## wp1889 - References 31 ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [wp1889 - References 31](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp1889.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp1889.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp1889.pdf.json) --- ### I. Introduction - Recent sharp increases in property prices in some areas of China have raised fears about a real estate bubble. - Two main dangers of a bursting property bubble: - Leverage in the financial system (through banks or securitization) results in systemic economic damage. - Rigidities in the legal process lead to persistent non-performance of properties in foreclosure. - Focus: timely regulatory and legal-code adjustments (rather than macroeconomic policy stance) to shore up confidence in housing and mortgage markets. - China’s unique situation: booming tier-1 cities versus “ghost cities” requires tailored analysis. ### II. History of the Chinese property market (periodization and key regulatory responses) - 1993-1998 - 1992 housing reform; Housing Provident Fund created in 1994. - Early local bubbles (Beihai, Haikou) produced non-performing assets and unfinished buildings. - Security Law enacted in 1995; Property Law enacted in 2007. - Bubble contained by small/local size and highly regulated/closed banking system. - 1998-2008 - Rapid development of commodity housing; local governments used land supply for revenue; residential mortgage rise. - 2005-2006: more than 10 measures on interest rates, lending standards, land supply, affordable housing. - 2007: tightening monetary and macroprudential policies (higher interest rates, higher required reserve ratios) and restrictive administrative measures. - Localized mortgage crises in Tier 3 cities (e.g., Wenzhou). - Authorities relied on short-term price-control tools rather than long-term systemic approaches. - 2008-2013 - Post-2008 stimulus (“4 Trillion”); monetary easing (lower interest rates and reserve ratios) 2008-2009; first pilot securitization programs for residential mortgage finance. - 2010 and 2011: policy tightening (purchase and mortgage restrictions, higher interest rates). - 2012: limited easing to “facilitate price to return to a reasonable level.” - By 2013: Tier 1 prices rebounded; affordability concerns intensified; hukou-related eligibility constraints affected many households. - 2013–Present - “National 5” (effective February 26, 2013): strict purchasing restrictions in Tier 1-2 (first home 30 percent down; second home 70 percent down), encouragement of REITs and securitization, expanded Housing Provident Fund financing. - Total residential land supply decreased by 11.5, 28.1, and 20.9 percent in 2012, 2014, and 2015 respectively. - Tier 1/2: stringent residential land supply leading to accelerating prices; Tier 3/4: “ghost towns” and excess supply. - Late 2016–2017: new round of restrictions; down payment and mortgage rates raised for first-time buyers in major cities; transaction freezes and large drops in sales volumes. ### III. Symptoms and consequences of overheating / bubble risks - Price and affordability indicators - Average home prices in 100 major cities increased by 16.6% in September 2016 year-on-year. - Shenzhen: prices rose to 36.9 times the average annual net income (first 3 quarters of 2016); up 49.4% year-on-year. - Land prices: average growth rate of 26% annually; share of house prices rose from 37% to nearly 60% since 2010. - Homes in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen comparable to New York and San Francisco in price levels, despite income disparities. - Mortgage liabilities and household debt - Total mortgages securitized by land accumulated at an average rate of 30.1 percent from 2009 through 2015; reached 11.33 trillion yuan in 2015 (4.4 times 2009 level). - Volume of residential mortgages in the Big Four cities increased by 22 percent in 2016 and now stands at nearly 25 percent of GDP. - China’s residential mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio is at the lower end compared to EU, US, Hong Kong SAR, but rapid accumulation raises risk-concentration concerns. - Housing supply, inventory, vacancy - Vacancy rates hover around 20 percent (definition: proportion of homeowner inventory that is vacant and for sale; excludes newly built unsold units, empty owner-held investment units, unfinished projects). - Tier 3/4 cities face large inventories that take five years or longer to consume. - Lack of direct, consistent, credible national/local vacancy data complicates monitoring and policy. - Guarantees and delinquency dynamics - Many residential mortgages are guaranteed by individuals or guarantee companies. - Mortgages are recourse; lenders can demand payment from guarantors or enforce mortgages. - Mortgage redemption rate (loans paid off by guarantee companies) can indicate delinquency; redemption rates in some cities ranged between 8-10 percent in 2015 (double 2014); in 