## 2. Review of Studies Analyzing the Short-term Effects of a Russian Natural Gas Shutoff

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### Introduction and scope
- Focus: medium- and long-term impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on EU energy markets, energy security, national and global emissions, and real GDP.
- Assumption: by 2027 natural gas and oil trade between Russia and the EU is shut-off as a result of strategic decisions by both the EU and Russia to decouple their energy trade.
- Emphasis: disruptions primarily concern natural gas (non-fungible, requires pipelines or LNG facilities) more than oil (fungible).
- Model used: IMF-ENV, a global recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with sectoral detail and features for energy and climate issues; includes all G20 countries and regional aggregations.

### Methodology, model features, and data foundations
- Model: IMF-ENV global recursive dynamic CGE model suitable to analyze medium- and long-term macroeconomic effects, structural change, energy demand and supply, electricity generation mix, GHG emissions, sectoral outcomes, and trade.
- Coverage: current version includes all G20 countries and regional aggregations.
- Policy closure: medium-term macroeconomic closure keeps both the current account balance and the government budget fixed as a share of GDP at the baseline (pre-war) levels; simulations do not account for short-term or transitional Russian policies.
- LNG trade facilitation assumption: modeled as a 5% decrease in natural gas trade costs to the European regions; export and trade diversion effects are endogenously determined.
- Data foundations:
  - Central database: GTAP 10 Power.
  - Updated natural gas bilateral Russian exports data and updated EU and UK bilateral natural gas imports for 2021 (OECD/IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics for 2021).
  - Electricity generation and total GHG emissions calibrated using CPAT projections.
  - Assumes annual overall energy efficiency growth of 1.5%.

### Overview of short-term literature and approaches
- Common modeling ingredients across studies: LNG imports, gas consumption, inventory changes, infrastructure expansion, gas-to-coal switching, renewable and nuclear power expansion.
- Short-term GDP effects estimated with IO and production-function models; require assumptions on substitution elasticities and shortage management (price adjustment or rationing).
- Notable short-term findings from surveyed studies:
  - Germany and Austria: gas shortage in winter of 18% (Di Bella et al., 2022).
  - Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary: gas shortage in winter of 91% (Di Bella et al., 2022).
  - Germany: reported GDP effects for 2022/23 range from 0.2 to 5% of GDP; using more realistic short-term elasticities and constraints, effects lie between 2 and 5%.
  - Household protection scenario increases GDP losses by around 50% on average, with GDP losses reaching up to 6% in the most affected countries.

### Scenario construction (four main scenarios and extensions)
- Scenario 1:
  - Implement initial trade bans by the EU, the UK and selected OECD countries; include the shutoff of natural gas by Russia; assume total shut-off of energy trade between Europe and Russia by 2027.
- Scenario 2:
  - Allow Russia to divert gas exports to China via a pipeline completed by 2030; increased Russian LNG exports to non-EU countries; increased US and other LNG exports to the EU; markets mostly compensate for pipeline shutdowns.
- Scenario 3:
  - Countries implement their current NDC emission targets; does not account for Russia’s war and related trade disruptions.
- Scenario 4:
  - Includes trade disruptions and reshaping of natural gas markets triggered by the war; assumes countries achieve NDCs using a generalized carbon tax on all GHG emissions.
- Extensions and alternate scenarios (in scenario construction section):
  - Scenario 5: combines trade disruptions (Scenario 2) and reshaping (Scenario 3) with NDC-consistent climate policies.
  - Technical assumptions in some scenarios: future expansion of Russian LNG exports by 5% annually; Russia constructs a new pipeline to China by 2030 increasing current exports to China by 300%; US LNG exports to the EU growth examples: 14.2 bcm in 2019 to 34 bcm in 2021 and expected 79 bcm in 2022 year-end.

### Main results and substantive findings
- General macroeconomic impacts:
  - EU GDP losses by 2030 are below 1%.
  - Losses are higher for EU countries more dependent on Russian gas: Italy, Germany, and the Rest EU region.
  - Losses simulated for Russia are larger, but magnitude is uncertain given unmodeled policies.
- Russian exports and trade flows:
  - Around 95% of Russian natural gas exports go through pipelines.
  - Even with increased LNG exports and a new pipeline to China, Russian natural gas exports will still decrease by 75% compared to baseline pre-war volumes.
  - Partial trade disruptions can reduce total Russian exports by around 11%.
  - Scenario 1: Russian natural gas exports fall by around 90%; Russian crude and refined oil exports decrease by around 5%.
  - Scenario 2: Russian natural gas exports decline by around 75%.
- Energy security and import substitution:
  - Most EU countries increase natural gas imports from other suppliers (mainly Norway, US, and Algeria) and reshape electricity generation toward more renewable generation.
  - The ratio of energy imports to domestic energy consumption is declining in most EU countries; imported energy dependence is reduced but shifts to other suppliers.
  - Norway, US, Qatar, and Algeria play major roles in filling the gap; large investments in LNG terminals in Europe (notably Germany) are assumed.
- Prices and global markets:
  - International natural gas prices are expected to be only 1% higher by 2030.
  - Natural gas domestic prices in Europe increase in the medium term; the increase is largest (around 10 percent) for countries with larger initial imports from Russia: Germany, Italy and Rest EU.
  - Electricity prices increase but less than natural gas prices; China’s electricity prices decrease in Scenario 2.
- Emissions and electricity mix:
  - Shifts toward renewable generation reduce overall GHG emissions in the EU by around 5% in 2030 compared with baseline values.
  - China’s increased access to relatively cheaper Russian natural gas is expected to raise China’s overall emissions by around 1.5% as cheaper gas reduces electricity prices and increases energy consumption.
  - Scenario 1 yields global emissions reductions (largest contributor in absolute terms: Rest EU); Scenario 2 yields a global emissions increase due to larger Chinese emissions.
- Distributional and sectoral points:
  - Gas-intensive sectors (electricity, chemicals) are most affected.
  - China’s gains from redirected Russian gas are relatively muted because China relies heavily on coal and renewable electricity generation and the new import volumes are small relative to China’s overall energy imports.
  - For most European countries, private consumption is the main declining GDP component; Germany shows net export increases that compensate consumption and investment losses, while Italy and Rest EU see net exports also decrease.
- Model caveats:
  - Simulations keep the current account balance fixed as a share of GDP, and do not model many current Russian policies, potential productivity losses from reduced trade, or some short-term rationing effects.

