## wpiea2020156-print-pdf

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [wpiea2020156-print-pdf](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020156-print-pdf.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020156-print-pdf.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020156-print-pdf.pdf.json)

---

### Preface and introduction — context and relevance
- Paper predates the current COVID-19 crisis and "does not reflect the Fund staff’s evolving analysis of potential financial stability implications and advice on financial regulation (IMF, 2020c)."
- Conceptual guidance on stress testing remains relevant to articulate capital impact of economic contraction on Islamic banks.
- Islamic banks likely to face rising capital and liquidity pressures due to:
  - "shrinking profits"
  - "deteriorating asset quality"
  - "adverse funding conditions"
- Additional business-model exposures due to:
  - "scarcity of short-term liquid assets and deep money markets"
  - "comprehensive collateralization of all borrowing and lending activities"
- Islamic finance characteristics emphasized:
  - "profit- and loss-sharing between lenders and borrowers"
  - focus on "investments that are socially responsible"
  - requirement of "linking finance with real economic activities"

### Size, concentration, and market dynamics
- Global industry size and shares:
  - Industry estimated to amount to $2.6 trillion (source text truncated but retained wording).
  - Penetration: "0.7 percent of total financial assets [Financial Stability Board {FSB}, 2019])."
  - Islamic banks account for "one percent (or $1.6 trillion) of global banking sector assets ($146.6 trillion)".
- Jurisdictional shares (mid-2017):
  - Iran: "34.4 percent"
  - Saudi Arabia: "20.6 percent"
  - UAE: "9.6 percent"
  - Malaysia: "9.1 percent"
  - Kuwait: "6.0 percent"
- Market structure notes:
  - In 14 countries Islamic banks represent "at least 15 percent of the total banking sector".
  - IFSB monitoring across "36 countries" found increases in domestic market share in 19 countries and constant share in seven (including Iran and Sudan with 100 percent market share by construction).
  - IFSB (2018) considers the sector systemically important in "12 countries" (list preserved in source).

### Balance sheets, funding structure, and contractual forms
- Stylized balance-sheet highlights (internal consistency preserved):
  - Total Assets: 1,000
  - Total Liabilities and Capital: 1,000
  - Cash and cash equivalents: 30
  - Interbank deposits (short-term murabaha): 20
  - Accounts receivable: 912
  - Financing and lending: 832
  - Investment and trading: 80
  - Fixed assets: 38
  - Demand deposits (qardh hasan): 250
  - Investment accounts (mudarabah/musharakah/wakala): 600
  - Restricted investment accounts (RIA): 200
  - Unrestricted investment accounts (UIA): 400
  - Reserves total: 52; Profit equalization reserves (PER): 22; Investment risk reserve (IRR): 30
  - Capital (equity): long-term syndicated musharaka/mudarabah: 48
- Funding and contractual features:
  - Four types of Islamic deposits: RIAs, UIAs, exchange-based contracts using reverse sales, current accounts.
  - UIAs often commingled with bank funds; RIAs are separately managed and "fully borne by account holders (that is, loss-absorbing from a capital perspective)."
  - Common uses of funds: murabahah (cost-plus sale), ijara (leasing), salam/istisna’a (special sales), musharakah/mudarabah (profit-and-loss sharing).
- Balance-sheet risk metrics (selected):
  - Total RWAs: 481
  - RWAs funded by investment accounts: 304
  - RWAs funded by UIA: 203
  - Share of RIA (percent of total liabilities): 22.2
  - Share of UIA (percent of total liabilities): 44.4
  - Supervisory discretion of DCR (a-parameter): 0.3
  - Assumed minimum CAR in example: 8% of RWAs

### Key risk categories and manifestations
- Generic risks: credit risk, market risk, operational risk.
- Islamic-specific or salient risks:
  - Displaced commercial risk (DCR): shareholders forgo profits to smooth returns to UIAs or compensate for losses.
  - Project and counterparty risks from musharakah/mudarabah.
  - Rate-of-return risk (indirect interest rate risk) in mixed systems due to benchmarking to conventional rates.
  - Operational/legal risk from shari’ah non-compliance.
  - Commodity/inventory risk from large inventories and asset-backed contracts.
  - Equity position risk for held-to-maturity equity-based instruments.
- Interactions and vulnerabilities:
  - Limited access to shari’ah-compliant short-term funding and underdeveloped shari’ah interbank markets create exposure to funding shocks and long-short mismatches.
  - Empirical/BCBS evidence: ignoring solvency-liquidity interaction can underestimate stress impacts "between 30 and 50 percent" under standard adverse scenarios.

### Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR), reserves, and smoothing mechanisms
- Mechanism:
  - DCR arises when banks smooth IA returns (usually UIAs) by transferring shareholder value via forgoing mudarib profits or using reserves.
  - RIAs are "considered fully loss-absorbing" and generally excluded from DCR.
- Reserves and functions:
  - Profit Equalization Reserve (PER): typically funded from net income of mudarabah IAs; used to smooth investor income; may be shared between IA holders and shareholders depending on structure.
  - Investment Risk Reserve (IRR): attributable to IA holders and used to cover investment losses; funded after deduction of bank’s share and PER contribution.
  - Existing IA holders hold no legal claim on PER or IRR; orphaned reserves may be donated to charity (corporate governance implications).
- Supervisory parameter:
  - 훼 ∈ [0,1] signifies estimated degree of DCR; IFSB Guidance Note used "30 percent" as an example; Central Bank of Bahrain chose "30 percent".
  - Alpha choices materially affect capital adequacy calculations (CAR_SDF adjustments).

### Stress testing Islamic banks — methodological considerations
- Applicability:
  - Top-down balance sheet-based stress testing remains applicable but must capture Islamic-specific features and risk drivers.
- Key adjustments to standard stress tests:
  - Explicitly capture DCR and the role of PER/IRR in loss absorption.
  - Incorporate asset-backed and commodity inventory price risks for exchange-based contracts.
  - Model project/counterparty profiles and non-recourse characteristics of equity-based contracts.
  - Account for rate-of-return risk and indirect interest rate exposures in mixed systems.
  - Integrate solvency-liquidity interaction modules given structural funding vulnerabilities.
- Scenario types and stress elements:
  - Credit shocks: broad-based deterioration, sector-specific shocks, NPA reclassification (notch deterioration).
  - Market shocks: price changes of inventories and investment/trading portfolios; FX treatment where gold and silver treated as foreign currency under sarf rules.
  - Operational shocks: shari’ah non-compliance leading to de-recognition of income or required compensation.
- Aggregation and multiperiod dynamics:
  - Aggregate CAR under combined shocks sums impacts from investment shortfall, interest rate gap, credit losses, special-sales credit loss, market losses, operational losses (see aggregation structure in source).
  - Multi-year scenarios capture feedbacks: higher cost of capital, erosion of DCR capacity, deleveraging, and liquidity pressures.
- Practical implementation notes:
  - Where IA attribution is unavailable, conservative approach treats credit risk losses without IA absorption (potential overstating of capital impact).
  - Stress-testing outputs should consider whether UIAs are commingled or ring-fenced (RIA) and the size/treatment of PER/IRR.

### Quantification of DCR — Box 1 (mechanics, VaR, CTE, and EVT extension)
- Income-flow cascade (preserved notation and relations from source):
  - Available return for disbursement and profit-sharing: (1−p)(1−l) r̃_UIA.
  - IRR retained by bank before attributing income to UIAs: i (1−e) (1−p) (1−l) r̃_UIA (UIA/A).
  - UIA profit share represented by (UIA/A); e is bank’s commission as mudarib; i is proportion appropriated to IRR.
- Capital requirement to absorb DCR:
  - r̃_UIA_loss = (1−i)(1−e) (UIA/A) (1−p)(1−l) r̃_UIA < 0
  - When r̃_UIA_loss A > PER + IRR, unexpected losses fall to shareholders.
  - Worst negative returns estimated from historical cumulative distribution of r̃_UIA_loss at confidence level a ∈ (0,1) over horizon t.
  - Multiplying estimated CTE_a,t by total assets A yields unexpected losses absorbed by shareholders absent risk-sharing (perfect DCR corresponds to α = 1); DCR declines by unexpected losses absorbed by UIA holders (α < 1).
- VaR and CTE under normality assumption:
  - Stochastic process: ℱ(x) = μ_tilde_UIA + z_t σ_tilde_UIA,     z_t ~ iid(0,1)      (B1.1)
  - VaR point estimate: VaR_{a,t} = μ_tilde_UIA + N(1−a) σ_tilde_UIA     (B1.2)
  - CTE: CTE_{a,t} = E[ x_t | x_t ≥ ℱ_t^{-1}(a) = VaR_{a,t} ]     (B1.3)
  - VaR adjusted for reserves: VaR_{a,t} = − sup{ x_t | ℱ_t^{-1}(a) | Pr[ (r̃_UIA_loss − (PER+IRR)/A ) > 0 ] ≥ a } = μ_tilde_UIA + N(1−a) σ_tilde_UIA + ...     (B1.4)
- EVT extension:
  - Normality may be inadequate; Appendix II shows EVT approaches (GEV and POT/GPD) to estimate CTE_{a,t} for heavy tails and extreme losses.
  - Example tail-confidence references preserved: "99.9 percent" used in tail-risk example and "99.7 percent" noted in context where source is truncated.

### Advanced quantification — Appendix II (EVT) and Appendix III (Contingent Claims Analysis)
- EVT methods (Appendix II):
  - Two approaches: empirical calibration of generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution; Peaks Over Threshold (POT) with generalized Pareto distribution (GPD).
  - GEV covers extremal types: EV0 (Gumbel), EV1 (Fréchet), EV2 (Weibull); shape parameter ξ interprets tail behavior.
  - POT uses exceedances over threshold u; CTE closed-form expressions via mean excess function and GPD quantile functions are provided.
  - Practical caveats: stationarity assumption and time-dependence of parameters.
- Contingent Claims Analysis (Appendix III):
  - DCR raises the default threshold in a Black-Scholes-Merton style firm-value model; reserves convert equity-like IA claims into quasi-secured claims raising default risk.
  - Market-implied valuation: reserve requirement and implicit shareholder transfers can be priced as option values (European put-like expressions preserved in source).
  - Market-implied marginal impact of DCR: ∆풫ா = 풫ாವ಴ೃ(...) − 풫ா(...) with expressions tying DCR to changes in default threshold and option-derived expected losses.
  - Analytical implication: CCA produces market-based, risk-adjusted valuation linking DCR to observable equity/option market signals and implied asset volatility.

