## Monetary Policy Frameworks: An Index and New Evidence (IAPOC) — wpiea2022022-print-pdf

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Monetary Policy Frameworks: An Index and New Evidence (IAPOC) — wpiea2022022-print-pdf](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022022-print-pdf.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022022-print-pdf.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022022-print-pdf.pdf.json)

---

### I. Introduction and purpose
- A monetary policy framework (MPF) comprises legal basis, design, implementation, and communication practices that enable and guide the conduct of monetary policy.
- Distinction:
  - A monetary policy regime is a specific configuration of select MPF elements (e.g., an inflation-targeting regime).
  - The MPF is broader and includes legal foundations, design, implementation, and communication elements.
- Two main roles of a well-established MPF:
  - Provides clarity and a frame of reference to guide sound and consistent policymaking and safeguard policy continuity.
  - Helps the public form expectations, reducing uncertainty and improving the effectiveness of monetary policy.
- The paper constructs a metric and index providing a multidimensional characterization of MPFs across countries and over time.

### II. The IAPOC metric: structure, axioms, and data
- Pillars (IAPOC):
  - (i) Independence and Accountability (foundations of monetary policy)
  - (ii) Policy and Operational Strategy (guides adjustments to policy stance and instruments)
  - (iii) Communications (conveys decisions about policy stance and rationale to the public)
- Metric design and data:
  - A granular set of 225 criteria was created to cover all pillars and their interactions.
  - Public information was collected manually from central banks’ laws and websites.
  - Resulting IAPOC index is provided for a heterogeneous group of 50 countries from 2007 to 2018.
- Three axioms underpinning the metric:
  - Transparency: availability and clarity of information necessary for the public to understand the MPF and associated policy actions.
  - Coherence: extent to which the MPF embodies logical and unequivocally desirable features (e.g., forward-looking strategy, timely communications).
  - Consistency: whether Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars are in accord (i.e., central banks do “what they say they do”).
- Standalone scores:
  - IAPOC-transparency, IAPOC-coherence, and IAPOC-consistency are computed alongside pillar scores.

### III. Scope, applicability, and limitations
- Applicability:
  - Designed to be broadly applicable across countries regardless of income level, development stage, and monetary policy or exchange rate regime.
  - Exclusions: individual countries in a monetary union; countries with a hard peg; countries with no separate legal tender.
- Suitability:
  - Especially suited to Emerging Market economies (EMs) and Low-Income Developing Countries (LIDCs); may underrepresent the most sophisticated, country-specific MPF details of Advanced Economies (AEs).
- Limitations:
  - Reliance on online and public resources and interpretative reading may introduce noise and some subjectivity, particularly where translations are required.

### IV. Pillars and sub-pillars (definitions and structure)
- Independence and Accountability — five sub-pillars:
  - 1. Delegation and Designation of Responsibility
  - 2. Mandated Goals and Numerical Targets
  - 3. Integrity of the Monetary Policymaking Body
  - 4. Financial Arrangements
  - 5. Reporting and Oversight
- Policy and Operational Strategy — five sub-pillars:
  - 1. Objectives
  - 2. Numerical Targets
  - 3. Tools
  - 4. Policy Formulation
  - 5. Policy Implementation
- Communications — five sub-pillars:
  - 1. Communication Cycle
  - 2. Announcing and Explaining the Policy Stance
  - 3. Monetary Policy Report
  - 4. Publication of Data
  - 5. Stakeholder Inclusion
- Terminology clarifications preserved:
  - “Mandate”, “Objectives”, “Numerical targets”, “Tools”, “Instruments” (definitions as in source).

### V. Construction and aggregation methodology
- Criteria and scoring:
  - Total criteria = 225.
  - Each criterion assessed per country-year against pre-defined mutually exclusive option sets; option values range between zero and one, uniformly spread.
  - Many criteria are binary (Yes—1; No—0); conditional scoring applies for indented/multilevel items.
- Sources for assessments:
  - Central bank laws and other applicable laws (e.g., Constitution) for de jure assessments.
  - Central bank websites, annual reports, policy strategy and operations documentation, press releases, decision announcements, and monetary policy/inflation reports for de facto and communications assessments.
- Aggregation rules:
  - Sub-pillar score = unweighted average of criteria in that sub-pillar.
  - Pillar score = unweighted average of its five sub-pillars.
  - IAPOC index = unweighted average of the three pillars.
- Frequency and coverage:
  - Annual, end-of-period measure (with two exceptions assessed intra-year: monetary policy communication vehicles and communication of changes in MPFs).
  - Historical assessments use archived central bank websites.

### VI. Sample and summary statistics (exact figures)
- Sample and timing:
  - IAPOC constructed for 50 countries across 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, and 2018.
  - Country composition: 13 Advanced economies (AEs), 26 Emerging market economies (EMs), 11 Low-income developing countries (LIDCs).
  - Total country-year observations: 234 (panel is unbalanced).
- IAPOC Index (a)
  - Mean 0.59; Range [0.20,0.82]; Standard deviation overall 0.15; Between 0.13; Within 0.07.
  - AEs: Mean 0.71; Range [0.51,0.82]; Std. dev. 0.07; Between 0.05; Within 0.05.
  - EMs: Mean 0.57; Range [0.20,0.80]; Std. dev. 0.15; Between 0.13; Within 0.08.
  - LIDCs: Mean 0.48; Range [0.22,0.69]; Std. dev. 0.10; Between 0.06; Within 0.08.
- Independence and Accountability (b)
  - Mean 0.52; Range [0.24,0.75]; Std. dev. overall 0.10; Between 0.09; Within 0.05.
  - AEs: Mean 0.56; Range [0.36,0.70]; Std. dev. 0.09; Between 0.09; Within 0.04.
  - EMs: Mean 0.52; Range [0.24,0.75]; Std. dev. 0.11; Between 0.10; Within 0.06.
  - LIDCs: Mean 0.47; Range [0.30,0.60]; Std. dev. 0.08; Between 0.08; Within 0.03.
- Policy and Operational Strategy (c)
  - Mean 0.66; Range [0.07,0.96]; Std. dev. overall 0.23; Between 0.19; Within 0.12.
  - AEs: Mean 0.84; Range [0.55,0.96]; Std. dev. 0.10; Between 0.08; Within 0.06.
  - EMs: Mean 0.62; Range [0.07,0.94]; Std. dev. 0.23; Between 0.19; Within 0.13.
  - LIDCs: Mean 0.50; Range [0.15,0.84]; Std. dev. 0.17; Between 0.11; Within 0.13.
- Communications (d)
  - Mean 0.60; Range [0.08,0.91]; Std. dev. overall 0.17; Between 0.15; Within 0.09.
  - AEs: Mean 0.74; Range [0.52,0.91]; Std. dev. 0.09; Between 0.07; Within 0.06.
  - EMs: Mean 0.58; Range [0.24,0.82]; Std. dev. 0.16; Between 0.13; Within 0.09.
  - LIDCs: Mean 0.45; Range [0.08,0.68]; Std. dev. 0.15; Between 0.09; Within 0.12.

