## wpiea2022250-print-pdf

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [wpiea2022250-print-pdf](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022250-print-pdf.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022250-print-pdf.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022250-print-pdf.pdf.json)

---

### Key findings and executive summary
- Weather shocks, as captured through a drought (aridity) index, increase the likelihood of intercommunal (non-state) domestic conflicts by as high as up to 38 percent.
- The effect holds for intercommunal conflicts and one-sided violence, but not for state-based (government-involved) conflicts.
- The effect is amplified in countries with:
  - More unequal income distribution.
  - A stronger share of young male demographics.
- Resilience factors that mitigate the weather shocks → conflict link include:
  - Higher quality social protection and access to basic health care services.
  - Stronger tax revenue mobilization.
  - Scaled up public investment in the agricultural sector.
  - Stepped-up anti-desertification (forest coverage) efforts.
- Results are robust across multiple sensitivity checks, alternative conflict measures, and alternative weather shock indicators.

### Introduction and motivation
- Study scope: 51 African countries over 1990–2018.
- Research goal: assess whether and to what extent climate shocks affect domestic conflict incidence, and identify resilience strategies to break the linkage.
- Novelty:
  - Macro-level analysis complementing grid-cell studies.
  - Broader weather shock indicator accounting jointly for precipitation and temperature via an aridity index (inverse CRU aridity index, min-max normalized to range 0 to 10).
  - Focus on intercommunal conflicts rather than just herder–farmer clashes.

### Data and variables
- Sample: 51 African countries, 1990–2018.
- Primary dependent variable: intercommunal conflict (UCDP GED Version 19.1), defined as non-state conflict (use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither the government).
- Alternative conflict data for robustness: ACLED (filtered for communal militia interaction codes).
- Primary weather shock variable: aridity index (inverse of CRU aridity index, min-max transformed to range 0 to 10).
- Alternative drought proxies:
  - Drought intensity (EM-DAT): share of population affected by drought.
  - SPEI-based extreme dry episodes: number of months SPEI < -2 in a calendar year.
- Controls include:
  - Economic: per capita GDP, real GDP growth, access to electricity.
  - Demographic: population size, population growth, population density, ethnic fractionalization (EF index).
  - Institutional quality: average of six WGI indicators.
  - Resilience/conditional variables: tax revenue (% GDP), remittances (% GDP), credit to private sector (% GDP), health expenditure (% GDP), hospital beds per 1000, redistribution effort (SWIID), investment in agriculture (% GDP), forest coverage (% total land).
- Descriptive highlights:
  - In-sample mean of Drought index: 0.5050179 (N=1,377, Std. Dev. 1.16678, Min 0, Max 10).
  - Conflict type 2 (non-state) mean: 0.2129817 (N=1,479).
  - Employment in agriculture sector (2015) referenced around 52% in rural populations.

### Methodology
- Econometric model: binary Logit discrete choice with Correlated Random Effects (CRE) to address unobserved country heterogeneity and allow estimation of time-constant covariates.
- Specification elements:
  - Weather shock variable(s) X_it (including lagged values).
  - Controls Z_it−1 (lagged where appropriate).
  - Country means of time-varying covariates X_i̅ and Z_i̅ (Mundlak approach).
  - Year dummies and lagged dependent variable to capture persistence.
- Rationale for CRE:
  - RE assumption Cov(μ_i, X) = 0 is often invalid.
  - FE has drawbacks in nonlinear models (incidental parameters problem) and would exclude time-invariant dependent observations (43% of sample with zero intercommunal conflict across the period).

### Econometric results — baseline
- Drought (aridity) index positively associated with intercommunal conflict occurrence at 1% significance in several specifications.
- Odds ratio interpretation: estimated odds ratios range between 1.22 and 1.38; a one-unit increase in drought index raises the chance of intercommunal conflict by between 22 and 38 percent.
- AUROC (predictive power):
  - Generally above 0.88 in most model columns.
  - Column 1 AUROC = 0.578 when only aridity index included.
- Additional baseline correlates:
  - Lagged conflict is positive and significant (persistence).
  - Higher log GDP per capita (t-1) associated with lower conflict probability (significant).
  - Access to electricity (t-1) negative in some specifications.
  - Institutional quality (t-1) significantly negative.
  - Ethnic fractionalization positive and significant.
  - Log population (t-1) positive and significant.
  - Sahel dummy not significant for intercommunal conflicts in baseline (but significant for state-based conflicts in placebo tests).

