## wpiea2022026-print-pdf — Section: Determinants of Gender Gap in Hours Worked (and Box 1 concluded)

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### Overview and purpose
- Examines interactions between tax policy and gender equality, emphasizing implicit bias in tax systems.
- Focuses on taxation of labor income (personal income tax, social security contributions, deductibility of employment-related costs) and effects on family and labor supply decisions.
- Distinguishes explicit bias (tax provisions that identify and treat men and women differently) from implicit bias (gender-differentiated impacts that arise from neutral rules).
- Aims to inform policymakers and researchers; notes country-specific circumstances matter.

### Key labor-market gaps and statistics
- Women earn, on average, 20 percent less than men in gross terms.
- Across advanced and emerging economies in the sample, women’s gross incomes are just 70 percent of men’s, on average; the fraction ranges from 60 to 94 percent in the country sample.
- Women are paid 15 percent less per hour of work than men, on average.
- Women are 20 percent less likely than men to participate in the labor force, on average.
- If employed, women work an average of 85 percent of the number of hours worked by men.
- Within the bottom income decile—which represents less than 5 percent of economies’ total income—more than half of that population segment is female.
- In the top decile (income share between 20 and 40 percent), women account for less than 40 percent of that population segment.

### Behavioral margins affected by labor taxes
- Taxation affects:
  - Whether to marry (tax liability can change with marital status).
  - Whether to form or maintain a single- or two-earner household (extensive margin for secondary earner).
  - If married and secondary earner works, how many hours to work or whether to work full- or part-time (intensive margin).
  - Whether to have children (child allowances, credits, household taxation).
  - Whether to work in formal or informal sector (formal employment may raise tax liabilities and affect incentives).

### Progressivity and gender gaps
- Progressive tax systems: average tax rate rises with income; because women’s average earnings are lower, progressive systems affect genders differently.
- Empirical impacts:
  - Gender gaps in net incomes are about 1.5 percentage points narrower than in gross terms in advanced countries.
  - In emerging economies the narrowing effect is very small.
  - Direct taxes reduce the shortfall in women’s income relative to men’s by about 1.4 percentage points in advanced economies and about 0.3 in emerging economies.
  - Social security contributions often are not progressive and in most cases either widen the gender income gap or have a small redistributive impact relative to direct taxes.
- Mechanisms:
  - More progressive systems can provide stronger work incentives to women at the low end of the income distribution.
  - A more progressive system raises more revenue from the top and can afford lower tax rates at the bottom for the same revenue.

### Unit of taxation: individual, household, and mixed systems
- System types:
  - Individual taxation: each person’s tax determined on their own income.
  - Household-level taxation: aggregates household incomes and applies a combined schedule.
  - Mixed systems: individual-based taxation with family-based elements (spouse allowances, child allowances, phased-out joint assessment benefits).
- Equity tradeoffs:
  - Household taxation ensures equal treatment across households but creates inequalities among individuals with the same earnings depending on marital status and spouse’s income.
  - Household taxation typically raises marginal tax rates for secondary earners and lowers them for primary earners, encouraging one-earner households.
- Stylized numerical example (authors’ constructed tax schedule):
  - Tax-free exemption worth 30 percent of average income.
  - Marginal tax rate rises from 0 to 50 percent between 30 and 200 percent of average income, then stays fixed.
  - In joint filing, all thresholds are doubled.
  - Example outcomes: marginal tax rate faced by someone married to a well-earning spouse (300 percent of average income) increases dramatically compared to a single; secondary earner with very low income faces significant tax from first dollar earned.
- Behavioral effects:
  - Substitution effect: increased marginal tax rate for secondary earner reduces return to additional hours and discourages intensive and extensive labor supply.
  - Income effect: household taxation typically reduces household average tax rate and increases net income, enabling more leisure and reducing labor supply for both spouses.
  - Optional individual filing is generally not a practical remedy because it typically increases total household tax and would not be chosen by income-maximizing couples.

### Tax provisions, social security, welfare, and fringe benefits
- Dependent spouse tax allowances support one-earner families but are withdrawn when secondary earner is employed, reducing incentives to work.
- Child tax allowances typically targeted at households; in individual systems they are often used by the primary earner and raise marginal tax rates for secondary earners; child tax credits can avoid this if not dependent on household total income.
- Social security contributions typically levied at individual level; certain benefits provided at family level may reduce incentives for secondary earners to formalize employment.
- Welfare benefits targeted at household level may discourage secondary earner participation if primary earner’s income uses up allowable thresholds before steep withdrawal rates.
- Family-level employment-related fringe benefits (family health insurance, survivor benefits) may be tax-favored and affect attractiveness of formal employment for secondary earners.

### Box 1 — Marriage and Fertility (impact of tax on household formation)
- Marriage:
  - Individual taxation is neutral with regards to marriage; household taxation may encourage or discourage marriage.
  - Where thresholds for couples are twice those of singles, marriage will either leave total tax unchanged (if both partners had same marginal tax rate) or reduce it.
  - Where thresholds increase by less than double, marriage penalties can arise, especially when both spouses earn similar or high incomes.
- Fertility:
  - Tax systems that provide greater incentives for female labor supply can potentially deter working parents from having children; trade-offs can be mitigated.
  - Empirical evidence is ambiguous:
    - Over time advanced economies display a negative relationship between female employment and fertility.
    - Across countries, this correlation has become positive.

### Empirical findings on tax disincentives and gendered labor supply (Box 1 concluded)
- Tax disincentives at the extensive margin:
  - Figures show secondary earners face higher taxes upon entering employment in most countries.
  - Additional tax burden for married secondary earners is higher among poorer countries and households with high within-household inequality in labor earnings.
- Tax disincentives at the intensive margin:
  - Married secondary earners face additional tax increases when moving from part-time to full-time employment; increases tend to be higher than for singles when within-household income inequality is high.
  - Joint taxation can be equally or more attractive at the household level, creating incentives to file jointly even if it raises the secondary earner’s marginal tax rate.
- Magnitudes and labor supply effects (cross-country averages and estimated associations):
  - Cross-country average tax increase at the extensive margin ranges between 5 and 18, depending on the primary and secondary earner’s incomes.
  - The tax increase secondary earners face relative to singles is associated with a reduction in women’s labor participation rate relative to men’s that ranges between 1 and 3.6 percentage points.
  - Among lower income families and spouses with high income/ability disparities, taxation accounts for 10 to 50 percent of the observed labor force rate differential between women and men.
  - At the intensive margin, cross-country average tax increases are between 2 and 16 percentage points higher than for singles, leading to a shortfall of 2 to  20 percent in the number of hours women work relative to men.
  - When considering moving from part-time to full-time employment, tax disincentives help explain between 20 and over 90 percent of the observed gender gap in hours worked among lower income families and families with high within-household inequality.
- Elasticities and responsiveness:
  - Literature indicates married women are more responsive to changes in net-of-tax wage rates than men; wage elasticities at the intensive margin show notable gender differences.

