## wpiea2020173-print-pdf - References

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### I. INTRODUCTION
- Episodes of capital flow surges and withdrawals in emerging markets (EMs) have benefits (additional financing, price discovery) and costs (sudden stops, overshooting).
- Policymakers face the challenge of assessing real-time fundamental changes, the equilibrium exchange rate, and the role of policy in preventing overshooting.
- “Fear of floating” is observed: reluctance to allow full exchange rate adjustment due to currency mismatches that amplify balance sheet and financial crisis risks.
- A less flexible exchange rate can reduce short-term volatility but may incentivize FX borrowing and build FX vulnerabilities (analogy to Minsky (2008) risk-taking in stability).
- Research objective: assess longer-term financial stability effects of preventing full exchange rate adjustment by exploring the relationship between exchange rate flexibility and FX vulnerabilities using difference-in-difference estimations.
- Key empirical finding preview: lower exchange rate flexibility is associated with higher levels of foreign currency debt; countries introducing more flexible regimes tend to experience a sharper reduction in foreign currency debt.

### II. RELATED LITERATURE
- Evidence on FX intervention (FXI) effectiveness:
  - Blanchard et al. (2015): intervention reduces appreciation pressure during inflows.
  - Adler et al. (2019): IV approach — purchasing reserves of 1 percentage point of GDP leads to a 1.7-2 percent depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
  - Single-country evidence is mixed (e.g., Tapia and Tokman (2004) limited impact in Chile; Kamil (2008) subset-effective interventions in Colombia).
- Relationship between exchange rate regimes and foreign currency debt:
  - Single-country studies generally find greater exchange rate flexibility associates with reduced foreign currency exposure (Cowan and De Gregorio (2007), Albagli et al. (2020), Martinez and Werner (2002), Pratap et al. (2003)).
  - Cross-country studies: Kamil (2012), Parsley and Popper (2006) find higher exposure under pegged regimes; Tong and Wei (2019) find greater reserve accumulation leads to higher leverage.
  - Berkmen and Cavallo (2009): countries with high liability dollarization attempt more exchange rate stabilization; little evidence for the reverse causal direction.
  - Ghosh et al. (2014): free floats least vulnerable to crisis; managed floaters show mixed results.
  - Kim et al. (2020): firm-level data show positive association between FXI and foreign currency debt.
- FX debt and crisis risk:
  - Bordo et al. (2010): positive association between foreign currency debt and crisis risk; crises associated with permanent output losses.
  - IMF (2020): FX debt liabilities increase likelihood of an external crisis, especially in EMs and developing economies; elevated pre-existing FX debt amplifies macroeconomic costs of an external crisis.
- Non-crisis channel: FX debt can weigh on activity when financial conditions become more determined by exchange rate developments (Bebczuk et al. (2006)).

### III. STYLIZED FACTS
- External FX debt dynamics (aggregated EMs):
  - External FX debt was within the range of 30-50 percent of GDP for most EMs in the past three decades.
  - Sharp increase in late-1990s due to rising external borrowing, “original sin,” and valuation effects from depreciations (Asia 1997; Russia 1998; Argentina 2001).
  - Gradual decrease in mid-2000s up to the GFC; slight aggregate increase post-GFC with a concurrent decline in share of external debt denominated in foreign currency.
- Carry trade and exchange rate risk:
  - Interest rate differentials made FX-borrowing attractive for much of the past two decades (interbank rates used as proxy).
  - Periods of heightened volatility (early 2000s, GFC) saw increased differentials but heightened exchange rate volatility offset attractiveness.
- Exchange rate regimes and FXI:
  - 1990s–mid-2000s: decline in intermediate regimes; rise in both fixed and flexible regimes.
  - Pre-GFC FXI: mostly on the purchasing side for precautionary reserve accumulation.
  - Post-GFC: shift toward greater ER flexibility; episodic FXI to counter depreciation during crises (GFC, 2013 Taper Tantrum, 2018 EM selloff).
  - FXI intensity negatively associated with regime flexibility (Figure 5): estimated average FXI highest under Peg, lower under Intermediate, lowest under Floating.
- Rolling correlations:
  - Positive relationship between external FX debt and intensity of FXI for most of 2003-17 (exception around the GFC).
  - Positive association may reflect (i) central banks stabilizing exchange rates in presence of high external FX debt, (ii) private sector exploiting exchange rate management to borrow in FX, or (iii) both.

### IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
- Data:
  - Sample: annual data for 24 EMs between 1990 and 2017.
  - Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Uruguay.
  - Main indicators: external FX debt (from Bénétrix et al. (2019)) and de facto exchange rate arrangements (AREAER).
  - External FX debt chosen for comprehensive sector coverage and valuation-adjustment capability; exchange rate regime chosen as proxy for perceived exchange rate risk and regime credibility.
- Methodology:
  - Two-step difference-in-difference framework:
    1. Identify episodes of shifts towards greater exchange rate flexibility (treatment) using AREAER classifications mapped across the 1998 and 2009 de facto systems.
       - Regime categories: (i) peg, (ii) intermediate, (iii) floating.
       - Shift criteria: (i) peg → intermediate/floating or intermediate → floating; (ii) no opposite change in previous five years; (iii) no reversal for at least five years after change.
    2. Compare changes in external FX debt in 5-year windows before and after regime shifts between treated group and control groups (all other EMs, and fixed-regime countries as a more relevant control).
  - Estimations:
    - Baseline specification (Eq. 1) includes D(treated), D(post-treatment), and their interaction D(treated)*D(post-treatment).
    - Time-trend specification (Eq. 2) adds time trend F and interactions to capture changing trends.
- Episodes identified:
  - 26 episodes of shifts towards greater exchange rate flexibility.
  - Breakdown: 12 episodes peg → floating; 12 episodes intermediate → floating; 2 episodes peg → intermediate.
  - Regional clustering: 12 episodes in Asia, 6 in LAC, 5 in Europe, 2 in MENA, 1 in CIS.
  - Temporal clustering: second half of the 1990s to early 2000s; mid-2000s; mid-2010s.
- Visual and regression findings:
  - Visual inspection: treated group shows external FX debt on a declining path before and after the shift, with an accelerated decline after treatment relative to control groups; control groups also show declines but less pronounced acceleration post-treatment.
  - Difference-in-difference results (control group: countries with fixed exchange rate regime):
    - Table 2 (Dependent variable: External FX Debt):
      - D(treated): 1.924 (standard error 3.035)
      - D(post-treatment): -6.775*** (standard error 1.643)
      - D(treated)*D(post-treatment): -9.311** (standard error 2.413)
      - Time trend: -2.027*** (standard error 0.510)
      - Trend*D(treated): -0.207 (standard error 0.600)
      - Trend*D(post-treatment): 0.359 (standard error 0.364)
      - Trend*D(treated)*D(post-treatment): -0.940* (standard error 0.486)
      - Constant: 4.106** (column 1) and 13.198*** (column 2) (standard errors 2.054 and 2.170)
      - R-squared: 0.13 (column 1) and 0.18 (column 2)
    - Interpretation:
      - Column (1): the interaction D(treated)*D(post-treatment) of -9.311** indicates the level of external FX debt was significantly lower in countries undertaking the regime shift.
      - Column (2): time trend of -2.027*** indicates external FX debt decreasing by around 2 percent of GDP per year across countries; Trend*D(treated)*D(post-treatment) = -0.940* indicates the rate of decline accelerated by around 0.9 percent of GDP in countries undertaking a shift to more flexible regimes following the shift.
- Robustness and caveats:
  - Pre-treatment trend test (Eq. 3) for t-5 to t-1:
    - Time trend coefficient: -1.281*** (standard error 0.411)
    - Time trend*D(treated): -0.304 (standard error 0.588)
    - Constant: 10.999*** (standard error 2.717)
    - R-squared: 0.01
    - Interpretation: interaction not statistically significant, suggesting treated and control groups did not exhibit different pre-treatment trends.
  - Potential caveats noted by authors:
    1. Parallel trends assumption between treated and control groups.
    2. Crisis-driven reversals: some regime changes occurred during crises, which also reduce market access and debt — but such crises can reflect the long-term implications of exchange rate stability contributing to vulnerability.
    3. Public vs non-financial private sector composition: decline in external FX debt might be driven by public external FX debt due to underdeveloped local-currency bond markets; however, positive cross-country relationship between external FX debt and non-financial private sector FX debt suggests implications extend to private sector (Figure 8).
    4. Concomitant reforms (monetary policy frameworks, institutional changes) can accompany regime shifts; if flexibility is prerequisite for reforms, association remains meaningful.
    5. Macroprudential policies (MPPs): episodes of shifts to more flexible regimes were rarely accompanied or followed by tightening of FX-related MPPs (reserve requirements differentiated by currency, limits on FX positions, limits on foreign currency lending) (Figure 9); regressions robust to accounting for MPPs tightening.
    6. Results are not a blanket prescription: exchange rate regime choice depends on country-specific circumstances; flexible regimes can be preferable in many cases but fixed regimes may be appropriate for some countries under some circumstances.
  - Data limitations:
    - Limited availability on non-financial private sector FX debt and hedging.
    - Attempted robustness with corporate FX debt (Kim et al. (2020)) constrained to five episodes.

