## wpiea2020213-print-pdf

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---

### I. Introduction
- Governments face many fiscal risks; state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a high-stakes area.
- SOE portfolios in many countries remain large, diversified, and complex to assess.
- Potential consequences of SOE distress:
  - Large cost to the budget from bailouts and possible effects on the country's credit rating.
  - Failure to deliver core public services (water, electricity) and potential spillovers to the financial sector.
  - Undermining economic growth when SOE efficiency is poor, especially in network sectors.
  - Management of substantial national wealth in some cases (e.g., national oil companies).
- Causes of weak SOE outcomes highlighted:
  - Unfunded policy mandates (excessive hiring, selling below cost).
  - Weak governance and limited government capacity to oversee SOEs.
  - Sparse information on SOEs undermining risk assessment.
  - Soft-budget constraints creating incentives for riskier management when government support is expected.
- Role of IMF work:
  - IMF programs address SOEs to ensure sound fiscal accounts and contain fiscal risks.
  - This paper introduces a “risk tool” to enhance monitoring, benchmark SOE performance, and provide quantitative fiscal-cost estimates when SOEs are hit by shocks.

### II. SOEs: Economic and Budgetary Impact
- Prevalence and sectors:
  - SOEs are prevalent in network sectors and are critical for well-functioning economies.
  - In some countries SOEs number in the thousands (examples given: China, Germany, Russia).
  - SOEs mainly operate in public utilities, energy (oil and gas), transportation, and banking.
  - SOEs are dominant in water and public transportation in advanced economies and significant in electricity in most countries.
  - SOEs are leading players in infrastructure.
- Employment and scale:
  - According to ILO data, SOEs represent on average 3 percent of the labor force, compared to 13 percent by the general government.
  - In some cases, like Ukraine, the proportions are inverted.
- Macroeconomic implications of weak SOE performance:
  - Inefficiencies in SOEs supplying inputs (e.g., electricity) can undermine other sectors, reduce competitiveness, cause unreliable service provision, or higher input costs.
  - Protection from competition combined with lower SOE efficiency can undermine aggregate productivity through resource misallocation.
- Fiscal exposure channels and opacity:
  - Size of SOE operations implies potentially large fiscal risks.
  - Limited transparency, complex holding structures, and sparse information make monitoring difficult.
  - Many SOEs face soft budget constraints; data show a large share of SOEs suffer persistent losses across sectors.
- Examples of SOE–budget interactions and specific data:
  - Direct links: transfers from SOEs to the budget (taxes and dividends).
  - Transfers from the budget to SOEs: subsidies, capital transfers, capital injections, loans, equity.
  - Below-the-line operations: loans or equity injections to SOEs.
  - Government-provided guarantees to SOEs can create contingent fiscal exposure.
  - Sample for persistent losses measure: about 102 counties (note as provided).
  - Georgian Rail (2016): transferred property with fair value of GEL 86 million (0.25 percent of GDP) to the government for GEL 147 million (0.43 percent of GDP); difference recognized as a non-cash equity contribution by the government.
  - Bosnia and Herzegovina: estimated tax and social contributions arrears of SOEs reached 4 percent of GDP in 2019.
  - Example: in Vietnam, SOEs paid 5.4 percent of GDP in taxes in 2015.

### III. Types and Drivers of Fiscal Risks from SOEs
- Fiscal risk transmission channels (Table 1 summary — unexpected impact on Revenue / Expenditure / Net financial position):
  - Revenue:
    - Variations in taxes and royalties
    - Variations in dividends
    - Cancellation of government loans to SOEs
  - Expenditure:
    - Higher subsidies or transfers triggered by indexation schemes, bailouts or explicit contingent liabilities
    - Higher interest payments triggered by debt guarantees
    - Equity purchases with below-market returns
    - Additional borrowing to fill gross financing needs
  - Net financial position:
    - Realization of explicit contingent liabilities of SOEs
    - Hidden liabilities
    - Accumulation of tax arrears
    - Credit risks in loans to SOEs
    - Positive valuation effects on SOEs liabilities or negative effects on SOEs assets
- Revenue-side specifics:
  - National oil companies frequently are the largest taxpayer/contributor in oil-exporting countries; revenues volatile due to oil price fluctuations and involvement in high-risk or non-core activities.
  - Dividend volatility can significantly impact budgets.
  - Accumulation of tax arrears undermines collections (example above: Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 percent of GDP in 2019).
- Expenditure-side specifics:
  - Materialization of risks can increase budget transfers to SOEs: recurrent subsidies, capital transfers, capital injections.
  - Subsidies can be linked to operational deficits or mandated quasi-fiscal activities and can vary considerably by country and context.
- Fiscal costs and cross-country evidence:
  - National oil or mining companies can transfer sizeable sums to governments (e.g. Saudi Aramco transferred 19 percent of GDP on average in the last three years).
  - Dividends from the Panama Canal Company represent 10-15 percent of government revenue.
  - Average bailout cost was above 5 percent of GDP in the 1990s and the 2010–18 periods; average was lower than 2 percent of GDP in the 2000s.
  - Bailout costs in some cases exceeded 10 percent of GDP.
  - Examples:
    - Jordan: transfers between 2012 and 2015 totaling 15 percent of GDP cumulatively to NEPCO.
    - Samoa: bailout to Polynesian Airlines in 1994 of 16 per cent of GDP.
    - Dubai World bailout in 2009 of 9 percent of Dubai’s GDP.
  - Sectoral QFA estimates: SSA electricity sector averaged 1.6 percent of GDP with 10 countries exceeding 2 percent of GDP.
  - PEMEX (2015): MXN 381 billion losses before royalties and other taxes; overall tax payments amounted to MXN 331 billion (1.8 percent of GDP).
  - Gambia (2017): trade arrears to NAWEC amounted to 1.7 percent of 2017 GDP.
- SOE balance-sheet magnitudes:
  - On average, non-financial SOEs financial assets account for 18 percent of those of the general government.
  - On average, liabilities of non-financial SOEs account for 34 of general government’s stocks (as reported).
  - Examples of guarantees:
    - South Africa: guarantees totaling 7 percent of GDP to SOEs, and a further 2.5 percent of GDP related to contracts with IPPs (March 2019).
    - Vietnam: guaranteed loans to SOEs close to 10 percent of GDP.
- Drivers of vulnerability:
  - Exogenous shocks: GDP growth slowdowns, interest rates, exchange rates, oil prices.
  - Built-up internal vulnerabilities: accumulation of losses, excessive leverage, complex government–SOE relationships.
  - Governance weaknesses: political interference, boards lacking independence, weak internal controls, corruption.
  - Uncompensated QFAs: over-staffing, regulated prices below cost.
  - Cross-arrears between SOEs and governments.

