## Migration into the EU: Stocktaking of Recent Developments and Macroeconomic Implications

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Migration into the EU: Stocktaking of Recent Developments and Macroeconomic Implications](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2024/english/wpiea2024211-print-pdf.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2024/english/wpiea2024211-print-pdf.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/wp/2024/english/wpiea2024211-print-pdf.pdf.json)

---

### Key recent developments and quantitative facts
- Around one-quarter of Eurobarometer survey respondents ranked immigration as one of the two most important issues facing the EU in the Spring of 2024.
- Immigration into the EU accelerated sharply after the onset of the war in Ukraine, reaching a historical high of around 6.5 million in 2022 when counting all the roughly 4 million refugees from Ukraine.
- Driven largely by refugees from Ukraine, the EU saw immigration of non-EU citizens of around 1.4 percent of its population in 2022, the highest level since harmonized migration data became available and close to 50 percent above the levels of 2015-16.
- Net immigration in 2023 dropped relative to 2022 but remained significantly higher than in the pre-pandemic years.
- EU population growth accelerated to 0.6 percent in 2022.
- Close to two-thirds (2.7 million) of EU jobs (4.2 million) created between 2019 and 2023 were filled by non-EU citizens.
- Initial fiscal costs of the increased migration have been estimated at around 0.2 percent of EU GDP.
- Semi-structural general equilibrium model estimates impact on the level of potential output in 2030 of the recent increase in immigration (relative to pre-pandemic expectations) at 0.2-0.7 percent, with a central estimate of 0.5 percent.
- If a permanent productivity wedge between migrants and natives remains and there are no positive aggregate TFP effects, the impact on GDP per capita would be negative.
- Anecdotal evidence suggests local crowding occurred in some places in 2022 amid local population shocks as high as 3 percent of the population.
- Ukrainians appear to have been absorbed into employment faster than previous refugee waves in many countries.

### Framing: economic channels and implications
- An unexpected increase in immigrants is akin to a sudden increase in a country’s population and alters population structure by age, gender, skill, and language.
- Economic implications include:
  - Higher aggregate demand and greater demand for public services and amenities.
  - A larger labor force (eventual).
  - Substitution or complementarity between immigrant and native human capital.
  - Stronger manifestation of national effects at the local level due to spatial concentration.

### Paper scope, data and approach
- Focus: host-country economic effects—population, labor market, production capacity (potential output), fiscal and distributional consequences, local amenity implications, and public perceptions.
- Methods: administrative and survey data; simulations using a semi-structural general equilibrium model to quantify potential output effects through 2030.
- Perception analyses: individual- and regional-level survey data (some using 2017 regional cross-sections).

### Primary conclusions (introductory summary)
- Recent surge materially contributed to higher population growth and helped address unprecedented labor demand in 2022–23 without raising the EU citizens’ unemployment rate from historic lows.
- Short- to medium-run macroeconomic impact:
  - Generally positive for economic migration; more ambiguous for refugees.
  - Effects depend on skill composition, labor-market matching, and capital adjustment.
- Productivity gains documented via channels: cultural and birthplace diversity, knowledge diffusion, skill diversity, innovation, entrepreneurship, product diversity.
- Wage and employment effects on natives can be heterogeneous; short-run adverse effects possible where migrants and natives are close substitutes; longer-run effects generally neutral or positive once productive capacity adjusts.
- Fiscal impacts depend on tax-benefit design and migrant composition; long-run macro estimates of migrants' average fiscal contributions span the range of -1 and 1 percent of GDP.
- Local congestion can cause short-run pressures and negative perceptions; migration salience increased following recent inflows.

### Two policy priorities emphasized
- Prioritize integrating migrants into the labor market—and integrating them in the most productive way possible—to improve output trends amid rapid aging and tight labor markets.
- Ensure the supply of public services and amenities (including at the local level) keeps up with population increases to mitigate congestion and distributional pressures.

### Aggregate migration flows and stocks (broader context)
- OECD: Aggregate immigration to advanced economies fell during the pandemic and rebounded sharply in 2022, reaching a record high of 6.1 million “permanent-type” migrants for the OECD overall.
- UNHCR reported Ukrainian refugees exceeded 6 million globally as of spring 2024.
- Considering refugees from Ukraine adds another 4 million migrants in Europe alone.
- Canada: immigration around 1.2 percent of the population in 2022; total net international migration flows for Canada in 2022 were 2.3 percent of the population.
- The recent surge produced a large positive “surprise” in population growth in Canada and Germany relative to pre-pandemic projections.

### The European case: flows, stocks, and distribution
- Official Eurostat: 7 million people immigrated into or within the EU in 2022, roughly 2.5 million more than the previous high in 2019 and about 3 million more than in 2015.
- Of the 7 million migrants, around 5 million came from outside the EU; increase largely driven by temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees.
- Several countries do not count asylum seekers or Ukrainian refugees under temporary protection in official migration statistics; total immigration might be about 1.5 million higher in 2022 than aggregate data show.
- Estimated immigration of non-EU citizens around 1.4 percent of the EU population in 2022; estimated 2023 immigration around 0.8 percent of the population.
- Intra-EU mobility broadly stable at around 2 million per year.
- Regional heterogeneity (NUTS3 crude rates of net migration):
  - 2019 (N=1343): min -10.2, P25 -0.1, P50 0.3, P75 0.6, max 6.5, mean 0.2, std 0.8
  - 2022 (N=1322): min -11.5, P25 0.2, P50 0.9, P75 1.6, max 14.2, mean 0.6, std 2.0
- Ukrainian refugees distribution (temporary protection, end-2023):
  - Germany: over 1 million
  - Poland: close to 1 million
  - Czechia, Spain, Bulgaria and Italy: each over 150,000
  - Total Ukrainian refugees roughly 4 million in total (Annex I note).
- Stocks and working-age population:
  - EU working-age population fell by 265,000 in 2021, then grew by 838,000 in 2022.
  - 2022 change reflected contraction of nearly 2 million in domestic working-age population, offset by increase of 2.7 million in non-EU citizens of working-age.
  - Growth rate of working-age population in 2022 was 0.6 percentage point higher than pre-pandemic projection—driven by non-EU citizens.
- Foreign-born and foreign-citizen shares:
  - EU share of foreign-born around 13 percent; share of foreign citizens about 9 percent.
  - Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus: foreign-born shares of 30 percent and above; Text Figure 1 notes: LU 2023 data is 58.55, LU 2019 data is 56.08; MT 2023 data is 37.27.
- Age and education composition:
  - Non-EU citizens on average younger than national citizens.
  - Non-EU citizens have lower educational attainment on average, though both foreign citizens and natives show a decline in low-skill workers and an increase in tertiary education share over time.
- Characteristics of Ukrainian arrivals (limited data):
  - Registrations under temporary protection by end-2022: 73 percent women and children (48 percent women, 25 percent children).
  - Tentative survey data show a majority of displaced people from Ukraine have tertiary education (FRA 2023 online survey August–September 2022).

