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### I. INTRODUCTION
- Central claim: dynamism for fair and inclusive markets is key for achieving high sustained and inclusive growth.
- Empirical claim: there may not be a tradeoff between market income inequality and high sustained growth.
- Concept definitions:
  - Market Gini = Gini index of income before taxes and transfers (measure of predistribution).
  - Fair and inclusive markets = markets that provide growth opportunities for a large number of workers and firms.
- Illustrative fact: about 850 million people were lifted out of poverty in four decades in China (Yang 2019).
- Narrative context: rising inequality and stagnating median income despite GDP growth since the 1980s, intensified by the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

### II. THE MARKET AT WORK: INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
- Key question: Is there a tradeoff between growth and inequality?
- Empirical patterns and data:
  - Cross-country scatter over 1974-2014 shows a negative relationship between long-run growth (relative income per capita vs. the U.S.) and recent market income Gini.
  - Figures cited: Figure 1 (Long-Run Economic Growth vs. Market Inequality, 1974-2014); Figure 2 (Average Market Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient) by Decade).
  - Data sources: Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015), SWIID (Solt 2019).
- Regression evidence (sample period 1970-2014; nonoverlapping 5- and 10-year data; fixed effects OLS and GMM-System regressions):
  - Key regressors include lagged Gini, relative income (vs. U.S.), relative income growth over 5 or 10 years (vs U.S.), and log structural export sophistication (EXPY adjusted for commodity exports).
  - Examples of reported coefficients and statistics from Table 1:
    - Gini (5-year/10-year lag) coefficients: 0.844***, 0.975***, 0.856***, 0.974***, 0.512***, 0.918***, 0.539***, 0.912***.
    - Relative income growth over 5 or 10 years (vs U.S., 5-year/10-year lag) coefficients include: -0.754***, -0.267*, -0.727***, -0.095, -1.540***, 0.784, -1.714***, -0.875.
    - Structural export sophistication (log, 5-year/10-year lag) coefficients include: -0.201, -0.649***, -0.330, -1.353*.
    - Adjusted R-squared reported as 0.72 and 0.35.
    - Number of countries reported: 162, 162, 162, 162, 134, 134, 132, 132.
    - Number of observations reported: 837, 837, 822, 822, 276, 276, 271, 271.
    - Number of instruments (when applicable): 7, 10, 7, 10.
    - Hansen J-test p-value reported: 0.00, 0.18, 0.05, 0.22.
    - Significance notation: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
- Interpretation:
  - Faster growth relative to others over the previous five or ten years is associated with lower subsequent market inequality.
  - Structural export sophistication is associated with lower market Gini.

### III. BEYOND GROWTH: “DYNAMISM” MATTERS
- Definition: dynamism = rapid and massive “creative destruction” toward more sophisticated products and sectors—changing the industrial structure of the economy.
- Mechanisms linking dynamism to inclusive outcomes:
  - Production sophistication proxied by structural export sophistication (Cherif, Hasanov, and Wang 2018) dampens market Gini.
  - Creative destruction and structural transformation create productivity gains, spillovers, and new higher-paying jobs.
  - Incumbent firms and entrant firms both can drive transformation (examples: chaebols in Korea; UMC and TSMC in Taiwan Province of China).
- Examples of structural transformation:
  - Korea: rice and wigs → textile → cars and electronics within three decades.
  - Taiwan Province of China: vegetables → sewing machines → electronics.
- Risks and transition considerations:
  - Impact on inequality depends on speed of transition and safety nets.
  - Slow or stagnant growth (“snail crawl”) with stable commodity-based exports correlates with poor real wage growth and worse market inequality.