### IV. Monitoring and Risk-Assessment Tools
- Aggregate and transparency monitoring essentials:
  - Inventory of existing SOEs (central and subnational levels, ownership status, responsible institutions, sectors).
  - Prioritization of SOEs for closer monitoring (complex business models, large fiscal risks, systemic macro effects).
  - Combine historical and forward-looking analysis (trend indicators and baseline/upside/downside scenarios).
- Useful aggregate indicators:
  - Magnitude of SOE revenues, expenditures or assets relative to GDP.
  - Magnitude of SOE liabilities as a percentage of GDP.
  - Net financial transfers (subsidies and transfers less taxes, royalties, dividends, interest payments) relative to GDP or total government expenditure.
  - Net financial worth, net worth, liquidity measures (net liquid assets), currency mismatches, risk-adjusted assets and liabilities.
- Quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs) monitoring:
  - Inventory non-commercial activities and estimate cost by activity (including financial costs).
  - Uncompensated losses = difference between prices plus compensation less costs.
  - Differentiate quasi-fiscal costs before taxes and after taxes and dividends.
  - Regular updates and coordination with line ministries/regulators.
- Firm-level “risk tool” (two-block structure):
  - Historical benchmarking of SOE financial indicators against peers (median, top 75th and bottom 25th percentiles).
  - Forward-looking stress-testing with baseline and risk scenarios, customizable shocks, and behavioral/structural parameters.
- Benchmark indicator categories:
  - Profitability: ROE, ROA.
  - Leverage: non-current liabilities to total assets.
  - Liquidity: current ratio, interest cover.
  - Cost and revenue: operating revenue per employee, labor cost per operating revenue.
- Forward-looking analysis inputs:
  - Medium-term macro projections (domestic and world GDP growth and inflation, exchange rate, short-term and long-term interest rates) with baseline and risk scenarios.
  - Matrix of shocks (stress tests use at least 2–3 standard deviations from baseline real GDP growth in examples).
  - Behavioral and structural parameters: share of domestic/world sales, share of imported inputs, share of oil on sales/inputs, planned investments, sensitivities, debt structure (FX share, guaranteed/on-lent debt, average tenor), policy parameters (tax rates, dividend payout ratios).
- Government reaction rules in the tool:
  - Transfers triggered to ensure minimum liquidity and to prevent solvency breaches (debt-to-equity approaching ceiling).
  - Liquidity proxied by quick liquidity ratio (cash, receivables, other liquid financial assets / current liabilities).
  - Calibrate liquidity and solvency thresholds using historical distress values, governance strength, reputational factors, SOE size/strategic importance, and government risk aversion.
  - Example calibration: liquidity floors set between 0.5 and 0.6 of current liabilities; debt-to-equity ratio cap between 1.4 and 2.
  - When both liquidity and leverage constraints bind and no alternative financing exists, government assumed to step in; tool captures asset divestment alternatives but rules out incurrence of arrears.

### Illustrative scenarios: Companies A, B, C (emerging market SOEs)
- Baseline assumptions (WEO October 2019): sales and non-oil output prices around trend, exchange rates stable, oil prices decline slightly.
- Company A (electricity):
  - 90 percent of sales are domestic.
  - Low but positive profitability; high debt triggers capital injections even in baseline alongside new borrowing to meet liquidity levels.
  - Around 20 percent of transfers used to service government-guaranteed debt, which accounts for 50 percent of outstanding domestic stock.
  - Stress outcome example: contribution to public net financial worth falls from 0.3 percent of GDP to -0.5 percent in 2024 (ex-transfers scenario).
  - NPV of capital injections in stress is 0.4 percent of GDP higher than baseline; NPV of net inflows worsens from -0.1 to -0.4 percent of GDP.
- Company B (air transport):
  - Negative equity due to cumulative losses; 50 percent of production sold internationally; oil accounts for 50 percent of variable costs.
  - Low liquidity and negative equity necessitate capital injections rather than borrowing even in baseline.
  - Stress outcome example: deterioration in EBIT and equity; in stress NPV of transfers raises by 0.25 percent of the pre-shock GDP; net inflows deteriorate by 0.3 percent of GDP to -0.8 percent.
  - Without transfers, borrowing would further worsen solvency and reduce SOE contribution to public net financial worth by 0.4 percent of GDP.
- Company C (oil):
  - 80 percent of oil sold in foreign markets.
  - Large oil price fall and world slowdown severely hurt operating profits; return on assets nears -30 percent at peak of shock; gross financing needs surge.
  - Initial low leverage and high cash allow partial self-financing, but capital injections still needed to avoid negative equity.
  - Absent capital injections, SOE contribution to public net financial worth would worsen by almost 20 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - NPV of capital injections example: 8.6 percent of the pre-shock GDP.
  - Net contribution to the budget falls from 2.4 percent of GDP to -8.2 percent (NPV of net budget inflows example).

