## 7. Country- and Industry-Specific Effects

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### Introduction and dataset
- Sample: some 5,000 publicly listed companies in 10 advanced economies (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the United States) for 2010–17; Worldscope sample after cleaning contains 2,800 firms with debt-related variables for 2010–17.
- Analysis covers indicators of debt leverage, debt maturity, debt service, composition by source of funds, bond financing characteristics, and use of funding.
- Data end point: 2017 (does not reflect developments during the coronavirus pandemic).

### Stylized facts: aggregate and firm-level patterns (2010–17)
- Cross-country aggregate movements:
  - Corporate debt increased in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United States.
  - Corporate debt remained broadly stable in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
  - Corporate debt declined in Italy and Spain.
  - Consolidated corporate debt (excluding intercompany loans) exceeds 100 percent of GDP in Belgium, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain; relatively low in Canada, Germany, and the United States.
- Main drivers:
  - Surge in corporate bond issuance after the crisis was the main driver of corporate debt increases.
  - Bank loans also played a large role in Canada and the Netherlands.
  - Intercompany loans were important in Belgium and France.
- Bond market developments:
  - Average yields-at-issuance declined from 5 percent before the crisis to 3 percent (developed countries).
  - Share of corporate bonds in total corporate debt rose in every country analyzed (range across countries: 3 percent in Spain to over 40 percent in Canada and the United States).
  - Average bond maturity increased in Canada, France, and the Netherlands.
  - Share of fixed rate bonds rose from 80 percent pre-crisis to over 90 percent.
  - One third of post-crisis bond issuance used to repay debt; about 10 percent used to finance acquisitions.
- Financial assets and uses of proceeds:
  - High correlation between incurrence of financial liabilities and purchase of financial assets in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United States.
  - Net consolidated debt (after subtracting cash holdings) is far less accentuated in Belgium and France; net consolidated debt remained almost constant in France and the United States between 2010 and 2017.
  - Purchase of financial assets declined from about 21 percent of GVA pre-GFC to 14 percent in 2010–17.
  - Country examples: Dutch firms acquire financial assets over 33 percent of GVA; firms in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK invest about 6 percent of GVA in financial assets.
- Firm-level representativeness:
  - Worldscope sample accounts on average for one third of total consolidated debt and of gross output; about 40 percent or more of consolidated debt in France, Germany, Japan, and the United States; over 45 percent of non-financial firms’ gross output in France and Germany.
- Summary descriptive statistics (sample averages):
  - Average debt-to-asset ratio: 22 percent.
  - Average debt-to-equity ratio: 58 percent.
  - Average long-term debt-to-asset ratio: 66 percent.
  - Average return on assets (ROA): 2 percent.
  - Average interest coverage ratio (ICR): 26 percent.
  - Average dividend payout ratio: 24 percent.
- Distributional heterogeneity (2010–17):
  - Firms in the top 95th percentile of change in leverage increased debt-to-asset ratio on average by 33 percentage points; firms in the 5th percentile decreased leverage on average by 27 percentage points.
  - Top-Δ-leverage firms have higher long-term debt-to-asset ratio (32 percent vs average 18 percent), lower profitability (average ROA −1.1 percent), and lower ICR (7 percent vs sample 27 percent).

### Sector concentration and sectoral indicators
- Debt concentration:
  - Debt of listed firms is highly concentrated among a few sectors; debt increases since 2010 driven by a small number of sectors in each country.
  - Examples: manufacturing accounts for over 60 percent of listed-firm debt stock in Belgium and Germany; network sectors (utilities, transportation, telecommunications) account for over 60 percent of the debt stock in Italy and Spain.
  - In the Netherlands, telecommunications alone accounts for over 35 percent of listed-firm debt.
- Leverage and debt-service risk by sector:
  - Network sectors are the most leveraged (debt-to-assets) and telecommunication sector saw the largest increases in leverage.
  - Oil and gas, telecom, and utilities have the highest debt-to-income ratios.
  - Debt-to-income ratios increased most in oil and gas between 2010 and 2017 due to low oil prices.

