## Who are Central Banks? Gender, Human Resources, and Central Banking — WP/2023/091

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---

### Introduction: scope, pilot, and objectives
- Central banks are characterized as core to the economics profession and paragon public institutions; the paper examines gender patterns within central banks, their persistence, and implications for norms and values.
- Objectives:
  - Assemble quantitative and qualitative data on gender equality in central banks via a newly designed survey directed to Human Resources (HR) departments, complemented with bilateral discussions.
  - Capture a broad spectrum: diversity policies, employment practices, earnings, leave and work arrangements, childcare and related benefits.
  - Organize aspects into “pillars” and “sub-pillars” and define the Human Resources Gender Index (HRGI).
  - Assess macro-criticality of gender equality and links to country characteristics and central bank performance.
- Pilot sample and timing:
  - Eight central banks in advanced economies (including G7 national central banks and the European Central Bank (ECB)).
  - Three International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as comparators: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group (WBG), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
  - Information collected refers to the last available fiscal year for each institution (2020 or 2021).

### Main introductory findings (pilot sample)
- Strengths:
  - Central banks on average perform well on diversity targets or affirmative action policies directed toward women and other minorities (examples include guaranteed interview schemes, scholarship, and mentoring programs).
  - Parental leave and flexible work arrangements are widely offered in central banks.
- Gaps and limitations:
  - Diversity measures are rarely enforced by law and are often limited to targets for people with disabilities.
  - Key shortcomings remain in inclusion in professions related to economics; representation in managerial positions; prevalence of full-time contracts; existence of a gender pay gap.
  - Childcare and related subsidies are limited compared to the IFIs in the study.
- Associations:
  - HRGI index, hiring and promotion of women, and contract types are associated with output and credit gaps in the pilot sample.
  - Broader country characteristics (e.g., percentage of women in high-level positions, government effectiveness, corruption) relate to gender patterns in central banks.
  - Role models, mentoring, and women in power can increase female participation and help women climb hierarchical ladders.

### Literature context (selected highlights)
- General workforce: closing gender gaps could increase GDP by between 10 and 80 percent, depending on initial female participation.
- Academia/economics: women are less than 20 percent in econometrics, finance, or macroeconomics—fields central to central bank hiring.
- Central banks: prior evidence shows male domination especially among managers; a wage gap is detected within a few years of hiring despite similar conditions, and women apply for fewer promotions.
- Diversity benefits: higher share of women in monetary policy committees and boards can lead to greater monetary and financial stability; female chairs may focus more on achieving price stability goals.

### Contribution and rationale
- Provides granular, multidimensional evidence on gender patterns, policies, drivers, and outcomes in central banking.
- Positions central banks as a lens to understand gender dynamics in the economics profession and the broader public sector.
- Informs policy advice consistent with the IMF Strategy Toward Mainstreaming Gender (IMF, 2022a).

### Survey design, scope, and HRGI methodology
- Survey:
  - Multidimensional survey of 20 questions directed at HR departments, complemented by bilateral discussions.
  - Pilot phase: eight central banks and three IFIs (IMF, WBG, OECD).
  - Covers economists, finance experts, administrative staff, HR experts, IT professionals, lawyers, across career stages; nonbinary employees not included.
  - Information refers to last available fiscal year for each institution (2020 or 2021).
- HRGI index structure and scoring:
  - 15 sub-pillars summarized into 5 pillars: Diversity policies; Gender and employment; Gender and earnings; Leave and work arrangements; Childcare and other benefits.
  - Scores for questions/options span from 0 to 1; possible maxima: 0, 0.5, 0.8, or 1. No answers are taken as n/a.
  - Scores averaged first by sub-pillars, then across sub-pillars to build pillar scores; overall HRGI compiled either as an average across pillars or as a simple average across all questions.
  - Authors impose no differential weights across questions, sub-pillars, or pillars.
- Sample and reporting:
  - HRGI index computed for each of the 7 national central banks and ECB, as well as for the IFIs.
  - Survey includes quantitative data and qualitative comments; most questions have an open section for clarifications.

