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---

### I. Introduction — key facts and definitions
- International migration remains around 3 percent of the world population since 1990.
- Most migration is intra-regional; notable regional hubs listed include Cote d’Ivoire, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, GCC countries, and intra-EU migration.
- Share of migrants from developing to advanced economies increased from 4 to 9 percent of the population of advanced economies (IMF WEO 2020).
- Scope and definitions:
  - “Migrants” defined as foreign-born residents of a recipient country (no distinction between permanent and temporary migrants unless noted).
  - Stock measurement from population censuses includes many “undocumented” residents; gross flow measures based on arrival records can underestimate migration.
- Focus: international migration (not internal) and mainly economic migration; refugees noted as a special case.

### II. Consequences of Migration for Migrants
- Returns to migration and selection:
  - Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2019): average lower bound on real (PPP) wage ratio between immigrants in the United States and observably equivalent nationals in 42 developing-country labor markets equals 5.7.
  - For some developing countries in the sample, the ratio exceeds 16.
  - Gains from migration larger for younger migrants (longer lifetime to realize extra income); selection favors younger, more educated, more skilled individuals (IMF, 2020 WEO).
- Risks and market failures:
  - Recruitment industry can engage in fraudulent and abusive practices; better regulation recommended (World Bank, 2014).
- Integration outcomes in OECD/EU:
  - Migrants tend to have much higher poverty rates than natives (Figure 2, OECD 2018).
  - Migrants more likely to be unemployed or overqualified, live in overcrowded housing, have worse health outcomes, and have worse education outcomes for their children.
  - Immigrants report high levels of discrimination and abuse based on nationality, ethnicity, or race.
- Return migration:
  - Return rates vary by destination; substantially higher return from European destinations compared with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
  - Return migration rates highest during the first decade after arrival and then level off (Dustmann and Görlach, 2016).
  - Some migrants return because of unmet expectations; others follow a temporary migration strategy to accumulate savings and human capital for return.

### III. Impact on Destination Countries — overview and labor market channels
- Trade-offs:
  - Short-run challenges: local labor market adjustments, potential short-term fiscal costs.
  - Medium/long-run opportunities: boost output, supply skills, stimulate trade, improve demographic balance and long-term fiscal position.
- Concentration:
  - Top 10 destination countries account for 60 percent of global immigration (World Bank, 2018).
  - Within the US, two-thirds of arrivals settle in 6 states; major cities can have foreign-born shares as large as 40 or 50 percent.
- Labor-market channels and empirical evidence:
  - Supply-shift (simple model) can reduce native wages/employment if wages rigid (cites Borjas 2003).
  - Offsetting channels documented:
    - Complementarity: immigrants often take different/complementary tasks (Peri and Sparber, 2009).
    - Demand creation: immigrants increase local consumption and investment (Peri, Rury, and Wiltshire, 2020).
    - Firm response: firms expand/relocate to immigrant-inflow areas (Beerli et al., 2018).
    - Entrepreneurship: immigrants create firms and opportunities (Lofstrom and Fairlie, 2015).
  - Net effect depends on relative strengths of supply and demand channels, migrant skill composition, and speed/degree of integration.

### III.A. Empirical estimates on wages, natural experiments, and mechanisms
- Empirical elasticities and aggregate findings:
  - Peri (2014) reviews 27 empirical studies with more than 270 baseline estimates; estimated elasticities range from -0.8 to 0.8.
  - About 80 percent of the studies show an elasticity of local wages to immigration concentrated between -0.1 and 0.2.
  - Bulk of evidence: effects of immigrants on average native wages are close to zero (negative competition effects offset by demand/complementarity/productivity effects).
- Mariel Boatlift (April–September 1980):
  - 125,000 Cuban refugees arrived on the coast of Florida; Miami’s labor supply increased by about 8 percent, concentrated among less-skilled workers.
  - Conflicting findings:
    - Borjas (2017): wages decreased significantly for non-Hispanic native workers with no high school degree.
    - Card (1990) and Peri and Yasenov (2017): wages and employment of most native groups left unaffected; negative effects only for very small groups with likely measurement error.
- Substitution/complementarity evidence:
  - Immigrants differ in specialization, skills, and language ability; often not substitutes even at similar schooling levels (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Card, 2009; Cattaneo, Fiorio and Peri, 2014; D’Amuri and Peri, 2014).
  - Firms and investment often respond quickly to new workers (Olney, 2013), allowing physical capital to increase and labor demand to shift right.
  - Previous immigrants may experience stronger competition: D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2009) find ten new immigrants in Western Germany drive three to four old immigrants out of employment while having no effect on natives.
  - High substitutability between new and previous migrants (Beine et al., 2011) and clustering of new migrants where previous migrants are over-represented (World Bank, 2018).

### III.B. Productivity, demand, networks, and aggregate wage outcomes
- Skill composition and productivity:
  - In the last 20 years immigrants in most OECD countries, including the US, were on average more skilled than natives (Docquier, Ozden, and Peri, 2014).
  - High-skilled immigration can increase the relative abundance of skilled people and generate positive complementarity effects for less-educated workers.
  - High-skilled immigrants can have positive effects on innovation and productivity (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; Peri, 2012).
- Female labor-force participation and services:
  - Low-cost workers in services/health care may enable high-skilled women to join the labor force or work longer hours (Tessada and Cortes, 2011; Jaumotte, Koloskova, and Saxena, 2016).
  - Rapid immigration can spur growth in personal services and raise female labor force participation (Conde Ruiz, Ramón Garcia, and Navarro, 2008).
- Occupational upgrading:
  - Immigrants covering manual, labor-intensive jobs encourage native specialization in more complex occupations, raising productivity and wages (Cattaneo, Fiorio, and Peri, 2014; Foged and Peri, 2016).
- Demand (scale) effects and examples:
  - Immigrants increase consumption and demand for local services, boosting production and native employment (Ozden and Wagner, 2014).
  - Examples:
    - Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2006): Hispanic immigrants to a meatpacking plant in Dawson County, Nebraska boosted local consumer demand.
    - Bodvarsson et al. (2008): immigrants increased consumption and demand for local services in Miami after the Mariel Boatlift.
- Aggregate outcome:
  - Demand and productivity shifts can offset supply shifts; net impact on native wages may be a decrease, no change, or increase. Most studies find roughly no wage change on average and for low-skilled natives.

