## 1. Composition of Self-Employment, 2008–17

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### Overview and context
- The Dutch pension system is described as among the most sophisticated; Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2018 ranked the Dutch system first in a group of 34 countries.
- Emerging pressures on the system include population aging, low long-term interest rates, and changes in labor market structure.
- Recent policy process milestones:
  - 2014: government initiated consultations with social partners on reform.
  - 2017: coalition agreement proposed a route for reform.
  - An agreement with social partners was expected in 2020 (text notes expectation of agreement in early 2018 with legislation to be passed in 2020).

### Structure and key parameters of the pension system
- Pillar structure:
  - 1st pillar – public, pay-as-you-go – grants a minimum flat pension to the entire population subject to age and residency requirements.
  - 2nd pillar – occupational schemes – cover over 90 percent of all employees and provide supplementary benefits based on lifetime wages.
  - 3rd pillar – voluntary, tax-exempt contracts – contribute about 10 percent of pension systems’ assets.
- 2nd pillar design features:
  - Contributions: quasi-mandatory, derived from collective labor agreements; levied at a uniform rate, independent of age.
  - Accrual: benefits accrued annually at a maximum rate of 1.875 percent, providing 75 percent of average lifetime pay after 40 years of contributions.
  - Contracts: Dutch DB contracts structured as deferred variable annuities; annuities are indexed to wages or inflation but can be frozen or cut in nominal terms conditional on the funding rate.
  - Governance: 2nd pillar funds managed by boards of employers, unions, retirees, and independent specialists who determine investments, contribution levels, and indexation collectively.
- Prudential and funding indicators:
  - Pension funds are required to meet a funding ratio in excess of 110 percent (requirement noted).
  - Funding ratio was 108.4 percent in mid-2018, against the statutory minimum of 104.2 percent (DNB, June 2018).

### Proposed reform elements and political economy positions
- Proposed reform elements (coalition agreement):
  - Replace variable annuities of “hybrid DBs” with personal entitlements in the form of financial assets, akin to a DC.
  - Feature insurance contracts hedging longevity risk and possibly collective buffers to share systemic risks across generations (“third space” or “personal pensions with risk-sharing and collective buffers” (PPR-CB)).
  - Reform would shift virtually all pension-related risks to participants and increase transparency of individual entitlements (PPR part).
- Political economy positions:
  - Government: justifies reform by intergenerational transfer tensions and labor market changes; pledged tax instruments to smooth transition.
  - Employers: favor shifting risks off balance sheets; support regressive premiums to lower hiring costs for younger workers; supportive of measures that reduce uncertainty for investment and hiring.
  - Unions: favor redistribution and mandatory participation in collective buffers at industry level; insist on compensating older generations affected by transition; support forcing self-employed to participate to reduce old-age poverty. Estimated cost of compensation for older generations is 55 billion euros.
  - Central bank: opposes allowing financial buffers to turn negative in downturns (point of contention with unions).

### Self-employment: recent trends and characteristics
- Aggregate and demographic facts:
  - Share of self-employment in total employment increased by more than 4 percentage points between 2005 and 2017, reaching 15.7 percent in 2017.
  - “Own-account workers” accounted for 11.6 percent of employed in 2017.
  - About 40 percent of the self-employed belong to the age group 50–64.
  - Slightly more than one in three self-employed workers are women.
  - Half of self-employed in 2017 were active in four main categories: construction, trade, social work and professional, scientific and technical activities.
  - The share of self-employed workers with tertiary education has expanded in recent years.
- Incentives and tax treatment:
  - Self-employed do not contribute to the sickness and disability insurance in most cases; tax deductions are available to incentivize entrepreneurship.
  - Self-employed on average pay 20 percent lower taxes on equivalent gross income compared to employees (Bosch and others, 2015).
  - Cap on tax deduction for contributions in 3rd pillar DC schemes increases with age.
- Pension coverage and information (DHS evidence):
  - DHS administered annually to about two thousand Dutch households (five thousand individuals); latest wave (25th) conducted April–October 2017.
  - Only a fifth of self-employed answered affirmatively that their current or last job entitles them to a retirement pension (aside from the 1st pillar, AOW), compared with 84 percent for the total surveyed employed population.
  - Only 11 percent of self-employed report having made other arrangements for their pension apart from customary employer-built pensions.
  - Two thirds of workers claim to have received an overview of pension rights from their fund in 2016; only about 40 percent of self-employed report the same.
  - On perceived information: although a higher share of self-employed in the DHS feels well informed, overall fewer self-employed feel well/adequately informed and a higher share feels not adequately informed and uninterested.
- Preferences and attitudes:
  - About 45 percent of self-employed prefer managing their savings independently; employees: about 65 percent gladly delegate pension decisions to a fund.
  - Self-employed expressed a somewhat higher attitude towards risk taking on pension income (willing to pay lower premium for a pension that can vary depending on investment risk).