### Stress-testing implementation guidance and numerical references
- Parameter and numeric references preserved from source:
  - Tail-risk example: "99.9 percent".
  - BIA operational risk percentage: "15 percent".
  - 훼 parameter domain: 훼 ∈ [0,1].
  - IFSB example 훼 parameter value: "30 percent".
  - Country alpha-values (from Table 2 as listed): Saudi-Arabia 1.00; UAE 1/0.35; Malaysia 0.00; Kuwait 0.50; Qatar 0.35; Turkey 0.70; Indonesia 0.00; Bahrain 0.30; Sudan 0.50; Kazakhstan 0.35; IFSB Example 0.30.
  - Stylized illustrative CAR benchmark: "CAR = 9.5%" (used in comparisons).
  - Example: for DCR = 30 percent, "CAR_SDF = CAR + 6.8%" (illustration).
  - MSCI World Islamic Equity Index proxy (t = 10 years until end-2018): μ̃ = 4.57% and σ̃ = 3.34%.
  - Example outcome: "α = 0.3 insufficient because CTE_a,t > α RWA_UIA = 0.15 if historical volatility doubles near 99.9 percent confidence."
- Stress-test loss components and formulations preserved:
  - Credit risk loss structure: credit risk loss = ∆NPA − specific provisions + foregone returns (see source equations).
  - Market risk loss examples for inventory and parallel salam preserved in formulaic description.
  - Indirect interest rate risk gap: interest rate gap = (exp. return_t − η × market interest rate) × total accounts_t (see source format) with deposit elasticity φ adjustments.

### Policy recommendations and supervisory implications
- Supervisory priorities:
  - Ensure stress tests explicitly capture DCR, PER/IRR buffers, and asset-backed nature of many contracts.
  - Integrate solvency-liquidity interaction modules given structural funding vulnerabilities and limited shari’ah-compliant liquidity backstops.
  - Strengthen disclosure, governance, and depositor/investor protection arrangements for IAs to reduce informational asymmetries and protect consumers.
  - Continue international coordination to harmonize prudential standards (IFSB-Basel-IFRS alignment) and improve cross-jurisdictional supervisory consistency.
  - Develop shari’ah-compliant market infrastructures (interbank money markets, short-term liquidity facilities) to alleviate long-short mismatches.
- Supervisory calibration notes:
  - Careful supervisory calibration of 훼 is critical given heterogeneity in reserve coverage and market volatility.
  - Interpret stress-testing outputs with attention to whether UIAs are commingled or ring-fenced and whether PER/IRR buffers are sizeable and treated appropriately in capital assessments.
  - For mixed banking systems, calibrate indirect interest-rate exposures and possible pass-through effects on IA profit rates.

*Source — content excerpt from wpiea2020156-print-pdf (IMF).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### wpiea2020156-print-pdf - References

### Appendices and Supporting Materials
- References listing ends on page "50".
- Appendices:
  - I. Additional Tables .................................................................................................................60
  - II. Modeling Unexpected Losses Using the Extreme Value Theory .......................................65
  - III. Modeling Displaced Commercial Risk via Contingent Claims Analysis ..........................70
  - IV. The Process-Driven Perspective of Profits in Islamic Finance .........................................72
  - V. Comprehensive Representation of Credit and Market Risks in Stress Testing ..................74
  - VI. The Evolving Nature of Stress Testing ..............................................................................77
- Box:
  - 1. The Quantification of Displaced Commercial Risk .............................................................22

### Tables and Figures Inventory (as listed)
- Tables:
  - 1. Stylized Balance Sheet of an Islamic Bank .........................................................................15
  - 2. Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR)―Current Regulatory Implementation .......................29
- Figures:
  - 1. Credit and Market Risks in Murabahah (Cost-Plus Sale) Contracts....................................16
  - 2. Credit and Market Risks in Ijara (Leasing) Contracts .........................................................17
  - 3. Credit and Market Risks in Salam (Forward) Contracts ......................................................17
  - 4. Generic and Unique Risks in Islamic Banking ....................................................................20
  - 5. Profit Equalization Reserve (PER) and Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) ............................21
  - 6. Loss Absorption of Unexpected Losses by Unrestricted Investment Accounts ..................30
  - 7. Comparison of Conventional and Islamic Banking Capital Adequacy Formulae with Same Input Parameters ......................................................................................................................31
  - 8. Comparison of Conventional CAR and CAR_SDF .................................................................33

### Preface — Key Points
- The paper predates the current COVID-19 crisis and "does not reflect the Fund staff’s evolving analysis of potential financial stability implications and advice on financial regulation (IMF, 2020c)."
- General guidance on conceptual foundations of stress testing remains relevant to articulate capital impact of economic contraction on Islamic banks.
- Islamic banks likely to face rising capital and liquidity pressures due to:
  - "shrinking profits"
  - "deteriorating asset quality"
  - "adverse funding conditions"
- Stress testing roles:
  - Traditionally prospective—assess capital adequacy and liquidity risk under severe but plausible scenarios.
  - When shocks have already occurred (e.g., COVID-19), stress tests help inform timely policy decisions via scenario analyses and selective data updates.
- Islamic banks have additional exposures due to business-model specific features (Chattha, 2020), including sensitivity to liquidity and commodity price shocks because of:
  - "scarcity of short-term liquid assets and deep money markets"
  - "comprehensive collateralization of all borrowing and lending activities" often via "precious metals or certain agricultural goods"
- Most Islamic banks operate in EMDEs, where shocks can trigger complex macro-financial challenges, notably:
  - "sharp reversal of capital inflows"
  - pressure on exchange rates and credit spreads increasing likelihood of credit defaults and financial distress
- Example impact: "the recent fall in oil prices is bound to result in a tightening of domestic liquidity conditions in oil-exporting countries and a rise in banks’ nonperforming exposures due to the deterioration of the balance sheets of the government, household, and nonfinancial corporate sectors (IMF, 2020b)."

### Introduction — Key Points on Islamic Finance Expansion and Characteristics
- Islamic finance has undergone rapid expansion in many EMDEs over the past two decades.
- Key characteristics of Islamic finance:
  - "profit- and loss-sharing between lenders and borrowers"
  - focus on "investments that are socially responsible"
  - requirement of "linking finance with real economic activities"
- Islamic finance defines an "asset-oriented system of ethical financial intermediation and investment built on the principles of risk-sharing in lawful activities (halal or لَّاَح) rather than rent-seeking gains."
- Use in infrastructure: Islamic finance principles have been used for infrastructure projects and have stimulated Islamic banking growth.
- Industry size statement: "The Islamic financial services industry is estimated to amount to $2.6 trillion (or about"

*Source: wpiea2020156-print-pdf - References (IMF).*

### 0.7 percent of total financial assets [Financial Stability Board {FSB}, 2019]). The potential

### wpiea2020156-print-pdf - 0.7 percent of total financial assets [Financial Stability Board {FSB}, 2019]). The potential

### Size, concentration, and recent market dynamics
- Islamic finance penetration remains small in global terms: "0.7 percent of total financial assets [Financial Stability Board {FSB}, 2019])."
- Penetration still below "20 percent" in some large and populous economies (example countries cited include Indonesia and Turkey).
- Most Islamic finance assets are concentrated in the banking sector.
- Islamic banks account for "one percent (or $1.6 trillion) of global banking sector assets ($146.6 trillion)".
- In 14 countries, Islamic banks represent "at least 15 percent of the total banking sector"; Iran and Sudan are the only jurisdictions where "the entire financial system operates in compliance with Islamic law (shari’ah or ةَعيِرَش)."
- IFSB monitoring over an expanded list of "36 countries" found Islamic banks have "increased their domestic market share in 19 countries while remaining constant in seven others (including Iran and Sudan, where they have a 100 percent market share by construction)."
- Jurisdictional shares of the global Islamic banking industry at mid-2017:
  - Iran: "34.4 percent"
  - Saudi Arabia: "20.6 percent"
  - UAE: "9.6 percent"
  - Malaysia: "9.1 percent"
  - Kuwait: "6.0 percent"
- The other large jurisdictions include Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Qatar, and Turkey.
- IFSB (2018) considers the Islamic financial sector systemically important in "12 countries (Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Djibouti, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and UAE)." Yemen also qualifies by size but was not included due to data constraints.
- UIF/market growth trends: Islamic banking market share has continued to increase in many of the above markets over recent years.

### Fundamentals and contractual principles of Islamic finance
- Islamic finance transactions are subject to prohibitory and permissible norms defined by shari’ah principles, anchored in the qu’ran (نآْرُق) and the sunnah (سنة).
- Key contractual/behavioral constraints distilled from shari’ah principles:
  - Price certainty without manipulation of risk; prohibitions on contracts that generate returns divorced from asset performance (maisir or ميسر).
  - Identifiable characteristics and certainty about delivery results to avoid gharar (غرر) and jahl (جهل).
  - Asset ownership and implicit avoidance of leverage: reference assets must be in ownership/possession of creditor at inception to ensure asset-backing.
- Profit generation is process-driven and state- or time-contingent: investors receive payoffs from direct participation in asset performance rather than guaranteed returns based on the time value of money.
- Riba (ِراَب) is prohibited and understood broadly (usury, interest, guaranteed rates of return, and related practices).

### Islamic banks’ balance sheets and funding structure
- Stylized balance sheet resembles conventional banks but with notable distinctions:
  - Greater sensitivity to monetary dynamics and typically a larger (positive) duration gap than conventional banks.
  - Cost of funding is largely "variable," making Islamic banks more vulnerable to higher nominal cost of capital under monetary tightening.
- Stronger linkage between sources and uses of funds through pervasive risk-sharing arrangements.
- Four types of Islamic deposits:
  - Restricted investment accounts (RIAs)
  - Unrestricted investment accounts (UIAs)
  - Exchange-based contracts using reverse sales
  - Current accounts
- UIAs often commingled with the bank’s own funds and current accounts; in some countries reverse commodity murabahah has become main source of deposit funding (example: Malaysia).
- UIAs do not constrain banks from using funds (as long as investments are shari’ah compliant); RIAs are separately managed funds often reported off-balance sheet and whose market and credit losses are "fully borne by account holders (that is, loss-absorbing from a capital perspective)."
- Under IAS 32, UIAs are typically viewed as puttable instruments (investors have right of withdrawal) while RIAs do not guarantee repayment of principal or return.
- In Malaysia UIAs account for "less than five percent of total funding of Islamic banks."
- Three basic forms of shari’ah-compliant uses of funds:
  - Lending: cost-plus sale-repurchase agreements (murabahah / reverse murabahah/tawarruq), including delayed payment/delivery contracts (salam/istisna’a).
  - Leasing: ijara (operating lease) and ijara muntahia bittamleek (financing lease).
  - Profit-and-loss sharing (equity-based): musharakah / mudarabah.

