## Appendix I: Data and Calibration of Parameters

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Appendix I: Data and Calibration of Parameters](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021278-print-pdf.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021278-print-pdf.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021278-print-pdf.pdf.json)

---

### I. Introduction — Scope and approach
- Focus: impact of the COVID pandemic on the corporate sector in India, with emphasis on contact-intensive services and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs).
- Analysis steps:
  - Examine evolution and current financial performance of the corporate sector using indicators of profitability, leverage, liquidity, and debt repayment capacity.
  - Single-year sensitivity analyses and stress tests under three scenarios where sectoral decline in corporate net sales is proportional to changes in GVA in FY2020/21 (baseline), 2020Q2 (severely adverse), and their average (moderately adverse).
  - Assess impact of increased stressed debts on aggregate balance sheets of banks and non-banks.
  - Forward-looking multi-year scenarios over a four-year period: one following July 2021 WEO projections and one with a more protracted recovery.
- Contribution: one of the first studies to examine COVID-related shocks on corporate resilience in India using a comprehensive firm-level database including MSMEs and to quantify role of announced policy measures (moratorium, credit guarantee schemes).

### II. Key single-year and multi-year findings (summary)
- Without policy support:
  - Share of corporate debt issued by firms with ICR < 1 (debt-at-risk) rises from 23 to over 36 percent under the baseline scenario and to about 50 percent under the severely adverse scenario.
  - Sectors most affected: construction, manufacturing, and contact-intensive services (trade, transport, hospitality).
  - MSME debt-at-risk increases more than for large firms under baseline and adverse scenarios.
- With 2020 policy support measures:
  - Debt-at-risk based on ICR in the baseline scenario falls to 26 percent from 36 percent (policy effect on liquidity).
  - Share of debt issued by firms with negative cashflow falls from around 35 percent to 8.6 percent.
  - Policy impact on solvency is less pronounced (reflecting policy focus on liquidity).
- Multi-year outlook:
  - Under baseline recovery path, corporate performance improves gradually with debt-at-risk returning close to pre-COVID levels by end-2023.
  - A slower recovery could produce persistently high debt-at-risk and prolonged scarring, especially in contact-intensive services, construction, and manufacturing.

### III. Data — Coverage and representativeness
- Primary data source: Prowess database from Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), covering over 20,000 listed and unlisted non-financial corporates on a standalone basis in India.
- Database features:
  - Firm characteristics (industry, ownership, year of establishment) and detailed financial performance and balance sheets.
  - Annual standalone financial database used for greater MSME coverage.
  - Roughly two-thirds of companies for 2007-2020 have sales of less than INR1 billion.
  - Manufacturing: around 40 percent of total assets and 32 percent of total debts in sample.
  - Trade, hotels, transport, and communication: around 20 percent of assets/debt.
  - Construction: around 10 percent of assets/debt.
  - Utilities sector: 24 percent of total debt and 15 percent of total assets in sample (reflecting high leverage).
- Sample trimming: firms making losses for the last three consecutive years including 2019 were removed; pre-shock data are end-March 2019 for most firms.

### IV. Stylized pre-COVID facts
- Profitability and leverage:
  - Median return on assets improved to 2.2 percent in 2019 from a trough of 0.9 percent in 2009.
  - Median debt-to-equity ratio declined from 1.1 percent in 2015 to 0.8 percent in 2019.
  - Improvement most notable in manufacturing and contact-intensive sectors; construction and utilities saw stagnant profitability and elevated leverage.
  - Micro firms (sales < INR50 million) had persistent low profitability and highest debt-at-risk.
- Interest coverage and debt-at-risk:
  - Median ICR recovered to 2.8 in 2019.
  - Debt-at-risk (ICR < 1) declined to 25 percent in 2019 from a peak of 36 percent in 2016 but remained above pre-GFC levels.
  - Share of debt of firms with ICR < 2 stood at around 60 percent versus around 40 percent prior to the GFC.
  - Debt-at-risk for micro firms around 80 percent (highest among firm-size groups).

