## wpiea2021083-print-pdf - Introduction ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [wpiea2021083-print-pdf - Introduction](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021083-print-pdf.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021083-print-pdf.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021083-print-pdf.pdf.json) --- ### Introduction: role of public expenditure in inclusive growth - Public expenditure affects economic growth and income distribution in the short- and long-run. - Social spending: - Provides a minimum income level and increases access to valuable public services. - Short-run: cash transfers reduce income poverty and inequality directly. - Long-run: targeted cash transfers can be growth-enhancing via human capital improvements for disadvantaged children. - Education and healthcare spending: - Improves quality of life and is growth-enhancing through the human capital channel. - If targeted to those most in need, can increase equality of opportunity and social mobility. - Social spending provides risk-mitigation against macroeconomic, financial, social, and environmental shocks. - Public investment in infrastructure: - Raises long-term economic growth and productivity, generating higher employment and reducing poverty. - Certain infrastructure (e.g., water and sewerage) improves living standards in multiple short-term dimensions. - Redistributive impact depends on size, composition, progressivity, and financing of public expenditure. - Key assessment questions: - Who benefits from existing public expenditure and by how much? - What are distributive effects of alternative spending measures? - When fiscal adjustment is necessary, what mitigating measures should protect the vulnerable? *Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - Introduction* ### I. Public expenditure — stylized facts - Aggregate and cross-group spending levels and composition: - Global government spending increased from 29 percent of GDP in 2000 to 33 percent of GDP in 2019. - Advanced economies: - Government spending hovered just below 40 percent of GDP (with a spike in 2009). - Social spending: about 26.5 percent of GDP in 2016-18 vs 25 percent in 2000-03. - Defense and security spending reduced from 3.4 percent of GDP in 2000-03 to 3 percent in 2016-18. - Emerging and developing economies (EMDs): - Government spending rose to 34 percent of GDP. - Social spending increased from 11 percent to 13.8 percent of GDP. - Low-Income Countries (LICs): - Government spending rose to 27 percent of GDP. - Social spending rose by 1.5 percentage point to 8 percent of GDP. - Share of public investment: LICs 29 percent of public spending vs Advanced Economies 4 percent. - Spending structure (shares of total public spending): - Wage bill: Advanced Economies 25 percent; LICs 28 percent. - Goods and services: about 14-15 percent across groups. - Social benefits: Advanced Economies 38 percent; Emerging Economies 18 percent; LICs 9.4 percent. - Public investment: Advanced Economies 4 percent; Emerging Economies 17 percent; LICs 29 percent. - Cyclicality and inefficiencies: - Public spending tends to be procyclical; more pronounced in developing countries (chart period 1980-2019 cited). - Health spending waste typically at least 20-40 percent (World Health Organization, 2010). - GDP losses due to wasteful spending on education and health estimated at more than 4 percent of GDP in a set of 24 economies (Grigoli and Ley, 2012). - IMF (2015) estimates average country loses about 30 percent of value of public investment due to inefficiencies. - Budget institutions and effectiveness: - Quality of budget institutions assessed across 12 indicators; Advanced Economies score higher than Emerging Economies and LICs on budget institution quality and government effectiveness (World Bank indicator range -2 to 2). ### II. Analytical framework — how public spending links to inclusive growth - Musgrave’s threefold rationale: - (i) Macroeconomic stabilization (countercyclical measures, preserving debt sustainability). - (ii) Resource allocation (providing public goods cost-effectively). - (iii) Distributional objectives (address disparities, promote equal opportunities). - Typology of spending outcomes: - Win-win: enhance long-term growth and reduce inequality (example: expanding equal access to education). - Lose-lose: inefficient and inequality-increasing (example: generalized energy subsidies). - Growth-enhancing but distribution-adverse: productivity-improving measures that increase near-term inequality. - Redistributive measures: reduce inequality and poverty; may be growth-enhancing especially when initial inequality is high but can crowd out growth-promoting spending if over-relied upon. - Financing considerations: - Taxation: distributional impact depends on design; progressive personal income tax can reduce inequality; flat VAT can increase inequality. - Borrowing: must be consistent with sustainable fiscal policy; example: Egypt interest payments rose from 15.2 percent to 42.6 percent of government revenue between 2009 and 2017, accompanying rise in debt-to-GDP ratio. - Spending reallocation: removing generalized subsidies can free resources for inclusive infrastructure and targeted social safety nets; capital spending and certain current components (e.g., operations and maintenance) are complements rather than substitutes. - Country-specific considerations: - Appropriate mix depends on initial poverty/inequality, coverage and adequacy of social protection systems, and administrative capacity. - Priorities differ by country: high-poverty countries may prioritize poverty reduction; others may emphasize growth-enhancing measures. ### III. Evidence on public spending and inclusiveness - Overall effectiveness: - Public expenditure has been more effective than taxation in reducing inequality. - Advanced economies: - Personal income taxation and direct transfer spending reduced prefiscal income inequality by 14 percentage points (about 25 percent) in mid-2000s (OECD, 2017). - Approximately two-thirds of redistribution due to public expenditures (estimates incomplete because indirect taxation often not included). - Within transfers, assistance transfers (e.g., family benefits) account for the bulk of redistribution. - Developing countries: - CEQ Assessments: fiscal redistribution via personal income taxation and direct transfers reduces market income inequality by 2.5 Gini points (5.5 percent on average). - Transfers contribute approximately 60 percent of overall reduction in inequality. - Indirect taxation and indirect subsidies tend to offset each other, producing a very small net reduction in the Gini coefficient. - Countries with higher social spending (share of GDP) show larger reductions in inequality. - In-kind transfers (education and health) redistributive effects: - Advanced economies: education reduces Gini by 2.1 percentage points; health reduces Gini by 3.3 percentage points. - Developing countries: education reduces Gini by 2.4 percentage points; health reduces Gini by 1.6 percentage points. - Caveat: incidence analysis values public services at cost of provision; inefficiencies and private substitution can erode redistributive effects. - Poverty effects: - In a sample of 16 developing countries, fiscal policy reduces poverty headcount by 2.3 percentage points on average (from 23.9 percent prefiscal to 21.6 percent disposable) using $PPP 3.20 per person per day poverty line. - Range: negligible in Uganda to 10.5 percentage points in South Africa. - In a sample of 35 countries, poverty headcount increased in 12 countries post-fiscal policy (based on $PPP 3.20 poverty line). - Fiscal impoverishment: - Some poor individuals become net payers ("Fiscal Impoverishment"); in sixteen developing countries fiscal impoverishment among postfiscal income poor ranged from approximately 9 percent (Panama) to nearly 99 percent (Tanzania). - Measurement notes: - Contributory pensions are considered as deferred income in incidence exercises; treating them as transfers inflates measured redistributive impacts. ### IV. Policy implications and design considerations - General design principles: - Measures should be cost-effective and consistent with fiscal sustainability. - Sensitivity to country starting points: poverty, inequality, coverage, administrative capacity. - Priorities by country type: - Advanced economies: better targeting of benefits; ensure pension sustainability. - Developing countries: extend coverage of social safety nets; improve access to basic public services; reduce nonproductive spending (subsidies favoring nonpoor); improve tax mobilization. - During fiscal consolidation: - Carefully design expenditure measures to mitigate adverse effects on inequality and poverty. - Implement compensating measures to protect vulnerable populations and prevent lasting human capital losses. - Complementarities and trade-offs: - Use mitigating social protection (well-targeted transfers, SSNs) to offset adverse distributional impacts from efficiency-enhancing reforms. - Consider joint incidence of taxes and spending to ensure the poor are not net payers. - Institutional priorities: - Strengthen budget institutions and public financial management to improve efficiency and protect resources from corruption and waste. - Build fiscal buffers in good times to enable countercyclical support during downturns and shocks. *Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - References* --- ### I. Public Expenditure — Stylized Facts (detailed metrics) - Key numeric patterns: - Global government spending: 29 percent of GDP in 2000 → 33 percent of GDP in 2019. - Social spending by country group: - Advanced Economies: social spending ≈ 26.5 percent of GDP in 2016-18. - Emerging Economies: social spending rose from 11 percent to 13.8 percent of GDP. - LICs: social spending rose by 1.5 percentage point to 8 percent of GDP. - Public investment shares of total public spending: - Advanced Economies 4 percent; Emerging Economies 17 percent; LICs 29 percent. - Wage bill shares of total public spending: - Advanced Economies 25 percent; LICs 28 percent. - Efficiency loss estimates: - Health spending waste: 20-40 percent. - Education and health waste: GDP losses > 4 percent in some sample (Grigoli and Ley, 2012). - Public investment value loss: about 30 percent on average (IMF, 2015). --- ### II. Public Spending and Inclusive Growth — Analytical Framework (summary) - Spending types classified by efficiency-equity profile: - Win-win (growth and equity): e.g., equal access to education. - Lose-lose (inefficient, inequality-increasing): e.g., generalized energy subsidies. - Growth-enhancing but distribution-adverse: productivity measures that raise inequality short-term. - Redistributive: reduce inequality and poverty; potential crowding-out risk. - Financing and allocation dynamics: - Taxes, borrowing, and reallocations each affect distributive outcomes. - Example fiscal pressure: Egypt interest payments rose from 15.2 percent to 42.6 percent of government revenue between 2009 and 2017. - Reallocating away from generalized subsidies can free resources for inclusive investments, but reforms require mitigation for vulnerable households. --- ### III. Public Spending and Inclusiveness — Evidence (selected empirical findings) - Redistribution via taxes and transfers: - Advanced economies: prefiscal-to-postfiscal Gini reduction of 14 percentage points (≈25 percent) in mid-2000s. - Developing countries: average Gini reduction by 2.5 percentage points (5.5 percent) from personal income taxation and direct transfers (CEQ). - In-kind transfers: - Education: Gini reductions of 2.1 (advanced) and 2.4 (developing) percentage points. - Health: Gini reductions of 3.3 (advanced) and 1.6 (developing) percentage points. - Poverty impacts: - Sample of 16 developing countries: fiscal policy reduces poverty headcount by 2.3 percentage points on average (from 23.9 percent to 21.6 percent) at $PPP 3.20/day. - In 11 of these 16 countries fiscal policy reduced the poverty headcount ratio. - Impact-effectiveness indicators (CEQ Institute): - Direct transfers mean Poverty Gap Impact Effectiveness = 0.54 (54 percent of maximum if optimally distributed). - Subsidies achieve barely 10 percent of maximum redistributive impact. - Direct taxes rank highest in inequality reduction in CEQ country set. --- ### IV. Policy options ### 1. Social Protection - Roles and categories: - Social safety nets (SSN)/social assistance: non-contributory; target poor and vulnerable (UCTs, CCTs). - Social insurance: contributory; manage income shocks (old age, sickness, unemployment). - Labor market programs: active and passive policies (training, employment intermediation, wage subsidies, unemployment insurance). - 1.1 Social Safety Nets (SSN) — facts and performance: - SSN spending (percent of GDP): Low-income countries 1.4 percent; Emerging economies 2.0 percent; OECD countries 2.7 percent. - Cash transfer program patterns: - Cash transfers represent one-third of reported SSN programs globally. - Account for two thirds of SSN spending in high- and middle-income countries and only 30 percent in low-income countries. - CCTs tend to be more effective than UCTs in reducing inequality and improving human capital. - Food and in-kind transfers: account for 37 percent of SSN spending in low-income countries; donor-funded common. - Public works: Share of total SSN spending 2.2 percent in high-income countries and 13 percent in low-income countries; poorest-quintile coverage limited at 11 percent (MGNREG in India at 27 percent for poorest quintile). - Coverage: - SSNs cover 33 percent of total population in developing countries. - Coverage by group: LICs 18 percent of total population; Emerging economies 43 percent. - Coverage of poorest 40 percent: Emerging economies ≈ 60 percent of poorest 40 percent; LICs 20 percent. - Targeting: - Poorest 40 percent represent 46 percent of SSN beneficiaries in LICs and 57 percent in emerging economies. - Leakages: 34 percent (LICs) and 24 percent (emerging economies) of SSN beneficiaries belong to the richest 40 percent. - CCT benefit share to poorest 40 percent: LICs 54 percent; emerging economies 75 percent. - Benefit size and impact: - Average SSN transfer as share of beneficiaries’ post-transfer consumption: LICs 6.4 percent; Emerging economies 