### Integration policies in the EU
- Early access to private and public sector labor markets and self-employment is a key prerequisite for speedy integration; Temporary Protection Directive allowed this for Ukrainian refugees.
- Refugees granted permanent status experience more favorable labor market outcomes than those with temporary status.
- Heterogeneity across EU countries in integration policy strands; on average EU scores lower than U.S. or Australia on MIPEX, though several EU countries outperform in multiple strands.
- Country examples:
  - Sweden and Finland score highest on education strand.
  - Portugal scores highest on labor market mobility strand.
  - Nordic countries provide greater targeted support for immigrant workers.
- Employment rates of refugee migrants typically lower upon arrival and increase over the first few years; speed of closing gaps varies across countries.
- EU-level initiatives:
  - Overhaul of asylum and migration rules (see Box 1).
  - European Commission’s Skills and Talent Mobility Package (December 2023) includes a New EU Talent Pool and EU Talent Pool Pilot (EURES) accessible to more than 5,000 registered employers.
- Various EU funds target integration (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund Allocation Objectives 2017-2021 shown in EUR bln in the source).

### Box 1: recent change to the EU legal framework for migration (high-level)
- Background: Dublin III Regulation assigned responsibility to the first country of registration; noted not designed to handle mass influx or ensure fair sharing of responsibility.
- Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into force in June 2024; member states required to start applying new legislation by 2026.
- Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR) replaces Dublin III; applicants still apply in state of first entry; establishes a new solidarity mechanism.
- Mandatory solidarity mechanism coordinated by an EU solidarity coordinator; contributions may be relocation, financial contributions, or alternative measures.
- Responsibility offsets apply if relocation pledges insufficient: transferring responsibility to a contributing member state to examine applications without transferring the applicant.
- Policy intent: improve administrative burden sharing and reduce unilateral actions by member states.

### Employment and labor force dynamics
- Pre-pandemic projections expected employment growth to slow from 1.2 percent per year to 0.5 percent over 2020-2023; actual employment growth held at 0.8 percent.
- Observed employment growth reflects significant increase in foreign working-age population and continued gains in domestic labor force participation.
- Population statistics vs LFS: population statistics show increase in non-EU citizens of working age of 2.8 million in 2022, whereas LFS records around half that increase.
- Migrants and labor shortages; sectoral patterns:
  - Migrant share higher in occupations/sectors with labor shortages.
  - European Labor Authority (2024) documented migrant worker increases between 2019 and 2022 in:
    - building and related trade: migrant workers increased by 7 percent versus stable for total workers;
    - health: migrant workers increased by 15 percent versus 7 percent for total workers;
    - ICT: migrant workers increased by 50 percent versus 30 percent for total workers.
- Overqualification and skill downgrading:
  - Migrants more likely to be overqualified than natives; phenomenon pronounced among female migrants.
  - Overqualification rates among high-skilled workers in 2019:
    - within-EU migrants: 34 percent of total high-skilled;
    - native workers: 22 percent of total high-skilled.
  - Country examples for non-EU migrants aged 25-64 (overqualification rate in 2022):
    - Italy: more than 50 percent;
    - Portugal: about 20 percent;
    - Netherlands: about 20 percent.
  - Average overqualification rate roughly 30-35 percent since early 2000s.
  - Anecdotal evidence for Ukrainian refugees in Poland: 50 percent state their work does not match their qualifications.
- Ukrainian refugees: employment integration:
  - Reached employment rates of around 50 percent in several countries—levels more commonly observed five or more years after a refugee wave.
  - OECD reports employment rates ranging from over 60 percent in Poland to below 20 percent in Italy (survey data).
  - Administrative data for Germany show 12 percent of Ukrainian refugees in formal employment after one year—higher than around 7 percent for Syrian refugees in 2015-16.

### Potential output: modeling approach, scenarios and results
- Model: semi-structural model (Andrle and others (2015) description); simulations focus on the euro area.
- All scenarios assume a temporary 0.2 percent of GDP fiscal expansion.
- Hours worked per week assumed identical for newly employed migrants and existing workers.
- Five scenarios combine assumptions on labor-force shock, productivity differential (permanent or closing by 2030), and migrant stay (permanent or partially temporary):
  - Scenario 1: labor force shock by year: 2020 -0.2%, 2021 -0.1%, 2022 0.6%; Permanent TFP differential: Yes; Permanent migration: Yes. Conservative; TFP differential stable at 18%; migrants stay permanently.
  - Scenario 2: 2020 -0.1%, 2021 0.0%, 2022 0.4%, 2023 0.5%; Permanent TFP differential: Yes; Permanent migration: Yes. Intermediate labor supply increase; TFP differential permanent; migrants stay permanently.
  - Scenario 3: same labor supply as Scenario 2; Permanent TFP differential: Yes; Permanent migration: Partly. Half of migrants return gradually over 2025-28.
  - Scenario 4: same labor supply as Scenario 2; Permanent TFP differential: No (TFP differential disappears by 2030); Permanent migration: Yes.
  - Scenario 5: 2020 -0.1%, 2021 0.0%, 2022 1.0%, 2023 0.2%; Permanent TFP differential: Yes; Permanent migration: Yes. Largest labor supply increase.
- Calibration notes:
  - Scenario 1 uses Eurostat working-age population data and captures 2020–22.
  - Scenario 2 calibrated on labor force survey data comparing non-EU citizen contributions pre-pandemic and 2020–2023 outturns.
  - Scenario 5 uses migration flow data and assumes two thirds of “excess” inflows are working-age.
- Simulation results by 2030 for a labor force increase of 0.3–1.1 percent due to net migration over 2020-23:
  - Potential output could rise by 0.2–0.7 percent by 2030.
  - Center estimate: about 0.5 percent.
- Sensitivities:
  - If half of migrants leave by 2030, the potential GDP impact reduces by 0.3 percentage points (difference between scenarios 2 and 3).
  - If TFP gap closes by 2030, potential GDP impact increases by 0.2 percentage points (difference between scenarios 2 and 4).
  - Scenarios 4 and 5 produce the same increase in potential output of 0.7 percent.
- GDP per capita:
  - If a permanent TFP gap persists, GDP per capita drops marginally in the simulations.
  - If the TFP gap closes, GDP per capita is unchanged in the medium-term.
- Short-run macro effects:
  - Labor force shock was modestly inflationary in the short run (around 0.1 percentage point).
  - All scenarios except scenario 3 see a positive GDP growth impact over the whole horizon as capital accumulation catches up.
- Fiscal implications:
  - Model not well-suited for detailed fiscal effects.
  - Literature indicates degree of labor market integration is key for longer-run fiscal impact.