### Conditional effects (heterogeneity and resilience factors)
- Demographics:
  - Sample split by youth share (<20% vs ≥20%): drought index (t-1) significantly positive for Group 2 (≥20%), insignificant for Group 1 (<20%). (Group medians: threshold 20 percent.)
  - Within youth-rich countries, effect stronger when male youth share outweighs female youth share.
- Macroeconomic and social resilience (interaction findings):
  - Tax revenue (% GDP): drought index (t-1) coefficient 3.134*** (0.803); interaction -0.164*** (0.049) → higher tax mobilization mitigates drought-driven conflict.
  - Health expenditure (% GDP): drought index (t-1) 0.992** (0.433); interaction -0.132* (0.078).
  - Hospital beds per 1000 people: drought index (t-1) 1.579*** (0.572); interaction -0.669*** (0.248).
  - Investment in agriculture (% GDP): drought index (t-1) 0.920*** (0.297); interaction -0.568* (0.293).
  - Forest coverage (% total land): drought index (t-1) 0.327*** (0.125); interaction -0.403** (0.201).
  - Remittances and access to credit: negative interactions but statistically insignificant.
  - Redistribution effort (market vs disposable Gini): interaction negative and significant → stronger redistribution mitigates climate–conflict link.

### Robustness checks
- Alternative dependent variable (“Number of conflicts per year” in 5 ordered categories):
  - Ordered probit+CRE: Drought index (t-1) 0.524** (0.211).
- Alternative estimation methods (Probit CRE, Logit RE, Probit RE) deliver qualitatively similar positive results.
- Placebo tests across conflict types:
  - All conflicts: Drought index (t-1) 0.686** (0.336).
  - Conflict type 1 (State-based): Drought index (t-1) -0.0536 (0.332) — not significant.
  - Conflict type 2 (Non-state/intercommunal): Drought index (t-1) 0.319** (0.151).
  - Conflict type 3 (One-sided violence): Drought index (t-1) 0.621** (0.299).
- Alternative weather shock indicators:
  - Drought intensity (EM-DAT): coefficient 0.00768 (0.0333) — positive but not significant.
  - SPEI (t-1): -0.0128 (0.439) — not significant.
  - Extreme dry episode (t-1): 0.634** (0.305) — positive and significant.
  - ACLED-based intercommunal conflict measure: Drought index (t-1) 0.477* (0.219) — qualitatively similar.
- Controlling for additional covariates (capital stock, youth unemployment, male/female youth unemployment, agriculture land %, arable land %, rural population %) leaves the drought index coefficient qualitatively unchanged. Example: with capital stock added, Drought index (t-1) 0.400** (0.177).

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Strengthen macro- and social resilience to reduce climate-driven conflict risk:
  - Improve tax revenue mobilization to build fiscal space for shocks and to finance social programs.
  - Expand social safety nets and improve access to quality health care services (health expenditure, hospital capacity).
  - Scale up public investment in the agricultural sector (irrigation, inputs, technical assistance, targeted transfers).
  - Implement redistributive policies to reduce income inequality and exclusion (addressing market vs disposable Gini gaps).
  - Promote reforestation and anti-desertification to reduce vulnerabilities captured by forest coverage.
  - Create job opportunities for youth, with emphasis on male youth cohorts where demographics amplify risk.
- Call for holistic reforms to strengthen adaptability to climate shocks and macroeconomic shocks more broadly, aligned with UN 13th Sustainable Development Goal (climate action).