### Key findings from the pilot sample (central banks vs IFIs)
- Overall HRGI index:
  - For the 8 central banks in the pilot, the HRGI index is on average slightly below 0.7 on a maximum level of 1.
  - Central banks’ HRGI index varies between 0.32 and 0.91 across institutions.
  - The average HRGI index calculated as a simple average across all questions is between 0.50 and 0.83.
  - The group of IFIs performs better in terms of gender equality, with a HRGI index greater than 0.7.
  - Smallest dispersion of pillar scores: leave and work arrangement, where central banks are all around or above 0.7.
- Diversity policies:
  - 62% of central banks have gender targets in place; 67% of IFIs have gender targets.
  - Affirmative action policies directed to gender diversity applied in 2/3 of central banks; 67% of IFIs.
  - For both targets and affirmative action policies directed at gender equality, only 12% are enforced by law in central banks; none are enforced by law in IFIs.
  - Almost 90% of central banks use diversity targets and affirmative action policies more broadly (sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion/faith, age, disability or special needs status, military service); slightly more than a half of central banks (compared to 30% of IFIs) implement these broader diversity targets/actions due to compulsory national legislation.
- Gender and employment:
  - Percentage of women employed on average in covered central banks: 44.6%; IFIs are above the 50% threshold.
  - Part-time contracts held by women average 65% in central banks; highest recorded 79.3%.
  - IFIs have higher share of women on part-time contracts: 79.8%.
  - Female shares by occupation in central banks:
    - Administrative and HR roles: close to 80%.
    - Economists: 35% on average, ranging from 26.0% to 43.3%.
  - PhD holders: IFIs 36.4% vs participating central banks 29%.
  - Management positions in central banks:
    - Female share of lower/middle management: 36.7%.
    - Female share of senior management: 32%.
    - Highest percentage of female managers slightly below 45%; lowest around 15%.
  - IFIs have about 42% female presence in both lower/middle and senior management.
  - Percentage of women working in central banks for more than 15 years: 47.2%; in IFIs: 53.6%.
  - Percentage of newly hired female staff in surveyed central banks is under 50% on average.
- Gender and earnings:
  - Distribution across annual base salaries (full-time employees):
    - Central banks: 50% of the bottom 20% earners are women.
    - IFIs: 73% of the bottom 20% earners are women.
    - Central banks: 27.3% of the top 20% earners are women.
    - IFIs: 35% of the top 20% earners are women.
  - Earnings ratio: difference in earnings between genders is small when women reach the top percentile; women earn approximately the same salary as male counterparts at the top.
- Leave and work arrangements:
  - Flexible work hours, telecommuting, compressed work schedules, and part-time are widely available across participating central banks and IFIs.
  - Half of the central banks offer between 10-25 days of annual leave; the other half accord more than 25 days.
  - All central banks offer (paid) parental leave of more than three months; fathers receive three months and mothers can take additional time if needed. Primary caregivers always get the longest parental leave time.
  - In IFIs, some have combined maternity and paternity leaves into parental leave, with two of the IFIs allowing parents to take more than 3 months off.
- Childcare and other benefits:
  - Around 60% of central banks do not offer nurseries at their headquarters or spaces in local nurseries reserved for staff, compared to 30% of IFIs.
  - 75% of central banks do not offer vouchers or any form of subsidies, compared to 67% of IFIs.
  - Other benefits (advisory services and family support services) are available in all central banks (examples: monthly pre-school allowances paid for children up to school age; HR-procured family care service providing cost-free information about childcare options; paid days for family-related reasons; leave of absence to provide care to a critically ill or injured child).

### Empirical strategy and data
- Sample: 8 central banks with data ranging from 2010 to 2021.
- Data sources: IMF WEO, WB Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), OECD, BIS, Eurostat, UNESCO, UNECE, EIGE, Dincer et al. (2022), Garriga (2016).
- Gender measures: numerical survey data, HRGI index and its pillars.
- Dependent variables: difference between realized inflation and target inflation, output gap, credit gap.
- Statistical technique: Weighted-Average Least Squares (WALS) with Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) used as robustness check.
  - WALS combines (constrained) least squares with Bayesian-type weights; priors are neutral.
  - Guideline: absolute t-ratio of 1 corresponds to posterior inclusion probability of 0.5.