### VII. Key empirical and comparative findings (empirics preserved)
- Cross-country and temporal patterns:
  - Across EMs and LIDCs, the IAPOC index captures significant variation driven mostly by Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars.
  - From 2007 to 2018, MPFs strongly evolved and generally improved in EMs and LIDCs in Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications; AEs improved too, particularly Communications, but by a smaller magnitude from a higher starting point.
  - Gaps narrowed over time but EMs and LIDCs still lag AEs across all three pillars.
- Independence and Accountability — de jure versus de facto:
  - IAPOC provides joint account of de jure and de facto scores for this pillar.
  - In EMs and especially in LIDCs, de jure arrangements are assessed as stronger than de facto implementation; the reverse holds for AEs.
  - Over time, de facto Independence and Accountability in LIDCs has moved closer to the de jure counterpart; the gap narrowed in EMs as well.
  - Improvements in Independence and Accountability stem predominantly from de facto changes rather than de jure changes.
- Drivers of variation and persistent challenges:
  - Most cross-country and temporal variation is attributable to Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications; Independence and Accountability shows much less variation.
  - EMs and LIDCs face difficulty mapping policy objectives into stable numerical targets; frequent revisions occur in the absence of comprehensive reviews.
  - Consistency challenges: tools used in practice sometimes do not match ex-ante policy formulations; explanations of how multiple tools are jointly balanced are often lacking.
- Communications advances and remaining gaps:
  - Strong progress across Communication Cycle, Announcing and Explaining the Policy Stance, Monetary Policy Report, Publication of Data, and Stakeholder Inclusion since 2007—especially for LIDCs that previously lacked basic elements.
  - Remaining deficiencies:
    - Decision announcements and monetary policy reports often lack a forward-looking view.
    - Some LIDCs struggle to establish a regular communication cycle and to ensure consistency between ex-ante objectives/numerical targets and ex-post announcements.
    - Publication of key data for policymaking (inflation, inflation expectations, forecasts) is incomplete in many EMs and LIDCs.
    - Need for more inclusive and simpler public communication.
- Comparisons with existing indices and regime classifications:
  - Correlation with Cukierman et al. legal CB independence index (Garriga (2016)):
    - Correlations in Levels (All (131)): IAPOC Independence and Accountability 0.43***; IAPOC De Jure 0.52***; IAPOC De Facto 0.21***.
    - Correlations in First Differences (All (84)): IAPOC Independence and Accountability 0.66***; IAPOC De Jure 0.85***; IAPOC De Facto 0.11***.
    - Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
  - Comparison with Dincer et al. (2019) transparency index:
    - High and significant correlations in levels:
      - All (177): IAPOC Index correlation 0.81***; IAPOC-Transparency correlation 0.75*** with Dincer et al.
    - Correlations in first differences much lower:
      - All (129): Changes in the IAPOC index 0.23***; Changes in IAPOC-Transparency 0.18*** with Dincer et al.
    - Dincer et al. index shows no change in 60 percent of country-year observations between 2007-2015 compared to 3 percent and 23 percent for IAPOC and IAPOC-transparency indices respectively.
  - Regime classifications are less informative than IAPOC for capturing heterogeneity and dynamism:
    - Around half of sampled countries in 2018 adopted multiple objectives and employed multiple tools (8 AEs, 8 EMs, 8 LIDCs).
    - Variation within the same regime can be large (differences up to about 0.36 for inflation-targeting regimes in 2018).
    - Inflation-targeting countries on average have higher IAPOC scores: 0.7 versus 0.5 for other regimes in 2018.
    - Between 2007 and 2018, only 18 countries underwent IMF AREAER monetary policy regime changes (13 percent of country-year observations), while the IAPOC index detected changes in 97 percent of country-year observations.

### VIII. Selected criteria examples (exact scoring structure preserved)
- Numerical targets (sample items and options preserved):
  - Independence and Accountability — 2.2. By law, is it stated that there is a numerical monetary policy target?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - Policy and Operational Strategy — 2.1. Is it stated what the numerical targets are?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - Policy Formulation — 4.2. Is it stated which objectives and numerical targets guide policy formulation?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
- Announcing and Explaining the Policy Stance (communication scoring examples):
  - Is there a statement of policy decisions? Yes—1; No—0.
  - Is there a statement explaining policy decisions? Yes—1; No—0.
  - Are the objectives and numerical targets in this explanation consistent with Policy and Operational Strategy? Yes—1; No—0.
  - Is there a discussion of the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target? Yes—1; No—0.
  - Is there a discussion of the risks to the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target? Yes—1; No—0.

### IX. Conclusions, contributions, and suggested future research
- Conclusions:
  - The IAPOC metric provides a multidimensional characterization of MPFs across Independence and Accountability, Policy and Operational Strategy, and Communications, employing axioms of transparency, coherence, and consistency.
  - Rapid improvements occurred in LIDCs and continued change in EMs largely driven by Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars.
  - Independence and Accountability is more persistent due to slow-moving de jure arrangements, though de facto practices have strengthened.
  - EMs and LIDCs lag AEs on average, especially on coherence and consistency between stated policy frameworks and actual practice.
- Contributions relative to existing measures:
  - Joint assessment of Independence and Accountability with de jure and de facto elements.
  - Explicit inclusion of coherence and consistency alongside transparency.
  - A finer, dynamic alternative to regime classifications for describing monetary policymaking.
- Caveats:
  - Reliance on online and public resources and interpretative reading may introduce noise and some subjectivity, particularly where translations are required.
- Future research directions:
  - Use IAPOC to examine whether exchange rate flexibility interacts with MPF soundness to affect monetary policy outcomes.
  - Explore interactions among pillars (e.g., whether greater independence and accountability lead to better communications).
  - Use IAPOC as a measure of MPF soundness to study monetary policy credibility.

*Source: wpiea2022022-print-pdf - Monetary Policy Frameworks: An Index and New Evidence Working Paper No. WP/22/22*

### References .............................................................................................................

### wpiea2022022-print-pdf - References .............................................................................................................

### I. Introduction and purpose
- A monetary policy framework (MPF) comprises legal basis, design, implementation, and communication practices that enable and guide the conduct of monetary policy.
- Distinction: a monetary policy regime is a specific configuration of select MPF elements (e.g., an inflation-targeting regime), while the MPF is broader and includes legal foundations, design, implementation, and communication elements.
- Two main roles of a well-established MPF:
  - Provides clarity and a frame of reference to guide sound and consistent policymaking and safeguard policy continuity.
  - Helps the public form expectations, reducing uncertainty and improving the effectiveness of monetary policy.
- The paper constructs a metric and index providing a multidimensional characterization of MPFs across countries and over time.

### The IAPOC metric: structure and data
- The MPF is conceptualized as three—IAPOC—pillars:
  - (i) Independence and Accountability (foundations of monetary policy)
  - (ii) Policy and Operational Strategy (guides adjustments to policy stance and instruments)
  - (iii) Communications (conveys decisions about policy stance and rationale to the public)
- Metric design:
  - A granular set of 225 criteria was created to cover all pillars and their interactions.
  - Public information was collected manually from central banks’ laws and websites.
  - Resulting IAPOC index is provided for a heterogeneous group of 50 countries from 2007 to 2018.
- Axiomatic approach focuses on three axioms:
  - Transparency: availability and clarity of information necessary for the public to understand the MPF and associated policy actions.
  - Coherence: extent to which the MPF embodies logical and unequivocally desirable features (e.g., forward-looking strategy, timely communications).
  - Consistency: whether Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars are in accord.
- Standalone scores computed for each axiom: IAPOC-transparency, IAPOC-coherence, and IAPOC-consistency.

### Scope, applicability, and limitations
- The IAPOC index is designed to be broadly applicable across countries regardless of income level, development stage, and monetary policy or exchange rate regime.
- Applicability excludes:
  - Individual countries in a monetary union
  - Countries with a hard peg
  - Countries with no separate legal tender
- The metric may underrepresent the most sophisticated, country-specific MPF details that are more relevant for advanced economies (AEs); it is especially suited to emerging market economies (EMs) and low-income developing countries (LIDCs).
- The IAPOC index is the first comprehensive measure to characterize all three pillars of MPFs across countries and over time.

### Key empirical and comparative findings
- Across EMs and LIDCs, the IAPOC index captures significant variation in monetary policymaking driven mostly by Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars.
- The index documents evolution of MPFs over time and identifies remaining gaps across pillars and sub-pillars, particularly in EMs and LIDCs where approaches are more eclectic and fast-changing than in AEs.
- The IAPOC index provides a joint account of Independence and Accountability, quantifying both de facto and de jure scores for this pillar.
  - In EMs and especially in LIDCs, de jure arrangements are assessed as stronger than de facto implementation; the reverse holds for AEs.
  - Over time, de facto Independence and Accountability in LIDCs has moved closer to the de jure counterpart; the gap narrowed in EMs as well.
- Progress across axioms:
  - EMs and LIDCs have made progress across transparency, coherence, and consistency over the past decade.
  - EMs and LIDCs still lag sizably behind AEs in coherence and consistency.
- Observations on practice versus ex-ante exposition:
  - In many LIDCs, monetary aggregates retain a central role despite its decline elsewhere.
  - LIDCs often employ multiple tools toward multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives, including on the exchange rate.
  - In some EMs, tools used in practice do not match the ex-ante exposition in the Policy and Operational Strategy; when they do match, explanations of how tools are jointly balanced are often lacking.
  - These gaps underscore the importance of assessing coherence and consistency in addition to transparency.