### Model, estimation, and key quantitative results
- Data and model:
  - Panel comprises answers collected during 2014–17 for a total of about 20,000 observations.
  - Probit regression estimated: SE_i,t = α DC_i,t + β' X_i,t + c_t + ε_i,t, where SE is self-employed dummy; DC1 = willingness to take pension income risk for lower premium; DC2 = preference for managing pension savings individually; X = demographic and psychological characteristics.
- Stylized expectations:
  - Women less likely to be self-employed; age positively influences self-employment; education relationship ambiguous; higher income or higher tax burden may influence self-employment decisions; personality traits matter (risk aversion, patience, control, mindfulness).
- Psychological trait averages (DHS 2017):
  - Risk aversion average score is 5 in a range of 1 to 7 (based on 6 questions).
  - Self-employed have slightly lower average “risk aversion” and higher “patience” than total population; “controlling” higher for self-employed; “mindfulness” lower for self-employed.
- PROBIT regression results — key coefficients and statistics (coefficients preserved exactly as reported):
  - DC1 0.019* (0.010)
  - DC2 0.036*** (0.010)
  - Age group (<35) -0.020 (0.016)
  - Age 35-45 (base)
  - Age 46-55 0.029** (0.013)
  - Age 56-67 0.041*** (0.013)
  - Gender (F) 0.015 (0.010)
  - Gross income 0.000 (0.000)
  - Tax burden -0.020** (0.008)
  - Children (Y) -0.012 (0.010)
  - Education (primary and below) (base)
  - Vocational_interm. 0.063*** (0.019)
  - Vocational_high 0.042** (0.019)
  - Pre-university 0.046** (0.022)
  - University 0.062*** (0.020)
  - Informed 0.002 (0.004)
  - Psychological traits:
    - Risk averse -0.004 (0.005)
    - Patient -0.001 (0.006)
    - Controlling 0.015** (0.007)
    - Mindful -0.030*** (0.011)
  - Time dummies: Yes
  - N obs 1,847
  - Pseudo R2 0.130
- Interpretation:
  - DC2 (preference for managing pension savings individually) and DC1 (willingness to accept investment risk for lower premium) are significantly and positively associated with probability of being self-employed.
  - Older age groups and higher education levels are associated with higher probability of self-employment.
  - Higher tax burden is associated with lower probability of self-employment.
  - Psychological trait “controlling” increases probability of self-employment; “mindful” decreases it.
  - Reported perceived information about future pension conditions (Informed) is not significant.

