## wpiea2019032

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### Introduction and overview
- Transition described: “scramble for gold” of the 1870s moved the world within a decade from a fixed exchange rate regime of new-universal coverage (both gold and silver) to a world split into a gold and a silver block, with Britain, France, Germany, and (with delay) the United States part of the gold block.
- Ex-post assessments of the switch to gold monometalism:
  - Gold monometalism tied the price level to gold supply shocks; bimetallism provided risk diversification via incomplete correlation between gold and silver supply shocks.
  - The transition triggered a surge in demand for gold and sustained deflation in the gold block; contemporaries labeled the deflationary slump from 1873 to the mid-1890s the “great depression,” with sub-par growth and severe distributional conflicts as deflation increased the real value of debt.
  - In Germany the post-transition period was marked by “Bismarck’s conservative turn” (Wehler, 1995, pp. 934-37).
- Clarified points about the demise of bimetallism:
  - Bimetallism functioned when a country with large share in global specie circulation stabilized the gold-silver price ratio; in the 1850s–1860s France played this role fixing the relative price at 15½ units of silver for one unit of gold.
  - Large gold discoveries 1848-51 (California and Australia) increased global gold supply; share of gold in France’s specie circulation increased from 30 percent in the early 1850s to more than 80 percent in the late 1860s (Flandreau, 1995).
  - Germany’s 1871-1873 currency reform introduced the Mark tied to gold; by itself this reform would not have broken global bimetallism.
  - France suspended free silver coinage in September 1873, followed by Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland, ending global bimetallism because no country continued to stabilize the gold-silver price ratio.

### II. The fear of being left behind — Germany’s pre-reform monetary debate
- Early debate and interventions:
  - Johann Gottlieb Hoffmann (1828 onward) advocated gold citing lower costs and predicted eventual universal recognition of gold’s superiority (Hoffmann, 1838).
  - Friedrich von Hermann (1834) argued switching costs would dwarf gold savings.
  - Munich (1837) and Dresden (1838) treaties kept silver as Germany’s monetary base.
- Gold discoveries in 1848 and 1851 shifted the debate:
  - Some economists predicted a fall in gold’s value and urged gold countries to switch to silver.
  - Adolf Soetbeer (1852, 1861, 1865) argued gold would dominate international commerce and urged Germany to switch to gold; quote: “Whoever is first in deciding to transition to a gold currency would sacrifice less than those who hesitate.” (Soetbeer and Weibezahn, 1861).
- Late-1860s political alignment in favor of reform:
  - Supporters: Ludwig Bamberger (Bamberger, 1861), deutsche Handelstag (survey and 1865 resolution), Volkswirtschaftliche Kongress, 1868 Handelstag.
  - Norddeutscher Reichstag (1868) and Zollverein parliament (1869) endorsed currency reform resolutions (author of Zollverein resolution: Bamberger).
  - Key officials: Rudolf Delbrück and Otto Michaelis.
- Perceived urgency: fear of “disadvantageous isolation” if Germany stayed on silver while England, the United States, and France used gold; John Prince Smith (1869) warned of timely action.

### II.B How endangered was bimetallism?
- Historical assessments: absent policy intervention bimetallism would have survived the early 1870s (Flandreau, 1996; Oppers, 1996).
- Bullion production trends:
  - Gold production began to retreat from the mid-1850s as Australian and Californian yields declined.
  - Silver production surged from the early 1870s due to expansion in the American West.
- Contemporary forecasts in the 1860s were scarce and often incorrect:
  - Soetbeer (1865) expected Californian gold production to increase; hedged on silver expansion prospects in Nevada, Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico and Mexico.
  - Seyd (1868) forecast probable exhaustion of New World gold fields while noting possible future discoveries.
  - Morys (2012): at the 1867 International Monetary Conference “any sense of the silver supply shock [of the 1870s] being imminent is completely absent”.
- Figure 2 forecasting exercise (Box-Jenkins/Flandreau framework; Annex):
  - Three projection approaches using information available in the late 1860s/early 1870s:
    - Static projection: bullion production treated as a non-predictable random walk; gold and silver production held constant at the latest observation.
    - Dynamic projection: uses historical patterns of gold and silver production as inputs.
    - Dynamic II (gold shock one-off): uses gold production only from 1853 onward, excluding the late 1840s/early 1850s gold shock; favorable to bimetallism.
  - Second step: projected global gold share fed into Flandreau’s (1996) model of the global bimetallic system; when projected global gold share approached or exceeded bimetallism’s upper structural limit, bimetallism’s viability became doubtful.
  - Results summarized:
    - From the late-1860s perspective, static and dynamic projections suggested gold would crowd out silver in France within 12-15 years.
    - The silver supply shock in the early 1870s improved prospects, but only by the mid-1870s did bimetallism appear “safe”—by then bimetallism had already been abandoned.
    - Even in Dynamic II, assessed from the late 1860s, the share of gold in France’s specie stock would increase to well over 90 percent and remain there for many years; a minor gold supply shock could have pushed bimetallism over the edge.
- Interpretation: contemporary fears (Soetbeer, Prince Smith) that France might demonetize silver were reasonable; many experts held a “knife’s edge” view of bimetallism’s sustainability.