### Main empirical findings: gender equality and central bank performance
- No clear relationship detected between gender equality measures and inflation in the sample (possibly due to limited changes in inflation up to 2020).
- HRGI index and specific HRGI pillars (notably leave and work arrangements) correlate with central bank performance.
- Robust links (relative to output gap and credit gap):
  - HRGI index: linked to output gap and credit gap.
  - Gender and employment pillar: linked to output gap.
  - Gender and earnings pillar: linked to credit gap.
  - Leave and work arrangements pillar: linked to output gap and credit gap.
  - New hires, female%: linked to output gap and credit gap.
  - Promotions, female%: linked to credit gap.
  - Part-time contracts, female%: linked to credit gap.
  - Open-ended contracts, female%: linked to output gap and credit gap.
  - Central bank transparency index: linked to credit gap.
- Interpretation notes:
  - HRGI index, gender and employment pillar, and open-ended contracts held by women are significant and positively correlated with output gaps; in the covered sample these output gaps have been mainly negative, so an increase in HRGI could help reduce the output gaps.
  - Coefficients estimated by (constrained) least squares; given the relatively small sample, coefficients should be taken with caution.
  - Possible mechanisms: diversity improves decision-making, risk management, and innovation; reverse causality is possible (better-managed institutions may attract more female executives).
- Country and bank characteristics robustly linked to HRGI and female hiring/promotions:
  - Percentage of women in central bank decision making bodies (EIGE data).
  - Percentage of women in ministries, government, academic heads of universities, and board members of largest listed companies.
  - Government effectiveness (WGI).
  - Control of corruption (WGI).
  - Central bank transparency index.
  - Total female participation in country (Female% country).
  - Voice and Accountability (WGI).
- Interpretation: role models and women in high-level positions, as well as government effectiveness and control of corruption, are important predictors of HRGI and career outcomes for women.

### Caveats and robustness
- Analysis is associative; the paper does not claim causality.
- Results are subject to limitations from sample size (8 central banks) and data availability.
- Variable inclusion depends on data availability and absolute t-ratio thresholds.
- BMA robustness checks broadly confirm main results, with some differences noted for credit gap drivers and HRGI relationships.

### Conclusions, relevance, and next steps
- Overall assessment: the pilot sample of central banks "have room for improvement in some aspects of gender equality."
- Areas of relative strength: diversity targets/affirmative action policies (rarely enforced by law), parental leave and flexible work arrangements.
- Areas of weakness: inclusion in economics professions, representation in managerial positions, prevalence of full-time contracts, gender pay gap, limited childcare and subsidies.
- Macro-criticality: HRGI, hiring and promotion of women, and contract types are associated with output and credit gaps, indicating relevance for central bank performance.
- Policy implications emphasized:
  - Role models, mentoring, and women in power to increase female participation and upward mobility.
  - Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms can strengthen diversity policy effects.
- Next steps:
  - Extend coverage worldwide beyond the pilot phase to provide an exhaustive view of gender equality in central banking.
  - With expanded sample size and more data points, enable more extensive econometric analyses on central bank performance and other impacts (financial development, innovation, climate change policies).
  - Potentially extend the survey scope beyond gender to a broader definition of diversity.

*Source: IMF Working Papers — Who are Central Banks? Gender, Human Resources, and Central Banking — WP/2023/091 (wpiea2023091-print-pdf)*

### 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................

### 1. Introduction

### Scope and objectives
- Central banks are core to the economics profession, important in training economists worldwide, and act as paragon public institutions.
- The paper investigates gender patterns within central banks, their potential persistence, and implications for norms and values emerging from these institutions.
- Objectives:
  - Assemble quantitative and qualitative data on gender equality in central banks via a newly designed survey directed to Human Resources (HR) departments, complemented with bilateral discussions.
  - Capture a broad spectrum: diversity policies, employment practices, earnings, leave and work arrangements, childcare and related benefits.
  - Organize aspects into “pillars” and “sub-pillars” and define the Human Resources Gender Index (HRGI) to measure gender equality comprehensively.
  - Assess macro-criticality of gender equality and links to country characteristics and central bank performance.

