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### I. Introduction — scope and empirical approach
- Context and motivation:
  - Governments increasingly resort to industrial policy and subsidies; in 2023 there were 2,500 new industrial policies – of which 71 percent are trade distortive (Evenett and others, 2024).
  - Subsidies are the most popular industrial policy instrument worldwide; recent examples include the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the Chips and Science Act (US), the European Green Deal and Digital Europe (EU), and Made in China 2025 (China).
- Objective:
  - Empirically investigate the effects of China’s subsidies on its trade flows over the period 2009-2022, assessing direct and spillover (through trade/supply chains) effects.
- Data and limitations:
  - Data source: Global Trade Alert (GTA) database recording existence of subsidies at HS 6-digit product level, dates of announcement/implementation/removal, implementing country, and product targets.
  - Key GTA limitations:
    - Lack of information about the monetary value of subsidies.
    - Absence of ‘legacy’ subsidies introduced before 2009.
    - Both limitations expected to attenuate estimated impacts (treat some subsidized products as non-subsidized; treat all subsidies equally regardless of size).

### II. Data and trends in China’s subsidies (2009–2022)
- Aggregate counts and concentration:
  - By 2022, approximately 5,400 subsidy policies introduced since 2009 and in force in China; these represent 95 percent of all GTA policies introduced by the country.
  - 20 percent of the sectors received over 50 percent of the subsidies.
  - Top industries (by 2022 subsidies): chemicals, machinery, automotive, metals.
  - Top 20 percent recipient industries attract almost half of China’s subsidies.
- Dynamics and sectoral patterns:
  - By 2022 number of subsidies in strategic sectors increased from 647 (2015) to 2420 (2022) — almost quadrupled; subsidies in other sectors tripled in same period.
  - For strategic green/tech products, subsidies increased after 2015 especially in lithium-ion batteries and solar panels; EVs and wind turbines trends roughly similar to all other products.
- Composition:
  - By 2022, subsidies are 95% of all trade-distortive GTA policies implemented by China.
  - Almost all (98%) of China’s subsidies are classified as monetary transfers from the government to firms (state aid and grants).

### III. Direct effects of China’s subsidies on product-level trade
- Empirical approach and caveats:
  - Specification: difference-in-differences with interactions for China (CHN) and extensive fixed effects (country-product, product-year, country-year) and controls for other GTA policies (IP matrix).
  - Identification caveats: endogenous selection into subsidies, time-varying product shocks, and retaliatory policies by trading partners; estimates interpreted as descriptive.
- Main quantified direct effects (product-level regressions; percent effects computed as [exp(β1+β2)−1]*100):
  - Exports: exports of subsidized products are 0.9% higher (relative to non-subsidized products) after China’s subsidies — CHN effect 0.009**.
  - Imports: China’s subsidies depress imports of targeted products relative to non-subsidized products; CHN effect -0.009**.
  - Coverage: China’s subsidies cover 77% of the country’s exports and 83% of its imports.
- Heterogeneity by partner group:
  - Exports to other G20 emerging economies (G20 EMs): 2.1% higher after subsidy (CHN effect to G20 EMs 0.021***).
  - No significant export market-share gains in Advanced Economies (AEs) on average.
  - Imports: stronger import-substitution effects for Advanced Economies:
    - 3% decrease in imports from G20 AEs of subsidized products relative to other products.
    - 4.8% decrease in imports from other AEs.
- Industry heterogeneity (selected):
  - Electrical machinery: subsidized product exports are 7% higher than other products after China’s subsidies.
  - Metals: exports and imports of subsidized products decline relative to other products within the industry.
  - Furniture: subsidies foster exports and reduce imports.