### III. The French-German currency game of the early 1870s — timing and choice of gold
- Central questions about Germany’s 1870s transition:
  - (i) why reform occurred in the early 1870s and not earlier?
  - (ii) why unified Germany adopted the gold standard instead of joining France on bimetallism?
- Rejection of simple explanations:
  - War indemnity explanation incomplete—other mechanisms existed to change specie base without purchasing bullion ex-ante.
  - Institutional capability not decisive—monetary issues were federal responsibility after 1866 and the same officials existed prior to the Empire.
- Key obstacle: currency reform required French accommodation regardless of mechanism chosen:
  - Undercutting the French legal mint ratio depended on France upholding that ratio; only France could absorb large quantities of demonetized silver.
  - Bamberger (1871): the difficulty was “where to put the silver?” — only France could absorb “300 or 400 million of silver”.
  - Prince Smith (1869) predicted France would likely abolish bimetallism at the first sign of demonetization by Germany.
- Military and diplomatic leverage from Franco-Prussian War (1870/71):
  - German victory and occupation of Paris allowed Germany to force French accommodation through indemnity and occupation conditions.
  - Frankfurt peace treaty (May 10, 1871) conditioned troop withdrawal on payment of France’s war indemnity; payments could be made with French silver coins, making immediate French demonetization infeasible without undermining its capacity to pay.
- Rapid German actions post-war:
  - July 3, 1871: the Berlin mint suspended silver coinage.
  - A few weeks later: the federal government began buying gold bullion in London.
  - Early December 1871: the Reichstag passed a law authorizing gold coinage.
  - From early 1872: new gold coins brought into circulation by spending the indemnity (hence without withdrawing silver coins); total specie circulation surged — “currency reform triggered a large fiscal-monetary stimulus.”
  - July 1873: the Reichstag formally adopted the gold standard.
- Fiscal and macro effects:
  - Indemnity receipts largely used to settle outstanding debts and spent on military and civilian uses by the federal government and German states; only a minor portion was invested (Soetbeer, 1874; Monroe, 1919).
  - Soetbeer and Bamberger warned that spending the indemnity would trigger a boom-bust cycle; Bamberger proposed investing indemnity receipts into the Rentes Thiers and urged exchanging gold for silver coins — advice largely unheeded.

### III.B Why gold and not bimetallism?
- Pre-unification disagreement:
  - Bamberger, Delbrück and (most of the time) Soetbeer favored gold monometalism.
  - Prince Smith and Michaelis were bimetallists.
  - Final currency law of July 1873 specified the imperial Mark would be based on gold only.
- Analytical/sketch game framework:
  - Notation: (x,X) are Germany’s/France’s regime choices; g/G denote gold monometalism, b/B bimetallism, s silver monometalism.
  - p(x,X) is Germany’s payoff function.
  - Germany enjoyed first-mover advantage owing to victory and leverage from occupation and indemnity.
- Strategic logic:
  - Germany needed France to accommodate demonetization of silver because only France could absorb the demonetized silver without collapsing the silver market or making the indemnity inconvertible.
  - Victory allowed Germany to introduce gold into circulation quickly (by spending indemnity proceeds) and create facts on the ground finalizing gold monometalism by July 1873.

### Germany’s regime choice: bimetallism versus gold (game-theoretic comparisons)
- Argument: adopting the gold standard weakly dominated bimetallism; formal comparisons presented:
  - 푝푝(푔푔,퐵퐵) ≈ 푝푝(푏푏,퐵퐵)
  - 푝푝(푔푔,퐺퐺) > 푔푔(푏푏,퐺퐺)
  - There are reasons to believe 푝푝(푏푏,퐵퐵) > 푝푝(푔푔,퐺퐺), implying the game resembles a prisoners’ dilemma.
- When France cooperates (maintains bimetallism), comparison of (푏푏,퐵퐵) and (푔푔,퐵퐵) shows the global fixed exchange rate system remains intact; main material difference is effective specie circulation in Germany.
- Game outcomes and Flandreau (1996) model analysis:
  - German and/or French reforms change specie demand and bimetallism’s structural limits.
  - If bimetallism collapses, the silver-gold price ratio becomes unstable and exchange rates between silver and gold currencies adjust.
  - First-column result: comparing (푏푏,퐵퐵) and (푔푔,퐵퐵) — global fixed exchange rate system remains intact; US return to gold in 1879 is absorbable.
  - Second-column (French retaliation): if Germany adopted bimetallism leading to (푏푏,퐺퐺), Germany would be unable to sustain global bimetallism alone and would be left on silver; by moving preemptively to gold Germany ensured it would be part of the gold block in (푔푔,퐺퐺).
- Key weakness of bimetallists: any German reform required French accommodation; German victory allowed forcing accommodation long enough to take irreversible steps toward gold.

### Timing, retaliation, and specie stock consequences
- France sought to minimize Germany’s first-mover advantage by paying the indemnity as fast as possible; final payment scheduled for March 1875 but issuance of the Rentes Thiers in 1871 and 1872 allowed France to pay off the indemnity on September 5, 1873—more than 18 months ahead of schedule.
- On September 6, 1873 France limited silver coinage; in January 1874 other Latin Monetary Union members followed.
- Germany’s reform was incomplete: indemnity spending brought gold coins rapidly into circulation, but demonetizing and selling silver had barely begun; Germany still possessed a large silver stock.
- With France cutting bimetallic ties, Germany could not sell its silver or could sell it only at a loss; French retaliation inflicted significant pain on Germany even though it could not prevent Germany’s reform by September 1873.

### Post-reform consequences and the bimetallism debates of the 1880s and 1890s
- France’s suspension of free silver coinage sent the price of silver into a tailspin; by the end of the 1870s, silver had depreciated by almost 20 percent relative to gold.
- The Reichsbank incurred heavy losses selling obsolete silver bullion; in 1879 Reichsbank President Hermann von Dechend ordered suspension of silver sales, even though little more than half of the silver stock had been sold.
- From 1873/74 the post-unification boom (Gründerboom) gave way to a slump (Gründerkrach), reinforcing deflationary impact of transition to gold.
- Wholesale prices fell by almost 30 percent between 1872 and 1879 (Jacobs and Richter, 1935).
- Otto Arendt (1880a, 1880b) blamed the German government and proposed a currency treaty between Germany, France and the United States to restore silver’s monetary function; his view gained supporters in the early 1880s.
- Germany attended the 1881 International Monetary Conference after refusing in 1878, but participation remained inconsequential.
- Gold-party objections:
  - Soetbeer: France had decided in the late 1860s to move to gold; suspension would have occurred independent of Germany.
  - Bamberger: currency treaties impractical because they require partners never to experience war, revolution, or economic shocks.
- Game-theoretic framing: Soetbeer argued France would have deviated regardless; Bamberger argued only non-cooperative equilibria are stable. Author concludes the French-German currency game resembled a prisoners’ dilemma from Germany’s perspective.