12 percent. - Transfer as share of welfare of beneficiary in poorest quintile: LICs 10.8 percent; Emerging economies 24 percent. - Empirical benchmark: transfers are more impactful when ≥ 20 percent of household consumption. - Impact on poverty/inequality: LICs SSNs reduce poverty rates by just less than 2.5 percent; Emerging economies reduce inequality by 4.2 percent (of pretransfer Gini) and poverty by 13 percent (of pretransfer poverty rate). - SSN policy recommendations (developing country emphasis): - Increase SSN spending and expand coverage, including family and child allowances. - Consolidate programs and develop national social registries with biometric identifiers. - Introduce/expand CCTs as administrative capacity improves. - Extend coverage to informal economy; scale up public works with training components. - Develop multi-dimensional programs covering health, education, and nutrition. - 1.2 Pensions — coverage and policy options: - Global coverage: - Globally, only 68 percent of the elderly receive benefits from publicly-supported pension schemes. - Advanced economies: spending close to 9 percent of GDP; elderly coverage 97 percent. - Developing countries: effective elderly coverage 24 percent in LICs and 57 percent in emerging economies; spending associated 1 percent and 4 percent of GDP respectively. - Contributory pension coverage (population above statutory pensionable age receiving old-age pension): LICs 13 percent; Emerging economies 29 percent. - Measurement caveat: - Counting pensions as transfers vs deferred income materially changes redistributive estimates (example: poverty headcount reductions 47.4 percent vs 26.2 percent across 19 developing countries depending on treatment). - Social pensions (non-contributory): - Globally cover close to 35 percent of old-age population. - Social pensions cover 50 percent of the poorest 40 percent in LICs and 63 percent in emerging economies. - Value of social pension transfer as share of beneficiaries’ post-transfer welfare for elderly in poorest quintile: LICs 12 percent; Emerging economies 35 percent. - Pension policy recommendations: - Monitor pension benefits and ensure parametric reforms avoid increasing elderly poverty. - Expand pension coverage to informal workers and use pensions to facilitate formalization. - Consider non-contributory means-tested social pensions where coverage is low. - Support lifelong learning and upskilling for elderly employment opportunities. - 1.3 Universal Basic Income (UBI): - Arguments for UBI: income security, simple administration, closes coverage gaps. - Arguments against UBI: large fiscal costs, potential crowding out of productive spending, leakages to upper-income households, possible labor supply disincentives, weaker automatic stabilizers. - Fiscal cost simulations: - UBI at 25 percent of median per capita income would cost 6-7 percent of GDP in advanced economies and 3-4 percent of GDP in developing countries (IMF, 2017a). - In developing countries, such a UBI could reduce poverty by 10.4 points in contexts of low existing coverage. - Decision framework: - Countries with mature social protection: prefer reforming and strengthening existing systems rather than replacing them with UBI. - Countries with minimal transfer systems: UBI could scale coverage but fiscal costs likely prohibitive; alternatives include targeted/basic income limited to poor or geographic targeting. - Alternatives: partial basic income with mild conditions (participation income) or gradual roll-out (e.g., to new cohorts). ### 2. Human capital - Overview: Equal access to affordable education and healthcare is essential to inclusive growth; affects current market income inequality and later social mobility. - 2.1 Education — key findings and recommendations: - Spending: - Advanced economies allocated 5 percent of GDP to education in 2016-18. - Emerging economies increased from 3.7 percent to 4 percent of GDP. - LICs peaked at 4.3 percent in 2008-11 before receding to 4 percent. - Enrollment levels: - Advanced economies: pre-primary enrollment 83 percent and tertiary enrollment 75 percent. - Developing economies: generalized primary education; gaps remain in pre-primary and tertiary; LICs have secondary gaps. - Redistribution impacts: - Public education expenditures reduce inequality by 2 percentage points across advanced and developing countries. - Pre-primary, primary and lower-secondary spending tend to be progressive and pro-poor; tertiary often equalizing or unequalizing. - Learning and inequality: - OECD PISA: advantaged students score 10 percent higher on reading than disadvantaged; high inequality in learning correlates with high income inequality. - Policy recommendations: - Expand early childhood care and basic schooling; increase pre-primary enrolment. - Balance tertiary tuition with targeted financial support (means-tested grants). - Develop vocational education, apprenticeships, and retraining. - Upgrade infrastructure in remote and poorer regions; improve transportation and internet access. - Enhance R&D collaboration between universities and firms. - 2.2 Health — key findings and recommendations: - Spending: - Governments spend around 4 percent of GDP on health globally. - Advanced economies: approximately 6.3 percent of GDP in 2016-18. - LICs: approximately 2 percent of GDP. - Outcomes and inequalities: - Life expectancy in developing countries is only 75 to 80 percent of HIC counterparts for individuals born today. - A 25-year old man with the lowest education can expect to live at least four years less than a man with tertiary education. - In LICs, only one-third of women in the poorest quintile have access to maternal healthcare vs > 80 percent in the richest quintile. - Rural-urban coverage gap: 56 percent of global rural population lacks health coverage vs 22 percent of urban population. - Redistribution impacts: - Health spending decreases Gini by 3.2 percentage points in advanced economies and by 1.5 percentage points on average in developing countries. - Supply-side shortages and out-of-pocket burdens: - ILO estimates shortfall of 7 million skilled health workers in rural areas vs 3 million in urban areas. - Selected out-of-pocket payments as percentage of total Health Expenditure, 2015 (as listed): Chad 72.745.280.4; Niger 60.540.664.7; India 61.849.867.2; Pakistan 60.642.270.9. - Policy recommendations: - Protect the poor from excessive cost-sharing (fee waivers, subsidies for complementary private insurance). - Expand maternity cash benefits and maternity leave; expand paid sickness leave. - Increase health infrastructure and incentives for healthcare workers in underserved areas. - Coordinate cash/in-kind transfers with nutrition and school feeding programs to improve child health. ### 3. Government effectiveness and budget institutions - 3.1 Rationalization of public sector remuneration: - Trends: - Public sector wages (share of GDP): Advanced economies 10.7 percent (2000-03) → 10.3 percent (2016-18). - Wage bill in emerging economies reached about 9 percent of GDP in 2016-18. - Wage bill in LICs was 7 percent of GDP in 2016-18 (increase of 1.5 points). - Impacts: - Average public sector wage premium: Advanced economies 5 percent; developing countries 13 percent. - Large public-private wage gaps can exacerbate inequality and crowd out productive spending. - Recommendations: - Contain the public wage bill to create fiscal space; prioritize hiring in social sectors; rationalize compensation by linking pay and performance. - Avoid using public sector as employer of last resort; adjust wages mindful of private-sector conditions. - 3.2 Replacing generalized subsidies by targeted transfers: - Scale and distribution: - Post-tax energy subsidies globally estimated at $5.2 trillion (6.5 percent of global GDP) in 2017. - Global water subsidies ≈ 0.6 percent of global GDP (range 0.5–2.4 percent across regions). - IMF sample of 32 developing countries: 45 percent of energy subsidies accrue to richest 20 percent vs 7 percent for poorest 20 percent. - Water sample: 56 percent of subsidies reach wealthiest quintile vs 6 percent to poorest quintile. - Economic distortions and crowding-out: - Subsidies distort prices, encourage overconsumption, reduce incentives for efficiency and cleaner energy, and can crowd out education and health spending. - Ebeke and Ngouana (2015): a 1 percentage point increase in energy subsidies to GDP reduces public spending in education and health by 0.6 percentage point of GDP on average. - Reform cautions: - Subsidy removal can impose significant real-income losses on poorest 40 percent; a $0.25/liter increase in fuel prices in ~40 developing countries reduces real income of poorest 40 percent by 5.4 percent on average. - Budget-neutral transformation of subsidies into targeted/universal cash transfers can create net losers among the poor in some samples (Lustig et al., 2019). - Recommended strategy elements: - Thorough preparation, strong government commitment, communications, scaling-up SSNs, stakeholder consultation, and transparency (include SOE quasi-fiscal activities). - 3.3 Building inclusive infrastructure: - Trends and impacts: - Public investment as share of GDP receded over last decade in advanced and emerging economies; signs of slowdown in LICs; stock of public capital declined in majority of countries. - Exogenous increase in public investment of 1 percent of GDP reduces Gini by about 0.3 percent one year after the increase. - Fabrizio et al. (2017): "2.3 percent five years after the increase." - Beneficial impacts vanish when investment efficiency is poor. - Priority areas: - School and health infrastructure; transport (connectivity, roads, school transportation); water and sanitation; energy (targeted subsidies, lifeline tariffs); telecommunications (internet access); research and development; local enterprise linkages. - Financing the SDG-related investment gap: - Additional total spending required in 2030 to make substantial SDG progress in education, health, roads, electricity, water and sanitation estimated at "4 and 15.4 percentage points of GDP for emerging economies and LICs, respectively (Gaspar et al., 2019)." - Median for LICs estimated at "7 percentage points of GDP" and maximum "around 50 percentage points of GDP." - Tax revenue medians: "15 percent and 18 percent among LICs and emerging economies, respectively (against 26 percent for advanced economies) (Gaspar, 2019)." - Financing options: - Improve tax mobilization, spending efficiency, develop government bond markets, foster private sector role (public-private partnership frameworks). - Role of budget institutions and public financial management: - Weak institutions enable capture and rent-seeking; strong institutions reduce political discretion and improve efficiency. - Practical reforms: - Enact fiscal responsibility laws; improve procurement transparency; strengthen merit-based civil service hiring; operationalize medium-term budgeting and program budgeting; involve citizens and NGOs; expand e-government services. - Expected benefits: - Stronger institutions associated with better protection of public investment during consolidation, more stable investment flows, and lower inequality in developing countries. --- ### Conclusion and key trade-offs - Public expenditure composition and quality matter as much as levels for inclusive growth. - Many areas provide win-win outcomes (efficiency and equity), e.g., equal access to education and maternal health services, inclusive infrastructure prioritized to benefit poor populations. - Reforms that reduce non-productive spending (generalized subsidies) and contain wage bills can create fiscal space for inclusive investments but require mitigating measures to protect vulnerable groups. - The "right" package must be cost-effective, fiscally sustainable, and tailored to country-specific constraints: starting poverty/inequality, social protection coverage/adequacy, and administrative capacity. - Strengthening budget institutions and public financial management is essential to improve spending efficiency, reduce corruption, and sustain inclusive outcomes. - Addressing procyclicality—by building buffers in good times and using medium-term frameworks—helps preserve social and investment spending through downturns. *Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf* ### Introduction ........................................................................................................... ### wpiea2021083-print-pdf - Introduction ............................................................................................................... ### I. Public Expenditure—Stylized Facts - Section title as listed in the content inventory. ### II. Public Spending and Inclusive Growth—An Analytical Framework - Section title as listed in the content inventory. ### III. Public Spending and Inclusiven ess—Evidence - Section title as listed in the content inventory. ### IV. Policy options - Overview of policy options as organized in the content inventory. - 1. Social Protection - 1.1. Social Saf ety Nets (SSN) - 1.2. Pensions - 1.3. Universal basic income - 2. Human capital - 2.1. Education - 2.2. Health - 3. Government eff ectiveness and budget institutions - 3.1. Rationalization of the remuneration policy in the public sector - 3.2. Replacing generalized subsidies by targeted transfers - 3.3. Building inclusive infra s tru c tu re - 3.4. Role of budget institutions ### Conclusion - Concluding section as listed in the content inventory. *Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - Introduction ...............................................................................................................