 28 percentage points of GDP.
  - New public investment net of depreciation made a small positive contribution.
- Transactions vs valuation decomposition (pre-2007):
  - Fiscal surpluses strengthened financial asset positions in general government more than they reduced debt.
  - Public corporations considerably reduced their financial liabilities.
  - Equity shares in financial assets of the general government were behind large valuation gains as equity prices rose pre-crisis.
  - Increases in public pension liabilities were mainly driven by interest rate effects (pensions nearing payment increase in present value); pension flows (new accrual minus pensions paid) broadly balanced out.
- Global Financial Crisis (GFC) impact (end 2007 → end 2008):
  - Public sector net worth decreased by more than 20 percent of GDP, driven mainly by valuation losses.
  - Fiscal balance and investment remained positive in 2008 across the public sector.
  - Large negative valuation changes in general government were driven by financial assets, particularly equity shares.
  - For public corporations, valuation changes in financial assets and liabilities roughly balanced out.
  - Pension valuation effects (pensions nearing disbursement) increased public pension liabilities.
- Post-GFC developments (end 2008 → end 2016):
  - Public net worth excluding private pensions declined slightly from 39 percent of GDP at end 2008 to 35 percent of GDP at end 2016.
  - Net effects on net worth after the GFC:
    - Fiscal deficits decreased net worth by 19 percent of GDP on net.
    - Acquisition of financial assets through pension funds continued: +18 percent of GDP.
    - New debt contraction by general government increased financial liabilities: +37 percent of GDP.
    - Public corporations kept investment and profits positive and reduced financial liabilities while acquiring financial assets.
    - Recovery of financial markets produced large positive valuation changes for the general government (recovering equity shares).
    - Increase in public pension liabilities comparable to pre-crisis period and largely due to pensions near their payment period.
- Static net worth measures:
  - Static net worth narrowly defined as contractual obligations was positive at end 2016.
  - Including pension liabilities for work already performed by private sector employees places static net worth considerably in negative territory.

### Risks and hedges in Finland’s public sector balance sheet
- Valuation sensitivity and short-run risk:
  - Large asset stocks, particularly equity shares held predominantly by social security funds, generate immediate net worth drops in crises due to large valuation changes.
  - Valuations of debt liabilities are much more stable than equity valuations.
  - Over medium–long term, equity portfolio valuation has contributed positively to net wealth.
- Post-shock stabilization:
  - If equity prices recover after a shock, favorable valuation changes can offset post-crisis fiscal deficits.
- Pension asset–liability mismatch:
  - Public pension liabilities increase gradually in nominal terms, while pension fund assets are subject to market fluctuations; this mismatch was realized during 2008.
  - Natural hedge: low interest rates increase present value of pension liabilities (discount factor decreases and low growth raises pension liabilities relative to GDP) but also raise equity and bond prices, increasing valuations of pension funds’ assets. Finland experienced offsetting effects post-GFC.
  - Pension liability estimate revisions included: change in discount factor from 4 percent to 3.5 percent between 2009 and 2010; a revision between 2014 and 2015 due to inclusion of the effects of the 2017 pension reform; and a further reduction of the discount factor to 3.0 percent (for the 2017–26 period).
- Public corporations and contingent liabilities:
  - Risks of hidden deficits in public corporations appear low; SOEs profitable with solid financial positions and regular monitoring.
  - Stock of government guarantees is the highest in the EU and risks are concentrated; provisioning and risk management are adequate but require close monitoring.
  - Planned relocation of Nordea Group’s headquarters to Helsinki in late 2018 will more than triple the current size of bank assets under supervision and expand implicit contingent liabilities.
- Debt structure and currency exposure:
  - Average maturity of central government debt is 6.5 years.
  - Annual gross financing needs remained below 12½ percent of GDP throughout 2000–16.
  - Rollover needs do not exhibit overly large spikes in any particular future years.
  - Around 98 percent of financial liabilities of the general government are issued in euros; the remainder is hedged by the state treasury.
  - Public corporations typically hedge foreign currency liabilities and have minimal maturity mismatches.
  - Currency risk exposure is limited to financial assets held by social security funds, half of which are foreign equity shares.