### Local economic implications and pressures
- Distribution: 2022 surge heterogeneously distributed across subnational regions.
  - Mean region net migration rate around 0.5 percent.
  - Top percentile experienced net migration as high as 4 percent of existing population in one year.
- Local supply inelasticities: schools, public housing, health services less elastic at local level, so aggregate effects manifest strongly locally.
- Data limitations: granular NUTS2/NUTS3 level data for 2022 inflows not yet fully available; quantitative assessment limited.
- Anecdotal/survey evidence of local pressures:
  - Poland: strains on local housing markets; rental price increases and shortages in some communities.
  - Germany: nurseries—around half had admitted Ukrainian children; among those that had not, 50 percent cited capacity constraints.
  - Schools: physical infrastructure and teacher availability stretched initially; personnel expanded and almost all Ukrainian children seem able to attend school despite waiting lists in some regions.
  - Eurofound and FRA (2023) survey: small villages with accessible accommodation often lack job opportunities; larger cities have labor opportunities but lack affordable housing.
  - Majority of migrants under temporary protection are women and children—early education and childcare fundamental to facilitate women’s labor participation.
  - Language training widely cited as a key barrier to labor market entry.
- Regional definitions: analysis relies on NUTS 3 regions.
- Cross-cutting implications reiterated:
  - Close to two-thirds (2.7 million) of EU jobs (4.2 million) created between 2019 and 2023 were filled by non-EU citizens.
  - Simulation favored point estimate: increase in euro area potential output of 0.5 percent by 2030 for a labor force increase of 0.3-1.1 percent.
  - GDP per capita falls in simulations if permanent TFP gap persists, but not if gap closes.
  - Temporary fiscal outlays estimated at 0.2 percent of EU GDP in previous IMF work.
  - Anecdotal evidence points to pressures on hospitals, affordable housing, and schooling at local level.

### Key local-level policy implications and specific measures
- Two overarching priorities:
  - Integrate migrants into the labor market in productivity-enhancing ways.
  - Ensure supply of public services and amenities keeps pace with population increases.
- Specific recommended measures:
  - Maintain or expand immediate access to the job market where appropriate (Temporary Protection Directive cited as successful).
  - Facilitate labor market access for immigrants not under Temporary Protection, including minimizing restrictions during asylum application phase.
  - Ease avenues for migrants to enter self-employment (including access to credit).
  - Facilitate skill recognition and strengthen language training.
  - Improve rental housing affordability and supply via:
    - targeted higher housing allowances,
    - more social rental housing,
    - regulatory and financial incentives to raise rental housing supply.
  - Strengthen role of NGOs and CSOs to provide immediate assistance and tailored support (example: Germany).
  - Study whether mechanisms prevent sudden declines in per capita provision of local public goods; establish whether per capita public good provision has been negatively affected as a first step.
  - Provide greater initial support from regional, central, or supranational governments to regions relying more on local financing that receive disproportionate shares of immigrants.
  - Reduce barriers to geographical mobility (including housing, education, health services) to allow migrants to move where labor demand is high.

### Perceptions and survey evidence (Annex II summary)
- Data sources: European Value Study (EVS) Wave 2008 and Wave 2017; World Value Survey (WVS) (2017-2021).
- EVS Wave 2017 contains six questions on perceptions of migrants covering concern, jobs, crime, welfare strain, cultural maintenance, and overall impact.
- Correlates of overall concerns:
  - Concern about own country’s development most correlated with overall concerns about immigrants.
  - Job security, strains on welfare, and increase in crimes also associated.
  - Cultural difference worries least correlated.
- Temporal changes:
  - Negative perceptions (immigrants take away jobs; strain welfare) declined between Wave 2008 and Wave 2017.
  - Improvement in perceptions larger in the UK than in the EU.
  - Existing immigrants tend to have better perceptions of new immigrants than natives; both groups improved over time.
- Cross-country heterogeneity (WVS/EVS):
  - Greece exhibits unfavorable perceptions on multiple fronts.
  - UK and Canada tend to view migrants favorably across aspects.
  - Netherlands: close to 60 percent agree migrants fill important job vacancies; more than 70 percent agree immigration increases crime rates (survey illustrations).

_Italic source: IMF Working Paper — Migration into the EU: Stocktaking of Recent Developments and Macroeconomic Implications (content unit excerpts)._

### 1. INTRODUCTION _______________________________________________________________________________ 7

### 1. INTRODUCTION

### Key recent developments and quantitative facts
- Around one-quarter of Eurobarometer survey respondents ranked immigration as one of the two most important issues facing the EU in the Spring of 2024.
- Immigration into the EU accelerated sharply after the onset of the war in Ukraine, reaching a historical high of around 6.5 million in 2022 when counting all the roughly 4 million refugees from Ukraine.
- Driven largely by refugees from Ukraine, the EU saw immigration of non-EU citizens of around 1.4 percent of its population in 2022, the highest level since harmonized migration data became available and close to 50 percent above the levels of 2015-16.
- Net immigration in 2023 dropped relative to 2022 but remained significantly higher than in the pre-pandemic years.
- EU population growth accelerated to 0.6 percent in 2022, the highest level in many years, despite continuing declines in fertility rates.
- Close to two-thirds (2.7 million) of EU jobs (4.2 million) created between 2019 and 2023 were filled by non-EU citizens.
- Initial fiscal costs of the increased migration have been estimated at around 0.2 percent of EU GDP.
- Using a semi-structural general equilibrium model, the impact on the level of potential output in 2030 of the recent increase in immigration (relative to pre-pandemic expectations) is estimated at 0.2-0.7 percent, with a central estimate of 0.5 percent.
- The impact on GDP per capita depends crucially on how productivity develops; if a permanent productivity wedge between migrants and natives remains and there are no positive aggregate TFP effects, the impact on GDP per capita would be negative.
- Anecdotal evidence suggests local crowding occurred in some places in 2022 amid large local population shocks (as high as 3 percent of the population) and an inelastic supply of public services and amenities (including housing).
- Ukrainians appear to have been absorbed into employment much faster than previous refugee waves in many countries, reflecting tight labor market conditions and the temporary protection scheme allowing immediate job search.