### Interaction of the war-induced trade shock with NDC implementation
- Mechanism and outcomes:
  - The trade shock increases renewable generation in Europe (triggered by disruption of natural gas and oil imports from Russia), reducing the additional effort/costs needed to meet NDCs.
  - When NDCs are modeled via a generalized carbon tax, the trade disruptions lower the carbon tax rate required on average by around US$18 per ton of CO2eq for EU countries, with largest decreases in Germany, Italy and Rest EU.
- Emissions and NDC costs:
  - Achieving NDC commitments results in global emissions reductions of around 12% or 7000 MTCO2eq with respect to baseline projections in 2030.
  - The NDCs imply emission changes of around 40% for most European countries relative to IMF emission projections, except Italy which requires a lower reduction.
- Macroeconomic costs:
  - Real GDP losses are larger when the war shock and NDCs are considered jointly than when NDCs are implemented alone, but the joint simulation produces lower combined GDP effects than running each scenario separately, indicating positive general equilibrium effects.
  - Italy, Germany, and Rest EU have the largest differences in GDP effects across scenarios.
  - China and the US experience very limited GDP changes from the trade shocks; China’s NDC costs are almost identical with and without the trade disruptions.
- Energy security under combined scenarios:
  - Concentration of total energy imports by suppliers does not change much when combining war shocks and NDCs.
  - Total energy imports relative to domestic demand is lower when NDC targets are combined with war trade shocks, implying improved energy security by this indicator.
  - Electricity prices in the NDC scenario increase with carbon taxation even though the price of natural gas is declining; in Scenario 4 natural gas prices are lower than in Scenario 2 due to accelerated renewables uptake.

### Key numeric outcomes and modeling assumptions (preserve exact figures)
- 2027: assumed year by which natural gas and oil trade between Russia and the EU is shut-off.
- 2030: year referenced for many scenario comparisons and outcomes.
- 95%: share of Russian natural gas exports that go through pipelines.
- 75%: reduction in Russian natural gas exports compared to baseline pre-war volumes even after LNG increases and a new pipeline to China.
- 5%: modeled decrease in natural gas trade costs to European regions representing increased LNG trade facilitation.
- below 1%: EU GDP losses by 2030.
- around 5%: reduction in overall GHG emissions in the EU in 2030 compared with baseline values.
- 1%: expected increase in international natural gas prices by 2030.
- around 1.5%: increase in China’s overall emissions due to cheaper Russian natural gas imports.
- Russia export composition and changes cited:
  - Natural gas represents 4% of total Russian exports.
  - Russian gas exports largely go to EU countries (around 80%).
  - Russian gas accounts for around 60% of German natural gas imports, and more than 90% for Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia.
- Scenario-specific figures:
  - Scenario 1: Russian natural gas exports fall by around 90%; crude and refined oil exports decrease by around 5%.
  - Partial trade disruptions can reduce total Russian exports by around 11%.
  - Chepeliev et al. (2022) reported: gradual reduction in Russian exports to EU: 50% in 2022 and 80% in 2030; EU medium-term real income drop of 0.4% in 2030; CO2 emissions drop by 3.1% in 2022 and by 7% in 2030; Russian real income reductions: 6% in 2022 and 8% by 2030.
  - US LNG exports to the EU example: from 14.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2019 to 34 bcm in 2021, and 2022 has an expected 79 bcm by years end (represents an average yearly increase of around 80%).
- Energy security targets referenced:
  - REPowerEU renewable generation target increased from 40 to 45% of total electricity generation by 2030.
  - EU wants 17.5 gigawatts of hydrogen capacity within three years under REPowerEU.

*Source: IMF Working Paper — Medium-term Macroeconomic Effects of Russia’s War in Ukraine and How it Affects Energy Security and Global Emission Targets (chapter: 2. Review of Studies Analyzing the Short-term Effects of a Russian Natural Gas Shutoff).*

### 2. Review of Studies Analyzing the Short-term Effects of a Russian Natural Gas Shutoff.......................... 6

### 2. Review of Studies Analyzing the Short-term Effects of a Russian Natural Gas Shutoff

### Introduction and scope
- Focus: medium- and long-term impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine on EU energy markets, energy security, national and global emissions, and real GDP.
- Assumption: by 2027 natural gas and oil trade between Russia and the EU is shut-off as a result of strategic decisions by both the EU and Russia to decouple their energy trade.
- Emphasis: disruptions primarily concern natural gas (non-fungible, requires pipelines or LNG facilities) more than oil (fungible).
- Model used: IMF-ENV, a global recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with sectoral detail and features for energy and climate issues. The model includes all G20 countries and regional aggregations.