### Policy options and trade-offs (Box 1 concluded)
- Move toward individual taxation:
  - Individual taxation is the most obvious tax policy choice to support female labor supply; optional separate filing is insufficient.
  - Individualization creates equal treatment across diverse household types but raises many households’ average tax rates, including poor one-earner households.
  - Remedies include:
    - Earned-income tax-credits (EITC), conditional on or rising in hours worked before withdrawal thresholds.
    - Revenue-neutral reforms pairing individualization with reductions in tax rates.
  - Example: United Kingdom moved from household to individual taxation in 1990.
- Policies to support female labor supply regardless of marital status:
  - Increase progressivity by reducing net marginal tax rates at the lower end.
  - Earned-income tax-credits and childcare tax credits lift the poor and raise female labor force participation, including single poor women and lone mothers.
- Tax base and work-related expenses:
  - Childcare and other work-related expenses should receive lenient tax treatment per theory (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976).
  - Policy instruments:
    - Tax deductibility of childcare expenses: most efficient in theory but provides little support to low-income families if they pay low tax rates.
    - Childcare tax credits, especially refundable ones, provide full-value benefits to low-income individuals.
    - Non-tax measures such as subsidized or free childcare services are equivalent alternatives.

### Explicit differentiation in tax codes: examples and trends
- Historical and contemporary explicit gender differentiation exists but is rarer than implicit bias.
- Examples include gender-differentiated tax-free allowances, gender-specific allowances or credits, filing responsibility rules, and gender-differentiated exemptions or tax rates in some jurisdictions.
- Trend: number of explicit provisions disadvantaging women has declined; explicit differentiation favoring women has proportionally risen in recent data.

### Arguments for and against gender-based taxation
- Theoretical rationales:
  - Ramsey principle: optimal taxes inversely proportional to labor supply elasticity; women (especially married) have more elastic labor supply, suggesting lower marginal tax rates could be optimal.
  - Correcting market failures: gender-based taxes could mitigate perceived higher costs of hiring female workers, incomplete part-time job markets, and myopic expectations about career interruptions.
- Practical difficulties:
  - Heterogeneity in productivity and marital status complicates implementation.
  - Fairness challenges for homosexual and nonbinary couples; tax avoidance via income-shifting risks.
- Policy recommendation stance:
  - Prefer neutral reforms toward individualized and progressive tax systems.
  - Complementary measures: tax- or social-security-financing of parental leave salary costs; reduction in payroll taxes during parental leave; targeted tax credits for sectors important for female employment.

### Capital income, wealth, inheritance, and gender
- Distributional background:
  - Women are strongly underrepresented at the top tail of the capital income distribution; share of women in top income deciles has increased since the 1980s but remains substantially below 50 percent in many places.
- Wealth gaps:
  - Gender wealth gap is substantial and wider than income gaps in most countries.
  - United States: gender wealth gap largest between never-married men and women at 71 cents on the dollar (St. Louis Fed 2021) after conditioning on contributing factors.
  - Europe: unexplained gaps in gross wealth as large as 45 percent in Germany and 48 percent in Greece after accounting for observable factors.
  - Top-tail surveys: women may represent as little as 12 percent of the world billionaire population, with only 16 percent self-made.
- Political economy and legal environment:
  - As of 2020, nearly 40 percent of economies still limit women’s property rights (World Bank 2021).
  - As of 2020, 23 percent of countries did not have full equality of inheritance rights between men and women.
  - Countries lacking equal inheritance rights tend to have lower top inheritance/estate tax rates to lineal heirs: averaging under 4 percent in countries with no equal inheritance rights versus nearly 13 percent in countries with full equal rights.
  - Countries with weaker legal gender equality in asset ownership could collect over 0.5 percent of GDP in property tax revenues if approximating the frontier of countries with equal rights.
- Tax policy implications:
  - Lower taxation of capital income disproportionately benefits men relative to a comprehensive-income benchmark.
  - Addressing loopholes and strengthening enforcement to reduce avoidance and evasion by high earners can mitigate gender disparities.
  - Corporate tax rules may favor male-led startups; international agreement on an effective minimum corporate income tax could reduce gender asymmetries.

### Consumption taxes, VAT, and excises: gender considerations
- VAT:
  - A single-rate VAT without exemptions would likely be gender neutral unless lifetime consumption shares differ across genders.
  - Rate differentiation across goods can create implicit biases because consumption patterns differ by gender.
  - General guidance: VAT reductions and exemptions are inferior to targeted transfers/subsidies for equity objectives; base-broadening with targeted protection for low-income households is preferable.
  - Feminine hygiene products:
    - Treat coherently with other necessities where reduced rates are used.
    - Providing free or highly subsidized access to poor women can be more cost-effective than across-the-board VAT cuts.
  - VAT on childcare services:
    - Lenient VAT treatment (or exemption/zero-rating where subsidies/credits are absent) can reduce work disincentives similar to income-tax treatment of work-related expenses.
- Excises:
  - Excises can entail implicit bias when consumption patterns differ across genders if they are used primarily to raise revenue rather than internalize externalities.
  - If an excise matches an externality (a Pigou tax), it is neutral to gender differences in consumption.
  - WHO recommends taxes make up at least 75 percent of tobacco retail prices.

### Tobacco taxation: incidence, implicit subsidy, and optimal-taxation argument
- Tobacco taxes have a higher incidence on men given greater male smoking rates, yet they effectively subsidize men as they are likely undertaxed relative to externalities/internalities generated.
- Ramsey-based argument: men’s tobacco consumption typically less tax elastic, which could justify a higher tax rate from an optimal commodity taxation perspective.
- Complication: externality/internality may not be independent of gender; evidence suggests tobacco taxation can be particularly effective at reducing smoking during pregnancy with intergenerational benefits.
- Cross-country pattern:
  - Implicit subsidy for tobacco products is highest in countries where relative female smoking rates are lowest.
  - Empirical finding: revenue from tobacco taxes is higher where smoking is less dominated by men.

