## TRADE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING WORLD: TARIFFS AND IMPORT MARKET POWER (wpiea2023005-print-pdf)

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---

### Motivation and context
- Main motivation for countries to join the WTO: conviction that WTO membership will increase trade, help economic development and foster economic growth.
- WTO created in 1995 with 128 original members; subsequently, 36 new members acceded under individually negotiated terms.
- Countries' import market power is a key determinant of accession terms and conditions.
- As countries develop, their share of world trade in different products changes, altering their ability to affect world prices and creating a need for recurring negotiations or commitments conditioned on import market power.
- Authors claim to be first in economic policy literature to stress implications for design and modelling of multilateral rounds and commitments.

### Theoretical framework, data, and empirical specification
- Analysis relies on Bagwell and Staiger (2011) framework.
- New estimates on the extent import market power influenced tariff commitments for original and acceded WTO members.
- Empirical inputs include a new dataset of pre-Uruguay Round applied tariffs plus standard data sources.
- Equation (benchmark specification, preserving notation exactly):
  - τ_ic_WTO = β_0 + β_1 τ_ic_Pre−WTO + β_2 V_ic_Pre−WTO + δ_HS2(i) + λ_c + u_ic
  - Expected sign: β_2 negative.
- Data sources: UN Comtrade; WTO CTS database and other WTO sources; previously unreleased pre-Uruguay Round applied tariffs (tariff-line level for 74 GATT members between 1988 and 1996); WTO IDB database for post-Uruguay accessions.
- Analysis unit: HS six-digit subheading level.
- Final estimation sample: 31 Uruguay Round participants and 10 subsequent accessions (covers all G20 economies except Argentina).

### Key quantitative finding (aggregate)
- Predicted tariff cuts to reflect current import market power would amount to a reduction in annual tariff costs of up to $26.4 billion.
- This $26.4 billion is equivalent to nearly 10% of global tariff costs.
- Decomposition of the $26.4 billion:
  - $4.7 billion in reductions in acceded members’ AG tariffs.
  - $14.8 billion in acceded members’ NAMA tariffs.
  - $6.9 billion in Uruguay Round developing members’ NAMA tariffs.

### Heterogeneity and sectoral concentration
- Substantial heterogeneity across countries and sectors.
- Product-level top predicted reductions (preserve entries exactly):
  - Acceded Members AG:
    - China 220421 Wine of fresh grapes, containers of 2L or less — 14.0
    - Viet Nam 100590 Maize (corn) — 13.5
    - China 020329 Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen — 12.0
    - China 020230 Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless — 12.0
    - China 240120 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped — 10.0
  - Acceded Members NAMA:
    - China 870323 Motor cars, passenger, between 1500cc and 3000cc — 18.5
    - Saudi Arabia 870324 Motor cars, passenger, over 3000cc — 3.7
    - China 901380 Liquid crystal devices, other — 3.6
    - China 870324 Motor cars, passenger, over 3000cc — 3.5
    - China 880240 Aeroplanes and other aircraft, over 15 tons — 3.0
  - Uruguay Round NAMA:
    - Morocco 854240 Hybrid integrated circuits — 10.7
    - Morocco 852313 Unrecorded media for sound or similar, over 6,5mm — 10.1
    - Venezuela 410422 Bovine leather, pre-tanned — 8.3
    - Mexico 847330 Parts and accessories for data processing machines — 7.9
    - Venezuela 900990 Parts and accessories for photocopying apparatus — 7.6
- Aggregate product-level reduction ranges reported:
  - Uruguay Round developing members: reductions range from 0 to 10.4 percentage points.
  - Acceded members: reductions up to 18.5 percentage points.
- Sectoral shares of reductions:
  - Acceded members’ AG reductions: 23% in oil seeds and industrial plants (HS 12); 15% in meats (HS 02); 13% in cereals (HS 10).
  - Acceded members’ NAMA reductions: 59% in vehicles (HS 87); 11% in optical and photo equipment (HS 90); 5% in aircraft (HS 88); 5% in machinery and appliances (HS 84-85).
  - Uruguay Round developing members’ NAMA reductions: 35% in precious metals (HS 71); 27% in machinery and appliances (HS 84-85); 16% in vehicles (HS 87).
- "18.5 percentage points, with China featuring the largest average reductions."