### IV. IN PURSUIT OF A BETTER GROWTH MODEL FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH
- Comparison of growth models:
  - Dynamic, sophisticated-production-based model: sustained growth, opportunities for skill upgrading, expansion of relatively high-paying jobs, continuous creative destruction.
  - Non-dynamic models (commodity-based, low-skilled service/tourism): may produce growth spells but are vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks, limited backward linkages, concentrated rents, and fragile employment—examples include heavy tourism dependence exposed during the global coronavirus pandemic of 2020.
- Advantages of sophisticated sectors:
  - High R&D intensity sectors listed as “sophisticated”: computer/electronic/optical products, pharmaceuticals, transport equipment, motor vehicles, information technology services, electrical equipment, machinery and equipment, chemicals, scientific/professional/technical services.
  - Manufacturing and high-skill services tend to provide wage premiums and on-the-job skill transformation; manufacturing wage premium in the U.S. in the 2010s reported as about 13 percent (declined from about 17 percent in the 1980s).
  - Informal economy shares: about 40 percent in low-income countries and about 30 percent in emerging markets (Medina and Schneider 2018).
- Creative destruction and social mobility:
  - Innovation by entrants increases social mobility even if innovation increases top income inequality (Aghion et al 2016).
  - More innovative firms tend to benefit low-skilled workers disproportionately (Aghion et al, 2019b).

### V. HOW TO PROMOTE DYNAMISM
- Three policy pillars to balance:
  1. State interventions to channel resources toward sophistication, structural transformation, and innovation (vertical/industrial policies).
  2. Enforcing competition to limit market power, lower barriers to entry, and preserve incentives to innovate.
  3. Encouraging technology diffusion (knowledge diffusion from frontier to laggard firms).
- Industrial policy design principles:
  - Combine horizontal policies (education, infrastructure, business environment) with vertical interventions to address market failures (externalities, informational asymmetries, coordination failures).
  - Use exports as signaling for accountability; discourage import-substitution protectionism.
  - Tools: investment support, credit policy, R&D support, university research, national labs, industry clusters, development banks, venture capital, export and investment promotion agencies, targeted skill training.
  - Emphasize accountability frameworks for firms receiving support.
- Competition policy and market power:
  - Competition should address not only consumer prices but also firms’ monopsony power, impact on workers, effects on innovation and knowledge diffusion, and missing markets.
  - Competition authorities need to be well-funded, competent, autonomous.
  - Revamped objectives for antitrust: include effects on workers, suppliers, innovation, missing markets, and political influence.
  - Policy mix may include stricter merger scrutiny, ban on exclusionary practices, intellectual property regimes that balance incentives and diffusion, and measures to limit abuse of market power.
- Evidence on interaction of competition and state support:
  - Targeted state subsidies are more beneficial for innovation and growth when the recipient sector is competitive (Aghion et al 2012); in low-competition sectors effects can be negative.
- Technology diffusion example and implication:
  - AT&T / Bell Labs case: antitrust requirement for free access to existing Bell Labs patents and small-fee access to future patents accelerated diffusion and fostered broader innovation (Fackler and others 2017).
  - Policy implication: encourage Big Firms to set up industrial research labs but require broad access to produced technologies for domestic firms in exchange for relatively small license fees.

### VI. CONCLUSION
- Core conclusions:
  - Dynamic economies characterized by structural sophistication and continuous creative destruction are more likely to deliver high sustained growth and better market inequality outcomes.
  - Both industrial structure (what a country produces) and market structure (degree of competition and market power) shape inclusive growth and market inequality.
  - State intervention (industrial policy), competition policy reform, and technology diffusion policies are complementary and necessary to revive dynamism and limit rising market power.
- Policy priorities highlighted:
  - Promote movement into sophisticated sectors via accountable industrial policies and export orientation.
  - Revamp competition policy beyond consumer prices to include impacts on workers, suppliers, innovation, and inequality.
  - Encourage technology creation and diffusion (e.g., access to research outputs from large corporate labs) to spur broad-based innovation and social mobility.