### The intertemporal balance sheet and long-run sustainability
- Concept:
  - The intertemporal balance sheet (IFNW) adds present values of future revenues and expenditures to the static balance sheet; it excludes non-financial assets to avoid double counting tax-generating capacity.
- Projection assumptions:
  - October 2017 WEO projections extended through 2022, updated with 2018 budget medium-term fiscal assumptions and supplemented by asset price projections for stress testing.
  - Long-term projections beyond 2022 rely on simple growth accounting assuming:
    - Real GDP growth stabilizes at around 1½ percent based on Statistics Finland population projections, a constant labor force 15–64 labor participation rate, and labor productivity growth of 1.5 percent.
    - Fiscal revenues remain constant relative to GDP.
    - Expenditure ratio varies in line with aging costs.
- IFNW as sustainability indicator:
  - Negative IFNW indicates fiscal policies will need eventual change to fulfill the budget constraint and could provoke adverse market reactions.
  - IFNW excludes non-financial assets (preferred to avoid double counting).
- Static net worth comparison:
  - Static net worth reported as -160 percent of GDP.
  - Under all scenarios IFNW exceeds static net worth; in three of five scenarios IFNW is positive.
  - Successful implementation of health and social services reform would boost IFNW by some 65 percent of GDP.

### Scenario definitions (five long-term fiscal scenarios)
- Baseline (Fiscal Position near balance by 2020):
  - Based on October 2017 WEO projections and assumes achieving a medium-term objective of a structural fiscal deficit of ½ percent of GDP by 2020.
- Baseline with health and social services reform:
  - Same as baseline plus improved fiscal path between 2023 and 2030 supposing gradual realization of savings of 1½ percent of GDP through health and social services reform.
- Moderated consolidation (2018 budget):
  - 2018 budget proposal medium-term framework with slower consolidation than baseline.
  - By early 2020s, the overall fiscal deficit would be around 1 percent of GDP, or ½ to ¾ percent of GDP higher than under the baseline.
- Moderated consolidation (2018 budget) with health and social services reform:
  - Combines the moderated medium-term consolidation with health and social services reform savings over the longer term.
- Abandoned consolidation:
  - Ongoing expenditure-based consolidation abandoned.
  - Overall fiscal deficit assumed at 1¾ percent of GDP throughout 2022, after which it changes only in line with age-related spending.
  - Assumes health and social services reform not implemented.

### Intertemporal results and policy implications
- IFNW results:
  - IFNW is highest under the baseline including health and social services reform.
  - Baseline without reform: IFNW positive, but barely so.
  - Moderated consolidation: health and social services reform is needed to achieve positive IFNW.
  - Abandoning fiscal consolidation: comprehensive financial worth would be negative, leaving Finland vulnerable to shocks.
- Policy implications:
  - Ambitious implementation of health and social services reform is critical to build a fiscal buffer large enough to absorb major shocks.
  - Continued expenditure-based fiscal consolidation, if fully implemented, would be sufficiently strong to ensure positive comprehensive financial net worth; however, reform remains crucial to create a sizable buffer.

### Stress-testing the balance sheet
- Purpose:
  - Calibrate a severe shock to assess how much IFNW would fall and the fiscal buffer needed to maintain positive IFNW after a large shock.
- Resulting buffer requirement:
  - A buffer in the range of 30–85 percent of GDP would be needed to withstand a severe shock with positive IFNW.
- Stress scenario calibration (benchmarked to three past crises: early 1990s Nordic Banking crisis; Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09; second dip 2012–14):
  - Severe shock assumptions:
    - GDP falls by 5.8 percent in 2018 and 1 percent in 2019.
    - Relative to the baseline, GDP would be 10 percent lower in 2019.
    - Equity prices fall by 40 percent in 2018.
    - Housing prices fall by 25 percent in 2018.
  - Contingent liability realizations (in order of increasing severity):
    - (i) Some explicit contingent liabilities (e.g., government guarantees) could be called.
    - (ii) Limited recapitalization of banks may become necessary.
    - (iii) Extreme scenario: full recapitalization of domestic banks (OP and Municipality Finance) would be needed.
- Calibration note:
  - Other macroeconomic variables are calibrated in line with the GDP shock and trajectories observed in the previous three crises.

*Source: Finnish authorities and IMF Staff calculations, as summarized in the provided content.*

### 31.      The fiscal balance deteriorates under the stress scenario, mainly driven by

### wp1878 - 31.      The fiscal balance deteriorates under the stress scenario, mainly driven by

### Fiscal flows under the stress scenario
- General government revenues:
  - Fall in absolute terms but initially increase relative to GDP because labor compensation drops less than GDP as firms retain some labor.
  - Revenues revert back to the baseline as the economy recovers.
- Expenditures:
  - Increase during the crisis due to automatic stabilizers, such as higher expenditures on unemployment benefits.
  - Remain above the baseline in the long term because (i) GDP in levels suffers a permanent loss (e.g., human capital depreciation of the unemployed) and (ii) some expenditures’ growth is independent of GDP (e.g., health care expenditures driven by aging remain the same in nominal terms).
  - Absent additional post-crisis fiscal consolidation efforts, fiscal deficits would remain elevated compared to the baseline.
- Resulting gap:
  - The combination of initial revenue behavior and persistently higher expenditures opens up a long-term shortfall in the primary balance.