### Main empirical findings (Uruguay Round participants and acceded members)
- Uruguay Round participants (highlights, preserve coefficients from Table 2 and Appendix B Table 1):
  - Terms-of-trade motive significant for developing country NAMA commitments (Column 6).
  - No significant role for terms-of-trade motive in developing country AG products or in developed economies during the Uruguay Round.
  - Evaluated at sample means: one standard deviation increase in pre-WTO NAMA imports predicted to lower bound tariff levels by about 0.5% (full sample of developing countries); country-specific predicted effects range from 0.0% to 3.7%.
  - Pre-WTO tariff coefficients (Table 2 summary): 0.676*** (All Goods, Developed); 0.439*** (AG, Developed); 0.673*** (NAMA, Developed); 0.241*** (All Goods, Developing); 0.430*** (AG, Developing); 0.126*** (NAMA, Developing).
  - Pre-WTO import value coefficients (Table 2 summary): 0.000 (All Goods, Developed); 0.000 (AG, Developed); 0.000 (NAMA, Developed); 0.003 (All Goods, Developing); 0.037 (AG, Developing); -0.003*** (NAMA, Developing).
  - Observations by column: 38,987; 3,834; 35,153; 68,753; 9,946; 58,807.
  - R-squared by column: 0.476; 0.414; 0.667; 0.539; 0.533; 0.694.
- Appendix B — Table 1 (TOBIT regression exact coefficients and statistics):
  - Pre-WTO tariff coefficients (Columns 1–6): 0.899*** (0.014); 0.879*** (0.072); 0.813*** (0.008); 0.235*** (0.008); 0.451*** (0.033); 0.125*** (0.005).
  - Pre-WTO import value coefficients (Columns 1–6): 0.000 (0.000); -0.001 (0.002); 0.000 (0.000); -0.001 (0.003); 0.060 (0.049); -0.005*** (0.001).
  - Constants (Columns 1–6): -3.021 (4.860); -14.62*** (5.480); -4.253*** (0.347); 36.93*** (1.982); 13.96*** (2.025); 25.22*** (0.502).
  - Observations (Columns 1–6): 38,987; 3,834; 35,153; 68,753; 9,946; 58,807.
  - Fixed effects: Country FE Yes; Sector FE Yes.
- Acceded members (Table 3 and Appendix B Table 2 highlights):
  - Term-of-trade motive significant determinant of WTO commitments for acceded members; AG coefficient larger in absolute value than NAMA, with aggregate results driven by NAMA.
  - Evaluated at sample means: one standard deviation increase in pre-WTO imports predicted to lower bound tariff levels by about 1.0% (full sample), 5.5% (AG), and 0.8% (NAMA). Country-specific ranges: below 0.1% to 25.0% for AG; 0.0% to 2.6% for NAMA.
  - Pre-WTO tariff coefficients (Appendix B Table 2): 0.489*** (All Products); 0.554*** (AG); 0.483*** (NAMA).
  - Pre-WTO import value coefficients (Appendix B Table 2): -0.002** (All Products); -0.020*** (AG); -0.001** (NAMA).
  - Observations: 41,160; 4,542; 36,618.
  - Constants: 4.504*** (All Products); 1.093 (AG); 2.628*** (NAMA).
  - Fixed effects: Country FE Yes; Sector FE Yes.