*Source: wpiea2021029-print-pdf - REFERENCES ___________________________________________________________19*

### REFERENCES ___________________________________________________________19

### REFERENCES ___________________________________________________________19

### I. INTRODUCTION
- Central claim: dynamism for fair and inclusive markets is key for achieving high sustained and inclusive growth.
- Empirical claim: there may not be a tradeoff between market income inequality and high sustained growth.
- Concept definitions:
  - Market Gini = Gini index of income before taxes and transfers (measure of predistribution).
  - Fair and inclusive markets = markets that provide growth opportunities for a large number of workers and firms.
- Illustrative fact: about 850 million people were lifted out of poverty in four decades in China (Yang 2019).
- Narrative context: the rising inequality and stagnating median income despite GDP growth since the 1980s, intensified by the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

### II. THE MARKET AT WORK: INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
- Key question: Is there a tradeoff between growth and inequality?
- Empirical patterns and data:
  - Cross-country scatter over 1974-2014 shows a negative relationship between long-run growth (relative income per capita vs. the U.S.) and recent market income Gini.
  - Figures cited: Figure 1 (Long-Run Economic Growth vs. Market Inequality, 1974-2014); Figure 2 (Average Market Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient) by Decade).
  - Data sources: Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015), SWIID (Solt 2019).
- Regression evidence:
  - Sample period: 1970-2014 with nonoverlapping 5- and 10-year data.
  - Estimation methods: fixed effects OLS and GMM-System regressions (10- or 20-year lagged values as instruments; lagged Gini not instrumented).
  - Key regressors include lagged Gini, relative income (vs. U.S.), relative income growth over 5 or 10 years (vs U.S.), and log structural export sophistication (EXPY adjusted for commodity exports).
  - Table 1 reported results (columns labeled (1)–(8)); examples of reported statistics:
    - Gini (5-year/10-year lag) coefficients: 0.844***, 0.975***, 0.856***, 0.974***, 0.512***, 0.918***, 0.539***, 0.912*** (standard errors in parentheses).
    - Relative income growth over 5 or 10 years (vs U.S., 5-year/10-year lag) coefficients include: -0.754***, -0.267*, -0.727***, -0.095, -1.540***, 0.784, -1.714***, -0.875 (standard errors in parentheses).
    - Structural export sophistication (log, 5-year/10-year lag) coefficients include: -0.201, -0.649***, -0.330, -1.353* (standard errors in parentheses).
    - Adjusted R-squared reported as 0.72 and 0.35 for sets of regressions.
    - Number of countries reported: 162, 162, 162, 162, 134, 134, 132, 132.
    - Number of observations reported: 837, 837, 822, 822, 276, 276, 271, 271.
    - Number of instruments (when applicable): 7, 10, 7, 10.
    - Hansen J-test p-value reported: 0.00, 0.18, 0.05, 0.22.
    - Significance notation: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
- Interpretation:
  - Faster growth relative to others over the previous five or ten years is associated with lower subsequent market inequality.
  - Structural export sophistication is associated with lower market Gini.

### III. BEYOND GROWTH: “DYNAMISM” MATTERS
- Definition of dynamism: rapid and massive “creative destruction” toward more sophisticated products and sectors—changing the industrial structure of the economy.
- Mechanisms linking dynamism to inclusive outcomes:
  - Production sophistication proxied by structural export sophistication (Cherif, Hasanov, and Wang 2018) dampens market Gini.
  - Creative destruction and structural transformation create productivity gains, spillovers, and new higher-paying jobs.
  - Incumbent firms and entrant firms both can drive transformation (examples: chaebols in Korea; UMC and TSMC in Taiwan Province of China).
- Examples of structural transformation:
  - Korea: rice and wigs → textile → cars and electronics within three decades.
  - Taiwan Province of China: vegetables → sewing machines → electronics.
- Risks and transition considerations:
  - Impact on inequality depends on speed of transition and safety nets.
  - Slow or stagnant growth (“snail crawl”) with stable commodity-based exports correlates with poor real wage growth and worse market inequality.