* ### References.............................................................................................................. ### References ### Introduction: Role of public expenditure in inclusive growth - Public expenditure affects economic growth and income distribution in the short- and long-run. - Social spending: - Provides a minimum income level and increases access to valuable public services. - Short-run: cash transfers reduce income poverty and inequality directly. - Long-run: targeted cash transfers can be growth-enhancing via human capital improvements for disadvantaged children. - Education and healthcare spending: - Improves quality of life and is growth-enhancing through the human capital channel. - If targeted to those most in need, can increase equality of opportunity and social mobility. - Social spending provides risk-mitigation against macroeconomic, financial, social, and environmental shocks. - Public investment in infrastructure: - Raises long-term economic growth and productivity, generating higher employment and reducing poverty. - Certain infrastructure (e.g., water and sewerage) improves living standards in multiple short-term dimensions. - Redistributive impact depends on size, composition, progressivity, and financing of public expenditure. - Key assessment questions: - Who benefits from existing public expenditure and by how much? - What are distributive effects of alternative spending measures? - When fiscal adjustment is necessary, what mitigating measures should protect the vulnerable? *Italicized references to literature and methodological caveats are preserved as in source (e.g., Lustig, 2018; Heckman and Mosso (2014); Skoufias (2003)).* ### I. Public expenditure — stylized facts - Global government spending increased from 29 percent of GDP in 2000 to 33 percent of GDP in 2019. - Advanced economies: - Government spending hovered just below 40 percent of GDP (with a spike in 2009). - Composition change: increase in social benefits offset by wage containment and cuts in public investment. - Social spending: about 26.5 percent of GDP in 2016-18 vs 25 percent in 2000-03. - Defense and security spending reduced from 3.4 percent of GDP in 2000-03 to 3 percent in 2016-18. - Emerging and developing economies (EMDs): - Government spending rose to 34 percent of GDP. - Social spending increased from 11 percent to 13.8 percent of GDP, driven by healthcare and social protection. - Low-Income Countries (LICs): - Government spending rose to 27 percent of GDP. - Social spending rose by 1.5 percentage point to 8 percent of GDP. - Share of public investment: LICs 29 percent of public spending vs Advanced Economies 4 percent. - Spending structure by income level (shares of total public spending): - Wage bill: Advanced Economies 25 percent; LICs 28 percent. - Goods and services: about 14-15 percent across groups. - Social benefits: Advanced Economies 38 percent; Emerging Economies 18 percent; LICs 9.4 percent. - Public investment: Advanced Economies 4 percent; Emerging Economies 17 percent; LICs 29 percent. - Cyclicality: - Public spending tends to be procyclical; more pronounced in developing countries. - Correlation between cyclical components of real government expenditure and real GDP indicates procyclicality for LICs, EMDs, and AEs (chart period 1980-2019). - Inefficiencies: - At least 20-40 percent of health spending typically wasted (World Health Organization, 2010). - GDP losses due to wasteful spending on education and health estimated at more than 4 percent of GDP in a set of 24 advanced and emerging economies (Grigoli and Ley, 2012). - IMF (2015) estimates average country loses about 30 percent of value of public investment due to inefficiencies. - Budget institutions and effectiveness: - Quality of budget institutions assessed across 12 indicators covering understanding fiscal challenge, credible fiscal strategy, and implementation. - Advanced Economies score consistently higher than Emerging Economies and Low Income Countries on budget institution quality and government effectiveness (World Bank indicator range -2 to 2). ### II. Analytical framework — how public spending links to inclusive growth - Framework draws on Musgrave’s threefold rationale for fiscal policy: - (i) Macroeconomic stabilization (countercyclical measures, preserving debt sustainability). - (ii) Resource allocation (providing public goods cost-effectively). - (iii) Distributional objectives (address disparities, promote equal opportunities). - Types of spending and their efficiency-equity profiles: - Win-win: measures enhancing long-term growth and reducing inequality (e.g., expanding equal access to education). - Lose-lose: inefficient and inequality-increasing (e.g., generalized energy subsidies). - Growth-enhancing but distribution-adverse: productivity-improving measures that increase near-term inequality. - Redistributive measures: primarily reduce inequality and poverty; may be growth-enhancing especially when initial inequality is high, but may crowd out growth-promoting spending if over-relied upon. - Financing considerations: - Taxation: - Distributional impact depends on design; progressive personal income tax can reduce inequality; flat VAT can increase inequality. - Net effect depends on the joint incidence of taxes and spending. - Borrowing: - Must be consistent with sustainable fiscal policy. - High debt servicing reduces fiscal space for inclusive spending (example: Egypt interest payments rose from 15.2 percent to 42.6 percent of government revenue between 2009 and 2017, accompanying rise in debt-to-GDP ratio). - Spending reallocation: - Removing generalized and untargeted subsidies can free resources for inclusive infrastructure and targeted social safety nets. - Excessive cuts in current spending to boost capital spending can be counterproductive; capital spending and certain current components (e.g., operations and maintenance) are complements rather than substitutes. - Country-specific considerations: - Appropriate mix of measures depends on initial poverty/inequality, coverage and adequacy of social protection systems, and administrative capacity. - Priorities differ: countries with high poverty may prioritize poverty reduction over inequality; others with low poverty/inequality may emphasize growth-enhancing measures. ### III. Evidence on public spending and inclusiveness - Overall effectiveness: - Public expenditure has been more effective than taxation in reducing inequality. - Advanced economies: - Personal income taxation and direct transfer spending reduced prefiscal income inequality by 14 percentage points (about 25 percent) in mid-2000s (OECD, 2017). - Redistribution varies by country: example absolute Gini reductions reported for many AEs (chart summary). - Approximately two-thirds of redistribution due to public expenditures; estimates incomplete because indirect taxation often not included. - Within transfers, assistance transfers (e.g., family benefits) account for the bulk of redistribution. - Trends: - Redistributive effect of taxes and transfers declined over last two decades, particularly mid-1990s to 2007, reflecting less generous transfers and somewhat less progressive income taxation. The 2007-08 crisis raised redistributive effect owing to automatic stabilizers and discretionary measures; effect receded afterward. - Developing countries: - CEQ Assessments: fiscal redistribution via personal income taxation and direct transfers reduces market income inequality by 2.5 Gini points (5.5 percent on average). - Transfers contribute approximately 60 percent of overall reduction in inequality. - Indirect taxation and indirect subsidies tend to offset each other, producing a very small net reduction in the Gini coefficient. - Countries with higher social spending (share of GDP) show larger reductions in inequality (Figure 3.3). - In-kind transfers (education and health): - Advanced economies: education reduces Gini by 2.1 percentage points; health reduces Gini by 3.3 percentage points. - Developing countries: education reduces Gini by 2.4 percentage points; health reduces Gini by 1.6 percentage points. - Caveats: - Incidence analysis values public services at cost of provision, which may not reflect real benefits received; inefficiencies and private substitution by upper-income households can erode redistributive effects. - Poverty effects: - In a sample of 16 developing countries, fiscal policy reduces poverty headcount by 2.3 percentage points on average (from 23.9 percent prefiscal to 21.6 percent disposable) using $PPP 3.20 per person per day poverty line. - Range: negligible in Uganda to 10.5 percentage points in South Africa. - Fiscal policy can reduce inequality yet increase poverty in some countries depending on tax and transfer composition; in a sample of 35 countries, poverty headcount increased in 12 countries post-fiscal policy (based on $PPP 3.20 poverty line). - Fiscal impoverishment: - Some poor individuals become net payers into the fiscal system despite aggregate pro-poor impacts; phenomenon labeled “Fiscal Impoverishment.” - Causes include low coverage of anti-poverty programs and broad-based indirect taxes like VAT. - In sixteen developing countries, fiscal impoverishment among postfiscal income poor ranged from approximately 9 percent (Panama) to nearly 99 percent (Tanzania). - Measurement and methodological notes: - Findings based on sequential methods for fiscal incidence; marginal contribution approaches may yield different results (Lustig, 2018). - Contributory pensions are considered as deferred income in incidence exercises. ### Policy implications and design considerations (drawn from evidence and framework) - Design spending measures to be: - Cost-effective and consistent with fiscal sustainability. - Sensitive to country starting points (poverty, inequality, coverage, administrative capacity). - Priorities by country type: - Advanced economies: - Better targeting of benefits. - Ensuring sustainability of pension systems. - Developing countries: - Extend coverage of social safety nets. - Improve access to basic public services (education, health). - Reduce nonproductive spending (subsidies favoring nonpoor). - Improve tax mobilization to preserve fiscal sustainability. - During fiscal consolidation: - Carefully design expenditure measures to mitigate adverse effects on inequality and poverty. - Implement compensating measures to protect vulnerable populations and prevent lasting human capital losses (e.g., interruptions to schooling, child malnutrition). - Complementarities and trade-offs: - Use mitigating social protection (well-targeted transfers, SSNs) to offset adverse distributional impacts from efficiency-enhancing reforms. - Consider joint incidence of taxes and spending to ensure the poor are not net payers. - Institutional priorities: - Strengthen budget institutions and public financial management to improve efficiency and protect resources from corruption and waste. - Build fiscal buffers in good times to enable countercyclical support during downturns and shocks. *Italic: Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - References (canonical URL provided in metadata).* ### 1.90 per person per day for lower-middle income countries. In all 16 countries f iscal p o licy red uced in equalit y ### wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 1.90 per person per day for lower-middle income countries. In all 16 countries f iscal p o licy red u c ed in equalit y ### Key findings on fiscal policy, inequality, and poverty - In all 16 countries fiscal policy reduced inequality. - In 11 countries fiscal policy reduced the poverty headcount ratio. - Contributory pensions are considered as deferred income. - Direct transfers achieve a mean Poverty Gap Impact Effectiveness indicator of 0.54, meaning direct transfers achieve 54 percent of the maximum impact if optimally distributed. - Subsidies reach barely 10 percent of the maximum redistributive impact from optimally-distributed subsidies of the same magnitude. - Spending on tertiary education tends to increase inequality in most countries. - There is room to improve the effectiveness of health spending in reducing inequality. ### Impact effectiveness: definition and empirical assessment - Impact effectiveness indicator: ratio of actual impact on inequality (poverty) to maximum possible impact if delivered optimally. - The indicator varies between -1 and 1; negative values indicate the fiscal measure increases inequality. - Empirical assessment by the CEQ Institute for a set of 11 African countries (Comoros (2014), Ivory Coast (2014), Ghana (2013), Mali (2014), Namibia (2009/10), Senegal (2011), South Africa (2010), Tanzania (2011), Togo (2015), Uganda (2013), and Zambia (2015)) shows: - Direct taxes rank highest in inequality reduction. - Direct transfers rank second behind direct taxes and are the most effective spending instrument on average. - Subsidies are largely ineffective in reducing inequality. - Health and hospital/inpatient health show underperformance relative to their potential. - Total benefits and total taxes have a range of impact effectiveness across countries (indicator can be negative or positive). ### Interaction between public spending, growth, and inclusiveness - Public expenditure affects inclusiveness both mechanically and via economic growth. - Increase in productive spending can lead to higher growth and employment, which can lift income and reduce poverty. - India and China are cited as examples where rapid economic growth led to significant poverty reduction. - There is no clear-cut answer on how growth affects inequality: growth may reduce inequality or exacerbate it (Bourguignon, 2003). ### Policy options: overview and social protection - The report identifies three major policy areas with largest scope to make growth more inclusive: - (i) social protection, - (ii) human capital, - (iii) government effectiveness and budget institutions. - Social protection roles and categories: 1. Social safety nets (SSN)/social assistance programs (SA): - Non-contributory interventions to help individuals and households cope with chronic poverty, destitution, and vulnerability. - Target the poor and vulnerable. Examples include unconditional and conditional cash transfers. 