## wpiea2021080-print-pdf

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [wpiea2021080-print-pdf](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021080-print-pdf.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021080-print-pdf.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021080-print-pdf.pdf.json)

---

### I. Introduction — scope and tradeoffs
- Decline in competition intensity observed via market concentration, firm ability to influence prices (market power), and decreasing business dynamism (entry/exit).
- Less competition disproportionately hurts the poor and contributes to rising inequalities and less inclusive growth.
- Tradeoffs:
  - Some monopoly power (e.g., patents) can be needed to incentivize risky innovation.
  - Resource misallocation from barriers to entry or survival of underperforming firms reduces productivity growth.
  - Redistribution via taxation can reduce inequality but may accelerate brain drain among top inventors (see Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva 2016).

### II. The rise of market power — evidence and channels
- Measurement:
  - Market power proxied by price markups (ratio of sales or revenue to a measure of variable cost); concentration indices (Herfindahl) are intuitive but not necessarily indicative of market power (Syverson 2019).
- Key empirical findings:
  - IMF (2019a): sub-Saharan Africa exhibits greater average markups compared to other developing and emerging economies, especially in non-tradable industries.
  - Greater markups associated with lower labor share, lower investment, lower productivity growth, and lower exports — channels detrimental to poverty reduction and equity.
  - Markup rise documented in advanced economies (De Loecker and Eeckhout 2020; IMF 2019b); no corresponding rise in emerging economies though levels may still be high.
- Direct costs of anti-competitive behavior:
  - Estimated price overcharges from identified cartels in advanced economies range from 15 to about 50 percent.
  - Ivaldi et al. (2017): using 1995–2013 cartel database for 20 developing economies, excess profits from price overcharges could reach about 4 percent of GDP (accounting for probability of undetected cartels).
- Distributional effects:
  - Market power in food, beverages, and medicines shown to be regressive (hurt poorest more) — Urzua (2013) and related studies.
  - OECD (2017) calibration: market power could substantially increase wealth of the richest 10 percent and reduce income of the poorest 20 percent.
- Labor share and superstar/composition effects:
  - Declining labor share in U.S. and other advanced economies linked partly to IT revolution and expansion of superstar firms with higher markups and lower labor shares.
  - Pronounced “between-firm” (composition/reallocation) effect in the U.S. discourages entry and reduces aggregate productivity growth and business dynamism (De Loecker and Eeckhout 2019; Baqaae and Farhi 2019; IMF 2019b).

### III. Tycoons, large firms, and sectoral nuances
- Positive channel (sophisticated, export-oriented sectors):
  - Large domestic firms in high R&D intensity sectors can exploit economies of scale, drive exports, absorb frontier managerial and technological processes, and support productivity and high-paying jobs (examples cited: Samsung, Hyundai).
- Negative channel (protected domestic dominance):
  - Large domestic monopolists in non-tradable sectors (telecom, construction, banking) enabled by tariffs or entry barriers can deliver higher prices, lower quality, limited spillovers, and harm international competitiveness and inclusiveness.
- Distinction among tycoons (Freund and Oliver 2016):
  - Tycoons deriving wealth from international competition are more likely to generate spillovers and pay higher wages.
  - Tycoons benefiting from protected domestic rents are more likely to entrench inequality and offer fewer broad-based gains.

### IV. The rise and consequences of Big Tech and platforms
- Mechanisms for dominance:
  - Network effects and platform linkages generate “winner-take-all” outcomes (FAANG and others).
  - Exclusive access to large personal and supplier data reinforces market power and creates proprietary advantages (e.g., personalized ads, self-driving data).
- Monopsony concerns:
  - Platforms can generate monopsony power over suppliers, gig workers, and small suppliers who must access consumers through few platforms, reducing suppliers’ bargaining power and potentially increasing inequality even if end-consumer prices are competitive.
- Positive effects:
  - Efficiency gains: reduced search costs, lower consumer prices, lowered transaction costs, opportunities for new businesses.
- Policy implication:
  - Interventions should target negative effects rather than apply broad-brush regulation.