### Pilot sample and data timing
- Pilot phase coverage:
  - Eight central banks in advanced economies (including G7 national central banks and the European Central Bank (ECB)).
  - Three International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as comparators: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group (WBG), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
- Information collected refers to the last available fiscal year for each institution (2020 or 2021).

### Key introductory findings (pilot sample)
- Strengths:
  - Central banks on average perform well on diversity targets or affirmative action policies directed toward women and other minorities (examples include guaranteed interview schemes, scholarship, and mentoring programs).
  - Parental leave and flexible work arrangements are widely offered in central banks.
- Gaps and limitations:
  - Diversity measures are rarely enforced by law and are often limited to targets for people with disabilities.
  - Key shortcomings remain in:
    - Inclusion in professions related to economics.
    - Representation in managerial positions.
    - Prevalence of full-time contracts.
    - Existence of a gender pay gap.
  - Childcare and related subsidies are limited compared to the IFIs in the study.
- Associations:
  - HRGI index, hiring and promotion of women, and contract types are associated with output and credit gaps in the pilot sample.
  - Broader country characteristics (e.g., percentage of women in high-level positions, government effectiveness, corruption) relate to gender patterns in central banks.
  - Role models, mentoring, and women in power can increase female participation and help women climb hierarchical ladders.

### Contribution and rationale
- The study fills gaps in the literature by providing granular, multidimensional evidence on gender patterns, policies, drivers, and outcomes in central banking.
- Central banks can be used as a lens to understand gender dynamics in the economics profession and the broader public sector; findings can identify gaps and good practices and inform policy advice consistent with the IMF Strategy Toward Mainstreaming Gender (IMF, 2022a).

---

### 2. Literature review

### Context and broad findings in related literatures
- General workforce:
  - Women are severely underrepresented in some sectors (e.g., construction and manufacturing) and concentrated in lower-paid occupations even when present in service industries (Elborgh-Woytek et al. 2013; Mukhtarova et al. 2021; Bertay et al. 2020).
  - Women perform more routine-prone tasks and fewer management/cognitive-skill tasks (Brussevich et al. 2018; Roberts et al. 2019).
  - Childcare costs and unpaid work affect labor market participation; if childcare costs were cut by half, the number of young mothers in the labor market could increase by 10% (Dabla-Norris and Kochhar, 2019; OECD, 2020a).
  - Closing the gender gap could increase GDP by between 10 and 80%, depending on initial female participation (Ostry et al. 2018).
- Public sector:
  - Women are underrepresented among senior public officials (Karkee and Sodergen, 2021).
  - Gender pay gap in the public sector is generally smaller than in the private sector (Shi et al. 2019).
  - Countries with strong monitoring mechanisms or higher income show greater gender balance in the public realm (OECD, 2019; Mukhtarova et al. 2021).
  - Legislative gender quotas accelerate growth in the percentage of women members of parliament (EIGE, 2021).
- Private sector and firms:
  - Female participation is smaller among board members and managers; less than a quarter of the EU’s largest companies has gender-balanced boards (EIGE, 2021).
  - Higher share of female managers is associated with a smaller gender wage gap and improved firm performance (Theodoropoulos et al. 2022; Dabla-Norris and Kochhar, 2019; Georgieva et al. 2022).
- Academia and economics profession:
  - The “leaky pipeline” shows large drops in female representation from junior to senior ranks (Buckles, 2019; Auriol et al. 2020; Garcia-Penolosa and Zignago, 2022).
  - Women face biases in letters of recommendation, teaching evaluations, co-authorship, and conference acceptances (Auriol et al. 2022; Buser et al. 2019; Hengel, 2017; Lundberg and Sterns, 2019; Hospido and Sanz, 2019).
  - Women are less than 20% in econometrics, finance, or macroeconomics—fields central to central bank hiring (Beneito et al. 2021; Verdun, 2022).