### Carbon taxation and the gender dimension
- Evidence gaps: dearth of literature on carbon footprint by gender and incidence of carbon taxes on women specifically.
- Potential channels of gender-differentiated incidence:
  - Consumption of carbon-intensive goods and services.
  - Employment in carbon-intensive industries (production-angle).
  - Exposure to negative environmental externalities.
- Considerations:
  - Some evidence men consume relatively more carbon-intensive transportation and food (“eco gender gap”).
  - Carbon taxes raise relative prices in sectors where more men are employed, potentially lowering associated wages.
  - Green economy jobs may emerge in male-dominated industries (renewables, manufacturing, construction).
  - Mortality rates from environmental-related occupational risks and ambient exposure are higher for men worldwide.
- Research recommendation:
  - Combine household consumption survey data with greenhouse gas emission figures and carbon tax data to determine gender split of effective tax burden across countries.

### Key conclusions and policy-relevant findings
- Provides an exhaustive overview of interactions between tax policy and gender equality, highlighting well-studied areas and preliminary findings.
- Labor taxation:
  - Sensitivity of women’s labor supply (notably those in couples) is well established.
  - Policy advice: move from household to individual taxation to avoid high marginal tax rates on secondary earners that discourage employment.
  - Reforms raising progressivity can address inequality via redistribution and by encouraging labor supply.
  - Well-designed earned income tax credits can overcome specific hurdles in marginal tax rate schedules.
- Capital income and wealth taxation:
  - Much less research exists despite greater gender inequality in capital than labor income.
  - Lower capital income than labor income tax rates disproportionately benefit men.
  - Tentative empirical evidence indicates providing stronger property rights to women increases revenues.
- Consumption taxes:
  - Even less is known; VAT rates for specific products are debated but often better alternatives exist.
- Overarching policy imperative:
  - Plenty of well-justified policy reforms would contribute to gender equality.
  - Tax policy may not always be the first-best tool, but explicitly neutral tax policy can have first-order effects on important dimensions of inequality.
  - Imperative that gender impact analysis be incorporated in optimal policy design.

*Source: IMF Working Paper: Gendered Taxes: The Interaction of Tax Policy with Gender Equality — Working Paper No. WP/22/26*

### REFERENCES _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 45

### wpiea2022026-print-pdf - REFERENCES _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 45

### Box
- 1. The Impact of Tax on Household Formation_____________________________________________________________ 12

### Figures
- 1.   Average Gender Gaps in Labor Market Outcomes _________________________________________________________ 5
- 2. Income Share and Share of Women in the Bottom and  Top Deciles_______________________________________ 6
- 3. Average Shortfall in Women’s Income Relative to Men’s __________________________________________________ 8
- 4. Progressivity and Female Labor Supply at the Bottom of the Distribution _________________________________ 9
- 5. Marginal and Average Tax Rates for Spouses under Household Taxation _______________________________ 11
- 6. Tax Rates Faced by Secondary Earners Upon Entering Employment, No Children, 2018 _________________ 14
- 7. Average Tax Rate  Increase Faced by Secondary Earner Moving from Partial to Full-Time Employment, No Children, 2 018______________________________________________________________________________________________ 15
- 8. Additional Tax for Secondary Earner versus Marriage Penalty ___________________________________________ 16
- 9. Wage Elasticities of Men and Women at the Intensive Margin __________________________________________ 17
- 10. Tax Systems and Gender Gaps Within Couples _________________________________________________________ 18
- 11. Labor Supply Gender Gaps: Implications of the Personal Income Tax __________________________________ 20
- 12. Comparison of Explicit Differentiation in Countries’ Tax Codes Over Time _____________________________ 25
- 13. Share of Capital Income and Women in the Top Decile ________________________________________________ 29
- 14. Net Worth of Women Relative to Men _________________________________________________________________ 30
- 15. Percent of Adult Population that Borrowed to Start, Operate, Expand a Farm or Business _____________ 31
- 1 6. Property Tax Revenue and Women’s Ownership Rights ________________________________________________ 35
- 17. Land Ownership Gender Ratio  and Property Tax Revenue in Low-Income and Emerging Market  
  Economies _________________________________________________________________________________________________ 36
- 18. VAT on Feminine Hygiene Products and Other Essential Goods________________________________________ 38
- 19. Tobacco Taxation and Relative Gender Smoking Prevalence ___________________________________________ 40

### Appendix tables
- 1. Characteristics of Personal Income Tax Systems _________________________________________________________ 42
- 2. Determinants of Gender Gap in Labor Force Participation _______________________________________________ 43

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022026-print-pdf.pdf*

### 3. Determinants of Gender Gap in Hours Worked__________________________________________________________ 44

### 3. Determinants of Gender Gap in Hours Worked

### Overview and purpose
- Paper examines interactions between tax policy and gender equality, with emphasis on implicit bias in tax systems.
- Focuses on taxation of labor income (personal income tax, social security contributions, deductibility of employment-related costs), and how tax features affect family and labor supply decisions.
- Distinguishes explicit bias (tax provisions that identify and treat men and women differently) from implicit bias (gender-differentiated impacts that arise from neutral rules).
- Paper aims to inform policymakers and researchers on relevant issues and policy directions, noting country-specific circumstances matter.

### Key labor-market gaps and statistics
- Women earn, on average, 20 percent less than men in gross terms.
- Across advanced and emerging economies in the sample, women’s gross incomes are just 70 percent of men’s, on average; the fraction ranges from 60 to 94 percent in the country sample.
- Women are paid 15 percent less per hour of work than men, on average.
- Women are 20 percent less likely than men to participate in the labor force, on average.
- If employed, women work an average of 85 percent of the number of hours worked by men.
- Within the bottom income decile—which represents less than 5 percent of economies’ total income—more than half of that population segment is female; in the top decile (income share between 20 and 40 percent), women are underrepresented and account for less than 40 percent of that population segment.
- Tax policy can reduce post-tax inequality and change incentives that affect labor supply and returns to education.

