## wpiea2020206-print-pdf ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [wpiea2020206-print-pdf](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020206-print-pdf.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020206-print-pdf.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020206-print-pdf.pdf.json) --- ### I. INTRODUCTION — context and research focus - Covid-19 is exacerbating South Africa’s existing economic and structural vulnerabilities and will lead to a severe economic contraction, with a gradual recovery expected. - Growth had stagnated for the best part of the last decade, with per capita income declining since 2014. - Structural constraints identified: factor market inefficiencies, inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs), dominant players in strategic sectors, excessive regulation, labor market rigidities, skills mismatches, financial market segmentation, deterioration in governance, and policy uncertainty. - Research focus and methods: - Narrative approach and multiple measures: aggregate mark-up (Diez, Leigh, Tambunlertchai, 2018; IMF, 2019b); industry-level mark-ups (Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke, 2008; Fedderke, Obikili, and Viegi, 2018); market concentration (Buthelezi, Mtani, and Ncube, 2018); and regulation indices (OECD, 2018). - Quantified reform payoff estimates: - Per capita growth could be higher by up to 1 percentage point, with headline growth increasing by 2.5 percentage points. - Reform priorities highlighted: - Change monopoly models in network industries (energy, telecommunications, transportation); - Foster competition using technology (banking, manufacturing); - Streamline regulations to support entrepreneurship. - Warning: Absent reforms, risk of “another lost decade and a lost generation”. ### II. UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S PRODUCT MARKETS — drivers and evidence of concentration - Three main drivers of high concentration: - Legacy of apartheid-era sanctions and SOE-led “national champions”; BEE altered shareholding but not market structure. - Government policies and high regulatory complexity (South Africa’s levels of regulation are higher than the OECD average) creating barriers to entry (ownership, domestic procurement, content requirements) and inflating production costs. - Incumbent firm conduct: mergers, exclusionary conduct, lobbying, collusion, and exclusivity clauses (evidence from the Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA)). - Key concentration and markup indicators: - A few firms controlled, on average, 62 percent of the relevant markets in strategic sectors (Buthelezi, Mtane, and Ncube, 2018). - Top five percent of firms raised market shares from 68 percent in 1996 to 75 percent in 2012 (Fedderke, Obikili and Viegi, 2018). - Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) notation: scores range from close to zero to 10,000 (monopoly); values above 2,500 point to highly concentrated markets. - Markup dynamics across databases: - Publicly listed firms (Diez, Leigh, Tambunlertchai, 2018): since 2000, South Africa’s markups have increased by nearly 25 percent; IMF (2019a) finds global markups increased by an average of 6 percent over the same period. - Firm-level IMF database (IMF, 2019b): markups in South Africa increased by almost 30 percent and decoupled from the SSA average following the GFC. - Manufacturing sector comparisons (Aghion et al., 1995-2004 vs Fedderke et al., 2010-12): most industries show higher estimated markups in 2010-12; food, tobacco, and chemicals experienced the biggest increases. - Caveat: Evidence on markups is sensitive to methodology and indices used; some studies (Budlender, 2019) urge nuance. ### III. HIGH MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES — correlations and mechanisms - Aggregate associations and trends: - Rising market power and markups beyond double digits are correlated with low growth and declining total factor productivity (TFP). - TFP trend: strong growth in the early 2000s with rising TFP until the GFC; TFP has failed to rebound after the GFC and has been on a declining trend. - Private investment rose before the GFC but failed to rebound thereafter; private investment trends mirror TFP declines. - Tradable sector contribution to domestic value added fell from 35 percent in 1993 to about 25 percent. - South Africa’s share of global exports has remained stagnant at about 0.6 percent. - Network industries and SOEs: - High concentration in network industries has allowed SOEs to pass inefficiencies to the rest of the economy, raising prices, delivering unreliable services, and creating fiscal costs through bailouts. - Large SOEs with outdated business models and weak governance create path dependency that deters entry by more efficient producers (Eskom cited as key example). - Labor market, SMEs, and distributional impacts: - Rising market power associated with slowdown in job creation and rising unemployment; large numbers of labor market entrants face weak job creation. - SMEs space is small and has shrunk; entrepreneurship rates have stagnated at low levels compared to peers. Large firms account for over 90 percent of new jobs. - SMEs cite barriers: access to finance, infrastructure, regulatory burden, crime, and unfair competition. - Market concentration sustains