### Counterfactual construction and simulated binding adjustments
- Change in market power computed as:
  - ∆V_ic = V_ic_CF − V_ic_Pre−WTO
  - V_ic_CF = V_ic_Present × (V_i_pre−WTO / V_i_Present) where pre-WTO and present periods are member-specific; present imports averaged over 2015-2017 (or closest years).
- Predicted change in binding:
  - ∆τ_ic_WTO_hat = β_2_hat ∆V_ic (negative if imports grew relatively).
- Hypothetical new bound:
  - τ_ic_WTO,CF = max{0, τ_ic_WTO + ∆τ_ic_WTO_hat}; bindings updated only when ∆τ_ic_WTO_hat < 0.
- Aggregate outcome: changes in import market power imply a shift towards lower tariff bindings for both Uruguay Round and acceded members.

### Policy implications and recommended negotiation design
- Because import market power changes are heterogeneous and partly endogenous, the WTO could:
  - Provide a forum for continuous negotiations in specific areas with periodic stock-takes of concrete outcomes achieved, rather than attempting all-encompassing rounds.
  - Negotiate new tariff bindings tailored to specific sectoral situations instead of applying horizontal tariff-cutting formulae.
  - Consider replacing fixed ceiling rate commitments with formula-type commitments that account for import market power.
- Rationale for sectoral approach:
  - Neutralising externalities may require reductions in externality-generating sectors while other sectors already have low tariffs or lack significant import market power.
  - Sectoral negotiations with clearly delimited scope (e.g., similar to the Information Technology Agreement) may be easier and timelier to conclude and can address specific sources of trade tensions.

### Concluding remarks
- No major multilateral tariff negotiations at the WTO in the past 25 years apart from sectoral initiatives such as the ITA, despite large changes in import market power.
- Current trade tensions may partly reflect terms-of-trade externalities from shifts in market power and absence of adjustments to existing tariff commitments.
- Continuous, sector-specific negotiating mechanisms and tailored binding designs can help internalise emerging externalities and reduce incentives to deviate from cooperative outcomes.

*IMF WORKING PAPERS — TRADE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING WORLD: TARIFFS AND IMPORT MARKET POWER (wpiea2023005-print-pdf).*

### Introduction ...........................................................................................................

### Introduction

### Motivation and context
- The main motivation for countries to join the WTO is their conviction that WTO membership will increase trade, help their economic development and foster economic growth.
- The WTO was created in 1995 based on terms negotiated between 128 original members. Subsequently, 36 new members have acceded under individual terms and conditions negotiated with existing members.
- Countries' import market power has been shown to be a key determinant of these terms and conditions (Bagwell and Staiger, 2011; Beshkar, Bond, and Rho, 2015; Beshkar and Lee, 2022).
- As countries develop, their share of world trade in different products will inevitably change, and so will their ability to affect world prices. This implies that recurring rounds of trade negotiations would be helpful to maintain commitments at mutually acceptable levels or that commitments be conditioned on some measure of import market power.
- The authors state they are the first to make this point in the economic policy literature, with implications for how multilateral rounds or commitments should be designed and how these negotiations should be modelled.

### Theoretical framework and data
- The analysis relies on a model by Bagwell and Staiger (2011) – described as "arguably the most rigorous theoretical framework explaining countries' participation in international trade agreements."
- The authors provide novel estimates on the extent to which import market power has influenced tariff commitments for a set of original and acceded WTO members.
- The empirical work uses a new dataset of pre-Uruguay Round applied tariffs in addition to standard data sources.

### Key quantitative finding
- Based on estimated effects of current import market power on tariff commitments, the authors predict the commitments that might have been negotiated under current levels of market power.
- They estimate that tariff cuts required to reflect current economic conditions would amount to a reduction in annual tariff costs of up to $26.4 billion.

### Heterogeneity and sectoral results
- Results reveal substantial heterogeneity between countries and sectors.
- The sectors with the largest potential tariff cost reductions are:
  - vehicles (HS 87)
  - machinery and appliances (HS 84-85)
- Product-level reductions would range from 0 to [text truncated in source].