### V. Single-year corporate stress tests — Scenarios
- Three single-year scenarios:
  - Baseline: calibrated to realized sectoral GVA outcomes in 2020.
  - Severely adverse: matches realization of sharp GDP contraction in 2020Q2 extrapolated to whole year.
  - Moderately adverse: simple average of baseline and severely adverse sector growth outcomes.
- Main shock channel: decline in net sales proportional to sectoral GVA changes; robustness checks performed with alternative GVA-to-sales linkages.

### VI. Methodology — Stress tests and pass/fail criteria
- Liquidity stress test 1 (ICR metric):
  - ICR = EBIT / interest expenses.
  - Post-shock ICR allows adjustment of material and wage costs via parameters y% and z%; sales shock captured by x%.
  - Without policy interventions, interest expense in t+1 equals interest expense in t.
  - Fail criterion: post-shock ICR < 1.
  - Aggregation metric: "debt at risk" = share of total corporate debt issued by firms with post-shock ICR < 1.
- Liquidity stress test 2 (cash flow-based metric):
  - End-of-period cash balance after shock accounts for retained earnings, principal debt payments, tax payments, and liquid current assets.
  - Retained earnings after shock = (post-shock EBIT − post-shock interest) * (1 − nse_mstn) if pre-tax earnings positive; otherwise no tax.
  - Fail criterion: end-period cash balance < 0.
  - Aggregation metric: share of corporate debt issued by firms with negative cash balance.
- Solvency stress test:
  - Post-shock equity = pre-shock equity + retained earnings after shock.
  - Fail criterion: post-shock equity < 0.
  - Aggregation metric: share of corporate debt issued by firms with negative equity.
- Parameter calibration and mapping to Prowess variables detailed in Appendix Tables 1–3 (as referenced).

### VII. Policy interventions modeled and implementation in tests
- Policy measures considered:
  - Broad-based monetary easing (115 basis points reduction in main policy rate over 2020).
  - Six-month moratorium on loan repayments (around 31 percent of corporate customers deferred payments as of end-August 2020 per RBI report).
  - Funding facilitation: TLTRO (on-tap up to INR1 trillion) and Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Schemes (ECLGS) 1.0 and 2.0 totaling INR3 trillion (MSMEs eligible for additional loans capped at 20 percent of total debt outstanding as of February 2020 with one-year moratorium on repayments).
- Incorporation into stress tests:
  - Interest expense after shock decomposed to account for reduction from lower interest rates (u%) and moratorium impact on interest payments (w%): equation (8).
  - Cash-flow test augmented to capture moratorium effect on principal payments (w%), debt rollover/additional credit through TLTRO (Λ_L% * short-term debt or for MSMEs Λ_MSME% * total debt), and share of long-term debt maturing in current period (s%): equation (9).
- Caveats:
  - Uniform policy impact across sectors assumed due to lack of granular uptake data.
  - Full benefit of moratorium assumed for firms (uptake detailed data unavailable).

### VIII. Single-period results — Stress outcomes and policy effects
- Without borrower relief and monetary easing:
  - ICR-based debt-at-risk could rise from 23 to over 34 percent under baseline and to about 52 percent under severely adverse.
  - Sharp increases in cash-flow-based debt-at-risk in absence of policy support (Appendix Figure 1).
  - MSMEs and smaller firms see larger increases in debt-at-risk compared with large firms.
  - Results robust to alternative GVA-sales specifications (Appendix Figure 2).
- With policy measures:
  - Baseline ICR-based debt-at-risk falls to 24 percent from 34 percent (source also reports a policy comparison of 26 percent from 36 percent in earlier summary).
  - Share of debt with negative cashflows falls from around 35 percent to 8.6 percent.
  - Severely adverse ICR-based debt-at-risk declines from 52 percent to 43 percent with policies; cash-flow-based debt-at-risk declines from 39 percent to 12 percent.
  - Loan moratorium and credit guarantee schemes found to be most effective for liquidity support.
- Solvency impact of policies:
  - Less pronounced effect on solvency than on liquidity.
  - Share of debt-at-risk (equity < 0) declines from 9 percent to 6 percent under baseline and from 18 percent to 15 percent under severely adverse when policies applied.