### Fiscal stocks: debt, net worth, and valuation effects
- Peak decline of static public sector net worth:
  - Peak decline reached in 2019 and amounts to 45 percent of GDP.
  - Including contingent liability realization in the most adverse stress scenario would lower net worth by an additional 12 percent of GDP.
- Gross debt dynamics:
  - Gross debt stands 20 percent above baseline in 2019.
  - Gross debt continues to rise through 2022, opening a 30 percent of GDP differential relative to baseline.
- Drivers of net worth decline:
  - Adverse asset price fluctuations decrease net worth by 26 percent of GDP by 2019.
  - Pension liabilities increase by a similar amount relative to GDP due to the decrease in GDP.
  - Realization of contingent liabilities in the most adverse scenario would reduce public sector net worth by another 12 percent of GDP.
- Interpretation:
  - Net worth falls more quickly and sharply than debt because net worth accounts for asset price impacts and pension liabilities that are often ignored in standard fiscal assessments.

### Intertemporal financial net worth (IFNW) and required buffers
- IFNW outcomes in 2019:
  - Baseline: 27 percent of GDP.
  - Stress scenario: -80 percent of GDP.
  - Deterioration: 107 percent of GDP (difference between baseline and stress).
- Reasons for larger IFNW deterioration vs static net worth:
  - Expenditures remain higher than baseline ad infinitum in the stress scenario, producing persistent negative present-value fiscal effects.
- Buffer calculations and scenarios:
  - A buffer of around 85 percent of GDP:
    - Would be needed to withstand a severe shock without need for post-crisis fiscal adjustment given IFNW deterioration of 107 percent of GDP.
    - Further analysis shows IFNW would increase by about 25 percent of GDP until 2022 if the projected asset price recovery materializes; thus, a buffer of 85 percent of GDP would likely be sufficient to ensure a zero IFNW in the absence of post-crisis fiscal adjustments.
  - A buffer of approximately 30 percent of GDP:
    - Would be sufficient to offset net worth deterioration of the crisis years and withstand the most immediate impacts of a large shock.
    - Would imply the need for post-crisis fiscal consolidation to return fiscal balances back to the baseline path by 2027.
    - Under the consolidation variation explored, IFNW would decrease to around 0, a drop of some 26½ percent of GDP compared to the baseline.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Health and social services reform:
  - Essential for Finland to build sufficient buffers to withstand a severe shock with positive IFNW.
  - Among the policy scenarios analyzed, the only scenarios that achieve an IFNW in the range of 30–85 percent of GDP are those including health and social services reform.
- Post-crisis fiscal consolidation:
  - If only a smaller buffer (e.g., ~30 percent of GDP) is in place, sustained fiscal adjustment after the crisis is required to bring fiscal balances back to baseline and to cover higher interest expenditures from larger debt stock.
- Alternative options:
  - Undertake post-crisis fiscal consolidation to offset perpetually higher expenditures.
  - Realize savings before a crisis to constitute a sufficiently high IFNW buffer ex ante.
- Monitoring and framework recommendations:
  - Enhanced monitoring of valuation changes, public pensions, and public corporations is important.
  - The public sector balance sheet approach (including static and intertemporal analyses) provides a more comprehensive tool than debt-only sustainability analyses and can inform reforms on pensions, health, labor market, and tax/expenditure policy.
  - Governments should abstain from immediate policy reactions to asset price-induced plunges in net worth but stand ready to act if net worth stays persistently depressed.

### Broader conclusions for Finland and cross-country application
- For Finland:
  - Public corporations are profitable with strong balance sheets and are not a large source of fiscal risks.
  - Pension liabilities are of paramount importance due to their size, continuing accumulation, and population aging.
  - Large financial asset stocks (mainly social security funds) are subject to considerable valuation changes that can amplify short-run net worth declines.
  - A positive IFNW in the range of 30–85 percent of GDP is desirable:
    - 30 percent of GDP: could absorb immediate impact but requires post-crisis consolidation.
    - 85 percent of GDP: sufficient to weather a large shock without need for subsequent fiscal adjustment while maintaining positive IFNW.
- Prudence and risks:
  - Building buffers early is prudent given: (i) Finland’s relatively volatile economic growth as a small open economy; (ii) uncertainty about savings from health and social services reform; (iii) vulnerability to asynchronous valuation changes given large balance sheet size; (iv) relatively large contingent liabilities; and (v) uncertainty inherent in macroeconomic and demographic projections and future interest rates.
- Applicability to other countries:
  - The public sector balance sheet analysis can provide early warning signals of fiscal imbalances and should be applied to other countries, where pension liabilities, public corporations, and data challenges may yield different sustainability implications.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in wp1878 (excerpt).*