- Table — Selected financial indicators of Companies A, B and C (baseline) — values reproduced exactly.
  - A (electricity)
    - ROA: 2.4 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.5
    - ROA (ex-transfers): 2.4 -0.6 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.5
    - Quick ratio: 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
    - Quick ratio (ex-transfers): 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
    - Debt-to-equity: 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.7
    - Debt-to-equity (ex-transfers): 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.2
    - NPV transfers (share of GDP): 0.4
  - B (airline)
    - ROA: -76.1 10.7 10.4 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.3
    - ROA (ex-transfers): -74.7 -71.8 -64.1 -51.0 -39.0 -27.5 -16.5
    - Quick ratio: 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
    - Quick ratio (ex-transfers): 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
    - Debt-to-equity: -1.9 -1.8 -1.9 -2.0 -2.2 -2.6 -3.3
    - Debt-to-equity (ex-transfers): -1.9 -1.5 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3
    - NPV transfers (share of GDP): 0.7
  - C (oil)
    - ROA: 5.2 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 4.8
    - ROA (ex-transfers): 5.2 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 4.8
    - Quick ratio: 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9
    - Quick ratio (ex-transfers): 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9
    - Debt-to-equity: 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
    - Debt-to-equity (ex-transfers): 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
    - NPV transfers (share of GDP): 0.0

### V. Mitigation Strategies (firm-level and macro-fiscal)
- Firm-level strategies:
  - Strengthen corporate governance (independence of boards, management skills, internal controls).
  - Enhance oversight to reduce risk-taking and enforce budget discipline (timely, standardized, reliable financial reports).
  - Compensate or limit uncompensated QFAs; quantify and monitor them.
  - Avoid excessive dividend/tax extraction that undermines company solvency and investment.
  - Use clear performance contracts linking objectives, KPIs, reporting obligations, dividend policy, and sanctions/rewards; set multi-year corporate plans with financial objectives.
  - Consider borrowing limits and liability ceilings:
    - Borrowing limits monitorable at high frequency and linked to operations.
    - Liability ceilings as medium-term anchors; consider net financial assets (NFA) floors as better solvency indicators.
    - Combine flow (borrowing) and stock (liability) ceilings; consider risk-weighted asset caps and leverage caps.
  - Limit debt guarantees and contingent liabilities:
    - Set ceilings for guarantees, require cost-benefit analysis, require collateral or guarantee fees reflecting expected losses.
  - Strengthen oversight capacity:
    - Centralize oversight (autonomous agency, holding company, or empowered MoF/Treasury unit) with technical capacity and legal authority to monitor, standardize reporting and enforce limits.
    - Examples noted: Finland, France, Kenya, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Singapore; Treasury role in New Zealand.
- Macroe-fiscal and transparency measures:
  - Improve fiscal coverage and transparency of SOEs in fiscal statistics and fiscal risk statements; report contingent liabilities, QFAs and transactions with government.
  - Consider including SOEs in consolidated fiscal targets or at least those that pose significant fiscal risks and are majority-owned:
    - Advantages: stronger fiscal discipline incentives, reduced ability to shift spending off-budget, better alignment of public sector fiscal goals.
    - Challenges: possible constraints on SOE operations; need to set targets accounting for investment plans and sector specificities.
    - If selectively included, require robust dynamic risk assessment and high thresholds for removal from targets.
  - Ministry of Finance roles:
    - Establish a department for SOE risk monitoring and assessment; coordinate with shareholding ministries and regulators.
    - Require standardized and frequent reporting (monthly/quarterly) converted to GFS where needed; publish IFRS-compliant statements and consolidated data.
    - Gatekeep and authorize individual borrowing decisions relative to approved financial plans.
- Crisis support principles:
  - Target support to address shock impacts and prioritize SOEs with large social/economic impact.
  - Assess cost-effectiveness and burden sharing with private investors where mixed ownership exists.
  - Make support temporary with an exit strategy; cap fiscal costs and guarantees ex ante where possible.
  - Ensure high transparency, parliamentary approval and full reporting of support and contingent liabilities.
  - Link support to reforms to improve efficiency, contain costs and strengthen governance where SOEs show systematic weaknesses.

### Conclusions and priorities
- SOEs operate in core sectors and can pose large fiscal risks through direct costs (transfers, guarantees) and indirect macro-financial spillovers.
- Key priorities for governments:
  - Demand timely, reliable and standardized reporting from SOEs to ensure accountability.
  - Strengthen oversight capacity and governance to align management incentives with owner priorities.
  - Use benchmarking and forward-looking stress-testing tools to identify vulnerabilities and prepare for tail risks.
  - Pursue policy measures including borrowing limits, performance contracts, clearer rules on guarantees, greater transparency, and, where appropriate, inclusion of SOEs in fiscal targets to strengthen fiscal discipline.

*Source: IMF working paper wpiea2020213-print-pdf (2017 content provided).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### wpiea2020213-print-pdf - References .............................................................................................................

### I. Introduction
- Governments face many fiscal risks; state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a high-stakes area.
- SOE portfolios in many countries remain large, diversified, and complex to assess.
- Potential consequences of SOE distress:
  - Large cost to the budget from bailouts and possible effects on the country's credit rating.
  - Failure to deliver core public services (water, electricity) and potential spillovers to the financial sector.
  - Undermining economic growth when SOE efficiency is poor, especially in network sectors.
  - Management of substantial national wealth in some cases (e.g., national oil companies).
- Causes of weak SOE outcomes highlighted:
  - Unfunded policy mandates (excessive hiring, selling below cost).
  - Weak governance and limited government capacity to oversee SOEs.
  - Sparse information on SOEs undermining risk assessment.
  - Soft-budget constraints creating incentives for riskier management when government support is expected.
- Role of IMF work:
  - IMF programs address SOEs to ensure sound fiscal accounts and contain fiscal risks.
  - Prior IMF papers addressed public enterprises at general or region-specific levels; concerns existed about excluding SOEs from fiscal targets and potential for riskier behaviour.
  - This paper introduces a “risk tool” to enhance monitoring, benchmark SOE performance, and provide quantitative fiscal-cost estimates when SOEs are hit by shocks.
- Paper organization (as provided):
  - Section II: relationship between SOEs and the economy and budget.
  - Section III: types of risks and main drivers.
  - Section IV: new “risk tool” for monitoring and fiscal-risk assessment.
  - Section V: mitigation strategies.
  - Conclusion.