### V. Big Agriculture — concentration, subsidies, and global spillovers
- Structural facts and inequalities:
  - Agricultural subsidies are the largest share of the EU budget (more than a third in 2020).
  - Distributional skew in EU subsidies: smallest 25 percent of farmers receive less than 1.5 percent of total subsidies, while the largest 20 percent receive 80 percent.
- Input market concentration:
  - U.S. market share of the four largest producers of seeds, fertilizers and farm pharmaceuticals increased markedly since the 1990s, reaching more than 50 percent; in some input segments concentration of four firms reached more than 85 percent.
  - The 6 largest players account for the bulk of acquisitions of innovative biotechnology start-ups and hold the majority of relevant intellectual property.
- Price and productivity dynamics:
  - For corn and soy producers (U.S. example), yield per acre rose about 19 and 30 percent over 1985–2011, respectively, while prices of seeds per acre increased by 325 and 259 percent, respectively.
- Risks to small farmers and low-income countries:
  - Two-thirds of the population in sub-Saharan Africa are small-holder farmers; dominance by a few multinationals, restrictive IP practices (e.g., “terminator” seeds), and strategic licensing threaten replanted seed access and small-farmer livelihoods.
- Policy need:
  - National antitrust policies, international coordination, and local initiatives to develop seed industries are urgently needed.

### VI. Competition, innovation, and inequality — theoretical and empirical insights
- Schumpeterian tradeoff:
  - Innovation (creative destruction) can increase top income inequality while also raising wages in innovative firms and improving social mobility when driven by entrant-led creative destruction.
- Empirical patterns:
  - Sectoral productivity growth often increases with competition (Blundell, Griffith, Van Reenen 1999; Nickell and Van Reenen 2002).
  - Competition and innovation relationship follows an inverted-U: more competition increases innovation at low competition levels but may reduce it at very high competition levels (Aghion et al. 2005; IMF 2019b).
  - Heterogeneity matters: frontier firms respond to increased competition by innovating more; laggard firms are discouraged.
- Inventors and inequality:
  - Inventors account for a sizable share of top income earners; parental income positively affects probability of children becoming inventors with a J-curve relationship (flat below 20th percentile then rising rapidly) — Bell et al. 2019; Akcigit et al. 2018/2019.
  - Higher top marginal income tax rates correlate with lower retention of “superstar” inventors (Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva 2016), potentially affecting innovation via mobility/brain drain channels.
- Policy balance:
  - Redistribution via taxes and transfers can lower inequality but may affect incentives for top inventors; policy design must weigh these tradeoffs.

### VII. Competition and growth policies to promote inclusive growth — recommendations and design principles
- Strengthening competition frameworks:
  - Tackle regulations and government actions that act as implicit entry barriers (licenses, tariffs, access to public goods).
  - Ensure competition institutions have autonomy, resources, and authority to enforce rules.
  - Improve detection of anti-competitive behavior (undiagnosed cartels remain significant); prioritize product markets affecting the poor given limited resources.
  - Control anti-competitive mergers to prevent direct rises in market power and indirect facilitation of collusion.
- Prioritization and scope:
  - Prioritize sectors with large consumption shares among low-income households (food and beverages typically 30-40 percent of consumption basket for low-income households).
  - Also prioritize inputs crucial to small firms (e.g., fertilizers) and sectors with characteristics conducive to anti-competitive behavior (low price elasticity, import barriers).
  - Consider broader international context: tariff reductions on heavily subsidized staples in advanced countries can wipe out small producers in developing countries; medicines, though a small consumption share, can have outsized welfare effects if generic entry is promoted.
- Adapting antitrust for dynamic competition:
  - Move from a static, single-market consumer-welfare view to a dynamic competition view that accounts for innovation, entry, monopsony, and longer-term effects across related markets.
  - When assessing mergers/acquisitions, consider potential effects on innovation, entry, and related markets (Gilbert 2020).
  - Reassess discretion for competition agencies to prioritize sectors or goods affecting poor and middle-class families (Baker and Salop 2015).
- Industrial policy design:
  - If state intervention (industrial policy) is used to correct externalities, it should target sectors (not firms), preserve market competition, and avoid creating isolated “islands” of advanced sectors disconnected from the broader economy.
  - Interaction matters: targeted state subsidies are more effective in sectors with higher product market competition; concentrated state aid reduces positive effects (Aghion et al. 2015).
- Non-distortive interventions:
  - Address information asymmetries and management practices: examples include productivity missions, export promotion, and management-improvement interventions (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010; Giorcelli 2019; Atkin et al. 2017).
  - These can raise SME productivity and export participation without curtailing competition.