high price levels and structural inflation; consumers, especially low-income households, face higher prices for essential goods and services (food, petroleum, energy, telecommunications, transport), eroding purchasing power and worsening inequality. ### IV. REFORM OPTIONS — three-pronged agenda and examples - Overarching three-pronged agenda: - (i) reform SOEs and rethink their business models; - (ii) leverage innovation to increase private sector participation in strategic sectors; - (iii) review regulatory architecture and enforce competition policy to facilitate firm entry. - A. Reduce SOE footprint and introduce competition in network industries - Focus SOE reforms on greater efficiency and competition; implement plans to restructure, liquidate, or divest SOEs based on commercial viability. - Expedite National Treasury proposals: strengthen SOE governance, harden budget constraints, and increase private participation; transparently cost and finance developmental mandates through the budget. - Eskom-specific guidance: - Improving Eskom’s efficiency and productivity and tackling load shedding will reduce business uncertainty and contain budgetary drain. - Link any financing (notably transfers from government) to addressing Eskom’s underlying operational and financial problems; unbundling alone will not address those issues. Debt restructuring through SPVs without addressing vulnerabilities is inadequate. - Implement Eskom’s Roadmap (DPE, 2019) and the Integrated Resource Plan (DMRE, 2019) credibly. Separation of generation, transmission, and distribution is noted as a structural objective. - Transport, ports, and Transnet: - Findings: Transnet effectively controls maritime and railway sectors and oil pipelines; ports are criticized for logistics inefficiencies and high costs; rail freight in some cases charged higher than road; port costs higher than Asian competitors. - Recommendations: - Introduce competition to Transnet in the ports sector and allow new operators to use the rail network. - Stop cross-subsidization of Transnet’s operations to allow fair pricing and enable private participation. - Control Transnet’s monopoly power through contract clauses guaranteeing access to other players and ensuring price transparency. - South African Airways (SAA): - SAA’s business model needs an overhaul. - Recommendations: Expedite implementation of the Business Rescue Plan; reengineer the equity structure to leverage private sector expertise; reassess routes to optimize commercial objectives. - C. Leveraging innovation for an enabling and inclusive business environment - Potential: Significant private investment opportunities; digitalization can accelerate innovation, inclusion, and efficiency. - Key measures: - Electronic processing of tax submissions, refund payments, and customs declarations to save time, reduce costs, and reduce scope for corruption. - Expand use of the government’s procurement platform; reduce cost of data to accelerate digitalization. - Accelerate allocation of broadband spectrum to accelerate digitalization and support new products. - Encourage entry of new telecommunications players to reduce prices and increase mobile broadband subscriptions and data usage. - Leverage Fintech to expand financial products for the previously underbanked and lower prices; adapt regulations to safeguard financial stability. - Make government procurement more transparent, inclusive, and efficient; fully extend centralized procurement platform to include SOEs, provinces, and local governments; enhance procurement design to create SME opportunities while mitigating abuse. - D. Levelling the playing field to increase market contestability (competition policy) - Rationale: Reducing entry barriers and deregulation would allow greater contestability and increase private sector contribution to growth; SMEs benefit most. - Policy options: - Reduce licensing, permits, and other onerous requirements. - Facilitate access to existing infrastructure for new players in network industries. - Set clear and stable rules broadly applicable to businesses and enforce competition legislation. - Role of the CCSA: - Base interventions on industry-specific determinants of market concentration. - Since 2019, competition law amendments: CCSA can examine factors with adverse impact on competition, make resolutions binding, and block mergers with anti-competitive intent; enhanced powers are supported by more stringent sanctions. - Close remaining exemptions to competition law based on broadly defined firm characteristics or objectives and align them to international standards. - Specific recommendations: - Alleviate regulatory constraints that inhibit competition, including policy capture by domestic incumbents. - Prevent incumbent lock-in by enabling switching (e.g., system interoperability in mobile services, easing constraints on mobile money and POS withdrawals). - Carefully assess M&A that seek to preserve market dominance; scrutinize vertical integration and exclusive arrangements. - Shift from vertical, fiscally costly industrial incentives to horizontal strategies tied to measurable export (value-added) targets with government ability to withdraw benefits if targets are unmet. - Inject greater clarity and transparency for regulated prices; reduce uncertainty from tensions between NERSA and Eskom; scrutinize