### Framing: how to think about economic effects
- An unexpected increase in immigrants is akin to a sudden increase in a country’s population and alters population structure by age, gender, skill, and language.
- Economic implications include higher aggregate demand, greater demand for public services and amenities, and (eventually) a larger labor force.
- Immigrants’ human capital can substitute for or complement native workers’ skills; spatial concentration implies national effects manifest strongly at the local level.

### Paper scope and approach
- The paper takes stock of recent migration developments in the EU (including policy changes) and situates them within the large existing literature.
- Focuses exclusively on host-country economic effects: population, labor market, production capacity (potential output), fiscal and distributional consequences, local amenity implications, and public perceptions.
- Uses evidence from administrative and survey data, and simulations from a semi-structural general equilibrium model to quantify potential output effects through 2030.
- Analyzes individual- and regional-level perceptions of migrants using cross-sectional survey data (noting that some perception analyses use 2017 regional cross-sections).

### Primary conclusions highlighted in the introduction
- The recent surge in immigration materially contributed to higher population growth and helped address unprecedented labor demand in 2022–23 without raising the EU citizens’ unemployment rate from historic lows.
- The short- to medium-run macroeconomic impact is generally positive for economic migration and more ambiguous for refugees; effects depend on skill composition, labor-market matching, and capital adjustment.
- Productivity gains are commonly documented in the literature via channels such as cultural and birthplace diversity, knowledge diffusion, skill diversity, innovation, entrepreneurship, and product diversity.
- Wage and employment effects on natives can be heterogeneous: possible short-run adverse effects for some native workers, especially where migrants and natives are close substitutes; longer-run effects are generally found to be neutral or positive once productive capacity adjusts.
- Fiscal impacts depend on tax-benefit design and migrant composition; long-run macro estimates of migrants' average fiscal contributions span the range of -1 and 1 percent of GDP.
- Local congestion (housing, schools, health, transport) can cause short-run pressures and negative perceptions; increased salience of migration as a public topic has risen following recent inflows.

### Two policy priorities emphasized
- Prioritize integrating migrants into the labor market—and integrating them in the most productive way possible—to improve output trends amid rapid aging and tight labor markets.
- Ensure the supply of public services and amenities (including at the local level) keeps up with population increases to mitigate congestion and distributional pressures.

_Italic source: IMF Working Paper — Migration into the EU: Stocktaking of Recent Developments and Macroeconomic Implications (1. INTRODUCTION)._

### 3. Recent Migration Developments

### 3. Recent Migration Developments

### Migration Flows and Population Stocks
- Aggregate immigration to advanced economies fell during the pandemic and rebounded sharply in 2022, reaching a record high of 6.1 million “permanent-type” migrants for the OECD overall (OECD, 2023a).
- Excluding refugees from Ukraine, for most G7 countries the sharp increase in migration in 2022 marked roughly a return to pre-pandemic levels.
- OECD data on permanent-type migrants exclude refugees from Ukraine; UNHCR reported Ukrainian refugees exceeded 6 million globally as of spring 2024.
- Considering refugees from Ukraine adds another 4 million migrants in Europe alone, concentrated in Germany among G7 economies, as well as substantial numbers in the US.
- The recent migration surge produced:
  - A large positive “surprise” in population growth in Canada and Germany relative to pre-pandemic projections.
  - Other countries (e.g., Italy and the US) are estimated to have had less/more negative population growth over 2020-2023 than projected by the UN in 2019, with Covid-19 also affecting outcomes.
- Data notes:
  - Data used reflect releases as of early September 2024. Harmonized migration data from the OECD for 2023 were not yet available at the time of publication.
  - Canada: immigration around 1.2 percent of the population in 2022, 50 percent higher than recent historical averages and other G7 countries; total net international migration flows for Canada in 2022 were 2.3 percent of the population.