### 48.      Public corporation and central bank accounts are consolidated with general

### Public corporation and central bank accounts are consolidated with general government accounts.

### Consolidation coverage and methodology
- Public corporation and central bank accounts are consolidated with general government accounts. Consolidated general government accounts are provided from Eurostat.
- Equity from non-financial SOEs is consolidated with general government accounts given that they are also counted in the latter data.
- Financial SOEs’ accounts are consolidated with general government accounts to the extent explicit creditor-debtor information is available in corporations’ annual financial statements.
- Accounts of the Bank of Finland were consolidated using creditor-debtor information provided by Statistics Finland.
- Coverage measure is calculated using the State Shareholding and Ownership Steering reports of the Finnish Prime Minister’s Office.
- Municipality Finance and Finnvera provide information on interactions of their accounts with government entities. Industry Investment (TESI) did not report explicit engagement with government entities in their balance sheets (included in general government accounts from 2014 onwards).

### Public corporations covered (selected entities and 2016 figures)
- Fingrid (Electricity transmission grid operator): Total assets, 2016: 2,101.8 (EUR millions); Central government shareholding, 2016: 53.1%
- Finnair (Airline): Total assets, 2016: 2,528.8; Central government shareholding, 2016: 55.8%
- Fortum (Electricity and energy): Total assets, 2016: 21,964.0; Central government shareholding, 2016: 50.8%
- Gasum (Transmission system operator of natural gas grid): Total assets, 2016: 1,461.5; Central government shareholding, 2016: 100%
- Neste Oil (Oil refinery and marketing): Total assets, 2016: 7,444.0; Central government shareholding, 2016: 50.1%
- Posti (Itella) (Postal service): Total assets, 2016: 1,185.5; Central government shareholding, 2016: 100%
- VR (Railway): Total assets, 2016: 2,002.2; Central government shareholding, 2016: 100%
- Municipality Finance (Credit institution for municipalities): Total assets, 2016: 34,052.2; Ownership: 16% Central Government; 30.7% Social Security Funds; 53.3% Local Governments
- Finnvera (Export credit agency): Total assets, 2016: 9,497.8; Central government shareholding, 2016: 100%
- Industry Investment (TESI) Investment company: Total assets, 2013: 561.5 (EUR millions); Is included in general government accounts from 2014 onwards

### Medium-term PSBS projection framework (through 2022)
- Baseline projection horizon: to 2022 using October 2017 WEO projections; includes the 2 percent of GDP multi-year fiscal consolidation currently underway in Finland.
- General government transactions assumptions:
  - Investments in debt securities, loans and equities follow the last 5 years’ average.
  - Stock of currency and deposits assumed to remain constant relative to GDP.
  - Transactions in other assets assumed zero.
  - Transactions in liabilities determined as residual from projected net lending less transactions in financial assets.
- Public corporations assumptions:
  - Operating balance (excluding central bank) remains at a constant 1 percent fraction of 2016 GDP.
  - Net acquisition of non-financial assets grow in line with private sector investment forecasts.
  - Bank of Finland operating balance held constant at its nominal value in 2016; BoF net acquisitions of non-financial assets assumed zero.
  - Transactions in financial assets grow with nominal GDP; transactions in financial liabilities determined as residual from public corporations’ net lending.
- Valuation changes assumptions:
  - Non-financial asset valuation changes proxied by house price index; for the general government valuation changes of financial liabilities are assumed zero.
  - Valuation changes of currency and deposits and other accounts receivable proxied by the short-term interest rate.
  - Debt securities’ valuation varies inversely with the long-term bond yield.
  - Equities and financial derivatives projected using equity price changes times a historical beta with the Helsinki OMX stock market index of 0.7.
  - House price inflation projection: equal to CPI inflation plus 2/3 of real GDP growth.
  - OMX projection: OMX yield = long-term bond yields (WEO Fall 2017) plus a risk premium of 4 percent.

### Medium-term pension liability projection (through 2022)
- Procedure:
  - Use WEO forecasts of employee compensation and real GDP growth to determine new pension liabilities accrued.
  - Use Finnish authorities’ fiscal forecasts for pension expenditure.
  - Fix the real discount factor at 3 percent to compute interest on existing pensions and augment by WEO inflation projection.
- Outcome: Public pension liabilities as a share of GDP are projected to remain stable until 2022.