### VIII. Conclusion — synthesis and policy agenda
- Competition and innovation jointly shape inclusive growth through multiple channels; policies must consider tradeoffs between innovation incentives, market power, and distributional outcomes.
- Recommended policy priorities:
  - Reappraise laws and regulations to explicitly consider effects on current and future inequality, transaction costs, and innovation spillovers.
  - Empower competition agencies with resources and discretion to prioritize enforcement in sectors affecting poor and middle-class households.
  - Promote technology diffusion (e.g., incentives for large firms to set up independent research labs with affordable licensing or free access) to revive business dynamism and mitigate inequality from supernormal returns.
- Overarching message:
  - A new competition policy paradigm is needed — one that fosters competition and innovation while explicitly aiming to limit rising inequality and support broad-based growth.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021080-print-pdf.pdf*

### References..............................................................................................................

### wpiea2021080-print-pdf - References......................................................................................................

### I. Introduction — scope and tradeoffs
- Decline in competition intensity observed via market concentration, firm ability to influence prices (market power), and decreasing business dynamism (entry/exit).
- Less competition disproportionately hurts the poor and contributes to rising inequalities and less inclusive growth.
- Tradeoffs highlighted:
  - Some monopoly power (e.g., patents) can be needed to incentivize risky innovation.
  - Resource misallocation from barriers to entry or survival of underperforming firms reduces productivity growth.
  - Redistribution via taxation can reduce inequality but may accelerate brain drain among top inventors (see Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva 2016).

### II. The rise of market power — evidence and channels
- Measurement:
  - Market power proxied by price markups (ratio of sales or revenue to a measure of variable cost); concentration indices (Herfindahl) are intuitive but not necessarily indicative of market power (Syverson 2019).
- Key empirical findings:
  - IMF (2019a): sub-Saharan Africa exhibits greater average markups compared to other developing and emerging economies, especially in non-tradable industries.
  - Greater markups associated with lower labor share, lower investment, lower productivity growth, and lower exports — channels detrimental to poverty reduction and equity.
  - Markup rise documented in advanced economies (De Loecker and Eeckhout 2020; IMF 2019b); no corresponding rise in emerging economies though levels may still be high.
- Direct costs of anti-competitive behavior:
  - Estimated price overcharges from identified cartels in advanced economies range from 15 to about 50 percent.
  - Ivaldi et al. (2017): using 1995–2013 cartel database for 20 developing economies, excess profits from price overcharges could reach about 4 percent of GDP (accounting for probability of undetected cartels).
- Distributional effects:
  - Market power in food, beverages, and medicines shown to be regressive (hurt poorest more) — Urzua (2013) and related studies.
  - OECD (2017) calibration: market power could substantially increase wealth of the richest 10 percent and reduce income of the poorest 20 percent.
- Labor share and superstar/composition effects:
  - Declining labor share in U.S. and other advanced economies linked partly to IT revolution and expansion of superstar firms with higher markups and lower labor shares.
  - Evidence points to a pronounced “between-firm” (composition/reallocation) effect in the U.S. (De Loecker and Eeckhout 2019; Baqaae and Farhi 2019; IMF 2019b), discouraging entry and reducing aggregate productivity growth and business dynamism.

### III. Tycoons, large firms, and sectoral nuances
- Positive channel of large firms:
  - In sophisticated, export-oriented sectors (high R&D intensity), large domestic firms can exploit economies of scale, drive exports, absorb frontier managerial and technological processes, and support productivity and high-paying jobs (examples: Samsung, Hyundai).
- Negative channel of protected domestic dominance:
  - Large domestic monopolists in non-tradable sectors (telecom, construction, banking) enabled by tariffs or entry barriers can deliver higher prices, lower quality, limited spillovers, and harm international competitiveness and inclusiveness.
- Distinction among tycoons (Freund and Oliver 2016):
  - Tycoons deriving wealth from international competition are more likely to generate spillovers and pay higher wages.
  - Tycoons benefiting from protected domestic rents are more likely to entrench inequality and offer fewer broad-based gains.