2013 redemption rate around 2 percent. - Example: Wenzhou’s 2008-2009 crisis linked to collapse of highly-leveraged personal and corporate guarantees; judicial foreclosure backlogs persisted (e.g., 2016 Wenzhou still handling cases from 2010). ### IV. Comparison with other bubble markets — structural distinctions - Supply-side distinctions - Land supply is government-controlled and inelastic; buildable land supplied by government; local governments acquire land via expropriation or redevelopment. - Conflict between local fiscal incentives and market stability: local governments may supply less land at higher prices. - Intensive and volatile government interventions create uncertainty; effectiveness of measures such as purchase restrictions has waned in recent years. - Demand-side distinctions - China’s urbanization rate is around 50 percent. - Underdeveloped financial markets limit household investment alternatives; housing acts as a store of value. - Closed capital account and strict FX controls reduce direct global contagion risk but a sharp housing-wealth drop could affect trading partners, notably commodity-exporting emerging economies. - Divergent market behavior across city tiers complicates national fiscal/monetary policy. ### V. The financial system and shadow banking - Banking sector observations - Debate exists regarding the health of the Chinese banking system; some see rising bad loans as precursors to distress while others are more sanguine. - Recent data show somewhat improved performance in the banking sector. - Mortgage performance is a key driver of banks’ overall condition. - Shadow banking and guarantees - Shadow banking has grown rapidly; crowdfunding and digital finance only recently legally recognized by courts. - CBRC demanded disclosure of off-balance sheet lending; regulators lack resources/capacity to address shadow banking and rapid financial innovations. - Non-banks are more fragile than banks; spillovers to formal system are possible. - Central government is well capitalized with low public-sector debt, but local government debt is high. - State-owned banks facilitate policy implementation but implicit guarantees can encourage capital misallocation. ### VI. Mortgage enforcement and legal framework (residential vs commercial) - Legal framework and procedures - Mortgage enforcement specified in one chapter of the 2007 Property Law, 1996 Guarantee Law, and judicial interpretation by Supreme People’s Court. - Two main foreclosure methods: negotiated sales and judicial auction (judicial auction predominant for residential). - Notable legal distinctions: - Mortgage loans are recourse. - Mortgage terminates upon transfer of ownership; buyer seeking financing must take a new mortgage and pay off previous one. - If delinquent property is borrower’s primary residence, lender obligated to provide adequate housing to the household. - Judicial auctions can be attempted a maximum of three times; price discounts apply on successive failed auctions; lender takes property if all three auctions fail. - Judicial auctions sell properties “as is” and do not guarantee free and marketable title registration. - Common problems in enforcement - Time and delay: process typically at least one year; in some cities 18 months to 2 years; poor property registration adds delays. - High and non-transparent costs; malpractice among auction/appraisal professionals. - Cross-jurisdiction enforcement difficulty due to inadequate information sharing and local rule variance. - No consumer/personal bankruptcy law for standardized practice; mortgages are recourse. - Lack of consumer protection, notice/publication standards, professional realtor and loan counseling services. - Inadequate access to accurate title/property information; title searches are hard; lack of title insurance products; auction buyers lack financing. - Enforcement courts and local governments often do not communicate; local government debt claims can impede enforcement and registration. - Commercial mortgage enforcement specific issues - Complex land ownership and unrecorded leases introduce uncertainty. - Complex debt structures with multiple lenders and liens. - Lease and construction lien priorities may limit lender recovery. - Absence of standardized enforcement procedures, higher taxes/fees, weak restructuring and bankruptcy law increase lender uncertainty and potential value erosion. ### VII. Near-term policy prescriptions (summary of recommendations) - A. Banks: mortgage underwriting procedures - Develop consistent metrics for borrower evaluation (analogous to FICO concepts); study FICO Financial Inclusion Initiative metrics. - Reassess 50% debt service-to-income ratio cap; U.S. Qualified Mortgage (QM) rule: debt service not exceed 43% (with temporary flexibility for GSEs raised to 50 in July 2016). - Establish clear reporting requirements and private credit bureaus to accurately track household debt; address new digital