### Long-term projections (beyond 2022) — methodology and assumptions to 2065
- Growth accounting approach based on population, productivity and participation rate.
- Working age population projections from Statistics Finland; labor force participation rate fixed at its 2022 level.
- Annual labor productivity growth assumed at 1.5 percent (below pre-crisis 2000–07 average of 2.4 percent; above last decade’s 0 percent).
- Nominal GDP: add an annual inflation rate of 2 percent to real GDP.
- Fiscal revenues assumed to remain at the projected 2022 level of 51.9 percent of GDP until 2065.
- Primary expenditures decomposed into pension (private and public), health, and other primary expenditures; pension and health shares adjusted using Finnish Ministry of Finance (2017a) demographic aging projections.
- Present values of future revenues and expenditures calculated using a 5 percent discount rate.
- Note on discount factors: ETK Finnish Centre for Pensions uses a 3 percent real discount factor through 2026; from 2027 onwards ETK assumes a 3.5 percent discount factor.

### Key variables under baseline assumptions (Table II.1; percent or EUR billions)
- Real GDP growth: 2017 2.8; 2018 2.3; 2019 1.8; 2020 1.6; 2021 1.5; 2022 1.5
- Nominal GDP growth: 2017 3.4; 2018 3.6; 2019 3.6; 2020 3.6; 2021 3.5; 2022 3.5
- HICP inflation: 2017 0.8; 2018 1.2; 2019 1.7; 2020 1.9; 2021 2.0; 2022 2.0
- Employment growth: 2017 0.7; 2018 1.3; 2019 0.8; 2020 0.6; 2021 0.3; 2022 0.1
- Unemployment rate: 2017 8.7; 2018 8.1; 2019 7.8; 2020 7.5; 2021 7.2; 2022 7.0
- Fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2017 -1.5; 2018 -1.2; 2019 -0.9; 2020 -0.5; 2021 -0.4; 2022 -0.3
- Primary balance (percent of GDP): 2017 -0.6; 2018 -0.4; 2019 -0.1; 2020 0.4; 2021 0.5; 2022 0.6
- Revenue (percent of GDP): 2017 52.7; 2018 51.9; 2019 51.8; 2020 52.0; 2021 51.9; 2022 51.9
- Expenditure (percent of GDP): 2017 54.3; 2018 53.1; 2019 52.7; 2020 52.4; 2021 52.3; 2022 52.2
- Primary expenditure (percent of GDP): 2017 53.3; 2018 52.3; 2019 51.9; 2020 51.6; 2021 51.4; 2022 51.4
- Interest expenditure (percent of GDP): 2017 0.9; 2018 0.9; 2019 0.8; 2020 0.8; 2021 0.8; 2022 0.9
- General government gross debt (Maastricht definition, percent of GDP): 2017 63.3; 2018 62.6; 2019 61.8; 2020 60.6; 2021 59.5; 2022 58.3
- PS static net worth (percent of GDP): 2017 36.4; 2018 36.6; 2019 37.8; 2020 39.9; 2021 42.7; 2022 45.6
- PS static net financial worth (percent of GDP): 2017 -47.1; 2018 -46.2; 2019 -45.0; 2020 -43.2; 2021 -41.1; 2022 -38.8
- PS static net worth including private pensions (percent of GDP): 2017 -159.9; 2018 -158.4; 2019 -156.9; 2020 -154.9; 2021 -152.5; 2022 -149.8
- PS static net financial worth including private pensions (percent of GDP): 2017 -243.4; 2018 -241.2; 2019 -239.8; 2020 -238.0; 2021 -236.2; 2022 -234.2
- Memorandum: Nominal GDP (EUR billions): 2017 223.0; 2018 231.1; 2019 239.3; 2020 247.9; 2021 256.6; 2022 265.5