### IV. The rise and consequences of Big Tech and platforms
- Mechanisms for dominance:
  - Network effects and platform linkages generate “winner-take-all” outcomes (FAANG and others).
  - Exclusive access to large personal and supplier data reinforces market power and creates proprietary advantages (e.g., personalized ads, self-driving data).
- Monopsony concerns:
  - Platforms can generate monopsony power over suppliers, gig workers, and small suppliers who must access consumers through few platforms, reducing suppliers’ bargaining power and potentially increasing inequality even if end-consumer prices are competitive.
- Positive effects:
  - Efficiency gains: reduced search costs, lower consumer prices, lowered transaction costs, opportunities for new businesses.
- Policy implication:
  - Interventions should target negative effects rather than apply broad-brush regulation.

### V. Big Agriculture — concentration, subsidies, and global spillovers
- Structural facts and inequalities:
  - Agricultural subsidies are the largest share of the EU budget (more than a third in 2020).
  - Distributional skew in EU subsidies: smallest 25 percent of farmers receive less than 1.5 percent of total subsidies, while the largest 20 percent receive 80 percent.
- Input market concentration:
  - U.S. market share of the four largest producers of seeds, fertilizers and farm pharmaceuticals increased markedly since the 1990s, reaching more than 50 percent; in some input segments concentration of four firms reached more than 85 percent.
  - The 6 largest players account for the bulk of acquisitions of innovative biotechnology start-ups and hold the majority of relevant intellectual property.
- Price and productivity dynamics:
  - For corn and soy producers (U.S. example), yield per acre rose about 19 and 30 percent over 1985–2011, respectively, while prices of seeds per acre increased by 325 and 259 percent, respectively.
- Risks to small farmers and low-income countries:
  - Two-thirds of the population in sub-Saharan Africa are small-holder farmers; dominance by a few multinationals, restrictive IP practices (e.g., “terminator” seeds), and strategic licensing threaten replanted seed access and small-farmer livelihoods.
- Policy need:
  - National antitrust policies, international coordination, and local initiatives to develop seed industries are urgently needed.

### VI. Competition, innovation, and inequality — theoretical and empirical insights
- Schumpeterian tradeoff:
  - Innovation (creative destruction) can increase top income inequality while also raising wages in innovative firms and improving social mobility when driven by entrant-led creative destruction.
- Empirical patterns:
  - Sectoral productivity growth often increases with competition (Blundell, Griffith, Van Reenen 1999; Nickell and Van Reenen 2002).
  - Competition and innovation relationship follows an inverted-U: more competition increases innovation at low competition levels but may reduce it at very high competition levels (Aghion et al. 2005; IMF 2019b).
  - Heterogeneity matters: frontier firms respond to increased competition by innovating more; laggard firms are discouraged.
- Inventors and inequality:
  - Inventors account for a sizable share of top income earners; parental income positively affects probability of children becoming inventors with a J-curve relationship (flat below 20th percentile then rising rapidly) — Bell et al. 2019; Akcigit et al. 2018/2019.
  - Higher top marginal income tax rates correlate with lower retention of “superstar” inventors (Akcigit, Baslandze, and Stantcheva 2016), potentially affecting innovation via mobility/brain drain channels.
- Policy balance:
  - Redistribution via taxes and transfers can lower inequality but may affect incentives for top inventors; policy design must weigh these tradeoffs.

