## wpiea2020250-print-pdf

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---

### Fiscal balance observation
- Estimated range: "0.8 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP."
- Interpretation: "This implies that despite a reduction in the center’s headline fiscal deficit of about 1.0 percentage point over this same time period (from 4.4 to"

### Extended Fiscal Deficit: definition and components
- Central government’s overall PSBR (the sum of its headline deficit and the borrowings of its PSUs) increased from 5.2 to 5.8 percent (percent of GDP).
- Estimates for FY2019/20 provided in the Union budget imply a similar level of CGPSU borrowings in that fiscal year; this remains highly uncertain until after the end of the fiscal year, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- To construct an extended notion of the central government’s fiscal deficit, two items are added to the central government’s headline fiscal deficit:
  - Financing for CGPSUs which comes from the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF)
  - New issuances of government fully serviced bonds
- Rationale: both items affect government debt stock—NSSF loans directly, fully serviced bonds at their eventual repayment date.

### Off-budget financing through NSSF loans (key figures)
- FY2015/16: Total NSSF net new loans to public agencies: -
- FY2016/17: Total NSSF net new loans to public agencies: -0.41 (percent of GDP)
- FY2017/18: Total NSSF net new loans to public agencies: 0.48 (percent of GDP)
- FY2018/19: Total NSSF net new loans to public agencies: 0.54 (percent of GDP)
- Component breakdown (percent of GDP):
  - Food Corporation of India: FY2016/17 -0.41; FY2017/18 0.27; FY2018/19 0.34
  - NHAI: FY2017/18 0.11; FY2018/19 0.10
  - Air India: FY2017/18 0.02; FY2018/19 0.00
  - BMTPC: FY2017/18 0.04; FY2018/19 0.00
  - IRFC: FY2017/18 0.05; FY2018/19 0.04
  - PFC: FY2018/19 0.04
  - REC Ltd: FY2018/19 0.02
- Note: Figures report additional loans, net of repayments during the FY.

### Extended fiscal deficit: headline numbers (percent of GDP)
- FY2016/17:
  - Central government fiscal deficit (authorities' definition): 3.5
  - Off-budget financing: 0.4
  - Government 'fully serviced' bonds: 0.1
  - Extended fiscal deficit: 3.9
- FY2017/18:
  - Central government fiscal deficit (authorities' definition): 3.4
  - Off-budget financing: 0.5
  - Government 'fully serviced' bonds: 0.1
  - Extended fiscal deficit: 4.0
- FY2018/19:
  - Central government fiscal deficit (authorities' definition): 3.8
  - Off-budget financing: 0.5
  - Government 'fully serviced' bonds: 0.3
  - Extended fiscal deficit: 4.6
- Sources cited in text for these numbers: Union Budget documents (Annex 8; Statement 27) and Authors' calculations.

### Importance of sound fiscal reporting (findings)
- Headline central deficit numbers can be misleading; the analysis shows fiscal policy was more expansionary than headline figures suggested.
- The PSBR exceeds net household financial savings, implying potential crowding out of private investment.
- Need for regular monitoring of state finances by the center to:
  - Foster good governance and fiscal discipline at the state level.
  - Identify and manage fiscal risks from states or state-level PSUs that could entail costs for the center (explicit or implicit obligations).
- Cross-country evidence on realized contingent liabilities (average fiscal costs):
  - Financial sector contingent liabilities: 9.7 percent of GDP
  - Bailout of subnational governments: 3.7 percent of GDP
  - Bailout of state-owned enterprises: 3.0 percent of GDP
  - Some bailout episodes reached costs as high as 12 to 15 percent of GDP.
- Exceptional scale of COVID-19 fiscal response increases the need for accurate, timely, and transparent fiscal reporting; upfront clear and transparent criteria to identify beneficiaries are important.