### II. SOEs: Economic and Budgetary Impact
- Prevalence and sectors:
  - SOEs are prevalent in network sectors and are critical for well-functioning economies.
  - In some countries SOEs number in the thousands (examples given: China, Germany, Russia).
  - SOEs mainly operate in public utilities, energy (oil and gas), transportation, and banking (Figure 1).
  - SOEs are dominant in water and public transportation in advanced economies and significant in electricity in most countries.
  - SOEs are leading players in infrastructure (World Bank 2017).
- Employment and scale:
  - According to ILO data, SOEs represent on average 3 percent of the labor force, compared to 13 percent by the general government.
  - In some cases, like Ukraine, the proportions are inverted.
- Macroeconomic implications of weak SOE performance:
  - As providers of inputs (e.g., electricity), SOE inefficiencies can undermine other sectors, reduce competitiveness, cause unreliable service provision, or higher input costs.
  - Undersupply of core public services (utilities, transport) can adversely affect households.
  - Protection from competition combined with lower SOE efficiency can undermine aggregate productivity through resource misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson 2019; Song and others 2011).
- Fiscal exposure channels:
  - Size of SOE operations implies potentially large fiscal risks (Figure 2).
  - Limited transparency on SOE operations exacerbates risks and challenges assessment of public-sector health.
  - Many SOEs face soft budget constraints; data show a large share of SOEs suffer persistent losses across sectors (Figure 3).
  - Complex holding structures increase opaqueness, making monitoring difficult.
- Examples of SOE–budget interactions:
  - Direct links: transfers from SOEs to the budget (taxes and dividends).
  - Transfers from the budget to SOEs: subsidies, capital transfers, capital injections, loans, equity.
  - Below-the-line operations: loans or equity injections to SOEs.
  - Government-provided guarantees to SOEs can create contingent fiscal exposure.
- Specific data points and examples:
  - Sample for persistent losses measure: about 102 counties (note as provided).
  - Georgian Rail example (2016): transferred property with fair value of GEL 86 million (0.25 percent of GDP) to the government for GEL 147 million (0.43 percent of GDP); difference recognized as a non-cash equity contribution by the government.
  - Benin: net flows into the budget were large and persistently negative in the illustrated period (Figure 4 shows Dividends and Taxes vs Subsidies for 2014–2016).

### III. Types and Drivers of Fiscal Risks from SOEs
- Overview:
  - Numerous transmission channels mean SOE shocks are likely to impact government budget or balance sheet.
  - Some effects are automatic (e.g., lower profits → lower dividends); others materialize only if government provides support (bailouts, contingent-liability realization).
  - Monitoring and mitigation require understanding channels and drivers of SOE vulnerabilities.
- Table 1 summary — Fiscal Risks (unexpected impact on Revenue / Expenditure / Net financial position):
  - Revenue:
    - Variations in taxes and royalties
    - Variations in dividends
    - Cancellation of government loans to SOEs
  - Expenditure:
    - Higher subsidies or transfers triggered by indexation schemes, bailouts or explicit contingent liabilities
    - Higher interest payments triggered by debt guarantees
    - Equity purchases with below-market returns
    - Additional borrowing to fill gross financing needs
  - Net financial position:
    - Realization of explicit contingent liabilities of SOEs
    - Hidden liabilities
    - Accumulation of tax arrears
    - Credit risks in loans to SOEs
    - Positive valuation effects on SOEs liabilities or negative effects on SOEs assets
- Revenue-side considerations:
  - Taxes, royalties and dividends from SOEs can be significant but volatile.
  - National oil companies frequently are the largest taxpayer/contributor in oil-exporting countries; revenues volatile due to oil price fluctuations and involvement in high-risk or non-core activities (Figure 5).
  - Dividend volatility can significantly impact budgets.
  - Accumulation of tax arrears undermines collections: Bosnia and Herzegovina estimated tax and social contributions arrears of SOEs reached 4 percent of GDP in 2019.
  - Example data fragment (as provided): For example, in Vietnam, SOEs paid 5.4 percent of GDP in taxes in 2015, 1.7 percent of GDP in Seychelles in [text truncated in source].
- Expenditure-side considerations:
  - Materialization of risks can increase budget transfers to SOEs: recurrent subsidies (operational losses, policy mandates, quasi-fiscal activities), capital transfers, capital injections.
  - Subsidies can be linked to operational deficits or mandated quasi-fiscal activities and can vary considerably by country and context.

### IV. Monitoring and Risk-Assessment Tools (overview from source)
- The paper introduces a “risk tool” to:
  - Enhance monitoring of SOEs.
  - Establish SOE performance benchmarks relative to peers.
  - Provide quantitative estimates of fiscal costs when SOEs are hit by shocks.
  - Inform government decisions on whether to retain or divest SOEs.
- Uses of the risk tool include:
  - Assessing fiscal exposures from direct and contingent links.
  - Benchmarking financial indicators (examples and figures referenced: Figures 9–16).
  - Calculating net present value (NPV) of net budget inflows from company scenarios (Figures 12, 14, 16).

### V. Mitigation Strategies (overview from source)
- Core mitigation elements emphasized:
  - Promote right incentives to ensure firms are managed efficiently and prudently (limit soft-budget constraints).
  - Strengthen capacity of government agencies to oversee SOEs.
  - Fully integrate SOEs into the overall fiscal framework to ensure fiscal discipline and transparency and reduce fiscal risks.
- Challenges highlighted:
  - Limited effectiveness of some strategies when capacity, information, and governance are weak.
  - Risk that excluding SOEs from fiscal targets encourages risk-taking if not accompanied by governance and oversight improvements.

*Source: IMF working paper content (wpiea2020213-print-pdf).*

### 2017. The case of national oil or mining companies is particularly striking as the sum of total income (taxes,

### wpiea2020213-print-pdf - 2017

### Fiscal costs and channels of SOE-related risks
- National oil or mining companies can transfer sizeable sums to governments (e.g. Saudi Aramco transferred 19 percent of GDP on average in the last three years).
- Dividends can be material for specific governments (e.g. dividends from the Panama Canal Company represent 10-15 percent of government revenue).
- Common channels through which SOEs affect public finances:
  - Direct transfers: taxes, royalties, dividends, explicit subsidies and capital injections.
  - Quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs): SOEs providing goods or services at prices below cost (electricity, public transport, water), below-market lending by state banks, arrears with governments or other SOEs.
  - Explicit guarantees and contingent liabilities (PPPs, revenue/debt/exchange rate guarantees, termination clauses).
  - Government support in absence of explicit guarantees to ensure continuity and avoid systemic disruption.
  - Government losses on on-lent funds from donors and international financial institutions.