### Methodology, model features, and data foundations
- Model: IMF-ENV global recursive dynamic CGE model suitable to analyze medium- and long-term macroeconomic effects, structural change, energy demand and supply, electricity generation mix, GHG emissions, sectoral outcomes, and trade.
- Coverage: current version includes all G20 countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and regional aggregations (Africa, East Asia, Eurasia, EU, Latin America and oil-producers).
- Policy closure for simulations: medium-term macroeconomic closure rules keep both the current account balance and the government budget fixed as a share of GDP at the baseline (pre-war) levels. Simulations therefore do not account for short-term or transitional policies currently implemented by the Russian authorities.
- Modeling assumption on LNG trade facilitation: increases in LNG trade are modeled as a 5% decrease in natural gas trade costs to the European regions; the model endogenously determines export and trade diversion effects.

### Scenario construction (four main scenarios)
- Scenario 1:
  - Implement initial trade bans imposed by the EU, the UK and selected OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and the US).
  - Include the shutoff of natural gas applied by the Russian government.
  - Assume a total shut-off of energy trade between Europe and Russia by 2027.
- Scenario 2:
  - Allow possibility of Russia diverting gas exports to China through an additional pipeline assumed to be completed by 2030.
  - Increased Russian LNG exports to non-EU countries.
  - Increased US and other countries' LNG exports to the EU.
  - Reshaping of international natural gas markets to mostly compensate for the shutdown of the gas pipelines connecting Russia and the EU.
- Scenario 3:
  - Countries implement their current NDC emission targets.
  - Does not account for Russia’s war in Ukraine and its related trade disruptions.
- Scenario 4:
  - Includes trade disruptions and reshaping of natural gas markets triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine.
  - Assumes countries achieve their NDCs using a generalized carbon tax on all GHG emissions.
- Purpose of scenarios: comparing Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 estimates how the costs of implementing NDCs change with Russia’s war in Ukraine.

### Main results and substantive findings
- General macroeconomic impacts:
  - EU GDP losses by 2030 are below 1%.
  - Losses are higher for EU countries more dependent on Russian gas: Italy, Germany, and the Rest EU region.
  - Losses simulated for Russia are larger, but the magnitude is uncertain given that several policies currently being implemented are not modeled.
- Russian exports and trade flows:
  - Around 95% of Russian natural gas exports go through pipelines.
  - Even with increased LNG exports and construction of a new pipeline to China, Russian natural gas exports will still decrease by 75% compared to baseline pre-war volumes.
- Energy security and import substitution:
  - Most EU countries increase natural gas imports from other suppliers (mainly Norway, US, and Algeria) and reshape electricity generation toward more renewable generation.
  - The ratio of energy imports to domestic energy consumption is declining in most EU countries.
  - Imported energy dependence is reduced in most EU countries, but dependence shifts to other natural gas suppliers.
- Prices and global markets:
  - International natural gas prices are expected to be only 1% higher by 2030.
- Emissions and electricity mix:
  - Shifts toward renewable generation reduce overall GHG emissions in the EU by around 5% in 2030 compared with baseline values.
  - China’s increased access to relatively cheaper Russian natural gas is expected to raise China’s overall emissions by around 1.5% as cheaper gas reduces electricity prices and increases energy consumption.
- Distributional and sectoral points:
  - China’s gains from redirected Russian gas are relatively muted because China relies heavily on coal and renewable electricity generation and the new import volumes of Russian natural gas are relatively low compared to China’s overall energy imports.

### Interaction of the war-induced trade shock with NDC implementation
- Comparing NDC implementation without the war (Scenario 3) and with the war and its trade disruptions (Scenario 4):
  - Once the economic costs of the trade shock from Russia’s war in Ukraine are accounted for, the costs for European countries of reaching their NDCs emission targets are slightly lower.
  - Mechanism: the trade shock increases renewable generation in Europe (triggered by the disruption of natural gas and oil imports from Russia), which reduces the additional effort/costs needed to meet NDCs.

### Key numeric outcomes and modeling assumptions (preserve exact figures)
- 2027: assumed year by which natural gas and oil trade between Russia and the EU is shut-off.
- 2030: year referenced for many scenario comparisons and outcomes.
- 95%: share of Russian natural gas exports that go through pipelines.
- 75%: reduction in Russian natural gas exports compared to baseline pre-war volumes even after LNG increases and a new pipeline to China.
- 5%: modeled decrease in natural gas trade costs to European regions representing increased LNG trade facilitation.
- below 1%: EU GDP losses by 2030.
- around 5%: reduction in overall GHG emissions in the EU in 2030 compared with baseline values.
- 1%: expected increase in international natural gas prices by 2030.
- around 1.5%: increase in China’s overall emissions due to cheaper Russian natural gas imports.