### Assessment of India's fiscal reporting practices (four dimensions)
- Institutional coverage:
  - Monthly Union budget execution data compiled by Controller General of Accounts (CGA).
  - Monthly state execution data produced by states' accountants general but not systematically public.
  - Public Enterprises Survey produced annually for central public sector enterprises.
  - No consolidated fiscal information on districts or municipalities; no unified repository for state-level PSUs information.
  - India among three G20 countries (with Saudi Arabia and Argentina) not producing full general government data in line with GFS standards.
  - India committed under G20 Data Gaps Initiative to compile quarterly GFS for consolidated general government by 2021; as of 2019, India had not recorded progress.
- Timeliness and frequency:
  - Union budget execution data: monthly with a one-month lag.
  - RBI mid-year review: published with a two-month lag.
  - Public debt reports: quarterly with a quarter lag (rated “Basic” under IMF FTC).
  - Combined Union and state financial accounts: produced by MoF two years after the end of the fiscal year (not audited).
  - Target recommendation: audited statements released within seven to nine months.
- Comprehensiveness:
  - Government operates under cash-basis accounting; limitations include lack of tracking receivables/payables, assets/liabilities, and risk of deferring cash disbursements.
  - Emerging accrual elements: statements of liabilities reported regularly; government accounts record financial assets though valuations not regularly updated.
  - Main shortcomings: (i) absence of systematic nonfinancial asset registers; (ii) lack of reporting on public pension liabilities; (iii) absence of recording of contingent liabilities other than explicit guarantees; (iv) lack of commitment control mechanisms.
  - Wide variation in reported accrual information prevents consolidated general government balance sheet.
  - Transition to accrual accounting typical duration: at least seven years; many countries moving towards accrual; India is among 30 percent of 150 countries tracked that still use pure cash accounting.
- Access to fiscal information:
  - Increased data release has not necessarily improved transparency for non-specialists.
  - Union government scored 49/100 in Open Budget Survey 2019 (global average 45) due to absence of a forward-looking fiscal strategy document released several months before the budget.
  - Transparency across states varies widely; Transparency International India (2020) survey: only Union government considered transparent; Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and Jharkhand display medium transparency; nine states considered opaque.

### Policy recommendations (three reform pillars and short-run steps)
- Three key reform pillars:
  - Improve timeliness via enhanced IT systems able to deliver and consolidate comprehensive high-frequency information; set clear standards on information to be collected and compiled; possibly set up a dedicated platform for all government units to share fiscal information.
  - Reinforce the Union government’s role in center-state coordination: regular review of states' fiscal positions and public sector entities; set common reporting and transparency standards; consider financial incentives for timely state reporting.
  - Increase comprehensiveness through a gradual move to accrual accounting across Union and state governments with a clear medium-term strategy (average seven to ten years), leveraging reforms such as the e-asset register.
- Short-run immediate steps:
  - The Union government should clearly designate the agency/unit in charge of spearheading the consolidation exercise.
  - The Union should set common standards for information sharing by States, including a template for regular fiscal reporting and a calendar for data collection and publication.
  - The Union government should move towards the calculation of a full central government deficit in line with GFSM 2014, along with a commitment to refrain from deferring cash payments, including unduly delaying tax refunds, and recourse to off-budget operations.
  - Compile a list of major state-level PSUs to assess fiscal risks related to them.
  - Compile and consolidate existing asset registries at the Union and state levels to draw up a first rough picture of general government assets.

### Conclusion (key points)
- Enhancing fiscal reporting in India is challenging because of the country’s size and multiple tiers of government, but critical because most government activity occurs outside the Union government’s scope.
- A consolidated national picture requires capacity development across all levels of public sector; some states are more advanced, but capacity gaps persist.
- The Union government should lead by example, set common reporting and budgeting standards, disclose extra-budgetary activities more clearly, and fully integrate them in the presentation of the Union-level fiscal stance using the methodologies presented in the paper.
- Governments should provide more user-friendly and forward-looking fiscal information and narratives (e.g., as part of a fiscal strategy statement) to help investors, markets, and the public understand actual fiscal stance and risks.