### Relation to existing literature and classifications
- The IAPOC metric complements literature on central bank transparency by incorporating coherence and consistency as additional axioms.
- It extends de jure central bank independence indices (e.g., Cukierman et al., 1992) by systematically accounting for de facto implementation.
- By focusing on MPFs instead of regime classifications (e.g., AREAER, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), the index provides comparability across countries operating various types of regimes or that do not fit into any regime.
- Regime classifications may be less informative for monetary policymaking in EMs and LIDCs because substantial variation in MPFs exists even among countries with the same regime type.
  - According to AREAER (2020) cited in the source, 11 percent of the EMs and 16 percent of LIDCs in the sample are classified under “other monetary policy regime”.

### Definition and scope of pillars (preview)
- MPF pillars and core elements:
  - Independence and Accountability covers mandate, goals, de jure and de facto operational independence, and public accountability.
  - Policy and Operational Strategy includes objectives, numerical targets, tools, policy formulation, and policy implementation.
  - Communications covers the communication cycle, announcing and explaining the policy stance, monetary policy reports, publication of data, and stakeholder inclusion.
- Clarifying terminology:
  - “Mandate”: legislated order to formulate and implement monetary policy toward certain goals.
  - “Objectives”: practical interpretation of mandated goals (what policy aims to achieve).
  - “Numerical targets”: operationalization of objectives through targets, typically with a medium-term horizon (e.g., the inflation target).
  - “Tools”: monetary policy operating targets adjusted to attain objectives (e.g., policy interest rate, asset purchases).
  - “Instruments”: monetary policy operations and facilities used to implement changes in tools (e.g., open market operations).

### Independence and Accountability (introductory remarks)
- Focus on operational independence: independence to formulate, decide on, and implement monetary policy without unwarranted external influence from branches of government or the financial sector.
- Accountability is a critical complement to independence to ensure appropriate control and good governance.
- The paper distills the Independence and Accountability pillar into five sub-pillars (enumeration of the five sub-pillars follows in the source).

*Source: wpiea2022022-print-pdf - References .............................................................................................................*

### 1. Delegation and  Designation  of  Responsibility covering  the  central  bank’s  statutory

### 1. Delegation and Designation of Responsibility covering the central bank’s statutory monetary policy mandate and the body(ies) responsible for monetary policy within the central bank (such as the Board or a designated Monetary Policy Committee).

### Independence and Accountability — Pillar components and focus
- Five sub-pillars assessed:
  - 1. Delegation and Designation of Responsibility covering the central bank’s statutory monetary policy mandate and the body(ies) responsible for monetary policy within the central bank (such as the Board or a designated Monetary Policy Committee).
  - 2. Mandated Goals and Numerical Targets covering the goals assigned to monetary policy in the mandate and the existence and governance of any associated numerical targets.
  - 3. Integrity of the Monetary Policymaking Body covering the integrity of the members of the monetary policymaking body, such as their terms of office, external affiliations, grounds and means for dismissal, and turnover rates.
  - 4. Financial Arrangements covering governance aspects of the central bank’s financial setup, such as lending to the government, profit distribution, and recapitalization arrangements.
  - 5. Reporting and Oversight covering the presence of accountability mechanisms, such as testimony to the legislature; and broad oversight, including auditing by an independent external body and periodic external reviews.
- Note: Even with de jure and de facto Independence and Accountability arrangements in place, undesirable interference in monetary policymaking may still occur; this motivates assessing how policy is actually conducted, not only legal design.

### Cross-reference to other pillars
- The Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars capture how the framework operates in practice and are focal to addressing de facto conduct.

---

### B. II. Policy and Operational Strategy

### Purpose and rationale
- This pillar guides:
  - monetary policy formulation — adjusting the tools based on objectives and associated numerical targets;
  - monetary policy implementation — adjusting instruments in line with the policy stance.
- Benefits of a well-articulated strategy:
  - facilitates sensible and consistent policy formulation and communication (Blinder et al., 2001);
  - supports predictability and understanding of monetary policy;
  - operational strategy aligns market conditions with the announced policy stance, fosters market development and functioning, and limits implementation discretion (Bindseil, 2014; 2016).

### Literature and EM/LIDC considerations
- Draws on literature including Adrian et al. (2018), Al-Mashat et al. (2018), Bernanke (2017), Levin (2014), Mishkin (2007; 2011; 2017), Svensson (2018), and Bindseil (2014; 2016).
- Complements with EM and LIDC perspectives where capacity constraints and less developed markets are prominent.

### Five sub-pillars of Policy and Operational Strategy
- 1. Objectives covering the practical interpretation of the mandated goals (and if there are multiple objectives, the potential interactions between them).
- 2. Numerical Targets covering the definition of numerical targets (including an inflation target), how they map into the objectives, the time horizon over which they are to be met, the conditions for their revisions and any actual revisions.
  - Footnote: Having an inflation target does not necessarily imply adopting an inflation-targeting regime.
- 3. Tools covering the tools used to set the policy stance and how they are defined, the relationship of these tools with the objectives and numerical targets (and if there are multiple tools, the potential interactions between them).
- 4. Policy Formulation covering the stages of the decision-making process, such as inputs from a quantitative framework and staff analyses, how objectives and numerical targets guide policy formulation (and if there are multiple objectives and numerical targets, how they are balanced), and the extent to which policy formulation is forward-looking.
- 5. Policy Implementation covering the monetary policy instruments, including their mapping to individual outcomes, details of the instruments that foster a predictable and stable interbank market (e.g., standing facilities), and the joint functioning of the instruments.

---

### B. III. Communications

### Role and rationale
- Communications convey decisions about the MPF and the policy stance and the underlying rationale to the public.
- Communication enhances policy effectiveness by:
  - reducing economic and financial uncertainty;
  - shaping and anchoring market expectations;
  - potentially serving as an additional policy lever (Bernanke, 2004; Blinder, 1999; 2018; Blinder et al., 2008; Woodford, 2005; Mishkin, 2017).
- Joint design of communications and policy/operational strategies is emphasized: strategy anchors communications, communications enhance understanding and credibility of the strategy (Levin, 2014; Archer and Levin, 2018).
- How and when to communicate matters; a clear, regular, and timely communication cycle aids public understanding (IMF, 2015).

### Five sub-pillars of Communications
- 1. Communication Cycle covering both the standard communication cycle, including the vehicles used and the frequency and regularity of communications; and the ad-hoc communication of major changes to the MPF (such as changes in objectives, numerical targets, or tools), their justification and, if temporary, the conditions that warrant the exit.
- 2. Announcing and Explaining the Policy Stance covering communication of monetary policy decisions about the policy stance that seek to announce and explain these decisions to the public, such as policy statements and press conferences.
- 3. Monetary Policy Report covering communication through a comprehensive, dedicated report (often called the Inflation Report) that further explains monetary policy decisions and their rationale.
- 4. Publication of Data covering the publication of relevant data—i.e., data related to the objectives, numerical targets, and tools, including forecasts.
- 5. Stakeholder Inclusion covering the extent to which communications are made accessible to various stakeholders, including through the language(s) in which information is provided, the technicality of language used, and whether research articles are disseminated.

---

### III. THE IAPOC METRIC FOR ASSESSING MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORKS

### Construction and scope
- The IAPOC metric formulates criteria corresponding to all sub-pillars of the three pillars (Independence and Accountability; Policy and Operational Strategy; Communications).
- Total number of criteria: 225 in total, presented in Appendix A.
- The IAPOC index is constructed by assessing countries’ central bank laws and websites against these criteria.
- Applicability:
  - All countries are subject to the same criteria, irrespective of level of development or income.
  - Criteria are applied to countries with some scope for monetary policy; no further distinction is made based on monetary policy or exchange rate regime.
- Axiomatic approach focuses on transparency, coherence, and consistency of MPFs.

### Three axioms underpinning the IAPOC metric
- (i) Transparency
  - Provision of information necessary for the public to understand the MPF and associated policy actions (Blinder et al., 2001).
- (ii) Coherence
  - Extent to which the MPF encapsulates logical features that are unequivocally desirable (e.g., timely and regular communications) or reflects strong consensus (e.g., price stability as a primary objective with an associated (medium-term) numerical inflation target and forward-looking policymaking).
- (iii) Consistency
  - Requires that the (ex-ante) Policy and Operational Strategy and (ex-post) Communications pillars are in accord in terms of monetary policy objectives, numerical targets, and tools.
  - Operationalizes whether central banks do “what they say they do” by taking objectives and numerical targets from Policy and Operational Strategy and tools from Communications.