finance access challenges. - Establish clear seniority of first-lien mortgages in borrower distress. - Set clear appraisal standards; build broad property-transaction databases and automated audit systems for valuation firms. - Conduct stress-tests for mortgage books with regionally tailored adverse scenarios; consider public disclosure of results to enhance confidence. - B. Mortgage requirements (legal and infrastructure) - Develop clear, substantive procedural laws and rules for mortgage creation and enforcement. - Enhance uniform and streamlined documentation nationwide. - Eliminate cross-jurisdictional enforcement barriers. - Implement efficient procedures for title registration and search; improve credit information collection. - Facilitate communication between judicial enforcement departments and local governments (especially where delinquency backlogs exist). - Shift provincial tax revenue sources away from sales of property to developers toward property and value-added taxes. - Renew land use rights automatically and at no cost for households with current annual property tax payments. - C. Consumer protection - Require clear disclosures on mortgage terms and costs. - Develop mechanisms for fair and timely foreclosure, eviction, and consumer insolvency actions. - D. Mortgage guarantee companies and shadow banking - Recognize private guarantee companies as formal financial intermediaries and subject them to proper regulatory standards. - Conduct research to quantify size and exposure of private guarantee industry. - Evaluate transition from current mortgage guarantee structure toward a mortgage insurance (MI) system given the fast-growing residential mortgage market. - Address Homestead Guarantee system constraints: limited funding, broker characterization, bureaucratic management, and weak supervision by MOHURD and HPFCs. - E. Secondary market liquidity - Consider securitization as a funding diversifier and set up a monitoring body with a mandate to ensure liquidity under market stress. - F. Support for underserved markets - Consider government programs to require or incentivize banks to lend to underserved markets (ghost cities, small cities, low-income neighborhoods) analogous to U.S. “Housing Goals” and “Duty to Serve” concepts, conditional on positive expected returns. ### VIII. Conclusion — long-run challenges and priorities - Regulatory policies should be associated with explicit, transparent priorities and goals. - Short-term priorities: - Tier 1 cities should prioritize market stability and predictability over targeting specific home-price levels. - Strengthen bank mortgage underwriting and capitalization to ensure resilience to normal market adjustments. - Promote private-agent participation in mortgage risk-sharing based on sound credit fundamentals without implicit government guarantees. - Balance safety and soundness of banks with consumer protection. - Long-term challenges: - Structural reforms needed to improve financial-sector allocation of capital and broaden benefits of growth. - A severe housing crisis in China would have global implications through trade links and capital markets. - The listed near-term prescriptions aim to reduce near-term risk and limit fallout, but lasting mitigation requires broader structural reform. *Source: wp1889 - References 31 (IMF working paper excerpt).* ### References 31 ### wp1889 - References 31 ### I. Introduction - Recent sharp increases in property prices in some areas of China have raised fears about a real estate bubble. - Two main dangers of a bursting property bubble: - Leverage in the financial system (through banks or securitization) results in systemic economic damage. - Rigidities in the legal process lead to persistent non-performance of properties in foreclosure. - Focus: timely regulatory and legal-code adjustments (rather than macroeconomic policy stance) to shore up confidence in housing and mortgage markets. - Note: China’s unique situation (booming tier-1 cities vs “ghost cities”) requires tailored analysis. ### II. History of the Chinese property market (periodization and key regulatory responses) - 1993-1998 - 1992 housing reform; Housing Provident Fund created in 1994. - Early local bubbles (Beihai, Haikou) produced non-performing assets and unfinished buildings. - Security Law enacted in 1995; Property Law enacted in 2007. - Bubble contained by small/local size and highly regulated/closed banking system. - 1998-2008 - Rapid development of commodity housing, local governments using land supply for revenue, residential mortgage rise. - 2005-2006: more than 10 measures on interest rates, lending standards, land supply, affordable housing. - 2007: tightening monetary and macroprudential policies (higher interest rates, higher required reserve ratios) and restrictive administrative measures. - Localized mortgage crises in Tier 3 cities (e.g., Wenzhou). - Authorities relied on short-term price-control tools rather