*Source: wpiea2020250-print-pdf - 0.8 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP. This implies that despite a reduction in the center’s (PDF).*

### 0.8 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP. This implies that despite a reduction in the center’s

### wpiea2020250-print-pdf - 0.8 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP. This implies that despite a reduction in the center’s

### Fiscal balance observation
- Estimated range: 0.8 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP.
- Interpretation: "This implies that despite a reduction in the center’s headline fiscal deficit of about 1.0 percentage point over this same time period (from 4.4 to"

### Key statistics (verbatim)
- "0.8 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP."
- "about 1.0 percentage point"
- "(from 4.4 to"

*Source: wpiea2020250-print-pdf - 0.8 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP. This implies that despite a reduction in the center’s (PDF).*

### 3.4 percent of GDP, between FY2013/14 and FY2018/19, according to the authorities’

### 3.4 percent of GDP, between FY2013/14 and FY2018/19, according to the authorities’ presentation of the fiscal deficit

### Extended Fiscal Deficit: definition and components
- The central government’s overall PSBR (the sum of its headline deficit and the borrowings of its PSUs) increased from 5.2 to 5.8 percent (percent of GDP).
- Estimates for FY2019/20 provided in the Union budget imply a similar level of CGPSU borrowings in that fiscal year; this remains highly uncertain until after the end of the fiscal year, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- To construct an extended notion of the central government’s fiscal deficit, two items are added to the central government’s headline fiscal deficit:
  - Financing for CGPSUs which comes from the National Small Savings Fund (NSSF)
  - New issuances of government fully serviced bonds
- Rationale: both items affect government debt stock—NSSF loans directly, fully serviced bonds at their eventual repayment date.

### Off-budget financing through NSSF loans (key figures)
- FY2015/16: Total NSSF net new loans to public agencies: -
- FY2016/17: Total NSSF net new loans to public agencies: -0.41 (percent of GDP)
- FY2017/18: Total NSSF net new loans to public agencies: 0.48 (percent of GDP)
- FY2018/19: Total NSSF net new loans to public agencies: 0.54 (percent of GDP)
- Component breakdown (percent of GDP):
  - Food Corporation of India: FY2016/17 -0.41; FY2017/18 0.27; FY2018/19 0.34
  - NHAI: FY2017/18 0.11; FY2018/19 0.10
  - Air India: FY2017/18 0.02; FY2018/19 0.00
  - BMTPC: FY2017/18 0.04; FY2018/19 0.00
  - IRFC: FY2017/18 0.05; FY2018/19 0.04
  - PFC: FY2018/19 0.04
  - REC Ltd: FY2018/19 0.02
- Note: Figures report additional loans, net of repayments during the FY.

### Extended fiscal deficit: headline numbers (percent of GDP)
- FY2016/17:
  - Central government fiscal deficit (authorities' definition): 3.5
  - Off-budget financing: 0.4
  - Government 'fully serviced' bonds: 0.1
  - Extended fiscal deficit: 3.9
- FY2017/18:
  - Central government fiscal deficit (authorities' definition): 3.4
  - Off-budget financing: 0.5
  - Government 'fully serviced' bonds: 0.1
  - Extended fiscal deficit: 4.0
- FY2018/19:
  - Central government fiscal deficit (authorities' definition): 3.8
  - Off-budget financing: 0.5
  - Government 'fully serviced' bonds: 0.3
  - Extended fiscal deficit: 4.6
- Sources cited in text for these numbers: Union Budget documents (Annex 8; Statement 27) and Authors' calculations.

### Importance of sound fiscal reporting (findings)
- Headline central deficit numbers can be misleading; the analysis shows fiscal policy was more expansionary than headline figures suggested.
- The PSBR exceeds net household financial savings, implying potential crowding out of private investment.
- Need for regular monitoring of state finances by the center to:
  - Foster good governance and fiscal discipline at the state level.
  - Identify and manage fiscal risks from states or state-level PSUs that could entail costs for the center (explicit or implicit obligations).
- Cross-country evidence on realized contingent liabilities (average fiscal costs):
  - Financial sector contingent liabilities: 9.7 percent of GDP
  - Bailout of subnational governments: 3.7 percent of GDP
  - Bailout of state-owned enterprises: 3.0 percent of GDP
  - Some bailout episodes reached costs as high as 12 to 15 percent of GDP.
- Exceptional scale of COVID-19 fiscal response increases the need for accurate, timely, and transparent fiscal reporting; upfront clear and transparent criteria to identify beneficiaries are important.