### Behavioral margins affected by labor taxes
- Key decision margins influenced by labor income taxation:
  - Whether to marry (tax liability can change with marital status).
  - If married, whether to form or maintain a single- or two-earner household (extensive margin for secondary earner).
  - If married and secondary earner works, how many hours to work or whether to work full- or part-time (intensive margin).
  - Whether to have children (affected by child allowances, credits, household taxation).
  - Whether to work in formal or informal sector (formal employment may raise tax liabilities and affect incentives, especially where enforcement and social safety nets are weak).

### Progressivity and gender gaps
- Progressive tax systems: average tax rate rises with income; because women’s average earnings are lower, progressive systems affect genders differently.
- Empirical impacts:
  - Gender gaps in net incomes (net of taxes and social security contributions) are about 1.5 percentage points narrower than in gross terms in advanced countries.
  - In emerging economies the narrowing effect is very small.
  - Direct taxes reduce the shortfall in women’s income relative to men’s by about 1.4 percentage points in advanced economies and about 0.3 in emerging economies.
  - Social security contributions often are not progressive and in most cases either widen the gender income gap or have a small redistributive impact relative to direct taxes.
- Mechanisms:
  - More progressive systems can provide stronger work incentives to women at the low end of the income distribution (both extensive and intensive margins) because poorer individuals—majority women—face lower marginal tax rates.
  - A more progressive system raises more revenue from the top and can afford lower tax rates at the bottom for the same revenue.

### Unit of taxation: individual, household, and mixed systems
- System types:
  - Individual taxation: each person’s tax determined on their own income.
  - Household-level taxation: aggregates a household’s incomes and applies a combined schedule; thresholds commonly increased relative to singles.
  - Mixed systems: individual-based taxation with family-based elements (spouse allowances, child allowances, phased-out joint assessment benefits).
- Equity tradeoffs:
  - Household taxation ensures equal treatment across households but creates inequalities among individuals with the same earnings depending on marital status and spouse’s income.
  - Household taxation typically raises marginal tax rates for secondary earners and lowers them for primary earners, encouraging one-earner households.
- Stylized numerical example (authors’ constructed tax schedule):
  - Tax-free exemption worth 30 percent of average income.
  - Marginal tax rate rises from 0 to 50 percent between 30 and 200 percent of average income, then stays fixed.
  - In joint filing, all thresholds are doubled.
  - Example spouse scenarios: married, spouse's income: 0; married, spouse's income: 300; filing separately (or single).
  - Outcome: marginal tax rate faced by someone married to a well-earning spouse (300 percent of average income) increases dramatically compared to a single; secondary earner with very low income faces significant tax from first dollar earned.
- Behavioral effects:
  - Substitution effect: increased marginal tax rate for secondary earner reduces return to additional hours and discourages intensive and extensive labor supply.
  - Income effect: household taxation typically reduces household average tax rate and increases net income, enabling more leisure and reducing labor supply for both spouses.
  - Optional individual filing is generally not a practical remedy because it typically increases total household tax and would not be chosen by income-maximizing couples.

### Tax provisions, social security, welfare, and fringe benefits
- Tax provisions:
  - Dependent spouse tax allowances support one-earner families but are withdrawn when secondary earner is employed, reducing incentives to work.
  - Child tax allowances are typically targeted at households; in individual systems they are often used by the primary earner and raise marginal tax rates for secondary earners; child tax credits can avoid this if not dependent on household total income.
- Social security contributions:
  - Contributions typically levied at individual level; certain benefits (health insurance, survivor coverage) often provided at family level.
  - For secondary earners, paying contributions may confer limited additional entitlements, reducing incentives for formal employment.
- Welfare benefits:
  - Social welfare typically targeted at household level and may discourage secondary earner participation if primary earner’s income uses up allowable thresholds before steep withdrawal rates.
- Fringe benefits:
  - Employment-related benefits given at family level (e.g., family health insurance, pension coverage with survivor benefits) may be tax-favored and affect the attractiveness of formal employment for secondary earners.

*Source: IMF Working Papers — Gendered Taxes: The Interaction of Tax Policy with Gender Equality — Section 3. Determinants of Gender Gap in Hours Worked.*

### Box 1. The Impact  of Tax on Household  Formation (Continued)

### Box 1. The Impact of Tax on Household Formation (Continued)

### Marriage
- Individual taxation is neutral with regards to marriage, but household taxation may encourage or discourage marriage (or any other bond recognized for tax purposes).
- Typically, household taxation will be favorable for couples with relatively unequal incomes, because under progressive schedules, the tax saving for the higher earner overcompensates for the additional tax on the secondary earner, as shown earlier.
- In systems where thresholds for couples are twice those of singles, marriage will always either leave the total tax bill unchanged (if both partners had the same marginal tax rate) or reduce it.
- In systems where thresholds are increased by less than double, there can be tax increases (i.e., marriage penalties) and these are especially likely where both spouses earn the same or high incomes.
- Note: The entitlements gained through the spouse are less certain though and can create dependencies if they are lost in case of divorce.11

### Fertility
- Tax systems that provide greater incentives for female labor supply can potentially deter working parents from having children, but the trade-off between employment and childbearing can be mitigated.
- The empirical evidence on the relationship between female employment and birth rates is ambiguous:
  - Over time advanced economies display a negative relationship between female employment and fertility.1
  - Across countries, however, this correlation has become positive (e.g., Manuelli and Seshadri 2009).

*IMF WORKING PAPERS Gendered Taxes: The Interaction of Tax Policy with Gender Equality — Box 1. The Impact of Tax on Household Formation (Continued)*