### The European case: flows, stocks, and distribution
- Role of migration:
  - Immigration can meaningfully impact population growth rates and help attenuate impacts of rapid aging, though net migration would need to be notably above historical levels to reverse the upward trend in the old-age dependency ratio.
- EU recent flows and magnitudes:
  - Official Eurostat: 7 million people immigrated into or within the EU in 2022, roughly 2.5 million more than the previous high in 2019 and about 3 million more than in 2015.
  - Of the 7 million migrants, around 5 million came from outside the EU, with the increase largely driven by the temporary protection scheme for Ukrainian refugees.
  - Several EU countries do not count asylum seekers or Ukrainian refugees under the temporary protection scheme in their official migration statistics; a rough calculation suggests immigration might have been about 1.5 million higher in 2022 than aggregate data show (illustrated as a light blue shaded area in Figure 2.1).
  - This implies immigration of non-EU citizens of around 1.4 percent of the EU population in 2022.
  - For 2023, estimates suggest immigration dropped relative to 2022 to around 0.8 percent of the population while remaining at historical highs (as temporary protection flows from Ukraine slowed significantly).
- Intra-EU mobility:
  - Migration flows of EU nationals within the EU have been broadly stable at around 2 million per year, substantially smaller than state-to-state flows within the US.
- Regional heterogeneity within EU:
  - Regions with highest immigration in 2022 (Ireland, some regions of Spain, Germany, Czechia, Austria, the Baltics and Poland) had net migration rates of over 3 percent.
  - Among larger countries, Germany had net migration rates above 1 percent in many NUTS3 regions.
  - Several regions in Eastern Europe had noticeable outward migration in 2022; northern France, southern Italy, Hungary and northern Greece saw moderate net outward migration.
  - Table 1 (NUTS3 crude rates of net migration):
    - 2019 (N=1343): min -10.2, P25 -0.1, P50 0.3, P75 0.6, max 6.5, mean 0.2, std 0.8
    - 2022 (N=1322): min -11.5, P25 0.2, P50 0.9, P75 1.6, max 14.2, mean 0.6, std 2.0
- Ukrainian refugees distribution (Eurostat temporary protection, end-2023):
  - Germany: over 1 million
  - Poland: close to 1 million
  - Czechia, Spain, Bulgaria and Italy: each saw an inflow of over 150,000 people
  - Total Ukrainian refugees roughly 4 million in total (Annex I note).
- Stocks and working-age population:
  - EU working-age population fell by 265,000 in 2021, then grew by 838,000 in 2022.
  - The 2022 change reflected a contraction of nearly 2 million in the domestic working-age population, offset by an increase of 2.7 million in the number of non-EU citizens of working-age.
  - The growth rate of the working-age population in 2022 was 0.6 percentage point higher than what was projected before the pandemic—driven by non-EU citizens.
- Foreign-born and foreign-citizen shares:
  - For the EU as a whole, the share of foreign-born persons stands at around 13 percent and the share of foreign citizens stands at about 9 percent.
  - Small, open economies (Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus) have shares of foreign-born of 30 percent and above and have seen large increases since 2019.
  - Text Figure 1 notes: LU 2023 data is 58.55, LU 2019 data is 56.08; MT 2023 data is 37.27.
- Age and education composition:
  - Non-EU citizens are on average younger than national citizens.
  - Non-EU citizens have lower educational attainment on average, though both foreign citizens and natives show a decline in low-skill workers and an increase in the share with tertiary education over time (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
- Characteristics of recent Ukrainian arrivals (limited data):
  - By end-2022 registrations under temporary protection: 73 percent women and children (48 percent women, 25 percent children).
  - Tentative survey data show a majority of people displaced from Ukraine have tertiary education (Text Figure 2; FRA 2023 online survey August–September 2022).

### Integration Policies in the European Union
- Policy importance and evidence:
  - Government policies are important in influencing labor market integration of refugees; granting asylum seekers early access to private and public sector labor markets and self-employment is a key prerequisite for speedy integration (Temporary Protection Directive allows this for Ukrainian refugees).
  - Refugees granted permanent status experience more favorable labor market outcomes than those granted temporary status (Bakker and others, 2017; Fasani and others, 2022).
- Heterogeneity across EU countries:
  - Significant heterogeneity across EU countries in all policy strands related to integration.
  - On average, the EU scores lower than the U.S. or Australia in promoting integration based on MIPEX data, though individual EU countries outperform both in seven out of eight strands.
  - Country examples:
    - Sweden and Finland score highest on the education strand, reflecting individualized, needs-based approaches to education of immigrant pupils.
    - Portugal scores highest on the labor market mobility strand, granting fully equal rights and opportunities to access jobs and facilitating fast recognition of qualifications; Nordic countries provide greater targeted support for immigrant workers.
- Labor market outcomes for refugees:
  - Employment rates of refugee migrants are typically lower than other immigrants upon arrival and tend to increase in the first few years.
  - Speed of closing the employment gap with other immigrants varies: gap closes rapidly in Norway and Sweden, modestly in Denmark, Germany, and Finland (Brell and others, 2020).
- Policy changes over the past decade:
  - Changes have mostly focused on reducing discrimination and some progress on labor market mobility and education (notably Greece, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Malta).
- EU-level initiatives and financial support:
  - Overhaul of the EU’s asylum and migration rules (Box 1).
  - European Commission’s Skills and Talent Mobility Package (December 2023) includes:
    - New EU Talent Pool and measures to promote recognition of qualifications and mobility of learners.
    - EU Talent Pool Pilot (EURES): Ukrainians and other beneficiaries of temporary protection (and job seekers allowed under national laws) can publish CVs accessible to more than 5,000 registered employers.
  - Various EU funds target aspects of integrating migrants into the EU economy and society (Text Figure 3: Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund Allocation Objectives 2017-2021 shown in EUR bln).

*IMF Working Paper — Migration into the EU: Stocktaking of Recent Developments and Macroeconomic Implications (chapter 3).*

### Box 1. European Union: Recent Change to the Legal Framework for Migration

### Box 1. European Union: Recent Change to the Legal Framework for Migration

### Background: Dublin III and the Common European Asylum System
- The Common European Asylum System provided a partial framework for EU asylum policies.
- Under the Dublin III Regulation, "the first country where the asylum seeker registered is responsible for processing the asylum application," with exceptions such as family cases.
- Most other asylum rules were national and differed across EU member countries, covering:
  - when and on what grounds residency is granted;
  - which countries of origin are deemed safe;
  - the extent and nature of the support given to asylum seekers;
  - how quickly access to the labor market is granted.
- The European Commission’s 2015 evaluation of the Dublin III Regulation noted missing elements that reduced Dublin’s overall relevance to achieve its objectives (to establish a clear and workable method for determining which member state is responsible for examining an application for international protection).
- The Dublin III Regulation was "not designed to 'deal with situations of mass influx' or 'to ensure fair sharing of responsibility'", and "does not effectively address the disproportionate distribution of applications."

### Pact on Migration and Asylum: Entry into Force and Implementation Timeline
- The Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into force in June 2024.
- Member states are required to put in place the legal and operational capabilities to start applying the new legislation by 2026.
- The European Commission and EU agencies are to provide technical, operational and financial support.

### Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR): Key Changes
- The AMMR replaces the Dublin III Regulation.
- Applicants will still have to apply for asylum in the member state of first entry as under the Dublin regulation.
- A new solidarity mechanism is established aimed at contributing to a fairer system for sharing responsibility among member states.

### Mandatory Solidarity Mechanism and Responsibility Offsets
- There is mandatory solidarity (coordinated by an EU solidarity coordinator) to support member states dealing with a mass of irregular arrivals (that is, when a "national system is under pressure or at risk").
- Contributing member states have flexibility as regards the choices of the contribution which can take the form of:
  - relocation of asylum seekers and of beneficiaries of international protections;
  - financial contributions such as supporting projects in third countries;
  - alternative solidary measures such as capacity building or placement of personnel.
- If relocation pledges are not sufficient, a backstop tool called "responsibility offsets" will apply:
  - Responsibility offsets transfer the responsibility of examining an application to the contributing member state, without the need for the applicant to be transferred (as the applicant is already in the contributing member state in this case).
  - Responsibility offsets apply to those whose asylum applications should have been examined by the member state under pressure but applicants moved to another member state in an unauthorized way.
  - Under the rule, these applicants should be sent back to the member state under pressure. However, the member state where the applicants are physically present takes the responsibility to examine the asylum applications instead of transferring the applicants back to the member state under pressure.