2. Social insurance programs: - Contributory interventions designed to help individuals manage sudden changes in income because of old age, sickness, disability, or natural disaster. - Individuals pay insurance premiums or contribute a percentage of earnings to mandatory schemes. Examples include contributory old-age pensions. *Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf* ### 3. Labor market programs. They can be contributory or non-contributory programs ### 3. Labor market programs. They can be contributory or non-contributory programs ### Labor market programs: definitions and typology - Labor market programs are designed to: - protect individuals against loss of income from unemployment (passive labor market policies), or - help individuals acquire skills and connect them to labor markets (active labor market policies). - Table of instruments (selected from source): - Social safety nets/social assistance (noncontributory): Unconditional/conditional cash transfers; Food and in-kind transfers; School feeding programs; Public works; Fee waivers and targeted subsidies. - Social insurance (contributory): Contributory old-age, survivor, disability pensions; Sick leave; Maternity/paternity benefits; Health insurance coverage; Unemployment insurance; Early retirement incentives. - Labor market programs: Active labor market programs such as Training; Employment intermediation services; Wage subsidies. Passive labor market programs included as well. ### Social protection spending: cross-country patterns and trends - Advanced economies: - Social protection spending was 14 percent of GDP in early 2000s and increased to 16 percent of GDP during 2012-15. - Social protection spending represents about one-third of total public spending in early 2000s. - Emerging economies: - Social protection spending increased by 1 percentage point since 2000-03 to 6.6 percent of GDP during 2016-18 (about 20 percent of total public spending). - Low-income countries (LICs): - Social protection increased from 2.3 percent of GDP at the beginning of the second millennium to 3.5 percent of GDP during 2012-15, then receded to 3.3 percent of GDP during 2016-18. - LICs allocate only 12 percent of the budget to social protection. ### 1.1 Social Safety Nets (SSN): spending, instruments, coverage, and impact Findings on spending and instruments - SSN spending (percent of GDP): - Low-income countries: 1.4 percent of GDP. - Emerging economies: 2.0 percent of GDP. - OECD countries: 2.7 percent of GDP. - Cash transfer programs: - Represent one-third of reported SSN programs globally. - Account for two thirds of SSN spending in high- and middle-income countries and only 30 percent in low-income countries. - Types: Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) and Conditional cash transfers (CCT). - CCT tend to be more effective in reducing inequality and enhancing long-term growth by raising school enrollment and improving health outcomes; they also can contribute to reducing gender inequality by improving girls’ enrollment and directing transfers to them. - Food and in-kind transfers: - Account for 37 percent of total SSN spending in low-income countries. - Often donor-funded and include food rations, clothes, school supplies, fertilizers, and emergency relief. - Self-targeting feature: coverage of the poor tends to be high; example cited: India covers 94 percent of the poor (World Bank, 2018). - Public works: - Share of total SSN spending: 2.2 percent in high-income countries and 13 percent in low-income countries. - Designed as labor-intensive community projects (e.g., road construction, drainage, public building maintenance). - Wages are set relatively low to ensure self-selection; coverage of the poorest quintile is limited at 11 percent (with MGNREG in India at 27 percent coverage of the poorest quintile). - Some programs append training components to improve beneficiaries’ skills and job opportunities (example: Argentina). Coverage and targeting - SSN programs cover 33 percent of the total population in developing countries. - Coverage by country group: - Low-income countries: 18 percent of total population. - Emerging economies: 43 percent of total population. - Coverage of the poorest 40 percent: - Emerging economies: close to 60 percent of the poorest 40 percent (≈ 24 percent of total population). - LICs: 20 percent of the poorest 40 percent (≈ 8 percent of total population). - Program-specific coverage of the poor: - School feeding programs: LICs 26 percent; emerging economies 36 percent. - Unconditional and conditional cash transfers: LICs coverage 6 percent and 11 percent respectively; emerging economies both types achieve 35 percent coverage rates. - Family and child benefits: LICs 9 percent of households; emerging economies 54 percent; advanced economies 90 percent (ILO, 2017). - Targeting performance: - The poorest 40 percent represent 46 percent of SSN beneficiaries in LICs and 57 percent in emerging economies. - Leakages: 34 percent (LICs) and 24 percent (emerging economies) of SSN beneficiaries belong to the richest 40 percent. - Share of SSN benefits accruing to the poorest 40 percent (bottom 40) versus richest 40 percent: - LICs: 43 percent of benefits to bottom 40; 42 percent to top 40. - Emerging economies: 64 percent of benefits to bottom 40; 21 percent to top 40. - Conditional cash transfer benefits are more pro-poor: - 54 percent of benefits accrue to the poorest 40 percent in LICs. - 75 percent in emerging economies. - Order of pro-poor impact in LICs: CCT > UCT > public works > in-kind transfers > school feeding. Untargeted subsidies and other social assistance provide only one-third of benefits to the poorest 40 percent. Benefit size and welfare impact - Average SSN transfer as share of beneficiaries’ post-transfer consumption: - LICs: transfers represent 6.4 percent of total consumption of beneficiaries. - Emerging economies: transfers represent 12 percent of total consumption of beneficiaries. - Average SSN transfer amounts as share of welfare of a beneficiary in the poorest quintile: - LICs: 10.8 percent. - Emerging economies: 24 percent. - Empirical benchmark: cash transfer programs are more impactful when the transfer is at least 20 percent of a household’s consumption (World Bank 2018, Handa et al. 2013). - Impact on poverty and inequality: - LICs: SSN programs reduce poverty rates by just less than 2.5 percent; redistributive effect is “barely perceptible.” - Emerging economies: SSN programs reduce inequality by 4.2 percent (of pretransfer Gini) and reduce poverty by 13 percent (of pretransfer poverty rate). Policy recommendations to improve SSN effectiveness (mainly for developing countries) - Increase spending on SSN programs and expand coverage, including family and child allowances/benefits. - Consolidate social assistance programs. - Develop biometric identification schemes to establish a national social registry (unique identifier) to allow better targeting. - Introduce or expand conditional cash transfer programs as administrative capacity improves. - When feasible, introduce mutual obligations by combining transfers with requirements to maintain investment in human capital and child health. - Extend social protection coverage to those in the informal economy. - Introduce/scale up public work programs and append training components to enhance job opportunities. - Develop multi-dimensional programs covering health, education, and nutrition. ### 1.2 Pensions: coverage, sustainability, and policy options Context and coverage - Global context: - Aging and longer life expectancies increase the share of non-working population needing financial support. - 2018 OECD survey: about 72 percent of all respondents (young and elderly) list old-age finances as one of the top-three long-term concerns. - Globally, only 68 percent of the elderly receive benefits from publicly-supported pension schemes. - Public spending and coverage by country group: - Advanced economies: close to 9 percent of GDP spent on public social protection for the elderly; coverage rate among the elderly is 97 percent. - Developing countries: effective coverage rates among the elderly are 24 percent in LICs and 57 percent in emerging economies; associated spending is 1 percent and 4 percent of GDP, respectively. - Contributory pension coverage: - Share of population above statutory pensionable age receiving an old-age pension: - LICs: 13 percent. - Emerging economies: 29 percent. - Coverage often limited to public sector and formal sector workers; many informal sector workers and self-employed are excluded. - Example reform: Morocco extended the public pension scheme to self-employed workers and workers with low and irregular earnings. Challenges: sustainability, equity, and measurement issues - Pensions are often the largest single expenditure in the budget; rising elderly shares can crowd out other growth-enhancing spending and constrain resources for redistribution to the working-age population. - Simulated reforms: - Parametric reforms that extend retirement age (instead of reducing replacement rates) tend to increase employment rates among the elderly and help contain old-age poverty. - Reforms may entail a projected 20 percent reduction in replacement rates and potentially a significant increase in elderly poverty rate (Shang, 2014). - Equity concerns: - Raising statutory retirement age may disproportionately benefit those with higher economic status (longer life expectancy, better health, less hard jobs, higher tele-workability). - Measurement caveat: - Treating public pensions as pure government transfers inflates their measured impact on poverty and inequality because pensions often reflect deferred income. - Empirical estimates: - Using 19 developing countries, Lustig et al. (2018): if pensions are counted as government transfers, average reduction in poverty headcount ratio is 47.4 percent; if treated as deferred income, reduction is 26.2 percent. - Reduction in inequality for 45 developing countries: 8.9 percentage points when pensions are treated as government transfers and 6.9 percentage points when treated as deferred income. - Real-world systems are often hybrid; part of pensions are deferred income and part financed by general revenue—implying impacts lie between extremes. Social pensions (non-contributory) - Characteristics: - Tax-funded, non-contributory benefits targeting the old-age population; can be universal or means-tested. - Globally cover close to 35 percent of the old-age population. - Universal schemes are main pension component in some countries (examples: Bolivia, Botswana, Thailand). - Distributional effects: - Social pensions cover 50 percent of the poorest 40 percent in LICs and 63 percent in emerging economies. - Value of social pension transfer as share of beneficiaries’ post-transfer welfare for elderly in poorest quintile: - LICs: 12 percent. - Emerging economies: 35 percent. - Impact on poverty and inequality: social pensions contribute to poverty reduction and inequality reduction, but outcomes differ across countries (example: Bolivia’s universal social pension is well below the $2.5 a day poverty line and makes only a small dent in elderly poverty). Policy options to make pensions more equitable and sustainable - In countries with developed pension systems: monitor pension benefit trends and ensure parametric reforms do not translate into substantial declines in pension benefits; consider mitigating measures to avoid increasing elderly poverty. - Expand pension coverage in developing countries to informal sector workers and leverage pensions to facilitate formalization (examples: subsidy combined with simplified tax and social security contribution mechanisms). - Ensure pension design sets benefits at adequate levels that address poverty risk without weakening work incentives. - Provide support for elderly whose health prevents them from working or job search. - For countries with no or low pension coverage: investigate options to introduce or expand non-contributory means-tested social pensions. - Enhance employment opportunities for the old-age population via lifelong learning and upskilling to maintain skills and adapt to technological change (OECD, 2019). ### 1.3 Universal Basic Income (UBI): debates, simulations, and decision framework Rationale and arguments - Motivations for renewed interest: - Gaps in coverage even in advanced economies (e.g., long-term unemployed). - Developing countries often focus social protection on extremes, leaving the “middle” and informal workers with little protection. - Global aging and transformations in work (temporary and contractual jobs) highlight limits of traditional provisions. - Arguments for UBI: - Provides income security and guarantees a minimum standard of living amid job precarization and high unemployment. - Requires little administrative capacity; no eligibility determination costs; eliminates coverage gaps. - Arguments against UBI: - Large fiscal costs, potential crowding out of productive spending, and leakages to upper-income households. - May weaken incentives to work and delink benefits from job-search behaviors, reducing labor supply. - If UBIs replace unemployment benefits, fiscal policy may become less counter-cyclical with fewer automatic stabilizers. Simulation outcomes and fiscal implications - OECD simulation (budget-neutral substitution of UBI for current social protection): - UBI represents only a fraction of the relative poverty line and has limited and mixed impact on poverty; some individuals are lifted out while others fall into poverty (OECD, 2017a). - Fiscal cost projections: - A UBI set at 25 percent of median per capita income would entail: - 6-7 percent of GDP in advanced economies (around current cost of social protection). - 3-4 percent of GDP in developing countries (IMF, 2017a). - For developing countries, such a UBI would produce a substantial poverty reduction of 10.4 points given low coverage and adequacy of existing programs. - Distributional effects: - Losers under UBI could include early retirees and low-income households if UBI replaces higher pensions or benefits; overall inequality tends to fall, with magnitude depending on financing. Financing considerations and potential adverse effects - Financing through higher domestic revenues can lead to negative social outcomes: - Example: Lustig, Jellema, and Pabon (2019) show that providing income floors by raising domestic taxes in a sample of 9 sub-Saharan African countries would require large tax increases that generate labor-market disincentives and negative impacts on tax collection. - Large tax increases can produce extreme re-ranking where top prefiscal income individuals end up with negative incomes after taxes. Decision framework and policy guidance (IMF 2017, 2020) - The desirability of UBI depends on (i) current coverage of the poor and (ii) current adequacy of benefits: - Countries with mature social protection systems (e.g., European, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America): - Replacing existing systems with UBI would yield modest universal benefits but reduce progressivity and lower benefits for many poor households; may even increase poverty. - Priority: reform and strengthen existing systems to enhance coverage and targeting instead of replacing them with UBI. - Countries with minimal transfer systems (e.g., some South Asian countries): - UBI could scale up coverage but fiscal costs would be prohibitive. - UBI could theoretically be financed via progressive taxation and fiscal reforms (e.g., removing energy subsidies), or by limiting basic income to the poor and vulnerable. - Geographic targeting could be considered where means-testing capacity is low and poverty is high and localized. - Countries with shortcomings in social protection: - Replacing existing systems with UBI expands coverage but lowers progressivity and reduces benefits for average beneficiaries. - Trade-off between coverage and progressivity: weigh UBI introduction against capacity to expand coverage under existing progressive transfer systems. - Alternatives and phased approaches: - OECD (2017) suggests: - (i) a “partial” basic income tied to mild eligibility conditions (e.g., participation income), or - (ii) gradual roll-out (e.g., only to new cohorts of young adults) of a full UBI. *Source: IMF staff; content excerpted from "3. Labor market programs. They can be contributory or non-contributory programs" (wpiea2021083-print-pdf).