### IX. Financial sector impact — Approach, calibration, and single-period results
- Objective: map increased corporate credit risk into effects on scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) and NBFCs using aggregate RBI balance sheets as of end-March 2020.
- Balance sheet inputs:
  - Share of corporate loan book in total loan advances.
  - Total risk-weighted assets (RWA), capital adequacy ratio (CAR), and total equity capital.
  - Gross non-performing assets (NPAs) and total provisions.
- Pre-COVID financial sector position and corporate exposure:
  - Public sector banks had a relatively high gross NPL ratio of around 10 percent (March 2020).
  - Capital adequacy ratios (as of end-March 2020):
    - Public sector banks: around 13 percent.
    - Banking sector as a whole: around 15 percent.
    - NBFCs: 19 percent.
  - Share of corporate loans in total loan books:
    - Public sector banks: around 60 percent.
    - Private banks: around 60 percent.
    - Foreign banks: 87 percent.
    - NBFCs: 69 percent.
- Mapping methodology:
  - Compute debt-at-risk: share of debt of firms with an ICR below one (failed ICR stress tests).
  - Translate change in distressed debt into an increase in corporate NPAs using historical relationship between debt-at-risk and NPA.
  - Historical correlation implies about 40 percent of the increase in debt-at-risk could potentially translate into NPAs.
  - Hurdle rate (regulatory minimum) used: nine percent capital ratio. Breaches occur if capital ratio falls below nine percent.
- Single-period results: impact on bank and NBFC balance sheets (no policy support)
  - System-wide starting capital adequacy ratios (pre-shock):
    - Banks: 14.7 percent.
    - NBFCs: 19.1 percent.
  - Without policy support, banks’ capital adequacy ratios would decline to:
    - Baseline scenario: 12.3 percent.
    - Moderately adverse scenario: 10.3 percent.
    - Severely adverse scenario: 8.4 percent.
  - Without policy support, NBFCs’ capital adequacy ratios would decline to:
    - Baseline scenario: 17.6 percent.
    - Moderately adverse scenario: 16.6 percent.
    - Severely adverse scenario: 15.3 percent.
  - NBFCs’ better outcomes largely driven by stronger starting capital position.
- Single-period results: impact with policy support
  - With policy measures (moratorium, interest reduction, other supports):
    - Banking sector capital ratio outcomes:
      - Baseline scenario: decline to 14.5 percent.
      - Most adverse scenario: decline to 10.3 percent.
    - NBFC sector:
      - Most adverse scenario: capital adequacy declines to 16.4 percent.
  - System-wide conclusion:
    - With policy support, system-wide CAR for the banking sector remains above the regulatory requirement in both the baseline and the most adverse scenario (per the analysis).
- Bank-type heterogeneity (with policy support)
  - Under the most adverse scenario and with policy support:
    - Public sector banks (PSBs) would not meet the regulatory minimum.
    - PSBs’ capital adequacy ratio would decline from 12.9 percent to 7.5 percent.
  - Weaker PSB performance partly driven by weaker starting positions relative to private and foreign banks.
- Caveats:
  - Analysis uses publicly available data; lacks confidential supervisory information on sectoral and firm-size exposures and concentration.
  - Limited public data on lenders’ exposures by firm size or concentration to large borrowers; NBFC exposures to severely hit industries or smaller firms could be understated.
  - Focus is on ICR-based stress tests; ICR preferred for estimating historical relationship with NPA ratios.
  - Alternative mappings between increases in debt-at-risk and NPAs are considered as robustness checks.