### Policy Intent and Expected Effects
- The new framework aims to improve administrative burden sharing and reduce member states’ incentive to act unilaterally.

*IMF WORKING PAPERS Migration into the EU: Stocktaking of Recent Developments and Macroeconomic Implications*

### 1.2 percent per year. In pre-pandemic projections, this growth rate was expected to slow to 0.5 percent over

### Migration into the EU: Stocktaking of Recent Developments and Macroeconomic Implications

### Employment and labor force dynamics
- Pre-pandemic projections expected employment growth to slow from 1.2 percent per year to 0.5 percent over 2020-2023 due to demographics, low unemployment by 2019, and expected easing of participation gains.
- Instead, actual employment growth held steady at 0.8 percent.
- The observed employment growth reflects a significant increase in the foreign working-age population and continued (and even accelerated) gains in the domestic labor force participation rate.
- The rise in employment is attributed largely to an increase in the foreign working-age population, suggesting an important contribution from new immigrants.
- Comparisons between Eurostat’s EU Labor Force Survey (LFS) and Eurostat population statistics indicate potential undercounting of recent migrants in the LFS: population statistics show the number of non-EU citizens of working age increased by 2.8 million in 2022, whereas the LFS records around half that increase.

### Migrants and labor shortages; sectoral patterns
- Countries with larger increases in the share of foreign-born population register less of a labor shortage since 2019 (with a few outliers).
- European Commission (2023b) using EU-LFS micro data (2017–2021) finds at the EU level the migrant share is higher in occupations and sectors that experience labor shortages than in those that don’t.
- European Labor Authority (2024) documented higher increases in migrant workers than native workers between 2019 and 2022 in sectors suffering from labor shortages:
  - building and related trade: migrant workers increased by 7 percent versus stable for total workers;
  - health: migrant workers increased by 15 percent versus 7 percent for total workers;
  - ICT: migrant workers increased by 50 percent versus 30 percent for total workers.
- Data constraints prevent an early assessment of the impact of migrants on native wages over the past few years.

### Overqualification and skill downgrading
- Migrants are more likely than natives to be overqualified for the jobs they hold (skill downgrading), with the phenomenon especially pronounced among female migrants.
- Among high-skilled workers in 2019, overqualification rates:
  - within-EU migrants: 34 percent of total high-skilled;
  - native workers: 22 percent of total high-skilled.
- Country examples for non-EU migrants aged 25-64 (overqualification rate in 2022):
  - Italy: more than 50 percent;
  - Portugal: about 20 percent;
  - Netherlands: about 20 percent.
- The average overqualification rate has remained relatively constant through time, hovering around 30-35 percent since the early 2000s.
- Anecdotal evidence for Ukrainian refugees in Poland: 50 percent state their work does not match their qualifications.

### Ukrainian refugees: labor market integration
- Available survey and administrative data suggest Ukrainian refugees have been absorbed into employment faster than previous refugee waves in many countries.
- Ukrainian refugees reached employment rates of around 50 percent in several countries—levels more commonly observed five or more years after a refugee wave.
- OECD reports employment rates ranging from over 60 percent in Poland to below 20 percent in Italy (survey data for Poland and Italy).
- Administrative data for Germany (Honorati and others, 2024) show 12 percent of Ukrainian refugees were in formal employment after one year—higher than the comparable number for Syrian refugees during the 2015-16 wave (around 7 percent).
- Contributing factors to faster absorption include tight labor market conditions, temporary protection allowing immediate work search, country-specific legal changes, financial incentives, vocational information and employment counseling, existing diasporas, and language proficiency (e.g., Russian proficiency aiding integration in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).

### Potential output: modeling approach and assumptions
- The study uses a semi-structural model (see Andrle and others (2015) for model description) to simulate the impact of migration-induced changes in 2020-23 on euro area potential output.
- Simulations focus on the euro area given model setup.
- All scenarios assume a temporary 0.2 percent of GDP fiscal expansion.
- Hours worked per week are assumed identical for newly employed migrants and existing workers.
- Five scenarios combine assumptions on:
  - size of the working-age population shock,
  - productivity differential between migrants and natives (permanent gap or gap that closes by 2030),
  - length of migrant stay (permanent or partially temporary).
- Scenario summaries (labor force shocks and key assumptions):
  - Scenario 1: labor force shock by year: 2020 -0.2%, 2021 -0.1%, 2022 0.6%; Permanent TFP differential: Yes; Permanent migration: Yes. Conservative assumption capturing only 2022 increase (2023 not captured); TFP differential stable at 18 percent; migrants stay permanently.
  - Scenario 2: 2020 -0.1%, 2021 0.0%, 2022 0.4%, 2023 0.5%; Permanent TFP differential: Yes; Permanent migration: Yes. Intermediate labor supply increase; TFP differential permanent; migrants stay permanently.
  - Scenario 3: same labor supply as Scenario 2 (2020 -0.1%, 2021 0.0%, 2022 0.4%, 2023 0.5%); Permanent TFP differential: Yes; Permanent migration: Partly. Half of migrants return gradually over 2025-28.
  - Scenario 4: same labor supply as Scenario 2; Permanent TFP differential: No (TFP differential disappears by 2030); Permanent migration: Yes.
  - Scenario 5: 2020 -0.1%, 2021 0.0%, 2022 1.0%, 2023 0.2%; Permanent TFP differential: Yes; Permanent migration: Yes. Largest labor supply increase.
- Calibration notes:
  - Scenario 1 uses Eurostat working-age population data and captures 2020–22 (2023 data not available).
  - Scenario 2 calibrated on labor force survey data comparing non-EU citizen contributions pre-pandemic and 2020–2023 outturns.
  - Scenario 5 uses migration flow data (aggregate) and assumes two thirds of “excess” inflows are working-age.