### The Structural Limits of Bimetallism: Flandreau’s (1996) model (specification and estimation)
- Quasi-demand functions for monetary gold and silver in the bimetallic block:
  - (1) 푝푝퐺퐺 푀푀퐺퐺푏푏 = 푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺) − 푆푆𝑚𝑚𝑆𝑆
  - (2) 푀푀𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 = −푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 푚푚𝑆𝑆 + 푆푆 (1 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆)
- Rewritten for estimation:
  - (3) 푝푝퐺퐺 푀푀퐺퐺푏𝑏 = 퐴퐴 + 푝푝퐺퐺 (∑∆퐺퐺푖푖)(1 − 푚푚퐺퐺) − (∑∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) 푚푚퐺퐺
  - (4) 푀푀𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 = 퐵퐵 − 푝푝퐺퐺 (∑∆퐺퐺푖푖) 푚푚𝑆𝑆 + (∑∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) (1 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆)
- Variable definitions:
  - G = global gold stock; S = global silver stock.
  - 푀푀퐺퐺푏𝑏 and 푀푀𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 = monetary gold and silver circulating in the bimetallic block.
  - 푝푝퐺퐺 = legal mint ratio in the bimetallic block.
  - ∆퐺퐺_푖 and ∆𝑆𝑆_푖 = annual gold and silver production in year i.
  - Parameters A, B, 푚푚퐺퐺, 푚푚𝑆𝑆 estimated by restricted least squares provided series are integrated of same order.
- Data sources: global gold and silver production for 1850-70 from Hay (1887) complemented by Mint Report (1880) as reported in Day (1890, p. 121); French gold and silver circulation from Flandreau (1995).
- Stationarity tests: standard tests suggest all time series are integrated of order 1.
- Estimated parameters (this study):
  - A = 709
  - B = 2,288
  - 푚푚퐺퐺 = 0.39
  - 푚푚𝑆𝑆 = 0.36
- Comparison to Flandreau (1996):
  - Flandreau (1996): A = 603, B = 2,528, 푚푚퐺퐺 = 0.37, 푚푚𝑆𝑆 = 0.39
- Robustness:
  - Changing data source (e.g., Mint Report (1880/89) instead of Hay (1887)) has negligible impact.
  - Estimates of global gold and silver stock for 1849 implied by parameters tend to be lower than contemporaries’ estimates, sometimes by a factor as large as 2; if stocks are taken from same source differences have no substantive implications.
- Interpretation of structural parameters:
  - 푚푚퐺퐺 = share in total specie demand from the gold block.
  - 푚푚𝑆𝑆 = share in total specie demand from the silver block.
  - (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆) = share in specie demand from the bimetallic block.
- Viability condition for global bimetallism:
  - As long as (5) 푚푚퐺퐺 ≤ 푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 (푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 + 푆푆) ≤ (1 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆), gold and silver coins circulate in the bimetallic block and global bimetallism is viable.
  - Define LLLL = 푚푚퐺퐺 and ULLL = (1 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆) as the upper and lower structural limits of bimetallism.

### Analyzing currency reforms (effects on structural limits)
- Reform framework: reforms change a country’s specie block membership; impact assessed by manipulating bimetallism’s structural limits according to changes in specie circulation.
- 훼훼 denotes country’s specie circulation relative to the bimetallic block.
- Post-reform structural limits 퐿퐿퐿퐿* and 푈푈퐿퐿* for reform types:
  - a. Country moves from silver to gold monometalism (Germany 1871-1873):
    - (6a) 퐿퐿퐿퐿* = 푚푚퐺퐺 + 훼훼 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆)
    - (7a) 푈푈퐿퐿* = 1 − 푚푚𝑠푠 + 훼훼 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆)
  - b. Country joins bimetallic block from silver:
    - (6b) 퐿퐿퐿퐿* = 퐿퐿퐿퐿 = 푚푚퐺퐺
    - (7b) 푈푈퐿퐿* = 1 − 푚푚𝑠푠 + 훼훼 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆)
  - c. Country moves from bimetallism to gold (France 1873):
    - (6c) 퐿퐿퐿퐿* = 푚푚퐺퐺 + 훼훼 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆)
    - (7c) 푈푈퐿퐿* = 푈푈퐿퐿 = 1 − 푚푚𝑠푠
  - d. Country joins gold standard from paper currency (U.S. 1879):
    - (6d) 퐿퐿퐿퐿* = [푚푚퐺퐺 + 훼훼(1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆)] / [1 + 훼훼(1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆)]
    - (7d) 푈푈퐿퐿* = 1 − [푚푚𝑆𝑆 / (1 + 훼훼(1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚𝑆𝑆))]
- Coefficients of proportionality used in examples:
  - Germany: 훼훼 = 0.33 (from Sprenger, 1981 and Flandreau, 1995)
  - U.S.: 훼훼 = 0.40 (from Meissner, 2015)