### Applicability to diverse frameworks
- IAPOC accommodates multiple numerical targets, multiple objectives, and non-standard regimes (e.g., temporary price-level targeting) provided transparency, consistency, and coherence axioms are satisfied.
- Exception noted:
  - The IMF’s AREAER database is used as a supplementary source for detecting presence of an exchange rate-related tool. Unless a country is classified as free-floating or floating, it is deduced that an exchange rate tool is used and hence is required to be featured throughout both Communications and Policy and Operational Strategy.

---

### Example: Criteria Related to the Numerical Targets (selected table content and scoring)
- Independence and Accountability — 2. Mandated Goals and Numerical Targets
  - 2.2. By law, is it stated that there is a numerical monetary policy target?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 2.2.1. By law, is it stated which body is responsible for setting the numerical monetary policy target(s)?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 2.2.1.1. By law, who sets the numerical monetary policy target(s)?  CH
    - Central bank and government jointly—1
    - Central bank or government alone—0.5
    - An individual—0
  - 2.2.2. By law, is it stated how frequently the target(s) may be revised?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 2.2.2.1. By law, how frequently may the target(s) be revised?  CH
    - Fixed, low frequency (≥ 5 years)—1
    - More often—0

- Policy and Operational Strategy — 2. Numerical Targets
  - 2.1. Is it stated what the numerical targets are?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 2.1.1. Does this include an inflation target?  CH
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 2.1.1.1. Is it stated which indices/data series define these targets?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No— 0
  - 2.1.1.2. Is it stated over which time horizon these targets should be met?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 2.1.1.2.1. Is the time horizon for the inflation target the medium-term?  CH
    - Yes— 1
    - No—0
  - 2.1.1.3. Is it stated under which conditions these targets may be revised?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 2.1.1.3.1. Under which conditions may these targets be revised?  CH
    - Through a comprehensive review at a fixed, low frequency (≥ 5 years)—1
    - Other—0
  - 2.1.1.4. Have any of these targets been revised?  CH
    - No; or through a comprehensive review—1
    - Not through a comprehensive review—0
  - 2.1.1.5. Is it explained how the objectives map into these targets?  CH
    - Yes—1
    - No—0

- Policy Formulation — 4. Policy Formulation
  - 4.2. Is it stated which objectives and numerical targets guide policy formulation?  T
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 4.2.1. Does policy formulation center around the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  CH
    - Yes—1
    - No—0
  - 4.2.2. If there are multiple objectives and numerical targets guiding policy formulation, is it explained how these, including an inflation target, are balanced?  CH
    - Yes—1
    - No—0

Source: IAPOC metric exposition and criteria as presented in the supplied content.

### 2. Announcing and Explaining the Policy Stance

### 2. Announcing and Explaining the Policy Stance

### Criteria and assessment structure for policy announcements
- Binary scoring for key communication criteria:
  - Is there a statement of policy decisions? Yes—1; No—0.
  - Is there a statement explaining policy decisions? Yes—1; No—0.
  - Are the objectives and numerical targets in this explanation consistent with Policy and Operational Strategy? Yes—1; No—0.
  - Is there a discussion of the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target? Yes—1; No—0.
  - Is there a discussion of the risks to the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target? Yes—1; No—0.
- T, CH, and CS label whether a criterion relates to the transparency, coherence, and consistency axiom respectively.
- De facto counterparts of de jure criteria (Independence and Accountability) and some numerical-target criteria are noted but not repeated in this table.

### Constructing the IAPOC index (methodology highlights)
- Each criterion has a pre-defined mutually exclusive option set; option values range between zero and one, uniformly spread.
- Many criteria are binary (yes/no) due to granularity.
- Indented/multilevel criteria may be scored or set to zero contingent on the base criterion’s answer (conditional scoring).
- Information sources used for assessments:
  - Central bank laws (and other applicable laws such as the Constitution) for de jure assessments.
  - Central bank websites, annual reports, policy strategy and operations documentation, press releases, decision announcements, and monetary policy/inflation reports for de facto and communication assessments.
- Aggregation rules:
  - Each criterion receives a value for each country-year.
  - Sub-pillar score = unweighted average of criteria in that sub-pillar.
  - Pillar score = unweighted average of its five sub-pillars.
  - IAPOC index = unweighted average of the three pillars.
- Index frequency and coverage:
  - Annual, end-of-period measure of MPFs (with two exceptions assessed intra-year: monetary policy communication vehicles and communication of changes in MPFs).
  - Historical assessments use archived central bank websites.

### Sample and coverage
- IAPOC constructed for 50 countries across 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, and 2018.
  - 13 Advanced economies (AEs), 26 Emerging market economies (EMs), 11 Low-income developing countries (LIDCs).
- Data is annual with a total of 234 country-year observations; the panel is unbalanced.
- Missing observations reflect archived website availability constraints for specific countries and years.

### Summary statistics (IAPOC and pillars)
- (a) IAPOC Index: Mean 0.59; Range [0.20,0.82]; Standard deviation overall 0.15; Between 0.13; Within 0.07.
  - AEs: Mean 0.71; Range [0.51,0.82]; Std. dev. 0.07; Between 0.05; Within 0.05.
  - EMs: Mean 0.57; Range [0.20,0.80]; Std. dev. 0.15; Between 0.13; Within 0.08.
  - LIDCs: Mean 0.48; Range [0.22,0.69]; Std. dev. 0.10; Between 0.06; Within 0.08.
- (b) Independence and Accountability: Mean 0.52; Range [0.24,0.75]; Std. dev. overall 0.10; Between 0.09; Within 0.05.
  - AEs: Mean 0.56; Range [0.36,0.70]; Std. dev. 0.09; Between 0.09; Within 0.04.
  - EMs: Mean 0.52; Range [0.24,0.75]; Std. dev. 0.11; Between 0.10; Within 0.06.
  - LIDCs: Mean 0.47; Range [0.30,0.60]; Std. dev. 0.08; Between 0.08; Within 0.03.
- (c) Policy and Operational Strategy: Mean 0.66; Range [0.07,0.96]; Std. dev. overall 0.23; Between 0.19; Within 0.12.
  - AEs: Mean 0.84; Range [0.55,0.96]; Std. dev. 0.10; Between 0.08; Within 0.06.
  - EMs: Mean 0.62; Range [0.07,0.94]; Std. dev. 0.23; Between 0.19; Within 0.13.
  - LIDCs: Mean 0.50; Range [0.15,0.84]; Std. dev. 0.17; Between 0.11; Within 0.13.
- (d) Communications: Mean 0.60; Range [0.08,0.91]; Std. dev. overall 0.17; Between 0.15; Within 0.09.
  - AEs: Mean 0.74; Range [0.52,0.91]; Std. dev. 0.09; Between 0.07; Within 0.06.
  - EMs: Mean 0.58; Range [0.24,0.82]; Std. dev. 0.16; Between 0.13; Within 0.09.
  - LIDCs: Mean 0.45; Range [0.08,0.68]; Std. dev. 0.15; Between 0.09; Within 0.12.

### Key findings on cross-country patterns and evolution
- Overall dynamics:
  - From 2007 to 2018, MPFs strongly evolved and generally improved in EMs and LIDCs in the Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars; AEs improved too, particularly Communications, but by a smaller magnitude from a higher starting point.
  - Gaps narrowed over time but EMs and LIDCs still lag behind AEs across all three pillars.
- Drivers of variation:
  - Most cross-country and temporal variation is attributable to Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars.
  - Independence and Accountability shows much less variation across countries and over time.
- Specific challenges for EMs and LIDCs:
  - Difficulty mapping policy objectives into stable numerical targets; frequent revisions in the absence of comprehensive reviews.
  - Issues with consistency between ex-ante declared tools and the tools used in practice; lack of explanation about interactions and tradeoffs among multiple tools (Tools and Policy Formulation) and joint functioning with associated instruments (Policy Implementation).
- Communications progress and remaining gaps:
  - Strong progress across Communication Cycle, Announcing and Explaining the Policy Stance, Monetary Policy Report, Publication of Data, and Stakeholder Inclusion since 2007—especially for LIDCs that previously lacked basic elements such as policy announcements or a monetary policy report.
  - Remaining deficiencies:
    - Decision announcements and monetary policy reports often lack a forward-looking view.
    - Some LIDCs struggle to establish a regular communication cycle and to ensure consistency between ex-ante objectives/numerical targets and ex-post announcements.
    - Publication of key data for policymaking (inflation, inflation expectations, forecasts) is incomplete in many EMs and LIDCs.
    - Need for more inclusive and simpler public communication.