than long-term systemic approaches. - 2008-2013 - Post-2008 stimulus (“4 Trillion”); monetary easing (lower interest rates and reserve ratios) 2008-2009; first pilot securitization programs for residential mortgage finance. - 2010 and 2011: policy tightening (purchase and mortgage restrictions, higher interest rates). - 2012: limited easing to “facilitate price to return to a reasonable level.” - By 2013: Tier 1 prices rebounded; affordability concerns intensified; hukou-related eligibility constraints affected many households. - 2013–Present - “National 5” (effective February 26, 2013): strict purchasing restrictions in Tier 1-2 (first home 30 percent down; second home 70 percent down), encouragement of REITs and securitization, expanded Housing Provident Fund financing. - Total residential land supply decreased by 11.5, 28.1, and 20.9 percent in 2012, 2014, and 2015 respectively. - Tier 1/2: stringent residential land supply leading to accelerating prices; Tier 3/4: “ghost towns” and excess supply. - Late 2016–2017: new round of restrictions; down payment and mortgage rates raised for first-time buyers in major cities; transaction freezes and large drops in sales volumes. ### III. Symptoms and consequences of overheating / bubble risks - Price and affordability indicators - Average home prices in 100 major cities increased by 16.6% in September 2016 year-on-year. - Shenzhen: prices rose to 36.9 times the average annual net income (first 3 quarters of 2016); up 49.4% year-on-year. - Land prices: average growth rate of 26% annually; share of house prices rose from 37% to nearly 60% since 2010. - Homes in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen comparable to New York and San Francisco in price levels, despite income disparities. - Mortgage liabilities and household debt - Total mortgages securitized by land accumulated at an average rate of 30.1 percent from 2009 through 2015; reached 11.33 trillion yuan in 2015 (4.4 times 2009 level). - Volume of residential mortgages in the Big Four cities increased by 22 percent in 2016 and now stands at nearly 25 percent of GDP. - China’s residential mortgage debt-to-GDP ratio is at the lower end compared to EU, US, Hong Kong SAR, but rapid accumulation raises risk-concentration concerns. - Housing supply, inventory, vacancy - Vacancy rates hover around 20 percent (definition: proportion of homeowner inventory that is vacant and for sale; excludes newly built unsold units, empty owner-held investment units, unfinished projects). - Tier 3/4 cities face large inventories that take five years or longer to consume. - Lack of direct, consistent, credible national/local vacancy data complicates monitoring and policy. - Guarantees and delinquency dynamics - Many residential mortgages are guaranteed by individuals or guarantee companies. - Mortgages are recourse; lenders can demand payment from guarantors or enforce mortgages. - Mortgage redemption rate (loans paid off by guarantee companies) can indicate delinquency; redemption rates in some cities ranged between 8-10 percent in 2015 (double 2014); in 2013 redemption rate around 2 percent. - Example: Wenzhou’s 2008-2009 crisis linked to collapse of highly-leveraged personal and corporate guarantees; judicial foreclosure backlogs persisted (e.g., 2016 Wenzhou still handling cases from 2010). ### IV. Comparison with other bubble markets — structural distinctions - Supply-side distinctions - Land supply is government-controlled and inelastic; buildable land supplied by government; local governments acquire land via expropriation or redevelopment. - Conflict between local fiscal incentives and market stability: local governments may supply less land at higher prices. - Intensive and volatile government interventions create uncertainty; effectiveness of measures such as purchase restrictions has waned in recent years. - Demand-side distinctions - China’s urbanization rate is around 50%. - Underdeveloped financial markets limit household investment alternatives; housing acts as a store of value. - Closed capital account and strict FX controls reduce direct global contagion risk but a sharp housing-wealth drop could affect trading partners, notably commodity-exporting emerging economies. - Divergent market behavior across city tiers complicates national fiscal/monetary policy. ### V. The financial system and shadow banking - Banking sector observations - Debate exists regarding the health of the Chinese banking system; some see rising bad loans as precursors to distress while others are more sanguine. - Recent data show somewhat improved performance in the banking sector. - Mortgage performance is a key driver of banks’ overall condition. - Shadow banking and guarantees - Shadow banking has grown rapidly; crowdfunding and digital finance only recently legally recognized by courts. - CBRC demanded disclosure of off-balance sheet lending; regulators lack resources/capacity to address shadow banking and rapid