- Cross-country evidence on fiscal costs:
  - Average bailout cost was above 5 percent of GDP in the 1990s and the 2010–18 periods; average was lower than 2 percent of GDP in the 2000s.
  - Bailout costs in some cases exceeded 10 percent of GDP.
  - Examples:
    - Jordan: sizeable transfers between 2012 and 2015 totaling 15 percent of GDP cumulatively to NEPCO.
    - Samoa: bailout to Polynesian Airlines in 1994 of 16 per cent of GDP.
    - Dubai: bailout of Dubai World by the Emirates’ authorities in 2009 of 9 percent of Dubai’s GDP.
  - Sectoral quasi-fiscal costs:
    - Trimble et al. (2016) estimated quasi-fiscal deficits in SSA’s electricity sector averaged 1.6 percent of GDP with 10 countries where it exceeded 2 percent of GDP.
    - Petri and Taube (2003): Azerbaijan energy sector QFAs reached 26.7 percent of GDP in 1999 and 6.5 percent of GDP in Ukraine in 2003.
  - PEMEX example: MXN 381 billion in losses before royalties and other taxes (2015), overall tax payments amounted to MXN 331 billion (1.8 percent of GDP).
  - Arrears example: Gambia Special Audit (2019) revealed trade arrears to NAWEC amounted in 2017 to 1.7 percent of 2017 GDP.

- SOEs and public sector balance sheet magnitudes:
  - On average, non-financial SOEs financial assets account for 18 percent of those of the general government.
  - On average, liabilities of non-financial SOEs account for 34 of general government’s stocks (as reported).
  - Example sovereign guarantees and exposures:
    - South African government provided guarantees totaling 7 percent of GDP to SOEs, and a further 2.5 percent of GDP related to contracts with independent power producers (IPPs) entered by the state-owned electricity utility (based on March 2019 data).
    - Vietnam: amount of guaranteed loans to SOEs is close to 10 percent of GDP.

### Drivers of SOE fiscal risk and typical vulnerabilities
- Exogenous shocks (macroeconomic variables, market-specific factors) and their correlation (slowdown, interest rates, exchange rates) are major sources of risk; simultaneous government fiscal stress (e.g. Covid-19) compounds these risks.
- Built-up internal vulnerabilities:
  - Accumulation of losses and excessive leverage making continued operations unsustainable.
  - Complex government–SOE relationships generating risk.
- Typical drivers:
  - Weak SOE corporate governance (political interference, boards lacking independence, weak internal controls).
  - Inadequate oversight leading to higher risk-taking and weaker budget discipline (lack of timely, standardized and reliable financial reports; corruption).
  - Uncompensated quasi-fiscal activities (over-staffing, regulated prices below cost) generating persistent losses and liquidity issues.
  - Cross-arrears between SOEs and governments crippling debt service capacity.
  - Excessive dividend or tax extraction weakening retained profits and investment capacity (PEMEX example above).
- Macroeconomic transmission channels that affect SOE finances:
  - Real GDP growth affects volume sales.
  - Inflation affects output prices and costs with offsetting effects on operating profits.
  - Exchange rate affects revenues, imported inputs, valuation of FX-denominated debt and interest payments.
  - Oil prices affect operating profits (detrimental for non-oil SOEs; beneficial for oil companies other things equal).
  - Interest rates affect non-operating profits/expenses and net present values of net inflows.
  - Asset price swings and liquidity conditions affect balance sheets and receivables recovery.

### Monitoring fiscal risks: aggregate view and transparency
- Effective monitoring requires both aggregate sectoral analysis and company-level monitoring.
- Core monitoring elements:
  - A comprehensive inventory of existing SOEs (central and subnational levels, ownership status, responsible institutions, sectors).
  - Prioritization of SOEs for closer monitoring (complex business models, large fiscal risks, systemic macro effects).
  - Combine historical and forward-looking analysis (trend indicators and baseline/upside/downside scenarios).
- Useful aggregate indicators:
  - Magnitude of SOE revenues, expenditures or assets relative to GDP.
  - Magnitude of SOE liabilities as a percentage of GDP (commonly used).
  - Net financial transfers (subsidies and transfers less taxes, royalties, dividends, interest payments) relative to GDP or total government expenditure.
  - Net financial worth, net worth, liquidity measures (net liquid assets), currency mismatches, risk-adjusted assets and liabilities.
- Quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs) monitoring and estimation challenges:
  - Need to inventory non-commercial activities and estimate cost by activity (including financial costs).
  - Uncompensated losses = difference between prices plus compensation less costs.
  - When QFAs are linked to regulated commercial activities, determine counter-factual revenues and costs (benchmarkable to private companies).
  - Differentiate quasi-fiscal costs before taxes and after taxes and dividends.
  - Quasi-fiscal cost estimates change over time; coordinate with line ministries/regulators and regularly update and report estimates.
- Transparency issues and regional coverage:
  - Fiscal coverage of SOEs varies widely by region and income group; many LICs have very limited coverage beyond central government.
  - Even advanced economies often have fragmented reporting with no consolidated SOE-sector report; QFAs and non-monetary transfers frequently omitted.
  - Trend toward expanding fiscal reporting to the whole public sector, publishing aggregate and qualitative SOE financial information (examples noted in text).