### V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
- Policy considerations:
  - Flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with lower external FX debt and, by implication, can reduce long-run FX vulnerability incentives.
  - Complementary policies can mitigate moral hazard and enhance benefits:
    - Development of domestic investor base and local-currency financial markets to reduce dependence on foreign financing.
    - Macroprudential policies targeted at FX exposure to prevent buildup of FX debt.
    - Use of FXI in flexible regimes to address disorderly market conditions and preserve monetary policy space (e.g., to avoid procyclical policy responses); FXI can be justified akin to lender-of-last-resort interventions when weighed against moral hazard.
- Main empirical conclusions:
  - Greater exchange rate flexibility is associated with lower levels of foreign currency debt; countries moving toward greater flexibility tend to experience a faster decline in external FX debt.
- Quantitative summary from estimations:
  - General decline in external FX debt across countries: around -2.027*** percent of GDP per year (time trend).
  - Additional acceleration in decline for countries switching to more flexible regimes: around -0.940* percent of GDP per year (trend interaction) and a level effect of -9.311** in the baseline specification.
- Important caveats reiterated:
  - Heterogeneity in effect sizes across countries; outcomes depend on prudential frameworks, balance of payments composition, hedging, depth and structure of domestic financial markets, and domestic savings base.
  - Data limitations, particularly on hedging and comprehensive private-sector FX debt series.
  - Policy trade-offs: reduction in exchange rate volatility by policymakers may alter private incentives toward FX borrowing; benefits of volatility reduction (preventing excessive financial turbulence) may outweigh unintended increases in FX borrowing in many instances.
- Further research warranted on heterogeneity, role of hedging, and single-country institutional contexts.

*Source: wpiea2020173-print-pdf - References (IMF staff calculations and cited literature).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### wpiea2020173-print-pdf - References

### I. INTRODUCTION
- Episodes of capital flow surges and withdrawals in emerging markets (EMs) have benefits (additional financing, price discovery) and costs (sudden stops, overshooting).
- Policymakers face the challenge of assessing real-time fundamental changes, the equilibrium exchange rate, and the role of policy in preventing overshooting.
- “Fear of floating” is observed: reluctance to allow full exchange rate adjustment due to currency mismatches that amplify balance sheet and financial crisis risks.
- A less flexible exchange rate can reduce short-term volatility but may incentivize FX borrowing and build FX vulnerabilities (analogy to Minsky (2008) risk-taking in stability).
- Research objective: assess longer-term financial stability effects of preventing full exchange rate adjustment by exploring the relationship between exchange rate flexibility and FX vulnerabilities using difference-in-difference estimations.
- Key empirical finding preview: lower exchange rate flexibility is associated with higher levels of foreign currency debt; countries introducing more flexible regimes tend to experience a sharper reduction in foreign currency debt.