### VII. Competition and growth policies to promote inclusive growth — recommendations and design principles
- Strengthening competition frameworks:
  - Tackle regulations and government actions that act as implicit entry barriers (licenses, tariffs, access to public goods).
  - Ensure competition institutions have autonomy, resources, and authority to enforce rules.
  - Improve detection of anti-competitive behavior (undiagnosed cartels remain significant); prioritize product markets affecting the poor given limited resources.
  - Control anti-competitive mergers to prevent direct rises in market power and indirect facilitation of collusion.
- Prioritization and scope:
  - Prioritize sectors with large consumption shares among low-income households (food and beverages typically 30-40 percent of consumption basket for low-income households).
  - Also prioritize inputs crucial to small firms (e.g., fertilizers) and sectors with characteristics conducive to anti-competitive behavior (low price elasticity, import barriers).
  - Consider broader international context: tariff reductions on heavily subsidized staples in advanced countries can wipe out small producers in developing countries; medicines, though a small consumption share, can have outsized welfare effects if generic entry is promoted.
- Adapting antitrust for dynamic competition:
  - Move from a static, single-market consumer-welfare view to a dynamic competition view that accounts for innovation, entry, monopsony, and longer-term effects across related markets.
  - When assessing mergers/acquisitions, consider potential effects on innovation, entry, and related markets (Gilbert 2020).
  - Reassess discretion for competition agencies to prioritize sectors or goods affecting poor and middle-class families (Baker and Salop 2015).
- Industrial policy design:
  - If state intervention (industrial policy) is used to correct externalities, it should target sectors (not firms), preserve market competition, and avoid creating isolated “islands” of advanced sectors disconnected from the broader economy.
  - Interaction matters: targeted state subsidies are more effective in sectors with higher product market competition; concentrated state aid reduces positive effects (Aghion et al. 2015).
- Non-distortive interventions:
  - Address information asymmetries and management practices: examples include productivity missions, export promotion, and management-improvement interventions (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010; Giorcelli 2019; Atkin et al. 2017).
  - These can raise SME productivity and export participation without curtailing competition.

### VIII. Conclusion — synthesis and policy agenda
- Competition and innovation jointly shape inclusive growth through multiple channels; policies must consider tradeoffs between innovation incentives, market power, and distributional outcomes.
- Recommended policy priorities:
  - Reappraise laws and regulations to explicitly consider effects on current and future inequality, transaction costs, and innovation spillovers.
  - Empower competition agencies with resources and discretion to prioritize enforcement in sectors affecting poor and middle-class households.
  - Promote technology diffusion (e.g., incentives for large firms to set up independent research labs with affordable licensing or free access) to revive business dynamism and mitigate inequality from supernormal returns.
- Overarching message:
  - A new competition policy paradigm is needed — one that fosters competition and innovation while explicitly aiming to limit rising inequality and support broad-based growth.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021080-print-pdf.pdf*