### Bimetallism’s prospects in real time (forecasting global gold shares)
- Projected gold share in year i based on information available in year t (i > t):
  - (8) � [푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 / (푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 + 푆푆)] �_i|t = [푝푝퐺퐺�퐺퐺_t + ∑_{휃= t+1}^{i} ∆퐺퐺_휃] / [푝푝퐺퐺�퐺퐺_t + ∑_{휃= t+1}^{i} ∆퐺퐺_휃 + 푆푆_t + ∑_{휃= t+1}^{i} ∆𝑆𝑆_휃]
- Projection methods for annual bullion production:
  - Static projection: fix bullion production at latest available observation.
  - Dynamic projections: fit ARIMA models; standard tests suggest (2, 1, 0) specification.
    - (9) ∆^2 푋_휃 = 휌_0 + 휌_1 ∆^2 푋_휃−1 + 휌_2 ∆^2 푋_휃−2, where 푋 = 퐺, 푆.
  - Dynamic projection II uses gold production only from 1853 to exclude early-1850s gold shock.
  - Sequential computation:
    - (10) ∆푋̂_휃 = ∆푋̂_휃−1 + ∆^2 푋̂_휃 with ∆푋̂_휃−1 = ∆푋_t for 휃 ≤ t+1.
- Example (cut-off date t = 1872):
  - Dynamic projection I for gold forecasts production to rebound.
  - Dynamic projection II for gold extrapolates the trend decline in gold production ongoing since 1853.
  - ARIMA model predicts silver production to increase, though projected growth falls short of the 1870s and 1880s silver bonanza.
- Methodological note: graphs show no forecast intervals because predictions are not used for statistical inference.
- Source data for projections: Hay (1887) and author’s calculations.

### Conclusions and broader implications
- The article supports Flandreau (1996) and Oppers (1996): the switch from global bimetallism to gold monometalism was triggered by uncoordinated policy decisions by Germany and France in the early 1870s.
- Without those unilateral moves, bimetallism would likely have survived and much economic pain of the late 1870s and 1880s may have been avoided.
- Key background conditions:
  - Australian and Californian gold discoveries in the early 1850s and ensuing crowding out of silver specie in France.
  - Active search for cooperative solutions in the 1860s (e.g., 1867 International Monetary Conference) but later acrimony led to disorderly unilateral steps.
- Historical lesson: fears about the end of bimetallism in the 1860s were legitimate but became self-fulfilling when policymakers acted prematurely rather than waiting for the North American silver shock to materialize.
- Policy implication and analogy: durable joint currency arrangements require strong common institutions to be resilient to asymmetric political or economic shocks (parallels drawn with debates about the Euro area architecture).

*Source: wpiea2019032 - References*

### References................................................................................................20

### wpiea2019032 - References

### Introduction and overview
- The “scramble for gold” of the 1870s marked a transition within a decade from a fixed exchange rate regime of new-universal coverage—where both gold and silver served as base for specie currencies—to a world split into a gold and a silver block, with the largest industrial countries—Britain, France, Germany, and, with a few years delay, the United States—all part of the gold block.
- Ex-post assessments tend to view the switch from bimetallism to gold monometalism negatively:
  - Gold monometalism tied the price level to the vagaries of gold supply, whereas bimetallism, through incomplete correlation between gold and silver supply shocks, provided a degree of risk diversification.
  - The transition triggered a surge in demand for gold and sustained deflation in the gold block. Contemporaries labeled the deflationary slump from 1873 to the mid-1890s the “great depression,” characterized by sub-par growth and severe distributional conflicts between creditors and debtors as deflation increased the real value of debt.
  - In Germany, the post-transition period was marked by “Bismarck’s conservative turn,” i.e. the end of the alliance between Bismarck and the national liberal party, and the replacement of liberals in the German-Prussian bureaucracy with conservatives (Wehler, 1995, pp. 934-37).
- The literature over the past three 30 years has clarified several points about the demise of bimetallism:
  1. Bimetallism functioned as long as countries with a sufficiently large share in global specie circulation stabilized the price of gold relative to silver. In the 1850s and 1860s, France played (primarily) this role, fixing the relative price at 15½ units of silver for one unit of gold. As per Gresham’s law, changes in the global supply of gold and silver translated into changes in the composition of France’s specie stock, instead of changes in the relative price between gold and silver (Prince Smith, 1869; Fisher, 1894; Friedman, 1990a; Flandreau, 1996; Oppers, 2000; Velde and Weber, 2000).
  2. Large gold discoveries 1848-51 in California and Australia greatly increased the global supply of gold and caused the share of gold currency in France (and other bimetallic countries) to surge. According to Flandreau (1995), the share of gold in France’s specie currency circulation increased from 30 percent in the early 1850s to more than 80 percent in the late 1860s. With Britain and the US (prior to the US civil war) on gold and France mostly using gold, gold specie became the prevalent means of payment for international transactions (Redish 1995; Morys, 2012, 2019).
  3. In 1871-1873, unified Germany introduced a new currency—the Mark—and tied it to gold, replacing the silver currencies that had existed in most German states beforehand. Germany’s currency reform by itself did not break global bimetallism: everything else equal, the sole consequence would have been an increase in the share of silver in France’s specie stock (Oppers, 1996; Flandreau, 1996; Velde, 2002).
  4. France suspended free silver coinage in September 1873, followed soon by other members of the Latin Monetary Union (Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland). This ended global bimetallism: thereafter, no one stabilized the gold-silver price ratio any longer (Oppers, 1996; Flandreau, 1996; Flandreau and Oosterlinck, 2012). Explanations for France’s move—each relating to Germany’s currency reform—included nervousness about downward pressure on silver prices as Germany began to shed its silver stock (Mertens, 1944); unwillingness to accept the increase in silver specie that accommodation of Germany’s reform would have triggered (Oppers, 1996); or retaliation following France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/71 and the obligation to pay a large war indemnity. By suspending silver coinage, France increased the cost of Germany’s currency reform (Flandreau, 1996).