*IMF Working Papers — "TRADE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING WORLD: TARIFFS AND IMPORT MARKET POWER" — Introduction*

### 18.5 percentage points, with China featuring the largest average reductions.

### wpiea2023005-print-pdf - 18.5 percentage points, with China featuring the largest average reductions.

### Importance of import market power and need for continuous negotiations
- Import market power creates incentives for unilateral tariff increases to capture terms-of-trade gains; such actions generate negative externalities on trading partners' terms-of-trade.
- If all countries act non-cooperatively, result is higher tariffs and less overall trade; trade agreements define cooperative equilibria where maximum or "bound" tariff levels internalise these externalities.
- Continuous rounds of trade negotiations are necessary because shifts in import market power over time—partly endogenously determined by earlier liberalisation—can create new terms-of-trade externalities even in products where tariffs were initially set at cooperative levels.
- Lack of adjustment of existing tariff commitments amid large and heterogeneous changes in import market power can increase trade tensions and policy uncertainty; bargaining tariffs (e.g., observed unilateral tariff increases) can be used as leverage.

### Data, empirical model, and estimation approach
- Data sources: UN Comtrade for trade flows; WTO CTS database and other WTO sources for WTO bindings and applied tariffs; a previously unreleased database for applied tariffs before the Uruguay Round (tariff-line level for 74 GATT members for various years between 1988 and 1996); applied tariffs for post-Uruguay accessions from the WTO IDB database.
- Analysis unit: HS six-digit subheading level.
- Final estimation sample: 31 Uruguay Round participants and 10 subsequent accessions, covering all G20 economies except Argentina.
- Benchmark empirical specification (equation (1) equivalent to Bagwell and Staiger (2011) equation (15a)):
  - τ_ic_WTO = β_0 + β_1 τ_ic_Pre−WTO + β_2 V_ic_Pre−WTO + δ_HS2(i) + λ_c + u_ic
  - β_2 expected sign: negative (terms-of-trade motive reduces negotiated bindings where pre-WTO import volume is larger).
  - Key regressors preserved exactly as in the source: τ_ic_WTO, τ_ic_Pre−WTO, V_ic_Pre−WTO, δ_HS2(i), λ_c, u_ic.

### Main empirical findings
- Uruguay Round participants (Table 2):
  - Terms-of-trade motive was a significant determinant of developing country NAMA tariff commitments (Column 6).
  - No significant role for the terms-of-trade motive in developing country AG products or in developed economies during the Uruguay Round.
  - Evaluated at sample means: a ceteris paribus increase in pre-WTO NAMA imports by one standard deviation is predicted to lower bound tariff levels by about 0.5% based on the full sample of developing countries; country-specific predicted effects range from 0.0% to 3.7%.
  - Regression highlights (preserve coefficients from Table 2):
    - Pre-WTO tariff coefficients: 0.676*** (All Goods, Developed), 0.439*** (AG, Developed), 0.673*** (NAMA, Developed), 0.241*** (All Goods, Developing), 0.430*** (AG, Developing), 0.126*** (NAMA, Developing).
    - Pre-WTO import value coefficients: 0.000 (All Goods, Developed), 0.000 (AG, Developed), 0.000 (NAMA, Developed), 0.003 (All Goods, Developing), 0.037 (AG, Developing), -0.003*** (NAMA, Developing).
    - Observations: 38,987; 3,834; 35,153; 68,753; 9,946; 58,807 (respectively by column).
    - R-squared: 0.476; 0.414; 0.667; 0.539; 0.533; 0.694 (respectively).
- Acceded members (Table 3):
  - Term-of-trade motive was a significant determinant of their WTO commitments.
  - AG coefficient larger in absolute value than for NAMA; aggregate results driven by NAMA.
  - Evaluated at sample means: a ceteris paribus increase in pre-WTO imports by one standard deviation is predicted to lower bound tariff levels by about 1.0% (full sample), 5.5% (AG), and 0.8% (NAMA). Country-specific ranges: below 0.1% to 25.0% for AG; 0.0% to 2.6% for NAMA.
  - Regression highlights (preserve coefficients from Table 3):
    - Pre-WTO tariff coefficients: 0.455*** (All Products), 0.526*** (AG), 0.451*** (NAMA).
    - Pre-WTO import value coefficients: -0.001** (All Products), -0.019*** (AG), -0.001** (NAMA).
    - Observations: 41,160; 4,542; 36,618.
    - R-squared: 0.676; 0.619; 0.720.