### X. Multi-year corporate stress tests (2020–2023): scenarios and results
- Multi-year scenarios by sector:
  - Baseline: follows the 2021 July World Economic Outlook projections.
  - Adverse: more protracted recovery with persistent low growth driven by future pandemic waves and slow recovery in services and industrial sectors.
- Aggregate GDP growth paths:
  - 2021 rebound:
    - Baseline: around 9.5 percent.
    - Adverse: 7.5 percent.
  - Subsequent years:
    - Growth is around 1 and 0.5 percentage points lower in 2022 and 2023, respectively, under the adverse scenario compared with baseline.
- Multi-year methodology highlights:
  - Apply ICR and equity stress tests annually using sectoral GDP growth as cumulative sales shocks.
  - Assume temporary policy measures (loan moratorium, interest rate reduction) are reflected in 2020 for both scenarios with gradual tapering thereafter.
  - Policy measures easing funding (TLTRO, credit guarantee schemes for MSMEs) assumed withdrawn after first year; loan moratorium expires; interest rates normalize gradually.
  - For 2021–2023, compute end-of-year ICR and equity using prior-year values for key variables; assume borrower-support policies have expired and are not re-introduced.
- Multi-year results: corporate liquidity and solvency
  - ICR-based corporate liquidity (share of total corporate debt outstanding with ICR<1):
    - Pre-COVID: 22.7 percent.
    - Baseline scenario:
      - Year 2 (peak deterioration): about 33.7 percent.
      - End of 2023: 26.7 percent.
    - Adverse scenario:
      - End of 2023: around 30.3 percent (persistent high debt-at-risk).
    - Most affected sectors: contact-intensive services, construction, manufacturing.
  - Equity stress test outcomes:
    - Share of total corporate debt outstanding with ICR<1 rises in both baseline and adverse by end of four-year horizon.
    - Impact on equity is persistent; policy measures provide muted mitigation on firm equity.
    - Under the adverse scenario, the debt-at-risk would rise to about 14.8 percent by the end of the four years (equity-focused metric reported in the analysis).

### XI. Conclusions and policy implications
- Key findings:
  - Differential sectoral impact: most severe on contact-intensive services, construction, manufacturing, and MSMEs.
  - Temporary policy measures were particularly effective in supporting firm liquidity; less pronounced impact on solvency.
  - Public sector banks are more vulnerable to corporate stress due to weaker starting positions.
  - The ultimate impact depends crucially on the speed of economic recovery; persistent low growth could exacerbate scarring, especially in services and industrial sectors.
- Corporate-sector policy recommendations:
  - Continue targeted support to viable corporate sectors, given heightened uncertainty.
  - Consider additional targeted relief for the most vulnerable sectors.
  - Supervisors should apply enhanced monitoring and collect more granular data across a broad range of corporate performance indicators to ensure lenders apply appropriate viability assessments.
  - Facilitate exit of non-viable firms: develop contingency plans for potential increases in insolvency cases and pursue reforms to reduce costs and time of exit.
  - Consider hybrid restructuring schemes and a simpler out-of-court restructuring process for MSMEs to facilitate timely resolution.
  - Address structural gaps in MSME access to finance in the medium term to minimize scarring and enable robust recovery.
- Financial-sector policy recommendations:
  - Encourage banks to build capital buffers and to recognize problem loans to avoid loan evergreening.
  - Ensure loans benefiting from COVID-related restructuring schemes are closely monitored and properly provisioned.
  - Ensure adequate capitalization in the financial system, particularly in public sector banks, to handle a potential rise in corporate insolvencies.

*Source — wpiea2021278-print-pdf (Appendix I: Data and Calibration of Parameters).*

### Appendix I: Data and Calibration of Parameters .................................................................... 25

### Appendix I: Data and Calibration of Parameters

### Major components listed in the unit
- "Appendix I: Data and Calibration of Parameters .................................................................... 25"

### Related appendix referenced
- "Appendix II: Additional Results and Robustness Checks ...................................................... 28"

*Source: wpiea2021278-print-pdf - Appendix I: Data and Calibration of Parameters .................................................................... 25*

### References .............................................................................................................

### wpiea2021278-print-pdf - References .............................................................................................................