* ### 2. Human capital ### 2. Human capital ### Overview - Equal access to affordable education and healthcare should be the focus of public policies; achieving equal access will ensure economic growth is as inclusive as possible. - Education and health are key determinants of an individual’s ability to earn a decent living and affect current market income inequality and later social mobility, reducing the need for government ex-post redistribution. ### 2.1. Education — key findings - More high quality education can increase individual and economy-wide productivity, boost growth in incomes, and reduce inequality. - An increase in the share of workers with upper secondary education was found to be associated with a decline in labor income inequality (Fournier and Koske, 2012). - Public spending on education (global patterns): - Advanced economies allocated 5 percent of GDP to the education sector 2016-18. - Education spending increased from 3.7 percent to 4 percent of GDP among emerging economies over the same period. - It peaked to 4.3 percent for LICs in 2008-11 before slightly receding to 4 percent. - Enrollment outcomes (levels cited): - Advanced economies: pre-primary enrollment 83 percent and tertiary enrollment 75 percent. - Emerging economies and LICs have generalized primary education and increased secondary enrollment, but gaps remain in pre-primary and tertiary; LICs also have gaps in secondary education. - Redistribution impacts: - Public education expenditures reduce inequality (Gini coefficient) by 2 percentage points among advanced and developing countries. - Evidence across 31 developing countries: pre-primary, primary and lower-secondary education spending tend to be progressive and pro-poor; upper secondary tends to be equalizing but not pro-poor; tertiary is often equalizing or unequalizing (not pro-poor). - Learning outcomes and inequality: - OECD PISA indicators show large disparities between developing and advanced economies in cognitive skills acquisition. - The average reading score of students from the most advantaged socio-economic background is 10 percent higher than those from the most disadvantaged background. - Countries with high inequality in learning outcomes tend to exhibit high income inequality. - Rural-urban and public-private disparities: - Rural-urban gaps reflect inadequate infrastructure and lack of quality teachers; transportation costs are a larger share of education spending in rural communities. - Private school attendees perform significantly better in PISA assessments; poorer public-school quality can drive households to spend on tutoring. Example: out-of-pocket education spending of the poorest 10 percent households with children at school in Egypt represented about 5 percent of their total spending, of which 40 percent was allocated to tutoring courses (CAPMAS, 2019). ### 2.1. Education — policy recommendations - Expand early childhood care and basic schooling for all; increase pre-primary enrolment and provide affordable, high-quality childcare to encourage female labor market participation. - Promote more equal tertiary education by balancing tuition fees with financial support for disadvantaged students (e.g., means-tested grants). - Develop vocational education and training, including work-based apprenticeships and re-training opportunities to reduce skill mismatches and mitigate skill-biased technical change. - Upgrade school infrastructure, particularly in remote and poorer regions, including improving public transportation and access to internet. - Enhance R&D collaboration between universities and firms to facilitate technological diffusion and make productivity more inclusive. ### 2.2. Health — key findings - Global public spending on health: - Governments spend around 4 percent of GDP on the health sector globally. - In 2016-18 it reached approximately 6.3 percent of GDP in advanced economies. - Health spending in LICs was approximately 2 percent of GDP. - Expenditure levels correlate with outcomes: healthcare service coverage tends to be universal in most advanced economies while large populations in emerging economies and LICs lack access to quality care. - Life expectancy and mortality: - Individuals born in developing countries today can expect to live only 75 to 80 percent as long as their HIC counterparts. - Life expectancy has risen steadily and mortality rates, notably among infants, have fallen over time. - Inequities in coverage and outcomes: - The poor and less educated are more likely to be in worse health and die prematurely; a 25-year old man with the lowest level of education can expect to live at least four years less than a man with tertiary education (OECD, 2017b). - In LICs, only one-third of women in the poorest quintile has access to maternal healthcare services against more than 80 percent of women in the richest quintile. - Rural-urban disparities: 56 percent of the global rural population lacks health coverage compared to 22 percent of the urban population (ILO, 2017); maternal mortality in rural areas is 2.5 times higher than in urban areas. - Redistribution impacts: - Health spending decreases the Gini coefficient by 3.2 percentage points in advanced economies. - The redistributive effect of health spending in developing countries averages 1.5 percentage points. - In some developing countries, the bottom 40 percent receives a less-than-proportional share of total public health spending. - Supply-side shortages and out-of-pocket burdens: - ILO estimates a shortfall of 7 million skilled health workers in rural areas, compared to 3 million in urban areas; the workforce shortage leads to exclusion from access to health care of 84 percent of the total population in LICs. - Out-of-pocket payments on health tend to represent a larger share of total health expenditure of rural households compared to urban households. - Selected out-of-pocket payments as a percentage of total Health Expenditure, selected countries, 2015 (as listed in source): - Chad 72.745.280.4 - Niger 60.540.664.7 - India 61.849.867.2 - Pakistan 60.642.270.9 ### 2.2. Health — policy recommendations - Protect the poor and vulnerable from excessive cost-sharing; provide health fee waivers and consider subsidies for complementary private health insurance for the poor. Note: in developing countries, only 12 percent of the poorest decile benefits from health fee waivers (World bank, 2018). - Expand coverage for maternity cash benefits and maternity leave; higher coverage for maternity cash benefits is associated with better maternal mortality ratios (ILO, 2017). - Expand paid sickness leave benefit to all workers to help prevent spread of infectious diseases. - Expand health infrastructure in underserved areas, increase hiring of healthcare professionals, and provide incentives for working in remote and disadvantaged areas. - Coordinate healthcare spending with other public policies: - Well-targeted in-kind or cash transfers with a nutritional component can improve health outcomes (examples: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in the United States; “Prospera” in Mexico). - Expand school feeding programs to improve child health and reduce stunting; currently only one-third of kids from the poorest quintile benefits from a school feeding program and about 22 percent of school feeding benefits leak to kids from the richest 40 percent households. - Address poor housing conditions and neighbourhood problems (e.g., cold and damp, inadequate safety, crime risk, air pollution) for positive health effects. *Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 2. Human capital.* ### 3. Government effectiveness and budget institutions ### 3. Government effectiveness and budget institutions ### 3.1. Rationalization of the remuneration policy in the public sector - Context and trends: - In advanced economies public sector wages (as a share of GDP) declined from 10.7 percent in 2000-03 to 10.3 percent in 2016-18. - The wage bill increased by 0.5 percentage points in emerging economies, reaching about 9 percent of GDP in 2016-18. - The increase was more substantial for LICs (1.5 points); the wage bill in LICs was 7 percent of GDP in 2016-18. - There is a secular decline in the share of labor income in the economy (ILO, 2019, IMF, 2017b), so a stable or rising public wage bill implies private-sector workers bear a larger share of rising income inequality. - Wage premia and impacts: - Average public sector wage premium reaches on average 5 percent for advanced economies and 13 percent for developing countries. - Large public-private wage gaps and high public employment can exacerbate inequality, crowd out productive spending, fragment labor markets, discourage skills accumulation, raise reservation wages, and lengthen unemployment spells. - Empirical examples: Mauritania doubled civil servant salaries between 2004 and 2008, which worsened income inequality and spatial disparities in a centralized administration context. - Policy implications and recommendations: - Contain the public wage bill to reduce expenditure rigidities and create fiscal space for productive and social spending. - Legitimate pressures for higher wages include inflation adjustments and hiring needs in social sectors (education and health). - Suggested measures to maintain the wage bill under check include: - Avoid using the public sector as an employer of last resort. - Prioritize hiring and workforce composition. - Rationalize compensation policy by tightening the link between pay and performance. - Note: adjustment of wages for inflation may not always be warranted in the private sector; other considerations include labor market tightness and profitability, contributing to public-private wage gaps. - Reference to guidance: - See IMF (2016) for detailed recommendations on managing and containing the public sector wage bill. ### 3.2. Replacing generalized subsidies by targeted transfers - Scale and distribution of subsidies: - Post-tax energy subsidies were estimated globally at $5.2 trillion (6.5 percent of global GDP) in 2017 (Coady, 2019). - Global water subsidies measured at about 0.6 percent of global GDP, ranging between 0.5 percent to 2.4 percent of GDP across regions, with low-income economies at the high end. - IMF calculations for 32 developing countries found that 45 percent of energy subsidies accrue to the richest 20 percent of households against 7 percent for the poorest 20 percent. - For water in a sample of 10 developing countries, 56 percent of subsidies reach the wealthiest quintile while 6 percent benefit the poorest quintile. - Economic distortions and fiscal crowding-out: - Subsidies (especially energy) distort prices, encourage overconsumption and resource misallocation, reduce incentives for investment in efficiency and cleaner energy, accelerate depletion of natural resources, and exacerbate external vulnerability to volatile international energy prices. - Subsidies can outpace spending on education and health; water subsidies can exceed total spending on public investment in some countries. - A 2015 IMF study (Ebeke and Ngouana, 2015) found that a 1 percentage point increase in energy subsidies to GDP leads, on average, to a reduction of public spending in education and health by 0.6 percentage point of GDP. - Crowding-out effects are larger with weak domestic institutions and narrow fiscal space. - Distributional considerations and risks of reform: - Subsidies can represent a sizeable share of purchasing power for poor and vulnerable households; reform should proceed cautiously. - A simulation of a $0.25 dollar liter increase in fuel prices in about 40 developing countries found that on average a household in the poorest 40 percent will witness a 5.4 percent reduction of its real income. - Lustig et al. (2019) found that in a sample of 11 African countries a budget-neutral transformation of current subsidy expenditure into targeted or universal cash transfers would create a net loss for some poor and vulnerable households. - Recommended components of subsidy reform strategies: - Thorough preparation, including careful planning of pace and breadth of reform with technical assistance from international stakeholders. - Strong government commitment built via communication and coalition building. - Introduction or scaling-up of effective social safety nets to mitigate impacts on the vulnerable. - Building consensus and consulting with stakeholders to reach public support. - Transparency note: - Quasi-fiscal activities of SOEs (such as utilities) often escape standard budget preparation; enhancing transparency and fully reflecting these activities in the budget is a first step to assessing their magnitude and merits relative to other spending. ### 3.3. Building inclusive infrastructure - Trends in public investment and capital stock: - Public investment (as a share of GDP) has receded over the last decade in advanced and emerging economies and showed some signs of a slowdown in LICs. - The stock of public capital has declined in the majority of countries. - Many countries are still well below the global median of the public investment’s share of GDP of 56. - Erosion of fiscal space via rising debt service and an anti-investment bias (investment often bears the brunt of fiscal consolidation) have contributed to low and declining public investment. - Channels through which public investment affects inclusive growth: - Short-term demand boost during implementation via fiscal multipliers. - Long-run growth increases by expanding productive capacity, facilitating human capital accumulation, enhancing returns on private investment, and improving productivity. - The magnitude of supply-side effects depends on investment efficiency; growth gains tend to be lower at high levels of public capital stock. - Distributional and regional effects: - Public investment can reduce inequities in access to education, health, water and sanitation, and improve living standards and labor mobility. - If infrastructure locations are unduly influenced by political factors, regional disparities can widen. - Overall, public investment expansions are associated with lower inequality among LICs. - An exogenous increase in public investment of 1 percent of GDP was found to reduce the Gini coefficient by about 0.3 percent one year after the increase. *From: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 3. Government effectiveness and budget institutions.