### Counterfactual exercise and simulated binding adjustments
- Counterfactual construction:
  - Change in market power: ∆V_ic = V_ic_CF − V_ic_Pre−WTO.
  - V_ic_CF = V_ic_Present × (V_i_pre−WTO / V_i_Present) where pre-WTO and present periods are member-specific; present imports averaged over 2015-2017 (or closest years).
  - Predicted change in binding: ∆τ_ic_WTO_hat = β_2_hat ∆V_ic (negative if imports grew relatively).
  - Hypothetical new bound: τ_ic_WTO,CF = max{0, τ_ic_WTO + ∆τ_ic_WTO_hat}; bindings updated only when ∆τ_ic_WTO_hat < 0.
- Aggregate and product-level counterfactuals:
  - On aggregate, changes in import market power imply a shift towards lower tariff bindings for both Uruguay Round and acceded members.
  - Product-level reductions:
    - Uruguay Round developing members: reductions range from 0 to 10.4 percentage points.
    - Acceded members: reductions up to 18.5 percentage points.
  - Table 4 top predicted reductions (preserve entries exactly):
    - Acceded Members AG:
      - China 220421 Wine of fresh grapes, containers of 2L or less — 14.0
      - Viet Nam 100590 Maize (corn) — 13.5
      - China 020329 Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen — 12.0
      - China 020230 Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless — 12.0
      - China 240120 Tobacco, unmanufactured, stemmed or stripped — 10.0
    - Acceded Members NAMA:
      - China 870323 Motor cars, passenger, between 1500cc and 3000cc — 18.5
      - Saudi Arabia 870324 Motor cars, passenger, over 3000cc — 3.7
      - China 901380 Liquid crystal devices, other — 3.6
      - China 870324 Motor cars, passenger, over 3000cc — 3.5
      - China 880240 Aeroplanes and other aircraft, over 15 tons — 3.0
    - Uruguay Round NAMA:
      - Morocco 854240 Hybrid integrated circuits — 10.7
      - Morocco 852313 Unrecorded media for sound or similar, over 6,5mm — 10.1
      - Venezuela 410422 Bovine leather, pre-tanned — 8.3
      - Mexico 847330 Parts and accessories for data processing machines — 7.9
      - Venezuela 900990 Parts and accessories for photocopying apparatus — 7.6

### Quantitative implications for tariff duties paid
- Neutralizing terms-of-trade externalities would require lower tariff commitments that could amount to a reduction in annual tariff costs of up to $26.4 billion — equivalent to nearly 10% of global tariff costs.
- Decomposition of the $26.4 billion total:
  - $4.7 billion in reductions in acceded members’ AG tariffs.
  - $14.8 billion in acceded members’ NAMA tariffs.
  - $6.9 billion in Uruguay Round developing members’ NAMA tariffs.
- Sectoral concentration of reductions:
  - Acceded members’ AG reductions: 23% in oil seeds and industrial plants (HS 12); 15% in meats (HS 02); 13% in cereals (HS 10).
  - Acceded members’ NAMA reductions: 59% in vehicles (HS 87); 11% in optical and photo equipment (HS 90); 5% in aircraft (HS 88); 5% in machinery and appliances (HS 84-85).
  - Uruguay Round developing members’ NAMA reductions: 35% in precious metals (HS 71); 27% in machinery and appliances (HS 84-85); 16% in vehicles (HS 87).

### Policy implications and recommended negotiation design
- Given heterogeneous and unforeseen sectoral changes in import market power, the WTO could:
  - Provide a forum for continuous negotiations in specific areas with periodic stock-takes of concrete outcomes achieved, rather than attempting all-encompassing rounds.
  - Negotiate new tariff bindings tailored to specific sectoral situations instead of applying horizontal tariff-cutting formulae.
  - Consider replacing fixed ceiling rate commitments with formula-type commitments that account for import market power.
- A sectoral approach is practical because:
  - Neutralising externalities may require reductions in the externality-generating sector when other sectors already have low tariffs or lack significant import market power.
  - Sectoral negotiations with clearly delimited scope (e.g., similar to the Information Technology Agreement) may be easier and timelier to conclude and can address specific sources of trade tensions.