### IV. Indirect effects through input-output (supply-chain) linkages
- Method and exposure measures:
  - Use China’s 2007 input-output table to compute industry-level exposure:
    - Upstream exposure measured by cost shares cost_kj.
    - Downstream exposure measured by sales shares sales_jk.
  - Aggregate subsidy counts at industry level; use inverse hyperbolic transform of counts.
- Key numerical findings (industry-level regressions on 94 goods industries):
  - Upstream-to-downstream export amplification for China:
    - China-specific upstream effect (CHN effect from upstream) in exports: 0.249*** (column (1) panel (a)) and 0.210*** (column (2) panel (a)).
  - Indirect import effects:
    - Upstream subsidies tend to lower imports in downstream industries (CHN effect from upstream in imports: -0.154 to -0.133 depending on specification).
  - Downstream-to-upstream effects:
    - Subsidies given to downstream industries have statistically significant negative effects on exports of their supplying industries (CHN effect from downstream -0.164* to -0.296**).
- Magnitude illustrations (back-of-envelope simulations):
  - Steel → automotive linkage: steel inputs account for 10% of automotive costs. Applying observed increase in subsidies to steel (2015–2022) implies a 3.5% increase in China’s automotive exports (derived using estimated upstream CHN coefficient 0.210 and asinh-change 0.165).
  - Reverse: increase in automotive (buyer) subsidies associated with a 2.6% decline in exports of steel processing (supplying industry), using estimated downstream CHN coefficient -0.296 and counterfactual change 0.09.
- Interpretation:
  - Upstream subsidies expand supplying industry capacity and lower input prices, helping downstream industries become more competitive in export markets and substitute imports.
  - Downstream subsidies can redirect supplier sales away from exports toward domestic supply, reducing supplier exports.

### V. Export price and quantity decomposition — implications for “overcapacity”
- Conceptual framework:
  - Price-quantity combinations and interpretations:
    - Higher quantity + lower price: consistent with excess supply OR efficiency/cost reductions.
    - Higher quantity + higher price: consistent with quality upgrading.
    - Lower quantity + higher price: consistent with market concentration/inefficiencies.
    - Lower quantity + lower price: could result from trade remedies or complex adjustments.
- Measurement:
  - Quantities measured in net weight (kg).
  - Export prices proxied by weighted average bilateral unit values (current USD per kg), weights equal to importer share in total exports of the product.
  - Estimates for direct (product-level) and indirect (industry-level via IO exposure) effects; fixed effects and GTA policy controls included.
- Average findings (Table 3):
  - Direct effects: on average, China’s subsidies are associated with small, statistically insignificant decreases in export prices and small, statistically insignificant increases in export quantities.
  - Indirect (upstream) China-specific effects: upstream subsidies associated with positive and statistically significant increases in export quantities in downstream industries (CHN effect from upstream on export quantities: 0.360*** and 0.261*** in columns (7)–(8)).
  - Indirect upstream effects on export prices for China are positive in point estimate but not precisely estimated for direct price changes.
- Industry-level heterogeneity:
  - Industries with higher quantities and lower prices (consistent with excess supply or cost reductions): communication equipment, plastic, chemicals, metal products, wood and furniture.
  - Electrical machinery: positive export price and quantity responses — evidence consistent with quality upgrading in this industry (batteries and solar panels included in the sector).
  - Automotive: evidence of negative price and quantity responses when combining direct and upstream subsidies.
  - Other transport equipment and Medical and precision instruments: direct subsidies associated with higher prices and lower quantities — consistent with increased market power or inefficiencies.
- Strategic sector IO findings (Table A.2 highlights):
  - Autos: significant negative price and positive quantity responses to upstream subsidies in automotive, consistent with upstream subsidies contributing to cost reduction or excess supply; downstream subsidies have the opposite sign.
  - For several strategic sectors, price effects are weak; upstream subsidies sometimes counter direct negative effects by expanding quantities.

### VI. Main conclusions and research implications
- Aggregate conclusions:
  - China’s subsidies between 2009 and 2022 are associated with:
    - Higher exports of subsidized products relative to non-subsidized products (average CHN export effect 0.009 or 0.9%).
    - Lower imports of subsidized products (average CHN import effect -0.009).
    - Indirect amplification of these effects via upstream supply-chain linkages.
  - Direct export market-share gains concentrate with other G20 emerging economies; indirect effects are most pronounced for trade with G20 advanced economies.
  - Industry heterogeneity matters: electrical machinery and furniture show strong pro-export responses; metal products show both exports and imports declining.
- On “overcapacity”:
  - Average evidence that subsidies cause lower export prices and higher quantities (signature of excess supply) is weak.
  - Industry-specific results indicate subsidies could have contributed to excess supply in certain sectors (metal products and furniture) but to quality upgrading in others (electrical machinery), at least up to 2022.
- Research and data needs (recommendations):
  - Obtain exhaustive information on the monetary value of subsidies across industries and over time for refined impact assessment.
  - Use firm-level data to identify subsidy effects on firm dynamics in export markets.
  - Develop model-based approaches to distinguish subsidy-driven effects from other structural and macroeconomic determinants of demand/supply and to quantify welfare implications.
  - Further theoretical and empirical work on interactions of countries’ measures (subsidies, trade remedies) to assess long-term welfare effects of industrial policy.