cost-recovery pricing and contract renegotiation with independent power producers. - E. Complementary policies, expected gains, and implementation considerations - Complementary priorities: - Reverse deterioration in fiscal outcomes and contain risks from SOEs; several SOEs will be further weakened by the pandemic. - Address labor market rigidities and alleviate labor regulations to open the economy and boost contestability. - Further governance reforms, rebuild institutions weakened by state capture, and strengthen coordination among government agencies. - Growth estimates and assumptions: - Implementing reforms could boost growth potential by at least 1 percentage point of GDP. - Assumes South Africa, over a five-year period, moves to the median of EMs across various indicators. - Product market reforms could deliver a per capita growth gain of about 1 percent of GDP—equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP overall. - Closing the gap on macro-stability and labor markets would give per capita growth gains of about 0.6 percent of GDP each. - Implementation and sequencing: - Enhance reform credibility by finalizing long-standing reforms with high payoffs (e.g., broadband spectrum allocation and streamlining mining rules). - Communicate urgency and trade-offs transparently; compensate groups whose benefits are eroded via fiscally responsible, time-bound transfers with well-defined sunset clauses and transitional employment protection with job search incentives. - Pace reforms cognizant of local economic and political conditions; prioritize sectoral reforms with broader spillovers (e.g., telecommunications and energy). - F. Concluding synthesis - The pandemic has exacerbated South Africa’s economic and social vulnerabilities; product market reforms are central to a credible reform strategy. - Market concentration and mark-ups were high before the pandemic; apartheid legacy, regulatory constraints, and anti-competitive behavior inhibited emergence of new firms, including labor-intensive SMEs. - Inefficient SOEs, particularly in network industries, have a large footprint and contribute to low private investment, weak exports, and weak TFP. - Distributional outcomes worsen as weak growth inhibits job creation and high prices on basic goods and services exacerbate poverty and inequality. - A credible reform strategy must: - Address market inefficiencies and increase competition. - Urgently improve operational and financial situations of SOEs to reduce fiscal risks. - Alleviate regulatory constraints and curtail anti-competitive behaviors to allow new firms to emerge and integrate in value chains. - Leverage digitalization and infrastructure sharing to increase competition. - Ensure CCSA continues industry-specific interventions. - Support product market reforms with post-pandemic policies that stabilize the economy, address labor market inefficiencies, and rebuild governance and institutions. - Appropriate sequencing informed by political economy can increase reform success and create opportunities for millions currently not fully integrated into the economic structure. *Source: wpiea2020206-print-pdf - introduction of private sector competition into generation and retail supply have (IMF).* ### REFERENCES ________________________________________________________________________________ 18 ### wpiea2020206-print-pdf - REFERENCES ________________________________________________________________________________ 18 ### I. INTRODUCTION — context and research focus - Covid-19 is exacerbating South Africa’s existing economic and structural vulnerabilities and will lead to a severe economic contraction, with a gradual recovery expected. - Growth had stagnated for the best part of the last decade, with per capita income declining since 2014. - Weak growth stems from structural constraints: factor market inefficiencies, inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs), dominant players in strategic sectors, excessive regulation, labor market rigidities, skills mismatches, financial market segmentation, deterioration in governance, and policy uncertainty. - This study focuses on market power and economic outcomes in South Africa, using a narrative approach and multiple measures: aggregate mark-up (Diez, Leigh, Tambunlertchai, 2018; IMF, 2019b); industry-level mark-ups (Aghion, Braun, and Fedderke, 2008; Fedderke, Obikili, and Viegi, 2018); market concentration (Buthelezi, Mtani, and Ncube, 2018); and regulation indices (OECD, 2018). - Per capita growth gains from product market reforms are estimated as: per capita growth could be higher by up to 1 percentage point, with headline growth increasing by 2.5 percentage points. - Reform priorities highlighted: change monopoly models in network industries (energy, telecommunications, transportation); foster competition using technology (banking, manufacturing); streamline regulations to support entrepreneurship. - Absent reforms, risk of “another lost decade and a lost generation” is emphasized. ### II. UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S PRODUCT MARKETS — drivers and evidence of concentration - Three main drivers of high concentration: - Legacy of apartheid-era sanctions and SOE-led “national champions” that created concentrated ownership and anti-competitive practices; BEE altered shareholding but not