### II. RELATED LITERATURE
- Evidence on FX intervention (FXI) effectiveness:
  - Blanchard et al. (2015): intervention reduces appreciation pressure during inflows.
  - Adler et al. (2019): IV approach — purchasing reserves of 1 percentage point of GDP leads to a 1.7-2 percent depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
  - Single-country evidence is mixed (e.g., Tapia and Tokman (2004) limited impact in Chile; Kamil (2008) subset-effective interventions in Colombia).
- Relationship between exchange rate regimes and foreign currency debt:
  - Single-country studies generally find greater exchange rate flexibility associates with reduced foreign currency exposure (Cowan and De Gregorio (2007), Albagli et al. (2020), Martinez and Werner (2002), Pratap et al. (2003)).
  - Cross-country studies: Kamil (2012), Parsley and Popper (2006) find higher exposure under pegged regimes; Tong and Wei (2019) find greater reserve accumulation leads to higher leverage.
  - Berkmen and Cavallo (2009): countries with high liability dollarization attempt more exchange rate stabilization; little evidence for the reverse causal direction.
  - Ghosh et al. (2014): free floats least vulnerable to crisis; managed floaters show mixed results.
  - Kim et al. (2020): firm-level data show positive association between FXI and foreign currency debt.
- FX debt and crisis risk:
  - Bordo et al. (2010): positive association between foreign currency debt and crisis risk; crises associated with permanent output losses.
  - IMF (2020): FX debt liabilities increase likelihood of an external crisis, especially in EMs and developing economies; elevated pre-existing FX debt amplifies macroeconomic costs of an external crisis.
- Non-crisis channel: FX debt can weigh on activity when financial conditions become more determined by exchange rate developments (Bebczuk et al. (2006)).

### III. STYLIZED FACTS
- External FX debt dynamics (aggregated EMs):
  - External FX debt was within the range of 30-50 percent of GDP for most EMs in the past three decades.
  - Sharp increase in late-1990s due to rising external borrowing, “original sin,” and valuation effects from depreciations (Asia 1997; Russia 1998; Argentina 2001).
  - Gradual decrease in mid-2000s up to the GFC; slight aggregate increase post-GFC with a concurrent decline in share of external debt denominated in foreign currency.
- Carry trade and exchange rate risk:
  - Interest rate differentials made FX-borrowing attractive for much of the past two decades (interbank rates used as proxy).
  - Periods of heightened volatility (early 2000s, GFC) saw increased differentials but heightened exchange rate volatility offset attractiveness.
- Exchange rate regimes and FXI:
  - 1990s–mid-2000s: decline in intermediate regimes; rise in both fixed and flexible regimes.
  - Pre-GFC FXI: mostly on the purchasing side for precautionary reserve accumulation.
  - Post-GFC: shift toward greater ER flexibility; episodic FXI to counter depreciation during crises (GFC, 2013 Taper Tantrum, 2018 EM selloff).
  - FXI intensity negatively associated with regime flexibility (Figure 5): estimated average FXI highest under Peg, lower under Intermediate, lowest under Floating.
- Rolling correlations:
  - Positive relationship between external FX debt and intensity of FXI for most of 2003-17 (exception around the GFC).
  - Positive association may reflect (i) central banks stabilizing exchange rates in presence of high external FX debt, (ii) private sector exploiting exchange rate management to borrow in FX, or (iii) both.

### IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
- Data:
  - Sample: annual data for 24 EMs between 1990 and 2017.
  - Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey and Uruguay.
  - Main indicators: external FX debt (from Bénétrix et al. (2019)) and de facto exchange rate arrangements (AREAER).
  - External FX debt chosen for comprehensive sector coverage and valuation-adjustment capability; exchange rate regime chosen as proxy for perceived exchange rate risk and regime credibility.
- Methodology:
  - Two-step difference-in-difference framework:
    1. Identify episodes of shifts towards greater exchange rate flexibility (treatment) using AREAER classifications mapped across the 1998 and 2009 de facto systems.
       - Regime categories: (i) peg, (ii) intermediate, (iii) floating.
       - Shift criteria: (i) peg → intermediate/floating or intermediate → floating; (ii) no opposite change in previous five years; (iii) no reversal for at least five years after change.
    2. Compare changes in external FX debt in 5-year windows before and after regime shifts between treated group and control groups (all other EMs, and fixed-regime countries as a more relevant control).
  - Estimations:
    - Baseline specification (Eq. 1) includes D(treated), D(post-treatment), and their interaction D(treated)*D(post-treatment).
    - Time-trend specification (Eq. 2) adds time trend F and interactions to capture changing trends.
- Episodes identified:
  - 26 episodes of shifts towards greater exchange rate flexibility.
  - Breakdown: 12 episodes peg → floating; 12 episodes intermediate → floating; 2 episodes peg → intermediate.
  - Regional clustering: 12 episodes in Asia, 6 in LAC, 5 in Europe, 2 in MENA, 1 in CIS.
  - Temporal clustering: second half of the 1990s to early 2000s; mid-2000s; mid-2010s.
- Visual and regression findings:
  - Visual inspection: treated group shows external FX debt on a declining path before and after the shift, with an accelerated decline after treatment relative to control groups; control groups also show declines but less pronounced acceleration post-treatment.
  - Difference-in-difference results (control group: countries with fixed exchange rate regime):
    - Table 2 (Dependent variable: External FX Debt):
      - D(treated): 1.924 (standard error 3.035)
      - D(post-treatment): -6.775*** (standard error 1.643)
      - D(treated)*D(post-treatment): -9.311** (standard error 2.413)
      - Time trend: -2.027*** (standard error 0.510)
      - Trend*D(treated): -0.207 (standard error 0.600)
      - Trend*D(post-treatment): 0.359 (standard error 0.364)
      - Trend*D(treated)*D(post-treatment): -0.940* (standard error 0.486)
      - Constant: 4.106** (column 1) and 13.198*** (column 2) (standard errors 2.054 and 2.170)
      - R-squared: 0.13 (column 1) and 0.18 (column 2)
    - Interpretation:
      - Column (1): the interaction D(treated)*D(post-treatment) of -9.311** indicates the level of external FX debt was significantly lower in countries undertaking the regime shift.
      - Column (2): time trend of -2.027*** indicates external FX debt decreasing by around 2 percent of GDP per year across countries; Trend*D(treated)*D(post-treatment) = -0.940* indicates the rate of decline accelerated by around 0.9 percent of GDP in countries undertaking a shift to more flexible regimes following the shift.
- Robustness and caveats:
  - Pre-treatment trend test (Eq. 3) for t-5 to t-1: Time trend coefficient -1.281*** (standard error 0.411); Time trend*D(treated) -0.304 (standard error 0.588); Constant 10.999*** (standard error 2.717); R-squared 0.01 — interaction not statistically significant, suggesting treated and control groups did not exhibit different pre-treatment trends.
  - Potential caveats noted by authors:
    1. Parallel trends assumption between treated and control groups.
    2. Crisis-driven reversals: some regime changes occurred during crises, which also reduce market access and debt — but such crises can reflect the long-term implications of exchange rate stability contributing to vulnerability.
    3. Public vs non-financial private sector composition: decline in external FX debt might be driven by public external FX debt due to underdeveloped local-currency bond markets; however, positive cross-country relationship between external FX debt and non-financial private sector FX debt suggests implications extend to private sector (Figure 8).
    4. Concomitant reforms (monetary policy frameworks, institutional changes) can accompany regime shifts; if flexibility is prerequisite for reforms, association remains meaningful.
    5. Macroprudential policies (MPPs): episodes of shifts to more flexible regimes were rarely accompanied or followed by tightening of FX-related MPPs (reserve requirements differentiated by currency, limits on FX positions, limits on foreign currency lending) (Figure 9); regressions robust to accounting for MPPs tightening.
    6. Results are not a blanket prescription: exchange rate regime choice depends on country-specific circumstances; flexible regimes can be preferable in many cases but fixed regimes may be appropriate for some countries under some circumstances.
  - Data limitations: limited availability on non-financial private sector FX debt and hedging; attempted robustness with corporate FX debt (Kim et al. (2020)) constrained to five episodes.
- Policy considerations:
  - Flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with lower external FX debt and, by implication, can reduce long-run FX vulnerability incentives.
  - Complementary policies can mitigate moral hazard and enhance benefits:
    - Development of domestic investor base and local-currency financial markets to reduce dependence on foreign financing.
    - Macroprudential policies targeted at FX exposure to prevent buildup of FX debt.
    - Use of FXI in flexible regimes to address disorderly market conditions and preserve monetary policy space (e.g., to avoid procyclical policy responses); FXI can be justified akin to lender-of-last-resort interventions when weighed against moral hazard.