### IV. IN PURSUIT OF A BETTER GROWTH MODEL FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH
- Comparison of growth models:
  - Dynamic, sophisticated-production-based model: sustained growth, opportunities for skill upgrading, expansion of relatively high-paying jobs, continuous creative destruction.
  - Non-dynamic models (commodity-based, low-skilled service/tourism): may produce growth spells but are vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks, limited backward linkages, concentrated rents, and fragile employment—examples include heavy tourism dependence exposed during the global coronavirus pandemic of 2020.
- Advantages of sophisticated sectors:
  - High R&D intensity sectors listed as “sophisticated”: computer/electronic/optical products, pharmaceuticals, transport equipment, motor vehicles, information technology services, electrical equipment, machinery and equipment, chemicals, scientific/professional/technical services.
  - Manufacturing and high-skill services tend to provide wage premiums and on-the-job skill transformation; manufacturing wage premium in the U.S. in the 2010s reported as about 13 percent (declined from about 17 percent in the 1980s).
  - Informal economy shares: about 40 percent in low-income countries and about 30 percent in emerging markets (Medina and Schneider 2018).
- Creative destruction and social mobility:
  - Innovation by entrants increases social mobility even if innovation increases top income inequality (Aghion et al 2016).
  - More innovative firms tend to benefit low-skilled workers disproportionately (Aghion et al, 2019b).

### V. HOW TO PROMOTE DYNAMISM
- Three policy pillars to balance:
  1. State interventions to channel resources toward sophistication, structural transformation, and innovation (vertical/industrial policies).
  2. Enforcing competition to limit market power, lower barriers to entry, and preserve incentives to innovate.
  3. Encouraging technology diffusion (knowledge diffusion from frontier to laggard firms).
- Industrial policy design principles:
  - Combine horizontal policies (education, infrastructure, business environment) with vertical interventions to address market failures (externalities, informational asymmetries, coordination failures).
  - Use exports as signaling for accountability; discourage import-substitution protectionism.
  - Tools: investment support, credit policy, R&D support, university research, national labs, industry clusters, development banks, venture capital, export and investment promotion agencies, targeted skill training.
  - Emphasize accountability frameworks for firms receiving support.
- Competition policy and market power:
  - Competition should address not only consumer prices but also firms’ monopsony power, impact on workers, effects on innovation and knowledge diffusion, and missing markets.
  - Competition authorities need to be well-funded, competent, autonomous.
  - Revamped objectives for antitrust: include effects on workers, suppliers, innovation, missing markets, and political influence.
  - Policy mix may include stricter merger scrutiny, ban on exclusionary practices, intellectual property regimes that balance incentives and diffusion, and measures to limit abuse of market power.
- Evidence on interaction of competition and state support:
  - Targeted state subsidies are more beneficial for innovation and growth when the recipient sector is competitive (Aghion et al 2012); in low-competition sectors effects can be negative.
- Technology diffusion example:
  - AT&T / Bell Labs historical case: antitrust requirement for free access to existing Bell Labs patents and small-fee access to future patents accelerated diffusion and fostered broader innovation (Fackler and others 2017).
  - Policy implication: encourage Big Firms to set up industrial research labs but require broad access to produced technologies for domestic firms in exchange for relatively small license fees.

### VI. CONCLUSION
- Core conclusions:
  - Dynamic economies characterized by structural sophistication and continuous creative destruction are more likely to deliver high sustained growth and better market inequality outcomes.
  - Both industrial structure (what a country produces) and market structure (degree of competition and market power) shape inclusive growth and market inequality.
  - State intervention (industrial policy), competition policy reform, and technology diffusion policies are complementary and necessary to revive dynamism and limit rising market power.
- Policy priorities highlighted:
  - Promote movement into sophisticated sectors via accountable industrial policies and export orientation.
  - Revamp competition policy beyond consumer prices to include impacts on workers, suppliers, innovation, and inequality.
  - Encourage technology creation and diffusion (e.g., access to research outputs from large corporate labs) to spur broad-based innovation and social mobility.