### Firm-level “risk tool”: benchmarking and forward-looking stress testing
- Two-block tool structure:
  - Historical, static benchmarking of SOE financial indicators against peers across countries (median, top 75th and bottom 25th percentiles).
  - Forward-looking stress-testing with baseline and risk scenarios, customizable shocks, and behavioral/structural parameters.
- Benchmark indicator categories:
  - Profitability (e.g. return on equity or assets).
  - Leverage (e.g. non-current liabilities to total assets).
  - Liquidity (e.g. current ratio).
  - Revenue and cost per worker (operating revenue per employee, labor cost per operating revenue).
- Benchmarking uses medians and percentiles across countries, income groups, years, and sector at 4-digit level where available; firm-level data mainly from Orbis.
- Forward-looking analysis inputs:
  - Medium-term macro projections (domestic and world GDP growth and inflation, exchange rate, short-term and long-term interest rates) with baseline and risk scenarios.
  - Matrix of shocks (historical distress-informed; stress tests use at least 2–3 standard deviations from baseline real GDP growth in examples).
  - Behavioral and structural parameters: share of domestic/world sales, share of imported inputs, share of oil on sales/inputs, planned investments, sensitivities of volumes/prices to macro variables, debt structure (FX share, guaranteed/on-lent debt, average tenor), policy parameters (tax rates, dividend payout ratios).
- Government reaction rules in the tool:
  - Transfers triggered to ensure minimum liquidity and to prevent solvency breaches (debt-to-equity approaching ceiling).
  - Liquidity proxied by quick liquidity ratio (cash, receivables, other liquid financial assets / current liabilities).
  - Calibrate liquidity and solvency thresholds using historical distress values, governance strength, reputational factors, SOE size/strategic importance, and government risk aversion.
  - Liquidity floors in examples set between 0.5 and 0.6 of current liabilities; debt-to-equity ratio cap between 1.4 and 2.
  - When both liquidity and leverage constraints bind and no alternative financing exists, government assumed to step in; tool captures alternatives like asset divestment (included) but rules out incurrence of arrears.

### Illustrative scenarios: Companies A, B, C (emerging market SOEs)
- Baseline assumptions (WEO October 2019): sales and non-oil output prices around trend, exchange rates stable, oil prices decline slightly.
- Company A (domestic electricity SOE):
  - 90 percent of sales are domestic.
  - Low but positive profitability; high debt triggers capital injections even in baseline alongside new borrowing to meet liquidity levels.
  - Around 20 percent of transfers used to service government-guaranteed debt, which accounts for 50 percent of outstanding domestic stock.
  - Stress outcome example: contribution to public net financial worth falls from 0.3 percent of GDP to -0.5 percent in 2024 (ex-transfers scenario).
  - NPV of capital injections in stress is 0.4 percent of GDP higher than baseline; NPV of net inflows worsens from -0.1 to -0.4 percent of GDP.
- Company B (air transport SOE with international exposure):
  - Negative equity due to cumulative losses; 50 percent of production sold internationally; oil accounts for 50 percent of variable costs.
  - Low liquidity and negative equity necessitate capital injections rather than borrowing even in baseline.
  - Stress outcome example: deterioration in EBIT and equity; in stress NPV of transfers raises by 0.25 percent of the pre-shock GDP; net inflows deteriorate by 0.3 percent of GDP to -0.8 percent.
  - Without transfers, borrowing would further worsen solvency and reduce SOE contribution to public net financial worth by 0.4 percent of GDP.
- Company C (oil-exporting SOE):
  - 80 percent of oil sold in foreign markets.
  - Large oil price fall and world slowdown severely hurt operating profits; return on assets nears -30 percent at peak of shock; gross financing needs surge.
  - Initial low leverage and high cash allow partial self-financing, but capital injections still needed to avoid negative equity.
  - Absent capital injections, SOE contribution to public net financial worth would worsen by almost 20 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - NPV of capital injections example: 8.6 percent of the pre-shock GDP.
  - Net contribution to the budget falls from 2.4 percent of GDP to -8.2 percent (NPV of net budget inflows example).

### Mitigating fiscal risks: firm-level and macro policy recommendations
- Firm-level strategies (aligning incentives, limiting soft-budget constraints):
  - Strengthen corporate governance (independence of boards, management skills, internal controls).
  - Enhance oversight to reduce risk-taking and enforce budget discipline (timely, standardized, reliable financial reports).
  - Compensate or limit uncompensated QFAs; quantify and monitor them.
  - Avoid excessive dividend/tax extraction that undermines company solvency and investment.
  - Use clear performance contracts linking objectives, KPIs, reporting obligations, dividend policy, and sanctions/rewards; set multi-year corporate plans with financial objectives.
  - Consider borrowing limits and liability ceilings tailored to firm conditions:
    - Borrowing limits monitorable at high frequency and linked to operations.
    - Liability ceilings as medium-term anchors; consider net financial assets (NFA) floors as better solvency indicators.
    - Combine flow (borrowing) and stock (liability) ceilings; consider risk-weighted asset caps and leverage caps.
  - Limit debt guarantees and contingent liabilities:
    - Set ceilings for guarantees, require cost-benefit analysis, require collateral or guarantee fees reflecting expected losses.
  - Strengthen oversight capacity:
    - Centralize oversight (autonomous agency, holding company, or empowered MoF/Treasury unit) with technical capacity and legal authority to monitor, standardize reporting and enforce limits.
    - Examples: Finland, France, Kenya, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, Singapore; Treasury role in New Zealand.
- Macroe-fiscal and transparency measures:
  - Improve fiscal coverage and transparency of SOEs in fiscal statistics and fiscal risk statements; report contingent liabilities, QFAs and transactions with government.
  - Consider including SOEs in consolidated fiscal targets or at least those that pose significant fiscal risks and are majority-owned:
    - Advantages: stronger fiscal discipline incentives, reduced ability to shift spending off-budget, better alignment of public sector fiscal goals.
    - Challenges: possible constraints on SOE operations; need to set targets accounting for investment plans and sector specificities.
    - If selectively included, require robust dynamic risk assessment and high thresholds for removal from targets.
  - Ministry of Finance roles:
    - Establish a department for SOE risk monitoring and assessment; coordinate with shareholding ministries and regulators.
    - Require standardized and frequent reporting (monthly/quarterly) converted to GFS where needed; publish IFRS-compliant statements and consolidated data.
    - Gatekeep and authorize individual borrowing decisions relative to approved financial plans.
- Crisis support principles (when large shocks materialize):
  - Target support to address shock impacts and prioritize SOEs with large social/economic impact.
  - Assess cost-effectiveness and burden sharing with private investors where mixed ownership exists.
  - Make support temporary with an exit strategy; cap fiscal costs and guarantees ex ante where possible.
  - Ensure high transparency, parliamentary approval and full reporting of support and contingent liabilities.
  - Link support to reforms to improve efficiency, contain costs and strengthen governance where SOEs show systematic weaknesses.