### Econometric analysis: determinants of leverage and debt maturity
- Specifications:
  - Panel specification (2010–17) includes lagged dependent variable, firm-level controls (lagged by one period), year fixed effects, sector fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Firm-level controls: ROA, total assets (relative to country average), fixed assets/total assets, sales/total assets, sales growth.
  - Macrofinancial specification drops time fixed effects to assess role of FCI (financial condition index) and real GDP growth (annual).
  - Cross-sectional specifications analyze changes between 2010 and 2017; quantile regressions for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th percentiles.
- Key panel results (Table 4):
  - Significant persistence in capital structure (lagged dependent variable coefficient statistically significant; e.g., dependent variable coefficient ≈ 0.909*** in column (1)).
  - Firm-level correlates of higher leverage: less profitable firms, larger size, higher fixed-assets share, lower turnover, higher growth opportunities.
  - Debt maturity correlates: more profitable firms have higher long-term debt share and lower short-term debt share.
  - Strong common time effects: debt-to-asset ratios and debt-to-equity ratios are on average 0.8 percentage points and 2.5 percentage points higher in 2017 relative to 2010, respectively (relative to average debt-to-asset 22 percent and debt-to-equity 58.5).
  - Time effects driven by long-term debt; short-term debt rose in 2011–13 then returned to levels not statistically different from 2010 on average.
- Macrofinancial effects (Table 5):
  - No robust, statistically significant impact of FCI and real GDP growth on overall debt-to-asset ratio.
  - Tighter financial conditions associated with:
    - Reduction in long-term debt financing (long-term debt / Assets; FCI coefficient −0.581**).
    - Increase in short-term debt financing (short-term debt / Assets; FCI coefficient 0.345*).
    - Reduction in debt maturity (long-term debt / Total debt; FCI coefficient −2.542***).
  - Interpretation: opposite effects on short- vs long-term debt can offset, producing no clear net effect on aggregate leverage while strongly affecting maturity composition.
- Cross-sectional changes (2010–17) and country effects (Table 6):
  - Mean reversion: firms with higher initial leverage experienced larger declines over 2010–17 (e.g., Dependent variable level 2010 coefficient −0.386*** for change in Total debt / Assets).
  - Larger firms and firms with more fixed assets experienced increases in leverage and debt maturity.
  - Country-specific changes after controlling for firm-level factors:
    - United States and Canada: firms increased leverage by about 5 percentage points more than French peers.
    - Japan: firms reduced leverage by about 5 percentage points.
    - Debt maturity increases by +5 to +10 percentage points above French peers for Canadian and U.S. firms; decreases by −5, −12, and −5 percentage points for Italy, Japan, and Spain, respectively.
- Quantile regression results (Table 7, Panel B):
  - Real GDP growth robustly positively associated with increases in leverage and debt maturity across quantiles.
  - FCI effects heterogeneous across distribution:
    - Among firms that deleverage significantly (10th percentile), tighter financial conditions associated with larger declines in long-term financing and maturity.
    - Among firms that leverage significantly (90th percentile), tighter financial conditions associated with increases in both short-term and long-term debt financing in some specifications.
  - Overall interpretation:
    - Cross-section of large increases in leverage more likely explained by differences in macroeconomic performance than by differences in financial conditions.
    - Looser financial conditions associated with improved debt maturity mainly by reducing declines in maturity (left tail).
    - No unambiguous evidence that loosening financial conditions uniformly extended maturity among firms with large increases; in some results the opposite holds.