### Concluding remarks
- No major multilateral tariff negotiations have taken place at the WTO in the past 25 years apart from sectoral initiatives such as the ITA, despite large changes in import market power.
- Current trade tensions may partly reflect terms-of-trade externalities from shifts in market power and the absence of adjustments to existing tariff commitments.
- Continuous, sector-specific negotiating mechanisms and tailored binding designs can help internalise emerging externalities and reduce incentives to deviate from cooperative outcomes.

*IMF WORKING PAPERS — TRADE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING WORLD: TARIFFS AND IMPORT MARKET POWER.*

### References

### References

### Key references cited
- Bagwell, K., Mavroidis, P. C., & Staiger, R. W. (2002). It’s a Question of Market Access. American Journal of International Law, 96(1), 56–76.
- Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1990). A Theory of Managed Trade. American Economic Review, 80(4), 779–795.
- Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2002). The Economics of the World Trading System. MIT press.
- Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2010). The WTO: Theory and Practice. Annual Review of Economics, 2(1), 223–256.
- Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2011). What do trade negotiators negotiate about? Empirical evidence from the World Trade Organization. American Economic Review, 101(4), 1238–73.
- Baldwin, R., & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2015). A simple model of the juggernaut effect of trade liberalisation. International Economics, 143, 70–79.
- Beshkar, M., Bond, E. W., & Rho, Y. (2015). Tariff binding and overhang: theory and evidence. Journal of International Economics, 97(1), 1–13.
- Beshkar, M., & Lee, R. (2022). How does import market power matter for trade agreements?. Journal of International Economics, 137, 103580.
- Broda, C., Limao, N., & Weinstein, D. E. (2008). Optimal tariffs and market power: the evidence. American Economic Review, 98(5), 2032–65.
- Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1995). Trade wars and trade talks. Journal of Political Economy, 103(4), 675–708.
- Johnson, H.G. (1953). Optimum tariffs and retaliation. Review of Economic Studies 21(2), 142–153.
- Larch, M., Monteiro, J. A., Piermartini, R., & Yotov, Y. V. (2019). On the Effects of GATT/WTO Membership on Trade: They Are Positive and Large after All. CESifo Working Papers.
- Mattoo, A., & Staiger, R. W. (2020). Trade Wars: What do they mean? Why are they happening now? What are the costs?. Economic Policy, 35(103), 561–584.
- Sheldon, I. M. (2022). The United States' power‐based bargaining and the WTO: Has anything really been gained?. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 44(3), 1424–39.
- Subramanian, A., & Wei, S. J. (2007). The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly. Journal of International Economics, 72(1), 151–175.
- Tang, M. K., & Wei, S. J. (2009). The value of making commitments externally: evidence from WTO accessions. Journal of International Economics, 78(2), 216–229.
- World Trade Organization (WTO) (2007). World Trade Report 2007, Geneva: WTO.