### Independence and Accountability: de jure versus de facto
- Observed improvements in Independence and Accountability stem predominantly from de facto changes rather than de jure (legal) changes.
  - De jure aspects improved only slightly over time; de facto practices advanced more rapidly.
  - Examples: One-third of countries identify the decision-making body responsible for monetary policy in practice despite lack of explicit legal basis; less than half legally require publication of monetary policy decisions, yet most publish them in practice.
- Implication: Incorporating de facto elements is essential to capture up-to-date Independence and Accountability for monetary policy.
- Correlations with existing de jure index:
  - IAPOC Independence and Accountability index correlates positively and significantly with the weighted Cukierman et al. legal CB independence index (Garriga (2016)), but correlations are limited to around 0.5, reflecting greater granularity of IAPOC.
- Correlation table summaries (levels and first differences):
  - (a) Correlations in Levels (All (131)): IAPOC Independence and Accountability 0.43***; IAPOC De Jure 0.52***; IAPOC De Facto 0.21*** with Cukierman et al. Central Bank Independence Index.
  - (b) Correlations in First Differences (All (84)): IAPOC Independence and Accountability 0.66***; IAPOC De Jure 0.85***; IAPOC De Facto 0.11*** with Cukierman et al. Central Bank Independence Index.
  - Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

### IAPOC versus transparency indices and regime classifications
- Comparison with Dincer et al. (2019) monetary policy transparency index:
  - High and significant correlations in levels:
    - All (177): IAPOC Index correlation 0.81***; IAPOC-Transparency correlation 0.75*** with Dincer et al. Transparency Index.
  - Correlations in first differences are much lower:
    - All (129): Changes in the IAPOC index 0.23***; Changes in IAPOC-Transparency 0.18*** with Dincer et al. Transparency Index.
  - Dincer et al. index shows no change in 60 percent of country-year observations between 2007-2015 compared to 3 percent and 23 percent for IAPOC and IAPOC-transparency indices respectively—highlighting greater dynamism captured by IAPOC.
- Multiple objectives and tools:
  - Around half of sampled countries in 2018 adopted multiple objectives and employed multiple tools (8 AEs, 8 EMs, 8 LIDCs).
  - In AEs, transparency, coherence and consistency scores are almost identical for countries with a single tool/objective versus multiple tools/objectives.
  - In EMs and LIDCs, ensuring consistency across multiple objectives and tools remains a challenge; tools used in practice sometimes do not match ex-ante policy formulations, and joint balancing is often unexplained.
- Regime classifications (monetary policy and exchange rate regimes) vs IAPOC:
  - Regime classifications group countries into broad categories and do not capture heterogeneity or dynamism of MPFs.
  - Within the same regime (e.g., inflation-targeting or money-targeting) variation in IAPOC scores can be large (differences up to about 0.36 for inflation-targeting regimes in 2018).
  - Inflation-targeting countries on average have higher IAPOC scores: 0.7 versus 0.5 for other regimes in 2018.
  - Between 2007 and 2018, only 18 countries underwent IMF AREAER monetary policy regime changes (13 percent of country-year observations), while the IAPOC index detected changes in 97 percent of country-year observations.
  - Exchange rate flexibility does not mechanically determine higher IAPOC scores:
    - In AEs, distributions of IAPOC scores for less flexible versus more flexible exchange rate groups are almost identical.
    - In EMs, more flexible exchange rates on average associate with higher scores, but ranges overlap.

### Conclusions and implications
- The IAPOC metric provides a multidimensional characterization of MPFs across Independence and Accountability, Policy and Operational Strategy, and Communications, employing axioms of transparency, coherence, and consistency.
- The index for 50 countries (2007–2018) shows:
  - Rapid improvements in LIDCs and continued change in EMs largely driven by Policy and Operational Strategy and Communications pillars.
  - Independence and Accountability is more persistent due to slow-moving de jure arrangements, though de facto practices have strengthened.
  - EMs and LIDCs lag AEs on average, especially on coherence and consistency between stated policy frameworks and actual practice.
- Contributions relative to existing measures:
  - Advances joint assessment of Independence and Accountability with de jure and de facto elements.
  - Complements transparency indices by explicitly including coherence and consistency.
  - Provides a finer, dynamic alternative to regime classifications for describing monetary policymaking.
- Caveats:
  - Reliance on online and public resources and interpretative reading may introduce noise and some subjectivity, particularly where translations are required.
- Future research directions suggested:
  - Use IAPOC to examine whether exchange rate flexibility interacts with MPF soundness to affect monetary policy outcomes.
  - Explore interactions among pillars (e.g., whether greater independence and accountability lead to better communications).
  - Use IAPOC as a measure of MPF soundness to study monetary policy credibility.