### Corporate debt-at-risk: stress tests and scenarios
- Vulnerability definition: ICR below 2 for at least three consecutive years (using consolidated balance sheet data of listed firms from Worldscope; shock window 2014–2017 and vulnerability defined if ICR < 2 in all three years).
- Baseline cross-country pattern (2013–17):
  - Share of debt-at-risk increased between 2013 and 2017 in Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
  - Share declined in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain.
  - In Canada, France, and the Netherlands, the amount of debt owned by vulnerable firms surpasses 4 percent of GDP.
- Observations on leverage vs ICR:
  - High net debt-to-equity ratio can reflect financing choices; when combined with low ICR it signals vulnerability.
  - Example: Germany has high share of listed firms with net debt-to-equity ratio above 100 (69 percent), but only a small part of those firms has low ICR; by contrast, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United States have large shares of firms with net debt-to-equity > 100 combined with low ICR.
- Cash buffer dynamics:
  - Cash-to-debt ratios increased or remained constant in France, Italy, Japan, and Spain; decreased in other countries in sample.
  - Cash holdings may be unevenly distributed; vulnerable firms in Belgium and the United Kingdom saw increased cash-to-debt despite aggregate declines.
- Five stress-test scenarios (applied to 2017 balance sheets; shocks represent upper bounds because some debt is fixed-rate):
  - Scenario 1: A 200 bp increase in interest rate on total debt.
  - Scenario 2: A 200 bp increase in interest rate on total debt and a 100 bp increase in interest on liquid assets.
  - Scenario 3: A 200 bp increase in interest rate on total debt and on liquid assets.
  - Scenario 4: A 200 bp increase in interest rate on total debt and on liquid assets, combined with a 10 percent decline in profits (if these are positive).
  - Scenario 5: A 200 bp increase in interest rate on short-term debt only.
- Stress-test outcomes:
  - Scenario 1 (200 bp on total debt) increases debt-at-risk substantially: average debt-at-risk increases from 3 percent of GDP under the baseline to 6 percent of GDP in scenario 1.
  - Under scenario 1, Canada, France, and the Netherlands have debt-at-risk of over 10 percent of GDP.
  - Introducing liquid assets (scenarios 2 and 3) substantially reduces debt-at-risk in France, Italy, and the United States.
  - Adding a 10 percent decline in profits on top of scenario 3 (scenario 4) increases debt-at-risk mainly in Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
  - Shocking only short-term debt (scenario 5) on average more than halves debt-at-risk relative to scenario 1; exception: Netherlands shows no difference between scenarios 1 and 5.

### Policy-relevant insights and implications
- Main empirical conclusions:
  - Changes in leverage and debt maturity since 2010 can be explained by a combination of firm characteristics, industry effects, and country characteristics, with a notable role for corporate bond issuance.
  - Cross-country differences in macroeconomic performance more clearly related to extensions of debt maturity and leveraging than disparities in financial conditions.
  - Looser financial conditions affected debt maturity more than aggregate leverage, by inducing shifts from short-term to long-term financing in some contexts and reducing declines in maturity in others.
  - There is substantial heterogeneity in firm responses; quantile regressions reveal asymmetric effects across firms that deleverage versus leverage.
- Monitoring and policy notes:
  - A large adverse macrofinancial shock could generate significant corporate debt-at-risk given 2017 balance sheets, but cash and liquid assets can materially buffer shocks.
  - Given the results and the concentration of debt and vulnerabilities in certain countries and sectors, corporate debt should be monitored closely and, if financial conditions tighten or economic growth slows down, policy actions should be considered.
  - Macroprudential policies addressing nonbank and market corporate financing are not yet well established; example of policy response: in France, the large exposure limit of banks was tightened to contain banks’ exposure to large indebted corporates (Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (2018) cited).

*Source: IMF staff analysis from "7. Country- and Industry-Specific Effects" (wpiea2020120-print-pdf), using Worldscope, OECD, Dealogic, BIS, Bank of Canada data; analysis covers 2010–2017 and uses consolidated listed-firm balance sheets.*

### References .............................................................................................................