### III.C. Broader links: trade, FDI, and networks
- Migrant networks foster trade and FDI, contributing to economic growth (Cohen, Gurun, and Malloy, 2017; Parsons and Vezina, 2016; Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan, 2016).
- Javorcik et al. (2011): US FDI abroad positively correlated with presence of migrants from the host country.
- Mechanism: immigrants lower informational barriers via knowledge of home-country language, regulations, market opportunities, and informal institutions.

### III.D. Public finance: short-term costs and long-term fiscal impacts
- Public concern: whether immigrants are net contributors or net recipients of welfare transfers (Dustmann and Preston, 2007).
- Short-term costs concentrated in social integration, assistance, and time to find employment; higher for refugees and lower for economic immigrants.
- Refugee statistics and fiscal-cost examples:
  - Refugees are about 10 percent of migrants to OECD countries.
  - Syria 2012-15: estimated fiscal cost for Jordan was 2.4 percent of GDP.
  - Syria 2012-15: estimated fiscal cost for Lebanon was 3.2 percent of GDP.
  - Syria 2012-15: estimated fiscal cost for Turkey was 1.3 percent of GDP.
  - Migration flows from Venezuela in 2018: estimated fiscal costs were 0.5 percent of the GDP of neighboring countries.
- Short-run fiscal cost example (US):
  - Flavin et al. (2011): fiscal cost per capita of foreign-born in the US is between half to two-thirds that of US-born individuals.
- Long-term determinants and projections:
  - Integration into the formal labor market is key to positive long-term fiscal impact.
  - Dustmann and Frattini (2014): migrants who arrived in the UK after 2000 were on average highly skilled and had a higher positive net fiscal contribution than the native population.
  - Orrenius (2017): positive net fiscal contribution of immigrants in the US over their lifetime, especially for more recent migrants.
  - Pension and healthcare spending in developed economies projected to reach 24.8 percent of GDP by 2100, up from 16.4 percent in 2015 because of population aging.
  - Clements et al. (2015): allowing for more immigration could help reduce age-related expenditures by 2 percent of GDP by 2100.
  - OECD (2013) cross-country static accounting: impact of immigration on public finances typically ±0.5 percent of GDP for advanced economies.

### III.E. Impact on crime — empirical evidence
- Raw correlations: cities with high crime rates tend to have more immigrants, but controlling for demographics or using instruments indicates little to no causal effect.
- US evidence: Butcher and Piehl (1998, 2007) find no effect of immigration on crime rates; youth born abroad are less likely than native-born youth to be criminally active and less likely to be incarcerated.
- Country-specific findings:
  - Buonanno and Pinotti (2012): robberies in Italy increased due to immigration; robberies are a small fraction of total offenses, so overall crime effect not significantly different from zero.
  - Bell, Fasani, and Machin (2013): late 1990s/early 2000s asylum seekers in the UK (with limited labor market access) caused a modest but significant increase in property crime; post-2004 inflow from EU accession countries did not.
- Legal status:
  - Undocumented immigrants often cannot officially work; where enforcement is lax they may have high employment rates in the legal economy (Borjas, 2016).
  - Informal employment yields inferior earnings opportunities; legal immigrants have much lower crime rates than illegal immigrants (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti, 2010).
  - Pinotti (2017): legalization reduces the crime rate of immigrants.
- Italy example statistic:
  - 0.6 percentage points on average, on a baseline crime rate of 1.1 percent in Italy.

### III.F. Policy design for destinations — integration and minimizing native-worker impacts
- Forward-looking immigration policies tied to population projections and labor force needs more likely to succeed.
- Reaping benefits:
  - Skill-based selection (examples cited: Canada and Australia) tends to select immigrants aligned to economic needs and maintain higher public support than family-centered systems (example cited: US).
  - Systems centered on working visas and permits are more likely to achieve full productive contribution and limit potential public-finance burdens.
  - Restricting asylum seeker access to formal work can lead to loss of tax revenue, skill deterioration, and higher long-run welfare bills.
- Integration policies recommended:
  - Basic education, basic health care, and especially language training (see Arendt et al., 2020).
  - Focus on schooling of the second generation.
  - Timely work permit authorizations and swift recognition of certificates, degrees, and licenses.
  - Encourage migrant entrepreneurship and access to financial services.
  - Clear paths to residency and employment security (temporary visa convertible to permanent when employers sponsor; example: H1-B structure).
- Labor-market policy options to protect/assist natives:
  - Adjustment assistance (skill upgrading) and relocation assistance; transitory welfare or unemployment insurance targeted to impacted native populations.
  - Promote efficient and flexible labor markets to ease occupational mobility.
  - Consider minimum income schemes or minimum wage for vulnerable native workers; more research needed on implications.
  - Fees on employers hiring foreign workers could finance adjustment/relocation; alternative to quotas (examples: Singapore and Malaysia mentioned).
  - Visa fees or visa auction systems allow firms to choose workers while providing government revenue to alleviate transitional costs.

### III.G. Refugee-specific recommendations
- Refugee flows can be sudden and large relative to host capacity; reasons to admit refugees primarily humanitarian.
- Policies to improve refugee economic outcomes:
  - Allow asylum seekers to work early in the asylum process.
  - Provide skills and language training before labor-market entry.
  - Encourage refugees to move to places with labor demand for their skills.
  - Introduce temporary wage subsidies to incentivize employers.
- Crisis mitigation and burden-sharing:
  - Monitor unstable countries and offer orderly labor migration options before crises.
  - Spread the burden of refugees across countries when migration crises occur.
  - World Bank (2018) suggests active large-scale refugee settlement policies and coordinated financial assistance.