### V. CONCLUSIONS
- Main empirical conclusion: greater exchange rate flexibility is associated with lower levels of foreign currency debt; countries moving toward greater flexibility tend to experience a faster decline in external FX debt.
- Quantitative summary from estimations:
  - General decline in external FX debt across countries: around -2.027*** percent of GDP per year (time trend).
  - Additional acceleration in decline for countries switching to more flexible regimes: around -0.940* percent of GDP per year (trend interaction) and a level effect of -9.311** in the baseline specification.
- Important caveats:
  - Heterogeneity in effect sizes across countries; outcomes depend on prudential frameworks, balance of payments composition, hedging, depth and structure of domestic financial markets, and domestic savings base.
  - Data limitations, particularly on hedging and comprehensive private-sector FX debt series.
  - Policy trade-offs: reduction in exchange rate volatility by policymakers may alter private incentives toward FX borrowing; benefits of volatility reduction (preventing excessive financial turbulence) may outweigh unintended increases in FX borrowing in many instances.
- Policy implications:
  - Flexible exchange rates can yield long-run financial stability benefits via reduced FX debt incentives.
  - Complementary measures — development of domestic financial markets, macroprudential FX measures, and targeted FX intervention in disorderly markets — can improve the cost-benefit trade-off of exchange rate policy.
  - Further research warranted on heterogeneity, role of hedging, and single-country institutional contexts.

*Source: wpiea2020173-print-pdf - References (IMF staff calculations and cited literature).*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Listed references