### Conclusions, implications, and policy recommendations
- Main conclusion:
  - Individuals who prefer pension plans with more freedom of choice and more investment risk are significantly more likely to choose self-employment than regular employment under the current pension system.
- Implications for labor market and pensions:
  - Favorable tax treatment of self-employment has been a dominant reason for increase in flexible contracts, especially among older and higher-educated workers.
  - Self-employed participate only marginally in occupational pension schemes and exhibit stronger preferences for individualized management and tolerance for pension investment risk.
  - A pension reform that gives more freedom of choice to regular employees should reduce incentives to go into self-employment and could include individuals who do not enjoy pension coverage into personal savings schemes.
  - A reform that decreases perceived pension wealth may prompt some individuals to increase savings or shift into employee relationships.
  - The proposed PPR-CB seeks to combine collective risk-sharing with individualized entitlements; it may reconcile DB and DC features but increases complexity for participants.
- Policy recommendations and considerations:
  - Provide greater transparency on the redistribution cost in the transition to the new contract type and explicit modalities of financing that transition (identify losers and winners and specify compensation modalities).
  - Information-building and communication to increase public acceptance and reduce reform resistance.
  - Consider regressive premiums (varying with age) to lower hiring costs for younger workers and potentially crowd self-employed into the pension system.
  - Ensure support for a smooth, evenly distributed transition across age cohorts via tax instruments as promised by government.
  - Recognize that learning and trust-building will take time; maintaining trust in institutions will be crucial for consensus and successful implementation.
- Research and monitoring needs:
  - Clarify the redistribution cost in the transition and the modalities of financing compensation.
  - Monitor how changes in pension architecture affect occupational choices and coverage of self-employed in formal pension arrangements.

### Appendix — selected key parameters and indicators (2016–2018 as reported)
- Pensionable age: Increasing to 67 by 2021, then linked to life expectancy; pensionable age noted as 68 in 2018.
- Accrual rate, annual: 1.875
- Annual benefit per person, gross (2017):
  - Maximum (in eur, 2017): 103,317
  - Average (in eur, 2017): 14,737
- Expenditure (2016) (billions eur / percent of GDP shown in source):
  - Billions eur: 37.5; 13.5; 41.1
  - Percent of GDP: 5.3; 1.9; 5.8
- Contributions (2016):
  - Contribution rate (average): employers 17, workers 7
  - Contributions (gross, billions): 31.2
  - Percent of GDP: 4.4
- Size of fund (in 2017): Billions eur: 1620
- Size of fund (in 2017) as percent of GDP: 220
- Non-indexed funding ratio (2017): 103/105 (regulatory min)
- Additional numeric items retained verbatim from source: 1st pillar: Mandatory; value shown as 7.0, 49.6, 8.89, 4.04 (context labels in source retained verbatim)

*Source: wpiea2019064 - 1. Composition of Self-Employment, 2008–17 (Appendix I and Appendix II).*

### 1. Composition of Self-Employment, 2008–17 _________________________________________ 10

### 1. Composition of Self-Employment, 2008–17

### Introduction and Context
- The Netherlands’ proposed pension reform is being discussed within a pension system characterized in the literature as among the most sophisticated.
- According to the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2018, the Dutch pension system ranked first in a group of 34 countries.
- The Index evaluates adequacy of benefits and the system’s sustainability and financial integrity across 40 indicators.

### Strengths of the Dutch Pension System
- High participation rates.
- Provision of adequate retirement income.
- A model that "adroitly takes advantage of the strengths intrinsic in defined-benefit (DB) and defined-contributions (DC) frameworks."

### Emerging Pressure Points
- Population aging.
- Low long-term interest rates.
- Changes in the labor market structure.
- These factors have strained redistribution and surfaced intergenerational tensions.

### Recent Policy Process Milestones
- 2014: The government initiated a series of consultations with social partners on a possible reform.
- 2017: The coalition agreement proposed a route for reform.
- An agreement with social partners was expected in early 2018 with legislation to be passed in