* ### 2.3 percent five years after the increase (Fabrizio et al., 2017). The beneficial impact ### wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 2.3 percent five years after the increase (Fabrizio et al., 2017). The beneficial impact ### Impact of public investment on growth and inequality - Public investment can increase growth; example evidence: "2.3 percent five years after the increase (Fabrizio et al., 2017)." - The beneficial impact vanishes when investment efficiency is poor (Figure 4.31). - For OECD countries, larger public investment could increase growth without significant impact on inequality (OECD, 2018b). - Improving public investment management would help contain fiscal cost and mitigate the trade-off between growth and debt. - Improving investment management (to the 90th percentile of best performers in each income group) could halve the size of investment inefficiencies across countries (Baum, et al. 2020). ### Priority areas for inclusive public investment - Public investment should be scaled up in school and health infrastructure to expand access to education and healthcare and address social gaps. - Investment strategies should prioritize areas enabling the largest possible number of poor people to engage in productive activities and access social services: - Transport: - Improve connectedness of transportation network to social and public services. - Expand road network in underserved areas to improve labor mobility, access to public services, production and trade. - Evaluate distributional implications of projects (example contrasts: new road connecting a poor remote area vs building a high-speed train between already well-connected major cities). - Introduce and improve school transportation in rural areas to increase attendance and alleviate out-of-pocket payments for rural households. - Water and sanitation: - In Africa and Asia-Pacific less than a third of the poorest urban households use a piped water source. - Clean water and sanitation improve hygiene, health status, and generate externalities (e.g., reduce time girls spend collecting water and improve school attendance). - Example: "If for instance in India, water and sanitation were accessible to even 1 percent more girls in secondary school, the country’s GDP would rise by more than $5 billion (UNGEI, 2011)." - Governments in water-stress countries should promote sustainable tourism and expand sustainable irrigation to enhance productivity and climate resilience. - Energy: - Large shares of population in many developing countries lack access to electricity while energy subsidies benefit mostly upper-income households. - Eliminating universal energy subsidies will free resources for infrastructure investment and social spending. - Preserve and improve access to affordable energy services via targeted subsidies (examples: lifeline tariff, LPG vouchers, micro-finance). - Telecommunications: - Improve and expand equal access to affordable internet to reduce the digital divide. - COVID crisis widened inequality of opportunities due to communications-technology access gaps (U.N., 2020). - Example of technology enabling income generation: expansion of mobile banking (M-Pesa) in Kenya promoting e-commerce and electronic cash systems in remote areas. - Research and development: - Increasing public spending on R&D would increase overall productivity. - Ensure productivity gains benefit all firms and sectors to avoid divergence of productivity and greater wage dispersion; facilitate technological diffusion to smaller firms. - Public projects should promote local enterprise development and employment for disadvantaged groups: - Encourage local private sector provision and involvement of local industries (within prudent contracting standards) to enhance local economic multipliers. - Consider small projects within public work programs for social safety nets and local development (road construction and maintenance, drainage, public building maintenance). - Append training components to programs to improve beneficiaries’ skills and job opportunities. - Some public investment projects may create negative externalities and exacerbate poverty and inequality (example cited: Duflo, 2007 on dams increasing rural poverty in some districts). ### Financing the SDG-related investment gap and leveraging private finance - Closing inclusive infrastructure gaps entails a prohibitive financial cost: - Additional total—private and public—spending required in 2030 to make substantial progress toward SDGs in five areas (education, health, roads, electricity, water and sanitation) is estimated at "4 and 15.4 percentage points of GDP for emerging economies and LICs, respectively (Gaspar et al., 2019)." - The cost varies widely: median for LICs is estimated at "7 percentage points of GDP" and the maximum at "around 50 percentage points of GDP." - Magnitude of cost mainly determined by size of initial SDG gaps, current government spending, demographics, and investment costs. - Financing sustainably requires a multi-front approach with priority on: - (i) achieving better tax mobilization given lower levels in emerging economies and LICs, and - (ii) improving spending efficiency. - Tax revenue medians: "The median of the tax revenue to GDP ratio is 15 percent and 18 percent among LICs and emerging economies, respectively (against 26 percent for advanced economies) (Gaspar, 2019)." - Develop government bond markets to reduce reliance on external debt and foster domestic financial markets. - Greater role for private sector given limited room for debt financing: - Private sector plays critical role in delivering health services to vulnerable segments (IFC, 2012). - Improve business climate and streamline regulations to encourage private investment in socio-economic sectors. - Well-designed public-private partnership laws can catalyze private financing without excessive fiscal risks. ### Role of budget institutions and public financial management - Weak budgetary institutions hamper development and limit equal opportunity by enabling capture and rent-seeking. - Political economy challenges include common pool problem and political myopia; fiscal outcomes can worsen around elections (example: government consumption increases during election years in LICs, with higher deficits and adjustments thereafter—Ebeke and Ölçer, 2013). - Good budget institutions reduce political discretion, contain spending bias, improve efficiency, and reinforce counter-cyclical public spending. - Strong budget institutions associated with more timely fiscal policy response during crises and better protection of public investment during fiscal consolidation (Figures 4.32 and 4.33 referenced). - Strong institutions lead to more stable and predictable investment flows (IMF, 2015). - Strengthening public financial management can reduce rent-seeking, improve spending efficiency, and lead to more inclusion: - Improvements in public financial management (proxied by PEFA scores) are associated with lower inequality in developing countries (Figure 4.34). - For OECD countries, greater government effectiveness may reduce inequality via better targeting and cost-efficient delivery of transfer programs (Fournier and Johnson, 2016). ### Practical reforms to strengthen budget institutions (priority measures) - Enacting fiscal responsibility law: - Commit governments to fiscal policy objectives and strategies that improve discipline, transparency, and accountability (van Eden, 2013). - Smooth fiscal policy over time, reinforce macroeconomic stability and growth, and improve ability to respond to shocks. - Improving public procurement procedures: - Promote transparent bidding and competitive procurement to reduce fraud, corruption, and capture by politically connected firms; improve value-for-money. - Enhancing public sector employment frameworks: - Foster competitive hiring and merit-based civil service systems to minimize corruption and ensure equal opportunities. - Example survey: "between 60 percent and 90 percent of respondents to a Gallup survey conducted in 2013 in MENA countries think that knowing people in high positions is critical to getting a job" (IMF, 2018). - Operationalizing medium-term budgeting: - Adopt multi-year budget frameworks that are consistently articulated with the annual budget and embedded in decision-making. - Align inclusive growth objectives with resource allocation over time; enforce fiscal discipline and reduce deficit bias. - Consider longer horizons (more than 20 years) for aging-related health care costs and pension sustainability. - Transition from line-item budgeting to program budgeting to increase accountability and link resources to outcomes. - Experiments to integrate the SDGs in budget processes (SDG budgeting) are being considered. - Involving citizens and NGOs in the budget process: - Increase citizen participation and budget openness to tackle leakage, corruption, and improve public resource allocation (de Renzio and Wehner, 2015). - Conduct incidence and distributional analysis of fiscal policy options to inform policy choices and mitigation measures (examples: Spain, United Kingdom, New Zealand). - Expanding e-government services: - Increase transparency, reduce corruption opportunities, and improve cost-effectiveness and equal access across regions. - Example: in Mauritania, more than two-thirds of poor households have "difficult access" to civil registry offices (against one-third for non-poor), imposing high costs and hampering formality. ### Key trade-offs and policy guidance in public expenditure for inclusive growth - Public expenditure is central to economic development and social welfare; COVID-19 underscored the role of spending in health, protection, and business support. - Levels and composition of public spending matter; social outcomes correlate strongly with levels of social spending. - Fiscal space can be created by reducing non-productive expenditures (e.g., generalized subsidies) and containing the wage bill. - Country-specific circumstances determine appropriate expenditure policy: level of development, fiscal space, ability to raise taxes, and societal preferences. - Advanced economies should focus on better targeting benefits through means-testing and ensuring pension sustainability. - Developing countries should prioritize extending coverage of social safety nets and improving access to basic public services while reducing universal subsidies and improving tax mobilization. - Many public spending areas offer win-win possibilities (efficiency and equity), e.g., expanding equal access to education and maternal health services. - Some reforms involve unavoidable trade-offs (e.g., subsidy reform) and require mitigating measures; incidence analysis is crucial. - Education and health priorities: - Education spending should shepherd children through primary to senior secondary and provide low-cost finance for post-basic education. - Healthcare should prioritize equal access to relevant services and low-cost or no-cost access to providers. - Inclusive infrastructure: - Infrastructure investment, if well planned and executed, can reduce inequality and support inclusive growth. - Prioritize transport, digital connectivity, water and sanitation, and properly-priced energy coverage. - Delivering projects using local firms and labor enhances fiscal multipliers and broad distribution of benefits. - Financing matters: - Financing progressive public expenditures through regressive taxes must still support redistribution. - Borrowing must be consistent with sustainable fiscal policy; large deficits can cause macroeconomic instability that disproportionately affects the poor. - The "right" package of measures should be cost-effective, fiscally sustainable, and tailored to country-specific constraints: - Consider starting prevalence of poverty and inequality, coverage and adequacy of social protection, and administrative capacity. - Countries with high poverty may prioritize poverty reduction over inequality; countries with relatively low poverty and inequality may prioritize growth-enhancing fiscal measures to boost productivity and job creation. - Address procyclicality of public expenditure: - Procyclical spending exacerbates macroeconomic instability and curtails social and investment spending. - Strengthening fiscal frameworks and credible medium-term budget frameworks can help build buffers in good times and preserve access to financial markets during downturns. - Use of cyclically adjusted fiscal balances can help limit procyclicality. - Strengthening institutions and governance is necessary to improve quality and efficiency of spending: - Focus areas include public financial management, procurement, fiscal transparency laws, citizen involvement, independent audit institutions, and anti-corruption agencies. *Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 2.3 percent five years after the increase (Fabrizio et al., 2017). The beneficial impact* ### 2019. Fiscal Policy and Development: Human, Social, and Physical Investment for the SDGs. ### 2019. Fiscal Policy and Development: Human, Social, and Physical Investment for the SDGs ### Major thematic areas covered in the cited literature - Public spending and long-run growth: concepts, tools, and evidence (Gemmell, Norman; Florian Misch; Blanca Moreno-Dodson, 2011). - Quality and efficiency of public spending and its relation to living standards (Grigoli, Francesco, and Eduardo Ley, 2012). - Design and implementation of effective safety nets (Grosh, Margaret; del Ninno, Carlo; Tesliuc, Emil; Ouerghi, Azedine. 