### Box 1. The Impact  of Tax on Household  Formation (Concluded)

### Box 1. The Impact of Tax on Household Formation (Concluded)

### Empirical findings on tax disincentives and gendered labor supply
- Tax systems are usually mixed; in most cases they create work disincentives for secondary earners.
- Tax disincentives at the extensive margin:
  - Figures show secondary earners face higher taxes upon entering employment in most countries.
  - Additional tax burden for married secondary earners is higher among poorer countries and households with high within-household inequality in labor earnings.
- Tax disincentives at the intensive margin:
  - Married-secondary earners face additional tax increases when moving from part-time to full-time employment; these increases tend to be higher than for singles when within-household income inequality is high.
  - Joint taxation can be equally or more attractive at the household level, creating incentives to file jointly even if it raises the secondary earner’s marginal tax rate.
- Magnitudes and labor supply effects (cross-country averages and estimated associations):
  - Cross-country average tax increase at the extensive margin ranges between 5 and 18, depending on the primary and secondary earner’s incomes.
  - The tax increase secondary earners face relative to singles is associated with a reduction in women’s labor participation rate relative to men’s that ranges between 1 and 3.6 percentage points.
  - Among lower income families and spouses with high income/ability disparities, taxation accounts for 10 to 50 percent of the observed labor force rate differential between women and men.
  - At the intensive margin, cross-country average tax increases are between 2 and 16 percentage points higher than for singles, leading to a shortfall of 2 to  20 percent in the number of hours women work relative to men.
  - When considering moving from part-time to full-time employment, tax disincentives help explain between 20 and over 90 percent of the observed gender gap in hours worked among lower income families and families with high within-household inequality.
- Elasticities and responsiveness:
  - The empirical literature summarized (Evers et. al 2008) indicates married women are more responsive to changes in net-of-tax wage rates than men.
  - Figures show wage elasticities of men and women at the intensive margin with markers representing deviations of +/- 2 standard errors.

### Policy options and trade-offs
- Move toward individual taxation:
  - The most obvious tax policy choice to support female labor supply is individual taxation rather than full household taxation.
  - Optional separate filing is insufficient; individualization must be the standard to alter incentives.
  - Moving to individual taxation creates equal treatment across diverse household types.
  - Individualization raises many households’ average tax rates, including poor one-earner households, but remedies include:
    - Earned-income tax-credits (EITC), which can be conditional on or rising in hours worked before reaching withdrawal thresholds.
    - Revenue-neutral reforms that pair individualization with reductions in tax rates to offset increased average tax burdens.
  - Example: United Kingdom moved from household to individual taxation in 1990.
- Policies to support female labor supply regardless of marital status:
  - Increase progressivity by reducing net marginal tax rates at the lower end of the distribution.
  - Earned-income tax-credits and childcare tax credits lift the poor and raise female labor force participation, including single poor women and lone mothers.
- Tax base and work-related expenses:
  - Work performed at home by a stay-at-home spouse yields an implicit tax saving for the household; entering the labor force requires purchasing those services with after-tax money.
  - Theory (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976) suggests childcare and other work-related expenses, complements to labor supply, should receive lenient tax treatment.
  - Policy instruments:
    - Tax deductibility of childcare expenses (Domeij and Klein 2013): most efficient in theory but provides little support to low-income families if they pay low tax rates.
    - Childcare tax credits, especially refundable ones, provide full-value benefits to low-income individuals and can support those not liable to pay tax.
    - Non-tax measures such as subsidized or free provision of childcare services are equivalent alternatives.

### Explicit differentiation in tax codes: historical and contemporary examples
- Explicit gender differentiation (different treatment of men and women) is rarer than implicit bias but has existed historically and persists in some provisions.
- Examples of explicit differentiation:
  - Gender-differentiated tax-free allowances: Netherlands historically higher allowance for a married man until 1984; India had higher basic exemptions for women prior to tax year 2012/13; Pakistan had higher threshold for working women until 2010.
  - Gender-specific allowances or credits: United Kingdom’s historical “married man’s allowance” (until 1993); Greece historically gave husband an extra allowance whether or not the wife had income.
  - Contemporary examples favoring women in some jurisdictions: Gibraltar additional allowance for women taxpayers over 60 (age limit differs by gender); Ukraine allowances for single mothers; Uzbekistan monthly allowance to single women with many children; special additional credits for working mothers in Spain; directors’ fee higher threshold for women in Argentina; Israel additional 0.5 credit point for female taxpayers.
  - Differential responsibility for filing and claiming refunds: Greece required husband to submit return and receive refunds prior to 2018; France historically placed responsibility on husband to sign joint return; responsibility tied to gender remains in places like Guernsey and Jamaica; Kenya and Democratic Republic of Congo deem a married woman’s income to be the husband’s for tax assessment.
  - Examples of gender-differentiated exemptions or tax rates: Equatorial Guinea exempted single women with more than 3 dependents under 18 from individual tax (Article 336); South Africa until 1995 taxed “married women” differently than “married persons.”
- Trends:
  - Number of explicit provisions disadvantaging women has declined; explicit differentiation favoring women has proportionally risen in recent data.
  - Most remaining explicit biases against women today are found in responsibility for filing taxes and on whom taxes are assessed.

### Arguments for and against gender-based taxation
- Theoretical rationales for gender-based taxation:
  - Ramsey principle: optimal taxes inversely proportional to labor supply elasticity; since women (especially married) have more elastic labor supply, lower marginal tax rates for women could be optimal.
  - Correcting market failures: gender-based taxes could mitigate perceived higher costs of hiring female workers, incomplete job markets for part-time work, and myopic expectations by young women about future labor-market interruptions.
- Practical and conceptual difficulties:
  - Heterogeneity in productivity and marital status complicates optimal taxation; optimal outcomes may not involve taxing women less than men (Bastani 2013).
  - Implementation challenges: fairness concerns for homosexual and nonbinary couples; tax avoidance via income-shifting to the lower-rate spouse.
- Policy recommendation stance:
  - Less controversial starting point is neutral reforms toward individualized and progressive tax systems, which reduce marginal tax rates for women and eliminate non-linearities that thin part-time job markets.
  - Complementary measures: tax- or social-security-financing of parental leave salary costs; reduction in payroll taxes during parental leave; targeted tax credits for sectors important for female employment.