### Key risk categories and unique risk drivers
- Generic solvency-relevant risks (as in conventional banks): credit risk, market risk, operational risk.
- Risks specific or particularly salient for Islamic banks:
  - Displaced commercial risk (DCR): shareholders forgo profits to smooth returns to unsecured depositors (UIAs) or compensate for losses.
  - Project and counterparty risks from partnership-like financing (musharakah, mudarabah).
  - Rate-of-return risk (indirect interest rate risk) from pricing frictions when Islamic banks adjust profit rates of investment accounts to compete with conventional banks responding to monetary policy changes.
  - Operational risk from failure to comply with Islamic finance principles or non-recognition under conventional jurisprudence.
  - Commodity/inventory risk from banks holding inventories of commodities and physical assets (commodity price deviations can produce market losses).
  - Equity position risk for equity-based instruments held until maturity.
- Specific manifestations:
  - Exchange-based instruments (murabahah, ijara) generate credit risk from counterparty nonperformance and market risk from asset price deviations.
  - Equity-based instruments (musharakah, mudarabah) expose banks to investment risk; full loss-sharing under musharakah, lender-borne losses under mudarabah.
- Interaction of solvency and liquidity:
  - Limited access to high-quality shari’ah-compliant short-term funding and underdeveloped shari’ah interbank money markets create structural vulnerability to funding shocks and long-short mismatches.
  - Empirical and Basel Committee evidence indicate that ignoring solvency-liquidity interaction can underestimate stress impacts substantially (BCBS Research Task Force findings cited: disregarding interaction can cause impact to be underestimated by "between 30 and 50 percent" under standard adverse scenarios).

### Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR), reserves, and smoothing mechanisms
- DCR arises when banks smooth returns to IA holders (usually UIAs) by transferring shareholder value (forgoing mudarib profits) to maintain funding stability or compensate for liquidity runs.
- DCR typically applies to UIAs; RIAs are "considered fully loss-absorbing" and generally excluded from DCR.
- Two reserves used to smooth returns and absorb losses (operational impact on DCR quantification):
  - Profit Equalization Reserve (PER)
    - Typically funded from net income of mudarabah IAs.
    - Bank (mudarib) is entitled to a pre-agreed fraction of profits; both IA holders and shareholders benefit from PER.
    - Used to smooth investor income over time.
  - Investment Risk Reserve (IRR)
    - Solely attributable to IA holders and funded after deduction of the bank’s share and PER contribution.
    - Used to cover losses from investments financed with IAs.
- Existing IA holders hold no legal claim on PER or IRR; orphaned reserves on account closure may be donated to charity—this practice requires high standards of corporate governance.

### Stress testing Islamic banks: implications and methodological notes
- Stress testing is fundamental for analyzing financial stability implications where Islamic finance is significant.
- Top-down balance sheet-based stress testing approaches remain applicable but must acknowledge distinct shari’ah-compliant features and risk drivers.
- Important stress-testing considerations for Islamic banks:
  - Adjust scenario definitions and loss calculations to capture:
    - DCR (potential transfers from shareholders to IA holders).
    - Asset-backed and commodity inventory price risks associated with exchange-based contracts.
    - Project/counterparty risk profiles of equity-based contracts and their non-recourse characteristics.
    - Rate-of-return risk and indirect interest rate exposure in mixed banking systems.
  - Incorporate solvency-liquidity interactions since limited shari’ah-compliant short-term funding can amplify capital impacts via higher funding costs and deleveraging needs.
  - Complementary sensitivity analyses are useful because the capital impact of a given macro-financial scenario "is likely to differ between conventional and Islamic banking activities under stress."
- Scope exclusions noted in the conceptual work:
  - The paper does not address process-oriented and technical implementation details such as treatment of capital resources, stress-scenario design, accounting-consistent loss calculations, definition of output measures, validation of results, and handling of stress-test outcomes.
- Alignment with existing guidance:
  - The approach complements IFSB supervisory guidance on microprudential stress testing (IFSB Technical Note on Stress Testing, 2016, and User Guide, 2017) and is consistent with IFSB high-level principles (2012a) and Basel Committee guidance (BCBS, 2018).
  - IFSB introduced capital adequacy and risk management standards (IFSB, 2005a; 2005b; 2013) relevant to capital assessment of Islamic banks under stress; the capital standard is being revised to align elements with Basel III and IFRS.

### Practical implications for supervisors and policymakers
- Supervisory and regulatory frameworks need refinement and greater harmonization to address unique Islamic finance risks; some IFSB standards are not applied consistently across jurisdictions.
- Key policy priorities emerging from the analysis:
  - Ensure stress tests for Islamic banks explicitly capture DCR, investment-account buffers (PER/IRR), and the asset-backed nature of many contracts.
  - Integrate solvency-liquidity interaction modules into stress-testing frameworks given structural funding vulnerabilities and limited shari’ah-compliant liquidity backstops.
  - Strengthen disclosure, governance, and depositor/investor protection arrangements for investment accounts (IAs) to reduce informational asymmetries and address consumer protection concerns.
  - Continue international coordination to harmonize prudential standards (IFSB-Basel-IFRS alignment) and improve cross-jurisdictional supervisory consistency.
  - Develop shari’ah-compliant market infrastructures (interbank money markets, short-term liquidity facilities) to alleviate long-short mismatches and reduce reliance on expensive short-term funding.
- Institutional application notes:
  - Stress-testing outputs should be interpreted with consideration of whether UIAs are commingled or ring-fenced (RIAs) and whether PER/IRR buffers are sizeable and appropriately treated in capital assessments.
  - For mixed banking systems, calibrate indirect interest-rate exposures and the possible pass-through effects on profit rates for IAs.

*Italic: Source — content excerpt from wpiea2020156-print-pdf (IMF).*

### Box 1. The Quantification of Displaced Commercial Risk

### Box 1. The Quantification of Displaced Commercial Risk

### Mechanism and income-flow representation
- The cascading mechanism creating prudential reserves is expressed in terms of income flows and balance sheet identities of an Islamic bank whose liabilities consist only of equity, E, and unrestricted IA accounts, UIA.
- General loan loss provisions and PER are retained from estimated annual net income, r̃_UIA (expressed as return from jointly funded total assets, A), as shares l and p, respectively, so that the available return for disbursement and profit-sharing is (1−p)(1−l) r̃_UIA.
- The available return is allocated between shareholders (through PER) and investors/UIA holders, with the structure shown in the source equation that allocates (1−p)(1−l) r̃_UIA across capital share (E/A), UIA share (UIA/A), the bank’s commission as mudarib for UIAs (e), the proportion appropriated to IRR (i), and the IRR retained by the bank:
  - IRR retained by the Islamic bank before attributing income to UIAs: i (1−e) (1−p) (1−l) r̃_UIA (UIA/A)
- UIA profit share is represented by (UIA/A); e is the bank’s commission as mudarib for UIAs; i is the proportion of returns appropriated to IRR.

### Capital requirement and displaced commercial risk (DCR)
- Capital is required to absorb displaced commercial risk (DCR) from unexpected losses after accounting for reserves when UIAs’ returns are negative:
  - r̃_UIA_loss = (1−i)(1−e) (UIA/A) (1−p)(1−l) r̃_UIA < 0
  - and when these losses exhaust available (accumulated) reserves so that r̃_UIA_loss A > PER + IRR.
- The amount of capital required to cover unexpected losses is determined by estimating worst negative returns from the historical cumulative distribution function of UIAs’ returns, r̃_UIA_loss, at a given level of statistical confidence a ∈ (0,1) over time horizon t (consistent with the bank’s prevailing solvency standards).
- Multiplying the estimated value of CTE_a,t with total assets, A, yields the unexpected losses absorbed by shareholders in the absence of any risk-sharing between the Islamic bank and UIA holders (perfect DCR corresponds to α = 1).
- DCR declines by any amount of unexpected losses absorbed by UIA holders (net of provisions), so that α < 1.

### Quantification: stochastic process, VaR and CTE
- Let r̃_UIA_loss be a sample drawn from i.i.d. random variables {X_t; t = 1,2,...,n} following the stochastic process:
  - ℱ(x) = μ_tilde_UIA + z_t σ_tilde_UIA,     z_t ~ iid(0,1)      (B1.1)
  - with conditional mean μ_tilde_UIA = E(r̃_UIA_loss) and standard deviation σ_tilde_UIA, where σ_tilde_UIA^2 = E(z_t^2 | Ω_{t−1}), and z has conditional c.d.f. G(z) = Pr(z_t < z | Ω_{t−1}) based on available information Ω_{t−1} at time t−1.
- Value-at-Risk point estimate at confidence level a:
  - VaR_{a,t} ≡ inf( x_t | ℱ(x ≥ a) ) = μ_tilde_UIA + N(1−a) σ_tilde_UIA     (B1.2)
  - VaR_{a,t} represents the (1−a)-quantile of ℱ(x) with Pr(x_t > VaR_{a,t}) = 1−a, under ℱ(x) ∼ N(μ_tilde_UIA, σ_tilde_UIA^2).
- Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE), a coherent risk measure of unexpected negative returns, is defined as:
  - CTE_{a,t} = E[ x_t | x_t ≥ ℱ_t^{-1}(a) = VaR_{a,t} ]     (B1.3)
- After accounting for available (accumulated) reserves, VaR can be expressed as:
  - VaR_{a,t} = − sup{ x_t | ℱ_t^{-1}(a) | Pr[ (r̃_UIA_loss − (PER+IRR)/A ) > 0 ] ≥ a } = μ_tilde_UIA + N(1−a) σ_tilde_UIA + ...     (B1.4)
  - (Equation (B1.4) includes the adjustment for reserves and the supremum condition as in the source.)
- The CTE can be approximated from VaR using equivalencies between z-scores: the z-scores φ(Φ^{-1}(1−a)) (for CTE) and Φ^{-1}(a) (for VaR), where φ(.) and Φ^{-1}(.) are the standard normal density and quantile functions respectively.

### Modeling assumptions and extensions
- The normality assumption (ℱ(x) ∼ N(μ_tilde_UIA, σ_tilde_UIA^2)) simplifies point estimation of CTE_{a,t}, but empirical return diffusion might not converge to normality.
- Appendix II shows how to determine CTE_{a,t} when the normality assumption is relaxed and asymptotic tail properties are modeled using extreme value theory (EVT).
- Note: the treatment ignores cases where returns are smoothed by PER or absorbed by IRR if they fall below a benchmark return rate but are still positive. See Toumi and others (2011) for detailed analytical treatment of these cases.
- For instance, CTE at statistical confidence level a = 99.7 percent can be approximated via VaR at a = (statement in source truncated).