*Content summarized from wpiea2024180-print-pdf - References.*

### References .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

### wpiea2024180-print-pdf - References .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

### I. Introduction — scope and empirical approach
- Governments increasingly resort to industrial policy and subsidies; in 2023 there were 2,500 new industrial policies – of which 71 percent are trade distortive (Evenett and others, 2024).
- Subsidies are the most popular industrial policy instrument worldwide; recent examples include the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the Chips and Science Act (US), the European Green Deal and Digital Europe (EU), and Made in China 2025 (China).
- Paper objective: empirically investigate the effects of China’s subsidies on its trade flows over the period 2009-2022, assessing direct and spillover (through trade/supply chains) effects.
- Data source for subsidies and policies: Global Trade Alert (GTA) database; data record existence of subsidies at HS 6-digit product level, dates of announcement/implementation/removal, implementing country, and product targets.
- Key GTA data limitations noted:
  - Lack of information about the monetary value of subsidies.
  - Absence of ‘legacy’ subsidies introduced before 2009.
  - Both limitations are expected to attenuate estimated impacts (treat some subsidized products as non-subsidized; treat all subsidies equally regardless of size).

### II. Data and trends in China’s subsidies (2009–2022)
- By 2022, approximately 5,400 subsidy policies introduced since 2009 and in force in China; these represent 95 percent of all GTA policies introduced by the country.
- Distributional facts:
  - 20 percent of the sectors received over 50 percent of the subsidies.
  - Top industries (by 2022 subsidies): chemicals, machinery, automotive, metals.
  - Top 20 percent recipient industries attract almost half of China’s subsidies.
  - By 2022 number of subsidies in strategic sectors increased from 647 (2015) to 2420 (2022) — almost quadrupled; subsidies in other sectors tripled in same period.
- Product-level trends for strategic green/tech products:
  - Subsidies increased after 2015 especially in lithium-ion batteries and solar panels; EVs and wind turbines trends roughly similar to all other products.
- Composition of China’s subsidies:
  - By 2022, subsidies are 95% of all trade-distortive GTA policies implemented by China.
  - Almost all (98%) of China’s subsidies are classified as monetary transfers from the government to firms (state aid and grants).

### III. Direct effects of China’s subsidies on product-level trade
- Empirical specification: difference-in-differences with interactions for China (CHN) and extensive fixed effects (country-product, product-year, country-year) and controls for other GTA policies (IP matrix).
- Identification caveats: endogenous selection into subsidies, time-varying product shocks, and retaliatory policies by trading partners can bias causal interpretation; estimates interpreted as descriptive.
- Main quantified direct effects (product-level regressions; percent effects computed as [exp(β1+β2)−1]*100):
  - Exports: exports of subsidized products are 0.9% higher (relative to non-subsidized products) after China’s subsidies — CHN effect 0.009**.
  - Imports: China’s subsidies depress imports of targeted products relative to non-subsidized products; CHN effect -0.009** (column (2) panel (b)).
  - Coverage: China’s subsidies cover 77% of the country’s exports and 83% of its imports.
- Heterogeneity by partner group:
  - Exports to other G20 emerging economies (G20 EMs): 2.1% higher after subsidy (CHN effect to G20 EMs 0.021***).
  - No significant export market-share gains in Advanced Economies (AEs) on average (possible role of trade remedies in AEs).
  - Imports: stronger import-substitution effects for Advanced Economies:
    - 3% decrease in imports from G20 AEs of subsidized products relative to other products.
    - 4.8% decrease in imports from other AEs.
- Industry heterogeneity (selected findings from Figure 4):
  - Electrical machinery: subsidized product exports are 7% higher than other products after China’s subsidies (large positive export effect in this sector).
  - Metals: exports and imports of subsidized products decline relative to other products within the industry.
  - Furniture: subsidies foster exports and reduce imports.