### Simulation results: potential output, GDP per capita, short-run effects
- Simulated impact on potential output by 2030 for a labor force increase of 0.3–1.1 percent due to net migration over 2020-23:
  - Potential output could rise by 0.2–0.7 percent by 2030.
  - Center estimate: about 0.5 percent (slightly less than half annual potential euro area GDP growth projected for that time).
- Sensitivity findings:
  - Keeping initial labor force increase constant, assuming half of migrants leave by 2030 reduces the potential GDP impact by 0.3 percentage points (difference between scenarios 2 and 3).
  - Assuming the TFP gap between migrants and natives closes over time increases the potential GDP impact by 0.2 percentage points (difference between scenarios 2 and 4).
  - Scenarios 4 and 5 produce the same increase in potential output of 0.7 percent—implying that higher migrant productivity can deliver the same output increase as a notably sharper labor force increase with more subdued migrant productivity.
- GDP per capita:
  - If a permanent TFP gap between natives and immigrants persists, GDP per capita drops marginally in the simulations.
  - If the TFP gap closes, GDP per capita is unchanged in the medium-term.
- Short-run macroeconomic effects:
  - The labor force shock was modestly inflationary in the short run (around 0.1 percentage point) due to a positive contribution to the output gap as potential GDP adjusts slower than actual GDP.
  - All scenarios except scenario 3 (where half of migrants stay temporarily) see a positive GDP growth impact over the whole horizon as capital accumulation catches up with increased labor force.
- Fiscal implications:
  - The model is not well-suited to study fiscal effects in detail.
  - Literature indicates the degree of labor market integration of migrants is a key factor for longer-run fiscal impact.

*IMF Working Paper (excerpt provided).*

### 5. Local Economic Implications

### 5. Local Economic Implications

### Local concentration and immediate effects
- The 2022 migration surge in the EU was heterogeneously distributed across subnational regions.
- The mean region saw a net migration rate of around 0.5 percent.
- The top percentile experienced net migration as high as 4 percent of the existing population in one year.
- Effects related to aggregate demand, labor market, and demand for public goods and services can be more pronounced at the local level because supply of schools, public housing, and health services may be less elastic relative to the national level.
- OECD (2022) and IMF (2022b) highlight safe, secure and affordable housing, education, childcare, health services, and housing as pressing local integration challenges.

### Availability of granular data and assessment limits
- Granular NUTS2/NUTS3 level data for 2022 inflows are not yet available to quantitatively gauge whether large inflows stretched local public goods provision or accentuated housing market pressures.
- This data gap makes it hard to assess the effects of the recent increase in immigration in a quantitative way; existing evidence is limited to anecdote and survey data.

### Anecdotal and survey evidence on local pressures
- Poland: anecdotal evidence indicates strains on local housing markets with a significant increase in rental prices in major hubs and shortages of available housing in some communities (Szymanska, 2023).
- Childcare and schooling:
  - A German Youth Institute survey among nurseries found that around half had admitted Ukrainian children; of those nurseries that had not admitted Ukrainian children, 50 percent cited capacity constraints.
  - For school-aged children, surveys suggest physical school infrastructure and teacher availability were stretched in many places after the initial wave; personnel has since been expanded and, despite waiting lists in some regions, almost all Ukrainian children seem to be able to attend a school.
  - Data limitations prevent assessing whether teacher-student ratios have been adversely affected.
- Eurofound and FRA (2023) survey (ten EU member states hosting the largest shares under temporary protection) reports:
  - Areas with more accessible accommodation (small villages) often lack job opportunities.
  - Larger cities with more labor market opportunities often lack affordable and adequate housing.
  - Majority of migrants under temporary protection are women and children, making access to early education and childcare fundamental to facilitate women’s labor force participation.
  - Language training needs are widespread and frequently cited as a key barrier to labor market entry (Text Figure 7), but providing language training can put pressure on local schools and budgets unless adequate resources are provided.

### Regional definitions used
- Regions are defined according to the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS).
- NUTS 3 level regions — the smallest regional entities according to this nomenclature — are considered throughout the paper.

### Cross-cutting implications summarized in the paper’s conclusion (relevant to local level)
- Recent immigration into the EU helped meet strong labor demand in 2022-23: close to two-thirds (2.7 million) of EU jobs created between 2019 and 2023 were filled by non-EU citizens.
- Simulation results:
  - An increase in labor force of 0.3-1.1 percent of existing labor force can increase the level of euro area potential GDP by 0.2-0.7 percent by 2030.
  - The impact is larger if the labor force increase is larger (bigger initial increase or immigrants stay permanently) and if the productivity differential between natives and migrants is lower.
  - The paper’s favored point estimate is an increase in euro area potential output of 0.5 percent by 2030.
- GDP per capita falls in simulations if a permanent TFP gap between natives and immigrants persists, but not if the gap gradually closes.
- Temporary fiscal outlays associated with immigrants are estimated at 0.2 percent of EU GDP in previous IMF work.
- Anecdotal evidence points to pressures on hospitals, affordable housing, and schooling at the local level.

### Key local-level policy implications and priorities
- Two policy priorities:
  - Focus on integrating migrants into the labor market, and integrating them in the most productivity-enhancing way possible.
  - Ensure the supply of public services and amenities (including at the local level) keeps up with population increases.
- Specific policy measures recommended:
  - Maintain or expand immediate access to the job market where appropriate (the Temporary Protection Directive for Ukrainian refugees in 2022 is cited as a successful example).
  - Facilitate labor market access for immigrants not under Temporary Protection, including minimizing restrictions on taking up work during the asylum application phase.
  - Ease avenues for migrants to enter self-employment (including access to credit).
  - Facilitate skill recognition and strengthen language training.
  - Improve rental housing affordability and supply:
    - Measures to expand affordable rental housing include targeted higher housing allowances, more social rental housing, and regulatory and financial incentives that raise rental housing supply across locations.
  - Strengthen the role of the non-governmental sector (NGOs, CSOs), drawing on country experience (for example Germany) to provide immediate assistance and tailored support.
  - Study whether mechanisms are in place to avoid sudden declines in per capita provision of local public goods (schooling, social housing); establish whether per capita public good provision has been negatively affected as a first step.
  - Provide greater initial support from regional, central, or supranational governments to regions relying more on local financing that receive disproportionate shares of immigrants.
  - Reduce barriers to geographical mobility (including those linked to housing, education, and health services) to allow migrants to move where labor demand is high.