### Assessment of India's fiscal reporting practices (four dimensions)
- Institutional coverage:
  - Monthly Union budget execution data compiled by Controller General of Accounts (CGA).
  - Monthly state execution data produced by states' accountants general but not systematically public.
  - Public Enterprises Survey produced annually for central public sector enterprises.
  - No consolidated fiscal information on districts or municipalities; no unified repository for state-level PSUs information.
  - India among three G20 countries (with Saudi Arabia and Argentina) not producing full general government data in line with GFS standards.
  - India committed under G20 Data Gaps Initiative to compile quarterly GFS for consolidated general government by 2021; as of 2019, India had not recorded progress.
- Timeliness and frequency:
  - Union budget execution data: monthly with a one-month lag.
  - RBI mid-year review: published with a two-month lag.
  - Public debt reports: quarterly with a quarter lag (rated “Basic” under IMF FTC).
  - Combined Union and state financial accounts: produced by MoF two years after the end of the fiscal year (not audited).
  - Target recommendation: audited statements released within seven to nine months.
- Comprehensiveness:
  - Government operates under cash-basis accounting; limitations include lack of tracking receivables/payables, assets/liabilities, and risk of deferring cash disbursements.
  - Emerging accrual elements: statements of liabilities reported regularly; government accounts record financial assets though valuations not regularly updated.
  - Main shortcomings: (i) absence of systematic nonfinancial asset registers; (ii) lack of reporting on public pension liabilities; (iii) absence of recording of contingent liabilities other than explicit guarantees; (iv) lack of commitment control mechanisms.
  - Wide variation in reported accrual information prevents consolidated general government balance sheet.
  - Transition to accrual accounting typical duration: at least seven years; many countries moving towards accrual; India is among 30 percent of 150 countries tracked that still use pure cash accounting.
- Access to fiscal information:
  - Increased data release has not necessarily improved transparency for non-specialists.
  - Union government scored 49/100 in Open Budget Survey 2019 (global average 45) due to absence of a forward-looking fiscal strategy document released several months before the budget.
  - Transparency across states varies widely; Transparency International India (2020) survey: only Union government considered transparent; Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and Jharkhand display medium transparency; nine states considered opaque.

### Policy recommendations (three reform pillars and short-run steps)
- Three key reform pillars:
  - Improve timeliness via enhanced IT systems able to deliver and consolidate comprehensive high-frequency information; set clear standards on information to be collected and compiled; possibly set up a dedicated platform for all government units to share fiscal information.
  - Reinforce the Union government’s role in center-state coordination: regular review of states' fiscal positions and public sector entities; set common reporting and transparency standards; consider financial incentives for timely state reporting.
  - Increase comprehensiveness through a gradual move to accrual accounting across Union and state governments with a clear medium-term strategy (average seven to ten years), leveraging reforms such as the e-asset register.
- Short-run immediate steps:
  - The Union government should clearly designate the agency/unit in charge of spearheading the consolidation exercise.
  - The Union should set common standards for information sharing by States, including a template for regular fiscal reporting and a calendar for data collection and publication.
  - The Union government should move towards the calculation of a full central government deficit in line with GFSM 2014, along with a commitment to refrain from deferring cash payments, including unduly delaying tax refunds, and recourse to off-budget operations.
  - Compile a list of major state-level PSUs to assess fiscal risks related to them.
  - Compile and consolidate existing asset registries at the Union and state levels to draw up a first rough picture of general government assets.

### Conclusion (key points)
- Enhancing fiscal reporting in India is challenging because of the country’s size and multiple tiers of government, but critical because most government activity occurs outside the Union government’s scope.
- A consolidated national picture requires capacity development across all levels of public sector; some states are more advanced, but capacity gaps persist.
- The Union government should lead by example, set common reporting and budgeting standards, disclose extra-budgetary activities more clearly, and fully integrate them in the presentation of the Union-level fiscal stance using the methodologies presented in the paper.
- Governments should provide more user-friendly and forward-looking fiscal information and narratives (e.g., as part of a fiscal strategy statement) to help investors, markets, and the public understand actual fiscal stance and risks.

*Sources: Union Budget documents (Annex 8; Statement 27), 'Sources and Applications of National Small Savings Fund' Indian Union Budget document (Annex 8 for FYs 2018/19, 19/20, and 20/21, Annex 6b for FY 17/18), Ministry of Finance and IMF staff calculations, and Authors' calculations.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2020/english/wpiea2020250-print-pdf.pdf_