market structure. - Government policies and high regulatory complexity (South Africa’s levels of regulation are higher than the OECD average) that create barriers to entry (ownership, domestic procurement, content requirements) and inflate production costs. - Incumbent firm conduct: mergers, exclusionary conduct, lobbying, collusion, and exclusivity clauses that inhibit competition (evidence from the Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA)). - Key concentration and markup indicators: - A few firms controlled, on average, 62 percent of the relevant markets in strategic sectors (Buthelezi, Mtane, and Ncube, 2018). - Top five percent of firms raised market shares from 68 percent in 1996 to 75 percent in 2012 (Fedderke, Obikili and Viegi, 2018). - Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) notation: scores range from close to zero to 10,000 (monopoly); values above 2,500 point to highly concentrated markets. - Markup dynamics across databases: - Publicly listed firms (Diez, Leigh, Tambunlertchai, 2018): since 2000, South Africa’s markups have increased by nearly 25 percent; IMF (2019a) finds global markups increased by an average of 6 percent over the same period. - Firm-level IMF database (IMF, 2019b): markups in South Africa increased by almost 30 percent and decoupled from the SSA average following the GFC. - Manufacturing sector comparisons (Aghion et al., 1995-2004 vs Fedderke et al., 2010-12): most industries show higher estimated markups in 2010-12; food, tobacco, and chemicals experienced the biggest increases. - Evidence on markups is sensitive to methodology and indices used; some studies (Budlender, 2019) urge nuance in the narrative of high and rising markups. ### III. HIGH MARKET POWER AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES — correlations and mechanisms - Aggregate associations: - Rising market power and markups beyond double digits are correlated with low growth and declining total factor productivity (TFP). - TFP trend: strong growth in the early 2000s with rising TFP until the GFC; TFP has failed to rebound after the GFC and has been on a declining trend. - Private investment rose before the GFC but failed to rebound thereafter; private investment trends mirror TFP declines. - Tradable sector contribution to domestic value added fell from 35 percent in 1993 to about 25 percent. - South Africa’s share of global exports has remained stagnant at about 0.6 percent. - Network industries and SOEs: - High concentration in network industries has allowed SOEs to pass inefficiencies to the rest of the economy, raising prices, delivering unreliable services, and creating fiscal costs through bailouts. - Large SOEs with outdated business models and weak governance create path dependency that deters entry by more efficient producers (Eskom cited as key example). - Labor market, SMEs, and distributional impacts: - Rising market power associated with slowdown in job creation and rising unemployment; large numbers of labor market entrants face weak job creation. - SMEs space is small and has shrunk; entrepreneurship rates have stagnated at low levels compared to peers. Large firms account for over 90 percent of new jobs. - SMEs cite barriers: access to finance, infrastructure, regulatory burden, crime, and unfair competition. - Market concentration sustains high price levels and structural inflation; consumers, especially low-income households, face higher prices for essential goods and services (food, petroleum, energy, telecommunications, transport), eroding purchasing power and worsening inequality. ### IV. REFORM OPTIONS — three-pronged agenda and examples - Overarching agenda: (i) reform SOEs and rethink their business models; (ii) leverage innovation to increase private sector participation in strategic sectors; (iii) review regulatory architecture and enforce competition policy to facilitate firm entry. Proposed reforms align with or complement measures announced by the National Treasury (2019) and often require credible implementation of adopted policies. - A. Reduce SOE footprint and introduce competition in network industries - Focus SOE reforms on greater efficiency and competition, starting with network industries; implement plans to restructure, liquidate, or divest SOEs based on commercial viability. - Expedite National Treasury proposals: strengthen SOE governance, harden budget constraints, and increase private participation. Assess freeing up monitoring resources and transferring non-viable SOE government functions to the budget. Transparently cost and finance developmental mandates through the budget. Eskom, Transnet, and SAA are priorities. - Eskom-specific guidance: - Improving Eskom’s efficiency and productivity and tackling load shedding will reduce business uncertainty and contain budgetary drain. - Link any financing (notably transfers from government) to addressing Eskom’s underlying operational and financial problems; unbundling alone will not address those issues. Debt restructuring through SPVs without addressing vulnerabilities is inadequate. - Implement Eskom’s Roadmap (DPE, 2019) and the Integrated Resource Plan (DMRE, 2019) credibly. Separation of generation, transmission, and distribution is noted as a structural objective. *Italic line: Source: wpiea2020206-print-pdf - REFERENCES ________________________________________________________________________________ 18* ### introduction of private sector competition into generation and retail supply have ### wpiea2020206-print-pdf - introduction of private sector competition into generation and retail supply have ### A. Transport, ports, and network SOEs (Transnet) — findings and recommendations - Transnet effectively controls the maritime and railway sectors, as well as the oil pipelines, and its management of the ports is criticized for logistics inefficiencies and prevailing cost charged. - In some cases, rail freight is charged at a higher rate than road. - South Africa’s port cost is significantly more expensive than its Asian competitors. - The corporatization of Transnet National Ports Authority currently under consideration could be leveraged to improve port performance and inject greater corporate discipline. - Policy recommendations: - Introduce competition to Transnet in the ports sector and allow new operators to use the rail network. - Stop cross-subsidization of Transnet’s operations to allow fair pricing and enable private participation. - Control Transnet’s monopoly power through contract clauses guaranteeing access to other players and ensuring price transparency. ### B. South African Airways (SAA) - SAA’s business model needs an overhaul. - Recommendation: Expedite implementation of the Business Rescue Plan to address over-spending and operational inefficiencies. - Recommendation: Reengineer the equity structure to leverage private sector expertise and market discipline and reassess routes to optimize commercial objectives. ### C. Leveraging innovation for an enabling and inclusive business environment - Potential: Significant private investment opportunities across the economy; digitalization can accelerate innovation, inclusion, and efficiency. - Key measures: - Electronic processing of tax submissions, refund payments, and customs declarations to save time, reduce costs, and reduce scope for corruption. - Expand use of the government’s procurement platform; reduce cost of data to accelerate digitalization. - Accelerate allocation of broadband spectrum to accelerate digitalization, support new products, improve service delivery, and create business opportunities with minimal trade-offs. - Encourage entry of new telecommunications players to reduce prices, increase mobile broadband subscriptions and data usage, and increase broadband speeds. - Leverage Fintech to expand financial products for the previously underbanked and lower prices; adapt regulations to safeguard financial stability. - Make government procurement more transparent, inclusive, and efficient; fully extend centralized procurement platform to include SOEs, provinces, and local governments; enhance procurement design to create SME opportunities while mitigating abuse. ### D. Levelling the playing field to increase market contestability (competition policy) - Rationale: Reducing entry barriers and deregulation would allow greater contestability and increase private sector contribution to growth; SMEs benefit most from deregulation. - Policy options: - Reduce licensing, permits, and other onerous requirements to improve return on investment and encourage entrepreneurship. - Facilitate access to existing infrastructure for new players in network industries, particularly finance and telecommunication. - Set clear and stable rules broadly applicable to businesses and enforce competition legislation. - Role of the CCSA: - Effective policies and enforcement can support competition and lower prices. - CCSA should base interventions on industry-specific determinants of market concentration. - Since 2019, competition law amendments: CCSA can examine factors with adverse impact on competition, make resolutions binding, and block mergers with anti-competitive intent; enhanced powers are supported by more stringent sanctions. - Remaining exemptions to competition law based on broadly defined firm characteristics or objectives should be closed and aligned to international standards. - Specific recommendations: - Alleviate regulatory constraints that inhibit competition, including policy capture by domestic incumbents that protect market share via regulations and non-trade barriers. - Prevent incumbent lock-in by measures enabling switching (e.g., system interoperability in mobile services, easing constraints on mobile money and POS withdrawals). - Carefully assess M&A plans that seek to preserve market dominance; scrutinize vertical integration and exclusive arrangements to create space for SMEs. - Enhance competition by combating policy capture and rethinking industrial support: shift from vertical, fiscally costly incentives to horizontal strategies that benefit the whole economy and tie favorable treatment to measurable export (value-added) targets with government ability to withdraw benefits if targets are unmet. - Inject greater clarity and transparency for regulated prices; for example, reduce uncertainty from tensions between NERSA and Eskom and scrutinize cost-recovery pricing and contract renegotiation with independent power producers. ### E. Complementary policies, expected gains, and implementation considerations - Complementary priorities (to be looked at simultaneously with product market reforms): - Reverse deterioration in fiscal outcomes and contain