### Capital income, wealth, inheritance, and gender
- Distributional background:
  - Women are strongly underrepresented at the top tail of the capital income distribution; analyses focus on singles to address joint ownership measurement challenges.
  - Share of women in top income deciles has increased relative to the 1980s but remains substantially below 50 percent in many places.
- Wealth gaps:
  - Gender wealth gap is substantial and wider than income gaps in most countries.
  - United States: gender wealth gap largest between never-married men and women at 71 cents on the dollar (St. Louis Fed 2021) after conditioning on contributing factors.
  - Europe: unexplained gaps in gross wealth as large as 45 percent in Germany and 48 percent in Greece after accounting for observable factors.
  - Top-tail surveys: women may represent as little as 12 percent of the world billionaire population, with only 16 percent self-made (survey caveat noted).
  - Women are underrepresented among landowners and homeowners in many countries; women’s home values and appreciation rates are lower in some contexts (e.g., United States).
  - Women have lower median retirement savings in some contexts (Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies, 2018).
- Entrepreneurial income and access to finance:
  - Women face lower access to finance, higher perceived credit constraints, and may opt out of formal loan application processes, limiting their entrepreneurial income prospects.
  - Evidence of higher interest rates for women entrepreneurs in some settings (Alesina et al. 2013 for Italy).
- Tax policy implications for capital income and wealth:
  - Lower taxation of capital income disproportionately benefits men relative to a comprehensive-income benchmark; this provides an additional argument for higher capital income taxation from a gender-equality perspective.
  - Addressing loopholes and strengthening enforcement to reduce avoidance and evasion by high earners can mitigate gender disparities in effective tax burdens.
  - Corporate tax rules (loss offsets, interest deductions) may favor male-led startups; international agreement on an effective minimum corporate income tax could reduce gender asymmetries in effective tax rates across business ownership structures.
  - Wealth taxes vs capital income taxes:
    - Taxing the flow (capital income) is more likely to tax rents that disproportionately accrue to men; wealth taxes may implicitly tax men less relative to a capital-income tax if men earn higher rents.
- Political economy and legal environment:
  - As of 2020, nearly 40 percent of economies still limit women’s property rights (World Bank 2021).
  - As of 2020, 23 percent of countries did not have full equality of inheritance rights between men and women.
  - Countries lacking equal inheritance rights tend to have lower top inheritance/estate tax rates to lineal heirs: averaging under 4 percent in countries with no equal inheritance rights versus nearly 13 percent in countries with full equal rights.
  - Property tax revenue potential: countries with weaker legal gender equality in asset ownership could collect over 0.5 percent of GDP in property tax revenues if approximating the frontier of countries with equal rights.
  - Recurrent property taxes are typically capitalized into property prices; high property transfer taxes can hamper women’s property purchases; some local governments have lower stamp duty rates for property purchases by women to mitigate disincentives (example: New Delhi and Punjab).

### Consumption taxes, VAT, and excises: gender considerations
- VAT:
  - A single-rate VAT without exemptions would likely be gender neutral unless lifetime consumption shares differ across genders.
  - Rate differentiation across goods can create implicit biases because consumption patterns differ by gender.
  - Empirical literature on gender-incidence of indirect taxes is scarce and mixed; household-level spending data limit precision.
  - Policy simulations typically find limited support for zero-rating beyond child-apparel.
  - General guidance: VAT reductions and exemptions are inferior to targeted transfers/subsidies for equity objectives; base-broadening with targeted protection for low-income households is preferable.
  - Feminine hygiene products:
    - Treat such goods coherently with other necessities where reduced rates are used.
    - Providing free or highly subsidized access to poor women can be more cost-effective than across-the-board VAT cuts.
    - Evidence of VAT passthrough to consumer prices is mixed.
- VAT on childcare services:
  - If childcare enables labor-market participation, lenient VAT treatment (or exemption/zero-rating where subsidies/credits are absent) can reduce work disincentives similar to income-tax treatment of work-related expenses.
- Excises:
  - Excises can entail implicit bias when consumption patterns differ across genders if they are used primarily to raise revenue rather than internalize externalities.
  - If an excise matches an externality (a Pigou tax), it is neutral to gender differences in consumption.
  - Example: Tobacco taxes often set below the externality level and thereby financially benefit men who on average smoke more; WHO recommends taxes make up at least 75 percent of tobacco retail prices, a level often not reached.

*Italic: Source – IMF Working Paper: Gendered Taxes: The Interaction of Tax Policy with Gender Equality (Box 1, concluded).*

### 19. Therefore, even though tobacco taxes have a higher incidence on men given their greater smoking rates,

### wpiea2022026-print-pdf - 19. Therefore, even though tobacco taxes have a higher incidence on men given their greater smoking rates,

### Tobacco taxation: incidence, implicit subsidy, and optimal-taxation argument
- Therefore, even though tobacco taxes have a higher incidence on men given their greater smoking rates, they effectively subsidize them, as they are likely undertaxed compared to the externalities/internalities generated.
- From an optimal commodity taxation perspective (to reduce deadweight loss), one could argue this bias should in fact be the reverse, as men’s tobacco consumption is typically less tax elastic (thus justifying a higher tax rate).
- Footnote 32: One complication is that the externality/internality may not be independent of gender. Notably, there is some research suggesting tobacco taxation can be particularly effective at reducing smoking during pregnancy for women, which then translates into improved educational outcomes of children from low socioeconomic backgrounds (Settele and van Ewijk 2018). This would argue for a higher excise on cigarettes consumed by pregnant women, but such differentiated excise would not be enforceable. In addition, the optimal commodity taxation argument referenced here is based solely on the Ramsey rule, rather than the Corlett-Hague (1953) rule (for lack of information on the leisure complementarity of tobacco consumption specifically).

### Cross-country pattern and gender smoking prevalence
- The implicit subsidy for tobacco products is highest in countries where relative female smoking rates are lowest.
- Figure 19 depicts this relationship; it has similarity to the finding on property taxes shown in Figure 16, in that both relationships are marked with high taxation when women are more likely to be liable to such tax.
- The paper notes that determining the source of this correlation is beyond its scope, but suggests it is possible policymakers may be more inclined for socio-cultural reasons to introduce heavier excises when women represent a relatively larger share of the smoker population.

### Carbon taxation and the gender dimension: evidence gaps and channels
- There is a dearth of literature on carbon footprint by gender, and nothing on the incidence of carbon taxes on women specifically, to the best of the authors’ knowledge.
- Several channels by which carbon taxes could be borne differentially by gender are identified:
  - consumption of carbon-intensive goods and services;
  - employment in carbon-intensive industries (production-angle);
  - exposure to negative environmental externalities.
- Evidence and considerations cited:
  - Some evidence men consume relatively more carbon-intensive transportation and food than women (informally termed the “eco gender gap”).
  - Carbon taxes raise relative prices in sectors where more men are employed than women (e.g., mining, oil, and gas), increasing production costs and potentially lowering associated wages.
  - The “green” economy stimulated by climate change mitigation measures (including carbon taxes) creates new jobs in currently male-dominated industries such as renewables, manufacturing, and construction (ILO 2018).
  - Mortality rates from environmental-related occupational risks and ambient exposure are higher for men worldwide (OECD 2020b).
- Net-burden consideration:
  - The true relative net burden of carbon taxes to men should offset the associated welfare cost of these premature deaths prevented by the introduction of carbon taxes against any increased tax burden due to higher carbon-intensive consumption and employment.
- Research recommendation:
  - Future research could combine existing household consumption survey data across countries with greenhouse gas emission figures and carbon tax data to determine the gender split of the effective tax burden across countries.