### Appendix A — Table 1: Data years used in regressions and counterfactual analysis (selected entries preserved exactly)
- Uruguay Round Members (sample entries):
  - Australia AUS: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 1988; Developed (WTO) 1; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 1992, 1993, 1994; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2015, 2016, 2017
  - Brazil BRA: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 1989; Recent Tariff Year 2018; Developed (WTO) 0; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 1992, 1993, 1994; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2015, 2016, 2017
  - China, Hong Kong SAR HKG: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 1992; Recent Tariff Year 2018; Developed (WTO) 0; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 1993, 1994, 1995; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2016, 2017
  - India IND: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 1988; Recent Tariff Year 2018; Developed (WTO) 0; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 1992, 1993, 1994; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2012, 2013, 2014
  - USA USA: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 1989; Developed (WTO) 1; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 1992, 1993, 1994; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2015, 2016, 2017
  - EU Members Since 1995 E95: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 1988; Developed (WTO) 1; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 1994; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2015, 2016, 2017
- Acceded Members (sample entries):
  - China CHN: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 2001; Recent Tariff Year 2017; Accession Year 2001; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 1999, 2000, 2001; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2015, 2016, 2017
  - Lao People's Dem. Rep. LAO: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 2008; Recent Tariff Year 2018; Accession Year 2013; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 2010, 2011, 2012; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2014, 2015, 2016
  - Russian Federation RUS: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 2011; Recent Tariff Year 2016; Accession Year 2012; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 2009, 2010, 2011; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2015, 2016, 2017
  - Viet Nam VNM: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 2006; Recent Tariff Year 2018; Accession Year 2007; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 2004, 2005, 2006; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2014, 2015, 2016
  - Samoa WSM: Pre-WTO Tariff Year 2011; Recent Tariff Year 2016; Accession Year 2012; Pre-WTO Imports (Avg) Years 2009, 2010, 2011; Recent Imports (Avg) Years 2015, 2016, 2017

### Appendix B — Table 1: TOBIT regression results for Uruguay Round participants (exact coefficients and statistics)
- Dependent Variable: WTO binding
- Columns: (1) Developed All Goods; (2) Developed AG; (3) Developed NAMA; (4) Developing All Goods; (5) Developing AG; (6) Developing NAMA
- Pre-WTO tariff coefficients:
  - Column (1): 0.899*** (0.014)
  - Column (2): 0.879*** (0.072)
  - Column (3): 0.813*** (0.008)
  - Column (4): 0.235*** (0.008)
  - Column (5): 0.451*** (0.033)
  - Column (6): 0.125*** (0.005)
- Pre-WTO import value coefficients:
  - Column (1): 0.000 (0.000)
  - Column (2): -0.001 (0.002)
  - Column (3): 0.000 (0.000)
  - Column (4): -0.001 (0.003)
  - Column (5): 0.060 (0.049)
  - Column (6): -0.005*** (0.001)
- Constant terms:
  - Column (1): -3.021 (4.860)
  - Column (2): -14.62*** (5.480)
  - Column (3): -4.253*** (0.347)
  - Column (4): 36.93*** (1.982)
  - Column (5): 13.96*** (2.025)
  - Column (6): 25.22*** (0.502)
- Observations:
  - Column (1): 38,987
  - Column (2): 3,834
  - Column (3): 35,153
  - Column (4): 68,753
  - Column (5): 9,946
  - Column (6): 58,807
- Fixed effects: Country FE Yes; Sector FE Yes
- Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1

### Appendix B — Table 2: TOBIT regression results for countries acceding after 1995 (exact coefficients and statistics)
- Dependent Variable: WTO binding
- Columns: (1) All Products; (2) AG; (3) NAMA
- Pre-WTO tariff coefficients:
  - Column (1): 0.489*** (0.008)
  - Column (2): 0.554*** (0.028)
  - Column (3): 0.483*** (0.006)
- Pre-WTO import value coefficients:
  - Column (1): -0.002** (0.001)
  - Column (2): -0.020*** (0.003)
  - Column (3): -0.001** (0.001)
- Constant terms:
  - Column (1): 4.504*** (0.772)
  - Column (2): 1.093 (0.992)
  - Column (3): 2.628*** (0.310)
- Observations:
  - Column (1): 41,160
  - Column (2): 4,542
  - Column (3): 36,618
- Fixed effects: Country FE Yes; Sector FE Yes
- Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** denotes p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1

### Data Availability
- The data underlying this article were provided by UN Comtrade and WTO under licence or by permission.
- Data will be shared upon request to the corresponding author exclusively for the purpose of replication.

*References and appendices extracted from the content unit "wpiea2023005-print-pdf - References".*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2023/english/wpiea2023005-print-pdf.pdf_