### wpiea2020120-print-pdf - References

### Tables
- 1. Description Statistics Panel Dataset, 2005–2017.................................................................27
- 2. Pairwise Correlations ...........................................................................................................27
- 3. Description Statistics Cross-Country Dataset ......................................................................27
- 4. Panel Regressions ................................................................................................................28
- 5. Panel Regressions: Impact of Macrofinancial Conditions ...................................................29
- 6. Cross-Sectional Regressions ................................................................................................30
- 7. Panel A. Cross-Sectional Regressions: Impact of Macrofinancial Conditions....................31

### Figures
- 1. Aggregate Debt ....................................................................................................................10
- 2. Bond Issuance ......................................................................................................................11
- 3. Firms’ Sources and Uses of Income ....................................................................................12
- 4. Sectoral Decomposition of Debt ..........................................................................................15
- 5. Debt Sustainability Indicators Among Listed Firms ...........................................................17
- 6. Country and Industry-Specific Effects.................................................................................21

*Source: wpiea2020120-print-pdf - References*

### 7. Country- and Industry-Specific Effects ..............................................................................

### 7. Country- and Industry-Specific Effects

### Introduction and dataset
- Sample: "some 5,000 publicly listed companies in 10 advanced economies" (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the United States) for 2010–17; Worldscope sample after cleaning contains "2,800 firms" with debt-related variables for 2010–17.
- Analysis covers indicators of debt leverage, debt maturity, debt service, composition by source of funds, bond financing characteristics, and use of funding.
- Data end point: 2017 (does not reflect developments during the coronavirus pandemic).

### Stylized facts: aggregate and firm-level patterns (2010–17)
- Cross-country aggregate movements:
  - Corporate debt increased in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United States.
  - Corporate debt remained broadly stable in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
  - Corporate debt declined in Italy and Spain.
  - Consolidated corporate debt (excluding intercompany loans) exceeds 100 percent of GDP in Belgium, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain; relatively low in Canada, Germany, and the United States.
- Main drivers:
  - Surge in corporate bond issuance after the crisis was the main driver of corporate debt increases.
  - Bank loans also played a large role in Canada and the Netherlands.
  - Intercompany loans were important in Belgium and France.
- Bond market developments:
  - Average yields-at-issuance declined from "5 percent" before the crisis to "3 percent" (developed countries).
  - Share of corporate bonds in total corporate debt rose in every country analyzed (range across countries: "3 percent" in Spain to "over 40 percent" in Canada and the United States).
  - Average bond maturity increased in Canada, France, and the Netherlands.
  - Share of fixed rate bonds rose from "80 percent" pre-crisis to "over 90 percent".
  - One third of post-crisis bond issuance used to repay debt; about "10 percent" used to finance acquisitions.
- Financial assets and uses of proceeds:
  - High correlation between incurrence of financial liabilities and purchase of financial assets in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United States.
  - Net consolidated debt (after subtracting cash holdings) is far less accentuated in Belgium and France; net consolidated debt remained almost constant in France and the United States between 2010 and 2017.
  - Purchase of financial assets declined from "about 21 percent of GVA" pre-GFC to "14 percent" in 2010–17.
  - Country examples: Dutch firms acquire financial assets over "33 percent" of GVA; firms in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK invest about "6 percent" of GVA in financial assets.
- Firm-level representativeness:
  - Worldscope sample accounts on average for "one third" of total consolidated debt and of gross output; about "40 percent or more" of consolidated debt in France, Germany, Japan, and the United States; over "45 percent" of non-financial firms’ gross output in France and Germany.
- Summary descriptive statistics (sample averages):
  - Average debt-to-asset ratio: "22 percent".
  - Average debt-to-equity ratio: "58 percent".
  - Average long-term debt-to-asset ratio: "66 percent".
  - Average return on assets (ROA): "2 percent".
  - Average interest coverage ratio (ICR): "26 percent".
  - Average dividend payout ratio: "24 percent".
- Distributional heterogeneity (2010–17):
  - Firms in the top 95th percentile of change in leverage increased debt-to-asset ratio on average by "33 percentage points"; firms in the 5th percentile decreased leverage on average by "27 percentage points".
  - Top-Δ-leverage firms have higher long-term debt-to-asset ratio ("32 percent" vs average "18 percent"), lower profitability (average ROA "-1.1 percent"), and lower ICR ("7 percent" vs sample "27 percent").