*Italic: Source: wpiea2019032 - References*

### 5. With bimetallism broken, s everal other European countries moved swiftly to gold,

### 5. With bimetallism broken, several other European countries moved swiftly to gold,

### II. THE FEAR OF BEING LEFT BEHIND — Germany’s pre-reform monetary debate
- Prior to the 1850s, German monetary reform focused on establishing common coinage standards among Zollverein member states (the German Customs Union established in 1833/34).  
- Early interventions:
  - Johann Gottlieb Hoffmann (1828 onward) advocated gold, arguing lower costs of processing, cleaning, maintenance, storage and transport relative to its intrinsic value and predicting “recognition [of the superiority of gold] will eventually have to be given everywhere, wherever the currency system is meant to be organized permanently.” (Hoffmann, 1838).
  - Friedrich von Hermann (1834) countered that savings from gold were dwarfed by switching costs from one currency metal to another.
- Munich (1837) and Dresden (1838) treaties kept silver as Germany’s monetary base.
- The gold discoveries in California (1848) and Australia (1851) made the choice of specie central:
  - Some international economists (Michel Chevalier, Richard Cobden) predicted a fall in gold’s value and urged gold countries to switch to silver.
  - Adolf Soetbeer (1852, 1861, 1865) argued that gold would dominate international commerce and urged Germany to switch to gold to avoid being leapfrogged and suffering accelerated silver devaluation. Key quotation: “Whoever is first in deciding to transition to a gold currency would sacrifice less than those who hesitate.” (Soetbeer and Weibezahn, 1861).
- By the late 1860s:
  - Influential supporters included Ludwig Bamberger (Bamberger, 1861), the deutsche Handelstag (survey and 1865 resolution requesting coinage of a German gold coin), the Volkswirtschaftliche Kongress, and 1868 Handelstag requests to harmonize with France.
  - The Norddeutscher Reichstag (1868) and the Zollverein parliament (1869) endorsed currency reform resolutions (author of Zollverein resolution: Bamberger).
  - Key officials supporting reform: Rudolf Delbrück and Otto Michaelis.
- Perceived urgency: contemporaries feared isolation if Germany remained on silver while England, the United States, and France counted and paid in gold. John Prince Smith (1869) warned of “disadvantageous isolation” and urged “timely action in the currency question.”

### II.B How endangered was bimetallism?
- Historical assessments (Flandreau, 1996; Oppers, 1996) indicate that absent policy intervention bimetallism would have survived the early 1870s.
- Bullion production trends (Figure 1 summary):
  - Gold production began to retreat from the mid-1850s as Australian and Californian yields declined.
  - Silver production surged from the early 1870s, driven largely by expansion of silver mining in the American West.
- Contemporary forecasts of bullion production in the 1860s were scarce and often incorrect:
  - Soetbeer (1865) expected Californian gold production to increase; hedged on silver expansion prospects in Nevada, Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico and Mexico (quotes preserved).
  - Seyd (1868) provided a more accurate but cautious forecast about probable exhaustion of New World gold fields while noting possible future discoveries in other regions.
  - Morys (2012): at the 1867 International Monetary Conference “any sense of the silver supply shock [of the 1870s] being imminent is completely absent”.
- Figure 2 forecasting exercise (Box-Jenkins/Flandreau framework; Annex):
  - Three projection approaches using information available in the late 1860s/early 1870s:
    - Static projection: bullion production treated as a non-predictable random walk; gold and silver production held constant at the latest observation.
    - Dynamic projection: uses historical patterns of gold and silver production as inputs.
    - Dynamic II (gold shock one-off): uses gold production only from 1853 onward, excluding the late 1840s/early 1850s gold shock; designed favorable to bimetallism by extrapolating post-1853 gold decline and capturing early harbingers of 1870s silver bonanza.
  - Second step: projected global gold share fed into Flandreau’s (1996) model of the global bimetallic system; when projected global gold share approached or exceeded bimetallism’s upper structural limit (gold crowding out silver in France’s specie circulation), bimetallism’s viability became doubtful.
  - Results summarized:
    - From the late-1860s perspective, static and dynamic projections suggested gold would crowd out silver in France within 12-15 years.
    - The silver supply shock in the early 1870s improved prospects, but only by the mid-1870s did bimetallism appear “safe” — by then bimetallism had already been abandoned.
    - Even in the favorable Dynamic II, assessed from the late 1860s, the share of gold in France’s specie stock would increase to well over 90 percent and remain there for many years; a minor gold supply shock could have pushed bimetallism over the edge.
- Interpretation:
  - Contemporary observers (Soetbeer, Prince Smith) reasonably feared France demonetizing silver and thereby undermining Germany’s silver-based currency; many experts held a “knife’s edge” view of bimetallism’s sustainability.