### IV. Indirect effects through input-output (supply-chain) linkages
- Method: use China’s 2007 input-output table to compute industry-level exposure:
  - Upstream exposure measured by cost shares cost_kj (how much industry k relies on inputs from industry j).
  - Downstream exposure measured by sales shares sales_jk (how much industry k provides inputs to other industries).
  - Aggregate subsidy counts at industry level; use inverse hyperbolic transform of counts.
- Key numerical and qualitative findings (industry-level regressions on 94 goods industries):
  - Strong positive effects of subsidies given to upstream supplying industries on exports of downstream buying industries for China:
    - China-specific upstream effect (CHN effect from upstream) in exports: 0.249*** (column (1) panel (a)) and 0.210*** (column (2) panel (a)).
  - Indirect import effects: upstream subsidies tend to lower imports in downstream industries (CHN effect from upstream in imports: -0.154 to -0.133 depending on specification).
  - Indirect downstream effects on upstream suppliers:
    - Subsidies given to downstream industries have statistically significant negative effects on exports of their supplying industries (CHN effect from downstream -0.164* to -0.296** in exports depending on specification).
  - Magnitude illustration (back-of-envelope simulations):
    - Steel → automotive linkage: steel inputs account for 10% of automotive costs. Applying observed increase in subsidies to steel (2015–2022) implies a 3.5% increase in China’s automotive exports (derived using estimated upstream CHN coefficient 0.210 and asinh-change 0.165).
    - Reverse example: increase in automotive (buyer) subsidies associated with a 2.6% decline in exports of steel processing (supplying industry), using estimated downstream CHN coefficient -0.296 and counterfactual change 0.09.
- Interpretation:
  - Upstream subsidies expand supplying industry capacity and lower input prices, helping downstream industries become more competitive in export markets and substitute imports.
  - Downstream subsidies can redirect supplier sales away from exports toward domestic supply, reducing supplier exports.

### V. Export price and quantity decomposition — implications for “overcapacity”
- Conceptual matrix for price-quantity combinations:
  - Higher quantity + lower price: consistent with excess supply OR efficiency/cost reductions.
  - Higher quantity + higher price: consistent with quality upgrading.
  - Lower quantity + higher price: consistent with market concentration/inefficiencies.
  - Lower quantity + lower price: could result from trade remedies or complex adjustments.
- Measurement approach:
  - Quantities measured in net weight (kg).
  - Export prices proxied by weighted average bilateral unit values (current USD per kg), weights equal to importer share in total exports of the product.
  - Estimates performed for direct (product-level) and indirect (industry-level via input-output exposure) effects; fixed effects and GTA policy controls included.
- Main average findings (Table 3):
  - On average, China’s subsidies are associated with small, statistically insignificant decreases in export prices and small, statistically insignificant increases in export quantities for direct effects.
  - Indirect (upstream) China-specific effects: subsidies upstream associated with positive and statistically significant increases in export quantities in downstream industries (CHN effect from upstream on export quantities: 0.360*** and 0.261*** in columns (7)–(8)).
  - Indirect upstream effects on export prices for China are positive in point estimate but not precisely estimated for direct price changes; industry-level upstream CHN effect on prices reported as 0.360*** in table (note: interpreted in context of specification).
- Industry-level heterogeneity (Figure 7 and text):
  - Industries with evidence of higher export quantities and lower export prices (consistent with excess supply or cost reductions): communication equipment, plastic, chemicals, metal products, wood and furniture.
  - Electrical machinery: positive export price and quantity responses — evidence consistent with quality upgrading in this industry (batteries and solar panels included in the sector; estimates do not isolate which HS 6-digit products drive this result).
  - Automotive: evidence of negative price and quantity responses when combining direct and upstream subsidies.
  - “Other transport equipment” and “Medical and precision instruments”: direct subsidies associated with higher prices and lower quantities — consistent with increased market power or inefficiencies.
- Additional sectoral input-output findings (smell test using strategic sectors; Table A.2 summary):
  - Autos: significant negative price and positive quantity responses to upstream subsidies in automotive, consistent with upstream subsidies contributing to cost reduction or excess supply; downstream subsidies have the opposite sign.
  - For several other strategic sectors, price effects are weak; upstream subsidies sometimes counter direct negative effects by expanding quantities.