### I. Introduction — Scope and approach
- Focus: impact of the COVID pandemic on the corporate sector in India, with emphasis on contact-intensive services and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs).
- Analysis steps:
  - Examine evolution and current financial performance of the corporate sector using indicators of profitability, leverage, liquidity, and debt repayment capacity.
  - Single-year sensitivity analyses and stress tests under three scenarios where sectoral decline in corporate net sales is proportional to changes in GVA in FY2020/21 (baseline), 2020Q2 (severely adverse), and their average (moderately adverse).
  - Assess impact of increased stressed debts on aggregate balance sheets of banks and non-banks.
  - Forward-looking multi-year scenarios over a four-year period: one following July 2021 WEO projections and one with a more protracted recovery.
- Contribution: one of the first studies to examine COVID-related shocks on corporate resilience in India using a comprehensive firm-level database including MSMEs and to quantify role of announced policy measures (moratorium, credit guarantee schemes).

### Key single-year and multi-year findings (summary)
- Without policy support:
  - Share of corporate debt issued by firms with ICR < 1 (debt-at-risk) rises from 23 to over 36 percent under the baseline scenario and to about 50 percent under the severely adverse scenario.
  - Sectors most affected: construction, manufacturing, and contact-intensive services (trade, transport, hospitality).
  - MSME debt-at-risk increases more than for large firms under baseline and adverse scenarios.
- With 2020 policy support measures:
  - Debt-at-risk based on ICR in the baseline scenario falls to 26 percent from 36 percent (policy effect on liquidity).
  - Share of debt issued by firms with negative cashflow falls from around 35 percent to 8.6 percent.
  - Policy impact on solvency is less pronounced (reflecting policy focus on liquidity).
- Multi-year outlook:
  - Under baseline recovery path, corporate performance improves gradually with debt-at-risk returning close to pre-COVID levels by end-2023.
  - A slower recovery could produce persistently high debt-at-risk and prolonged scarring, especially in contact-intensive services, construction, and manufacturing.

### II. Data — Coverage and representativeness
- Primary data source: Prowess database from Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), covering over 20,000 listed and unlisted non-financial corporates on a standalone basis in India.
- Database features:
  - Firm characteristics (industry, ownership, year of establishment) and detailed financial performance and balance sheets.
  - Annual standalone financial database used for greater MSME coverage.
  - Roughly two-thirds of companies for 2007-2020 have sales of less than INR1 billion.
  - Manufacturing: around 40 percent of total assets and 32 percent of total debts in sample.
  - Trade, hotels, transport, and communication: around 20 percent of assets/debt.
  - Construction: around 10 percent of assets/debt.
  - Utilities sector: 24 percent of total debt and 15 percent of total assets in sample (reflecting high leverage).
- Sample trimming: firms making losses for the last three consecutive years including 2019 were removed; pre-shock data are end-March 2019 for most firms.

### Stylized pre-COVID facts
- Profitability and leverage:
  - Median return on assets improved to 2.2 percent in 2019 from a trough of 0.9 percent in 2009.
  - Median debt-to-equity ratio declined from 1.1 percent in 2015 to 0.8 percent in 2019.
  - Improvement most notable in manufacturing and contact-intensive sectors; construction and utilities saw stagnant profitability and elevated leverage.
  - Micro firms (sales < INR50 million) had persistent low profitability and highest debt-at-risk.
- Interest coverage and debt-at-risk:
  - Median ICR recovered to 2.8 in 2019.
  - Debt-at-risk (ICR < 1) declined to 25 percent in 2019 from a peak of 36 percent in 2016 but remained above pre-GFC levels.
  - Share of debt of firms with ICR < 2 stood at around 60 percent versus around 40 percent prior to the GFC.
  - Debt-at-risk for micro firms around 80 percent (highest among firm-size groups).

### III. Single-year corporate stress tests — Scenarios
- Three single-year scenarios:
  - Baseline: calibrated to realized sectoral GVA outcomes in 2020.
  - Severely adverse: matches realization of sharp GDP contraction in 2020Q2 extrapolated to whole year.
  - Moderately adverse: simple average of baseline and severely adverse sector growth outcomes.
- Main shock channel: decline in net sales proportional to sectoral GVA changes; robustness checks performed with alternative GVA-to-sales linkages.