### IV. Impact on Origin Countries — labor markets, remittances, trade, and brain drain
- Labor-market effects of emigration:
  - Emigration reduces labor supply but can also reduce demand, human capital, and entrepreneurship with ambiguous net effects on wages.
  - In countries with chronic unemployment/underemployment, emigration can ease labor-market tensions (conditional on demand/human-capital effects).
  - Emigrants usually positively selected in skills (Grogger and Hanson 2011); emigration can cause loss of productivity, innovation capacity, and fiscal deterioration.
  - Dustmann et al. (2015): large-scale emigration raised employment and wages in Poland after EU entry.
  - IMF (2016, SDN/16/07) simulates emigration may have reduced annual growth rates by 0.6– (text ends in source).
- Remittances — scale and channels:
  - World Bank: officially recorded remittances at $548 billion in 2019.
  - Remittances exceed official development assistance by more than three times and are comparable to total FDI flows.
  - Remittances often in the range of 15-20 percent of GDP in many countries and can reach 30-40 percent of GDP in exceptional cases (examples: Tonga, Haiti, Kyrgyz Republic).
  - Sending money remains expensive, with fees often surpassing 5 percent.
  - Mobile technology advances likely to reduce remittance costs (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 2018; Schmitz and Endo 2011).
- Developmental roles and macro effects of remittances:
  - Reduce poverty and improve nutritional and educational outcomes in many Asian and African countries (Binci and Giannelli, 2018; Bargain and Boutin 2014).
  - Provide consumption smoothing and act as insurance in natural disasters and conflicts.
  - Abdih et al. (2012a): remittances improve fiscal balance by increasing aggregate private demand and expanding the tax base.
  - Abdih et al. (2012b): remittances can negatively affect governance by creating moral-hazard effects that reduce pressure for reforms.
  - Remittances can reduce labor-force participation rates, especially for women.
  - Distributional impacts mixed: remittances can lower inequality if recipients are disadvantaged, but empirical studies show heterogeneous outcomes across countries and migration stages.
- Trade and investment links:
  - Emigrant networks reduce information frictions, facilitating trade and FDI (Parsons and Vezina, 2016; Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan, 2016).
  - Javorcik et al. (2011): US exports to Vietnam grew most in US states with larger Vietnamese populations after lifting trade restrictions in 1994.
  - Doubling residents with ancestry from a foreign country increases the probability that at least one local firm invests in that country by four percentage points (Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan, 2016).
  - Impact amplified by migrant skill composition, emigrant cohesion, sound public policies, political stability, and low corruption.
- Brain drain: magnitudes and effects
  - Share of highly skilled workers leaving can reach 40 percent in some small low-income countries (Artuç et al., 2015).
  - Highly educated individuals are two to three times more likely to migrate than less educated (Grogger and Hanson, 2011).
  - Consequences: lower human capital, shortages of high-skilled labor, reduced productivity, possible wage increases due to labor shortages and remittance-driven reservation wages, and slower potential growth.
  - IMF (2016) links emigration during 1990–2012 to an average increase of overall government spending relative to GDP of 6.2 percentage points in Central European and South-Eastern European countries.
  - Example magnitudes: 0.9 percentage points in some countries in South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Montenegro, and Romania) and the Baltics (Latvia and Lithuania) cited for slowed income convergence.
- Country cases:
  - Kyrgyz Republic:
    - Remittances increased from virtually zero in 2000 to 10 percent of GDP by 2005 and 30 percent of GDP in 2011.
    - Remittances averaged almost 30 percent of GDP during the last decade.
    - IMF (2016) finds little evidence of remittances’ positive impact on growth; remittances used for basic consumption and associated with real effective exchange rate appreciation.
    - Gini coefficient fell by about 10 points since 2006 (period coinciding with high emigration).
  - Mexico:
    - One of the world’s largest remittance recipients.
    - Over time remittance-receiving households shifted from being typically middle-income to increasingly pro-poor.
    - Remittances constitute a larger share of income for poorer households.
    - During the peso crisis (1994) and the Global Financial Crisis (2008-09), remittance likelihood and amounts fell for top income deciles but increased for poorer households.
- Policies for origin countries:
  - Reduce high-skilled emigration by creating more and better employment opportunities, improving institutions, maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability, supporting job creation, and improving education.
  - Replenish high-skilled workforce by encouraging return migration and facilitating high-skilled immigration from other countries.
  - Better utilize remaining workforce through higher labor force participation, education, and on-the-job training.
  - Maximize remittance benefits: increase competition among remittance service providers, help migrants compare costs, facilitate mobile technologies, improve investment opportunities and financial inclusion.

### V. Conclusion — balancing challenges and opportunities
- Drivers: large wage and employment differentials drive migration.
- Destination countries:
  - Short-run stresses on local labor markets and public finances possible.
  - Medium/long-run benefits include boosted output, skill supply, trade stimulation, and contributions to long-term fiscal balances.
- Origin countries:
  - Emigration can cause loss of human capital and reduced competitiveness, but also generates remittances and international connections (trade, FDI, technological transfers).
- Policy prescriptions:
  - Destination countries: design forward-looking immigration policies, support integration (language, education, recognition of qualifications), enable labor-market access, consider employer fees to finance adjustment, and adopt refugee-specific measures that permit early labor-market entry.
  - Origin countries: improve business and employment opportunities, leverage financial and technological inflows, and take measures to reduce loss of highly skilled labor.

*Source: wpiea2021088-print-pdf - 27.5 percent of the country’s entrepreneurs but only around 13 percent of the population in / 0.6 percentage points on average, on a baseline crime rate of 1.1 percent in Italy. (IMF content provided).*

### References..............................................................................................................

### wpiea2021088-print-pdf - References..............................................................................................................

### I. Introduction
- International migration remains around 3 percent of the world population since 1990.
- Most migration is intra-regional; notable regional hubs: Cote d’Ivoire, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, GCC countries, and significant intra-EU migration.
- Share of migrants from developing to advanced economies increased from 4 to 9 percent of the population of advanced economies (IMF WEO 2020).
- Distinction: paper focuses on international (not internal) migration and mainly on economic migration; refugees are noted as a special case.
- Data notes:
  - “Migrants” defined as foreign-born residents of a recipient country (no distinction between permanent and temporary migrants unless noted).
  - Stock measurement from population censuses includes many “undocumented” residents; gross flow measures based on arrival records can underestimate migration.

### II. Consequences of Migration for Migrants
- Large wage/income gaps drive migration:
  - Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2019) estimate the average lower bound on the real (PPP) wage ratio between immigrants in the United States and observably equivalent nationals in 42 developing-country labor markets to be 5.7.
  - For some developing countries in the sample, the ratio exceeds 16.
- Gains from migration are larger the younger the migrant (longer lifetime to realize extra income); selection favors younger, more educated, more skilled individuals (IMF, 2020 WEO).
- Risks and market failures:
  - Recruitment industry can engage in fraudulent and abusive practices; better regulation recommended to protect migrants (World Bank, 2014).
- Integration challenges in OECD/EU:
  - Migrants tend to have much higher poverty rates than natives (Figure 2, OECD 2018).
  - Migrants are more likely to be unemployed or overqualified, live in overcrowded housing, have worse health outcomes, and have worse education outcomes for their children.
  - Immigrants report high levels of discrimination and abuse based on nationality, ethnicity, or race.
- Return migration:
  - Return rates vary by destination; substantially higher return from European destinations compared with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
  - Return migration rates are highest during the first decade after arrival and then level off (Dustmann and Görlach, 2016).
  - Some migrants return due to unmet expectations; others follow an explicit temporary migration strategy to accumulate savings and human capital for return.