2008). - Budget institutions and public financial management in low-income and G-20 countries (Gupta, Sanjeev, and Sami Ylaoutinen, 2014; IMF, 2014a). - Integrating the SDGs into the budget and country experiences (Gouzien, Quentin, 2020). - Social protection coverage, equity, and rural deficits (ILO, 2017b; Scheil-Adlung, X, 2015). - Public investment efficiency and infrastructure governance (IMF, 2015; Schwartz et al.; Taliercio and Estrada, 2020). - Fiscal policy, income inequality, and redistribution (IMF, 2014e; IMF, 2017a; Lindert, Peter H., 2017; Lustig, Nora, 2015, 2018, 2020). - Social spending strategy and universal vs. targeted transfers (IMF, 2019a; IMF, 2019b; IMF, 2020a). - Public wage bills and managing government compensation (IMF, 2016; IMF, 2018). - Pension reform and impacts on poverty (Shang, Baoping, 2014). - Subsidy reform (Sdralevich et al., 2014). - Water pricing and management policy (Lipton, David, 2016; Kochhar et al., 2015). - Universal Basic Income debate and impact assessment (Maura, Francese, and Delphine Prady, 2018. IMF Working paper WP/18/273). - COVID-19 impacts on human development, social assistance, and recovery (UNDP, 2020; United Nations, 2020; IMF, 2020b). ### Methodologies, tools, and institutional guidance cited - Commitment to Equity (CEQ) methodologies and country CEQ Master Workbook sources (multiple CEQ references and working papers including CEQ Working Paper 73; CEQ Working Paper 85; CEQ Working Paper 92). - Fiscal incidence analysis and distributional impact measurement (Lustig, Nora. 2020; Paulus et al., 2009 EUROMOD Working Paper EM8/09). - Project appraisal and selection best practices for public investment (Taliercio and Estrada, 2020). - Legal frameworks to promote fiscal responsibility and public financial management design (Van Eden, Holger; Pokar Khemani; Richard P. Emery Jr., 2013). - Empirical country case studies and household survey data sources documented for CEQ-derived figures, charts, and tables (country list includes Albania (2015), Argentina (2012), Armenia (2011), Burkina Faso (2014), Belarus (2015), Bolivia (2009), Brazil (2008), Chile (2013), among others). ### Country-specific CEQ studies and data provenance (selected examples) - Albania (2015): Dávalos, Maria E., Gjika, Aida, Robayo-Abril, Monica, & Shehaj, Esmeralda. (2018, March). The Distributional Impact of the Fiscal System in Albania. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8370. - Argentina (2012): Rossignolo, Dario. (2018). Argentina: Taxes, Expenditures, Poverty, and Income Distribution. In Nora Lustig (Ed.), Commitment to Equity Handbook. CEQ Master Workbook: Argentina (2012-2013). - Armenia (2011): Khachatryan, Artsyi, & Younger, Stephen D. (2017). Fiscal Incidence in Armenia. CEQ Master Workbook: Armenia (2011). - Bolivia (2009): Jiménez Pozo, Wilson, Molina, George Gray, Paz Arauco, Verónica, & Yáñez Aguilar, Ernesto. (2013, July). Explaining Low Redistributive Impact in Bolivia. CEQ Master Workbook: Bolivia (2009). - Brazil (2008): Higgins, Sean & Pereira, Claudiney. (2013, September). The Effects of Brazil’s High Taxation and Social Spending on the Distribution of Household Income. CEQ Master Workbook: Brazil (2008-2009). - Chile (2013): Del Carmen, Giselle, Fuchs, Alan, Martínez-Aguilar, Sandra, & Ortiz-Juarez, Eduardo. (2018). Chile: the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty. CEQ Master Workbook: Chile (2013). ### Key institutional and policy guidance referenced - IMF policy papers and department papers on fiscal policy, inequality, public investment, social spending, and budget institutions (multiple IMF entries including IMF, 2014c; IMF, 2014e; IMF, 2015; IMF, 2016; IMF, 2017b; IMF, 2019a; IMF, 2020b). - World Bank and OECD analyses on growth, inclusive growth, and sectoral reforms (World Bank; OECD publications from 2011, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019). - Sector-specific guidance: World Health Organization on health systems financing (2010); ILO reports on social protection and labor income share (ILO, 2017b; ILO, 2019). *Source: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 2019. Fiscal Policy and Development: Human, Social, and Physical Investment for the SDGs.* ### 2013. Dataset downloaded from http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen- ### wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 2013. Dataset downloaded from http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen- ### Country entries and CEQ Master Workbook / Household Survey sources - Colombia (2010) - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Martinez, Valentina, & Melendez, Marcela. (2019, February 20). CEQ Master Workbook: Colombia (2010). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and Inter-American Development Bank. - Household Survey Citation: National Administrative Department for Statistics of the Republic of Colombia. Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida 2010. Dataset downloaded from http://microdatos.dane.gov.co/index.php/catalog/201/get_microdata - Colombia (2014) - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Martinez, Valentina, & Melendez, Marcela (2019, February 28). CEQ Master Workbook: Colombia (2014). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: National Administrative Department for Statistics of the Republic of Colombia. Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida 2014. Dataset downloaded from http://microdatos.dane.gov.co/index.php/catalog/342/get_microdata - Comoros (2010) - Reference: Belghith, Nadia Belhaj Hassine, Harivelo, Faniry Nantenaina Razafimanantsoa, Mahdi, Shireen, Sharma, Natasha, & Takamatsu, Shinya. (2017, April). Comoros: Poverty Assessment. - Costa Rica (2010) - Reference: Sauma, Pablo & Trejos, Juan Diego. (2014, March). Social Public Spending, Taxes, Redistribution of Income, and Poverty in Costa Rica (CEQ Institute Working Paper 18). - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Sauma, Pablo & Trejos, Juan Diego. (2014, February 14). CEQ Master Workbook: Costa Rica (2010). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics and Census of Costa Rica. Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2010. Dataset downloaded from http://sistemas.inec.cr/pad4/index.php/catalog/128 - Croatia (2014) - Reference: Inchauste, Gabriela & Rubil, Ivica. (2017, September). The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Croatia. (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8203). - Dominican Republic (2006) - Reference: Aristy-Escuder, Jaime, Cabrera, Maynor, Moreno-Dodson, Blanca, & Sanchez-Martin, Miguel E. (2018). The Dominican Republic: Fiscal Policy, Income Redistribution, and Poverty Reduction. In Nora Lustig (Ed.), Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty (pp. 603-666). Brookings Institution Press. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Aristy-Escuder, Jaime. (2019, January 23). CEQ Master Workbook: Dominican Republic (2006-2007). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: National Office of Statistics Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 2006-2007 [dataset] - Ecuador (2011) - Reference: Llerena Pinto, Freddy Paul, Llerena Pinto, María Andrea, Llerena Pinto, María Christina, & Saá Daza, Roberto Carlos. (2015, February). Social Spending, Taxes and Income Redistribution in Ecuador (CEQ Institute Working Paper 28). - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Llerena Pinto, Freddy Paul, Llerena Pinto, Maria Andrea, Llerena Pinto, Maria Christina, & Saa Daza, Roberto Carlos. (2017, January 5). CEQ Master Workbook: Ecuador (2011-2012). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics and Census of the Republic of Ecuador. Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares Urbanos y Rurales, 2011-2012. Dataset downloaded from http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec//encuesta-nacional-de-ingresos-y- gastos-de-los-hogares-urbanos-y- rurales-bases-de-datos/ - Egypt (2015) - Reference: Fayez, Rana, Ibarra, Gabriel Lara, Jellema, Jon, & Sinha, Nistha. (2019, April). Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty in the Arab Republic of Egypt (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8824). - El Salvador (2011) - Reference: Beneke, Margarita, Lustig, Nora, & Oliva Cepeda, Jose Andres. (2018). El Salvador: The Impact of Taxes and Social Spending on Inequality and Poverty. In Nora Lustig (Ed.), Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty (pp. 667-701). Brookings Institution Press. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Oliva, Jose Andres. (2019, October 23). CEQ Master Workbook: El Salvador (2011). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and Inter-American Development Bank. - Household Survey Citation: General Statistics and Census Department of the Ministry of Economy of El Salvador. Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples 2011. Dataset downloaded from http://digestyc.microdatahub.com/index.php/auth/login/?destination=catalog/14/get_microdata - Ethiopia (2010) - Reference: Hill, Ruth, Inchauste, Gabriela, Lustig, Nora, Tsehaye, Eyasu, & Woldehanna, Tassew. (2017). Fiscal Incidence Analysis for Ethiopia. In Inchauste, Gabriela., & Lustig, Nora. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. Evidence from Eight Low-and Middle-Income Countries, (pp. 79-112). Directions in Development: World Bank. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Hill, Ruth, Tsehaye, Eyasu, & Woldehanna, Tassew. (2014, September 28). CEQ Master Workbook: Ethiopia (2010-2011). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank. - Household Survey Citation: Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia. Household Consumption Expenditure Survey 2010 -2011 and Welfare Monitoring Survey 2010-2011 [dataset] - Georgia (2013) - Reference: Bondarenko, Elena, & Cancho, Cesar. (2017). The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in Georgia. In Inchauste, Gabriela, & Lustig, Nora. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. Evidence from Eight Low-and Middle-Income Countries, (pp. 113-148). Directions in Development: World Bank. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Bondarenko, Elena & Cancho, Cesar. (2015, December 31). CEQ Master Workbook: Georgia (2013). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank. - Household Survey Citation: National Statistics Office of Georgia. Integrated Household Survey 2013 [dataset] - Ghana (2012) - Reference: Oppong, Felix, Osei-Assibey, & Younger, Stephen. (2017, January). Fiscal Incidence in Ghana. Review of Development Economics, 21(4). - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Oppong, Felix, Osei-Assibey, Eric, & Younger, Stephen. (2018, October 28). CEQ Master Workbook: Ghana (2012-2013). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS6) 2012, version1.0. Dataset downloaded from http://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/5350/get_microdata - Guinea (2012) - Reference: Batana, Yele Maweki, Hounsa, Mahunan Thierry, Konou, Akakpo Domefa, & Tien, Bienvenue. (2019, May). Incidence of Fiscal Policies on Poverty and Inequality in Guinea. World Bank. - Guatemala (2011) - Reference: Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI). (2017, May). Incidencia de la Politica Fiscal en la Desigualdad y la Pobreza en Guatemala (CEQ Institute Working Paper 50). - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Cabrera, Maynor & Moran, Hilcias E. (2016, October 4). CEQ Master Workbook: Guatemala (2011). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University, Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics of Guatemala. Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida 2011. Dataset downloaded from https://www.ine.gob.gt/index.php/encuestas-de-hogares-y- personas/condiciones-de-vida - Honduras (2011) - Reference: Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI). (2017, April). Incidencia de la Politica Fiscal en la Desigualdad y la Pobreza en Honduras (CEQ Institute Working Paper 51). - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Castaneda, Ricardo & Espino, Ilya. (2015, July 27). CEQ Master Workbook: Honduras (2011). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University, Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics of Honduras. Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples, Mayo 2011 [dataset] - Indonesia (2012) - Reference: Afkar, Rythia, Jellema, Jon, & Wai-Poi, Matthew. (2017). The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in Indonesia. In Inchauste, Gabriela., & Lustig, Nora. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. Evidence from Eight Low-and Middle-Income Countries, (pp. 149-178). Directions in Development: World Bank. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Afkar, Rythia, Jellema, Jon, & Wai-Poi, Matthew. (2015, August 5). CEQ Master Workbook: Indonesia (2012). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank. - Household Survey Citation: Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia. Survei Sosial-Ekonomi Nasional 2012. Dataset downloaded from https://microdata.bps.go.id/mikrodata/index.php/catalog/87/study-description - Iran (2011) - Reference: Enami, Ali, Lustig, Nora, & Taqdiri, Alireza. (2017, September). Fiscal Policy, Inequality and Poverty in Iran: Assessing the Impact and Effectiveness of Taxes and Transfers (CEQ Institute Working Paper 48). - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Enami, Ali, Lustig, Nora, & Taqdiri, Alireza. (2017, May 5). CEQ Master Workbook: Iran (2011-2012). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and Economic Research Forum. - Household Survey Citation: The Statistical Center of Iran . Iranian Urban and Rural Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2011-2012 [dataset] - Ivory Coast (2014) - Reference: Jellema, Jon and Caroline Tassot (forthcoming). Analyse de l’impact des politiques fiscales et de protection sociale sur les inégalités et la pauvreté au Côte d’Ivoire.” OECD Development Policy Paper, OECD Publishing, Paris. - Jordan (2010) - Reference: Alam, Shamma, Inchauste, Gabriela, & Serajuddin, Umar. (2017). The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in Jordan. In Inchauste, Gabriela., & Lustig, Nora. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. Evidence from Eight Low-and Middle-Income Countries, (pp. 179-198). Directions in Development: World Bank. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Abdel-Halim, Morad, Alam, Shamma A., Mansur, Yusuf, Serajuddin, Umar, & Verme, Paolo. (2016, March 8). CEQ Master Workbook: Jordan (2010-2011). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank. - Household Survey Citation: Economic Research Forum and the Department of Statistics of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Household Expenditure and Income Survey 2010/2011 (HEIS 2010/2011), Version 1.0 of the Licensed data files (March 2013), provided by the Economic Research Forum. http://www.erfdataportal.com/index.php/catalog - Kenya (2015) - Reference: Pape, Utz Johann, & Lange, Simon. (2018, May). Fiscal Incidence Analysis for Kenya: Using the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey 2015/16. World Bank. - Sri Lanka (2009) - Reference: Arunatilake, Nisha, Inchauste, Gabriela, & Lustig, Nora. (2017). The Incidence of Taxes and Spending in Sri Lanka. In Inchauste, Gabriela, & Lustig, Nora. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. Evidence from Eight Low-and Middle-Income Countries, (pp. 267-292). Directions in Development: World Bank. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Abayasekara, Ashani, Arunatilake, Nisha, & Jayawardena, Priyanka. (2019, August 10). CEQ Master Workbook: Sri Lanka (2009-2010). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank. - Household Survey Citation: Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka. Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2009-2010 [dataset]. Ref. LKA_2009_HIES_v01_M. Dataset downloaded from http://www.statistics.gov.lk - Mexico (2010) - Reference: Scott, John. (2013, August). Redistributive Impact and Efficiency of Mexico’s Fiscal System. Public Finance Review 42(3), 368-390. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Scott, John. (2013, September 2). CEQ Master Workbook: Mexico (2010). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico. Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 2010. Dataset downloaded from http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/programas/enigh/tradicional/2010/ - Mexico (2012) - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Aranda, Rodrigo, De La Rosa, Enrique, Martinez-Aguilar, Sandra, & Scott, John. (2019, June 15). CEQ Master Workbook: Mexico (2012). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico. Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 2012. Dataset downloaded from http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/programas/enigh/nc/2012/default.html#Microdatos - Mexico (2014) - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Aranda, Rodrigo, De La Rosa, Enrique, Martinez-Aguilar, Sandra, & Scott, John. (2019, June 15). CEQ Master Workbook: Mexico (2014). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico. Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 2014. Dataset downloaded from http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/programas/enigh/nc/2014/default.html#Microdatos - Mali (2014) - Reference: Coulibaly, Mohamed, Hounsa, Thierry, & Sanoh, Aly. (2019, June). The Redistributive Effects of Fiscal Policy in Mali and Niger (World Bank Poverty & Equity Global Practice Working Paper No. 208). - Mongolia (2016) - Reference: Freije-Rodriguez, Samuel, & Yang, Judy. (2018, November). Mongolia: Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. (World Bank Working Paper No. 131852). - Namibia (2009) - Reference: Jellema, Jon, Schuler, Philip M., Sulla, Victor, & Zikhali, Precious. (2017, June). Does Fiscal Policy Benefit the Poor and Reduce Inequality in Namibia? The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in Namibia (World Bank Working Paper No. 116029). - Niger (2014) - Reference: Coulibaly, Mohamed, Hounsa, Thierry, & Sanoh, Aly. (2019, June). The Redistributive Effects of Fiscal Policy in Mali and Niger (World Bank Poverty & Equity Global Practice Working Paper No. 208). - Nicaragua (2009) - Reference: Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI). (2017, May). Incidencia de la Politica Fiscal en La Desigualdad y la Pobreza en Nicaragua (CEQ Institute Working Paper 52). - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Cabrera, Maynor & Moran, Hilcias E. (2015, October 14). CEQ Master Workbook: Nicaragua (2009). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University, Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Development Information. Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida (EMNV) 2009, Ref. NIC_2009_EMNV_v01_M. - Panama (2016) - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Martinez-Aguilar, Sandra. (2019, January 16). CEQ Master Workbook: Panama (2016). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the Economic Co-operation and Development. - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics and Census of Panama. _Encuesta de Propósitos Múltiples 2016. Dataset downloaded from https://www.contraloria.gob.pa/inec/Publicaciones/Subcategoria.aspx?ID_SUBCATEGORIA=38&ID_IDIOMA=1 - Peru (2009) - Reference: Jaramillo, Miguel. (2013, July). The Incidence of Social Spending and Taxes in Peru. Public Finance Review 42(3), 391-412. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Jaramillo, Miguel. (2015, August 7). CEQ Master Workbook: Peru (2009). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática - Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2009. Dataset downloaded from http://iinei.inei.gob.pe/microdatos/ - Peru (2011) - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Jaramillo, Miguel. (2019, February 11). CEQ Master Workbook: Peru (2011). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática - Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2011. Dataset downloaded from http://iinei.inei.gob.pe/microdatos/ - Poland (2014) - Reference: Goraus, Karolina, & Inchauste, Gabriela. (2016, August). The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers in Poland. (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7787). - Paraguay (2014) - Reference: Colman, Humberto, Farfan, Gabriela, Galeano, Juan Jose, Gimenez, Lea, Lugo, Maria Ana, & Martinez-Aguilar, Sandra. (2017, October). Paraguay: Análisis del sistema fiscal y su impacto en la pobreza y la equidad (CEQ Institute Working Paper 74). - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Colman, Humberto, Farfan, Gabriela, Galeano, Juan Jose, Gimenez, Lea, Lugo, Maria Ana, & Martinez-Aguilar, Sandra. (2017, February 12). CEQ Master Workbook: Paraguay (2014). CEQ Data Center: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: General Statistics and Census Department of Paraguay. Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 2014. Dataset downloaded from http://www.dgeec.gov.py/microdatos/index.php#collapse-3 - Romania (2016) - Reference: Inchauste, Gabriela, & Militaru, Eva. (2018, August). The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Social Spending in Romania. (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8565). - Russia (2010) - Reference: Lopez-Calva, Luis F., Lustig, Nora, Matytsin, Mikhail, & Popova, Daria (2017). Who Benefits from Fiscal Redistribution in the Russian Federation? In Inchauste, Gabriela., & Lustig, Nora. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. Evidence from Eight Low-and Middle-Income Countries, (pp. 199-232). Directions in Development: World Bank. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Popova, Daria, & Malytsin, Mikhail. (2019, March 21). CEQ Master Workbook: Russia (2010). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank. - Household Survey Citation: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring survey, RLMS-HSE”, conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Economics and ZAO “Demoscope” together with Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology RAS. - South Africa (2010) - Reference: Inchauste, Gabriela, Lustig, Nora, Maboshe, Mashekwa, Purfield, Catriona, & Woolard, Ingrid. (2017). The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in South Africa. In Inchauste, Gabriela, & Lustig, Nora. (Eds.), The Distributional Impact of Taxes and Transfers. Evidence from Eight Low-and Middle-Income Countries, (pp. 233-266). Directions in Development: World Bank. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Inchauste, Gabriela, Lustig, Nora, Maboshe, Mashekwa, Purfield, Catriona, Woolard, Ingrid & Zikhali, Precious. (2016, March 6). CEQ Master Workbook: South Africa (2010-2011). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and the World Bank. - Household Survey Citation: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit. National Income Dynamics Study 2010-2011, Wave 2 [dataset]. Version 2.2. Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit [producer], 2012. Cape Town: DataFirst [distributor], 2012 - Tunisia (2010) - Reference: Jouini, Nizar, Lustig, Nora, Moummi, Ahmed, & Shimeles, Abebe. (2018). Tunisia: Fiscal Policy, Income Redistribution, And Poverty Reduction. In Nora Lustig (Ed.), Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty (pp. 723-744). Brookings Institution Press. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Jouini, Nizar, Lustig, Nora, Moummi, Ahmed, & Shimeles, Abebe. (2017, May 5). CEQ Master Workbook: Tunisia (2010). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution; CEQ Institute, Tulane University and African Development Bank. - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics of Tunisia. National Survey on Household Budget, Consumption and Standard of Living 2010 [dataset] - Tanzania (2011) - Reference: Mdadila, Kenneth, Myamba, Flora, & Younger, Stephen. (2016, September). Fiscal Incidence in Tanzania. African Development Review, 28(3), 264-276. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Mdadila, Kenneth, Myamba, Flora, & Younger, Stephen. (2019, June 21). CEQ Master Workbook: Tanzania (2011-2012). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2011-2012, Ref. TZA_2011_HBS_v01_M. - Togo (2015) - Reference: Jellema, Jon and Caroline Tassot (2018). Analyse de l’impact des politiques fiscales et de protection sociale sur les inégalités et la pauvreté au Togo.” OECD Development Policy Paper, No. 12, OECD Publishing, Paris. - Uganda (2013) - Reference: Haas, Astrid, Jellema, Jon, Lustig, Nora, & Wolf, Sebastian. (2018). Uganda: The Impact of Taxes, Transfers, and Subsidies on Inequality and Poverty. In Nora Lustig (Ed.), Commitment to Equity Handbook. Estimating The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty (pp. 745-779). Brookings Institution Press. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Haas, Astrid, Jellema, Jon, Lustig, Nora, & Wolf, Sebastian. (2016, July 28). CEQ Master Workbook: Uganda (2012-2013). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University and International Growth Center. - Household Survey Citation: Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). 2014. Uganda National Household Survey 2012/2013. Kampala Uganda; UBOS, provided by the National Data Archive. www.ubos.org/unda - Ukraine (2016) - Reference: Bornukova, Kateryna, Leshchenko, Nataliia, & Matytsin, Mikhail. (2019, March). Fiscal Incidence in Ukraine: A Commitment to Equity Analysis (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8765). - Uruguay (2009) - Reference: Amábile, Florencia, Bucheli, Marisa, Lustig, Nora, & Rossi, Máximo. (2013, July). Social Spending, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in Uruguay. Public Finance Review 42(3), 413-433. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: Bucheli, Marisa. (2019, April 7). CEQ Master Workbook: Uruguay (2009). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation: National Institute of Statistics of Uruguay. Encuesta Continua de Hogares 2009.Dataset downloaded from http://www.ine.gub.uy/encuesta-continua-de-hogares1 - United States (2011) - Reference: Higgins, Sean, Lustig, Nora, Ruble, Whitney, & Smeeding, Timothy (2015, May). Comparing the Incidence of Taxes and Social Spending in Brazil and the United States. Review of Income and Wealth, 62(1), 22-46. - CEQ Master Workbook Source: n.a. (The MWB was not completed by the author/s.) - Household Survey Citation: Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Renae Rodgers, Steven Ruggles, and J. Robert Warren. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, *Italicized source attribution: Extracted from wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 2013. Dataset downloaded from http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen-* ### 2018. https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V6.0 ### 2018. https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V6.0 ### Venezuela (2013) - Molina, Emiro. (2018, April 5). CEQ Master Workbook: Venezuela (2012). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - CEQ Master Workbook Source - Molina, Emiro. (2018, April 5). CEQ Master Workbook: Venezuela (2012). CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution: CEQ Institute, Tulane University. - Household Survey Citation - National Institute of Statistics of Venezuela. Encuesta Nacional de Hogares por Muestreo (ENHM), Sistema de Indicadores de Coyuntura (SIC). Tercer trimestre 2013 [dataset] ### Zambia (2013) - De la Fuente, Alejandro, Rosales, Manuel, and Jon Jellema (2017). The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty in Zambia. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8246. World Bank: Washington, DC. *Content derived from the source PDF: wpiea2021083-print-pdf - 2018. https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V6.0* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021083-print-pdf.pdf_