### Evidence specific to central banks
- Central banks are mostly male dominated, especially among managers; a wage gap is detected within a few years of hiring despite similar conditions, and women apply for fewer promotions (Hospido et al. 2020).
- Gendered preconceptions favor men in perceptions of competence and management (Bodea and Kerner, 2022; Carli and Eagly, 2016).
- Presence of women in top roles influences future representation: when a central bank has at least one woman on the board of its monetary policy committee, future committees are more likely to include more women (Masciandaro et al. 2020).
- Benefits of diversity for central banks:
  - A more diverse pool of economists can improve decision making and broaden topics (Madouros, 2019; Megalokonomou, 2021).
  - Higher share of women in monetary policy committees and boards can lead to greater monetary and financial stability (Diouf and Pépin, 2017; Masciandaro et al. 2016; Sahay et al. 2018).
  - Female chairs may focus more on achieving price stability goals and may exhibit hawkish preferences, potentially due to greater resistance to political pressures and seeking credibility in male-dominated environments (Diouf and Pépin, 2017; Masciandaro et al. 2016; Masciandaro et al. 2020).
- Gender has not been prioritized in the design and execution of policies affecting monetary positions, banking regulation, deposit insurance, or bond issuance; women remain a minority across roles from depositors and borrowers to managers and regulators (Bhatia, 2021; Loko and Yang, 2022).
- Financial inclusion:
  - A bigger financial inclusion gap between men and women is associated with higher income inequality (Fouejieu et al. 2020).
  - Better access to banking services for households and firms leads to greater growth (Sahay et al. 2015; Sahay and Čihák, 2018).

### Contribution of this paper relative to the literature
- Provides granular and multidimensional data on gender patterns, policies, drivers, and outcomes in central banking.
- Measures gaps, establishes benchmarks, and highlights good practices within central banks.
- Demonstrates links between gender equality measures and central bank performance (broadly defined as achieving mandated goals including price stability, financial stability, and managing economic fluctuations).
- Positions central banks as both a subject of study and a potential blueprint for public-sector gender equality practices.

*IMF WORKING PAPERS — Who are Central Banks? Gender, Human Resources, and Central Banking — 1. Introduction*

### 3. Description of the survey

### 3. Description of the survey

### Survey design and scope
- Multidimensional survey of 20 questions on gender patterns and practices directed at HR departments in central banks, complemented by bilateral discussions with the institutions.
- Pilot phase conducted in eight central banks (this includes G7 national central banks and the ECB), and in three IFIs as comparators: the IMF, the WBG and the OECD.
- Information collected refers to the last available fiscal year for each institution (2020 or 2021).
- The survey covers (macro) economists and finance experts as well as administrative staff, HR experts, IT professionals and lawyers and at different stage of their career, including new hires and departures.
- The survey only covers information on gender; nonbinary employees are not included in the scope of the survey.
- When relevant, IFIs specified if the information apply to HQ only. For the WBG, the survey’s replies concern the entire group.

### HRGI index: structure and scoring methodology
- The survey contents are organized into 15 sub-pillars, summarized into 5 pillars: Diversity policies; Gender and employment; Gender and earnings; Leave and work arrangements; Childcare and other benefits.
- Each survey question/option is translated into a score that spans from 0 to 1, with 1 being the maximum in terms of equality.
- The scores can take the form of 0, 0.5, 0.8, or 1 as the maximum. No answers are taken as n/a.
- Scores are averaged first by sub-pillars, then across sub-pillars to build pillar scores. The overall HRGI index is compiled either as an average across pillars or as a simple average across all the questions.
- The authors take an agnostic view, not imposing different weights to any question, sub-pillar, and/or pillar.

### Sample and reporting
- HRGI index computed for each of the 7 national central banks and ECB, as well as for the IFIs.
- The information collected includes both quantitative data and qualitative details and additional comments, with most questions having an open section for clarifications.
- Detailed methodology for translating survey results into scores is available in Appendix. More details are available upon request.

### Main findings from the pilot sample (comparisons between central banks and IFIs)
- Overall HRGI index:
  - For the 8 central banks in the pilot, the HRGI index is on average slightly below 0.7 on a maximum level of 1.
  - Central banks’ HRGI index varies between 0.32 and 0.91 across institutions.
  - The average HRGI index calculated as a simple average across all questions is between 0.50 and 0.83.
  - The group of IFIs performs better in terms of gender equality, with a HRGI index greater than 0.7.
  - The smallest dispersion of scores at pillar level is in leave and work arrangement, where central banks are all around or above 0.7.