financial innovations. - Non-banks are more fragile than banks; spillovers to formal system are possible. - Central government is well capitalized with low public-sector debt, but local government debt is high. - State-owned banks facilitate policy implementation but implicit guarantees can encourage capital misallocation. ### VI. Mortgage enforcement and legal framework (residential vs commercial) - Legal framework - Mortgage enforcement specified in one chapter of the 2007 Property Law, 1996 Guarantee Law, and judicial interpretation by Supreme People’s Court. - Two main foreclosure methods: negotiated sales and judicial auction (judicial auction predominant for residential). - Notable legal distinctions: - Mortgage loans are recourse. - Mortgage terminates upon transfer of ownership; buyer seeking financing must take a new mortgage and pay off previous one. - If delinquent property is borrower’s primary residence, lender obligated to provide adequate housing to the household. - Judicial auctions can be attempted a maximum of three times; price discounts apply on successive failed auctions; lender takes property if all three auctions fail. - Judicial auctions sell properties “as is” and do not guarantee free and marketable title registration. - Common problems in enforcement - Time and delay: process typically at least one year; in some cities 18 months to 2 years; poor property registration adds delays. - High and non-transparent costs; malpractice among auction/appraisal professionals. - Cross-jurisdiction enforcement difficulty due to inadequate information sharing and local rule variance. - No consumer/personal bankruptcy law for standardized practice; mortgages are recourse. - Lack of consumer protection, notice/publication standards, professional realtor and loan counseling services. - Inadequate access to accurate title/property information; title searches are hard; lack of title insurance products; auction buyers lack financing. - Enforcement courts and local governments often do not communicate; local government debt claims can impede enforcement and registration. - Commercial mortgage enforcement specific issues - Complex land ownership and unrecorded leases introduce uncertainty. - Complex debt structures with multiple lenders and liens. - Lease and construction lien priorities may limit lender recovery. - Absence of standardized enforcement procedures, higher taxes/fees, weak restructuring and bankruptcy law increase lender uncertainty and potential value erosion. ### VII. Near-term policy prescriptions (summary of recommendations) - A. Banks: mortgage underwriting procedures - Develop consistent metrics for borrower evaluation (analogous to FICO concepts); study FICO Financial Inclusion Initiative metrics. - Reassess 50% debt service-to-income ratio cap; U.S. Qualified Mortgage (QM) rule: debt service not exceed 43% (with temporary flexibility for GSEs raised to 50 in July 2016). - Establish clear reporting requirements and private credit bureaus to accurately track household debt; address new digital finance access challenges. - Establish clear seniority of first-lien mortgages in borrower distress. - Set clear appraisal standards; build broad property-transaction databases and automated audit systems for valuation firms. - Conduct stress-tests for mortgage books with regionally tailored adverse scenarios; consider public disclosure of results to enhance confidence. - B. Mortgage requirements (legal and infrastructure) - Develop clear, substantive procedural laws and rules for mortgage creation and enforcement. - Enhance uniform and streamlined documentation nationwide. - Eliminate cross-jurisdictional enforcement barriers. - Implement efficient procedures for title registration and search; improve credit information collection. - Facilitate communication between judicial enforcement departments and local governments (especially where delinquency backlogs exist). - Shift provincial tax revenue sources away from sales of property to developers toward property and value-added taxes. - Renew land use rights automatically and at no cost for households with current annual property tax payments. - C. Consumer protection - Require clear disclosures on mortgage terms and costs. - Develop mechanisms for fair and timely foreclosure, eviction, and consumer insolvency actions. - D. Mortgage guarantee companies and shadow banking - Recognize private guarantee companies as formal financial intermediaries and subject them to proper regulatory standards. - Conduct research to quantify size and exposure of private guarantee industry. - Evaluate transition from current mortgage guarantee structure toward a mortgage insurance (MI) system given the fast-growing residential mortgage market. - Address Homestead Guarantee system constraints: limited funding, broker characterization, bureaucratic management, and weak supervision by MOHURD and HPFCs. - E. Secondary market liquidity - Consider