### Stress test design and calibration (shock hitting in 2018)
- Stress scenario rationale: mirrors average of three major downturns in Finland (early 1990s Nordic banking crisis; 2008–09 GFC; 2012–14 double dip), somewhat less severe than the GFC.
- Macroeconomic shock path assumptions:
  - Real GDP: drop by 5.2 percent in 2018 and an additional 0.7 percent in 2019; relative to a longer-term potential growth rate of 1.5 percent implies lost growth of 10 percent.
  - Labor market: unemployment peaks at around 12 percent in 2019–20 (from slightly below 9 percent); firms retain some labor so output falls more than employment.
  - Employment falls: -2.1 percent in 2018 and -0.6 percent in 2019 (labor compensation drops by 3.3 percent across 2018–19 in one depiction).
  - Fiscal revenue ratio: projected to rise in proportion to GDP in the stress scenario due to muted labor compensation declines relative to output.
- Asset price shocks assumed:
  - House prices: fall by 15 percent relative to baseline in 2018 followed by slow recovery.
  - Equity prices: drop of 40 percent relative to baseline in 2018 with a comparatively quick recovery.
  - Pension liabilities: nominal growth attenuated by lower activity but increase relative to GDP.
- Contingent liability realizations:
  - Explicit contingent liabilities: government guarantees (local governments, National Housing Fund, Finnvera). Stock of guarantees was 28.3 percent of GDP in 2015 (Eurostat harmonized). Assumed that 15 percent of these exposures will transform into explicit government liabilities in the crisis scenario.
  - Implicit contingent liabilities: risks from the banking sector. A severe FSAP stress scenario (shock equivalent in size to the GFC) estimated impact of about 2¼ percent of GDP, reflecting high capitalization of Finnish banks. An extreme tail risk scenario: recapitalization of OP Financial and Municipality Finance equivalent to their equity positions at end-2016.
- Box 1 key points on guarantees:
  - Finland's general government guarantee-to-GDP ratio: 28.3 percent of GDP in 2015 (highest among EU countries under harmonized definition).
  - Finnvera expansion: expanded by 55 percent from 2013 to 2016; accounts for 9½ percent of GDP (only part of resources drawn).
  - Finnvera risk concentration: top 1, 3, and 10 clients make up 10, 24, and 41 percent of its lending portfolio.
  - Finnvera reserves: dedicated reserves of 0.6 percent of GDP to cover losses; Value at Risk calculations suggest sufficiency to cover losses in 99 percent of possible scenarios.
  - Guarantees to National Housing Fund: 6 percent of GDP in 2016; Housing Fund liquid reserves ~0.5 percent of GDP and expected to grow to about 1 percent of GDP by 2020.
  - Local government guarantees: 10½ percent of GDP in 2015.

### Key stress scenario quantitative outcomes (Table III.1; percent or EUR billions)
- Real GDP growth under stress: 2017 2.8; 2018 -5.2; 2019 -0.7; 2020 1.5; 2021 2.2; 2022 2.6
- Nominal GDP growth under stress: 2017 3.4; 2018 -6.0; 2019 0.4; 2020 3.0; 2021 4.4; 2022 5.2
- HICP inflation under stress: 2017 0.8; 2018 -0.8; 2019 1.0; 2020 1.5; 2021 2.2; 2022 2.5
- Employment growth under stress: 2017 0.7; 2018 -2.1; 2019 -0.6; 2020 0.5; 2021 1.0; 2022 1.2
- Unemployment rate under stress: 2017 8.7; 2018 11.1; 2019 11.9; 2020 11.9; 2021 10.9; 2022 10.0
- Fiscal balance (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 -1.5; 2018 -5.6; 2019 -7.2; 2020 -6.8; 2021 -5.5; 2022 -4.2
- Primary balance (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 -0.6; 2018 -4.7; 2019 -6.0; 2020 -5.4; 2021 -3.9; 2022 -2.4
- Revenue (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 52.7; 2018 52.1; 2019 52.4; 2020 52.5; 2021 52.6; 2022 52.5
- Primary expenditure (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 53.3; 2018 56.7; 2019 58.4; 2020 57.9; 2021 56.5; 2022 54.9
- Interest expenditure (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 0.9; 2018 1.0; 2019 1.2; 2020 1.4; 2021 1.6; 2022 1.7
- General government gross debt (Maastricht definition, percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 63.3; 2018 73.2; 2019 80.7; 2020 85.6; 2021 88.2; 2022 88.5
- PS static net worth (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 36.4; 2018 -5.7; 2019 -8.4; 2020 -3.3; 2021 3.2; 2022 8.9
- PS static net financial worth (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 -47.1; 2018 -74.3; 2019 -74.8; 2020 -69.0; 2021 -63.3; 2022 -59.6
- PS static net worth including private pensions (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 -159.9; 2018 -196.1; 2019 -197.1; 2020 -191.0; 2021 -185.0; 2022 -180.4
- PS static net financial worth including private pensions (percent of GDP) under stress: 2017 -243.4; 2018 -264.8; 2019 -263.4; 2020 -256.7; 2021 -251.5; 2022 -249.0
- Memorandum: Nominal GDP (EUR billions) under stress: 2017 223.0; 2018 209.7; 2019 210.5; 2020 216.8; 2021 226.4; 2022 238.1

*Source: IMF Staff projections and IMF working paper content.*

### ANNEX IV:  SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES AND TABLES

### ANNEX IV:  SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES AND TABLES

### Financial Asset Composition of Financial and Non-Financial SOEs, 2000–2016
- Financial corporations’ assets are dominated by their lending activities.
- Non-financial public corporations have built up substantial cash reserves in recent years.
- Sources: SOEs’ Annual Reports and IMF Staff calculations.