- Diversity policies:
  - 62% of central banks have gender targets in place; 67% of IFIs have gender targets.
  - Affirmative action policies directed to gender diversity are applied in 2/3 of central banks, and similarly, in 67% of IFIs.
  - For both targets and affirmative action policies directed at gender equality, only 12% are enforced by law in central banks, while none are in IFIs.
  - Almost 90% of the central banks in the sample use diversity targets and affirmative action policies more broadly (sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion/faith, age, disability or special needs status, military service); slightly more than a half of central banks (compared to 30% of IFIs) implement these broader diversity targets/actions due to compulsory national legislation.

- Gender and employment:
  - Percentage of women employed on average in covered central banks: 44.6%; IFIs are above the 50% threshold.
  - Wide gap between percentage of women over total of full-time and part-time contracts in central banks; part-time contracts held by women average 65%, with the highest recorded being 79.3%.
  - IFIs have higher share of women on part-time contracts (79.8%) but perform slightly better in management positions and promotions of women.
  - Female shares by occupation in central banks:
    - Administrative and HR roles: close to 80%.
    - Economists: 35% on average, ranging from 26.0% to 43.3%.
  - More women holding PhDs: IFIs 36.4% vs participating central banks 29%.
  - Management positions in central banks:
    - Female share of lower/middle management: 36.7%.
    - Female share of senior management: 32%.
    - Highest percentage of female managers slightly below 45%; lowest around 15%.
  - IFIs have about 42% female presence in both lower/middle and senior management.
  - Percentage of women working in central banks for more than 15 years: 47.2%; in IFIs: 53.6%.
  - Percentage of newly hired female staff in surveyed central banks is under 50% on average.

- Gender and earnings:
  - Distribution across annual base salaries (full-time employees):
    - Central banks: 50% of the bottom 20% earners are women.
    - IFIs: 73% of the bottom 20% earners are women.
    - Central banks: 27.3% of the top 20% earners are women.
    - IFIs: 35% of the top 20% earners are women.
  - Earnings ratio: difference in earnings between genders is small when women reach the top percentile; women earn approximately the same salary as male counterparts at the top.

- Leave and work arrangements:
  - Flexible work hours, telecommuting, compressed work schedules, and part-time are widely available across participating central banks and IFIs.
  - Half of the central banks offer between 10-25 days of annual leave; the other half accord more than 25 days.
  - All central banks offer (paid) parental leave of more than three months; fathers receive three months and mothers can take additional time if needed. Primary caregivers always get the longest parental leave time.
  - In IFIs, some have combined maternity and paternity leaves into parental leave, with two of the IFIs allowing parents to take more than 3 months off.

- Childcare and other benefits:
  - Around 60% of central banks do not offer nurseries at their headquarters or spaces in local nurseries reserved for staff, compared to 30% of IFIs.
  - 75% of central banks do not offer vouchers or any form of subsidies, compared to 67% of IFIs.
  - Other benefits (advisory services and family support services) are available in all central banks. Examples reported include monthly pre-school allowances paid for children up to school age, HR-procured family care service providing cost-free information about childcare options, paid days for family-related reasons, and leave of absence to provide care to a critically ill or injured child.

*Source: IMF Working Papers — Who are Central Banks? Gender, Human Resources, and Central Banking — Section 3: Description of the survey*

### 5. Empirical results

### 5. Empirical results

### Methodology and data
- Sample: 8 central banks with data ranging from 2010 to 2021.
- Data sources used: IMF WEO, WB Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), OECD, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Eurostat, UNESCO, UNECE, EIGE, Dincer et al. (2022), and Garriga (2016).
- Gender measures: numerical survey data, HRGI index and its pillars.
- Dependent variables examined: difference between realized inflation and target inflation, output gap, credit gap.
- Statistical technique: Weighted-Average Least Squares (WALS) (Magnus et al. 2010; Magnus and De Luca 2016).
  - WALS combines (constrained) least squares with Bayesian-type weights; priors are neutral.
  - Guideline for robustness: absolute t-ratio of 1 corresponds to posterior inclusion probability of 0.5 (Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2008).
  - Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) used as a robustness check; main results broadly confirmed with some differences noted for credit gap drivers and HRGI relationships.
- Note on gaps: Output gap data from IMF WEO; credit gap from BIS calculated as difference between credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend (percentage points), both derived from one-sided HP-filtering.