*Source: IMF Working Paper — Medium-term Macroeconomic Effects of Russia’s War in Ukraine and How it Affects Energy Security and Global Emission Targets (chapter: 2. Review of Studies Analyzing the Short-term Effects of a Russian Natural Gas Shutoff).*

### 2. Review of Studies Analyzing the Short-term

### 2. Review of Studies Analyzing the Short-term Effects of a Russian Natural Gas Shutoff

### Overview of the literature and modeling approaches
- Several recent papers analyze short-term (2022–23) effects of disruption of Russian natural gas imports to Germany and Europe: Bachmann et al., 2022; Lan et al., 2022; Albrizio et al., 2022; Baqaee et al., 2022; Di Bella et al., 2022.
- Common modeling ingredients across studies: LNG imports, gas consumption, inventory changes, infrastructure expansion, gas-to-coal switching, renewable and nuclear power expansion.
- GDP effects are estimated with different input-output (IO) and production-function models; these require assumptions on elasticities of substitution (mainly between gas and other energy sources) and on how shortages are managed (price adjustments or rationing). Some studies include demand-side effects (trade changes) and uncertainty effects.
- Albrizio et al. (2022), Bachmann et al. (2022) and Baqaee et al. (2022) use the trade model from Baqaee and Farhi (2019) but implement a partial-equilibrium, “sufficient statistic” second-order approximation. The source notes this approximation:
  - Is based on a second-order approximation that generally only holds for marginal shocks and when other variables are kept fixed.
  - Assumes total exports are unchanged by the gas supply shock, thereby missing trade-related general equilibrium effects from lower aggregate demand in a highly integrated region like the EU.

### Country-specific short-term exposure and GDP findings
- Di Bella et al. (2022):
  - Provides country-specific Russian gas dependence and substitution detail across most European countries.
  - Identifies two main groups facing largest short-term disruptions in winter:
    - Germany and Austria: gas shortage in winter of 18%.
    - Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary: gas shortage in winter of 91%.
  - Finds other countries largely able to substitute to alternative gas sources (mainly LNG) and thus not expected to have direct shortages, though they will be indirectly affected by higher gas prices.
  - Uses a combination of Albrizio et al. (2022) estimations and a multi-sector demand-spillover model calibrated to regional gas shortages.
  - Key results:
    - Losses depend on country-specific reliance on Russian gas and overall gas-intensity of the economy.
    - Gas-intensive sectors (electricity, chemicals) are most affected.
    - “Solidarity” scenario (re-exporting gas to hardest hit countries) spreads GDP losses and reduces extreme negative impacts for the most affected countries.
    - Household protection scenario (household gas consumption fixed) increases GDP losses by around 50% on average, with GDP losses reaching up to 6% in the most affected countries.
- For Germany, the surveyed studies report a wide range of GDP effects for 2022/23: from 0.2 to 5% of GDP. The source notes that when using more realistic short-term elasticities and gas substitution constraints, effects are between (2 and 5%).
- For other EU countries, results are country-specific and can be substantial for countries experiencing shortages.

### Indirect international effects and related studies
- Albrizio et al. (2022):
  - Highlights an important indirect effect: higher European demand for LNG raises international LNG prices, negatively affecting Korea and Japan and other LNG-importing countries.
  - Notes redirecting Russian natural gas exports from Europe to China only becomes viable at least until 2030:
    - Current pipeline to China sources gas from Far East Russia and volumes are relatively small (around 5% of total Russian gas exports).
    - Agreed second pipeline from Western Siberia has timeline for full construction in 2030 and capacity to cover only one-third of current Russian exports to Europe.
- Al-Karablieh (2022): analyzes short-term impacts of a European ban on Russian crude and refined oil imports; finds effects can be significant for some European countries but generally smaller than natural gas disruption due to easier oil substitution.
- Ari et al. (2022): emphasizes trade-offs between short-term energy price/security and medium-term EU climate goals; main policy recommendation:
  - Provide short-term income support for low-income households (with limited and targeted support to vulnerable firms).
  - Avoid distorting prices to preserve incentives for firms and households to reduce energy consumption, increase energy-efficiency investments, and switch to renewables.
  - Warns of dangers: short-term gas-to-oil and gas-to-coal substitution, and global effects of larger EU LNG demand pushing some countries (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Indonesia) toward coal.
- Chepeliev et al. (2022) (closely aligned with the source study):
  - Employs the ENVISAGE CGE model calibrated to 2030 with gradual tariff increases by mostly OECD countries on Russian fossil-fuel exports; results include:
    - Gradual reduction in Russian exports to EU: 50% in 2022 and 80% in 2030.
    - EU medium-term real income drop of 0.4% in 2030 (relative to baseline).
    - CO2 emissions drop by 3.1% in 2022 and by 7% in 2030 (relative to baseline).
    - Emission reductions ease EU mitigation targets and reduce the implicit carbon price to achieve emission targets by around 40 EUR per ton of CO2.
    - Russian real income reductions: 6% in 2022 and 8% by 2030 (relative to baseline).
    - Short-term effects for EU countries lie in the lower bound of related studies: -0.7 to -1.7%.
  - Notes limitations: designed before EU trade restrictions were defined and before Russia’s partial shut-off; did not update global natural gas trade shares nor account for non-fungibility of pipeline natural gas.

### Methodology: IMF-ENV model features
- IMF-ENV is a global recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.
- Model characteristics:
  - Suited for structural change and sectoral impacts from energy and climate shocks and policies.
  - Simulates impacts on energy demand and supply, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, macroeconomic variables, sectoral outcomes, and trade.
  - Based on neo-classical framework optimizing consumption and production; treats commodities and production factors (labor, capital, land) with almost perfect markets.
  - Actors: firms, households, markets; markets determine equilibrium prices for factors, goods, and services; countries exchange goods on international markets.
  - Factors nearly perfectly mobile across sectors; capital stocks have vintages so production and behavior differ in short and long run.
  - Recursive dynamic: solved as sequence of comparative static equilibria; factors are exogenous at each point and linked across periods with accumulation expressions (akin to Solow dynamics).
  - Production uses nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions to capture substitutability across inputs.
  - Trade: Armington specification with differentiated goods by region of origin, full set of bilateral flows and prices by traded commodity.
  - Links economic activity to environmental outcomes: models emissions of CO2, CH4, N2O and fluorinated gases (HFCs, PFCs and SF6).
- Model uses for analysis:
  - Scenario analysis projecting up to 2050 with internally consistent trends of economic, sectoral, trade-related, and environmental variables.
  - Quantitative policy assessment for transitions to low-carbon economies and costs/benefits of policy instruments for GHG reduction targets.
  - Caveat: very long-run projections are especially uncertain due to possible disruptive technology innovations.