securitization as a funding diversifier and set up a monitoring body with a mandate to ensure liquidity under market stress. - F. Support for underserved markets - Consider government programs to require or incentivize banks to lend to underserved markets (ghost cities, small cities, low-income neighborhoods) analogous to U.S. “Housing Goals” and “Duty to Serve” concepts, conditional on positive expected returns. ### VIII. Conclusion — long-run challenges and priorities - Regulatory policies should be associated with explicit, transparent priorities and goals. - Short-term priorities: - Tier 1 cities should prioritize market stability and predictability over targeting specific home-price levels. - Strengthen bank mortgage underwriting and capitalization to ensure resilience to normal market adjustments. - Promote private-agent participation in mortgage risk-sharing based on sound credit fundamentals without implicit government guarantees. - Balance safety and soundness of banks with consumer protection. - Long-term challenges: - Structural reforms needed to improve financial-sector allocation of capital and broaden benefits of growth. - A severe housing crisis in China would have global implications through trade links and capital markets. - The listed near-term prescriptions aim to reduce near-term risk and limit fallout, but lasting mitigation requires broader structural reform. *Source: wp1889 - References 31 (IMF working paper excerpt).* ### References ### References ### Cited works - Chen, Jie. 2010. “Affordable Housing Needs Effective Guarantee Mechanism.（保障性住房融资需要有担保机制）Real Estate Information of China（房地产信息）Vol. 9: 55-60. - Chen, Jie and Deng, Lan. 2014. “Financing Affordable Housing Through Compulsory Saving: The Two-Decade Experience of Housing Provident Fund in China.” Housing Studies. Vol. 29, pp 937-958. - Chen K. and Y. Wen, 2016, “The Great Housing Boom of China,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2014-022A. - Chivakul, M., W. R. Lam, X. Liu, W. Maliszewski, and Alfred Schipke, 2015, “Understanding Residential Real Estate in China,” IMF WP/15/84 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). - Deng, Yusong, 2016. Phases of Housing Market Development, its Fluctuation and Risks (住房市场发展阶段、波动与风险), China Science Publishing (科学出版社). - Fang, Hanming, Quanlin Gu, Wei Xiong, and Li-An Zhou, 2015, “Demystifying the Chinese Housing Boom,” paper prepared for NBER Macro Annual (Volume 30) - Glaeser, Edward, Wei Huang, Yueran Ma, and Andrei Shleifer, 2016. “A Real Estate Boom With Chinese Characteristics,” prepared for the Journal of Economic Perspectives (October 2016). - Jiang, Shuming. 2014. “Risk Management and Monitoring System of the Homestead Guarantee Industry”（住房置业担保行业风险初探）, China Real Estate（中国房地产）, Vol. 9, pp. 30-33. - Lam, Raphael W., Markus Rodlauer, and Alfred Schipke, 2017, Modernizing China: Investing in Soft Infrastructure. (Washington: International Monetary Fund). - Liu, Chunyu. 2017. “Exploring the Development Path of Homestead Guarantee Industry”（关于住房置业担保的发展探索）. Real Estate Biweekly（房地产导刊）. - Lin, Quanling. 2008. “Homestead Guarantee System and Low-to-Middle Income Housing Finance.”（住房置业担保制度与中低收入者住房融资）, Political Science and Law. Vol. 2, pp 14-18. - 32 - Loungani, P. 2017, “Inclusive Growth and the IMF” https://blog- imfdirect.imf.org/2017/01/24/inclusive-growth-and-the-imf/ - Maliszewski, W., S. Arslanalp, J. Caparusso, J. Garrido, S. Guo, et al., 2016, “Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem,” IMF WP/16/203 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). - Renaud, Bertrand (2016), Housing During China’s Growth Transition, Chapter 2 of Zhi Liu, Rebecca L.H. Chiu and Bertrand Renaud (eds.), The Great Housing Divides: Implications for China, LILP Press, Cambridge MA (English), Peking University Press (Chinese), forthcoming. - Shi, Xinrui, 2016, “Mortgage Enforcement and Public Regulatory Actions in Selected Chinese Cities,” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper. - World Bank. 2013. “China: the Role of Housing Provident Funds in the Construction of Affordable Housing.” East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank, Washington DC. - Wu J, Gyourko J, Deng Y. 2010. Evaluating conditions in major Chinese housing markets. NBER Working Paper No. 16189. - Zhao, Simon X and Bryane Michael, 2016. “How Big is the Chinese Real Estate Bubble and Why Hasn’t it Yet Burst: A Comparative Study between China and World Major Financial Crises 1980- 2014.” Working Paper. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA. - Zheng, Siqi, Weizeng Sun and Matthew E. Kahn, 2016. “Investor Confidence as a Determinant of China’s Urban Housing Market Dynamics,” Real Estate Economics, V44 4: pp. 814–845 - Zhi, Fengyin. 2015. “Reform and Breakthrough of the Guarantee Industry.” （担保业转型与破局）, China Finance. Vol.10: pp. 96-99. *Source: wp1889 - References* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2018/wp1889.pdf_