### III. THE FRENCH-GERMAN CURRENCY GAME OF THE EARLY 1870S — timing and choice of gold
- Two central questions about Germany’s 1870s transition:
  - (i) why did the reform occur in the early 1870s and not earlier (e.g., after establishment of the Northern German Confederation in 1867)?  
  - (ii) why did unified Germany adopt the gold standard instead of joining France on bimetallism—a possibility discussed in the 1860s?
- Arguments rejecting simple explanations:
  - The war indemnity explanation: standard claim that the indemnity gave Germany means to purchase gold (Kindleberger, 1984; Flandreau, 1996) is incomplete because other mechanisms existed to change specie base without purchasing bullion ex-ante (e.g., U.S. Coinage Act of 1834, Netherlands currency certificates of 1847).
  - Institutional capability: monetary issues were a federal responsibility in the Northern German Federation established after the 1866 war; same officials (Delbrück, Michaelis) and dominant national liberal party existed prior to the Empire—so institutional incapacity is not the key obstacle.
- Key obstacle identified: currency reform required French accommodation regardless of the mechanism chosen. Reasons:
  - Undercutting the French legal mint ratio depended on France upholding that ratio; exchanging silver for gold and ensuring an adequate silver price required France to stick to its bimetallic system.
  - Bamberger (1871): “the difficulty was never to ask: ‘where to find the gold’ but: ‘where to put the silver?’ Where is the hole in which we can throw 300 or 400 million of silver that we need to get rid of, without throwing them into the water outright?” — only France could absorb that silver.
  - Prince Smith (1869) predicted that Germany offering its demonetized silver “would be near impossible to predict” and that France would likely abolish bimetallism at the first sign of such a step.
- Military and diplomatic leverage created by the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71):
  - German victory and occupation of Paris allowed Germany to force French accommodation through the indemnity and occupation conditions.
  - Frankfurt peace treaty (May 10, 1871) conditioned troop withdrawal on payment of France’s war indemnity; payments could be made with French silver coins, making immediate French demonetization of silver infeasible without undermining its capacity to pay and recover from occupation.
- Rapid German actions after the war:
  - July 3, 1871: the Berlin mint suspended silver coinage.
  - A few weeks later: the federal government began buying gold bullion in London.
  - Early December 1871: the Reichstag passed a law authorizing gold coinage.
  - From early 1872: new gold coins were brought into circulation by spending the indemnity (hence without withdrawing silver coins); total specie circulation surged — “currency reform triggered a large fiscal-monetary stimulus.”
  - July 1873: the Reichstag formally adopted the gold standard.
- Fiscal and macro effects:
  - Indemnity receipts were largely used to settle outstanding debts and spent on military and civilian uses by the federal government and German states; only a minor portion was invested (Soetbeer, 1874; Monroe, 1919).
  - Soetbeer and Bamberger warned that spending the indemnity would trigger a boom-bust cycle; Bamberger proposed investing indemnity receipts into the Rentes Thiers (France’s perpetual bonds) and urged exchanging gold for silver coins to bring gold into circulation — advice largely unheeded.

### III.B Why gold and not bimetallism?
- Pre-unification disagreement among reformers:
  - Bamberger, Delbrück and (most of the time) Soetbeer favored gold monometalism.
  - Prince Smith and Michaelis were bimetallists.
  - The specie base question remained open until the final currency law of July 1873 specified that the imperial Mark would be based on gold only.
- Analytical approach: sequential non-cooperative game between Germany and France (sketch in Figure 4)
  - Notation from the source: (x,X) are Germany’s/France’s currency regime choices; g/G denote gold monometalism, b/B bimetallism, and s silver monometalism.
  - p(x,X) is Germany’s payoff function resulting from both countries’ regime choices.
  - Germany enjoyed first-mover advantage owing to victory in the Franco-Prussian war and leverage from occupation and indemnity arrangements.
- Strategic logic summarized:
  - Germany needed France to accommodate the demonetization of silver because only France could absorb large quantities of demonetized silver without precipitating collapse of the silver market or making the indemnity inconvertible.
  - By winning the war and compelling indemnity payments in specie, Germany could introduce gold into circulation quickly (by spending indemnity proceeds) and thereby force France into a position where demonetizing silver was the least feasible immediate response.
  - The rapid sequence of suspending silver coinage (July 3, 1871), buying gold bullion, authorizing gold coinage (Reichstag, December 1871), and bringing gold coins into circulation from early 1872 created facts on the ground that finalized the choice of gold monometallism in July 1873.

*wpiea2019032 - 5. With bimetallism broken, several other European countries moved swiftly to gold,*

### Section II already discussed Germany’s motivation to move away from silver: (푠푠/퐵퐵)

### wpiea2019032 - Section II already discussed Germany’s motivation to move away from silver: (푠푠/퐵퐵)

### Germany’s regime choice: bimetallism versus gold
- The section argues that adopting the gold standard weakly dominated bimetallism, with the formal comparisons:
  - 푝푝(푔푔,퐵퐵) ≈ 푝푝(푏푏,퐵퐵)
  - 푝푝(푔푔,퐺퐺) > 푔푔(푏푏,퐺퐺)
  - Further, there are reasons to believe 푝푝(푏푏,퐵퐵) > 푝푝(푔푔,퐺퐺), implying the game resembles a prisoners’ dilemma (see section IV).
- When France “cooperates” and maintains bimetallism, the comparison of (푏푏,퐵퐵) and (푔푔,퐵퐵) shows Germany’s choice is of limited consequence for the global fixed exchange rate system; the system remains intact and could absorb the United States’ return to gold in 1879 (legislated in 1873).
- Main material difference under (푏푏,퐵퐵) versus (푔푔,퐵퐵) is effective specie circulation in Germany—whether both gold and silver circulate or only gold.

### Game outcomes and Flandreau (1996) model analysis (Figure 5)
- German and/or French monetary reforms (both modeled as placed in 1873) change specie demand and thus bimetallism’s structural limits.
- In cases where bimetallism collapses—either because all countries abandon bimetallism, or because the remaining bimetallic block is too small—the silver-gold price ratio becomes unstable and exchange rates between silver and gold currencies adjust.
- The first column in the model compares (푏푏,퐵퐵) and (푔푔,퐵퐵): global fixed exchange rate system remains intact; the US return to gold in 1879 is absorbable.
- The second column analyzes French “retaliation” where France demonetizes silver after Germany’s reform:
  - If Germany had adopted bimetallism, leading to (푏푏,퐺퐺), Germany would bear the burden of sustaining global bimetallism alone and would be unable to do so: the enlarged gold block would absorb all monetary gold, effectively leaving Germany on silver.
  - To avoid being left on silver, Germany needed to move to gold preemptively. Global bimetallism would collapse after French retaliation in either (푏푏,퐺퐺) or (푔푔,퐺퐺), but crucially in (푔푔,퐺퐺) Germany would be part of the gold block.
- Key weakness of the bimetallists’ position: any German reform required French accommodation. Victory in the Franco-Prussian war allowed Germany to force accommodation long enough to take irreversible steps toward gold; joining bimetallism would have required long-term French cooperation, now improbable after armed conflict.