risks from SOEs; several SOEs will be further weakened by the pandemic; Eskom’s capacity to provide reliable electricity is a key determinant of growth. - Address labor market rigidities and alleviate labor regulations to open the economy and boost contestability; pandemic will exacerbate unemployment, including youth unemployment. - Further governance reforms and provide greater policy clarity; rebuild institutions weakened by state capture and strengthen coordination among government agencies to define responsibilities and enforce accountability. - Growth estimates and assumptions: - Implementing reforms could boost growth potential by at least 1 percentage point of GDP. - Assumes South Africa, over a five-year period, moves to the median of EMs across various indicators. - Product market reforms could deliver a per capita growth gain of about 1 percent of GDP—equivalent to 2.5 percent of GDP overall. - Closing the gap on macro-stability and labor markets would give per capita growth gains of about 0.6 percent of GDP each. - Implementation and sequencing recommendations: - Enhance reform credibility by finalizing long-standing reforms with high payoffs (e.g., broadband spectrum allocation and streamlining mining rules). - Communicate the urgency and trade-offs transparently regarding South Africa’s vulnerable economic situation and the cost of inaction. - Compensate groups whose benefits are eroded during reforms via fiscally responsible, time-bound transfers with well-defined sunset clauses and transitional employment protection with job search incentives. - Pace reforms cognizant of local economic and political conditions; prioritize sequencing where sectoral reforms have broader spillovers (e.g., telecommunications and energy) and complement product market reforms with effective regulation to support job creation and price reductions. ### F. Concluding remarks — synthesis - The pandemic has exacerbated South Africa’s economic and social vulnerabilities; product markets reforms are central to a credible reform strategy. - Market concentration and mark-ups were high before the pandemic; apartheid legacy, regulatory constraints, and anti-competitive behavior inhibited emergence of new firms, including labor-intensive SMEs. - Inefficient SOEs, particularly in network industries, have a large footprint and contribute to low private investment, weak exports, and weak TFP. - Distributional outcomes worsen as weak growth inhibits job creation and high prices on basic goods and services exacerbate poverty and inequality. - A credible reform strategy must: - Address market inefficiencies and increase competition. - Urgently improve operational and financial situations of SOEs to reduce fiscal risks. - Alleviate regulatory constraints and curtail anti-competitive behaviors to allow new firms to emerge and integrate in value chains. - Leverage digitalization and infrastructure sharing to increase competition. - Ensure CCSA continues industry-specific interventions. - Support product market reforms with post-pandemic policies that stabilize the economy, address labor market inefficiencies, and rebuild governance and institutions. - Appropriate sequencing informed by political economy can increase reform success; successful implementation will create opportunities for millions currently not fully integrated into the economic structure and support a fairer, more inclusive society. *Source: wpiea2020206-print-pdf - introduction of private sector competition into generation and retail supply have (IMF).* ### References ### References ### Academic studies on competition, market power, and productivity - Aghion, P., M. Braun and J. Fedderke, 2008. “Competition and Productivity Growth in South Africa,” Economics of Transition, 16: 741–68. - Aghion, P., and R. Griffith, 2005. Competition and Growth: Reconciling Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. - Autor, D., D. Dorn, L. F Katz, C. Patterson, J. Van Reenen, 2020, “The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(2):645–709 - Baqaee, D., and E. Farhi. 2020. "Productivity and Misallocation in General Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(1): 105-163. - Basu, S. 2019. "Are Price-Cost Markups Rising in the United States? A Discussion of the Evidence." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33 (3): 3-22. - Baumol, W. J. 1982. “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure,” American Economic Review, 72(1): 1–15. - Bourlès, R., G. Cette, J. Lopez, J. Mairesse and G. Nicoletti. 2013. "Do Product Market Regulations In Upstream Sectors Curb Productivity Growth? Panel Data Evidence For OECD Countries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 95(5): 1750-1768. - De Loecker, J., J. Eeckhout, and G. Unger. 2020. “The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(2), 561-644. - Díez, F., D. Leigh, and S. Tambunlertchai. 2018. “Global Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Implications.” IMF Working Paper 18/137, IMF, Washington, DC. - Duval, R., D. Fuceri. 2018. "The Effects of Labor and Product Market Reforms: The Role of Macroeconomic Conditions and Policies," IMF Economic Review, vol. 66(1): 31-69. - Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer. 2015. "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" American Economic Review, 105(10), 3150-3182, available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt - Kaplinsky, R., and C. Manning. 