### Sector concentration and sectoral indicators
- Debt concentration:
  - Debt of listed firms is highly concentrated among a few sectors; debt increases since 2010 driven by a small number of sectors in each country.
  - Examples: manufacturing accounts for over "60 percent" of listed-firm debt stock in Belgium and Germany; network sectors (utilities, transportation, telecommunications) account for over "60 percent" of the debt stock in Italy and Spain.
  - In the Netherlands, telecommunications alone accounts for "over 35 percent" of listed-firm debt.
- Leverage and debt-service risk by sector:
  - Network sectors are the most leveraged (debt-to-assets) and telecommunication sector saw the largest increases in leverage.
  - Oil and gas, telecom, and utilities have the highest debt-to-income ratios;
  - Debt-to-income ratios increased most in oil and gas between 2010 and 2017 due to low oil prices.

### Econometric analysis: determinants of leverage and debt maturity
- Panel specification (2010–17) includes lagged dependent variable, firm-level controls (lagged by one period), year fixed effects, sector fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Firm-level controls: ROA, total assets (relative to country average), fixed assets/total assets, sales/total assets, sales growth.
- Macrofinancial specification drops time fixed effects to assess role of FCI (financial condition index) and real GDP growth (annual).
- Cross-sectional specifications analyze changes between 2010 and 2017; quantile regressions for 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th percentiles.
- Key panel results (Table 4):
  - Significant persistence in capital structure (lagged dependent variable coefficient statistically significant; e.g., dependent variable coefficient ≈ "0.909***" in column (1)).
  - Firm-level correlates of higher leverage: less profitable firms, larger size, higher fixed-assets share, lower turnover, higher growth opportunities.
  - Debt maturity correlates: more profitable firms have higher long-term debt share and lower short-term debt share.
  - Strong common time effects: debt-to-asset ratios and debt-to-equity ratios are on average "0.8 percentage points" and "2.5 percentage points" higher in 2017 relative to 2010, respectively (relative to average debt-to-asset "22 percent" and debt-to-equity "58.5").
  - Time effects driven by long-term debt; short-term debt rose in 2011–13 then returned to levels not statistically different from 2010 on average.
- Macrofinancial effects (Table 5):
  - No robust, statistically significant impact of FCI and real GDP growth on overall debt-to-asset ratio.
  - Tighter financial conditions associated with:
    - Reduction in long-term debt financing (long-term debt / Assets; FCI coefficient "−0.581**").
    - Increase in short-term debt financing (short-term debt / Assets; FCI coefficient "0.345*").
    - Reduction in debt maturity (long-term debt / Total debt; FCI coefficient "−2.542***").
  - Interpretation: opposite effects on short- vs long-term debt can offset, producing no clear net effect on aggregate leverage while strongly affecting maturity composition.
- Cross-sectional changes (2010–17) and country effects (Table 6):
  - Mean reversion: firms with higher initial leverage experienced larger declines over 2010–17 (e.g., Dependent variable level 2010 coefficient "−0.386***" for change in Total debt / Assets).
  - Larger firms and firms with more fixed assets experienced increases in leverage and debt maturity.
  - Country-specific changes after controlling for firm-level factors:
    - United States and Canada: firms increased leverage by about "5 percentage points" more than French peers.
    - Japan: firms reduced leverage by about "5 percentage points".
    - Debt maturity increases by "+5 to +10 percentage points" above French peers for Canadian and U.S. firms; decreases by "-5", "-12", and "-5 percentage points" for Italy, Japan, and Spain, respectively.
- Quantile regression results (Table 7, Panel B):
  - Real GDP growth robustly positively associated with increases in leverage and debt maturity across quantiles (e.g., Real GDP growth coefficients in many quantiles significant and positive).
  - FCI effects heterogeneous across distribution:
    - Among firms that deleverage significantly (10th percentile), tighter financial conditions associated with larger declines in long-term financing and maturity.
    - Among firms that leverage significantly (90th percentile), tighter financial conditions associated with increases in both short-term and long-term debt financing in some specifications.
  - Overall interpretation:
    - Cross-section of large increases in leverage more likely explained by differences in macroeconomic performance than by differences in financial conditions.
    - Looser financial conditions associated with improved debt maturity mainly by reducing declines in maturity (left tail).
    - No unambiguous evidence that loosening financial conditions uniformly extended maturity among firms with large increases; in some results the opposite holds.