### Conclusion
- Macro-level empirical evidence from 51 African countries over 1990–2018 indicates a robust relationship between weather shocks (drought/aridity) and intercommunal conflicts.
- The link is conditional on demographic, institutional, and macroeconomic characteristics; targeted resilience-building policies can mitigate the climate–conflict nexus.
- Results underscore the need for comprehensive policy packages combining fiscal capacity, social protection, agricultural investment, anti-desertification, and youth employment strategies.

*Source: wpiea2022250-print-pdf*

### References .............................................................................................................

### wpiea2022250-print-pdf - References .............................................................................................................

### Key findings and executive summary
- Weather shocks, as captured through a drought (aridity) index, increase the likelihood of intercommunal (non-state) domestic conflicts by as high as up to 38 percent.
- The effect holds for intercommunal conflicts and one-sided violence, but not for state-based (government-involved) conflicts.
- The effect is amplified in countries with:
  - More unequal income distribution.
  - A stronger share of young male demographics.
- Resilience factors that mitigate the weather shocks → conflict link include:
  - Higher quality social protection and access to basic health care services.
  - Stronger tax revenue mobilization.
  - Scaled up public investment in the agricultural sector.
  - Stepped-up anti-desertification (forest coverage) efforts.
- Results are robust across multiple sensitivity checks, alternative conflict measures, and alternative weather shock indicators.

### Introduction and motivation
- Study scope: 51 African countries over 1990-2018.
- Research goal: assess whether and to what extent climate shocks affect domestic conflict incidence, and identify resilience strategies to break the linkage.
- Novelty:
  - Macro-level analysis complementing grid-cell studies.
  - Broader weather shock indicator accounting jointly for precipitation and temperature via an aridity index (inverse CRU aridity index, min-max normalized to range 0 to 10).
  - Focus on intercommunal conflicts rather than just herder–farmer clashes.

### Literature context
- Climate shocks (droughts, floods, extreme temperatures, storms) are increasingly considered drivers of domestic conflicts through competition for scarce natural resources and impacts on agricultural-dependent livelihoods.
- Prior mixed evidence; von Uexkull and others (2016) note lack of consensus on climate–conflict relationship.
- Nonlinearity and heterogeneity matter: demographic structure, institutional quality, social protection, and economic factors condition the relationship.

### Data and variables
- Sample: 51 African countries, 1990–2018.
- Primary dependent variable: intercommunal conflict (UCDP GED Version 19.1), defined as non-state conflict (use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither the government).
- Alternative conflict data for robustness: ACLED (filtered for communal militia interaction codes).
- Primary weather shock (interest) variable: aridity index (inverse of CRU aridity index, min-max transformed to range 0 to 10).
- Alternative drought proxies for robustness:
  - Drought intensity (EM-DAT): share of population affected by drought.
  - SPEI-based extreme dry episodes: number of months SPEI < -2 in a calendar year.
- Controls:
  - Economic: per capita GDP, real GDP growth, access to electricity.
  - Demographic: population size, population growth, population density, ethnic fractionalization (EF index).
  - Institutional quality: average of six WGI indicators.
  - Other conditional/resilience variables: tax revenue (% GDP), remittances (% GDP), credit to private sector (% GDP), health expenditure (% GDP), hospital beds per 1000, redistribution effort (SWIID), investment in agriculture (% GDP), forest coverage (% total land).
- Descriptive highlights:
  - In-sample mean of Drought index: 0.5050179 (N=1,377, Std. Dev. 1.16678, Min 0, Max 10).
  - Conflict type 2 (non-state) mean: 0.2129817 (N=1,479).
  - Employment in agriculture sector (2015) averages around 52% in rural populations referenced in text.

### Methodology
- Econometric model: binary Logit discrete choice with Correlated Random Effects (CRE) to address unobserved country heterogeneity and allow estimation of time-constant covariates.
- Specification accounts for:
  - Weather shock variable(s) X_it (including lagged values).
  - Controls Z_it−1 (lagged where appropriate).
  - Country means of time-varying covariates X_i̅ and Z_i̅ to implement CRE (Mundlak approach).
  - Year dummies and lagged dependent variable to capture persistence.
- Rationale for CRE:
  - RE assumption Cov(μ_i, X) = 0 is often invalid.
  - FE has drawbacks in nonlinear models (incidental parameters problem) and would exclude time-invariant dependent observations (43% of sample with zero intercommunal conflict across the period).