- Adler, G., N. Lisack, and R. Mano, 2019, Unveiling the effects of foreign exchange intervention: A panel approach, Emerging Markets Review 40 (2019) 100620
- Adler, G., Chang, R. Mano, and Y. Shao, 2020, Foreign Exchange Intervention: A Dataset of Public Data and Proxies, International Monetary Fund, forthcoming
- Alam, Z., A. Alter, J. Eiseman, G. Gelos, H. Kang, M. Narita, E. Nier, and N. Wang, 2019, Digging Deeper – Evidence on the Effects of Macroprudential Policies from a New Database, IMF Working Paper 19/66
- Albagli, E., M. Calani, M. Hadzi-Vaskov, M. Marcel, and L.A. Ricci, 2020, Comfort in Floating: Taking Stock of Twenty Years of Freely-Floating Exchange Rate in Chile, IMF Working Paper forthcoming
- Basu, S., E. Boz, G. Gopinath, F. Roch, and F. Unsal, 2020, A Conceptual Model for the Integrated Policy Framework, IMF Working Paper 20/121
- Bebczuk, R., A. Galindo, and U. Panizza, 2006, An Evaluation of the Contractionary Devaluation Hypothesis, Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper 582
- Belochine, N., E. Crivelli, N. Geng, T. Scutaru, J. Wiegand, and Z. Zhan, 2016, Taking Stock of Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Europe, European Department, International Monetary Fund
- Bénétrix, A., D. Gautam, L. Juvenal, and M. Schmitz, 2019, Cross-Border Currency Exposures. New evidence based on an enhanced and updated dataset, IMF Working Paper 19/299
- Berkmen, S.P., and E.A. Cavallo, 2009, Exchange Rate Policy and Liability Dollarization: What Do the Data Reveal About Casuality?, IMF Working Paper 07/33
- Bernanke, B.S., 2005, The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit, Homer Jones Lecture, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, April 14, 2005
- BIS, 2013, Market volatility and foreign exchange intervention in EMEs: what has changed?, BIS Papers No 73
- Blanchard, O., G. Adler, and I. de Carvalho Filho, 2015, Can Foreign Exchange Intervention Stem Exchange Rate Pressures from Global Capital Flow Shocks?, IMF Working Paper 15/159
- Bordo, M. D., 2003, Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Historical Perspective, IMF Working Paper 03/160
- Bordo, M.D., C.M. Meissner, and D. Stuckler, 2010, Foreign currency debt, financial crises and economic growth: A long-run view, Journal of International Money and Finance 29 (2010) pp 642-665
- Calvo, Guillermo A., 1998, Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops, Journal of Applied Economics 1998 1(1), pp. 35-54.
- Cowan, K., and J. De Gregorio, 2007, International Borrowing, Capital Controls, and the Exchange Rate. Lessons from Chile, In: Edwards, S. (ed.), 2007, Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices and Consequences, University of Chicago Press
- Dornbusch, R., 1976, Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics, Journal of Political Economy, 84 (6), pp. 1161–1176.Eichengreen, B., and R. Hausmann, 1999, Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility, NBER Working Paper 7418
- Eichengreen, B., R. Hausmann, and U. Panizza, 2003, The Pain of Original Sin, August 2003
- Ghosh, A.R., J.D. Ostry, and M.S. Qureshi, 2014, Exchange Rate Management and Crisis Susceptibility: A Reassessment, IMF Working Paper 14/11
- Ghosh, A.R., J.D. Ostry, and C. Tsangarides, 2011, Exchange Rate Regimes and the Stability of the International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper 270, International Monetary Fund
- IMF, 2003, Exchange Arrangements and Foreign Exchange Markets – Developments and Issues, International Monetary Fund, 2003
- IMF, 2012, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2012, International Monetary Fund, October 2012
- IMF, 2019, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2018, International Monetary Fund, April 2019
- IMF, 2020, External Stress and the International Investment Position, Chapter 2 in the External Sector Report, International Monetary Fund, August 2020
- Kamil, H., 2008, Is Central Bank Intervention Effective Under Inflation Targeting Regimes? The Case of Colombia, IMF Working Paper 08/88
- Kamil, H., 2012, How Do Exchange Rate Regimes Affect Firms’ Incentives to Hedge Currency Risk? Micro Evidence for Latin America, IMF Working Paper 12/69
- Kim, M., R. Mano, and M. Mrkaic, 2020, Do FX interventions lead to higher FX debt? Evidence from firm-level data, forthcoming IMF Working Paper
- Mano, R., and S. Sgherri, 2020, One Shock, Many Policy Responses, IMF Working Paper 20/10
- Martinez, L., and A. Werner, 2002, The exchange rate regime and the currency composition of corporate debt: the Mexican experience, Journal of Development Economics 69 (2002) pp 315-334
- Minsky, H., 2008, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, McGraw-Hill Education.
- Parsley, D.C., and H.A. Popper, 2006, Exchange rate pegs and foreign exchange exposure in East and South East Asia, Journal of International Money and Finance 25 (2006) pp 992-1009
- Patnaik, I., and Shah, A., 2010, Does the currency regime shape unhedged currency exposure?, Journal of International Money and Finance 29(5) (2010), pp 760-769.
- Pratap, S., I. Lobato, and A. Somuano, 2003, Debt composition and balance sheet effects of exchange rate volatility in Mexico: a firm level analysis, Emerging Markets Review 4 (2003) pp 450-471
- Rey, H. 2015, Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence, NBER Working Paper No. 21162
- Tapia, M., and A. Tokman, 2004, Effects of Foreign Exchange Intervention Under Public Information: The Chilean Case, Central Bank of Chile Working Papers No 255
- Tong, H., and S-J. Wei, 2019, Endogenous Corporate Leverage Response to a Safer Macro Environment: The Case of Foreign Exchange Reserve Accumulation, NBER Working Paper 26545

*Source: REFERENCES section from the provided PDF content.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020173-print-pdf.pdf_