*Source: wpiea2019064 - 1. Composition of Self-Employment, 2008–17*

### 2020. While there appears to be a broad consensus on the need for reform, an agreement on

### wpiea2019064 - 2020. While there appears to be a broad consensus on the need for reform, an agreement on

### Background on the pension reform and political economy
- Dutch pension system structure:
  - 1st pillar – public, pay-as-you-go – grants a minimum flat pension to the entire population subject to age and residency requirements.
  - 2nd pillar – occupational schemes – cover over 90 percent of all employees and provide supplementary benefits based on lifetime wages.
  - 3rd pillar – voluntary, tax-exempt contracts – contribute about 10 percent of pension systems’ assets, but growing.
- 2nd pillar key design features:
  - Contributions are quasi-mandatory and derived from collective labor agreements; levied at a uniform rate, independent of age.
  - Benefits are accrued annually at a maximum rate of 1.875 percent, providing 75 percent of average lifetime pay after 40 years of contributions.
  - Dutch DB contracts structured as deferred variable annuities aimed at a stable lifetime income; annuities are indexed to wages or inflation but can be frozen or cut in nominal terms conditional on the funding rate.
  - 2nd pillar funds are managed by boards of employers, unions, retirees, and independent specialists who determine investments, contribution levels, and indexation collectively.
- Prudential and funding indicators:
  - Pension funds are required to meet a funding ratio in excess of 110 percent (requirement noted).
  - Funding ratio was 108.4 percent in mid-2018, against the statutory minimum of 104.2 percent (DNB, June 2018).
- Proposed reform elements (coalition agreement):
  - Replace variable annuities of the “hybrid DBs” with personal entitlements in the form of financial assets, akin to a DC.
  - Feature insurance contracts hedging longevity risk and possibly collective buffers to share systemic risks across generations (concepts described as “third space” or “personal pensions with risk-sharing and collective buffers” (PPR-CB)).
  - Reform would shift virtually all pension-related risks to participants and increase transparency of individual entitlements (PPR part).
- Political economy positions:
  - Government: reform justified by intergenerational transfer tensions and labor market changes; pledged tax instruments to smooth transition.
  - Employers: favor shifting risks off balance sheets; support regressive premiums to lower hiring costs for younger workers; supportive of measures that reduce uncertainty for investment and hiring.
  - Unions: favor redistribution and mandatory participation in collective buffers at industry level; insist on compensating older generations affected by transition; support forcing self-employed to participate to reduce old-age poverty. Estimated cost of compensation for older generations is 55 billion euros.
  - Central bank opposes allowing financial buffers to turn negative in downturns (point of contention with unions).

### Self-employment: recent trends, characteristics, and pension coverage
- Aggregate and demographic facts:
  - The share of self-employment in total employment increased by more than 4 percentage points between 2005 and 2017, reaching 15.7 percent in 2017.
  - “Own-account workers” accounted for 11.6 percent of employed in 2017.
  - About 40 percent of the self-employed belong to the age group 50–64.
  - Slightly more than one in three self-employed workers are women.
  - Half of self-employed in 2017 were active in four main categories: construction, trade, social work and professional, scientific and technical activities.
  - The share of self-employed workers with tertiary education has expanded in recent years.
- Incentives and tax treatment:
  - Self-employed do not contribute to the sickness and disability insurance in most cases; tax deductions are available to incentivize entrepreneurship.
  - Self-employed on average pay 20 percent lower taxes on equivalent gross income compared to employees (Bosch and others, 2015).
  - Cap on tax deduction for contributions in 3rd pillar DC schemes increases with age.
- Pension coverage and information (evidence from the DHS):
  - The DHS is administered annually to about two thousand Dutch households (five thousand individuals); latest wave (25th) conducted April–October 2017.
  - Only a fifth of self-employed answered affirmatively that their current or last job entitles them to a retirement pension (aside from the 1st pillar, AOW), compared with 84 percent for the total surveyed employed population.
  - Only 11 percent of self-employed report having made other arrangements for their pension apart from customary employer-built pensions (annuities, whole life insurance, additional pension rights purchased through employer).
  - Two thirds of workers claim to have received an overview of pension rights from their fund in 2016; only about 40 percent of self-employed report the same.
  - On perceived information: although a higher share of self-employed in the DHS feels well informed, overall fewer self-employed feel well/adequately informed and a higher share feels not adequately informed and uninterested.
- Preferences and attitudes:
  - About 45 percent of self-employed prefer managing their savings independently; employees: about 65 percent gladly delegate pension decisions to a fund.
  - Self-employed expressed a somewhat higher attitude towards risk taking on pension income (willing to pay lower premium for a pension that can vary depending on investment risk).