### Data and baseline adjustments applied in this study
- Central database: GTAP 10 Power (Aguiar et al., 2019; Chepeliev, 2020b).
  - Database contains country-specific input-output tables for 141 countries and 65 commodities and real macro flows.
  - This version of the model employs 36 activities, 28 commodity sectors and 25 country/regions.
  - Includes eight electricity generation technologies and an electricity transmission and distribution activity.
- Baseline calibration and assumptions:
  - Electricity generation and total GHG emission values calibrated using projections from the Climate Policy Assessment Tool (CPAT) from IMF’s FAD.
  - Assumes annual overall energy efficiency growth of 1.5%.
  - Emission projections include technological advances reducing emission intensity but do not include emission reductions from new mitigation policies; baseline only includes already implemented carbon pricing policies, such as the EU’s emissions trading system (ETS).
- Two major adjustments to GTAP for this study:
  1. Updated natural gas bilateral Russian exports data.
  2. Updated EU and UK bilateral natural gas imports to reflect latest data for 2021 (natural gas import data from OECD/IEA Natural Gas Information Statistics for 2021).
- Observations from adjusted baseline trade data:
  - Russian crude and refined oil is the main Russian export; gas represents 4% of total exports.
  - Almost half of all Russian exports, including energy, go to other European countries.
  - Russian gas exports largely go to EU countries (around 80%).
  - Russian gas accounts for around 60% of German natural gas imports, and more than 90% for Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia.
  - Natural gas exports are mainly through pipelines, making natural gas trade non-fungible and difficult to substitute.
  - Russian oil exports can be more easily redirected to other markets.
  - Oil trade data from Eurostat (usually 2022) show large EU countries (Germany, Italy, France; and the UK) have already stopped oil imports from Russia; of the rest of EU countries, only Hungary, Greece, Czechia, and Latvia are still importing, and these flows represent around one quarter of the pre-war Russian oil imports for the RestEU region.
- Policy-scenario assumption used in this study:
  - The EU has stated it intends to stop gas and oil imports from Russia as soon as possible. Thus, the study assumes in its policy scenarios that there are no more imports of Russian natural gas and oil by European countries in the medium term.
- EU energy import dependence (2021) findings from updated data:
  - Germany, Italy, and the RestEU region rely heavily on Russian energy imports; France and the UK do not.
  - Natural gas import dependence ratios highest for Germany, and above 40% for Italy and the RestEU region.
  - RestEU hides large dependencies in Central European countries (Austria, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary) and very low dependencies for Western Europe (Spain, Portugal).
  - Most European countries have energy import dependency ratios of around 50%, with Italy and the UK lower. This indicates more than half of energy demand is linked to imports.
  - The baseline (BaU) excludes future policies even if committed; it includes only latest carbon pricing policies and is a reference for comparing future policy changes.

*Source: IMF Working Paper — 2. Review of Studies Analyzing the Short-term Effects of a Russian Natural Gas Shutoff*

### 4. Scenario Construction

### 4. Scenario Construction

### Trade disruptions from Russia’s war in Ukraine
- Implement trade disruptions based on the initial EU bans imposed by the European Council.21
- Assume a full import ban for all products, with the exception of agricultural products and food, fertilizers, pharmaceutical and medical products.
- EU did not ban Russian natural gas imports, but Russia stopped a large share of its gas exports to European countries. By the summer of 2023, European imports of natural gas from Russia represented around 25% of the pre-war levels.22
- Assume all European energy imports from Russia are shutoff by 2027 in the policy scenarios (strategic decision by both the EU and Russia to decouple their energy trade in the medium run).
- No explicit bans on electricity imports from Russia, so electricity trade continues (i.e., Baltic countries continue to import electricity from Russia).
- EU imposed export bans for EU firms to export to Russia iron and steel, cement, wood, and seafood.
- Non-fungibility of pipeline natural gas: pipeline gas exported to specific countries cannot be redirected to other countries not connected to the pipeline. LNG increases tradability but requires large investments for exporters and importers and can take several years to substitute pipeline flows.23
- Assume in Scenarios 1 and 2 that Russian natural gas exported to Europe before the trade shock cannot be redirected to other countries.
- Constrain natural gas exports of other (non-Russian) suppliers to Europe to be the same as in the baseline projections (to reflect limitations of expanding natural gas exports in the short-term).
- Scenario 3 relaxes natural gas constraints to allow for expansion of Russian LNG and pipeline exports:
  - Assume future expansion of LNG exports will increase total Russian natural gas exports by 5% annually.
  - Assume Russia constructs a new pipeline to China by 2030, which increases current exports to this country by 300%.
  - Allow for increased pipeline gas exports from Norway and expand LNG exports of the US, Qatar and Algeria to Europe in response to higher prices and the supply vacuum after the shutoff of Russian natural gas imports.
  - US LNG exports to the EU: from 14.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2019 to 34 bcm in 2021, and 2022 has an expected 79 bcm by years end.25 This represents an average yearly increase of around 80%.
- Technical modeling: trade disruptions are modeled using iceberg trade costs that create a price wedge between exporting producers and importing consumers; to ban certain trade flows, iceberg trade costs are arbitrarily increased to effectively make the trade flows zero (avoids creating tariff revenues that would not be received in reality).