*Source: wpiea2022022-print-pdf - 2. Announcing and Explaining the Policy Stance*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### Major cited works on central banking, monetary policy, and frameworks
- Adrian, T., D. Laxton, and M. Obstfeld, (eds.), 2018. “Advancing the Frontiers of Monetary Policy,” Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- Adrian, T., C. J. Erceg, J. Linde, P. Zabczyk, and J. Zhou, 2020. “A Quantitative Model for the Integrated Policy Framework.” IMF Working Papers.
- Adam, C., A. Berg, R. Portillo, and F. Unsal, 2018. “Monetary Policy and Central Banking in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Research Handbook on Central Banking. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Alesina, A. and L.H. Summers, 1993. “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 25 (2), pp. 151-162.
- Alesina, A., and A. Stella, 2010. “The Politics of Monetary Policy,” in B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 3(18), pp. 1001-1054.
- Al-Mashat, R., A. Bulíř, N.N. Dinçer, T. Hlédik, T. Holub, A. Kostanyan, D. Laxton, A. Nurbekyan, and H. Wang, 2018. “An Index for Transparency for Inflation-Targeting Central Banks: Application to the Czech National Bank,” IMF Working Paper.
- Alpanda, S. and A. Honig, 2010. “Political Monetary Cycles and a De Facto Ranking of Central Bank Independence,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 29 (6), pp. 1003-1023.
- Apel, M. and M. Blix Grimaldi, 2012. “The Information Content of Central Bank Minutes”, Working Paper Series 261, Sveriges Riksbank.
- Archer, D. and A.T. Levin, 2018. “Robust Design Principles for Monetary Policy Committees,” RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: J. Simon and M. Sutton (ed.), Central Bank Frameworks: Evolution or Revolution? Reserve Bank of Australia.
- Bade, R. and M. Parkin, 1980. “Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy,” University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Balls, E., J. Howat, and A. Stansbury, 2018. “Central Bank Independence Revisited: After the Financial Crisis, What Should a Model Central Bank Look Like?” M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 87.
- Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 2009. “Issues in the Governance of Central Banks,” A report from the Central Bank Governance Group, Basel.
- Barro, R.J. and D.B. Gordon, 1983a. “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, pp. 589-610.
- Barro, R.J. and D.B. Gordon, 1983b. “Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 12, pp. 101-121.
- Basu, S., E. Boz, G. Gopinath, F. Roch, and F. Unsal, 2020. “A Conceptual Model for the Integrated Policy Framework,” IMF Working Paper.
- Batini, N. and D. Laxton, 2007. “Under What Conditions can Inflation Targeting be Adopted? The Experience of Emerging Markets,” Series on Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies, No. 11.
- Benchimol, J., S. Kazinnik, and Y. Saadon, 2020. “Communication and Transparency through Central Bank Texts” Paper presented at the 132nd Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, January 3-5, 2020, San Diego, CA, United States.
- Benes, J., A. Berg, R. Portillo, and D. Vavra, 2015. “Modeling Sterilized Interventions and Balance Sheet Effects of Monetary Policy in a New-Keynesian Framework,” Open Economies Review, 26, pp. 81-108.
- Berg, A. and R. Portillo, (eds.) 2018. Monetary Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, Oxford University Press.
- Berg, A., S.A. O’Connell, C. Pattillo, R.A. Portillo, and D.F. Unsal, 2014. “Monetary Policy Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa,” In: Monga, C. and J.Y. Lin. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 2: Policies and Practices.
- Bernanke, B.S., 2004. “Central Bank Talk and Monetary Policy,” speech prepared for the Japan Society, New York, New York, October 7.
- Bernanke, B.S., 2017. “Monetary Policy in a New Era,” paper prepared for the conference on Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy, Peterson Institute, Washington D.C., October 12-13, 2017.
- Binder, C. C., 2021. “Political Pressure on Central Banks,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pp. 715-744.
- Bindseil, U., 2014. “Monetary Policy Operations and the Financial System,” Oxford Scholarship Online.
- Bindseil, U., 2016. “Evaluating Monetary Policy Operational Frameworks,” paper presented at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
- Blinder, A.S., C. Goodhart, P. Hildebrand, C. Wyplosz, and D. Lipton, 2001. “How Do Central Banks Talk?,” Geneva Reports on the World Economy 3, London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Blinder, A.S., 1999. Central Banking in Theory and Practice. MIT Press.
- Blinder, A.S., 2018. “Through a Crystal Ball Darkly: The Future of Monetary Policy Communication,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 108, pp. 567-71.
- Blinder, A.S., M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzscher, J. De Haan, and D.J. Jansen, 2008. “Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 46 (4), pp. 910-945.
- Borio, C., 2019. “Monetary Policy Frameworks in EMEs: Practice Ahead of Theory”, the BIS Annual General Meeting, Basel, 30 June 2019.
- Calvo, G.A. and C.M. Reinhart, 2002. “Fear of Floating,” The Quarterly journal of economics, Vol. 117(2), pp. 379-408.
- Cavallino, P., 2019. “Capital Flows and Foreign Exchange Intervention,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 11 (2), 127-170.
- Cobham, D., 2021. “A Comprehensive Classification of Monetary Policy Frameworks in Advanced and Emerging Economies,” Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 73, Issue 1, January 2021, pp. 2–26.
- Crowe, C. and E.E. Meade, 2008. “Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 24(4), pp.763-777.
- Cukierman, A., 1992. “Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence,” MIT Press.
- Cukierman, A., S. Webb, and B. Neyapti, 1992. “Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and its Effect on Policy Outcomes,” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 6(3), pp. 353-398.
- Debelle, G. and S. Fischer, 1994. “How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?,” In: J.C. Fuhrer (ed.), Goals, Guidelines, and Constraints Facing Monetary Policy makers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston.
- Dincer, N. and B. Eichengreen, 2008. “Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why and With What Effects?” in Jean-Philippe Touffut (ed.), Central Banks as Economic Institutions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 105-141.
- Dincer, N. and B. Eichengreen, 2014. “Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures.” International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 10 (1), pp. 189-253.
- Dincer, N., B. Eichengreen, and P.M. Geraats, 2019. “Transparency of Monetary Policy in the Post Crisis World.” In: David Mayes, Pierre Siklos and Jan-Egbert Sturm (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking, Oxford University Press, pp. 287-333.
- Dreher, A., J.-E. Sturm, and J. de Haan, 2010. “When is a Central Bank Governor Replaced? Evidence Based on a New Data Set,” Journal of Macroeconomics, 32, pp. 766-781.
- Eggertsson, G.B., 2013. “Fiscal Multipliers and Policy Coordination,” Central Banking Analysis and Economic Policies, in: L.F. Céspedes and J. Galí, (eds.), Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, Vol. 1(17), pp. 175-234.
- Eijffinger, S.C. and P.M. Geraats, 2006. “How Transparent are Central Banks?,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 22(1), pp.1-21.
- Fanelli, S. and L. Straub, 2019. “A Theory of Foreign Exchange Interventions,” mimeo, Harvard University.
- Fischer, S., 1995a. “Modern Central Banking,” In: Forrest Capie, Stanley Fischer, Charles Goodhart and Norbert Schnadt (eds.), The Future of Central Banking, Cambridge University Press, pp. 262-308.
- Fischer, S., 1995b. “Central-Bank Independence Revisited,” American Economic Review, Vol. 85(2), pp. 201-206.
- Fischer, S., 2001. “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15(2), pp. 3-24.
- Fischer, S., 2017. “The Independent Bank of England--20 Years On,” Speech at “20 Years On," a conference sponsored by the Bank of England, London, England.
- Friedman, B.M. and K.N. Kuttner, 2010. “Implementation of Monetary Policy: How Do Central Banks Set Interest Rates?,” In: B.M. Friedman and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 3(24), pp. 1345-1438.
- Fry, M., D. Julius, L. Mahadeva, S. Roger, and G. Sterne, 2000a. “The Devil in the Detail of MP Frameworks: Issues and Measures of Monetary Framework Characteristics,” In: L. Mahadeva and G. Sterne (eds.) MP Frameworks in a Global Context London: Routledge, pp. 57-87.
- Fry, M., D. Julius, L. Mahadeva, S. Roger, and G. Sterne, 2000b. “The Devil in the Detail of MP Frameworks (2): Interpreting Measures of Framework Characteristics,” In: L. Mahadeva and G. Sterne (eds.) MP Frameworks in a Global Context, London: Routledge, pp. 88-108.
- Garriga, A. C., 2016. “Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set,” International Interactions, Vol. 42(5), pp. 849-868.
- Goodhart, C. and R. Lastra, 2018. “Populism and Central Bank Independence,” Open Economies Review, Vol. 29(1), pp. 49–68.
- Gopinath, G., 2019. “A Case for an Integrated Policy Framework”, paper presented at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
- Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini, 1991. “Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy, Vol. 6(13), pp. 341-392.
- Hammond, G., 2012. "State of the Art of Inflation Targeting," Handbooks, Centre for Central Banking Studies, Bank of England, Edition 4, Number 29.
- Hansen, S., M. McMahon, and A. Prat, 2018. “Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 133 (2), pp. 801–870.
- Ilzetzki, E., C.M. Reinhart, and K.S. Rogoff, 2019. “Exchange Arrangements Entering the 21st Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 134(2), pp. 599-646.
- Ilzetzki, E., C.M. Reinhart, and K.S. Rogoff, 2021. “Rethinking Exchange Rate Regimes”, in G. Gopinath, E. Helpman and K. Rogoff (eds.), Handbook in International Economics, Vol 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2015. Evolving Monetary Policy Frameworks in Low-Income and Other Developing Countries, IMF Policy Paper.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2020a. “The Central Bank Transparency Code”, IMF Policy Paper.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2020b. “Toward an Integrated Policy Framework”, IMF Policy Paper.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2021. “Macroeconomic Research in Low-Income Countries: Advances Made in Five Key Areas through a DFID-IMF Collaboration”, RES-SPR Joint Departmental Paper, Vol 2021: Issue 006.
- Kydland, F.E. and E.C. Prescott, 1977. “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85(3), pp.473-491.
- Laurens, B., M. Arnone, and J. Segalotto, 2009. “Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency – A Global Perspective,” International Monetary Fund, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Levin, A.T., 2014. “The Design and Communication of Systematic MP Strategies,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 9, pp. 52-69.
- Masciandaro, D. and G. Tabellini, 1988. “Monetary Regimes and Fiscal Deficits: A Comparative Analysis,” In: H.S. Cheng, (ed.), Monetary Policy in Pacific Basin Countries, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Mishkin, F.S., 2007. “Monetary Policy Strategy,” MIT Press (Cambridge).
- Mishkin, F.S., 2011. “Monetary Policy Strategy: Lessons from the Crisis,” NBER Working Papers 16755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mishkin, F.S., 2017. “Rethinking Monetary Policy After the Crisis,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 73, pp. 252-274.
- Posen, A., 1993. “Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix for Politics”. In Finance and the International Economy: 7, R. O'Brien (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 40-65.
- Posen, A., 1995. “Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence”, in B. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg (eds), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Posen, A., 1998. “Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pp. 335-359.
- Posen, A., 2017. “In the Fray, Not Above It Observations on the Global History of Central Bank Independence”, Presentation at Bank of England Conference Independence 20 Years On.
- Reinhart, C.M. and K.S. Rogoff, 2004. “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: a Reinterpretation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119(1), pp.1-48.
- Rogoff, K., 1985. “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 100(4), pp. 1169-1189.
- Rogoff, K., 1989. “Reputation, Coordination, and Monetary Policy,” In: R.J. Barro (ed.), Modern Business Cycle Theory, Boston: Harvard University Press, pp. 236-264.
- Schonhardt-Bailey, C., 2013. “Deliberating American Monetary Policy: A Textual Analysis”, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 2018. “The Future of Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy,” paper prepared for ‘The Future of Central Banking’, Frankfurt am Main.
- Tucker, P., 2018. “Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State,” Princeton University Press (Princeton).
- Vandenbussche, J., 2006. “Elements of Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Design”, IMF Working Paper 06/277.
- Woodford, M., 2005. “Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness,” Proceedings – Economic Policy Symposium – Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