### References

### wpiea2021080-print-pdf - References

### References
- Aghion, Philippe, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, Peter Howitt, and Susanne Prantl (2009), “The Effects of Entry on Incumbent Innovation and Productivity,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1), pp. 20-32.
- Aghion, Philippe, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Grif fith, and Peter Howitt (2005), Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2), pp. 701-728.
- Aghion, Philippe. 2016. “Growth Policy Design for Middle-Income Countries.” In Cherif, Reda, Fuad Hasanov, and Min Zhu (editors), Breaking the Oil Spell: The Gulf Falcons’ Path to Diversification. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund Press.
- Aghion, Philippe, Ufuk Akcigit, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell, and David Hemous. 2016. “Innovation and Top Income Inequality.” Working paper.
- Aghion, Philippe, Antonin Bergeaud, Timo Boppart, Peter J. Klenow, Huiyu Li. 2019. “A Theory of Falling Growth and Rising Rents.” Working paper.
- Aghion, Philippe, Nicholas Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rach el Grif fith, and Peter Howitt. 2005. “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(2), May:   701–728.
- Aghion, Philippe, Jing Cai, Mathias Dewatripont, Luosha Du, Ann Harrison, and Patrick Legros. 2015. “Industrial Policy and Competition.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(4), October: 1-32.
- Aghion, Philippe and Peter Howitt. 1992. “A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction.” Econometrica 60: 323–51.
- Akcigit, Ufuk, Salomé Baslandze, and Stefanie Stantcheva. 2016. “Taxation and the International Mobility of Inventors.” American Economic Review, 106 (10): 2930-81.
- Akcigit, Ufuk, John Grigsby, Tom Nicholas, and Stefanie Stantcheva, Taxation and Innovation in the 20th Century, NBER Working Papers, September 2018, No. 24982.
- Armstrong, Mark and David Sappington, 2006. “Regulation, Competition and Liberalization,” Journal of Economic Literature.
- Arrow, Kenneth. 1962. “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing.” The Review of Economic Studies 29 (3 ), June: 155-173.
- Atkin, Davis & Amit K. Khandelwal & Adam Osman, 2017. “Exporting and Firm Performance: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 132(2), pages 551-615.
- Autor, David, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen. 2017. “Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share,” American Economic Review 107(5), May: 180-185.
- Baker, Jonathan B. and Steven C. Salop. 2015. “Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality.” Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, 1462.
- Baker, Jonathan B. 2019. The Anti-Trust Paradigm. Harvard University Press.
- Baqaee, David and Emmanuel Farhi. 2020. “Productivity and Misallocation in General Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 135 (1): 105-163.
- Bessen, James. 2017. “Information Technology and Industry Concentration.” Law and Economics Paper No 17-41. Boston University School of Law.
- Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen. 2010. “Why Do Management Practices Differ across Firms and Countries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (1): 203-24.
- Chandler, Alfred D., Jr. 1991. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Belknap Press, Cambridge.
- Cherif, Reda and Fuad Hasanov. 2016. “Soaring of the Gulf Falcons: Diversification in GCC Oil Exporters in Seven Propositions.” In Cherif, Reda, Fuad Hasanov, and Min Zhu (editors), Breaking the Oil Spell: The Gulf Falcons’ Path to Diversification. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund Press.
- Cherif, Reda, Fuad Hasanov, and Min Zhu (eds). 2016. Breaking the Oil Spell: The Gulf Falcons’ Path to Diversification. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund Press.
- Cherif, Reda and Fuad Hasanov. 2019. “The Return of the Policy that Shall Not Be Named: Principles of Industrial Policy.” IMF Working Paper 19/74.
- Cherif, Reda and Fuad Hasanov. 2019b. “The Leap of the Tiger: Escaping the Middle-Income Trap to the Technological Frontier.” Global Policy 10(4), November: 497-511.
- Cherif, Reda, Marc Engher, and Fuad Hasanov. 2020. “Crouching Belief s, Hidden Biases: The Rise and Fall of  Growth Narratives.”    IMF Working Paper 20/228.
- Combe, E., C. Monnier, and R. Legal. 2008. “Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the European Union.” Bruegel European Economic Research Papers no. 12.
- Creedy, J., and R. Dixon. 1998. “The Relative Burden of Monopoly on Households with Different Incomes.” Economica 65 (258): 285–93.
- Creedy, J., and R. Dixon. 2000. “Relative Welf are Losses and Imperfect Competition in New Zealand.” New Zealand Economic Papers 34 (2): 269–86.
- De Loecker, Jan and Jan Eeckhout. 2020. “Th e Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
- Dollar, David, Tatjana Kleineberg, and Aart Kraay. 2013. “Growth Still is Good for the Poor.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6568.
- Fackler, Thomas A., Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer, Martin Watzinger. 2017. “How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree,” CEPR Discussion Papers 11793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ferreira, Gustavo Filipe Canle, Pablo Antonio Garcia Fuentes, and Juan Pablo Canle Ferreira. 2018. “The Successes and Shortcoming of Costa Rica Exports Diversification Policies.” Background paper to the UNCTAD-FAO Commodities and Development Report 2017.
- Freund, Caroline and Sarah Oliver. 2016. Rich People Poor Countries: The Rise of Emerging-Market Tycoons and their Mega Firms. Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 7038, July.
- Freund, Caroline and Martha Denisse Pierola, 2016. “The Origins and Dynamics of Export Superstars,” Working Paper Series WP16-11, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Furceri, Davide and Jonathan D. Ostry. 2019. “Robust Determinants of Income Inequality.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 35(3): 490–517.