### III. Impact of Migration on Destination Countries — Overview
- Migration presents both short-run challenges (local labor market adjustments, potential short-term fiscal costs) and medium/long-run opportunities (boost output, supply skills, stimulate trade, improve demographic balance and long-term fiscal position).
- Political economy: distributional effects matter — different groups (by education, capital ownership, age) gain or lose differently, influencing public perceptions and policy.
- Concentration of migration:
  - Top 10 destination countries account for 60 percent of global immigration (World Bank, 2018).
  - Within the US, two-thirds of arrivals settle in 6 states; major cities can have foreign-born shares as large as 40 or 50 percent.
  - Figure 3 and Figure 1 illustrate destination concentration and migration flows.

### III.A. Impact on the Labor Market — Key Channels and Evidence
- Simple supply-shift model (Diagram 1a) suggests immigration could reduce native wages or employment if wages are rigid (cites Borjas 2003).
- Broader evidence and channels that can offset or reverse negative effects:
  - Complementarity: immigrants often take jobs that are different and complementary to natives (Peri and Sparber, 2009).
  - Demand creation: immigrants increase local consumption and investment, raising labor demand (Peri, Rury, and Wiltshire, 2020).
  - Firm response: firms expand or relocate to areas with immigrant inflows, generating investment and opportunities for natives (Beerli et al., 2018).
  - Entrepreneurship: immigrants create firms and opportunities for natives (Lofstrom and Fairlie, 2015).
- Net effect on wages and employment depends on relative strengths of supply and demand channels, migrant skill composition, and speed/degree of integration into formal labor markets.

*Source: Excerpted content from wpiea2021088-print-pdf - References..............................................................................................................*

### 27.5 percent of the country’s entrepreneurs but only around 13 percent of the population in

### wpiea2021088-print-pdf - 27.5 percent of the country’s entrepreneurs but only around 13 percent of the population in

### Immigration and native wages: empirical evidence and summary findings
- Peri (2014) reviews 27 empirical studies corresponding to more than 270 baseline estimates; estimated elasticities range from -0.8 to 0.8, with about 80 percent of the studies showing an elasticity of local wages to immigration concentrated between -0.1 and 0.2.
- The bulk of empirical evidence suggests effects of immigrants on average native wages are close to zero, consistent with negative competition/crowding-out effects being balanced by positive demand/complementarity/productivity effects.
- Studies differ by country coverage, unit of analysis (local areas, states, countries), and identification strategy; many use local area-level variation and instrumental variables (e.g., shift-share instruments based on historical enclaves) to address endogeneity.
- Natural experiments and push-driven “quasi-experimental” events are used to isolate short-run effects where migrants were not attracted by local economic conditions.

### Mariel Boatlift and short-run natural experiments
- Mariel Boatlift (April–September 1980): 125,000 Cuban refugees arrived on the coast of Florida; Miami’s labor supply increased by about 8 percent, concentrated among less-skilled workers.
- Empirical findings on the Mariel Boatlift:
  - Borjas (2017) finds wages decreased significantly for non-Hispanic native workers with no high school degree.
  - Card (1990) and Peri and Yasenov (2017) find wages and employment of most native groups left unaffected; negative effects only for very small groups with likely large measurement error in CPS.
  - Estimated effects on most groups with sufficient observations are very small and often non-negative.

### The substitution / complementarity channel
- The competition (substitution) effect treats immigrants as adding identical less-educated labor and shifting supply right, putting downward pressure on less-skilled native wages.
- This effect assumes immigrants and natives are substitutes and that firms do not adjust physical capital.
- Evidence that immigrants differ in specialization, skills, and language ability suggests immigrants are often not substitutes even at similar schooling levels (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Card, 2009; Cattaneo, Fiorio and Peri, 2014; D’Amuri and Peri, 2014).
- Firms and investment often respond quickly to new workers (Olney, 2013), allowing physical capital to increase and short-run labor demand to shift right.
- Previous immigrants may experience stronger competition: D’Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2009) find ten new immigrants in Western Germany drive three to four old immigrants out of employment while having no effect on natives.
- High substitutability between new and previous migrants (Beine et al., 2011) and clustering of new migrants where previous migrants are over-represented (World Bank, 2018) contribute to this effect.

### Productivity, demand, and aggregation of effects
- In the last 20 years immigrants in most OECD countries, including the US, were on average more skilled than natives (Docquier, Ozden, and Peri, 2014); high-skilled immigration can increase relative abundance of skilled people and generate positive complementarity effects for less-educated workers.
- High-skilled immigrants can have positive effects on innovation and productivity (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; Peri, 2012), supporting long-run economic and wage growth.
- Availability of relatively low-cost workers in services/health care may enable high-skilled women to join the labor force or work longer hours, increasing productivity (Tessada and Cortes, 2011; Jaumotte, Koloskova, and Saxena, 2016).
- Rapid immigration can spur growth in personal services and raise female labor force participation (Conde Ruiz, Ramón Garcia, and Navarro, 2008).
- Occupational upgrading: immigrants covering manual, labor-intensive jobs encourage native specialization in more complex occupations, raising productivity and wages (Cattaneo, Fiorio, and Peri, 2014; Foged and Peri, 2016).
- Demand (scale) effect: immigrants increase consumption and demand for local services, boosting overall production and native employment (Ozden and Wagner, 2014). Examples:
  - Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2006) show Hispanic immigrants to a meatpacking plant in Dawson County, Nebraska boosted local consumer demand.
  - Bodvarsson et al. (2008) find immigrants increased consumption and demand for local services in Miami after the Mariel Boatlift.
- Aggregate effect: demand and productivity shifts can offset supply shifts; the net impact on native wages can be a decrease, no change, or increase depending on relative magnitudes. Most studies find roughly no wage change on average and for low-skilled natives.