### Corporate debt-at-risk: stress tests and scenarios
- Definition of vulnerable firm in stress tests: ICR below "2" for at least three consecutive years (using consolidated balance sheet data of listed firms from Worldscope; shock window 2014–2017 and vulnerability defined if ICR < 2 in all three years).
- Baseline cross-country pattern (2013–17):
  - Share of debt-at-risk increased between 2013 and 2017 in Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
  - Share declined in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain.
  - In Canada, France, and the Netherlands, the amount of debt owned by vulnerable firms surpasses "4 percent of GDP".
- Observations on leverage vs ICR:
  - High net debt-to-equity ratio can reflect financing choices; when combined with low ICR it signals vulnerability.
  - Example: Germany has high share of listed firms with net debt-to-equity ratio above "100" ("69 percent"), but only a small part of those firms has low ICR; by contrast, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United States have large shares of firms with net debt-to-equity > "100" combined with low ICR.
- Cash buffer dynamics:
  - Cash-to-debt ratios increased or remained constant in France, Italy, Japan, and Spain; decreased in other countries in sample.
  - Cash holdings may be unevenly distributed; vulnerable firms in Belgium and the United Kingdom saw increased cash-to-debt despite aggregate declines.
- Five stress-test scenarios (applied to 2017 balance sheets; shocks represent upper bounds because some debt is fixed-rate):
  - Scenario 1: A "200 bp" increase in interest rate on total debt.
  - Scenario 2: A "200 bp" increase in interest rate on total debt and a "100 bp" increase in interest on liquid assets.
  - Scenario 3: A "200 bp" increase in interest rate on total debt and on liquid assets.
  - Scenario 4: A "200 bp" increase in interest rate on total debt and on liquid assets, combined with a "10 percent" decline in profits (if these are positive).
  - Scenario 5: A "200 bp" increase in interest rate on short-term debt only.
- Stress-test outcomes:
  - Scenario 1 ("200 bp" on total debt) increases debt-at-risk substantially: average debt-at-risk increases from "3 percent" of GDP under the baseline to "6 percent" of GDP in scenario 1.
  - Under scenario 1, Canada, France, and the Netherlands have debt-at-risk of "over 10 percent of GDP".
  - Introducing liquid assets (scenarios 2 and 3) substantially reduces debt-at-risk in France, Italy, and the United States.
  - Adding a "10 percent" decline in profits on top of scenario 3 (scenario 4) increases debt-at-risk mainly in Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
  - Shocking only short-term debt (scenario 5) on average more than halves debt-at-risk relative to scenario 1; exception: Netherlands shows no difference between scenarios 1 and 5.