*Source: Box 1. The Quantification of Displaced Commercial Risk (from the supplied IMF content unit).*

### 99.9 percent.

### wpiea2020156-print-pdf - 99.9 percent

### Credit risk
- Islamic banks face credit risk from counterparties failing to meet obligations in investment or lending contracts (IFSB, 2005b).
- Both ordinary sales/leases (murabahah and ijara) and special sales (salam, istisna’a and bay bithaman ajil) imply credit risk.
  - Ordinary sales/leases and special sales with deferred payment (bay bithaman ajil): credit risk from uncertainty about timely and full repayment, amplified by lack of collateral due to delayed settlement.
  - Special sales with deferred delivery (salam and istisna’a): credit risk from (i) failure to deliver specified commodities; (ii) late delivery; (iii) defective delivery.
- Collateralization mitigates credit risk after accounting for market liquidity risk (risk that asset cannot be sold quickly without materially affecting its price).
- Equity-based contracts (mudarabah and musharakah) expose banks primarily to capital impairment risk, but some investments may also imply credit risk.
- Special-sales interaction: engaging in parallel salam contracts reduces inventory risk but does not reduce credit risk of the first salam; if the first salam fails, the bank must buy the commodity at prevailing market price — market risk can amplify counterparty losses.

### Market risk
- Islamic banks are especially exposed to market risk due to prevalence of asset-based financial contracts and large inventories of commodities.
- Market risk arises from adverse asset price movements affecting valuation of on- and off-balance-sheet exposures (inventory and trading).
- Mitigants: minimize inventories, complete transactions swiftly, use hedging techniques; execution constrained in less developed economies.
- Financing agricultural activities increases exposure to commodity and inventory risk depending on product price volatility.
- Parallel special-sales (e.g., parallel salam) are not genuine hedges for credit exposure; they are asset-liability/cash-flow management tools.
- Market risk losses examples:
  - Market risk loss from inventory decline: market risk loss = (1 + foregone return) × (inventory_t0 − inventory_t1) (see equation (28) format).
  - Market risk of parallel salam: market risk loss = FV(collateral asset at maturity) − collateral asset spot value received (see equation (29) format).

### Operational risk
- Operational risk: losses from failed internal processes, systems, human error, fraud, and legal risk.
- For Islamic banks, failure to comply with shari’ah principles (or inability to enforce them) is an additional legal/operational risk that can lead to de-recognition of income and losses.
- Even under conventional solvency regimes, Islamic banks may be statutorily obliged to compensate customers when transactions are deemed non-compliant; profits attributable to non-compliant activities may be donated to charity.
- IFSB adopted the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) for operational risk capital treatment: recommended percentage is 15 percent (IFSB, 2005a) — capital requirement for operational risk equals average over previous three years of a fixed percentage of positive annual gross income.

### Capital requirement for Islamic banks (CAR and SDF)
- Capital adequacy of Islamic banks similar to conventional banks but accounts for potential loss absorption by depositors (investment account holders, IAs).
- IFSB Capital Standard comprises a Standard Formula and a Supervisory Discretion Formula (SDF) that adjust numerator (eligible capital) and denominator (RWAs) of the conventional CAR.
- Numerical and definitional highlights:
  - Eligible capital defined as total (book) equity, which may in some circumstances include shareholders’ share of PER and IRR.
  - 훼 ∈ [0,1] signifies estimated degree of DCR (displaced commercial risk) — supervisory authorities have discretion in setting 훼.
  - IFSB Guidance Note used parameter value of 30 percent as an example; Central Bank of Bahrain chose 30 percent (IFSB, 2011; Central Bank of Bahrain, 2008).
  - Under illustrative assumptions, for a common DCR of 30 percent, 퐶퐴푅_SDF = CAR + 6.8% (all else equal), where CAR = 9.5% baseline in the illustration.
  - Inclusion of reserves (PER, IRR) in regulatory capital treatment differs across jurisdictions (example: Bahrain caps PER and IRR included as Tier 2 up to amount equal to capital charge pertaining to 30 percent of RWAs financed by UIAs).
- Key tensions:
  - Predefined impact of DCR commingles expected and unexpected losses.
  - Loss-absorbing share of UIAs, (1 − 훼) RWA_UIA, is contingent on adequate provisioning (IRR, PER) for expected losses and capitalization of unexpected losses up to 훼 RWA_UIA.
  - If earmarked capital and reserves insufficient to cover higher-than-expected DCR, lower loss absorption by UIAs decreases CAR_SDF.
- Practical example:
  - Historical MSCI World Islamic Equity Index used as proxy for UIA returns (t = 10 years until end-2018, μ̃ = 4.57% and σ̃ = 3.34%).
  - Under those conditions, choice of 훼 = 0.3 would be insufficient since CTE_a,t > 훼 RWA_UIA = 0.15 if historical volatility doubles to a level of statistical confidence close (but below) 99.9 percent.

### Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR) and stress scenarios
- DCR: transfer of shareholder value to unsecured depositors (UIAs) when realized returns fall short of targeted profit rates offered to depositors.
- Three illustrative stress scenarios for shocks to rate of return:
  - Shock to asset returns: investment shortfall = (actual return − expected return)_t × total accounts_t.
  - Shock to availability of funding (competitor rates): investment shortfall = (total accounts_t − expected total accounts_t) × actual return_t.
  - Combined shock to asset returns and funding: investment shortfall = (actual return_t − revised expected return_t) × (expected total accounts_t − total accounts_t).
- Effect on CAR after retained earnings and provisions: formula structure (see equation (12) format) reduces capital when investment shortfall exceeds available PER and IRR.
- PER shared between shareholders and depositors; IRR only usable for distributions to depositors. If reserves exhausted, shareholder transfers diminish retained earnings.

### Indirect interest rate risk
- In mixed financial systems, Islamic banks benchmarking IA returns to conventional deposit rates face indirect interest rate risk.
- Interest rate gap specification: interest rate gap = (exp. return_t − η × market interest rate) × total accounts_t (see equation (15) format), where η is degree of pass-through.
- Deposit elasticity parameter φ captures fraction of IAs needing compensation; adjusted gap: × φ × total accounts_t (see equation (16) format).
- CAR impact formula adjusts for interest rate gap analogous to investment shortfall treatment (see equation (17) format).

### Stress-testing credit risk (implementation notes)
- Credit risk shocks commonly considered:
  - Broad-based deterioration of economic conditions leading to general increase in NPAs and charge-offs.
  - Sector-specific negative shock affecting asset quality.
  - Deterioration of existing NPAs by one or more notches across subcategories.
- Credit risk loss components: credit risk loss = ∆NPA − specific provisions + foregone returns (see equation (19) format).
- RWAs change under stress due to higher PDs, concentration, charge-offs, and net change of RWAs of credit exposures (see equation (20) format). Simplified implementation approximates RWAs of defaulted exposures as 2.5 times average RWAs for non-defaulted exposures.
- Implementation complexity arises from IA loss absorption: if detailed attribution not available, conservative approach treats credit risk losses without IA absorption (overstating capital impact).
- Special-sales-specific credit risk:
  - Salam contract: credit loss quantified as (1 + foregone return) × (PV(collateral asset) − spot value(payment of asset)) (see equation (24) format).
  - Bay bithaman ajil: analogous formula with PV(asset repayment) − spot value(delivered asset) (see equation (25) format).
  - Net credit loss from special sales combines both effects (see equation (26) format).

### Stress-testing market risk
- Market risk arises chiefly from price changes of net open positions of inventory and from trading/investment portfolios (sukuk, ICIS, equity securities).
- Market risk losses interact with credit risk when collateral values change — expected losses are bi-dimensional (probability of shortfall between collateral and exposure).
- Changes in VaR and composition drive ∆RWA_market (see equation (30) format); standardized stress tests often simplify to ∆RWA_market = − RWA_∆.
- CAR after market shock includes deduction of market risk losses from capital/retained earnings and updated RWAs (see equation (31) format).
- FX considerations: sarf rules treat gold and silver as foreign currency; permissible use of currency derivatives is restricted in Islamic finance.

### Operational risk in stress testing
- Operational risk shocks are difficult to model quantitatively; qualitative overlays and KRIs often used.
- Given shari’ah compliance importance, operational risk can overlap materially with legal/reputational risk; shocks above regulatory minimum (∆OpRisk) affect CAR via increased OpRisk capital charge and reduced net income (see equation (32) format).

### Aggregation and multi-factor stress tests
- Aggregate CAR under combined shocks sums impacts from:
  - Investment shortfall, interest rate gap, credit risk loss, special-sales credit loss, market risk losses (ordinary, special, trading), operational risk loss — without diversification benefits (see aggregation structure in equation (33) and simplified equation (34) formats).
- Balance-sheet dynamics (∆RWAs) and retained earnings/delivery of managerial capital buffers included in the multiperiod implementation.
- Practical considerations:
  - Selection and calibration of risk factors must reflect evolving business models and macrofinancial linkages.
  - Accounting measures (net income, profitability) and liquidity metrics enhance interpretation.
  - Multi-year scenarios identify medium- and long-term vulnerabilities and feedback effects (higher cost of capital, erosion of DCR capacity).
  - Stress testing tools (for instance, IMF Workbox Solvency Tool) can project dynamic balance-sheet evolution and assess capital adequacy under stress.

### Key numeric and parameter references preserved from source
- Probability/confidence reference for tail-risk example: 99.9 percent.
- BIA recommended percentage for operational risk capital: 15 percent.
- 훼 parameter domain: 훼 ∈ [0,1].
- IFSB example 훼 parameter value: 30 percent (used in Guidance Note).
- Country alpha-values (Table 2): Saudi-Arabia 1.00; UAE 1/0.35; Malaysia 0.00; Kuwait 0.50; Qatar 0.35; Turkey 0.70; Indonesia 0.00; Bahrain 0.30; Sudan 0.50; Kazakhstan 0.35; IFSB Example 0.30.
- Stylized illustrative CAR benchmark: CAR = 9.5% (used in comparison charts).
- Example: for DCR = 30 percent, 퐶퐴푅_SDF = CAR + 6.8% (illustration).
- MSCI World Islamic Equity Index historical proxy (t = 10 years until end-2018): μ̃ = 4.57% and σ̃ = 3.34%.
- Example numeric outcome: 훼 = 0.3 insufficient because CTE_a,t > 훼 RWA_UIA = 0.15 if historical volatility doubles near 99.9 percent confidence.