### Interaction with climate policies
- Scenario 4 (reference in this section): only assume climate policies consistent with the NDCs are implemented — used as a reference for economic costs of achieving the NDCs without direct and indirect effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine on trade.
- Scenario 5: includes trade disruptions from Russia’s war in Ukraine (from Scenario 2) and reshaping of international natural gas markets (from Scenario 3), plus climate policies consistent with national determined contributions (NDCs).
  - Estimate the carbon price consistent with emission reductions required for the EU and other countries to reach their NDCs by 2030.
- NDC scenarios are based solely on carbon taxation and do not reflect the most recently announced climate policies.26
  - Note: All countries will likely employ a combination of different climate policy instruments; many countries, including the US, are not planning to use carbon pricing as their main climate policy to decrease GHG emissions.
- REPowerEU (as reaction to Russia cutting gas exports to the EU) aims to achieve full independence from Russian energy imports well before 2030 through four inter-related dimensions:
  - (i) reducing energy consumption;
  - (ii) diversifying supplies;
  - (iii) accelerating the green transition;
  - (iv) improving connectivity within Europe.
- REPowerEU does not include temporary use of coal plants to avoid gas shortages in 2022/23. The longer-term focus is cutting reliance on imported fossil fuels.
- Under the plan, the EU wants to have 17.5 gigawatts of hydrogen capacity within three years and has increased the renewable generation target from 40 to 45% of total electricity generation by 2030.28
- Analysis of detailed REPowerEU and Fit for 55 policies is beyond the scope of this study and will be analyzed in an upcoming joint paper with the IMF’s European Department (EUR).
- Carbon tax revenue treatment in NDC scenarios: assume carbon tax revenue is recycled towards a decrease in labor taxes (chosen to provide one of the most efficient recycling options and maintain comparability across countries).26

### Scenario summary
- Scenarios divided into two main groups:

1. Russian trade disruptions:
  - Scenario 1 (Sce1):
    - Most Russian exports to the EU, UK, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, and the US are banned, excluding sectors with no bans in the EU: agriculture, food, and electricity.
    - Include reduction of Russian exports of natural gas to the EU.
    - Assume Russia cannot divert its pipeline natural gas exports that currently go to the EU to other regions, while the EU cannot increase (for 2022 and 2023) their natural gas imports from other non-EU regions.
    - Assume total shut-off of energy trade between Russia, the EU and other OECD countries by 2027.
    - EU imposes bans on exports to Russia of iron, steel, wood, cement, and seafood.
  - Scenario 2 (Sce2):
    - Same as Scenario 1, but adjust the international market for natural gas:
      - Russia increases its natural gas exports by 5% annually (through expanding LNG exports) to all countries, except those who imposed trade restrictions.
      - Russia constructs a new pipeline to China (with an increase of 300% on current exports there).
      - European countries increase natural gas imports from alternative suppliers: the US, Qatar, Algeria, and other countries.

2. Interaction with climate commitments:
  - Scenario 3 (Sce3):
    - All countries achieve their NDC emission targets, but do not assume the international trade shock from Russia’s war in Ukraine (used to compare NDC costs with and without the war).
  - Scenario 4 (Sce4):
    - Same as Scenario 2 but now all countries achieve their NDC emission targets through an increase in the overall carbon tax rate.

*Source: wpiea2024039-print-pdf - 4. Scenario Construction*

### 5.1 Trade  disruptions from the war

### 5.1 Trade disruptions from the war

### Trade shock scenarios and impacts on Russian energy exports
- Scenario 1 (partial import bans from the EU and other OECD countries):
  - Russian natural gas exports fall by around 90%.
  - Russian crude and refined oil exports decrease by around 5%.
  - The large decrease in natural gas reflects the shutdown of pipelines to Europe.
  - Russia’s oil exports to non-European destinations mostly compensate for the closure of European markets, increasing foreign revenue from oil.
- Scenario 2 (allowing increased Russian LNG exports and a new pipeline to China fully operational by 2030):
  - Russian natural gas exports decline by around 75%.
  - The new pipeline to China is assumed to be fully operational by 2030; however, regaining pre-war natural gas export levels would require much larger volumes to China and/or exports to India or other large markets.
- Model assumption relevant to trade effects:
  - The IMF-ENV model assumes that the current account balance (CAB) is kept constant as a share of real GDP; therefore, part of the export effects are driven by this CAB constraint.

### Aggregate export and macroeconomic consequences
- Total Russian exports:
  - Partial trade disruptions result in overall Russian exports decreasing by around 11%.
  - Redirecting Russian natural gas has a limited effect on total Russian exports relative to redirecting oil exports because crude and refined oil represent almost half of total Russian exports.
- Real GDP effects in 2030 (changes w.r.t. baseline 2030 values):
  - Russia experiences the highest GDP losses under partial trade disruptions (Scenario 1); GDP losses are less pronounced in Scenario 2 when redirection to China and larger LNG trade are allowed.
  - For EU countries, GDP costs are less than 1% and do not vary much between scenarios.
  - China and the US have very small negative effects (driven by indirect effects as European demand decreases).
- Modeling caveats on GDP results:
  - These simulations should not be seen as medium-term projections of output losses in Russia.
  - The magnitude of medium-term GDP losses is uncertain because many factors (including current Russian policies) are not modeled.
  - The model does not include potential productivity losses associated with lower trade levels (e.g., technological transfers embedded in imports) or direct losses to human capital; it does include a reduced-form endogenous labor supply mechanism linked to changes in real wages.