*Source: wpiea2021029-print-pdf - REFERENCES ___________________________________________________________19*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Books, Edited Volumes, and Monographs
- Aghion, Philippe. 2016. “Aghion, Philippe. 2016. “Growth Policy Design for Middle-Income Countries.” In Cherif, Reda, Fuad Hasanov, and Min Zhu (editors), Breaking the Oil Spell: The Gulf Falcons’ Path to Diversification. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund Press.
- Baker, Jonathan B. 2019. The Anti-Trust Paradigm. Harvard University Press.
- Case, Anne and Angus Deaton. 2020. Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism. Princeton University Press.
- Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. 1990. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Belknap Press, Cambridge.
- Galbraith, John. 1967. The New Industrial State. Princeton University Press.
- Philippon, Thomas. 2019. The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets. Belknap Press.

### IMF and Policy Papers
- Cherif, Reda, Fuad Hasanov, and Min Zhu (eds). 2016. Breaking the Oil Spell: The Gulf Falcons’ Path to Diversification. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund Press.
- Cherif, Reda and Fuad Hasanov. 2019. “The Return of the Policy that Shall Not Be Named: Principles of Industrial Policy.” IMF Working Paper 19/74.
- Cherif, Reda and Fuad Hasanov. 2019b. “The Leap of the Tiger: Escaping the Middle-Income Trap to the Technological Frontier.” Global Policy 10(4), November: 497-511.
- Cherif, Reda, Fuad Hasanov, and Lichen Wang. 2018. “Sharp Instrument: A Stab at Identifying the Causes of Economic Growth.” IMF Working Paper 18/117.
- Cherif, Reda, Marc Engher, and Fuad Hasanov. 2020. “Crouching Beliefs, Hidden Biases: The Rise and Fall of Growth Narratives.” IMF Working Paper 20/228.
- IMF. 2019a. “Competition, Competitiveness, and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook, October. Washington, D.C.
- IMF. 2019b. “The Rise of Corporate Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Effects.” World Economic Outlook, April. Washington, D.C.
- Medina, Leandro and Friedrich Schneider. 2018. “Shadow Economies Around the World: What Did We Learn Over the Last 20 Years?” IMF Working Paper 18/17.

### Working Papers and NBER Papers
- Aghion, Philippe, Ufuk Akcigit, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell, and David Hemous. 2016. “Innovation and Top Income Inequality.” Working paper.
- Aghion, Philippe, Antonin Bergeaud, Timo Boppart, Peter J. Klenow, Huiyu Li. 2019. “A Theory of Falling Growth and Rising Rents.” Working paper.
- Aghion, Philippe, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell, and Rachel Griffith. 2019b. “The Innovation Premium to Soft Skills in Low-skilled Occupations,” working paper, Collège de France.
- Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, Luosha Du, Ann Harrison, and Patrick Legros. 2012. NBER Working Paper No. 18048, May.
- Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt. 1992. “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction.” Econometrica 60: 323–51.
- Akcigit, Ufuk and Sina Ates. 2019. “Ten Facts on Declining Business Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory.” Working paper.
- Diao, Xinshen, Margaret McMillan, and Dani Rodrik. 2017. “The Recent Growth Boom in Developing Economies: A Structural Change Perspective.” NBER Working Paper No. 23132.
- Fackler, Thomas A., Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer, Martin Watzinger. 2017. “How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree,” CEPR Discussion Papers 11793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gutiérrez, Germán and Thomas Philippon. 2017. “Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S.” NBER Working Papers 23583, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- McMillan, M., and D. Rodrik. 2011. “Globalization, Structural Change, and Productivity Growth.” NBER Working Paper 17143.