### Conclusion (summary of substantive findings and policy guidance)
- Islamic banking requires differentiated stress-testing treatment for:
  - DCR (loss absorption by UIAs and supervisory choice of 훼),
  - Indirect interest rate risk (benchmarking to conventional rates in mixed systems),
  - Counterparty/project risk (special-sales and deferred-delivery/payment contracts),
  - Market risk from inventories and parallel special sales,
  - Operational risk from shari’ah non-compliance.
- The IFSB Capital Standard (Standard Formula and SDF) provides an adjusted CAR framework that recognizes IA loss absorption but requires careful supervisory calibration of 훼 and explicit treatment of reserves (PER, IRR).
- Stress testing should integrate these Islamic-specific risk drivers into common solvency frameworks, apply satellite models or expert judgment for macrofinancial linkages, incorporate multiperiod horizons, and account for balance-sheet dynamics and feedback effects to inform supervisory actions and macroprudential surveillance.

*Source: wpiea2020156-print-pdf - 99.9 percent.*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Standards and regulatory guidance
- AAOIFI, 1999. Financial Accounting Standard No. 11 (Provisions and Reserves) (Manama/Bahrain: Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions), available at http://www.aaoifi.com/en/standards-and-definitions/shari%E2%80%99a-standards/accounting-standards.html.
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2005. “An Explanatory Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions,” July (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/irbriskweight.pdf.
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2009. “Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision,” BCBS Publication No. 155, May (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.htm.
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2010. “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems,” BCBS Publication No. 189, December (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm.
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2012. “Peer Review of Supervisory Authorities’ Implementation of Stress Testing Principles,” BCBS Publication No. 218, April (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs218.htm.
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2015. “Making Supervisory Stress Tests More Macroprudential: Considering Liquidity and Solvency Interactions and Systemic Risk,” Working Paper No. 29, November (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/wp29.htm.
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2018. “Stress Testing Principles,” Guidelines, BIS Paper No. 450, October (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d450.htm.
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2019. “Minimum Capital Requirements for Market Risk,” BIS Paper No. 457, January (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.htm.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2005a. “Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial Services,” December (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb2.pdf.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2005b. “Guiding Principles for Risk Management for Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services,” December (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb1.pdf.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2010. “Guidance Note on the Practice of Smoothing the Profits Payout to Investment Account Holders,” December (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at http://www.ifsb.org/standard/eng_GN-3_Guidance_Note_on_the_Practice_of_Smoothing.pdf.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2011. “Guidance Note in Connection with the IFSB Capital Adequacy Standard: The Determination of Alpha in the Capital Adequacy Ratio for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial Services,” March (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at http://www.ifsb.org/standard/eng-GN-4%20Guidance%20Note.pdf.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2012a. “IFSB-13: Guiding Principles on Stress Testing for Institutions Offering only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance Institutions and Islamic Collective Investment Schemes),” March (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at http://www.ifsb.org/standard/eng_IFSB13%20Guiding%20Principles%20on%20Stress%20Testing%20_(Mar2012).pdf.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2012b. “Revised Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services,” Exposure Draft No. 15, November (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at http://ifsb.org/docs/IFSB%20ED-15%20Revised%20Capital%20Adequacy%20Final%20(01-11-2012).pdf.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2013. “IFSB-15: Revised Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (Excluding Islamic Insurance Institutions and Islamic Collective Investment Schemes),” December (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at http://www.ifsb.org/standard/2014-01-28_eng_IFSB15%20Revised%20Capital%20Adequacy_(Jan%202014).pdf.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2016. “Technical Note on Stress Testing for Financial Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IIFS),” Technical Note No. 2 (TN-2), December (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at https://www.ifsb.org/download.php?id=4378&lang=English&pg=/published.php.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2017. “Technical Note on Stress Testing for Financial Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IIFS)―User Guide,” Technical Note No. 2, June (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at https://www.ifsb.org/download.php?id=4385&lang=English&pg=/published.php.
- Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2018. “Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report,” June (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Financial Services Board), available at https://www.ifsb.org/download.php?id=4811&lang=English&pg=/index.php.
- Central Bank of Bahrain, 2008. Rulebook—Islamic Banks. Vol. 2, January (Manama/Bahrain: Central Bank of Bahrain).
- BNM, 2010. “Shariah Resolutions in Islamic Finance,” October (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia), available at https://www.bnm.gov.my/microsite/fs/sac/shariah_resolutions_2nd_edition_EN.pdf.
- BNM, 2017. “Investment Account,” October (Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia), available at https://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=57&pg=137&ac=84&bb=file.
- ISRA, 2010. ISRA Compendium for Islamic Financial Terms: Arabic-English (Kuala Lumpur/Malaysia International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance).

### IMF publications and working papers
- Adrian, Tobias, James Morsink and Liliana Schumacher, 2020. “Stress Testing at the IMF,” Departmental Paper No. 20/04, February (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund), available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/01/31/Stress-Testing-at-the-IMF-48825.
- Blaschke, Winfrid, Matthew T. Jones, Giovanni Majnoni, and Soldedad Martinez Peira, 2001. “Stress Testing of Financial Systems: An Overview of Issues, Methodologies, and FSAP Experiences,” IMF Working Paper No. 01/88 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Čihák, Martin, 2007. “Introduction to Applied Stress Testing,” IMF Working Paper No. 07/59 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0759.pdf.
- Errico, Luca, and Mitra Farrahbaksh, 1998. “Islamic Banking: Issues in Prudential Regulation and Supervision,” IMF Working Paper No. 98/30 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9830.pdf.
- Espinosa-Vega, Marco A., and Juan Solé, 2011. “Cross-border Financial Surveillance: A Network Perspective,” Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Vol. 3, No. 33, 182–205.
- Gross, Marco, Dimitrios Laliotis, Mindaugas Leika, and Pavel Lukyantsau, forthcoming. “Expected Credit Loss Modeling from a Macro-Financial System and Stress Testing Perspective,” IMF Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Hesse, Heiko, Ferhan Salman, and Christian Schmieder, 2014. “How to Capture Macro-Financial Spillover Effects in Stress Tests?” IMF Working Paper No. 14/103 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14103.pdf.
- Imam, Patrick A., and Kangni Kpodar, 2015. “Is Islamic Banking Good for Growth?” IMF Working Paper No. 15/81 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1581.pdf.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2012. “Macrofinancial Stress Testing: Principles and Practices,” IMF Policy Paper, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, August 22 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/082212.pdf.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2015. “Islamic Finance: Meeting Global Aspirations,” IMF Survey Magazine: In the News, November 9 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/NEW110915A.htm.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2020a. “Global Financial Stability Overview: Markets in the Time of COVID-19,” Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 1, April (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2020/04/14/global-financial-stability-report-april-2020.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2020b. “Assessing Stress from Oil Price Shocks,” Special Series on COVID-19, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, April 29 (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund), available at https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/en-special-series-on-covid-19-assessing-stress-from-oil-price-shocks.ashx?la=en.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2020c. “Banking Sector Regulatory and Supervisory Response to Deal with Coronavirus Impact (with Q and A),” Special Series on COVID-19, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, May 13 (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund), available at https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/covid19-special-notes/enspecial-series-on-covid19banking-sector-regulatory-and-supervisory-response-to-deal-with-coronavir.ashx?la=en.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2007a. “The Economics of Islamic Finance and Securitization,” Journal of Structured Finance, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring, 1–22. Also published as IMF Working Paper No. 07/117, May, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07117.pdf.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2007b. “Operational Risk—The Sting is Still in the Tail But the Poison Depends on the Dose,” Journal of Operational Risk, Vo. 2, No. 2, 1–56.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2009. “Islamic Derivatives,” International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 2, Nos. 3 and 4, 254–60.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2012. “Risk Management of Islamic Finance Instruments,” in: Scott Moeller (ed.) Finance Essentials: The Practitioners’ Guide (London: Bloomsbury Publishing), 48–52.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2013a. “Reflect on Islamic Finance But Do Not See It As a Panacea,” Financial Times, Comment, November (London: Financial Times), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/de4113c6-4180-11e3-b064-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz30OgvHYqp.
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2013b. “Guidelines for the Bottom-Up Solvency Stress Test―Banking,” in: International Monetary Fund, “Belgium: Technical Note on Stress Testing the Banking and Insurance Sectors,” IMF Country Report No. 13/137, May 24 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Jobst, Andreas A., 2013c. “Derivatives in Islamic Finance: There is No Right Way to Do the Wrong Thing―Opportunities for Investors,” Journal of Investing, Vol. 22, No. 1, 7–21.
- Jobst, Andreas A., Peter Kunzel, Paul Mills, and Amadou Sy, 2007. “Shari’ah-Compliant Securities―Islamic Finance Expanding Rapidly,” IMF Survey Magazine, September 19 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/res0919b.htm.
- Jobst, Andreas A., and Dale F. Gray, 2013. “Systemic Contingent Claims Analysis (Systemic CCA)―Estimating Market-Implied Systemic Risk,” IMF Working Paper No. 13/54 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1354.pdf.
- Jobst, Andreas A., Li Lian Ong, and Christian Schmieder, 2013. “A Framework for Macroprudential Bank Solvency Stress Testing: Application to S-25 and Other G-20 Country FSAPs,” IMF Working Paper No. 13/68 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1368.pdf.
- Jobst, Andreas A., Li Lian Ong, and Christian Schmieder, 2017. “Macroprudential Liquidity Stress Testing in FSAPs for Systemically Important Financial Systems,” IMF Working Paper No. 17/102 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/WP/2017/wp17102.ashx.
- Jobst, Andreas A., Peter Kunzel, Paul Mills, and Amadou Sy, 2008. “Islamic Bond Issuance—What Sovereign Debt Managers Need to Know,” International Journal of Islamic & Middle East Finance and Management, Vol. 1, No. 4, 330–44. Also published as IMF Policy Discussion Paper No. 08/03, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pdp/2008/pdp03.pdf.
- Jobst, Andreas A., and Juan Solé, 2009. “The Governance of Derivatives in Islamic Finance,” Journal of International Business Law and Regulation, Vol. 24, No. 11, 556–65.
- Jobst, Andreas A., and Juan Solé, 2012. “Operative Principles of Islamic Derivatives.” IMF Working Paper No. 12/63 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1263.pdf.
- Jobst, Andreas A., Nobuyasu Sugimoto, and Timo Broszeit, 2014. “Macroprudential Solvency Stress Testing of the Insurance Sector,” IMF Working Paper No. 14/133, July 22 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14133.pdf.
- Jobst, Andreas A., and Anke Weber, 2016. “Profitability and Balance Sheet Repair of Italian Banks,” IMF Working Paper No. 16/175, August 19 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=44195.0.
- Leika, Mindaugas, Liliana Schumacher, and Laura Valderrama, forthcoming. “Workbox 2020: The IMF Solvency Stress Testing Tool,” IMF Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Lopez Mejia, Alejandro, Suliman Aljabrin, Rachid Awad, Mohamed Norat, and Inwon Song, 2014. “Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks,” IMF Working Paper No. 14/219 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14219.pdf.
- Lukonga, Inutu, 2015. “Seven Questions on Islamic Finance,” IMF Research Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), 6–9.
- Ong, Li Lian, Rodolfo Maino, and Nombulelo Duma, 2010. “Into the Great Unknown: Stress Testing with Weak Data,” IMF Working Paper No. 10/282 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10282.pdf.
- Ong, Li Lian, 2014. A Guide to IMF Stress Testing―Methods and Models (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Ong, Li Lian, and Andreas A. Jobst, 2020. A Guide to IMF Stress Testing―Principles, Concepts and Frameworks (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Schmieder, Christian, Claus Puhr, and Maher Hasan, 2011. “Second Generation Applied Stress Testing—Solvency Module,” IMF Working Paper No. 11/83 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1183.pdf.
- Schmitz, Stefan W., Michael Sigmund, and Laura Valderrama, 2017. “Bank Solvency and Funding Cost: New Data and New Results,” IMF Working Paper No. 17/116, May (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/05/15/Bank-Solvency-and-Funding-Cost-New-Data-and-New-Results-44914.
- Solé, Juan, 2008. “Introducing Islamic Banks into Conventional Banking Systems,” Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Vol. 4, No. 2. Also published as IMF Working Paper 07/175 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Song, Inwon, and Carel Oosthuizen, 2014. “Islamic Banking Regulation and Supervision: Survey Results and Challenges,” IMF Working Paper No. 14/220 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14220.pdf.
- Kammer, Alfred, Mohamed Norat, Marco Piñón, Ananthakrishnan Prasad, Christopher Towe, and Zeine Zeidane, 2015. “Islamic Finance: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Options,” IMF Staff Discussion Note No. 15/05, April 6 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1505.pdf.
- Lagarde, Christine, 2015. “Unlocking the Promise of Islamic Finance,” Keynote Speech at Conference on Islamic Finance: Meeting Global Aspirations, November 11 (Kuwait City, Kuwait), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2015/111115.htm.
- Ong, Li Lian, and Andreas A. Jobst, 2020. A Guide to IMF Stress Testing―Principles, Concepts and Frameworks (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).