### III. Methodology — Stress tests and pass/fail criteria
- Liquidity stress test 1 (ICR metric):
  - ICR = EBIT / interest expenses.
  - Post-shock ICR allows adjustment of material and wage costs via parameters y% and z%; sales shock captured by x%.
  - Without policy interventions, interest expense in t+1 equals interest expense in t.
  - Fail criterion: post-shock ICR < 1.
  - Aggregation metric: "debt at risk" = share of total corporate debt issued by firms with post-shock ICR < 1.
- Liquidity stress test 2 (cash flow-based metric):
  - End-of-period cash balance after shock accounts for retained earnings, principal debt payments, tax payments, and liquid current assets.
  - Retained earnings after shock = (post-shock EBIT − post-shock interest) * (1 − nse_mstn) if pre-tax earnings positive; otherwise no tax.
  - Fail criterion: end-period cash balance < 0.
  - Aggregation metric: share of corporate debt issued by firms with negative cash balance.
- Solvency stress test:
  - Post-shock equity = pre-shock equity + retained earnings after shock.
  - Fail criterion: post-shock equity < 0.
  - Aggregation metric: share of corporate debt issued by firms with negative equity.
- Parameter calibration and mapping to Prowess variables detailed in Appendix Tables 1–3 (as referenced).

### Policy interventions modeled and implementation in tests
- Policy measures considered:
  - Broad-based monetary easing (115 basis points reduction in main policy rate over 2020).
  - Six-month moratorium on loan repayments (around 31 percent of corporate customers deferred payments as of end-August 2020 per RBI report).
  - Funding facilitation: TLTRO (on-tap up to INR1 trillion) and Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Schemes (ECLGS) 1.0 and 2.0 totaling INR3 trillion (MSMEs eligible for additional loans capped at 20 percent of total debt outstanding as of February 2020 with one-year moratorium on repayments).
- Incorporation into stress tests:
  - Interest expense after shock decomposed to account for reduction from lower interest rates (u%) and moratorium impact on interest payments (w%): equation (8).
  - Cash-flow test augmented to capture moratorium effect on principal payments (w%), debt rollover/additional credit through TLTRO (Λ_L% * short-term debt or for MSMEs Λ_MSME% * total debt), and share of long-term debt maturing in current period (s%): equation (9).
- Caveats:
  - Uniform policy impact across sectors assumed due to lack of granular uptake data.
  - Full benefit of moratorium assumed for firms (uptake detailed data unavailable).

### III.C Results — Single-period stress outcomes and policy effects
- Without borrower relief and monetary easing:
  - ICR-based debt-at-risk could rise from 23 to over 34 percent under baseline and to about 52 percent under severely adverse.
  - Sharp increases in cash-flow-based debt-at-risk in absence of policy support (Appendix Figure 1).
  - MSMEs and smaller firms see larger increases in debt-at-risk compared with large firms.
  - Results robust to alternative GVA-sales specifications (Appendix Figure 2).
- With policy measures:
  - Baseline ICR-based debt-at-risk falls to 24 percent from 34 percent (noting other text cites 26 percent from 36 percent in earlier summary; both policy comparisons are reported in the source text).
  - Share of debt with negative cashflows falls from around 35 percent to 8.6 percent.
  - Severely adverse ICR-based debt-at-risk declines from 52 percent to 43 percent with policies; cash-flow-based debt-at-risk declines from 39 percent to 12 percent.
  - Loan moratorium and credit guarantee schemes found to be most effective for liquidity support.
- Solvency impact of policies:
  - Less pronounced effect on solvency than on liquidity.
  - Share of debt-at-risk (equity < 0) declines from 9 percent to 6 percent under baseline and from 18 percent to 15 percent under severely adverse when policies applied.