### Econometric results — baseline
- Main baseline: drought (aridity) index positively associated with intercommunal conflict occurrence at 1% significance in several specifications.
- Odds ratio interpretation: estimated odds ratios range between 1.22 and 1.38; a one-unit increase in drought index raises the chance of intercommunal conflict by between 22 and 38 percent.
- AUROC (predictive power) generally above 0.88 in most model columns; column 1 AUROC = 0.578 when only aridity index included.
- Additional baseline correlates:
  - Lagged conflict is positive and significant (persistence).
  - Higher log GDP per capita (t-1) is associated with lower conflict probability (significant).
  - Access to electricity (t-1) negative in some specifications.
  - Institutional quality (t-1) significantly negative (mitigates conflicts).
  - Ethnic fractionalization positive and significant.
  - Log population (t-1) positive and significant.
  - Sahel dummy not significant for intercommunal conflicts in baseline (but significant for state-based conflicts in placebo tests).

### Conditional effects (heterogeneity and resilience factors)
- Demographics:
  - Sample split by youth share (<20% vs ≥20%): drought index (t-1) significantly positive for Group 2 (≥20%), insignificant for Group 1 (<20%). (Group medians: threshold 20 percent.)
  - Within youth-rich countries, effect stronger when male youth share outweighs female youth share.
- Macroeconomic and social resilience:
  - Tax revenue (% GDP): interaction (drought index * tax revenue) negative and significant → higher tax mobilization mitigates drought-driven conflict.
  - Remittances and access to credit: negative interactions but statistically insignificant.
  - Health expenditure and hospital beds: interaction terms negative and significant → better health services mitigate conflict risk from droughts.
  - Redistribution effort (difference between market and disposable Gini): interaction negative and significant → stronger redistribution mitigates climate–conflict link.
  - Investment in agriculture (% GDP): interaction negative and significant → scaled-up public investment reduces conflict risk after weather shocks.
  - Forest coverage (% total land): interaction negative and significant → reforestation/anti-desertification mitigates conflict risk.
- Table 3 interaction coefficients examples (drought index (t-1) positive coefficients and drought index * X negative coefficients with significance where noted):
  - X = Tax Revenue: Drought index (t-1) 3.134*** (0.803); interaction -0.164*** (0.049).
  - X = Health expenditure: Drought index (t-1) 0.992** (0.433); interaction -0.132* (0.078).
  - X = Hospital beds per 1000 people: Drought index (t-1) 1.579*** (0.572); interaction -0.669*** (0.248).
  - X = Investment in agriculture: Drought index (t-1) 0.920*** (0.297); interaction -0.568* (0.293).
  - X = Forest coverage: Drought index (t-1) 0.327*** (0.125); interaction -0.403** (0.201).

### Robustness checks
- Alternative dependent variable: “Number of conflicts per year” (rearranged into 5 ordered categories) — ordered probit and ordered logit CRE confirm higher drought index associated with more intense intercommunal conflicts. Example coefficient: Drought index (t-1) 0.524** (0.211) in ordered probit+CRE.
- Alternative estimation methods: Probit CRE, Logit RE, Probit RE deliver qualitatively similar positive results; Logit FE less reliable due to FE limitations.
- Placebo tests across conflict types:
  - All conflicts: Drought index (t-1) 0.686** (0.336).
  - Conflict type 1 (State-based): Drought index (t-1) -0.0536 (0.332) — not significant.
  - Conflict type 2 (Non-state/intercommunal): Drought index (t-1) 0.319** (0.151).
  - Conflict type 3 (One-sided violence): Drought index (t-1) 0.621** (0.299).
- Alternative weather shock indicators:
  - Drought intensity (EM-DAT): coefficient 0.00768 (0.0333) — positive but not significant.
  - SPEI (t-1): -0.0128 (0.439) — not significant.
  - Extreme dry episode (t-1): 0.634** (0.305) — positive and significant.
  - ACLED-based intercommunal conflict measure: Drought index (t-1) 0.477* (0.219) — qualitatively similar.
- Controlling for additional covariates (capital stock, youth unemployment, male/female youth unemployment, agriculture land %, arable land %, rural population %) leaves the drought index coefficient qualitatively unchanged. Example: with capital stock added, Drought index (t-1) 0.400** (0.177).