### Model, estimation, and key quantitative results
- Data and model:
  - Panel comprises answers collected during 2014–17 for a total of about 20,000 observations (panel starting year corresponds to initial proposal).
  - Probit regression estimated: SE_i,t = α DC_i,t + β' X_i,t + c_t + ε_i,t, where SE is self-employed dummy; DC1 = willingness to take pension income risk for lower premium; DC2 = preference for managing pension savings individually; X = demographic and psychological characteristics.
- Stylized facts and expected signs:
  - Women less likely to be self-employed; age positively influences self-employment; education relationship ambiguous (possible U-shaped); higher income or higher tax burden may influence self-employment decisions; personality traits matter (risk aversion, patience, control, mindfulness).
- Psychological trait averages (DHS 2017):
  - Risk aversion average score is 5 in a range of 1 to 7 (based on 6 questions).
  - Self-employed have slightly lower average “risk aversion” and higher “patience” than total population; “controlling” higher for self-employed; “mindfulness” lower for self-employed.
- Regression (PROBIT) results — key coefficients and statistics (table preserved as reported):
  - DC1 0.019* (0.010)
  - DC2 0.036*** (0.010)
  - Age group (<35) -0.020 (0.016)
  - Age 35-45 (base)
  - Age 46-55 0.029** (0.013)
  - Age 56-67 0.041*** (0.013)
  - Gender (F) 0.015 (0.010)
  - Gross income 0.000 (0.000)
  - Tax burden -0.020** (0.008)
  - Children (Y) -0.012 (0.010)
  - Education (primary and below) (base)
  - Vocational_interm. 0.063*** (0.019)
  - Vocational_high 0.042** (0.019)
  - Pre-university 0.046** (0.022)
  - University 0.062*** (0.020)
  - Informed 0.002 (0.004)
  - Psychological traits:
    - Risk averse -0.004 (0.005)
    - Patient -0.001 (0.006)
    - Controlling 0.015** (0.007)
    - Mindful -0.030*** (0.011)
  - Time dummies: Yes
  - N obs 1,847
  - Pseudo R2 0.130
- Interpretation of estimation results:
  - Preference for greater freedom of choice (DC2) and greater willingness to accept investment risk (DC1) are significantly and positively associated with the probability of being self-employed.
  - Older age groups and higher education levels are associated with higher probability of self-employment.
  - Higher tax burden is associated with lower probability of self-employment.
  - Psychological trait “controlling” increases probability of self-employment; “mindful” decreases it.
  - Reported perceived information about future pension conditions is not significant.

### Conclusions, implications, and policy recommendations
- Main conclusion:
  - Individuals who prefer pension plans with more freedom of choice and more investment risk are significantly more likely to choose self-employment than regular employment under the current pension system.
- Labor-market and pension system implications:
  - Favorable tax treatment of self-employment has been a dominant reason for the increase in flexible contracts, especially among older and higher-educated workers.
  - Self-employed participate only marginally in occupational pension schemes and exhibit stronger preferences for individualized management and tolerance for pension investment risk.
  - A pension reform that gives more freedom of choice to regular employees should reduce incentives to go into self-employment and could include individuals who do not enjoy pension coverage into personal savings schemes.
  - A reform that decreases perceived pension wealth may prompt some individuals to increase savings or shift into employee relationships.
  - The proposed PPR-CB seeks to combine collective risk-sharing with individualized entitlements; it may reconcile DB and DC features but increases complexity for participants.
- Policy recommendations and considerations emphasized:
  - Greater transparency on the redistribution cost in the transition to the new contract type and explicit modalities of financing that transition (identify losers and winners and specify compensation modalities).
  - Information-building and communication to increase public acceptance and reduce reform resistance (drawing on elimination, compensation and information-building strategies).
  - Consider regressive premiums (varying with age) to lower hiring costs for younger workers and potentially crowd self-employed into the pension system.
  - Ensure support for a smooth, evenly distributed transition across age cohorts via tax instruments as promised by government.
  - Recognize that learning and trust-building will take time; maintaining trust in institutions will be crucial for consensus and successful implementation.
- Research and monitoring needs:
  - Clarify the redistribution cost in the transition and the modalities of financing compensation.
  - Monitor how changes in pension architecture affect occupational choices and coverage of self-employed in formal pension arrangements.