### IV. Financial sector impact — Approach and data
- Objective: map increased corporate credit risk into effects on scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) and NBFCs using aggregate RBI balance sheets as of end-March 2020.
- Balance sheet inputs:
  - Share of corporate loan book in total loan advances.
  - Total risk-weighted assets (RWA), capital adequacy ratio (CAR), and total equity capital.
  - Gross non-performing assets (NPAs) and total provisions.
- Disaggregation: impact assessed by bank type—public sector banks (PSBs), private banks, and foreign banks.
- Preview of findings (as reported earlier in the paper):
  - Corporate stress could have sizable impacts on balance sheets of banks and NBFCs, particularly PSBs due to weaker starting capital positions.
  - Policy support measures played an important mitigating role.

*Source: wpiea2021278-print-pdf - References .............................................................................................................*

### 2020. Prior to the pandemic, public sector banks tended to have weaker asset quality

### wpiea2021278-print-pdf - 2020. Prior to the pandemic, public sector banks tended to have weaker asset quality

### Pre-COVID financial sector position and corporate exposure
- Public sector banks had a relatively high gross NPL ratio of around 10 percent (March 2020).
- Capital adequacy ratios (as of end-March 2020):
  - Public sector banks: around 13 percent.
  - Banking sector as a whole: around 15 percent.
  - NBFCs: 19 percent.
- Share of corporate loans in total loan books:
  - Public sector banks: around 60 percent.
  - Private banks: around 60 percent.
  - Foreign banks: 87 percent.
  - NBFCs: 69 percent.

### Methodology for mapping corporate stress to financial sector stress
- Main steps:
  - Compute debt-at-risk: share of debt of firms with an ICR below one (failed ICR stress tests).
  - Compare after-shock debt-at-risk with pre-shock debt-at-risk.
  - Translate change in distressed debt into an increase in corporate NPAs using historical relationship between debt-at-risk and NPA.
- Key calibration:
  - Historical correlation implies about 40 percent of the increase in debt-at-risk could potentially translate into NPAs.
  - Hurdle rate (regulatory minimum) used: nine percent capital ratio. Breaches occur if capital ratio falls below nine percent.
- Caveats:
  - Analysis uses publicly available data; lacks confidential supervisory information on sectoral and firm-size exposures and concentration.
  - Limited public data on lenders’ exposures by firm size or concentration to large borrowers; NBFC exposures to severely hit industries or smaller firms could be understated.
  - Focus is on ICR-based stress tests; ICR preferred for estimating historical relationship with NPA ratios.
  - Alternative mappings between increases in debt-at-risk and NPAs are considered as robustness checks.

### Single-period results: impact on bank and NBFC balance sheets (no policy support)
- System-wide starting capital adequacy ratios (pre-shock):
  - Banks: 14.7 percent.
  - NBFCs: 19.1 percent.
- Without policy support, banks’ capital adequacy ratios would decline to:
  - Baseline scenario: 12.3 percent.
  - Moderately adverse scenario: 10.3 percent.
  - Severely adverse scenario: 8.4 percent.
- Without policy support, NBFCs’ capital adequacy ratios would decline to:
  - Baseline scenario: 17.6 percent.
  - Moderately adverse scenario: 16.6 percent.
  - Severely adverse scenario: 15.3 percent.
- Relative performance drivers:
  - NBFCs’ better outcomes largely driven by stronger starting capital position.
  - Due to data limitations, sectoral exposure differences by lender type may not be fully captured.

### Single-period results: impact with policy support
- With policy measures (moratorium, interest reduction, other supports):
  - Banking sector capital ratio outcomes:
    - Baseline scenario: decline to 14.5 percent.
    - Most adverse scenario: decline to 10.3 percent (stated as above the regulatory minimum).
  - NBFC sector:
    - Most adverse scenario: capital adequacy declines to 16.4 percent.
- System-wide conclusion:
  - With policy support, system-wide CAR for the banking sector remains above the regulatory requirement in both the baseline and the most adverse scenario (per the analysis).