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Strengthen macro- and social resilience to reduce climate-driven conflict risk:
  - Improve tax revenue mobilization to build fiscal space for shocks and to finance social programs.
  - Expand social safety nets and improve access to quality health care services (health expenditure, hospital capacity).
  - Scale up public investment in the agricultural sector (irrigation, inputs, technical assistance, targeted transfers).
  - Implement redistributive policies to reduce income inequality and exclusion (addressing market vs disposable Gini gaps).
  - Promote reforestation and anti-desertification to reduce vulnerabilities captured by forest coverage.
  - Create job opportunities for youth, with emphasis on male youth cohorts where demographics amplify risk.
- Holistic reforms to strengthen adaptability to climate shocks and macroeconomic shocks more broadly, aligned with the UN 13th Sustainable Development Goal (climate action), are called for.

### Conclusion
- Macro-level empirical evidence from 51 African countries over 1990–2018 indicates a robust relationship between weather shocks (drought/aridity) and intercommunal conflicts.
- The link is conditional on demographic, institutional, and macroeconomic characteristics; targeted resilience-building policies can mitigate the climate–conflict nexus.
- Results underscore the need for comprehensive policy packages combining fiscal capacity, social protection, agricultural investment, anti-desertification, and youth employment strategies.

*IMF WORKING PAPERS Climate Shocks and Domestic Conflicts in Africa — wpiea2022250-print-pdf*

### References

### References

### Climate–conflict empirical studies and reviews
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American economic review, 91(5), 1369–1401.
- Buhaug, H., Nordkvelle, J., Bernauer, T., Böhmelt, T., Brzoska, M., Busby, J. W., Ciccone, A., Fjelde, H., Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2014). One effect to rule them all? A comment on climate and conflict. Climatic Change, 127(3‑4), 391–397.
- Burke, M., Hsiang, S.M. and Miguel, E. (2015). Climate and conflict. Annu. Rev. Econ., 7(1), 577–617.
- Carleton, T., Hsiang, S.M. and Burke, M. (2016). Conflict in a changing climate. The European Physical Journal Special Topics, 225(3), 489–511.
- Hsiang, S.M., Burke, M. and Miguel, E. (2014). Reconciling climate-conflict meta-analyses: reply to Buhaug et al. Climatic Change, 127(3), 399–405.
- Mach, K.J., Kraan, C.M., Adger, W.N., Buhaug, H., Burke, M., Fearon, J.D., Field, C.B., Hendrix, C.S., Maystadt, J.F., O’Loughlin, J. and Roessler, P. (2019). Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict. Nature, 571(7764), 193–197.
- Schleussner, C.-F., Donges, J. F., Donner, R. V., & Schellnhuber, H. J. (2016). Armed-conflict risks enhanced by climate-related disasters in ethnically fractionalized countries. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(33), 9216–9221.
- Von Uexkull, N., Croicu, M., Fjelde, H., & Buhaug, H. (2016). Civil conflict sensitivity to growing-season drought. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(44), 12391–12396.
- Raleigh, C. and Urdal, H. (2007). Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict, Political Geography 26, 674–694
- Reuveny, R. (2007). Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict. Political geography, 26(6), 656–673.
- Gleick, P. H. (2014). Water, drought, climate change, and conflict in Syria. Weather, Climate, and Society, 6(3), 331–340.
- Harari, M. and Ferrara, E.L. (2018). Conflict, climate, and cells: a disaggregated analysis. Review of Economics and Statistics, 100(4), 594–608.
- Hendrix, C. S., & Glaser, S. M. (2007). Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political geography, 26(6), 695–715.
- Van Uexkull et al. (2016) [see Von Uexkull entry above].