### Finland: Public Sector Net Worth Evolution 2000–2007
- Net worth increased considerably during 2000-07 driven by both fiscal surpluses and positive valuation changes.
- Fiscal surpluses allowed asset accumulation by general government.
- Positive valuation changes centered on general government non-financial and financial assets.
- Positive equity valuations drove increases in financial assets.
- Pension liabilities increased considerably, given relatively high interest rates during the pre-crisis period.
- Notes: GG= General Government; NFA=Non-financial Assets; FA = Financial Assets; FL = Financial Liabilities.

### Finland: Public Sector Net Worth Evolution 2007–2008
- During the initial year of the global financial crisis, negative valuation changes were the main driver of lowering net worth by some 20 percentage points.
- The fiscal balance was still positive in 2008, given large fiscal surpluses before the global financial crisis.
- Valuation losses were driven by the general government’s financial assets, mainly the social security funds’ investments in equities.
- Public pension liabilities continued to steadily increase in nominal terms, thereby increasing considerably relative to GDP.
- Notes: GG= General Government; NFA=Non-financial Assets; FA = Financial Assets; FL = Financial Liabilities.

### Finland: Public Sector Net Worth Evolution 2008–16
- Despite persistent moderate fiscal deficits in the post-GFC period, net worth remained quite stable in light of large valuation gains.
- Social security funds continued to accumulate assets, offsetting increases in debt by central and local government.
- The value of general governments’ financial assets increased as equity valuations recovered after the GFC.
- Public pension liabilities increased quite strongly, as lower interest rates contributed to raise their present value.
- Notes: GG= General Government; NFA=Non-financial Assets; FA = Financial Assets; FL = Financial Liabilities.

### Table IV.1. Finland’s Historic Public Sector Balance Sheets 2000–16 (Percent of GDP) — Selected figures
- Static Public Sector Net Worth A (=B+D‐F):
  - 2000: ‐114.6
  - 2007: ‐82.3
  - 2008: ‐114.3
  - 2016: ‐163.1
- General Government B — Assets:
  - 2000: 147.3
  - 2007: 176.7
  - 2008: 157.7
  - 2016: 203.4
- General Government C — Nonfinancial:
  - 2000: 66.3
  - 2007: 66.9
  - 2008: 68.9
  - 2016: 74.9
- General Government C — Financial:
  - 2000: 81.0
  - 2007: 109.8
  - 2008: 88.8
  - 2016: 128.5
- General Government — Liabilities:
  - 2000: 50.9
  - 2007: 40.1
  - 2008: 38.8
  - 2016: 75.0
- Public Corporations and Central Bank D — Assets:
  - 2000: 30.1
  - 2007: 34.8
  - 2008: 38.9
  - 2016: 75.1
- Existing Pension Liabilities F:
  - 2000: 216.1
  - 2007: 225.0
  - 2008: 238.5
  - 2016: 301.1
- Existing Public Pension Liabilities F:
  - 2000: 76.8
  - 2007: 80.0
  - 2008: 84.8
  - 2016: 103.3
- Existing Private Pension Liabilities F:
  - 2000: 139.2
  - 2007: 145.0
  - 2008: 153.7
  - 2016: 197.8
- Intertemporal Component G (=H‐I‐J‐K) (under Baseline assumptions):
  - 2000: 229.9
  - 2007: 201.6
  - 2008: 209.2
  - 2016: 271.5
- PV of Revenues H:
  - 2000: 2662.6
  - 2007: 2378.0
  - 2008: 2352.6
  - 2016: 2650.7
- Future Pension Liabilities I:
  - 2000: 591.6
  - 2007: 520.7
  - 2008: 503.8
  - 2016: 550.9
- PV of Health Expenditure J:
  - 2000: 498.6
  - 2007: 467.4
  - 2008: 465.8
  - 2016: 549.1
- PV of Non‐Pension, Non‐Health Primary Expenditure K:
  - 2000: 1342.5
  - 2007: 1188.3
  - 2008: 1173.9
  - 2016: 1279.1
- Intertemporal Financial Net Worth L (=A+G‐C‐E) (under Baseline):
  - 2000: 36.5
  - 2007: 42.1
  - 2008: 15.0
  - 2016: 23.9
- Memorandum items:
  - PV of Primary balance (2000): 10.9; (2016): ‐33.6
  - PV of Primary Expenditure (2000): 2633.1; (2016): 2658.5
  - Nominal GDP (Euro billions) (2000): 136.3; (2016): 215.6