### Islamic finance literature, practice, and Shari’ah sources
- Ahmad, Kurshid, 2000. “Islamic Finance and Banking: The Challenge of the 21st Century,” Review of Islamic Economic Studies, Vol. 9, 57–82.
- Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi ad-Din, 1949. Nazariyat al Aqd (Cairo: Matbaa al Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah).
- Al-Buhuti Ibn Yunus, Mansur, 2003. Kashshaf Al-qina` `an Matn al-Iqna` (Riyad: Dar `Alam al-Kutub).
- Al-Shawkani Ibn Ali, Muhammad, 1985. Kitab al-Sayl A-jarrar Al-mutadaffiq `ala Hada'iq Al-azhar (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyah), 23.
- Al-Suwailem, Sami, 1999-2000. “Towards an Objective Measure of Gharar in Exchange,” Islamic Economic Studies, Vol. 7, Nos. 1 and 2, October–April, 66f.
- El-Hawary, Dahlia, Wafik Grais, and Zamir Iqbal, 2004. “Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions: The Nature of the Regulated,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3227, March (Washington, D.C.: World Bank), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3227.
- Farooq, Mohammad Omar, and Sowmya Vivek, 2012. “Displaced Commercial Risk and the Value of Alpha for Islamic Banks in Bahrain/GCC,” Working Paper, July 1 (Manama: Bahrain Institute of Banking & Finance), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2318974.
- Grais, Wafik, and Anoma Kulathunga, 2007. “Capital Structure and Risk in Islamic Financial Services,” in Archer, Simon, and Rifaat Ahmed Abdul Karim (eds.) Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd).
- Greuning, Hennie Van, and Zamir Iqbal, 2008. Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (Washington, D.C.: World Bank).
- Iqbal, Zamir, and Hiroshi Tsubota, 2006, “Emerging Islamic Capital Markets,” Islamic Finance Review, Euromoney Handbook (London: Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC).
- Iqbal, Zamir, and Abbas Mirakhor, 2006. An Introduction to Islamic Finance—Theory and Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.).
- ISRA Compendium for Islamic Financial Terms: Arabic-English, 2010 (Kuala Lumpur/Malaysia International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance).
- Sairally, Beebee Salma, Marjan Muhammad, and Madaa Munjid Mustafa, 2013. “Instruments for Meeting Capital Adequacy Requirements of Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 under Basel III: A Shari’ah Perspective,” mimeo, Paper Proceeding of the 5th Islamic Economics System Conference (iECONS 2013), “Sustainable Development through the Islamic Economics System,” Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia, Faculty Economics and Muamalat (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia), September 4–5.
- Subhani, Azeemuddin, 2011. “Wither Islamic Finance? ‘... Allah Permitteth Bay’ and Forbiddeth Riba ...’,” New Horizon, No. 178 (January–March), 15–8.
- Toumi, Kaouther, Jean-Laurent Viviani, and Lotfi Belkacem, 2011. “Actual Risk Sharing Measurement in Islamic Banks,” Critical Studies on Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability, Vol. 2, 325–47.
- Vogel, Frank E., and Samuel L. Hayes III, 1998. Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return (The Hague and Boston: Kluwer Law International).
- World Bank Group/Islamic Development Bank Group, 2017. “The Islamic Banking Sector,” Global Report on Islamic Finance (“Islamic Finance―A Catalyst for Shared Prosperity?”), Chapter 3, February 20 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group/Islamic Development Bank Group), 47–67.
- Ernst & Young, 2015. “World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016,” Banking in Emerging Markets (London: Ernst & Young Global Limited), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-world-islamic-banking-competitiveness-report-2016/$FILE/ey-world-islamic-banking-competitiveness-report-2016.pdf.
- Farooq, Mohammad Omar, and Sowmya Vivek, 2012. “Displaced Commercial Risk and the Value of Alpha for Islamic Banks in Bahrain/GCC,” Working Paper, July 1 (Manama: Bahrain Institute of Banking & Finance), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2318974.

### Stress testing, risk measurement, and quantitative methods
- Artzner, Philippe, Freddy Delbaen, Jean-Marc Eber, and David Heath, 1999. “Coherent Measures of Risk,” Mathematical Finance, Vol. 9, No. 3, 203–28.
- Black, Fischer, 1976. “Studies of Stock Price Volatility Changes,” in: American Statistical Association (ed.) Proceedings of the 1976 Meeting of the Business and Economic Statistics Section (Washington, D.C.: American Statistical Association), 177–81.
- Chavez-Demoulin, Valérie, and Paul Embrechts, 2004. “Smooth Extremal Models in Finance and Insurance,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 71, No. 2, 183–99.
- Cheng, Linyin, and Amir AghaKouchak, 2014. “Nonstationary Precipitation Intensity-Duration-Frequency Curves for Infrastructure Design in a Changing Climate,” Scientific Reports, Vol. 4, No. 7093.
- Cheng, Linyin, Amir AghaKouchak, Eric Gilleland, and Richard W. Katz, 2014. “Non-Stationary Extreme Value Analysis in a Changing Climate,” Climate Change, November, Vol. 127, No. 2, 353–69.
- Coles, Stuart, 2001. An Introduction to Statistical Modelling of Extreme Values (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag).
- Fisher, Ronald A., and Leonard H.C. Tippett, 1928. “Limiting Forms of the Frequency Distribution of the Largest or Smallest Member of a Sample,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, 180–90.
- Gnedenko, Boris V., 1943. “Sur la Distribution Limite du Terme Maximum d’Une Série Aléatoire,” Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 44, No. 3, 423–53.
- Hammad, Nazih, 2007. “Compensation for an Obligation to Sell Currency in the Future: Currency Hedging,” Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 521–36.
- Merton, Robert C., 1973. “Theory of Rational Option Pricing,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 4 (spring), 141–83.
- Merton, Robert C., 1974. “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 29, May, 449–70.
- Ong, Li Lian, 2014. A Guide to IMF Stress Testing―Methods and Models (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Ong, Li Lian, and Andreas A. Jobst, 2020. A Guide to IMF Stress Testing―Principles, Concepts and Frameworks (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
- Ong, Li Lian, Rodolfo Maino, and Nombulelo Duma, 2010. “Into the Great Unknown: Stress Testing with Weak Data,” IMF Working Paper No. 10/282 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10282.pdf.
- Puhr, Claus, and Stefan W. Schmitz, 2014. “A View from the Top—The Interaction Between Solvency and Liquidity Stress,” Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, Vol. 7, No. 4, 38–51.
- Ruggiero, Peter, Paul Komar, and Jonathan Allan, 2010. “Increasing Wave Heights and Extreme Value Projections: The Wave Climate of the U.S. Pacific Northwest,” Coastal Engineering, Vol. 57, No. 5, 539–52.
- Schmieder, Christian, Claus Puhr, and Maher Hasan, 2011. “Second Generation Applied Stress Testing—Solvency Module,” IMF Working Paper No. 11/83 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1183.pdf.
- Schmitz, Stefan W., Michael Sigmund, and Laura Valderrama, 2017. “Bank Solvency and Funding Cost: New Data and New Results,” IMF Working Paper No. 17/116, May (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund), available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/05/15/Bank-Solvency-and-Funding-Cost-New-Data-and-New-Results-44914.
- Artzner, Philippe, Freddy Delbaen, Jean-Marc Eber, and David Heath, 1999. “Coherent Measures of Risk,” Mathematical Finance, Vol. 9, No. 3, 203–28.

### Other reports, surveys, and practitioner notes
- Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), 2000. “Stress Testing by Large Financial Institutions: Current Practice and Aggregation Issues,” CGFS Publications No. 14, April (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs14.pdf.
- Financial Stability Board, 2019. “Global Monitoring Report on Non-bank Financial Intermediation 2018,” February 4 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements), available at https://www.fsb.org/2019/02/global-monitoring-report-on-non-bank-financial-intermediation-2018/.
- Chattha, Jamshaid A., 2020. “The COVID-19 Pandemic: Supervisory Implications and Priorities for Islamic Banking,” Toronto Centre Notes, May (Toronto: Toronto Centre), available at https://res.torontocentre.org/guidedocs/COVID19%20and%20Islamic%20Finance%20FINAL.pdf.
- Uberoi, Priya, 2010. “An Introduction to Islamic Derivatives,” Practice Note, Practice Law Company, March 25, available at http://us.practicallaw.com/8-501-6191.
- Hammad, Nazih, 2007. “Compensation for an Obligation to Sell Currency in the Future: Currency Hedging,” Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 521–36.
- Leika, Mindaugas, Liliana Schumacher, and Laura Valderrama, forthcoming. “Workbox 2020: The IMF Solvency Stress Testing Tool,” IMF Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).