### Conflict, grievances, resources, and political economy
- Collier, P. (2000). Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy.
- Collier, P., Berdal, M., & Malone, D. M. (2000). Greed and Grievance: economic agendas in civil wars. Doing Well out of war, London.
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2001). Data issues in the study of conflict. Identifying Wars: Systematic Conflict Research and Its Utility in Conflict Resolution and Prevention, Uppsala, Swe den, 8(9).
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563‑595. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2005). Resource rents, governance, and conflict. Journal of conflict resolution, 49(4), 625–633.
- Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (1999). Conflict and distribution. Journal of Economic Theory, 87(2), 379–415.
- Fearon, J. D. (2004). Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others? Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 275‑301. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043770
- Fearon, J. D. (2006). Ethnic mobilization and ethnic violence. The Oxford handbook of political economy, 852–868.
- Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75‑90. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000534
- Østby, G. (2008). Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 45(2), 143–162.
- Østby, G., Nord\aas, R., & Rød, J. K. (2009). Regional inequalities and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Studies Quarterly, 53(2), 301–324.
- Stewart, F. (2016). Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies. Springer.
- Pettersson, T., Högbladh, S., & Öberg, M. (2019). Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements. Journal of Peace Research, 56(4), 589–603.

### Methodology, econometrics, and data issues
- Allison, P. D. (2009). Fixed effects regression models (Vol. 160). SAGE publications.
- Chamberlain, G. (1979). Analysis of covariance with qualitative data. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Mundlak, Y. (1978). On the pooling of time series and cross section data. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 69–85.
- Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT press.
- Wooldridge, J. M. (2019a). Correlated random effects models with unbalanced panels. Journal of Econometrics, 211(1), 137–150.
- Wooldridge, J. M. (2019b). Correlated random effects models with unbalanced panels. Journal of Econometrics, 211(1), 137‑150. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2018.12.010
- Eck, K. (2012). In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED conflict events datasets. Cooperation and Conflict, 47(1), 124–141.
- Sundberg, R., & Melander, E. (2013). Introducing the UCDP georeferenced event dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 50(4), 523–532.
- Raleigh, C., & Dowd, C. (s. d.). Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook. 24.
- Drazanova, L. (2019). Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) [Data set]. Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/4JQRCL

### Climate science, impacts on agriculture, and vulnerability
- Canadell, J. G., & Raupach, M. R. (2008). Managing Forests for Climate Change Mitigation. Science, 320(5882), 1456‑1457. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1155458
- IPCC, C. C. (2001). IPCC Third Assessment Report. Climate Change 2001. In five volumes: Synthesis Report (Short version 184 pp. and long version 398 pp.) Working Group I: The Scientific Basis, 944 pp. Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 1000 pp. Working Group III: Mitigation, 700 pp. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. IPCC Third Assessment Report of Working Group I.
- IPCC, T. (2007). Climate change 2007: synthesis report. Contribution of working groups I, II and III to the fourth assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change, 95–212.
- Masson-Delmotte, V., Zhai, P., Pörtner, H. O., Roberts, D., Skea, J., Shukla, P. R., Pirani, A., Moufouma-Okia, W., Péan, C., & Pidcock, R. (2018). IPCC, 2018: Summary for policymakers. Global warming of, 1.
- Mendelsohn, R., Dinar, A., & Dalfelt, A. (2000). Climate change impacts on African agriculture. Preliminary analysis prepared for the World Bank, Washington, District of Columbia, 25.
- Ringler, C., Zhu, T., Cai, X., Koo, J., & Wang, D. (2010). Climate change impacts on food security in sub-Saharan Africa. Insights from Comprehensive Climate Change Scenarios, 2.
- Vicente-Serrano, S. M., Gouveia, C., Camarero, J. J., Beguería, S., Trigo, R., López-Moreno, J. I., Azorín-Molina, C., Pasho, E., Lorenzo-Lacruz, J., & Revuelto, J. (2013). Response of vegetation to drought time-scales across global land biomes. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(1), 52–57.
- Santoni Olivier. (2017). Base de données Climat au niveau pays 1901-2016.