### Broader economic links: trade, FDI, and networks
- Migrant networks foster trade and FDI, contributing to economic growth (Cohen, Gurun, and Malloy, 2017; Parsons and Vezina, 2016; Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan, 2016).
- Javorcik et al. (2011) find US FDI abroad is positively correlated with presence of migrants from the host country.
- Immigrants lower informational barriers via knowledge of home-country language, regulations, market opportunities, and informal institutions.

### Impact on public finance — key points
- Public concern about immigrants often centers on whether they are net contributors or net recipients of welfare transfers (Dustmann and Preston, 2007).
- Short-term costs are concentrated in social integration, assistance, and time to find employment; costs are higher for refugees and lower for economic immigrants.
- Immigrants tend to be less costly in health care over time because they tend to move when young.
- Over time, migrants can have a net positive effect on government budgets if successfully integrated into the labor market; immigration of young workers can ease fiscal sustainability pressures in aging societies.

### Short-term fiscal impact: examples and magnitudes
- Refugees are about 10 percent of migrants to OECD countries; thus refugee-related costs are small for most advanced economies.
- Flavin et al. (2011) estimate fiscal cost per capita of foreign-born in the US is between half to two-thirds that of US-born individuals.
- Fiscal costs of refugee inflows example (estimates):
  - Syria 2012-15: estimated fiscal cost for Jordan was 2.4 percent of GDP.
  - Syria 2012-15: estimated fiscal cost for Lebanon was 3.2 percent of GDP.
  - Syria 2012-15: estimated fiscal cost for Turkey was 1.3 percent of GDP.
  - Migration flows from Venezuela in 2018: estimated fiscal costs were 0.5 percent of the GDP of neighboring countries.
- Short-run fiscal impact depends on distinguishing economic migrants (mostly to advanced economies, small initial costs spread over time) from refugees (mostly to neighboring developing countries, potentially large short-run fiscal transfers).

### Long-term fiscal impact: determinants and projections
- Long-term fiscal impact depends on tax/benefit system design, coverage, and immigrants’ integration into formal labor markets.
- Integration into the formal labor market is key to generating positive long-term fiscal impact; higher-skilled migrants are expected to contribute more due to higher income.
- Dustmann and Frattini (2014): migrants who arrived in the UK after 2000 were on average highly skilled and had a higher positive net fiscal contribution than the native population.
- Orrenius (2017): positive net fiscal contribution of immigrants in the US over their lifetime, especially for more recent migrants.
- Demographics: immigrants (usually young) increase labor force size and reduce old-age dependency ratios in aging societies.
- Pension and healthcare spending in developed economies is projected to reach 24.8 percent of GDP by 2100, up from 16.4 percent in 2015 because of population aging.
- Clements et al. (2015) show allowing for more immigration could help reduce age-related expenditures by 2 percent of GDP by 2100.
- OECD (2013) cross-country static accounting: impact of immigration on public finances typically ±0.5 percent of GDP for advanced economies; lower tax contributions, not greater demand for benefits, mainly explain less favorable net fiscal balances.
- Immigrants tend to have negative net fiscal balance during youth and old age and positive balance during working age; arriving early in working age yields higher net positive fiscal impact because receiving countries save education costs and get many contributing years before retirement.

### Impact on crime
- Raw correlations show cities with high crime rates tend to have more immigrants, but controlling for demographics or using instruments indicates immigration has little to no significant causal effect on crime rates.
- Butcher and Piehl (1998, 2007): no effect of immigration on crime rates in the United States; youth born abroad are significantly less likely than native-born youth to be criminally active and less likely to be incarcerated.
- Miles and Cox (2014): using immigration status of arrestees finds similar results.
- Buonanno and Pinotti (2012): only incidence of robberies in Italy increased due to immigration; robberies are a small fraction of total offenses, so overall crime effect not significantly different from zero.
- Labor market opportunities and formal employment reduce crime probability (Becker-Ehrlich model implications).
- Bell, Fasani, and Machin (2013): two UK waves—late 1990s/early 2000s asylum seekers (limited official labor market access) caused a modest but significant increase in property crime; post-2004 inflow from EU accession countries did not.
- Undocumented immigrants often cannot officially work; where enforcement is lax they may have high employment rates in the legal economy (Borjas, 2016).
- Informal employment yields inferior earnings opportunities; legal immigrants have much lower crime rates than illegal immigrants (Mastrobuoni and Pinotti, 2010).
- Pinotti (2017) shows legalization reduces the crime rate of immigrants.

*Italicized source: wpiea2021088-print-pdf - 27.5 percent of the country’s entrepreneurs but only around 13 percent of the population in*

### 0.6 percentage points on average, on a baseline crime rate of 1.1 percent in Italy.

### wpiea2021088-print-pdf - 0.6 percentage points on average, on a baseline crime rate of 1.1 percent in Italy.

### Adopting reasonable immigration policies and fostering integration
- Immigration policies based on forward-looking considerations, such as the country’s population projection and expectation of labor force needs, are more likely to succeed.
- Policies should aim to ease initial costs and enhance and redistribute the economic benefits of migration so that government choices are supported by citizens.

### Reaping the benefits of immigration
- Skill-based selection (examples cited: Canada and Australia) tends to select immigrants with skills aligned to economic needs and has maintained higher public support for immigration than family-centered systems (example cited: US).
- Systems centered around working visas and permits are more likely to:
  - Achieve full productive contribution from migrants.
  - Limit potential burdens on public finances.
- Restricting access to formal work for asylum seekers can lead to:
  - Loss of tax revenue.
  - Likely deterioration of human capital.
  - Higher long-run welfare benefit bills.
- Integration policies found effective or recommended:
  - Basic education, basic health care, and especially language training (see Arendt et al., 2020) to increase long-run employment and earnings potential.
  - Focus on schooling of the second generation to enable full integration.
  - Timely work permit authorizations and swift recognition of certificates, degrees, and licenses across countries.
  - Encourage migrant entrepreneurship and access to financial services (bank accounts, financial transactions).
  - Provide clear paths to residency and employment security (temporary visa convertible to permanent when employers sponsor, example: H1-B structure).
- Empirical labor-market statistics and findings:
  - OECD (2018): average overqualification rate of the foreign-born population in the EU was over 33 percent, compared to 21 percent for native-born workers. (Over-qualification defined as the share of tertiary-educated employees who work in a job that is ISCO-classified as low or medium-skilled, i.e. ISCO levels 4 to 9.)
  - Employment rates for migrants are higher in countries with low entry-level wages and less employment protection (Ho and Shirono, 2015).
  - Helbling, Simon, and Schmid (2020): immigration restrictions do not lead to better integration of migrants.