### Journal Articles and Chapters
- Aghion, Philippe, Nicholas Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and Peter Howitt. 2005. “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2), May: 701–728.
- Autor, David, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen. 2017. “Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share,” American Economic Review 107(5), May: 180-185.
- Baker, Jonathan B. and Steven C. Salop. 2015. “Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality.” Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, 1462.
- Herrendorf, Berthold and Akos Valentinyi. 2012. “Which Sectors Make Poor Countries So Unproductive?” Journal of the European Economic Association 10(2): 323–41.
- Furceri, Davide and Jonathan D. Ostry. 2019. “Robust Determinants of Income Inequality.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 35(3): 490–517.
- Lamoreaux, Naomi R. 2019. “The Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil to Google.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(3): 94-117.
- Lucas, Robert Jr., 1993. “Making a Miracle,” Econometrica 61(2), March: 251–72.
- Matsuyama, Kiminori. 1992. “Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Theory 58(2): 317-334.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2005. “Growth Strategies,” in Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, Oxford: Elsevier, 967–1014.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2016. “Premature Deindustrialization,” Journal of Economic Growth 21(1), pp.1–33.
- Sala-i-Martin, Xavier. 2006. “The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and Convergence, Period,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2): 351-397.
- Syverson, Chad. 2019. “Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(3), Summer: 23-43.

### Data Resources, Databases, and Reports
- Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer. 2015. “The Next Generation of the Penn World Table.” American Economic Review 105(10): 3150-3182. Available: www.ggdc.net/pwt.
- Solt, Frederick. 2019. “Measuring Income Inequality Across Countries and Over Time: The Standardized World Income Inequality Database.” SWIID Version 8.2, November.

### Articles, Commentaries, and Online Pieces
- Ang, Yuen Yuen. 2019. “Missing the Big Picture on Poverty Reduction.” Project Syndicate. November 13. Available: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-poverty-reduction-reinforces-rct-doubts-by-yuen-yuen-ang-2019-11.
- Galbraith, James. 2020. “The Roots of American Misery.” Project Syndicate. September 18. Available: https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/why-america-is-miserable-by-james-k-galbraith-2020-09.
- Freund, Caroline and Sarah Oliver. 2016. Rich People Poor Countries: The Rise of Emerging-Market Tycoons and their Mega Firms. Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 7038, July.
- Freund, Caroline and Martha Denisse Pierola, 2016. “The Origins and Dynamics of Export Superstars,” Working Paper Series WP16-11, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Mishel, Lawrence. 2018. “Yes, Manufacturing Still Provides a Pay Advantage, But Staffing Firm Outsourcing is Eroding It.” Economic Policy Institute, Report.
- Phillips Sawyer, Laura. 2019. “U.S. Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective.” Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-110, May.
- Salvatori, Andrea, and Paolo Falco. 2017. “Poles Apart? How Technology & Globalisation Have Affected the Global Workforce.” OECD Forum Network. September 5. Available: https://www.oecd-forum.org/users/62601-andrea-salvatori-and-paolo-falco/posts/19894-poles-apart-how-technology-globalisation-have-affected-the-global-workforce.
- Yang, Yao. 2019. “The Open Secret of Development Economics.” Project Syndicate. October 22. Available: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/development-economics-nobel-open-secret-by-yao-yang-2019-10.

### Law, Competition, and Inequality Studies
- Baker, Jonathan B. and Steven C. Salop. 2015. “Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality.” Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, 1462.
- Khan, Lina and Sandeep Vaheesan. 2017. “Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and its Discontents.” Harvard Law & Policy Review 235.
- Fackler, Thomas A., Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer, Martin Watzinger. 2017. “How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree,” CEPR Discussion Papers 11793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Phillips Sawyer, Laura. 2019. “U.S. Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective.” Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-110, May.

*Source: wpiea2021029-print-pdf - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021029-print-pdf.pdf_