### VI. Main conclusions and research implications
- Aggregate conclusions:
  - China’s subsidies between 2009 and 2022 are associated with:
    - Higher exports of subsidized products relative to non-subsidized products (average CHN export effect 0.009 or 0.9%).
    - Lower imports of subsidized products (average CHN import effect -0.009).
    - Indirect amplification of these effects via upstream supply-chain linkages.
  - Direct export market-share gains concentrate with other G20 emerging economies; indirect effects are most pronounced for trade with G20 advanced economies.
  - Industry heterogeneity is important: electrical machinery and furniture show strong pro-export responses; metal products show both exports and imports declining.
- On “overcapacity”:
  - Average evidence for subsidies causing lower export prices and higher quantities (signature of excess supply) is weak.
  - Industry-specific results show that subsidies could have contributed to excess supply in certain sectors (metal products and furniture) but to quality upgrading in others (electrical machinery), at least up to 2022.
- Recommendations for further research and data needs:
  - Exhaustive information on the monetary value of subsidies across industries and over time is needed for refined impact assessment.
  - Firm-level data would enable identification of subsidy effects on firm dynamics in export markets.
  - Model-based approaches needed to distinguish subsidy-driven effects from other structural and macroeconomic determinants of demand/supply and to quantify welfare implications.
  - Further theoretical and empirical work on interactions of countries’ measures (subsidies, trade remedies) to assess long-term welfare effects of industrial policy.

*Italic: Content summarized from wpiea2024180-print-pdf - References .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . (source PDF content provided).*

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### Appendix A — Figures and notes
- Figure A.1. China’s and US subsidies in Advanced Technology Products
  - Note: Policies announced since 2009 and in force. A policy is a country-policy combination, counted once regardless of the number of products affected. The same policy can be counted in multiple products. The “Advanced tech. products” are defines as in the list of the US Census bureau (available here: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/reference/codes/atp/index.html). Source: Global Trade Alert and authors’ calculations.

### Table A.1 — Effects of subsidies by China, US and EU on exports and imports (product-level regressions)
- Dependent variables: Ln(exports) and Ln(imports).
- Controls: dummies for other GTA policies and their interaction with CHN/USA/EU, country-product, product-year, country-year fixed effects, and country-product linear trends. Standard errors two-way clustered by product and country. ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
- Key coefficient estimates (standard errors in parentheses):
  - Column (1) CHN, Ln(exports):
    - Subsidies 0.023*** (0.006)
    - Subsidies×country -0.014* (0.007)
    - Country-specific effect 0.009** (0.005)
    - Obs 67830
    - R2 0.90
  - Column (2) USA, Ln(exports):
    - Subsidies 0.023*** (0.006)
    - Subsidies×country -0.015** (0.006)
    - Country-specific effect 0.008** (0.004)
    - Obs 16678
    - R2 0.90
  - Column (3) EU, Ln(exports):
    - Subsidies 0.008 (0.010)
    - Subsidies×country 0.018 (0.012)
    - Country-specific effect 0.027*** (0.007)
    - Obs 67830
    - R2 0.90
  - Column (4) CHN, Ln(imports):
    - Subsidies 0.033*** (0.006)
    - Subsidies×country -0.042*** (0.007)
    - Country-specific effect -0.009** (0.004)
    - Obs 67644
    - R2 0.92
  - Column (5) USA, Ln(imports):
    - Subsidies 0.034*** (0.006)
    - Subsidies×country -0.033*** (0.007)
    - Country-specific effect 0.001 (0.003)
    - Obs 67644
    - R2 0.92
  - Column (6) EU, Ln(imports):
    - Subsidies -0.017* (0.010)
    - Subsidies×country 0.063*** (0.012)
    - Country-specific effect 0.046*** (0.006)
    - Obs 67644
    - R2 0.92

### Figure A.2 — Effects of subsidies on China’s export prices and quantities by industry
- Note: Estimates by ISIC 2-digit industry (mining, fishery and forestry not reported). Sum of the coefficient on a dummy for the existence of at least one subsidy policy and the coefficient on the interaction of the subsidy dummy with a CHN dummy, with export unit values (vertical axis) and export quantities (horizontal axis) as dependent variables.
- Controls: dummies for export subsidy, TBT, import restriction, export restriction, temporary import restriction, local content requirement, government procurement restriction, and other GTA policies; country-product fixed effects; country-product trends; country-year and product-year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by country and by product.
- Significance labeling: “One significant” = only one direct effect of China’s subsidies is significant; “Both significant” = both effects significant; “None significant” = neither effect significant. Statistical significance at 90% level.