### Policy-relevant insights and implications
- Main empirical conclusions:
  - Changes in leverage and debt maturity since 2010 can be explained by a combination of firm characteristics, industry effects, and country characteristics, with a notable role for corporate bond issuance.
  - Cross-country differences in macroeconomic performance more clearly related to extensions of debt maturity and leveraging than disparities in financial conditions.
  - Looser financial conditions affected debt maturity more than aggregate leverage, by inducing shifts from short-term to long-term financing in some contexts and reducing declines in maturity in others.
  - There is substantial heterogeneity in firm responses; quantile regressions reveal asymmetric effects across firms that deleverage versus leverage.
- Monitoring and policy notes:
  - A large adverse macrofinancial shock could generate significant corporate debt-at-risk given 2017 balance sheets, but cash and liquid assets can materially buffer shocks.
  - Given the results and the concentration of debt and vulnerabilities in certain countries and sectors, "corporate debt should be monitored closely and, if financial conditions tighten or economic growth slows down, policy actions should be considered."
  - Macroprudential policies addressing nonbank and market corporate financing are "not yet well established"; example of policy response: in France, the large exposure limit of banks was tightened to contain banks’ exposure to large indebted corporates (Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (2018) cited).

*Source: IMF staff analysis from "7. Country- and Industry-Specific Effects" (wpiea2020120-print-pdf), using Worldscope, OECD, Dealogic, BIS, Bank of Canada data; analysis covers 2010–2017 and uses consolidated listed-firm balance sheets.*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Cited research topics and themes
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- Sovereign debt crises and sovereign–corporate risk spillovers: Acharya, V., T. Eisert, C. Eufinger, and C. Hirsch, 2018. “Real Effects of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe: Evidence from Syndicated Loans,” The Review of Financial Studies, 31(8), 2855-96; Augustin, P., H. Boustanifar, J. Breckenfelder, and J. Schnitzler, 2016. “Sovereign to corporate risk spillovers,” ECB Working Paper No. 1878.
- Corporate debt structure, substitutability, and leverage dynamics: Antoun de Almeida, L., and O. Masetti, 2016. “Corporate Debt Substitutability and the Macroeconomy: Firm-Level Evidence from the Euro Area,” mimeo; Bluеdorn, J., and C. Ebeke, 2016. “Investment, Firm Size, and the Corporate Debt Burden: A Firm-Level Analysis of the Euro Area,” IMF Country Report No. 16/220; DeAngelo, H., and R. Roll, 2015. “How Stable Are Corporate Capital Structures?” The Journal of Finance, Vol. LXX, No.1, February.
- Bank lending channel, bank-dependent borrowers, and credit supply cyclicality: Becker, B., and V. Ivashina, 2014. “Cyclicality of Credit Supply: Firm Level Evidence,” Journal of Monetary Economics 62, 76-93; Ivashina, V., and D.S. Scharfstein, 2010. “Bank Lending in the Financial Crisis of 2008,” Journal of Financial Economics, 97, 319-38; Buca, A., and P. Vermeulen, 2015. “Corporate investment and bank-dependent borrowers during the recent financial crisis,” ECB Working Paper No. 1859; Leary, M., 2009. “Bank Loan Supply, Lender Choice, and Corporate Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance, 64(3), 1143-85.
- Corporate vulnerabilities, stress testing, and firm-level assessments in emerging markets and specific countries: Chan-Lau, J.A., W. Miao, K. Miyajima, and J. Shin, 2017. “Assessing Corporate Vulnerabilities in Indonesia: A Bottom-Up Default Analysis,” IMF Working Paper WP/17/97; Chivakul, M., and W.R. Lam, 2016. “Assessing China’s Corporate Sector Vulnerabilities,” IMF Working Paper WP/15/72; Chow, J., 2015. “Stress Testing Corporate Balance Sheets in Emerging Economies,” IMF Working Paper 15/216; Jones, M.T., and M. Karasulu, 2006. “The Korean Crisis: What Did We Know and When Did We Know It? What Stress Tests of the Corporate Sector Reveal,” IMF Working Paper WP/06/114.
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- Debt maturity, short-term debt use, and international financial architecture: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2019b, “Debt Maturity and the Use of Short-Term Debt: Evidence from Sovereigns and Firms, IMF Departmental Paper No.19/03; Jeanne, O., 2009. “Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture,” American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-29.