### Gender equality and central bank performance (main empirical findings)
- General:
  - No clear relationship detected between gender equality measures and inflation in the sample (possibly due to limited changes in inflation up to 2020).
  - The HRGI index and specific HRGI pillars (notably leave and work arrangements) correlate with central bank performance.
- Table 1 summary of robust links (relative to output gap and credit gap):
  - HRGI index: linked to output gap and credit gap.
  - Gender and employment pillar: linked to output gap.
  - Gender and earnings pillar: linked to credit gap.
  - Leave and work arrangements pillar: linked to output gap and credit gap.
  - New hires, female%: linked to output gap and credit gap.
  - Promotions, female%: linked to credit gap.
  - Part-time contracts, female%: linked to credit gap.
  - Open-ended contracts, female%: linked to output gap and credit gap.
  - Central bank transparency index: linked to credit gap.
- Interpretation notes:
  - HRGI index, gender and employment pillar, and open-ended contracts held by women are significant and positively correlated with output gaps; in the covered sample these output gaps have been mainly negative, so an increase in HRGI could help reduce the output gaps.
  - Coefficients from WALS are estimated by (constrained) least squares; given the relatively small sample, coefficients should be taken with caution.
  - Possible mechanisms: diversity improves decision-making, risk management, and innovation; reverse causality is possible (better-managed institutions may attract more female executives).

### Country and bank characteristics linked to gender equality (main empirical findings)
- Strong robust predictors for HRGI index and female hiring/promotions:
  - Percentage of women in central bank decision making bodies (EIGE data): linked to HRGI index, new hires female%, promotions female%.
  - Percentage of women in ministries, government, academic heads of universities, and board members of largest listed companies: linked to HRGI index, new hires female%, promotions female%.
  - Government effectiveness (WGI): linked to HRGI index, new hires female%, promotions female%.
  - Control of corruption (WGI): linked to HRGI index, new hires female%, promotions female%.
  - Central bank transparency index: linked to HRGI index and new hires female%.
  - Total female participation in country (Female% country): linked to HRGI index and promotions female%.
  - Voice and Accountability (WGI): linked to promotions female%.
- Interpretation notes:
  - Role models and women in high-level positions are important to increase female participation and career advancement within central banks.
  - Corruption and government effectiveness shape societal norms and institutional behavior, and are significantly related to female hiring and promotions.

### Additional observations and caveats
- The analysis does not claim causality; results are associative and subject to limitations from sample size and data availability.
- Variable inclusion in tables depends on data availability and the absolute t-ratio; if a variable is absent it may be due to lack of data or zero absolute t-ratio.
- Full set of outcomes and additional robustness checks (including BMA results) are available upon request.

*Source: 5. Empirical results (wpiea2023091-print-pdf).*

### 6. Conclusions

### 6. Conclusions

### Role and rationale
- Central banks are described as "at the core of the economics profession, paragon of public institutions," and "should represent the population of nation(s) they serve."
- Analyzing central banks can shed light on broader gender patterns and act as a benchmark for the broader public sector.
- Existing literature mostly focuses on overall female employment or shares of women in boards and monetary policy committees; there is limited knowledge on hiring, firing, promotion, retention, and good HR practices within central banks.

### Survey and Human Resources Gender Index (HRGI)
- A multidimensional survey directed at HR departments in central banks was designed to increase awareness and understand gender equality more comprehensively.
- Survey aspects include: diversity policies, employment practices, earnings, leave and work arrangements, childcare and other benefits.
- A ‘scoring’ system was created and used to build a comprehensive and holistic index of equality: the Human Resources Gender Index (HRGI).
- The HRGI summarizes both quantitative and qualitative information and is used for empirical analyses.