1998. “Concentration, competition policy and the role of small and medium‐sized enterprises in South Africa's industrial development.” The Journal of Development Studies, 35:1, 139-161 - Munkacsi, Z., and M. Saxegaard. 2017. “Structural Reform Packages, Sequencing, and the Informal Economy”, IMF Working Paper 17/125, IMF, Washington, DC. - Prati, A., M. G. Onorato, and C. Papageorgiou. 2013. "Which Reforms Work and under What Institutional Environment? Evidence from a New Data Set on Structural Reforms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(3): 946-968. - Roberts, S. 2004. “The Role for Competition Policy in Economic Development: The South African Experience.” Development Southern Africa 21 (1): 227–243. - Syverson, C., 2019, “Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33, 23–43. ### Empirical and country-specific analyses focused on South Africa - Budlender, J., 2019. Markups and Market Structure in South Africa: What Can be Learnt from New Administrative Data?, UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2019/58. Helsinki. - Buthelezi, T., T. Mtani, and L. Mncube, 2018, “The Extent of Market Concentration in South Africa’s Product Markets”, Working Paper 2018/05, Competition Commission of South Africa, Pretoria. - Competition Commission of South Africa. 2017. Annual Report 2016–17. Pretoria. - Competition Commission of South Africa. 2018. Annual Report 2017–18. Pretoria. - Competition Commission of South Africa. 2019. Data Services Market Inquiry—Final Report: Non-Confidential. Pretoria. - Das Nair, R., and Dube, Shingie, Competition. 2015. “Barriers to Entry and Inclusive Growth: Case Study on Fruit and Veg City.” CCRED Working Paper No. 9/2015. - Dauda, S., Nyman, S., and Cassim, A. 2019. ‘Product Market Competition, Productivity, and Jobs: The Case of South Africa’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9084. World Bank Group, Washington D.C. - Faulkner, D., and C. Loewald. 2008. Policy Change and Economic Growth: A Case Study of South Africa. Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper; No. 41. World Bank. Washington, DC. - Fedderke, J., N. Obikili, and N. Viegi. 2018. “Markups and Concentration in South African Manufacturing Sectors: An Analysis with Administrative Data.” South African Journal of Economics 86(S1): 120–40. - FinMark Trust (2010). “FinScope Small Business Survey 2010.” - Makhaya, G., & S. Roberts. 2013. “Expectations and outcomes: considering competition and corporate power in South Africa under democracy.” Review of African Political Economy, 40:138, 556-571 - National Treasury. 2019. Economic Transformation, Inclusive Growth and Competitiveness: A Contribution Towards a Growth Agenda for the South African Economy. Economic Policy Division, National Treasury, South Africa. - Pieterse, D., Farole, T., Odendaal, M., and Steenkamp, A. 2015. “Enhancing South Africa’s Export Competitiveness: Reform of the Port and Rail Network.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 7532. Washington, DC: World Bank. - Roberts, S. 2004. “The Role for Competition Policy in Economic Development: The South African Experience.” Development Southern Africa 21 (1): 227–243. - Statistics South Africa, (various issues), Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa. - World Bank. 2016. South Africa Economic Update: Promoting Faster Growth and Poverty Alleviation Through Competition, Washington, DC: World Bank Group. ### Policy, institutional, and sector reports - Department of Mineral Resources and Energy. 2019. Integrated Resource Plan 2019. Pretoria. - Department of Public Enterprises. 2019. Roadmap for Eskom in a Reformed Electricity Supply Industry. Pretoria. - International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2015. Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. A Report to the G20 Development Working Group by the IMF, OECD, UN, and the World Bank. - International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2019a. “The Rise of Corporate Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Effects.” World Economic Outlook, Washington, DC, April. - International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2019b. “Competition, Competitiveness, and Growth.” Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC, October. - OECD (2018), Product Market Regulation Database, OECD: Paris. ### Working papers and forthcoming pieces on reform and recovery - Ganum, P., and V. Thakoor, (forthcoming), “Post-COVID-19 Recovery and Resilience: Leveraging Structural Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa,” IMF Working Paper. - Munkacsi, Z., and M. Saxegaard. 2017. “Structural Reform Packages, Sequencing, and the Informal Economy”, IMF Working Paper 17/125, IMF, Washington, DC. - Díez, F., D. Leigh, and S. Tambunlertchai. 2018. “Global Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Implications.” IMF Working Paper 18/137, IMF, Washington, DC. - Dauda, S., Nyman, S., and Cassim, A. 2019. ‘Product Market Competition, Productivity, and Jobs: The Case of South Africa’. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9084. World Bank Group, Washington D.C. *Source: wpiea2020206-print-pdf - References* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020206-print-pdf.pdf_