- Effects of financial crises on firms’ capital structures, employment, investment, and default risk: Chodorow-Reich, G., 2014. “The employment effects of credit market disruptions: firm-level evidence from the 2008-9 financial crisis,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (1), 1-59; Chava, S., and A. Purnanandam, 2011. “The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers,” Journal of Financial Economics 99, 116-135; Demirguc-Kunt, A., M. Martinez-Peria, and T. Tressel, forthcoming in 2020. “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Firms’ Capital Structure,” Journal of Corporate Finance.
- Corporate credit provision, productivity, and credit risk transmission: Boyarchenko, N., and P. Mueller, 2019. “Corporate Credit Provision,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 895, August; Manaresi, F., and N. Pierri, 2019. “Credit Supply and Productivity Growth,” IMF Working Paper, WP/19/107; Moreno, R., and J.M. Serena-Garralda, 2018. “Firms’ Credit Risk and the Onshore Transmission of the Global Financial Cycle,” BIS Working Paper No.712.
- The rise of zombie firms and systemic risk implications: Banerjee, R., and B. Hofmann, 2018. “The Rise of Zombie Firms: Causes and Consequences,” BIS Quarterly Review, September; Bats, J.V., and A.C.F.J. Houben, 2020. “Bank-based versus market-based financing: Implications for systemic risk,” Journal of Banking and Finance 114, 105776.
- Theoretical and empirical foundations of capital structure, agency, and credit channels: Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976. “Theory of firm: Managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-60; Bernanke, B.S., and A.S. Blinder, 1988. “Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand,” American Economic Review, 78(2), 435-39; Bernanke, B.S., and M. Gertler, 1995. “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), 27-48; Diamond, D., 2004. “Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short-term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly,” Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1447-79.
- Empirical studies on credit risk cross-section, growth options, and macroeconomic conditions: Arnold, M., A. Wagner, and R. Westermann, 2013. “Growth options, macroeconomic conditions and the cross-section of credit risk,” Journal of Financial Economics 107 (2013) 350-85; Hackbarth, D., J. Miao, and E. Morellec, 2006. “Capital Structure, Credit Risk, and Macroeconomic Conditions,” Journal of Financial Economics, 82, 519-50.
- Institutional and regulatory references: Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière, 2018. Décision No. D-HCSF-2018-2 Relative aux Grands Risques des Institutions Systémiques, May 11; International Monetary Fund, 2019. “Institutional Investors: Falling Rates, Rising Risks,” Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 3, October 2019; International Monetary Fund, 2019, “Global Corporate Vulnerabilities: Riskier Business,” Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 2, October 2019.

### Key bibliographic identifiers and exact references (selected entries as provided)
- Adler, K., J. Ahn, and M. Dao, 2019. “Innovation and Corporate Cash Holdings in the Era of Globalization,” IMF Working Paper 19/17.
- Adrian, T., P. Colla, and H.S. Shin. 2013. “Which Financial Frictions? Parsing the Evidence from the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009," in NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2012, edited by D. Acemoglu, J. Parker, and M. Woodford, 159-214.
- Boyarchenko, N., and P. Mueller, 2019. “Corporate Credit Provision,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 895, August.
- Dao, M., and C. Maggi, 2018. “The Rise in Corporate Saving and Cash Holding in Advanced Economies: Aggregate and Firm-Level Trends,” IMF Working Paper WP/18/262.
- Manaresi, F., and N. Pierri, 2019. “Credit Supply and Productivity Growth,” IMF Working Paper, WP/19/107.
- Moreno, R., and J.M. Serena-Garralda, 2018. “Firms’ Credit Risk and the Onshore Transmission of the Global Financial Cycle,” BIS Working Paper No.712.

*Source: REFERENCES section of the content unit wpiea2020120-print-pdf*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020120-print-pdf.pdf_