### Bank-type heterogeneity (with policy support)
- Under the most adverse scenario and with policy support:
  - Public sector banks (PSBs) would not meet the regulatory minimum.
  - PSBs’ capital adequacy ratio would decline from 12.9 percent to 7.5 percent.
- Weaker PSB performance partly driven by weaker starting positions relative to private and foreign banks.

### Multi-year corporate stress tests (2020–2023): scenarios
- Two multi-year scenarios by sector:
  - Baseline: follows the 2021 July World Economic Outlook projections.
  - Adverse: more protracted recovery with persistent low growth driven by future pandemic waves and slow recovery in services and industrial sectors.
- Aggregate GDP growth paths:
  - 2021 rebound:
    - Baseline: around 9.5 percent.
    - Adverse: 7.5 percent.
  - Subsequent years:
    - Growth is around 1 and 0.5 percentage points lower in 2022 and 2023, respectively, under the adverse scenario compared with baseline.

### Multi-year methodology highlights
- Apply ICR and equity stress tests annually using sectoral GDP growth as cumulative sales shocks.
- Assume temporary policy measures (loan moratorium, interest rate reduction) are reflected in 2020 for both scenarios with gradual tapering thereafter.
- Policy measures easing funding (TLTRO, credit guarantee schemes for MSMEs) assumed withdrawn after first year; loan moratorium expires; interest rates normalize gradually.
- For 2021–2023, compute end-of-year ICR and equity using prior-year values for key variables; assume borrower-support policies have expired and are not re-introduced.

### Multi-year results: corporate liquidity and solvency
- ICR-based corporate liquidity (share of total corporate debt outstanding with ICR<1):
  - Pre-COVID: 22.7 percent.
  - Baseline scenario:
    - Year 2 (peak deterioration): about 33.7 percent.
    - End of 2023: 26.7 percent.
  - Adverse scenario:
    - End of 2023: around 30.3 percent (persistent high debt-at-risk).
  - Most affected sectors: contact-intensive services, construction, manufacturing.
- Equity stress test outcomes:
  - Share of total corporate debt outstanding with ICR<1 rises in both baseline and adverse by end of four-year horizon.
  - Impact on equity is persistent; policy measures provide muted mitigation on firm equity.
  - Under the adverse scenario, the debt-at-risk would rise to about 14.8 percent by the end of the four years (equity-focused metric reported in the analysis).

### Conclusions and policy implications
- Key findings:
  - Differential sectoral impact: most severe on contact-intensive services, construction, manufacturing, and MSMEs.
  - Temporary policy measures were particularly effective in supporting firm liquidity; less pronounced impact on solvency.
  - Public sector banks are more vulnerable to corporate stress due to weaker starting positions.
  - The ultimate impact depends crucially on the speed of economic recovery; persistent low growth could exacerbate scarring, especially in services and industrial sectors.
- Corporate-sector policy recommendations:
  - Continue targeted support to viable corporate sectors, given heightened uncertainty.
  - Consider additional targeted relief for the most vulnerable sectors.
  - Supervisors should apply enhanced monitoring and collect more granular data across a broad range of corporate performance indicators to ensure lenders apply appropriate viability assessments.
  - Facilitate exit of non-viable firms: develop contingency plans for potential increases in insolvency cases and pursue reforms to reduce costs and time of exit.
  - Consider hybrid restructuring schemes and a simpler out-of-court restructuring process for MSMEs to facilitate timely resolution.
  - Address structural gaps in MSME access to finance in the medium term to minimize scarring and enable robust recovery.
- Financial-sector policy recommendations:
  - Encourage banks to build capital buffers and to recognize problem loans to avoid loan evergreening.
  - Ensure loans benefiting from COVID-related restructuring schemes are closely monitored and properly provisioned.
  - Ensure adequate capitalization in the financial system, particularly in public sector banks, to handle a potential rise in corporate insolvencies.

*Italic: Source — wpiea2021278-print-pdf (2020) — IMF working paper content provided in the input.*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2021/english/wpiea2021278-print-pdf.pdf_