*Source: wpiea2019064 - 2020.*

### Appendix I. Data and Tables

### Appendix I. Data and Tables

### The Netherlands: Key Parameters of the Dutch Pension System, 2018
- Pillars and providers
  - 1st pillar: Public, Mandatory, Coverage: All residents (not means tested)
  - 2nd pillar: Public provider, Coverage: 90% active workers, Funding: DB/PAYG, Type: Hybrid DB (occupational, private)
  - Minimum pension: Public
- Pensionable age
  - Increasing to 67 by 2021, then linked to life expentancy
  - Pensionable age noted as 68 in 2018
- Beneficiaries and benefit formulas
  - Beneficiaries: Millions (2016)
  - Benefit formula: average of all salaries
  - Accrual rate, annual: 1.875
- Annual benefit per person, gross (2017)
  - Maximum (in eur, 2017): 103,317
  - Average (in eur, 2017): 14,737
- Expenditure (2016)
  - Billions eur: 37.5; 13.5; 41.1
  - Percent of GDP: 5.3; 1.9; 5.8
- Indexation post-retirement
  - Minimum wages; CPI
- Contributions (2016)
  - Contributors (millions)
  - Contribution rate (average): employers 17, workers 7
  - Contributions (gross, billions): 31.2
  - Percent of GDP: 4.4
- Other financial indicators
  - Interest rate on contributions (monthly, Dec 2017)
  - Size of fund (in 2017): Billions eur: 1620
  - Percent of GDP: 220
  - Non-indexed funding ratio (2017): 103/105 (regulatory min)
- Additional numeric items shown
  - 1st pillar: Mandatory; value shown as 7.0, 49.6, 8.89, 4.04 (context labels in source retained verbatim)
  - Reference: the AOW franchise

### Trust in Institutions, 2000–18 (Figure notes from source)
- Institutions reported in figure titles:
  - Political Parties (years shown: 2000, 2009, 2013, 2018)
  - Parliament (years shown: 2000, 2009, 2013, 2018)
  - Government (years shown: 2009, 2013, 2018)
  - Press (years shown: 2000, 2009, 2017)
- Response categories displayed in the figure legend:
  - Tend to trust
  - Tend not to trust
  - Don't know
- Source: Eurobarometer.

### Appendix II. The DNB Households Survey (DHS) — Variables Description

### Dependent variables and construction
- DC1: dummy = 1 if respondent indicated willingness to take a risk related to pension income in exchange for paying a lower premium (from dnb95).
- DC2: dummy = 1 if respondent expressed preference for managing pension savings individually (from dnb96).

### Demographic and socioeconomic variables
- age: constructed from birth less the year of the survey; used to construct 5 dummies for main age groups; individuals older than 67 are dropped from estimation.
- Educational dummies: grouped into “low” (primary education or below or special education), and other dummies for university, pre-university and vocational education at high and intermediate level.
- Female: gender dummy, 1 if female.
- Children: dummy = 1 if respondent reported having children.
- Married: dummy = 1 if in a registered partnership; 0 if divorced, in unregistered partnership, widowed or never married.
- Health: step dummy for self-reported health status: 1 = excellent, 2 = good, 3 = fair, 4 = not so good, 5 = poor.
- Informed: step dummy 1 to 6 indicating how informed respondent feels about future pension arrangements; lower value = better informed.