- Furman, Jason and Peter Orszag. 2015. “A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality.”    Presentation at “A Just Society” Centennial Event in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz,  Columbia University.
- Gabaix, Xavier. 2009. “Power Laws in Economics and Finance,” Annual Review of Economics 1(1): 255–94.
- Gilbert, Richard. 2020. Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-technology Economy. MIT Press.
- Giorcelli, Michela. 2019. “The Long-Term Effects of Management and Technology Transfers.” American Economic Review 109(1): 121-1 52.
- Gutiérrez, Germán and Thomas Philippon. 2017. “Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S.” NBER Working Papers 23583, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hausmann, Ricardo & Rodrik, Dani, 2003. “Economic development as self-discovery,” Journal of Development Economics vol. 72(2), pages 603-633, December.
- Hausmann, Ricardo, Jason Hwang, and Dani Rodrik, 2007. “What You Export Matters,” Journal of Economic Growth 12(1), March: 1–25.
- Herrendorf, Berthold and Akos Valentinyi. 2012. “Which Sectors Make Poor Countries So Unproductive?” Journal of the European Economic Association 10(2): 323–41.
- Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Peter Klenow. 2009. “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(4), November: 1403–1448.
- Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Enrico Moretti. 2019. “Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 11(2), April: 1-39.
- IMF. 2018. “Manufacturing Jobs: Implications for Productivity and Inequality,” World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3, April.
- IMF. 2019a. “Competition, Competitiveness, and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Economic Outlook, October. Washington, D.C.
- IMF. 2019b. “The Rise of Corporate Market Power and Its Macroeconomic Effects.” World Economic Outlook, April. Washington, D.C.
- Ivaldi, Marc, Frédéric Jenny, and Aleksandra Khimich. 2016. “Cartel Damages to the Economy: An Assessment for Developing Countries.”
- Khan, Lina and Sandeep Vaheesan. 2017. “Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and its Discontents.” Harvard Law & Policy Review 235.
- Kitzmuller, M., and M. Martinez Licetti. 2012. “Competition Policy: Encouraging Thriving Markets for Development.” Viewpoint: Public Policy f or the Private Sector, Note 331 (August), World Bank Group, Washington, DC.
- Krueger, Alan B. 2019. Rockonomics: A Backstage Tour of What the Music Industry Can Teach Us About Economics and Life. Currency.
- Krugman, Paul. 1987. “The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Competitive Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: Notes on Trade in the Presence of Dynamic Scale Economies,” Journal of Development Economics 27(1-2): 41–55.
- Lamoreaux, Naomi R. 2019. “The Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil to Google.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(3): 94-117.
- Lucas, Robert Jr., 1993. “Making a Miracle,” Econometrica 61(2), March: 251–72.
- Matsuyama, Kiminori. 1992. “Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Theory 58(2 ): 317-334.
- Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 1989. “Industrialization and the Big Push,” Journal of Political Economy 97(5): 1003–26.
- OECD. 2017. “Inequality: A Hidden Cost of Market Power.”
- OECD. 2018. “Market Concentration.” Issue Paper.
- Philippon, Thomas. 2019. The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets. Belknap Press.
- Phillips Sawyer, Laura. 2019. “U.S. Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspective.” Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 19-110, May.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2005. “Growth Strategies,” in Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, Oxford: Elsevier, 967–1014.
- Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul. 1943. “Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South- Eastern Europe.” Economic Journal 53(210/211):  202–211.
- Salvatori, Andrea, and Paolo Falco. 2017. “Poles Apart? How Technology & Globalization Have Affected the Global Workforce.” OECD Forum Network. September 5. Available: https://www.oecd-forum.org/users/62601-andrea-salvatori-and-paolo-falco/posts/19894-poles-apart-how-technology-globalisation-have-affected-the-global-workforce.
- Solt, Frederick. 2019. “Measuring Income Inequality Across Countries and Over Time: The Standardized World Income Inequality Database.” SWIID Version 8.2, November.
- Spar, Debora.1998. “Attracting high technology investment: Intel's Costa Rican plant.” Foreign Investment Advisory Service occasional paper; no. FIAS 11 Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.
- Syverson, Chad. 2019. “Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(3), Summer: 23-43.
- Tenn, S., and B. W. Wendling. 2014. “Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry.” Review of Economics and Statistics 96 (2): 214–28.
- Urzua, C. M. 2013. “Distributive and Regional Effects of Monopoly Power.” Economia Mexicana Nueva Epoca 22 (2): 279–95.
- Wang, Sun Ling, Roberto Mosheim, Richard Nehring, and Eric Njuki, “Agricultural Productivity in the U.S.” USDA, Economic Research Service, January 2020
- World Bank Group. 2016. “Markets and Competition Policy Assessment Tool” (MCPAT).
- World Bank and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2017. “A Step Ahead: Competition Policy for Shared Prosperity and Inclusive Growth,” World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 27527.
- Zerbe, Noah, 2001. “Seeds of Hope, Seeds of Despair: Towards a Political Economy of the Seed Industry in Southern Africa.” Third World Quarterly Vol 22, No. 4. Taylor and Francis.

*wpiea2021080-print-pdf - References*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021080-print-pdf.pdf_