### Table A.2 — Indirect effects of China’s subsidies on export prices and quantities through input-output linkages, by strategic industry
- Regressions at the industry level. Dependent variables: Ln(export prices) and Ln(export quantities). Specifications include the (inverse hyperbolic sine of the) count of subsidies in the own industry, the weighted sum of subsidies in upstream and in downstream industries. Each of these three variables are interacted with a CHN dummy, with a dummy for the sector indicated as column title, and with both the CHN dummy and the sector dummy. All columns include country-industry, industry-year, country-year fixed effects, and country-industry linear trends. Standard errors clustered by industry in columns (5) to (8). ∗ significant at 10%; ∗∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
- Panel: Dep. variable Ln(export prices) — selected coefficients (standard errors in parentheses), Obs 186512, R2 0.86 for each column:
  - Autos:
    - Upstream subsidies 0.052 (0.035)
    - Upstream subsidies×CHN -0.129 (0.171)
    - Upstream subsidies×CHN×Sect. -10.317*** (2.798)
    - Upstream subsidies×Sect. -0.449*** (0.147)
    - Downstream subsidies 0.039 (0.041)
    - Downstream subsides×CHN 0.026 (0.173)
    - Downstream subsides×CHN×Sect. 37.406*** (10.047)
    - Downstream subsides×Sect. 0.341 (0.453)
    - CHN effect from upstream in Sect. -10.394*** (2.748)
    - CHN effect from downstream in Sect. 37.471*** (10.043)
  - Chemicals:
    - Upstream subsidies 0.055 (0.036)
    - Upstream subsidies×CHN -0.107 (0.162)
    - Upstream subsidies×CHN×Sect. -0.210 (0.672)
    - Upstream subsidies×Sect. -0.061 (0.105)
    - Downstream subsidies 0.040 (0.053)
    - Downstream subsides×CHN 0.113 (0.179)
    - Downstream subsides×CHN×Sect. -0.648 (0.671)
    - Downstream subsides×Sect. 0.013 (0.068)
    - CHN effect from upstream in Sect. -0.262 (0.676)
    - CHN effect from downstream in Sect. -0.495 (0.647)
  - Electrical machinery; Medical instr.; Oth. Machinery; Oth. Transport — analogous rows reported with coefficients and standard errors as shown in the table.
- Panel: Dep. variable Ln(export quantities) — selected coefficients (standard errors in parentheses), Obs 186512, R2 0.94 for each column:
  - Autos:
    - Upstream subsidies -0.043 (0.028)
    - Upstream subsidies×CHN 0.403*** (0.102)
    - Upstream subsidies×CHN×Sect. 3.977** (1.535)
    - Upstream subsidies×Sect. 0.398*** (0.141)
    - Downstream subsidies -0.014 (0.042)
    - Downstream subsidies×CHN -0.170 (0.127)
    - Downstream subsidies×CHN×Sect. -11.083*** (2.749)
    - Downstream subsidies×Sect. -1.461*** (0.405)
    - CHN effect from upstream in Sect. 4.337*** (1.510)
    - CHN effect from downstream in Sect. -11.267*** (2.738)
  - Chemicals:
    - Upstream subsidies -0.041 (0.029)
    - Upstream subsidies×CHN 0.409*** (0.104)
    - Upstream subsidies×CHN×Sect. -0.225 (0.213)
    - Upstream subsidies×Sect. -0.034 (0.066)
    - Downstream subsidies -0.018 (0.054)
    - Downstream subsidies×CHN -0.182 (0.140)
    - Downstream subsidies×CHN×Sect. 0.210 (0.370)
    - Downstream subsidies×Sect. 0.017 (0.058)
    - CHN effect from upstream in Sect. 0.143 (0.223)
    - CHN effect from downstream in Sect. 0.010 (0.346)
  - Electrical machinery; Medical instr.; Oth. Machinery; Oth. Transport — analogous rows reported with coefficients and standard errors as shown in the table.

*Content unit: wpiea2024180-print-pdf - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2024/english/wpiea2024180-print-pdf.pdf_