### Timing, retaliation, and specie stock consequences
- France sought to minimize Germany’s first-mover advantage by paying the indemnity as fast as possible; the final payment was scheduled for March 1875 but issuance of the Rentes Thiers in 1871 and 1872 allowed France to pay off the indemnity on September 5, 1873—more than 18 months ahead of schedule.
- On September 6, 1873, the next day, France limited silver coinage. In January 1874, other members of the Latin Monetary Union followed.
- Germany’s reform process was incomplete: while indemnity spending brought gold coins rapidly into circulation, demonetizing and selling silver had barely begun. As a result, Germany still possessed a large silver stock (Figure 6).
- With France cutting bimetallic ties, Germany would be unable to sell its silver, or sell it only at a loss; thus French retaliation inflicted significant pain on Germany even though it could not prevent Germany’s reform by September 1873.

### Post-reform consequences and the bimetallism debates of the 1880s and 1890s
- France’s suspension of free silver coinage sent the price of silver into a tailspin; by the end of the 1870s, silver had depreciated by almost 20 percent relative to gold.
- The Reichsbank tried to sell obsolete silver bullion and incurred heavy losses; in 1879 Reichsbank President Hermann von Dechend ordered suspension of silver sales, even though little more than half of the silver stock had been sold.
- From 1873/74 the post-unification boom (Gründerboom) gave way to a slump (Gründerkrach), reinforcing the deflationary impact of the transition to gold.
- Wholesale prices fell by almost 30 percent between 1872 and 1879 (Jacobs and Richter, 1935).
- Otto Arendt (1880a, 1880b) blamed the German government for silver’s devaluation and proposed a currency treaty between Germany, France and the United States to restore silver’s monetary function; his view gathered supporters in the early 1880s.
- Germany sent a delegation to the 1881 International Monetary Conference, a reversal from 1878 refusal to attend, suggesting possible openness to Arendt’s proposal—but participation remained inconsequential in practice.
- Gold-party political economy objections emphasized:
  - Soetbeer: France had already decided in the late 1860s to move to gold; the suspension of bimetallism would have occurred independent of Germany’s action.
  - Bamberger: currency treaties are impractical because they implicitly require partners never to experience war, revolution, or economic shocks.
- Soetbeer’s and Bamberger’s positions can be represented game-theoretically: Soetbeer argued France would have deviated regardless of Germany’s actions; Bamberger argued only non-cooperative equilibria are stable in currency games.
- The author concludes that, at least from Germany’s perspective, the French-German currency game resembled a prisoners’ dilemma.

### Conclusions and broader implications
- The article supports Flandreau (1996) and Oppers (1996): the switch from global bimetallism to gold monometalism was triggered by uncoordinated policy decisions by Germany and France in the early 1870s.
- Without those unilateral moves, bimetallism would likely have survived and much economic pain of the late 1870s and 1880s may have been avoided.
- Flandreau (1996) termed the emergence of the gold standard an “accident of history”; this review qualifies that accident as heavily conditioned by circumstance:
  - The Australian and Californian gold discoveries in the early 1850s and the ensuing crowding out of silver specie in France were necessary background conditions.
  - In the 1860s there was active search for cooperative international solutions (e.g., the 1867 International Monetary Conference), but the climate turned acerbic in the 1870s and unilateral steps terminated global bimetallism disorderly.
- Historical lesson: fears about the end of bimetallism—legitimate in the 1860s—became self-fulfilling when policymakers acted prematurely rather than waiting for the North American silver shock to materialize.
- Policy implication and analogy: durable joint currency arrangements require strong common institutions to make them resilient to asymmetric political or economic shocks (parallels drawn with debates about the Euro area architecture).

*Source: wpiea2019032 - Section II already discussed Germany’s motivation to move away from silver: (푠푠/퐵퐵).*