### Minimizing the impact on native workers
- Native workers tend to respond to immigration by upgrading and adjusting occupations (Peri and Sparber 2009; Cattaneo, Fiorio and Peri 2015).
- Policy options to assist natives:
  - Adjustment assistance (skill upgrading) and relocation assistance (changing occupations, cities, or sectors), including transitory welfare benefits or unemployment insurance—both require identification of impacted native populations (often difficult).
  - Promote efficient and flexible labor markets to reduce costs of changing jobs and enable occupational mobility.
  - Strong labor protection can impede occupational upgrading and reduce labor markets’ ability to absorb immigrants (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014).
  - For vulnerable native workers (e.g., low-educated manual workers), consider minimum income schemes (example: Denmark) or minimum wage, noting that more research is needed on implications.
- Immigration fees versus quotas:
  - Fees on employers hiring foreign workers could finance adjustment/relocation and make employers pay part of the hiring surplus. Examples in place: Singapore and Malaysia (no compelling efficiency assessment noted).
  - Immigration quotas determined bureaucratically can lead to misallocation, rent-seeking, and corruption, and do not generate revenue.
  - Visa fees or visa auction systems allow firms to choose workers while providing government revenue to alleviate transitional costs.

### Paying special attention to refugees
- Refugee flows can be sudden and large relative to host-country capacity, posing distinct challenges; reasons to admit refugees are primarily humanitarian.
- Policies to improve refugee economic outcomes:
  - Allow asylum seekers to work early in the asylum process.
  - Provide skills and language training before labor-market entry, given likely trauma and skill deterioration.
  - Encourage refugees to move to places with labor demand for their skills.
  - Introduce temporary wage subsidies to incentivize employers and improve integration.
- Crisis mitigation and burden-sharing:
  - Monitor unstable countries and offer orderly labor migration options before crises erupt.
  - Spread the burden of refugees across countries when migration crises occur.
  - World Bank (2018) suggests establishing active large-scale refugee settlement policies and coordinating financial assistance.

### IV. IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON ORIGIN COUNTRIES

#### A. Impact on the labor market in origin countries
- Emigration reduces labor supply but can also reduce demand, human capital, and entrepreneurship with ambiguous net effects on wages.
- In countries with chronic unemployment or underemployment, emigration can ease labor-market tensions and improve job availability, conditional on demand and human-capital effects not depressing local labor demand.
- Emigrants are usually positively selected in skills (Grogger and Hanson 2011), so emigration can cause:
  - Loss of productivity, innovation capacity, and fiscal balance deterioration.
- Empirical evidence:
  - Dustmann et al. (2015): large-scale emigration raised employment and wages in Poland after EU entry.
  - IMF (2016, SDN/16/07): emigration creates a negative externality by removing primarily high-skilled workers; IMF (2016) simulates that emigration may have reduced annual growth rates by 0.6– (text ends in source).

#### B. The role of remittances
- Global remittance facts:
  - World Bank estimates officially recorded remittances at $548 billion in 2019.
  - Remittances exceed official development assistance by more than three times and are comparable to total FDI flows.
  - Remittances are often in the range of 15-20 percent of GDP in many countries and can reach 30-40 percent of GDP in exceptional cases (examples: Tonga, Haiti, Kyrgyz Republic).
- Costs and channels:
  - Sending money across borders remains expensive, with fees often surpassing 5 percent.
  - Costs vary by corridor and provider; highest in small markets with little competition and through commercial banks.
  - Recent mobile technology advances likely to reduce remittance costs (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 2018; Schmitz and Endo 2011).
- Developmental roles of remittances:
  - Help reduce poverty and improve nutritional and educational outcomes in many Asian and African countries (Binci and Giannelli, 2018; Bargain and Boutin 2014).
  - Provide consumption smoothing through counter-cyclicality and by supporting financial inclusion and access to credit.
  - Act as insurance in natural disasters and individual shocks; evidence of remittances increasing or stabilizing after earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones, floods, droughts, and conflicts (multiple studies cited).
- Macroeconomic and distributional effects:
  - Abdih et al. (2012a): remittances improve fiscal balance by increasing aggregate private demand and expanding tax base (VAT and sales taxes).
  - Remittances often increase consumption rather than private investment; savings may take the form of assets (gold, real estate).
  - Abdih et al. (2012b): remittances can negatively affect governance by creating moral-hazard effects that reduce pressure for reforms and potentially erode fiscal and debt discipline.
  - Remittances can reduce labor-force participation rates, especially for women.
  - Distributional impacts depend on recipients: can lower inequality if recipients are disadvantaged and low-income, but empirical studies show mixed results across countries and migration stages.
- Empirical heterogeneity on inequality:
  - Studies report mixed findings: remittances increase inequality in Kosovo (Möllers and Meyer 2014); lower inequality in Pakistan and Mexico (Mughal and Anwar 2012; Koczan and Loyola 2018).
  - Differences may reflect “migration stage”: pioneer migrants often from wealthier households; later migrants increasingly from poorer households as networks expand, implying remittances may first increase then reduce inequality.

#### C. Impact through trade and investment
- Emigrant networks can facilitate trade and investment between destination and origin countries by reducing information frictions.
- Empirical findings:
  - Parsons and Vezina (2016): after lifting trade restrictions in 1994, US exports to Vietnam grew most in US states with larger Vietnamese populations (linked to earlier refugee inflows).
  - Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan (2016): using 130 years of migration data to the US, doubling the number of residents with ancestry from a foreign country relative to the mean increases the probability that at least one local firm directly invests in that country by four percentage points.
- Conditions amplifying impact:
  - Skill composition of migrants and emigrant cohesion/attitude.
  - Sound public policies, political stability, favorable business environment, and low corruption in the origin country.
- Emigrant investment can:
  - Diversify investor base in origin country.
  - Provide a reliable funding source.
  - Undertake riskier projects due to superior local knowledge and contacts.