*APPENDIX A: THE IAPOC METRIC*

### Overview
- The IAPOC metric includes a total of 225 criteria together with pre-defined options.

### Table A.I. Criteria for Independence and Accountability — Sections and sample items
- Section 1. DELEGATION AND DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
  - 1.1. By law, is the central bank empowered to formulate and implement monetary policy?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.1.1. By law, is it stated that the central bank is prohibited from taking instructions from any external party when formulating and implementing monetary policy?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 1.1.1.1. By law, if the central bank is not prohibited from taking instructions from any external party in formulating and implementing monetary policy, is it explicitly allowed?
    - Options: No. 1; Yes. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.1.2. By law, is it stated that government overrule regarding monetary policy is prohibited?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 1.1.2.1. By law, if government overrule regarding monetary policy is not prohibited, is it explicitly allowed?
    - Options: No; or yes but it is only possible subject to listed and demanding formal procedures. 1; Yes, under other circumstances. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.2. By law, is it stated which body(s) is responsible for formulating monetary policy within the central bank?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 1.2.1. By law, is a single body identified?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.2.2. By law, is this body(s) responsible solely for formulating monetary policy?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.2.3. By law, is this body(s) a committee rather than an individual?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.2.3.1. By law, is it stated what the decision-making procedures of this body(s) are?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 1.2.3.1.1. By law, are decisions taken by the committee rather than an individual?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.2.3.1.1.1. By law, if decisions are taken through voting, is it stated who has the casting vote?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 1.2.3.1.1.1.1. By law, does a government official have the casting vote?
    - Options: No. 1; Yes. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.2.3.2. By law, is it stated who the chairperson of this body is?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 1.2.3.2.1. By law, is the chairperson a government official?
    - Options: No. 1; Yes. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.2.4. By law, is it stated what the frequency of monetary policymaking meetings are?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 1.2.4.1. By law, what is the specified frequency?
    - Options: At least quarterly. 1; Less frequently or not at a fixed frequency. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 1.3. In practice, is it stated which body(s) is responsible for formulating monetary policy within the central bank?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; T
  - 1.3.1. In practice, is this a single body?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH
  - 1.3.2. In practice, is this body(s) responsible solely for formulating monetary policy?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH
  - 1.3.3. In practice, is this body(s) a committee rather than an individual?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH
  - 1.3.3.1. In practice, is it stated what the decision-making procedures of this body are?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; T
  - 1.3.3.1.1. In practice, are decisions taken by the committee rather than an individual?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH
  - 1.3.3.1.1.1. In practice, if decisions are taken through voting, is it stated who has the casting vote?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; T
  - 1.3.3.1.1.1.1. In practice, does a government official have the casting vote?
    - Options: No. 1; Yes. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH
  - 1.3.3.2. In practice, is it stated who the chairperson of this body is?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; T
  - 1.3.3.2.1. In practice, is the chairperson a government official?
    - Options: No. 1; Yes. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH
  - 1.3.4. In practice, is this body(s) the same as the legally responsible monetary policymaking body?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH
  - 1.3.5. In practice, is it stated what the frequency of monetary policymaking meetings are?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; T
  - 1.3.5.1. In practice, what is the frequency of monetary policymaking meetings?
    - Options: At least quarterly. 1; Less frequently or not at a fixed frequency. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH

- Section 2. MANDATED GOALS AND NUMERICAL TARGETS (sample items)
  - 2.1. By law, is it stated what the goal(s) of monetary policy is?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 2.1.1. By law, is price stability (one of) the goal(s)?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 2.2. By law, is it stated that there is a numerical monetary policy target?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 2.2.1. By law, is it stated which body(s) is responsible for setting the numerical monetary policy target(s)?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 2.2.1.1. By law, who sets the numerical monetary policy target(s)?
    - Options: The central bank and the government through joint consultations. 1; The central bank or government alone. 0.5; An individual. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 2.2.2. By law, is it stated how frequently the target(s) may be revised?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Jure; T
  - 2.2.2.1. By law, how frequently may the target(s) be revised?
    - Options: At a fixed, low frequency, once every five or more years. 1; More often. 0
    - Type: De Jure; CH
  - 2.3. In practice, is it stated that there is a numerical monetary policy target?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; T
  - 2.3.1. In practice, is it stated which body is responsible for setting the numerical monetary policy target(s)?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; T
  - 2.3.1.1. In practice, who sets the numerical monetary policy target(s)?
    - Options: The central bank and the government through joint consultations. 1; The central bank or government alone. 0.5; An individual. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH
  - 2.3.2. In practice, is it stated how frequently the target(s) may be revised?
    - Options: Yes. 1; No. 0
    - Type: De Facto; T
  - 2.3.2.1. In practice, how frequently may the target(s) be revised?
    - Options: At a fixed, low frequency, once every five or more years. 1; More often. 0
    - Type: De Facto; CH

*References and Appendix A content reproduced from the source PDF chapter/section.*

### 3. INTEGRITY OF THE MONETARY POLICYMAKING BODY

### 3. INTEGRITY OF THE MONETARY POLICYMAKING BODY

### 3.1. INTEGRITY OF THE GOVERNOR
- 3.1.1. By law, is it stated who appoints the governor? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.1.1.1. By law, is the governor appointed by a group rather than an individual? — Yes. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.1.2. By law, is it stated how long the governor’s term of office is? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.1.2.1. By law, how long is the governor’s term of office? — At least 5 years. 1; De Jure; CH  
  - 3.1.2.2. In practice, did the current governor’s predecessor fill the full legal term of office? — Yes. 1; De Facto; CH
- 3.1.3. By law, is it stated whether the governor may be reappointed? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.1.3.1. By law, is reappointment of the governor permitted? — No; or at most a single reappointment. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.1.4. By law, is it stated whether the governor may be removed from office? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.1.4.1. By law, is it stated what the grounds for dismissal are? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T
- 3.1.5. By law, is it stated whether the governor may hold potentially conflicting offices outside the central bank? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.1.5.1. By law, may the governor hold potentially conflicting positions outside the central bank? — No. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.1.6. In practice, is it stated who the current governor is? — Yes. 1; De Facto; T  
  - 3.1.6.1. In practice, is it stated how long the current governor’s term of office is? — Yes. 1; De Facto; T  
    - 3.1.6.1.1. In practice, how long is the current governor’s term of office? — At least 5 years. 1; De Facto; CH  
    - 3.1.6.1.2. In practice, is the governor’s appointment linked to the political cycle? — No. 1; De Facto; CH
- 3.1.7. In practice, does the current Governor hold (potentially conflicting) offices outside the central bank? — No. 1; De Facto; CH
- 3.1.8. In practice, how long was the total time in office served by the current governor’s predecessor? — At least 5 years. 1; De Facto; CH
- 3.1.9. In practice, was the current governor’s predecessor removed from office? — No. 1; De Facto; CH
- 3.1.10. In practice, was the current governor’s predecessor reappointed? — No; or at most a single reappointment. 1; De Facto; CH

### 3.2. INTEGRITY OF THE LEGALLY DESIGNATED MONETARY POLICYMAKING BODY
- 3.2.1. By law, is it stated what the composition of the monetary policymaking body is? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.2.1.1. By law, is there a requirement to have external members on the policymaking body? — Yes. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.2.2. By law, is it stated how long each member’s term of office is? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.2.2.1. By law, how long is each member’s terms of office? — At least 4 years. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.2.3. By law, is it stated whether members may be reappointed? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.2.3.1. By law, is reappointment of members permitted? — No; or at most a single reappointment. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.2.4. By law, is it stated who appoints members? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.2.4.1. By law, are members appointed by a group rather than an individual? — Yes. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.2.5. By law, is it stated whether members may be removed from office? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.2.5.1. By law, is it stated what the grounds for dismissal are? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T
- 3.2.6. By law, is it stated whether there are legal penalties for members of the monetary policymaking body? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.2.6.1. By law, under what circumstances are members of the monetary policymaking body legally liable? — In case of serious misconduct, negligence, malfeasance, corruption, neglect of duty and other similar instances. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.2.7. By law, is it stated whether members may hold (potentially conflicting) offices outside the central bank? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.2.7.1. By law, may members hold (potentially conflicting) offices outside the central bank? — No. 1; De Jure; CH
- 3.2.8. By law, is it stated whether there is a government official on the monetary policymaking body or that sits in on meetings? — Yes. 1; De Jure; T  
  - 3.2.8.1. By law, is a government official permitted to participate in meetings? — No. 1; De Jure; CH