### References

### References

### The Structural Limits of Bimetallism: Flandreau’s (1996) Model
- Model specification (quasi-demand functions for monetary gold and silver in the bimetallic block):
  - (1) 푝푝퐺퐺 푀푀퐺퐺푏푏 = 푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺) − 푆푆푚푚퐺퐺
  - (2) 푀푀푆푆푏푏 = −푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 푚푚푆푆 + 푆푆 (1 − 푚푚푆푆)
- Rewritten for estimation:
  - (3) 푝푝퐺퐺 푀푀퐺퐺푏푏 = 퐴퐴 + 푝푝퐺퐺 (∑∆퐺퐺푖푖)(1 − 푚푚퐺퐺) − (∑∆푆푆푖푖) 푚푚퐺퐺
  - (4) 푀푀푆푆푏푏 = 퐵퐵 − 푝푝퐺퐺 (∑∆퐺퐺푖푖) 푚푚푆푆 + (∑∆푆푆푖푖) (1 − 푚푚푆푆)
- Variable definitions:
  - G = global gold stock; S = global silver stock.
  - 푀푀퐺퐺푏푏 and 푀푀푆푆푏푏 = monetary gold and silver circulating in the bimetallic block.
  - 푝푝퐺퐺 = legal mint ratio in the bimetallic block.
  - ∆퐺퐺푖 and ∆푆푆푖 = annual gold and silver production in year i.
  - Parameters A, B, 푚푚퐺퐺, 푚푚푆푆 estimated by restricted least squares provided series are integrated of the same order.
- Data sources and integration:
  - Global gold and silver production for 1850-70 from Hay (1887) complemented by Mint Report (1880) as reported in Day (1890, p. 121).
  - French gold and silver circulation from Flandreau (1995).
  - Standard stationarity tests suggest all time series are integrated of order 1.
- Estimated parameters (this study):
  - A = 709
  - B = 2,288
  - 푚푚퐺퐺 = 0.39
  - 푚푚푆푆 = 0.36
- Comparison to Flandreau (1996) estimates:
  - Flandreau (1996): A = 603, B = 2,528, 푚푚퐺퐺 = 0.37, 푚푚푆푆 = 0.39
- Robustness notes:
  - Changing data source (e.g., using Mint Report (1880/89) instead of Hay (1887)) has negligible impact on results.
  - Estimates of global gold and silver stock for 1849 implied by parameters tend to be lower than contemporaries’ estimates, sometimes by a factor as large as 2; if stocks are taken from the same source differences have no substantive implications.
- Interpretation of structural parameters:
  - 푚푚퐺퐺 = share in total specie demand from the gold block.
  - 푚푚푆푆 = share in total specie demand from the silver block.
  - (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚푆푆) = share in specie demand from the bimetallic block.
- Viability condition for global bimetallism:
  - As long as (5) 푚푚퐺퐺 ≤ 푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 (푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 + 푆푆) ≤ (1 − 푚푚푆푆), gold and silver coins circulate in the bimetallic block and global bimetallism is viable.
  - Define LLLL = 푚푚퐺퐺 and ULLL = (1 − 푚푚푆푆) as the upper and lower structural limits of bimetallism.

### Analyzing Currency Reforms (effects on structural limits)
- Reform framework: currency reforms change a country’s specie block membership; impact assessed by manipulating bimetallism’s structural limits according to changes in specie circulation triggered by the reform.
- 훼훼 denotes the country’s specie circulation relative to the bimetallic block (coefficient of proportionality).
- Post-reform structural limits 퐿퐿퐿퐿* and 푈푈퐿퐿* for reform types analyzed:
  - a. Country moves from silver to gold monometalism (Germany 1871-1873):
    - (6a) 퐿퐿퐿퐿* = 푚푚퐺퐺 + 훼훼 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚푆푆)
    - (7a) 푈푈퐿퐿* = 1 − 푚푚푠푠 + 훼훼 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚푆푆)
  - b. Country joins bimetallic block from silver:
    - (6b) 퐿퐿퐿퐿* = 퐿퐿퐿퐿 = 푚푚퐺퐺
    - (7b) 푈푈퐿퐿* = 1 − 푚푚푠푠 + 훼훼 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚푆푆)
  - c. Country moves from bimetallism to gold (France 1873):
    - (6c) 퐿퐿퐿퐿* = 푚푚퐺퐺 + 훼훼 (1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚푆푆)
    - (7c) 푈푈퐿퐿* = 푈푈퐿퐿 = 1 − 푚푚푠푠
  - d. Country joins the gold standard from paper currency (U.S. 1879):
    - (6d) 퐿퐿퐿퐿* = [푚푚퐺퐺 + 훼훼(1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚푆푆)] / [1 + 훼훼(1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚푆푆)]
    - (7d) 푈푈퐿퐿* = 1 − [푚푚푆푆 / (1 + 훼훼(1 − 푚푚퐺퐺 − 푚푚푆푆))]
- Coefficients of proportionality used in examples:
  - Germany: 훼훼 = 0.33 (from Sprenger, 1981 and Flandreau, 1995)
  - U.S.: 훼훼 = 0.40 (from Meissner, 2015)

### Bimetallism’s Prospects in Real Time (forecasting global gold shares)
- Projected gold share in year i based on information available in year t (i > t):
  - (8) � [푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 / (푝푝퐺퐺 퐺퐺 + 푆푆)] �_i|t = [푝푝퐺퐺�퐺퐺_t + ∑_{휃= t+1}^{i} ∆퐺퐺_휃] / [푝푝퐺퐺�퐺퐺_t + ∑_{휃= t+1}^{i} ∆퐺퐺_휃 + 푆푆_t + ∑_{휃= t+1}^{i} ∆푆푆_휃]
- Projection methods for annual bullion production:
  - Static projection: fix bullion production at latest available observation.
  - Dynamic projections: fit ARIMA models; standard tests suggest (2, 1, 0) specification.
    - (9) ∆^2 푋_휃 = 휌_0 + 휌_1 ∆^2 푋_휃−1 + 휌_2 ∆^2 푋_휃−2, where 푋 = 퐺, 푆.
  - (9) fitted separately for each cut-off year t, with data coverage starting in 1849.
  - For dynamic projection II, gold production data are used only from 1853 to exclude early-1850s gold shock.
  - Sequential computation of projected bullion production:
    - (10) ∆푋̂_휃 = ∆푋̂_휃−1 + ∆^2 푋̂_휃 with ∆푋̂_휃−1 = ∆푋_t for 휃 ≤ t+1.
- Example (cut-off date t = 1872):
  - Dynamic projection I for gold forecasts production to rebound.
  - Dynamic projection II for gold extrapolates the trend decline in gold production ongoing since 1853.
  - ARIMA model predicts silver production to increase, though projected growth falls short of the 1870s and 1880s silver bonanza.
- Methodological note:
  - The graph referenced shows no forecast intervals because predictions are not used for statistical inference.
  - Source data for projections: Hay (1887) and author’s calculations.

*Source: wpiea2019032 - References*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2019/wpiea2019032.pdf_