### Empirical findings from the pilot sample
- Sample: eight central banks including G7 national central banks and the ECB.
- Overall assessment: these central banks "have room for improvement in some aspects of gender equality."
- Areas of relative strength:
  - Diversity targets or affirmative action policies: perform well on average, but "the measures are rarely enforced by law."
  - Parental leave and flexible work arrangements: "widely offered."
- Areas of weakness:
  - Inclusion in professions related to economics.
  - Representation in managerial positions.
  - Having full-time contracts.
  - Facing a gender pay gap.
  - Childcare and related subsidies: "limited."

### Associations and links to macro outcomes
- In the pilot sample, the HRGI index, hiring and promotion of women, and their contract types are associated with output and credit gaps, consistent with recent IMF studies.
- The percentage of women in high-level positions across sectors is linked to gender equality, underscoring the importance of role models, mentoring, and women in power to increase female participation and upward mobility.
- Other country characteristics associated with equality include government effectiveness and corruption.

### Relevance to IMF strategy and broader implications
- The project extends and deepens quantitative and qualitative data available on gender in central banking, helping to "pin down where the remaining issues lie," measure gaps, and establish benchmarks for guidance and best practices.
- The work demonstrates that various aspects of gender equality are "macro-critical" via their links to central bank performance, relevant in the current economic environment.
- Diversity is suggested to be instrumental for addressing 21st-century challenges, including potential impacts on financial development, innovation, and climate change policies.

### Next steps and potential expansions
- Plan to extend coverage worldwide beyond the pilot phase to provide a complete, exhaustive view of gender equality in central banking.
- With expanded sample size and more data points, the study would enable more extensive econometric analyses on central bank performance and other impacts (e.g., financial development, innovation, climate change policies).
- The scope of the survey could be potentially extended beyond gender to analyze a broader definition of diversity.

*Source: 6. Conclusions — wpiea2023091-print-pdf*

### References

### References (Who are Central Banks? Gender, Human Resources, and Central Banking — WP/2023/091)

### Major thematic areas covered by the references
- Gender representation and careers in economics and finance (education, hiring, promotion, mentoring, pipeline issues)
- Gender composition and decisionmaking in central banking and monetary policy (central bank independence, boards, monetary policy frameworks)
- Macroeconomic and labor-market consequences of gender gaps (growth, employment, unpaid work, caregiving, financial inclusion)
- Measurement, methodology, and data resources relevant to gender and institutions (model averaging techniques, datasets on central bank independence, gender indices)
- Diversity, inclusion, and policy interventions (quotas, workplace inclusion, family policies, gender-responsive central banking)

### Policy, practice, and discourse items cited
- IMF stewardship and policy documents:
  - International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022a. IMF Strategy Toward Mainstreaming Gender, IMF Policy Papers, Volume 2022: Issue 037.
  - International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022b. Monetary Policy and Central Banking, International Monetary Fund, Factsheets.
  - Brussevich, M., E. Dabla-Norris, C. Kamunge, P. Karnane, S. Khalid, and K. Kochhar. 2018. “Gender, Technology, and the Future of Work”, IMF Staff Discussion Note 18/07.
  - Ostry, J. D., et al. 2018. “Economic Gains from Gender Inclusion: New Mechanisms, New Evidence,” IMF Staff Discussion Note 18/06.
  - Kazandijian, R., Kolovich, L. Kochhar, K. and Newiak, M. 2016. “Gender Equality and Economic Diversification”, IMF, WP/16/140, pp.2-21.

- Public commentary, speeches, and practitioner perspectives:
  - Carney, M. 2019. “Finance by all, for all”, remarks at Women in Banking and Finance 22nd Annual Awards, 14th of June 2019, London.
  - Madouros, V. 2019. “Diversity and Inclusion: why it matters for the Central Bank”, Speech at National Diversity & Inclusion Conference, 04 September 2019.
  - Bhatia, A. 2021. “Why We Need Gender-Responsive Central Banking”, Project Syndicate Apr 22, 2021.
  - Hernandez Kent, A. 2022. “Why supporting working moms can benefit families, the economy and all of us”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

*References section of Who are Central Banks? Gender, Human Resources, and Central Banking — Working Paper No. WP/2023/091*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2023/english/wpiea2023091-print-pdf.pdf_