### 3.3. INTEGRITY OF THE DE FACTO MONETARY POLICYMAKING BODY
- 3.3.1. In practice, is it stated what the composition of the de facto monetary policymaking body is? — Yes. 1; De Facto; T  
  - 3.3.1.1. In practice, are there any external members on the de facto monetary policymaking body? — Yes. 1; De Facto; CH
- 3.3.2. In practice, is it stated who the current members of the de facto monetary policymaking body is? — Yes. 1; De Facto; T  
  - 3.3.2.1. In practice, is it stated how long each current member’s term of office is? — Yes. 1; De Facto; T  
    - 3.3.2.1.1. In practice, how long is each current member’s terms of office? — At least 4 years. 1; De Facto; CH  
    - 3.3.2.1.2. In practice, are the terms of office of the current members linked to the political cycle? — No. 1; De Facto; CH  
    - 3.3.2.1.3. In practice, have any of the current members been reappointed? — No; or at most a single reappointment. 1; De Facto; CH
  - 3.3.2.2. In practice, do any members (other than a government representative) hold potentially conflicting offices outside the central bank? — No. 1; De Facto; CH
- 3.3.3. In practice, is it stated who appoints members? — Yes. 1; De Facto; T  
  - 3.3.3.1. In practice, are members appointed by a group rather than an individual? — Yes. 1; De Facto; CH
- 3.3.4. In practice, is it stated whether there is any government official on the monetary policymaking body or that sits in on meetings? — No. 0; De Facto  
  - 3.3.4.1. In practice, is there any government official that participates in meetings? — No. 1; De Facto; CH

*Source: wpiea2022022-print-pdf - 3. INTEGRITY OF THE MONETARY POLICYMAKING BODY*

### conclusion of policy meetings?

### conclusion of policy meetings?

### 2.1 Policy meetings and announcement practices
- 2.1.1. Are policy decisions taken at ordinary scheduled policy meetings?  
  - Yes, at a pre-set time.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - Yes, but at varying times.  0.5
  - No.  0
- 2.1.2. How are policy decisions announced?  
  - Via a press release and verbal press conference with a Q&A session.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - Via a press release and (or) verbal press conference without a Q&A session.  0.5
  - Some other way.   0
- 2.1.3. Is there a statement explaining policy decisions?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - No, or only when tools are changed. 0
- 2.1.3.1. Are the objectives and numerical targets in the explanation consistent with Policy and Operational Strategy?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No.  0
- 2.1.3.1.1. Is there a discussion of the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0
- 2.1.3.1.2. Is there a discussion of the risks to the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0
- 2.1.3.1.3. Are the tools in this explanation consistent with the tools used in practice?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No. 0
- 2.1.3.1.3.1. Is an interpretation of the policy stance provided?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0
  - xvii Unified stance of all main tools, e.g., loose, neutral, tight.
- 2.1.3.1.3.2. Is there a discussion of how the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target, are to be achieved through the policy decisions?  
  - No. 0
  - De
  - Facto
- 2.1.3.1.3.3. Is reference made to the future trajectory of the policy stance?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0
  - xviii This criterion captures the likely future path for policy, not a policy commitment.
- 2.1.3.1.3.3.1. Is there a discussion of how this trajectory is warranted by the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0

### 3. MONETARY POLICY REPORT
- 3.1. Is a monetary policy report published?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - There are multiple similar such reports. 0.5
  - No. 0
- 3.1.1. When is the report published?  
  - Within 1 month of each ordinary meeting. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - At a lower frequency. 0.5
  - On an ad hoc basis or with >1 month delay. 0
- 3.1.2. Does the governor or other members of the policymaking body present the report?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0
- 3.1.3. Is it stated what the current policy actions and expected outcomes are?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - No. 0
- 3.1.3.1. Are the objectives and numerical targets in the statement of expected outcomes consistent with Policy and Operational Strategy?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No. 0
- 3.1.3.1.1. Is there a discussion of the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
- 3.1.3.1.2. Is there a discussion of the risks to the outlook for the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
- 3.1.3.1.3. Are the tools in the statement of current policy actions consistent with the tools used in practice?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No. 0
- 3.1.3.1.3.1. Is an interpretation of the policy stance provided?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
  - xix Footnote XVII applies.
- 3.1.3.1.3.2. Is there a discussion of how the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target, are to be achieved through the current settings of the tools?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
- 3.1.3.1.3.3. Is reference made to the future trajectory of the policy stance?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.   0
  - xx Footnote XIIII applies.
- 3.1.3.1.3.3.1. Is there a discussion of how this trajectory is warranted by the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
- 3.1.4. Is it stated what past policy actions and outcomes were?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - No.   0
- 3.1.4.1. Are the objectives and numerical targets in the statement of past outcomes consistent with Policy and Operational Strategy?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No.   0
- 3.1.4.1.1. Is there a discussion of past developments in driving the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
- 3.1.4.1.2. Is there a discussion of the extent to which the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target, have been achieved?  
  - Yes, with explanations of deviations. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - Yes, but without explanations of deviations. 0.5
  - No.  0
- 3.1.4.1.3. Are the tools in the statement of past policy actions consistent with the tools used in practice?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No. 0
- 3.1.4.1.3.1. Is there a discussion of the extent to which the intended past policy stance has been achieved?  
  - Yes, with explanations of deviations 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - Yes, but without explanations of deviations 0.5
  - No. 0
- 3.1.4.1.3.2. Is there a discussion of the contribution of past policy actions in meeting the objectives and numerical targets, including an inflation target?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0

### 4. PUBLICATION OF DATA
- 4.1. Is data relevant for monetary policymaking published?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - No.  0
  - xxi This includes publicly available data on the objectives, numerical targets, tools and instruments.
- 4.1.1. Does this include data on the objectives and numerical targets that is consistent with Policy and Operational Strategy, and on the tools that is consistent with the tools used in practice?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No. 0
- 4.1.1.1. Does this include data on inflation and inflation expectations?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
- 4.1.1.1.1. Is this data available in downloadable format at a quarterly frequency at least?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0
- 4.2. Are forecasts published?  
  - Yes, numerical forecasts.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - Yes, graphical forecasts. 0.5
  - No. 0
- 4.2.1. Does this include medium-term forecasts for inflation?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
- 4.2.1.1. At what frequency are forecasts published?  
  - At least quarterly. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - Less than quarterly.  0
- 4.2.1.2. Is it stated what the assumption about the path for the tools associated with the forecast is?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - No. 0
- 4.2.1.2.1. Are these tools consistent with the tools used in practice?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No. 0
- 4.2.1.3. Does the central bank communicate forecast uncertainties?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0
- 4.3. Is it stated how the tools and instruments were used in the past?  
  - Yes, at least annually.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - No.  0
  - xxii Ex-post reporting, including quantities.
- 4.3.1. Are these tools and instruments consistent with the tools used in practice?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CS
  - No. 0
- 4.3.2. Is the past use of the instruments explained with reference to the policy stance?  
  - Yes. 1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No. 0

### 5. STAKEHOLDER INCLUSION
- 5.1. Is information made available in all major official languages?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - No.  0
- 5.2. Are there efforts to simplify monetary policy information into accessible language for a wider audience?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0
  - xxiii This criterion concerns the main monetary policy communication vehicles, such as decision press-releases and/or the Monetary Policy Report.
- 5.3. Are there efforts to disseminate monetary policy information to a wider audience?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - CH
  - No.  0
- 5.4. Are research articles published?  
  - Yes.  1
  - De
  - Facto
  - T
  - No. 0

*Monetary Policy Frameworks: An Index and New Evidence Working Paper No. WP/22/22*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022022-print-pdf.pdf_