### Key conclusions and policy-relevant findings from the paper
- Aim: provide an exhaustive overview of the interactions between tax policy and gender equality, covering well-studied areas and those where findings are preliminary.
- Focus on implicit biases in tax systems and discussion of corrective gender-based taxes.
- Labor taxation:
  - The sensitivity of the labor supply of women (notably those in couples) is well established.
  - Policy advice: move from household to individual taxation to avoid high marginal tax rates on secondary earners that discourage taking up employment.
  - Reforms that raise the progressivity of tax systems can be expected to address inequality both via redistribution and by encouraging labor supply.
  - More complex reforms, such as well-designed earned income tax credits, can overcome specific hurdles in marginal tax rate schedules and benefit other disadvantaged groups.
- Capital income and wealth taxation:
  - Much less research exists, despite greater gender inequality in capital than labor income.
  - Lower capital income than labor income tax rates have a gender angle: they disproportionally benefit men given greater gender inequality in capital income.
  - The paper shows tentative empirical evidence that providing stronger property rights to women increases revenues.
- Consumption taxes:
  - Even less is known and policy recommendations are less clear-cut due to household-level consumption data limitations.
  - VAT rates for specific products are often debated, but there are often better ways of achieving desirable outcomes.
  - Tentative empirical work finds revenue from tobacco taxes is higher where smoking is less dominated by men—a finding with similarity to the property tax result despite covering a different tax type.
- Overarching policy imperative:
  - While more research is needed, there are plenty of well-justified policy reforms that would contribute to gender equality.
  - Tax policy may not always be the first-best tool, but explicitly neutral tax policy can have first-order effects on important dimensions of inequality.
  - It is imperative that gender impact analysis be incorporated in optimal policy design.

*IMF Working Papers: Gendered Taxes: The Interaction of Tax Policy with Gender Equality*

### References

### References

### Taxation, household structure, and gendered tax design
- Apps, Patricia F. and Ray Rees, 1999, “Individual Versus Joint Taxation in Models with Household Production,” Journal of Political Economy 107(2): 393-403.
- Apps, Patricia and Ray Rees, 2004, “Fertility, Taxation and Family Policy,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106(4): 745-763.
- Apps, Patricia and Ray Rees, 2011, “Optimal Taxation and Tax Reform for Two-Earner Households,” CESifo Economic Studies 57(2): 283-304.
- Bastani, S., 2013, “Gender-Based and Couple-Based Taxation,” International Tax and Public Finance 20(4): 653-686.
- Boskin, M.J. and E. Sheshinski, 1983, “Optimal Tax Treatment of the Family: Married Couples,” Journal of Public Economics 20(3): 281-297.
- Cremer, Helmuth and Kerstin Roeder, 2019, "Income Taxation of Couples, Spouses’ Labor Supplies and the Gender Wage Gap," Economics Letters 175: 71-75.
- Meier, V. and M. Wrede, 2013, Reducing the Excess Burden of Subsidizing the Stork: Joint Taxation, Individual Taxation, and Family Tax Splitting, Journal of Population Economics 26(3): 1195-1207.
- Mirrlees, James A. 1971, “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies 38(2): 175–208.
- Ramsey, Frank P, 1927, “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation.” Economic Journal, 37(145): 47–61.
- Spencer, N. S., 1986, “Taxation of Husband and Wife: Lessons from Europe,” Fiscal Studies 7(3): 83–90.
- Seely, Antony, 2021, “Income Tax Allowances for Married Couples, Briefing Paper No. 870, House of Commons Library.

### Labor supply, female employment, and labor market participation
- Besamusca, J., K. Tijdens, M. Keune, and S. Steinmetz, 2015, “Working Women Worldwide. Age Effects in Female Labor Force Participation in 117 Countries,” World Development 74: 123-141.
- Bick, A. and N. Fuchs-Schündeln, 2018, Taxation and Labour Supply of Married Couples across Countries: A Macroeconomic Analysis, Review of Economic Studies 85(3): 1543–1576.
- Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2007. “Changes in the Labor Supply Behavior of Married Women: 1980–2000.” Journal of Labor Economics 25(3): 393–438.
- Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn, 2017, “The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations," Journal of Economic Literature: 55 (3): 789-865.
- Fabrizio, Stefania, Anna Fruttero, Daniel Gurara, Lisa Kolovich, Vivian Malta, Marina M. Tavares, and Nino Tchelishvili, 2020, “Women in the Labor Force: The Role of Fiscal Policies,” IMF Staff Discussion Notes No. 20/03.
- IZA, 2014. “Female Labor Force Participation in Developing Countries”. IZA World of Labor 2014: 87.
- Thomas, A. and P. O’Reilly, 2016, “The Impact of Tax and Benefit Systems on the Workforce Participation Incentives of Women,” OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 29.
- Waldfogel, Jane, 1997, “The Effect of Children on Women's Wages.” American Sociological Review 62(2), 209–217.

### Wealth, assets, property, and top incomes
- Anglade, Boaz, Useche, Pilar and Carmen Diana Deere, 2017, “Decomposing the Gender Wealth Gap in Ecuador," World Development 96(C): 19-31.
- Deere, Carmen Diana, Abena D. Oduro, Hema Swaminathan, and Cheryl Doss, 2013, “Property Rights and the Gender Distribution of Wealth in Ecuador, Ghana and India,” Journal of Economic Inequality 11 (2): 249–65.
- Edlund, Lena and Wojciech Kopczuk, 2009. “Women, Wealth, and Mobility”. American Economic Review 99: 146-178.
- Saez, Emmanuel and Gabriel Zucman, 2016, “Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(2): 519–578.
- Scheuer, F. and J. Slemrod, 2021, “Taxing Our Wealth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 35(1): 207–30.
- Schneebaum, A., M. Rehm, K. Mader, and K. Hollan, 2018, “The Gender Wealth Gap Across European Countries,” Review of Income and Wealth 64: 295-331.
- Bobilev, R., A. Boschini, and J. Roine, 2020, “Women in the Top of the Income Distribution: What Can We Learn From LIS-Data?” Italian Economic Journal 6: 63–107.
- Boschini, Anne and Jesper Roine, 2020, “The Share of Women in Top Incomes”, VoxEU, 29 January.
- Goldsmith-Pinkham, Paul S. and Kelly Shue, 2020, “The Gender Gap in Housing Returns,” NBER Working Paper No. W26914.