### Adaptation, remittances, social spending, and policy instruments
- Bendandi, B., & Pauw, P. (2016). Remittances for Adaptation: An ‘Alternative Source’ of International Climate Finance? In A. Milan, B. Schraven, K. Warner, & N. Cascone (Éds.), Migration, Risk Management and Climate Change: Evidence and Policy Responses (p. 195‑211). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-42922-9_10
- Le De, L., Gaillard, J. C., & Friesen, W. (2013). Remittances and disaster: a review. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 4, 34–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2013.03.007
- Catalano, M., Forni, L., & Pezzolla, E. (2020). Climate-change adaptation: The role of fiscal policy. Resource and Energy Economics, 59, 101111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2019.07.005
- Cammeraat, E. (2020). The relationship between different social expenditure schemes and poverty, inequality and economic growth. International Social Security Review, 73(2), 101‑123. https://doi.org/10.1111/issr.12236
- Celikay, F., & Gumus, E. (2017). The effect of social spending on reducing poverty. International Journal of Social Economics, 44(5), 620‑632. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSE-10-2015-0274
- IMF. (2020b). Adapting to Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. International Monetary Fund. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF086/28915-9781513536835/28915-9781513536835/ch02.xml?redirect=true
- IMF. (2017). Sub-Saharan Africa Fiscal Adjustment and Economic Diversification - chapter 3 in the October 2017 Regional Economic Outlook of the IMF’s African Department (pages 55-70).
- IMF. (2019). Building Resilience in Developing Countries Vulnerable to Large Natural Disasters. IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/06/24/Building-Resilience-in-Developing-Countries-Vulnerable-to-Large-Natural-Disasters-47020
- IMF. (2020). Natural Disaster Insurance for Sovereigns: Issues, Challenges and Optimality. IMF. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2020/01/17/Natural-Disaster-Insurance-for-Sovereigns-Issues-Challenges-and-Optimality-48925

### Regional studies, case studies, and conflict dynamics in Africa
- Africa report. (2020). Role of climate change in Central Sahel’s conflicts: not so clear. The Africa Report.Com. https://www.theafricareport.com/26791/role-of-climate-change-in-central-sahels-conflicts-not-so-clear/
- Sangaré, Y., & McSparren, J. J. (2018). Acknowledging Conflict across Mali’s Centre: Drivers and History. African Solutions Journal, 3, 14–38.
- Tumushabe, J. T. (2018). Climate change, food security and sustainable development in Africa. In The Palgrave handbook of African politics, governance and development (p. 853–868). Springer.
- McGuirk, E. and Burke, M. (2020). The economic origins of conflict in Africa. Journal of Political Economy, 128(10), 3940–3997.
- McGuirk, E.F. and Nunn, N. (2020). Nomadic Pastoralism, Climate Change, and Conflict in Africa, Working paper.
- Helgeson, J. F., Dietz, S., & Hochrainer-Stigler, S. (2013). Vulnerability to Weather Disasters: the Choice of Coping Strategies in Rural Uganda. Ecology and Society, 18(2). JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26269323
- Kniveton, D., Schmidt-Verkerk, K., Smith, C., & Black, R. (2008). Climate Change and Migration.
- Ikejiaku, B. V. (2012). Poverty-conflict nexus: the contentious issue revisited. European Journal of Sustainable Development, 1(2), 127–127.
- Urdal, H. (s. d.). Demograpy and Armed Conflict: Assessing the Role of Population Growth and Youth Bulges. 2, 18.
- Urdal, H. (2005). People vs. Malthus: Population pressure, environmental degradation, and armed conflict revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 42(4), 417–434.
- Yilmaz, M. E. (2005). Interactive Problem Solving in Intercommunal Conflicts. Peace Review, 17(4), 443‑450. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402650500374751

*Source: wpiea2022250-print-pdf - References*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2022/english/wpiea2022250-print-pdf.pdf_