### Conclusions and priorities
- SOEs operate in core sectors and can pose large fiscal risks through direct costs (transfers, guarantees) and indirect macro-financial spillovers.
- Key priorities for governments:
  - Demand timely, reliable and standardized reporting from SOEs to ensure accountability.
  - Strengthen oversight capacity and governance to align management incentives with owner priorities.
  - Use benchmarking and forward-looking stress-testing tools to identify vulnerabilities and prepare for tail risks.
  - Pursue policy measures including borrowing limits, performance contracts, clearer rules on guarantees, greater transparency, and, where appropriate, inclusion of SOEs in fiscal targets to strengthen fiscal discipline.

*Italic line: Source: IMF working paper wpiea2020213-print-pdf (2017 content provided).*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

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- Baum, A., P. Medas, A. Soler and M. Sy .2020: “How to Assess Fiscal Risk in SOEs”. How-to Note, IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. Forthcoming
- Bova, Elva; Ruiz-Arranza., Marta; Toscani, Frederick; Ture, H. Elif. 2016. “The Fiscal Cost of Contingent Liabilities: A New Dataset”. IMF Working Paper 16/14.
- Bower, U. 2017. ‘’State-Owned Enterprises in Emerging Europe: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’’, IMF Working Paper 17/221.
- Dobozi, I. 2016. “Financial viability of the power sector in developing countries: recent trends and effectiveness of World Bank interventions.” World Bank Independent Evaluation Group.
- Hutton, G. and M. Varughese. 2016. ‘’The Costs of Meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goal Targets on Drinking Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene’’, Water and Sanitation Program Technical Paper.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2005. Public Investment and Fiscal Policy: Lessons from Pilot Country Studies. SM/05/118.
- ———. 2007. Public Enterprises and Fiscal Risks: Lessons from Pilot II Country Studies. SM/07/368.
- ———. 2008. Indonesia. Assessing Fiscal Risks from State-Owned Enterprises. Technical Assistance Report.
- ———. 2016a. “Analyzing and Managing Fiscal Risks. Best Practices”.
- ———. 2016b. “Thailand: Strengthening SOE Governance and Public Investment”.
- ———. 2007. Manual on Fiscal Transparency. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- ———. 2017. The Gambia: Fiscal Stress Test. Technical Assistance Report (unpublished)
- ———. 2018. The Gambia Article IV Consultation and Selected Issues Paper (Fiscal Stress Test in The Gambia), Country Report No. 18/99. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- ———. 2019. “Curbing Corruption’’, Fiscal Monitor, April 2019, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
- ———. 2020a. Fiscal Monitor, May 2020, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.
- ———. 2020b. “Government Support to State-Owned Enterprises: Options for Sub-Saharan Africa”. IMF Special Series on COVID-19. June 2020.
- Kornai, Janos. 1979. ‘’Resource-Constrained Versus Demand-Constrained Systems’’, Econometrica, Vol. 47, Issue 4, 801–19.
- Musacchio, A., and Emilio I. Pineda. 2019. Fixing State-Owned Enterprises in Latin America: Old Problems, New Solutions. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2015. OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2015 Edition. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Petri, M. and Tauber, G. 2003. “Fiscal Policy Beyond the Budget: Quasi-Fiscal Activities in the Energy Sectors of the Former Soviet Union.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, vol. 39 (1), pp. 24–41.
- PWC. 2015. State-Owned Enterprises: Catalysts for Public Value Creation? Arlington, VA: Public Sector Research Centre
- Restuccia, Diego and Richard Rogerson. 2019. “The Causes and Costs of Misallocation”, Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 31, Number 3—Pages 151–74.
- Richmond, C. J.; D. Benedek; E. Cabezon; B. Cegar; P. Dohlman; M. Hassine; B. Jajko; P. Kopyrski; M. Markevych; J. A. Miniane; F. J. Parodi; G. Pula; J. Roaf; M. Kyu Song; M. Sviderskaya; R. Turk; and S. Weber. 2019. Reassessing the Role of State-Owned Enterprises in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. European Departmental Paper Series 19/11. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Shirley, Mary. 1998. “Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven’t Worked. Public Policy for the Private Sector, Number 150 (August 1998).
- Simpson, Samuel Nana Yawn; Nyante, Hadija Narye. 2015. Evaluating Performance Contracts as a Tool for Evaluating State-Owned Enterprises in Two Developing Countries: A Look at the Performance Dimensions. Public Policy and Administration Research. Volume 5, Number 9 – Pages 27–35.
- Song, Zheng, Kjetil Storesleten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2001. Growing Like China. American Economic Review, 101(1): 196–233.
- Trimble, C.; M. Kojima.; Perez A., I.; Mohammadzadeh, F. 2016. ‘’Financial Viability of Electricity Sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa: Quasi-Fiscal Deficits and Hidden Costs’’. Policy Research Working Paper; No. 7788. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Van den Berg, C. and A. Danilenko. 2017. Performance of Water Utilities in Africa. World Bank, Washington, D.C., The World Bank.
- World Bank. 2017. Who Sponsors Infrastructure Projects? Disentangling Public and Private Contributions. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Yousef, Seyed Reza. 2019. Public Sector Balance Sheet and the Macroeconomy. IMF Working Paper 19/170.

### Annex 1 — The Public Sector: classification highlights
- Publicly owned companies may be covered under general government (GG), the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS), or the whole public-sector accounts.
- General government covers only non-market public companies; the NFPS covers nonfinancial public corporations; the public sector covers the entire public corporation sector (including financial public enterprises).
- A public corporation is a market producer when its output is sold at economically significant prices, i.e. average costs are recovered (IMF’s Government Finance Statistic Manual 2014).
- The economically significant price test: verify whether the majority of the SOE’s operating revenue stems from its own activities or from the budget over a 3-year period.
- Complications arise when profitable SOEs are given non-commercial mandates and undertake large QFAs requiring annual subsidies; debate may exist on whether the test applies or other criteria (expected length of QFAs, extent of compensation, profitability of commercial mandates) should be developed.
- For partially government-owned market producers, GFSM 2014 proposes assessing public control via: majority of voting interests, control of the board and/or appointment of key personnel, or existence of golden shares or equivalent options that confer government greater control than shareholding implies.
- Footnote: General government encompasses the budgetary central government, extrabudgetary funds (EBFs), including social security funds (SSFs), non-market public corporations, and subnational governments. Countries with fiscal reporting limited to the central government do not include public corporations in fiscal statistics.