### Income and tax variables
- tax: implied overall tax burden = (gross - net) / net.
- income tax ib: alternative tax-burden measure calculated on taxable components of total gross income and includes social security premiums.
- Total gross and total net income: btot and ntot, calculated from many reported personal income sources (work, benefits, scholarships, tax credit, rental, etc.).

### Employment status dummies
- Employee: 1 if employed on a contractual basis or works in own business.
- Self-employed: 1 if self-employed, freelancer or in a free profession.
- Unemployed: 1 if looking for a job after losing one or seeking first job.
- Other work: 1 if performs household, voluntary, unpaid, or other work and is not a student, retiree, employee or self-employed.

### Psychological traits variables (question-scale based means)
- Respondents rate agreement on personality statements from 1 to 7 (extremely uncharacteristic to extremely characteristic); coverage and number of questions may vary across years.
  - Risk averse: mean of values (between 1 and 7) on 6 questions linked to risk aversion.
  - Patient: mean of values (between 1 and 7) on 12 questions linked to patience.
  - Controlling: mean of values (between 1 and 7) on 13 questions linked to locus of control.
  - Mindful: mean of values (between 1 and 5) on 18 questions linked to consciousness.
- Data adjustments: in some instances values were recoded and missing variables in certain years replaced with average responses from previous years.

### DHS Questions on Pensions (question codes and response options)

- (dnb94) Which of the below mentioned statements applies to you most?
  1. I do not worry about my pension arrangements, we’ll see by then.
  2. It is important to know that my pension is taken care of, without knowing the details.
  3. I keep well informed about any developments regarding my pension.
  4. I don’t know.

- (dnb95) Which of the below mentioned statements applies to you most?
  1. I‘d I rather pay more premium for a guaranteed pension (money for pension mainly invested in bonds).
  2. I’d rather pay less premium for a pension that on average is equally high or is expected to be equally high, but for which the final pension payment can be higher or lower due to the higher risk of the chosen investment form (money for pension mainly invested in stocks).
  3. I don’t know.

- (dnb96) Which of the below mentioned statements applies to you most?
  1. I’d rather determine myself what is done with the pension premiums I pay, so that the final pension payment depends on the decisions I made.
  2. I’d rather decide which pension fund manages my pension premiums for me.
  3. Building up my pension I gladly leave to the pension fund of my employer.
  4. Not applicable.
  5. I don’t know.

- (dnb207a) In 2012, it has been decided to increase the general old-age pension age. To make sure that the general old-age pension remains affordable, which of the following measures appeals to you most?
  1. A lower general old-age pension.
  2. An increase of the old-age pension premium for people working.
  3. Increase the age on which I will receive the general old-age pension.

- (dnb207b) Which of the two remaining measures appeals the most to you thereafter?
  1. A lower general old-age pension.
  2. An increase of the old-age pension premium for people working.
  3. Increase the age by two years on which I will receive the general old-age pension.

- (dnb116) Will you adjust your conduct if the pensions are cut down, for example through an adjustment on the indexation, postponement of the retirement age or a different pension system?
  1. Yes, I will put more money aside for my pension.
  2. No, I will see what I’ll do when it happens.
  3. No, I think I can make ends meet fairly easily with the pension I will have.
  4. Other.
  5. I don’t know.

- (dnb210) Suppose your pension fund makes a choice between increasing the pension premium or increase the risk of the investment, as a result of which the exact amount of your pension becomes less certain (there is a 2.5% chance that it will be 10% lower). Will you change your savings behavior if the fund chooses an investment mix with a higher risk but the premium remains the same?
  1. Yes, I will put more money aside towards my pension.
  2. No, I will see what I’ll do when it happens.
  3. No, I think I can make ends meet fairly easily with the pension I will have.
  4. Other.
  5. I don’t know.

*Source: Appendix I and Appendix II, wpiea2019064 - Appendix I. Data and Tables.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2019/wpiea2019064.pdf_