### Indirect taxation, VAT/excises, and consumption taxes
- Ebrill, Liam, Michael Keen, Jean-Paul Bodin, and Victoria Summers, 2001, The Modern VAT, International Monetary Fund.
- Crawford, Ian, Michael Keen, and Stephen Smith, 2010, “Value Added Taxes and Excises.” In Dimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review, edited by James Mirrlees et al., 275–422. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Casale, D.M., 2012, “Indirect Taxation and Gender Equity: Evidence from South Africa,” Feminist Economics 18(3): 25-54.
- De la Feria, Rita and Michael Walpole, 2020, “The Impact of Public Perceptions on General Consumption Taxes,” British Tax Review 5: 637-669.
- Jurga, Ina, Marc Yates, and Sarah Bagel, 2020, “What Impact Does a VAT/GST Reduction or Removal Have on the Price of Menstrual Products?” WASH United gGmbH.
- Rossouw, Laura and Hana Ross, 2020, “An Economic Assessment of Menstrual Hygiene Product Tax Cuts,” Gates Open Res 2020, 4:137 [version 1; not peer reviewed].
- Crawford, Ian; Keen, Michael; Smith, Stephen, 2010 (see above) — coverage of VAT/excise design relevant to gendered incidence.

### Credit, financial inclusion, housing finance, and retirement
- Alesina, A., F. Lotti, and P. Mistrulli, 2013, “Do women pay more for credit? Evidence from Italy,” Journal of the European Economic Association 11: 45-66.
- Morsy, Hanan, Amira El-Shal, and Andinet Woldemichael, 2019, “Women Self-Selection out of the Credit Market in Africa,” African Development Bank Working Paper 317.
- Ongena, S. and A. Popov, 2016, “Gender Bias and Credit Access,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 48(8): 1691–1724.
- International Finance Corporation (IFC), 2019. “Her Home - Housing Finance for Women”.
- Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies. 2018, “Here and Now: How Women Can Take Control of Their Retirement,” Select Findings from the 18th Annual Transamerica Retirement Survey of Workers, Research Report.
- Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2019, “Global Wealth Databook 2019”.
- Wealth X, 2019, “Billionaire Census 2019”.

### Public provision, childcare, family policy, and fertility
- Domeij, David Paul Klein, 2013, “Should Day Care be Subsidized?,” Review of Economic Studies 80(2): 568-595.
- Gauthier, Anne Helene, 2007, “The Impact of Family Policies on Fertility in Industrialized Countries: A Review of the Literature.” Population Research and Policy Review, 26: 323–346.
- Rossin-Slater, Maya, 2017, “Maternity and Family Leave Policy,” NBER Working Paper No. 23069.
- OECD, 2020c, “Is Childcare Affordable?” Policy Brief on Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, OECD, Paris.
- Fabrizio et al., 2020, “Women in the Labor Force: The Role of Fiscal Policies,” IMF Staff Discussion Notes No. 20/03 (see above).

### Gender gaps, preferences, behavior, and social attitudes
- Aguiar, Mark and Erik Hurst, 2007, “Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of Time over Five Decades,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3): 969–1006.
- Croson, R. and U. Gneezy, 2009, “Gender Differences in Preferences,” Journal of Economic Literature 47: 448-474.
- Barber, B.M. and T. Odean, 2001, “Boys will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116: 261-292.
- Torgler, Benno and Neven Valev, 2010, “Gender and Public Attitudes toward Corruption and Tax Evasion,” Contemporary Economic Policy 28: 554-568.
- Hunt, Ellen, 2020, “The Eco Gender Gap: Why is Saving the Planet Seen as Women’s Work?” The Guardian, February 6.

### Health, environmental, and behavioral taxation evidence
- Nelson JP, 2014, “Gender Differences in Alcohol Demand: a Systematic Review of the Role of Prices and Taxes,” Health Economics 23(10):1260-80.
- Settele, Sonja and Reyn van Ewijk, 2018, "Can Cigarette Taxes During Pregnancy Mitigate the Intergenerational Transmission of Socioeconomic Status?," Labour Economics 55(C): 130-148.
- Cohen, MG, 2015. “Gendered Emissions: Counting Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Gender and Why it Matters”, in Lipsig-Mumme and McBride (eds), Working in a Warming World, 59-81, McGill-Queen’s Press, Montreal and Kingston.
- OECD, 2020b, “Gender and Environmental Statistics: Exploring Available Data and Developing New Evidence”, OECD Publishing, Paris.
- Räty, R. and A. Carlsson-Kanyama, 2010, "Energy Consumption by Gender in Some European Countries," Energy Policy 38(1): 646-649.

### Data sources, databases, and tools referenced
- Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (multiple countries; June-December, 2021). Luxembourg: LIS.
- LIS Data Access Research Tool (DART), https://dart.lisdatacenter.org/ (Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS) database, December 2021). Luxembourg: LIS.
- World Bank, 2021, “Women, Business and the Law 2021,” Washington, DC.
- IBFD, 2021, Individual Taxation, Country Tax Guides (for all available countries).

### IMF and multilateral policy-relevant publications included
- International Monetary Fund, 2013, “Women, Work and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity,” IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/10. Washington, DC.
- International Monetary Fund, 2017, “Fiscal Monitor: Tackling Inequality,” October, Washington, DC.
- International Monetary Fund, 2018, “Gender and Finance: A Case for Closing Gaps,” IMF Staff Discussion Note 18/05. Washington, DC.
- International Monetary Fund, 2021a, “Fiscal Monitor: A Fair Shot”, Chapter 2, April, Washington, DC.
- International Monetary Fund, 2021b, “Gender Equality and COVID-19: Policies and Institutions for Mitigating the Crisis”, Special Series on COVID-19, Washington, DC.
- Tang, Vincent et al., 2021, “Gender Equality and COVID-19: Policies and Institutions for Mitigating the Crisis,” Special Series on COVID-19, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

*Gendered Taxes: The Interaction of Tax Policy with Gender Equality Working Paper No. WP/22/26*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022026-print-pdf.pdf_