#### D. Costs of emigration associated with the brain drain
- Brain drain defined as emigration of highly skilled and productive individuals; primary concern for origin countries.
- Data and magnitudes:
  - Share of highly skilled workers leaving can reach 40 percent in some small low-income countries (Artuç et al., 2015).
  - Highly educated individuals are two to three times more likely to migrate than less educated (Grogger and Hanson, 2011).
- Consequences:
  - Lowers human capital and creates shortages of high-skilled labor, reducing productivity.
  - Can raise wages due to labor shortages and rising reservation wages from remittance inflows.
  - Combined effects can significantly reduce potential growth.
  - IMF (2016) simulates that emigration may have reduced annual growth rates by 0.6– (source text ends here).

*Source: wpiea2021088-print-pdf - 0.6 percentage points on average, on a baseline crime rate of 1.1 percent in Italy.*

### 0.9 percentage points in some countries in South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Montenegro, and

### wpiea2021088-print-pdf - 0.9 percentage points in some countries in South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Montenegro, and

### Brain drain: fiscal, labor market, and institutional effects
- Brain drain can slow income convergence; example magnitude cited as 0.9 percentage points in some countries in South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Montenegro, and Romania) and the Baltics (Latvia and Lithuania).
- Fiscal composition effects:
  - Shifts tax revenue away from income taxes (which decline because of lower high skilled labor) toward consumption taxes (which increase because of remittances inflows).
  - Expenditure shifts often include lower spending on education (explained by lower demand with outflow of high skilled workers) and higher spending on social assistance programs.
  - Countervailing argument: Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2008) argue the possibility of migrating increases demands for schooling, generating in net higher skills.
- Empirical estimate:
  - IMF (2016) estimates that emigration during 1990–2012 has been linked to an average increase of overall government spending relative to GDP of 6.2 percentage points in Central European and South-Eastern European countries.
- Institutional effects:
  - Departing high skilled workers reduce a potential political force advocating improvements in business and investment climate and better control of corruption (Omar Mahmoud et al., 2013).
  - Risk that countries become passive recipients of remittances, with a large majority uninterested in changing the status quo.

### Country case: Kyrgyz Republic
- Migration and remittances:
  - Remittances increased from virtually zero in 2000 to 10 percent of GDP by 2005 and 30 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Remittances averaged almost 30 percent of GDP during the last decade.
- Impact findings (IMF 2016):
  - Little evidence of any positive impact of remittances on growth; remittances typically used for basic consumption and not investment.
  - Significant impact of remittances on real effective exchange rate appreciation, suggesting a possibility of Dutch disease-like effects.
- Poverty, inequality, and labor market:
  - During high emigration (beginning around 2000), extreme poverty was reduced, but overall poverty levels remain high compared to regional peers.
  - Inequality: Gini coefficient fell by about 10 points since 2006 (the period that coincided with high emigration).
  - Labor market: outflow of labor did not bring tangible benefits; unemployment remains high, especially among youth and women.
  - Education and literacy: the country lags behind neighbors in primary school enrolment and youth literacy levels.
- Policy emphasis from IMF (2016):
  - Improve the business environment, promote formal employment, and build human capital as key measures to reduce inequality.

### Country case: Mexico
- Remittance patterns:
  - Mexico is one of the world’s largest recipients of remittances.
  - Over time remittance-receiving households shifted from being typically in the middle of the income distribution to becoming increasingly pro-poor.
  - Remittance-receiving households are on average poorer than non-remittance-receiving households, even when taking remittances into account.
  - Remittances constitute a larger share of income for poorer households.
- Inequality effects:
  - The Gini coefficient of households’ “no-migration” counterfactual income is higher than that of actual income, implying inequality would be higher in the absence of remittances (based on 2002, 2008 and 2014 surveys; source: INEGI and Koczan and Loyola (2018)).
  - The behavioral response of remittance-receiving households yields a counterfactual inequality lower than that based on income excluding remittances.
  - The pro-poor pattern is especially pronounced in rural areas.
- Crisis dynamics:
  - During the peso crisis (1994) and the Global Financial Crisis (2008-09), likelihood of receiving remittances and remittance amounts as a share of income fell for top income deciles, consistent with falling investment motives.
  - For poorer households, the likelihood of receiving remittances and their amount as a share of income actually increased during the Global Financial Crisis.
  - Possible explanations include falling fixed costs of migration (making migration more accessible to poorer households) or migrants’ better integration in the United States (higher incomes, more stable jobs, regularized status), allowing them to better cushion the shock.

### Policies to maximize benefits and minimize costs of emigration
- Reduce high-skilled emigration by addressing root causes:
  - Create more and better employment opportunities to slow emigration, reverse some outflows, and attract immigrants from third countries.
  - Improve institutions, maintain macroeconomic and financial stability, support job creation, and improve education to strengthen the labor market.
- Replenish high-skilled workforce:
  - Encourage emigrants to return and facilitate high-skilled immigration from other countries.
  - Create a welcoming environment, ease (re)integration, remove labor market barriers by recognizing degrees from other countries.
- Better utilize remaining workforce:
  - Increase labor force participation and improve labor quality through education and on-the-job training.
- Maximize gains from remittances and mitigate risks:
  - Increase competition among remittance service providers, help migrants compare costs across providers, and facilitate mobile technologies to reduce transaction costs.
  - Improve investment opportunities, financial inclusion, and access to high-quality, productive jobs to reduce dependence risks.

### Conclusion: balancing challenges and opportunities
- Migration is driven by large wage and employment differentials and presents both challenges and opportunities for origin and destination countries.
- Destination countries: immigrants can stress local labor markets and public finances in the short run but also boost output, create opportunities, provide needed skills, stimulate trade, and contribute positively to long-term fiscal balances.
- Origin countries: emigration can cause loss of human capital and reduced competitiveness, but also generates remittances and international connections (trade, FDI, technological transfers).
- Policy prescription for origin countries:
  - Improve business and employment opportunities, take advantage of financial and technological inflows, and reduce loss of highly skilled labor.