### Composition of GDP changes and consumption effects
- Decomposition of real GDP effects (Scenario 2, 2030):
  - For most European countries, private consumption is the main declining component.
  - Germany: net export increases compensate for losses in consumption and investment.
  - Italy and Rest of EU: net exports also decrease, so overall GDP changes are larger than for Germany.
  - Reductions in private consumption are correlated with consumer welfare losses.

### Electricity generation mix and energy substitution in Europe and China
- EU electricity generation (2030):
  - Russian shutoff of natural gas triggers substantial reduction in gas generation across EU regions.
  - Italy has the highest decrease in gas generation; Germany and Rest EU also see significant decreases.
  - Reduction in gas generation is substituted mostly by renewable sources; coal and oil generation remain very close to baseline values.
  - These are medium-term effects; in the short term, some European countries might need to revert to coal and nuclear-powered electricity.
  - The reduction in gas generation is moderated because Russian gas imports into Europe are almost completely substituted by imports from other natural gas suppliers.
- China electricity generation and pipeline effects:
  - Electricity generation in China is dominated by coal and renewables; natural gas is one of the least important power sources.
  - The new Russia–China pipeline is expected to generate a 300% expansion in current Russian natural gas exports to China, but this has only a moderate effect on Chinese electricity generation because resulting export volumes remain small relative to overall Chinese energy demand.
  - Russia was already the largest supplier of natural gas to China; with the new pipeline it is expected to provide more than 90% of total natural gas imports to China.
  - Russia provides less than 10% of total energy imports to China (including oil and coal); Russia’s war in Ukraine increases this share to 20%, which also reflects a sharp increase in crude and refined oil imports from Russia.
  - As a result, China does not benefit much in terms of GDP changes or electricity generation changes from the new pipeline, despite reducing the price it pays for natural gas imports.

### GHG emissions impacts
- European emissions:
  - The shutoff of Russian natural gas exports leads to substitution away from gas to renewable generation, reducing GHG emissions in European countries.
  - Italy, Germany, and Rest EU have the largest decreases among European regions.
  - These emission reductions are less than 5% of total European emissions.
- Russia and China emissions:
  - Russia experiences a relatively large rise in emissions as domestic consumption of natural gas increases and electricity prices decline.
  - China’s emissions increase by about 1.5% with respect to its baseline levels in Scenario 2:
    - Cheaper Russian natural gas initially reduces coal generation share, but lower electricity prices increase overall energy consumption, accounting for the rise in emissions.
- Global absolute emissions:
  - Scenario 1 yields global emissions reductions, with the largest contributor in absolute terms being Rest EU and to a lesser extent other European countries.
  - Scenario 2 yields a global emissions increase due to larger Chinese emissions.
  - Relative percentage increases in China translate into relatively large absolute emission changes measured in MTCO2eq.

### Energy security indicators, import shares, and prices
- Imported energy shares and supplier concentration (2030):
  - Projected that the EU is not dependent on Russian energy imports by 2030 for overall energy (coal, crude and refined oil, natural gas) and for natural gas specifically.
  - Reductions in Russian supply are compensated mainly by increased imports from Norway (included in the EU+EFTA region) and by substantial increases in LNG imports from Qatar (OPEC), Algeria (Africa), and the US.
  - Large investments in LNG terminals in Europe, particularly in Germany, account for increased LNG import shares from the US and Qatar.
  - Increased dependency on non-Russian exporters creates potential future security issues if those suppliers become less reliable.
  - Norway will need to expand current natural gas production and exports, requiring heavy investment in new gas fields and possibly new pipelines to Europe.
- Share of imported energy relative to domestic energy consumption (2030):
  - All European countries in the simulations experience a decline in the share of imported energy relative to their energy demand, but the reduction is not substantial because Russian natural gas consumption is substituted by imports from other sources.
- Energy prices (medium-term simulation results):
  - Natural gas domestic prices in Europe increase in the medium term.
  - The increase is largest (around 10 percent) for countries with larger initial imports from Russia: Germany, Italy and Rest EU.
  - The international price of natural gas increases by 1 percent relative to baseline prices.
  - Electricity prices also increase but less than natural gas prices.
  - China: electricity prices decrease in Scenario 2, helping explain increased energy consumption and emissions in China.
- Interpretation:
  - Relatively small international price increases reflect substitution of Russian natural gas by other suppliers and increased LNG supply in international markets; medium-term increases in non-Russian natural gas exports are expected to fill the supply gap left by Russian pipeline gas.

*Source: wpiea2024039-print-pdf - 5.1 Trade  disruptions from the war*

### 5.2  Interaction  of  the  war  with  climate  commitments

### 5.2 Interaction of the war with climate commitments

### NDC implementation and emissions
- The analysis models a global commitment to reducing emissions through the implementation of the NDCs in G20 countries (Scenario 3) and then interacts this global NDC scenario with the trade shocks resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine (Scenario 4).
- Achieving the NDC commitments requires drastic GHG emission reductions by 2030. The EU’s Green Deal envisages a reduction of 55% with respect to 2005 emission values for all sources of GHG.
- The NDC commitments, which are relative to a historical emission value (2005 for the EU), result in emission changes with respect to the IMF emission projections of around 40% for most European countries, except for Italy that requires a lower emission reduction.
- The implementation of these NDC targets results in global emissions reductions of around 12% or 7000 MTCO2eq with respect to baseline projections in 2030.
- By volume, most emissions reductions are in China and the US, even though EU countries have similar percentage reductions as the US.