### Annex 2 — Financial indicators used for benchmarking SOEs
- Profitability
  - ROE using net income: ROE (in percent) = net income/Shareholder funds
  - ROA using net income: ROA (in percent) = net income/total assets
- Liquidity
  - Current ratio: Current ratio = current assets/current liabilities
  - Interest cover: Interest cover = operating profit/interest paid.
- Leverage
  - Non-current liabilities to assets ratio: (Total liabilities – current-liabilities)/total asset
- Cost and revenue
  - Operating revenue per employee: By default, in millions of local currencies
  - Labor cost per operating revenue: Wage bill/operating revenue (In percent)
- Sources: ORBIS and IMF staff compilation

### Annex 3 — A firm-level database of state-owned enterprises (methodology and coverage)
- Data source: ORBIS database (Bureau Van Dijk); SOEs identified as "organizations ultimately owned or de facto controlled by public sector entities".
- Domestic SOEs selection: drop firms whose Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) and Immediate Shareholders (ISH) have different country origin with respect to the location of the firms.
- Cleaning procedure (following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015)):
  - drop duplicates in terms of identifier and year;
  - drop SOE with limited financials;
  - drop observation with missing year;
  - drop company-years with missing information on total assets and operating revenue and sales and employment (simultaneously);
  - drop the entire company (all years) if total assets is negative in any year;
  - drop the entire company if employment (in persons) is negative in any year;
  - drop the entire company if sales are negative in any year;
  - drop the entire company if Tangible Fixed Assets (such as buildings, machinery) is negative in any year.
- Final filters:
  - dropped firms that do not have information for at least 5 consecutive years;
  - retain only firms whose status according to Orbis is “Active”.
- Coverage: final database covers the period 2007-2016, with more than 30000 SOEs for almost 80 countries.
- Footnote: ORBIS contains: 1) information on over 220 million firms worldwide in more than 100 countries; 2) covers both private and public companies; 3) provides both financial and real information (employment) about the firms; 4) provides historical information on firms’ ownership.
- Practical ownership assumption: governments must own or indirectly control at least 50.1 percent of the capital of the company (noting that in reality countries may control a company with significantly less than 50 percent of the shares).

### Annex 4 — A scenario of three state-owned enterprises (A, B, C): setup and baseline implications
- Firms considered: three real SOEs from three different emerging economies; historical data to 2018; baseline projections cover 2019–24.
- Company sectors and structure:
  - Company A: electricity (generation, transmission and distribution); holding company.
  - Company B: air transport (passenger and cargo transport, ground handling and transport services); holding company.
  - Company C: oil (exploration, production, transportation, refining and marketing); holding company.
- Starting financial positions:
  - Company A: highly indebted — initial debt-to-equity ratio is above 2 (elevated solvency risks); quick liquidity ratio is worrying; profitability exceptionally high in 2018 due to one-off operations but historically slightly above zero or negative; sizeable near-term debt amortizations.
  - Company B: heavy loss-maker with strongly negative profitability and negative equity due to cumulative losses; liquidity intermediate risk; debt amortization expected to mount.
  - Company C: profitable mainly due to non-operating revenues (dividends from subsidiaries and capital gains); operating profits slightly negative even with oil prices above USD 60 per barrel due to inefficient cost structure; vulnerable to shocks hitting oil and non-financial revenues; leverage and liquidity comfortable.
- Medium-term baseline developments:
  - Quick ratio threshold set between 0.5 and 0.6 for all three, considered an intermediate risk level.
  - Companies A and B will not reach the quick ratio target due to large debt amortizations, rising interest payments, and (for B) large structural losses that shrink only gradually.
  - Company C: declining oil price trend and rising costs push profitability into negative territory from the second projection year.
- Debt-to-equity ratio targets:
  - Set at 1.4 for A and B, except company C where it is set at 2 given stronger fundamentals.
- Capital injections (NPV, share of 2018 GDP):
  - Company A and B: capital injections needed in the baseline; NPV amounts are 0.4 and 0.7 percent of 2018 GDP respectively.
  - Company A: bail-out circumscribed to 2019; enhanced equity improves solvency and allows borrowing thereafter.
  - Company B: persistently negative equity requires capital injections over the whole projection period, totaling 1.1 percent of 2018 GDP.
  - Company C: no need for capital injections in the baseline; room to build liquidity buffers by borrowing.

### Table — Selected financial indicators of Companies A, B and C (baseline)
- Table layout: years 2018–2024. Indicators shown: ROA, ROA (ex-transfers), Quick ratio, Quick ratio (ex-transfers), Debt-to-equity, Debt-to-equity (ex-transfers), NPV transfers (share of GDP). Values reproduced exactly.

- A (electricity)
  - ROA: 2.4 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.5
  - ROA (ex-transfers): 2.4 -0.6 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 1.5
  - Quick ratio: 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
  - Quick ratio (ex-transfers): 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
  - Debt-to-equity: 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.7
  - Debt-to-equity (ex-transfers): 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.2
  - NPV transfers (share of GDP): 0.4

- B (airline)
  - ROA: -76.1 10.7 10.4 13.7 13.5 13.5 13.3
  - ROA (ex-transfers): -74.7 -71.8 -64.1 -51.0 -39.0 -27.5 -16.5
  - Quick ratio: 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
  - Quick ratio (ex-transfers): 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
  - Debt-to-equity: -1.9 -1.8 -1.9 -2.0 -2.2 -2.6 -3.3
  - Debt-to-equity (ex-transfers): -1.9 -1.5 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3
  - NPV transfers (share of GDP): 0.7

- C (oil)
  - ROA: 5.2 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 4.8
  - ROA (ex-transfers): 5.2 3.1 3.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 4.8
  - Quick ratio: 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9
  - Quick ratio (ex-transfers): 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9
  - Debt-to-equity: 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
  - Debt-to-equity (ex-transfers): 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
  - NPV transfers (share of GDP): 0.0

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020213-print-pdf.pdf*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020213-print-pdf.pdf_