*Source: wpiea2021088-print-pdf - 0.9 percentage points in some countries in South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Montenegro, and Romania) (IMF content provided).*

### Chapter 4: The Macroeconomic Effects of Global Migration. Washington DC, April.

### Chapter 4: The Macroeconomic Effects of Global Migration. Washington DC, April.

### Migration, income levels, and inequality
- Jaumotte, M.F., Koloskova, K., and Saxena, M.S.C., 2016. Impact of migration on income levels in advanced economies. International Monetary Fund.
- Koczan, Zsoka, and Franz Loyola. (2018). ‘How do migration and remittances affect inequality? A case study of Mexico’ IMF Working Paper, No. 18/136, 2018.
- Margolis, David, Luis Miotti, El Mouhoub Mouhoud, Joël Oudinet. (2013). ‘To Have and Have Not’: Migration, Remittances, Poverty, and Inequality in Algeria.’ IZA Discussion Paper 7747, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn.
- Möllers, Judith and Wiebke Meyer. (2014). ‘The Effects of Migration on Poverty and Inequality in Rural Kosovo.’ IZA Journal of Labor & Development 3 (16).
- Mughal, Mazhar, and Amar Iqbal Anwar. (2012). ‘Remittances, Inequality and Poverty in Pakistan: Macro and Microeconomic Evidence.’ CATT Working Paper 2, Centre d’Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques, Cedex.
- Stark, Oded, J. Edward Taylor, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. (1988). ‘Migration, Remittances and Inequality: A Sensitivity Analysis using the Extended Gini Index.’ Journal of Development Economics 28: 309–22.
- Taylor, J. Edward, Richard Adams, Jorge Mora, and Alejandro López-Feldman. (2009). ‘Remittances, Inequality and Poverty: Evidence from Rural Mexico.’

### Remittances, crises, and disaster responses
- Koczan, Zs. (2016). ‘Remittances during crises: Evidence from ex-Yugoslavia, Economics of Transition, 24(3), pp. 507–533.
- Mohapatra, S., Joseph, G. and Ratha, D. (2009). ‘Remittances and natural disasters: Ex-post response and contribution to ex-ante preparedness,’ Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 4972, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Schmitz, Kai and Isaku Endo (2011), “Lowering the cost of sending money home,” Finance and Development, June 2011.
- Suleri, A. Q. and Savage, K. (2006). ‘Remittances in crises: A case study from Pakistan,’ Humanitarian Policy Group Background Paper, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Weiss Fagen, P. and Bump, M. N. (2005). ‘Remittances in conflict and crises: How remittances sustain livelihoods in war, crises, and transitions to peace,’ International Peace Academy Policy Paper, Washington, DC: International Peace Academy. Georgetown University.
- Wu, T., 2006. ‘The role of remittances in crisis: An Aceh research study,’ Humanitarian Policy Group Background Paper, London: ODI.

### Labor market effects, legal status, and native wages
- Kossoudji, S.A. and Cobb-Clark, D.A., 2002. Coming out of the shadows: Learning about legal status and wages from the legalized population. Journal of Labor Economics, 20(3), pp.598-628.
- Kugler, A., and M. Yuksel, 2008. Effects of Low-Skilled Immigration on US Natives: Evidence from Hurricane Mitch. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3670, 2008.
- Lozano, F. and Sørensen, T.A., 2011. The Labor Market Value to Legal Status.
- Peri, G. and Sparber, C., 2009. Task specialization, immigration, and wages. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(3), pp.135-69.
- Peri, G. and Yasenov, V., 2017. The labor market effects of a refugee wave: Applying the synthetic control method to the Mariel Boatlift. NBER Working Paper No. 21801.
- Peri, G., 2012. The effect of immigration on productivity: Evidence from US states. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(1), pp.348-358.
- Peri, G., 2014. Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers?. IZA World of Labor.
- Peri, G., Rury, D., and Wiltshire, J., 2020. The Economic Impact of Migrants from Hurricane Maria.
- Ö rrenius, P., 2017. New Findings on the Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the United States.
- Özden, Ç., and Wagner, M., 2014. Immigrant versus natives? Displacement and job creation. The World Bank.

### Migration, networks, trade, investment, and firm dynamics
- Javorcik, B.S., Özden, Ç., Spatareanu, M. and Neagu, C., 2011. Migrant networks and foreign direct investment. Journal of development economics, 94(2), pp.231-241.
- McKenzie, D. and H. Rapoport 2007. ‘Network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico.’ Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), pp. 1-24.
- Parsons, C. and Vezina, P., 2016. Migrant Networks and Trade: The Vietnamese Boat People as a Natural Experiment” forthcoming. The Economic Journal.
- Olney, W.W., 2013. Immigration and firm expansion. Journal of regional science, 53(1), pp.142-157.
- Vandor, P. and Franke, N., 2016. Why are immigrants more entrepreneurial? Harvard Business Review, 27.

### Innovation, skills, and knowledge diffusion
- Kerr, W.R. and Lincoln, W.F., 2010. The supply side of innovation: H-1B visa reforms and US ethnic invention. Journal of Labor Economics, 28(3), pp.473-508.
- Omar Mahmoud, T., Rapoport, H., Steinmayr, A., and Trebesch, C., 2013. The effect of labor migration on the diffusion of democracy: evidence from the former Soviet Republic.

### Crime, enforcement, and social outcomes
- Mastrobuoni, G. and Pinotti, P., 2011. Migration restrictions and criminal behavior: Evidence from a natural experiment.
- Miles, T.J. and Cox, A.B., 2014. Does immigration enforcement reduce crime? Evidence from secure communities. The Journal of Law and Economics, 57(4), pp.937-973.
- Pinotti, P., 2017. Clicking on heaven’s door: The effect of immigrant legalization on crime. American Economic Review, 107(1), pp.138-68.

### Refugees, conflict, and regional economic impacts
- Maystadt, J.-F., and P. Verwimp, 2014. “Winners and losers among a refugee-hosting population.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 62:4 (2014): 769–809.
- Rother, M.B., Pierre, M.G., Lombardo, D., Herrala, R., Toffano, M.P., Roos, M.E., Auclair, M.A.G. and Manasseh, M.K., 2016. The economic impact of conflicts and the refugee crisis in the Middle East and North Africa. International Monetary Fund.

### Global assessments and development perspectives
- Milanovic, B., 2016. Global inequality: A new approach for the age of globalization. Harvard University Press.
- OECD- European Commission, 2018. Settling in 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration
- OECD, 2013. International Migration Outlook 2013. OECD Publishing
- World Bank, 2006. Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- World Bank, 2014. International Migration and Development in East Asia and the Pacific. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- World Bank, 2018. Moving for Prosperity Global Migration and Labor Markets. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- World Bank, 2019. Leveraging Economic Migration for Development. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

*Chapter 4: The Macroeconomic Effects of Global Migration. Washington DC, April. wpiea2021088-print-pdf*

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