### Carbon tax rates and electricity generation mix
- For simplicity, the NDC emission reductions are modeled through a general carbon tax levied on all GHGs and polluting activities.
- Countries require substantial increases in carbon tax rates to achieve their NDCs.
- The level of required carbon tax rates is related to country carbon-intensity and is affected by trade disruptions triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine:
  - The trade disruptions shift the electricity mix towards a larger share of renewable generation and reduce domestic consumption of imported fossil fuels.
  - This implies the carbon tax rate is lower on average by around US$18 per ton of CO2eq for EU countries, with the largest decreases in Germany, Italy and the Rest of EU region.
- The electricity mix for 2030 under the NDC is calibrated to match values from the PRIMES energy model from the European Commission’s Joint Research Center (JRC-Seville); calibration matches shares of fossil fuel and renewable generation while allowing differences in the composition of fossil fuels and renewable types.
- By construction the NDC values for both Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 are similar. However:
  - Russia’s war in Ukraine (Scenario 2) produces an intermediate step between baseline values and the NDC targets for all European countries.
  - In Italy, trade disruptions brought about by the war bring the electricity mix closer to the NDC-compatible mix.
  - For Germany, the UK, and the Rest EU region, much larger adjustments are required, with large reductions of coal and natural gas generation.
- Nuclear generation volumes are kept fixed to baseline values in the calibration.

### Macroeconomic costs and GDP effects
- The shock from Russia’s war in Ukraine slightly reduces the overall economic costs (reflected in reductions in real GDP) of reaching the NDCs when scenarios are simulated jointly.
- Real GDP losses are larger in the scenario with the shock of Russia’s war in Ukraine (Scenario 4) than in the scenario without (Scenario 3) in all European countries.
- However, when trade shocks and NDC policies are simulated jointly, the GDP effects are lower than the GDP effects of each scenario (2 and 3) run separately, indicating positive general equilibrium effects of running both scenarios simultaneously.
- Italy, Germany, and the Rest EU region have the largest differences in GDP effects between scenarios.
- China and the US experience very limited GDP changes from the trade shocks associated with Russia’s war in Ukraine.
- The NDC costs for China are almost identical with and without the trade disruptions associated with Russia’s war in Ukraine because:
  - Gas generation represents a very small fraction of electricity generation in China.
  - Larger imports of natural gas from Russia are relatively small compared to China’s overall energy imports.
  - The reduction in electricity price from cheaper Russian natural gas requires a higher implicit carbon tax to reduce emissions.

### Energy security indicators
- Concentration of total energy imports by suppliers does not change much between the war trade shocks (Scenario 2) and when those are combined with the NDC (Scenario 4).
- For natural gas imports, shares shift more between Scenarios 2 and 4, but remain relatively close, implying implementing the NDC targets after the war does not materially affect supplier composition of energy and natural gas imports.
- Total energy imports relative to total domestic energy demand is lower when the NDC targets are combined with the war trade shocks for all European regions, implying improved energy security by this indicator.
- Electricity prices in the NDC scenario (Scenario 3) increase with carbon taxation even though the price of natural gas is declining, because carbon taxation makes fossil-fuel generation more expensive while reducing fossil-fuel demand and prices.
- The interaction of NDC policies with the war trade shock (Scenario 4) makes natural gas prices lower than in Scenario 2, as the shutoff of Russian natural gas imports forces countries to move more aggressively towards renewable generation.
- Electricity prices in Scenario 4 do not change much compared to the NDC scenario.
- Overall, the war trade shocks, implementation of NDC targets, and the combination of both provide more energy security when measured as the share of imported energy to domestic consumption or energy price changes.

### Summary of related medium-term findings (from this section)
- Trade disruptions triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine are expected to generate modest medium-term economic losses for European countries; simulations show real GDP losses associated with the trade disruptions are expected to be higher for Russia but moderate for other European countries (less than 1%) and negligible for other G20 countries.
- Switching away from Russian energy imports is expected to create a greener electricity generation mix in Europe and reduce EU overall emissions between 2% to 5% as a consequence of the trade disruptions associated with the war.
- Italy, Germany, and the Rest EU region are the most affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine, with the largest GDP losses and higher natural gas consumer price changes, due to initial high dependency on Russian natural gas and large shares of natural gas in electricity generation.
- Some Central and Eastern European countries (Austria, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria) are likely more severely affected; these are aggregated in the Rest of EU region in the model.
- Natural gas prices are not expected to increase substantially in the medium-term because EU countries will still import substantial amounts of natural gas from suppliers such as Norway, the US, Qatar, and Algeria instead of Russia.
- If a new pipeline between Russia and China is constructed, it will have relatively small GDP effects for both countries under the model assumptions; natural gas exports of Russia are assumed to still decrease by almost 75% of pre-war levels.
- When countries implement their NDCs, overall costs of implementing the NDCs are slightly reduced for European countries because the trade shocks associated with Russia’s war in Ukraine already have a positive impact on renewable generation and reduce natural gas demand.
- The required shadow price of carbon to reach the NDCs is slightly lower after Russia’s war in Ukraine as countries move faster toward renewable generation and rely less on imported fossil fuel energy.

*IMF Working Paper — Section 5.2: Interaction of the war with climate commitments*

### References

### References

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*Medium-term Macroeconomic Effects of Russia’s War in Ukraine and How it Affects Energy Security and Global Emission Targets — Working Paper No. WP/2024/039*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2024/english/wpiea2024039-print-pdf.pdf_