*Source: REFERENCES (wpiea2020156-print-pdf - REFERENCES).*

### APPENDIX I. ADDITIONAL TABLES

### APPENDIX I. ADDITIONAL TABLES

### Glossary of Islamic Finance Terms for Banking
- bay mu’ajal or bay bithaman ajil (predelivery, deferred payment)
  - The seller can sell a product on the basis of a deferred payment, in installments or in a lump sum. The price of the product is agreed upon between the buyer and the seller at the time of the sale and cannot include any charges for deferring payment. In a BBA contract, the lender is not compelled to disclose the profit margin.
- ijāra (or ijārah) (lease, lease purchase)
  - A party leases a particular product for a specific sum and a specific time period. In the case of a lease purchase, each payment includes a portion that goes toward the final purchase and transfer of ownership of the product. An ijara muntahia bittamleek (or ijara wa iqtina) contract offers the lessee the option to own the asset at the end of the lease period either by purchase of the asset through a token consideration or payment of the market value, or by means of a gift contract.
- Investment risk reserve (IRR)
  - Reserves (after disbursement of the mudarib’s share), which are used to cover (some or all) losses of investment account (IA) holders.
- istisna (or istisna’a) (deferred payment and delivery)
  - Agreement to sell to a customer a non-existent asset, to be manufactured or built according to the buyer’s specifications and delivered on a specified future date at a predetermined selling price. Price may be paid in installments or part in advance. A parallel istisna is a second istisna contract where a third party will manufacture for the bank an asset corresponding to the first istisna.
- mudaraba (or mudarabah) (trust-based contract)
  - Contract between the capital provider and a skilled entrepreneur (mudarib). Profits are shared per the agreement; losses are borne solely by the capital provider unless due to the mudarib’s misconduct, negligence, or breach of contracted terms.
- murābaḥa (or murābaḥah) (mark-up/cost-plus sale)
  - Sales contract whereby the bank sells to a client at an agreed profit margin plus cost (selling price) a specified asset.
- mushāraka (or mushārakah) (equity participation or “sweat capital finance”)
  - The bank enters into an equity partnership to jointly finance an investment project. Profits and losses are shared per agreement; losses shared in proportion to capital share. Diminishing musharakah involves gradual purchase of one partner’s equity by another; buying and selling must be independent of the partnership contract.
- Profit equalization reserve (PER)
  - Reserve funded by mudarabah income (after disbursement of the mudarib’s share), used to cover (some or all) losses of investment account holders and smooth earnings of shareholders.
- qard hasan (benevolent loans)
  - Non-interest-bearing loan repaid in the same amount at the end of the period. Banks may charge a service fee to cover administrative expenses; the fee should not be related to the loan amount or maturity.
- Restricted investment accounts (RIA)
  - Investment account holders authorize the bank to invest funds under mudarabah/mushārakah or wakalah contracts with restrictions as to where, how, and for what purpose funds are invested.
- salam (prepayment, deferred delivery)
  - The buyer pays the full negotiated purchase price of a commodity that the seller promises to deliver at a future date. A parallel salam contract with a third party can be used.
- sukuk (investment certificates)
  - Certificates that confer ownership in an undivided part of an underlying asset where the holder assumes rights and obligations to such asset.
- tawarruq (or reverse murabahah)
  - Purchase of a commodity in possession of the seller on a deferred basis, which the buyer resells to a third party to acquire cash (al-wariq).
- Unrestricted investment accounts (UIA)
  - Investment account holders authorize the bank to invest funds without restriction. Bank can commingle these funds with their own funds and invest in a pooled portfolio.
- wakalah (agency)
  - Principal (muwakkel) appoints an agent (wakil) to undertake transactions on his/her behalf in a non-binding contract for a fixed fee. Services include exchange-based and profit- and loss-sharing contracts.

*Sources: authors, Errico and Farrahbaksh (1998), El-Hawary and others (2004), IFSB (2005a and 2005b), and ISRA (2010).*

### Stylized Balance Sheet of an Islamic Bank (internally consistent values)
- Balance sheet totals
  - Total Assets: 1,000
  - Total Liabilities and Capital: 1,000
- Selected asset items (Amount)
  - (1) Cash and cash equivalents: 30
  - (2) Interbank deposits (short-term murabaha): 20
  - (3) Accounts receivable: 912
  - (4) Financing and lending: 832
  - (5) Investment and trading: 80
  - (6) Fixed assets: 38
- Selected liability and capital items (Amount)
  - (7) Demand deposits: checking accounts (qardh hasan): 250
  - (8) Investment accounts (mudarabah/musharakah/wakala): 600
  - (9) Restricted investment accounts (RIA): 200
  - (10) Unrestricted investment accounts (UIA): 400
  - (11) Funding liabilities (exchange-based and profit- and loss-sharing contracts): 50
  - (12) Reserves: 52
  - (13) Profit equalization reserves (PER): 22
  - (16) Investment risk reserve (IRR): 30
  - (19) Capital (equity): long-term syndicated musharaka/mudarabah: 48
- Decompositions (from assets)
  - of which: exchange-based contracts: 632
    - of which: ordinary sales (murabahah): 432
    - of which: special sales (salam/istisna/bay bithaman ajil) 1/: 100
    - Exchange-based contracts (murabaha, salam/istisna): 25
    - Profit- and loss-sharing contracts (e.g., sukuk): 25
    - of which: leases (ijara): 100
  - of which: inventory (commodities): 30
  - of which: profit- and loss-sharing contracts: 50
- Reserve attribution (Amount)
  - (14) of which: attributable to UIA (PER_UIA) 2/: 20
  - (15) of which: attributable to Equity (PER_Equity) 2
  - (17) of which: attributable to UIA (IRR_UIA) 20
  - (18) of which: attributable to RIA (IRR_RIA) 10
- Risk-weighted assets (RWAs) and risk metrics
  - (20) Total RWAs: 481
  - (21) RWAs for credit and market risks: 456
  - (22) of which: funded by investment accounts: 304
  - (23) of which: funded by RIA: 101
  - (24) of which: funded by UIA: 203
  - (25) of which: funded by reserves: 26
  - (26) of which: funded by PER_UIA: 10
  - (27) of which: funded by PER_Equity: 1
  - (28) of which: funded by IRR_UIA: 5
  - (29) of which: funded by IRR_RIA: 10
  - (30) RWAs for operational risk: 25
  - (31) Expected losses for operational risk: 2.0
  - (32) Conversion factor (inverted minimum CAR): 12.5
  - (33) Supervisory discretion of DCR (a-parameter) 3/: 0.3
  - (34) Amount of credit-sensitive assets: 832
  - (35) Riskiness of assets (average risk weighting) (in percent of assets): 50.0
  - (36) Share of RIA (in percent of total liabilities): 22.2
  - (37) Share of UIA (in percent of total liabilities): 44.4
- Explanatory notes and assumptions
  - 1/ trade financing; 2/ “special sales" are contracts with delayed settlement in the form of salam and istisna’a (delayed delivery) or bay bithaman ajil (delayed payment); 3/ assumption of 5 percent reserve coverage for UIA and RIA; 4/ supervisory authorities may apply supervisory discretion to account for DCR also to RIAs; this would then change PER in (16) to include PER_RIA (and a corresponding change of RWAs funded by reserves in (26) to include RWAs funded by PER_RIA).
  - Memo items: RWAs calculated as sum of credit, market, and operational RWAs; credit and market RWAs calculated as product of (34) and (35) and product of (5) and (35).
  - Other assumptions: implies assumed minimum CAR of 8% of risk-weighted assets (RWAs); determines the amount of credit and market RWA subject to DCR.

### Output Template of Multiperiod Stress Test for an Islamic Bank — Main Results and Risk Drivers
- Notes on template and usage
  - PER_UIA = profit equalization reserve for unrestricted investment accounts (UIA) and IRR = investment risk reserve.
  - The values in the prepopulated cells are for illustration purposes only (but consistent with balance sheet items shown in Table A2).
  - 1/ The reporting basis can be either "solo" (legal entity level), "combined" (domestic operations and foreign branches), or "consolidated" (all group-wide activities, irrespective of jurisdiction and legal status (branches/subsidiaries)).
- Stress-test guidance (template features)
  - Balance sheet information and stress test parameters include EAD = exposure at default, LGD = loss-given-default, PD = probability of default, NPA = nonperforming asset ratio, DCR = displaced commercial risk.
  - The average PDs for the portfolio should be used to derive the asset correlation from the Basel II formula (by exposure types), averaged across exposure types weighted by EAD. The portfolio average PD includes both defaulted and non-defaulted exposures.

### APPENDIX II. MODELING UNEXPECTED LOSSES USING THE EXTREME VALUE THEORY (EVT)
- Purpose
  - Relax the normality assumption of investment return distributions to estimate unexpected losses by estimating tail risk.
  - Two practical EVT approaches:
    - Empirical calibration of the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution.
    - Estimating the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) via exceedances (Peaks Over Threshold, POT).
- A. Empirical Calibration Using the GEV
  - Setup: Observations {x_t; t=1,2,...,n} with distribution function F_t(x) and sample maxima converge to a GEV distribution per the Fisher-Tippett-Gnedenko theorem.
  - Extremal types (three limiting distributions):
    - EV0 (Gumbel): G_0(x) = exp(−exp(−x)) if x≥0, ξ=0.
    - EV1 (Fréchet): G_1(x) = exp(−x^(−1/ξ)) if x∈[μ−σ/ξ, ∞[, ξ>0.
    - EV2 (Weibull): G_2(x) = exp(−(−x)^(−1/ξ)) if x∈]−∞, μ−σ/ξ], ξ<0.
  - Interpretation of shape parameter ξ:
    - ξ>0: Fréchet (EV1), regularly varying tails/fat tails (e.g., Stable Paretian).
    - ξ<0: Weibull (EV2), finite end-point (no tail).
    - ξ→0: Gumbel (EV0), thin tails; all moments exist.
  - Unified GEV c.d.f. and p.d.f. definitions provided with parameters μ̂>0 (location), σ̂>0 (scale), and ξ̂ (shape).
  - Estimation
    - Parameters estimated concurrently using linear combinations of ratios of spacings (LRS) and maximum likelihood (ML) optimization over a rolling window.
    - Note: ML estimator fails for ξ ≤ −1 (no global maximum).
  - Tail risk metrics
    - Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) / Conditional VaR is derived using GEV quantiles with formulas for CTE and VaR as probability-weighted residual density beyond a severity threshold VaR_S,t at significance level a.
- B. GPD via the Peaks Over Threshold (POT) approach
  - POT extracts exceedances x_t > u over high threshold u and models excesses y_t = x_t − u.
  - Excess c.d.f. F_t(y; u) approximated by generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) H_u(x) with scale σ̂>0 and shape ξ̂.
  - GPD quantile function H_u^{-1}(a) and reconstruction of full c.d.f. using empirical estimator of F_t(u) = (n−n_u)/n are provided.
  - Mean excess function (MEF): e(u) = E[X − u | X > u] = (σ + ξ u) / (1 − ξ), linear in u for 0 < ξ < 1 and σ + ξ u > 0.
  - CTE under GPD (POT) is computed by combining threshold quantile and MEF expressions to obtain closed-form expression for CTE at significance level a.
- Practical considerations
  - Stationarity assumption: GEV and GPD assume stationarity; extreme observations often violate stationarity—parameters may be time-dependent.
  - References cited for non-stationarity adjustments and methodological details.