### Annex Table IV.2. Projections of Finland’s Public Sector Balance Sheets 2017–22 (Percent of GDP) — Selected figures
- Static Public Sector Net Worth A (=B+D‐F) — Baseline:
  - 2017: ‐159.3
  - 2018: ‐157.5
  - 2019: ‐155.9
  - 2020: ‐154.0
  - 2021: ‐151.7
  - 2022: ‐149.4
- Static Public Sector Net Worth A — Stress Scenario:
  - 2017: ‐159.9
  - 2018: ‐216.1
  - 2019: ‐224.2
  - 2020: ‐218.6
  - 2021: ‐210.0
  - 2022: ‐201.7
- General Government B — Assets (Baseline):
  - 2017: 129.1
  - 2018: 128.0
  - 2019: 128.3
  - 2020: 129.4
  - 2021: 131.2
  - 2022: 133.1
- General Government B — Assets (Stress Scenario):
  - 2017: 128.5
  - 2018: 93.5
  - 2019: 91.9
  - 2020: 96.9
  - 2021: 102.3
  - 2022: 106.2
- General Government C — Nonfinancial (Baseline):
  - 2017: 73.8
  - 2018: 73.1
  - 2019: 73.1
  - 2020: 73.3
  - 2021: 73.8
  - 2022: 74.3
- General Government C — Financial (Baseline):
  - 2017: 129.2
  - 2018: 127.8
  - 2019: 126.9
  - 2020: 126.4
  - 2021: 126.3
  - 2022: 126.4
- General Government — Liabilities (Baseline):
  - 2017: 73.8
  - 2018: 72.9
  - 2019: 71.8
  - 2020: 70.3
  - 2021: 69.0
  - 2022: 67.6
- Public Corporations and Central Bank D — Assets (Baseline):
  - 2017: 10.5
  - 2018: 11.4
  - 2019: 12.4
  - 2020: 13.4
  - 2021: 14.4
  - 2022: 15.4
- Existing Pension Liabilities F (Baseline):
  - 2017: 298.9
  - 2018: 296.9
  - 2019: 296.5
  - 2020: 296.7
  - 2021: 297.3
  - 2022: 297.9
- Existing Public Pension Liabilities F (Baseline):
  - 2017: 102.6
  - 2018: 101.9
  - 2019: 101.8
  - 2020: 101.8
  - 2021: 102.0
  - 2022: 102.3
- Existing Private Pension Liabilities F (Baseline):
  - 2017: 196.3
  - 2018: 195.0
  - 2019: 194.8
  - 2020: 194.9
  - 2021: 195.2
  - 2022: 195.7
- Intertemporal Component G (Baseline):
  - 2017: 269.5
  - 2018: 267.5
  - 2019: 266.8
  - 2020: 266.1
  - 2021: 265.6
  - 2022: 265.0
- PV of Revenues H (Baseline):
  - 2017: 2638.5
  - 2018: 2621.7
  - 2019: 2606.1
  - 2020: 2589.9
  - 2021: 2575.3
  - 2022: 2560.7
- Future Pension Liabilities I (Baseline):
  - 2017: 550.3
  - 2018: 548.0
  - 2019: 544.5
  - 2020: 540.4
  - 2021: 536.4
  - 2022: 532.5
- PV of Health Expenditure J (Baseline):
  - 2017: 550.2
  - 2018: 550.1
  - 2019: 550.2
  - 2020: 550.2
  - 2021: 550.5
  - 2022: 550.7
- PV of Non‐Pension, Non‐Health Primary Expenditure K (Baseline):
  - 2017: 1268.5
  - 2018: 1256.1
  - 2019: 1244.5
  - 2020: 1233.2
  - 2021: 1222.7
  - 2022: 1212.5
- Intertemporal Financial Net Worth L (under Baseline):
  - 2017: 26.6
  - 2018: 27.0
  - 2019: 27.8
  - 2020: 28.7
  - 2021: 29.7
  - 2022: 30.7
- Intertemporal Financial Net Worth L (Stress Scenario):
  - 2017: ‐55.0
  - 2018: ‐91.0
  - 2019: ‐91.3
  - 2020: ‐82.1
  - 2021: ‐72.5
  - 2022: ‐65.8
- Memorandum items (Baseline):
  - PV of Primary balance:
    - 2017: ‐34.2
    - 2018: ‐34.4
    - 2019: ‐34.9
    - 2020: ‐35.7
    - 2021: ‐36.6
    - 2022: ‐37.6
  - PV of Primary Expenditure:
    - 2017: 2645.8
    - 2018: 2628.6
    - 2019: 2613.1
    - 2020: 2597.6
    - 2021: 2583.8
    - 2022: 2570.4
  - Nominal GDP (Euro billions):
    - 2017: 223.0
    - 2018: 231.1
    - 2019: 239.3
    - 2020: 247.9
    - 2021: 256.6
    - 2022: 265.5

*Source: wp1878 - ANNEX IV: SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES AND TABLES*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp1878.pdf_