*Sources: tables and text within the content unit.*

### APPENDIX III. MODELING DISPLACED COMMERCIAL RISK VIA CONTINGENT CLAIMS

### APPENDIX III. MODELING DISPLACED COMMERCIAL RISK VIA CONTINGENT CLAIMS

### Overview and key concept
- Displaced commercial risk (DCR) represents the share of unexpected losses that are not absorbed by holders of unrestricted investment accounts (IA) during times of stress.
- Reserves (PER and IRR) mitigate run-off risk by converting the equity-like claim of IA depositors, in whole or in part, into a quasi-secured credit claim, which raises the bank’s default risk by transferring shareholder wealth to unsecured creditors.
- In firm value models (Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) style), adding IAs subject to DCR to existing payment obligations raises the default threshold.

### Contingent claims analysis (CCA) approach
- CCA generalizes the BSM approach to assess credit risk and helps estimate the fair value of reserves required to cover DCR as the marginal impact of a higher default threshold on the bank’s default risk over a pre-defined risk horizon.
- CCA interprets equity holders as holding a call option on firm value after liabilities are paid; default occurs when asset value is insufficient to repay non-equity investors (the “default threshold” or “distress barrier”).
- The impact of DCR on expected losses can be valued as an implicit put option written on the amount of outstanding liabilities, where the default barrier is the strike price.
- The put option value reflects expected loss: the probability and severity that future asset value falls below the default barrier over the predefined horizon. This depends on:
  - level and volatility of implied asset value (reflected in equity and equity option prices),
  - capital structure,
  - maturity term of total payments to investors,
  - leverage of the bank.
- The risk-adjusted return compensates for expected losses investors accept in funding the bank (i.e., expected return promised to IA holders).

### Market-implied pricing and formulae (as presented)
- Present value of market-implied expected losses can be priced as a European put option:
  - 풫ா(퐿) = 푃ா(퐴,퐵,휏,푡) = Φ(−푥ି)퐵ఛ,௧푒ి௥ఛ − Φ(−푥ା)퐴ሚ௧
  - where the change of the bank’s implied asset value over time, 퐴ሚ௧, is modeled as a geometric Brownian motion, Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and present value 퐷=퐵ఛ,௧푒ి௥ఛ of outstanding payment obligations 퐵 is the strike price.
  - Asset volatility is 휎஺ ෨ = 퐸௧ 휎ா퐴ሚ௧ (expression context preserved as in source).
  - Sensitivity:
    - 푥± = 1 휎஺ ෨ √휏 [ ln 퐴ሚ௧ 퐵ఛ,௧ + (푟 ± 0.5 휎஺ ෨ଶ) 휏 ]
- The market-implied estimate of implicit transfer of shareholder wealth to UIA holders to cover DCR:
  - ∆풫ா = 풫ாವ಴ೃ(퐴,퐵,퐷퐶푅,휏,푡) − 풫ா(퐴,퐵,휏,푡)
  - 풫ாವ಴ೃ(퐴,퐵,퐷퐶푅,휏,푡) = Φ(−푥஽஼ோಿ)[퐵ఛ,௧ + 퐷퐶푅ఛ,௧]푒ಿ௥ఛ − Φ(−푥஽஼ோಾ)퐴ሚ௧
  - 푥஽஼ோ± = 1 휎஺ ෨ √ఛ [ ln (...) + (푟 ± 0.5 휎஺ ෨ଶ) 휏 ] (structure preserved from source)
  - 퐷퐶푅ఛ,௧ = 훼* × 푅푊퐴௎ூ஺ 푅푊௎ூ஺௎ூ஺஺ (expression preserved as in source)
- Note: the approach uses market prices to endogenize risk-weighting of assets in market-based solvency assessment; uncertainty around DCR could also affect implied asset volatility 휎஺ ෨, which is kept constant for simplicity.

### Analytical implications
- CCA provides a market-based, risk-adjusted valuation of the balance sheet to quantify how DCR raises expected losses via a higher default threshold.
- The marginal impact of DCR can be expressed in option-pricing terms and tied to observable equity and equity option market signals.

*Source: APPENDIX III. MODELING DISPLACED COMMERCIAL RISK VIA CONTINGENT CLAIMS (from provided content).*

---

### APPENDIX IV. THE PROCESS-DRIVEN PERSPECTIVE OF PROFITS IN ISLAMIC FINANCE

### Shari’ah foundations and contractual validity
- Prohibition of interest-based income is linked to the shari’ah concept of wealth (mal). Lawfulness hinges on the commercial value of obligations arising from contracts.
- Two aspects considered in lawfulness:
  - nature of wealth and defining elements of value in al-fiqh;
  - degree to which such value is realized in a transaction.

### Three elements for contractual validity (sahih)
- The presence of an intended “usufruct” (meaningful use): defined as a proper objective to attract benefit or repel detriment.
- The commercial value of “usufruct”: object accorded value if it has generally acknowledged monetary value based on commercial practice or current custom (al-‘urf).
- The lawfulness of “usufruct”: requires legal or scriptural confirmation of lawfulness; the lawfulness of a contract depends on intent and final use by the beneficiary rather than general permissibility of the usufruct itself.

*Source: APPENDIX IV. THE PROCESS-DRIVEN PERSPECTIVE OF PROFITS IN ISLAMIC FINANCE (from provided content).*

---

### APPENDIX V. COMPREHENSIVE REPRESENTATION OF CREDIT AND MARKET RISKS IN STRESS TESTING

### Credit risk, RWAs and unexpected losses
- Deterioration in asset quality increases nonperforming asset (NPA) balances and unexpected losses, raising capital intensity of credit-sensitive assets.
- Measuring change in capital intensity of unexpected losses requires detailed sensitivity of credit RWAs to default risk and portfolio concentration.

### Proposed additive increases of risk weights under stress
- Nonlinear effect of changes in PDs on RWAs, f(∆PD), determined by fixing asset correlations to the lowest PD level and LGD to 45 percent. Marginal increase formula:
  - ∆푅푊퐴 푖 / ∆ PD = 0.12 × ∆PD^2 − 0.049 × ∆PD + 0.006       (A5.2)
- RWAs of total lending:
  - 푅푊퐴 = 퐾 × 12.5 × EAD      (A5.3)
  - 퐾 = LGD × [ Φ( (1 / (1−R)^0.5) × Φ−1(PD) + ( (R/(1−R))^0.5 × Φ−1(0.999) ) ) − PD ]      (A5.4)
  - R = AVC × [ (0.12 × ( (1 / (1 + e^(−50 × PD)) )^2 / ( (1 / (1 + e^(−50 × PD)) )^2 + 0.24 × (1 − (1 / (1 + e^(−50 × PD)) )^2 ) ) ) + 0.24 × (1 − ... ) ] (A5.5) (expressions preserved as in source)
- AVC = 1.25 if the company is a large regulated financial institution (total asset equal or greater to US$100 billion) or an unregulated financial institution regardless of size, else AVC = 1.
- Forward-looking provisioning estimate (Jobst and Weber, 2016):
  - (0.00092 × RWA^2 − 0.06 × RWA + 1.662) × (LGD / 100)

### Concentration risk impact on RWAs
- Impact of concentration (f(∆Concentration)): percentage increase of RWAs:
  - ∆푅푊퐴 푖 = 100 + (0.02 + 12.6 × HHI)       (A5.6)
  - Baseline average exposure-weighted PD = 0.4%. For each 0.4 percentage point increase in PD above 0.4%, ∆푅푊퐴 increases by 1 + (PD/0.4% − 1) × 0.1.
  - Example: portfolio with HHI ≤ 0.0006 and EAD-weighted PD = 0.8% → expected increase of RWAs by 3.0 percent due to concentration risk.

### Market risk and RWAs under stress
- Change in RWAs from market risk:
  - ∆푅푊퐴 푚 = f(∆VaR) − RWA_∆푚       (A5.7)
  - f(∆VaR) reflects change in sum of VaR, stressed VaR, and incremental risk charges using short-term price changes over a 10-day period (consistent with BCBS, 2015).
  - Net change in portfolio allocation affecting RWAs, RWA_∆푚, depends on investment and trading behavior under stress.

*Source: APPENDIX V. COMPREHENSIVE REPRESENTATION OF CREDIT AND MARKET RISKS IN STRESS TESTING (from provided content).*

---

### APPENDIX VI. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF STRESS TESTING

### Essential domains for modern stress testing frameworks
- Dynamic approach:
  - Incorporates changes in institutional behavior affecting capital impact (e.g., ringfencing liquidity, asset sales, lower credit growth, raising capital, withholding dividends).
- Spillover effects:
  - Interconnectedness within financial systems and interactions with non-financial entities can produce contagion and amplify shocks across borders.
- Cross-functional perspective of solvency and liquidity risks:
  - Liquidity and solvency risks are increasingly connected during stress and influenced by system-wide liquidity and network effects.
- Feedback loop with real economy:
  - Two-way interaction between real economy and financial activities requires dynamic specification of transmission channels and consistent macrofinancial scenario design, potentially enriched by full or partial equilibrium macroeconomic models.

### Implementation context
- Greater data availability, enhanced statutory reporting, and supervisory coordination broaden macrofinancial linkages in scenarios to include non-bank financial institutions and markets.
- The typical assumed origin of stress is an adverse shock to credit portfolios affecting PDs and/or asset values; first-round shocks reduce capital ratios and can trigger liquidity risk via higher funding costs and rollover disruptions in networks.

*Source: APPENDIX VI. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF STRESS TESTING (from provided content).*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020156-print-pdf.pdf_