*International Monetary Fund — “5. Local Economic Implications” (excerpt from IMF Working Paper).*

### References

### wpiea2024211-print-pdf - References

### Major literature themes covered
- Extensive references on the economics of migration, including:
  - Macroeconomic effects and regional spillovers of large migration waves.
  - Labor market impacts, integration dynamics, and refugee employment outcomes.
  - Fiscal impacts and public finance consequences of immigration.
  - Knowledge diffusion, productivity, and innovation linked to immigrant skill composition.
  - Housing, social cohesion, and policy responses to refugee inflows.
- Empirical contexts include EU member states, the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Poland, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Methods and data sources cited range from micro-level natural experiments and survey experiments to macro-modeling and regional outlooks.

### Key empirical and methodological references (representative)
- Studies on refugee and refugee-integration economics: Aiyar et al. 2016; Bahar, Brough, and Peri 2024; Engler et al. 2023; Fasani, Frattini, and Minale 2022.
- Labor market and wage impact literature: Card 1990; Borjas 2003; Angrist and Kugler 2003; Dustmann and Frattini 2014; Edo 2019; Brell, Dustmann, and Preston 2020.
- Fiscal and public finance implications: Rowthorn 2008; Preston 2014; OECD 2013; Fiorio et al. 2023; Colas and Sachs 2024.
- Knowledge spillovers, productivity, and innovation: Peri 2012; Bahar and Rapoport 2018; Hornung 2014; Stuen, Mobarak, and Maskus 2012.
- Housing and integration policy: El Fayoumi et al. 2021; OECD 2022; Solf, Guerrero, and Sherzad 2024.
- Recent EU- and Ukraine-related analyses: European Commission 2023a/2023b; Eurofound 2024; UNHCR 2024; Honorati, Testaverde, and Totino 2024.

### Annex I — Measurement of Migration and Migrants in the Labor Market: Key observations and statistics
- Timing of Eurostat comprehensive migration statistics:
  - Eurostat publishes comprehensive migration and migrant population statistics in Spring of year t, for year t-2. Example: data for 2022 were published in March 2024.
- Definition of migration:
  - Eurostat: “immigrants who have been residing (or who are expected to reside) in the territory of an EU Member State for a period of at least 12 months are included in the statistics, as are emigrants living abroad for more than 12 months.”
- Data collection sources:
  - Most EU Member States base statistics on administrative data sources (population registers, registers of foreigners, residence or work permits, health insurance registers, tax registers); some use mirror statistics, sample surveys, or estimation methods.
- Granularity:
  - Flow data categorize migrants as EU, non-EU or (returning) nationals; stock data include country of birth and country of citizenship.
- Definitional differences across countries and implications:
  - Some countries exclude asylum seekers or refugees under temporary protection from their statistics. Countries that do not include asylum seekers in migration statistics: Bulgaria, Denmark, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
  - Countries that do not include refugees from Ukraine under temporary protection in migration and population statistics: Bulgaria, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and Liechtenstein.
  - Result: Total number of migrants in 2022 could be as much as 1.5 million higher than the official statistics based on these exclusions.
- Temporary protection (Ukraine):
  - Eurostat issued initial guidance on measurement in January 2023 for the first-time use of temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees as of 2022.
  - Monthly flow data on granting of temporary protection, annual flow data, and annual stock data are available but not fully consistent.
  - The delta in the annual stock is the measure most closely capturing the number of Ukrainians de facto in a member country: 3.8 million at end-2022 and 4.3 million at end 2023.
- Asylum seekers:
  - First-time asylum applications are country-specific and imply no time limit; an asylum seeker can be a first-time applicant in different countries.
- Data on emigration:
  - Official data show a very stable annual rate of emigration from the EU (somewhat over 1 million people).
- Net migration:
  - Eurostat publishes net migration plus statistical adjustment with aggregate population statistics. Data for 2023 for this measure are available as of early July 2024.
- Labor Force Survey (LFS) timing and scope:
  - Eurostat publishes quarterly and annual LFS data. Quarterly data are published around 10 weeks after the end of the quarter; annual data are available roughly four months after the end of the calendar year.
  - Sample size: 1.1 million in 2021. Survey covers everyone aged 15 and above living in private households; excludes those in military/community service and those living in institutional or collective housing (relevant because migrants, especially refugees, often initially live in collective housing).
- Differences between population statistics and LFS for working-age population (WAP):
  - Eurostat’s migrant population statistics: increase in non-EU citizens between 1 January 2022 and 1 January 2023 (increase during 2022) is roughly 2.8 million.
  - From quarterly LFS: increase between Q1 2022 and Q1 2023 was 1.5 million (1.7 million when taking Q4 2021 as the base).
  - Implication: a shortfall of over 1 million in LFS relative to population statistics for that period.
  - For 2021: population statistics show an increase of only 185,000, while the LFS shows an increase in the WAP of around 500,000.

*Source: wpiea2024211-print-pdf - References (Annex I text and reference list).*

### Annex II. A Further Look at Aggregate

### Annex II. A Further Look at Aggregate Perceptions Data

### Data and Questions
- Data sources:
  - European Value Study (EVS) Wave 2008 (field work 2008-2010) and Wave 2017 (field work 2017-2021).
  - World Value Survey (WVS) last survey conducted jointly with EVS during 2017-2021.
- EVS Wave 2017 contains six questions related to perceptions of migrants:
  - 1. Feel concerned about immigrants — scale 1-5 (1-very much; 5-not at all).
  - 2. Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality] — scale 1-10 (1-agree; 10-disagree).
  - 3. Immigrants increase crime problems — scale 1-10 (1-agree; 10-disagree).
  - 4. Immigrants are a strain on welfare system — scale 1-10 (1-agree; 10-disagree).
  - 5. Immigrants maintain own/take over customs — scale 1-10 (1-agree; 10-disagree).
  - 6. Evaluate the impact of immigrants on the development of [your country] — scale 1-5 (1-very bad; 5-very good).

### Correlates of Overall Concerns
- Overall concerns (EVS question 1) reflect multiple dimensions captured in EVS:
  - Concern about own country’s development is most correlated with overall concerns about immigrants.
  - Job security, strains on welfare, and increase in crimes are also associated with overall concerns.
  - Worries about cultural differences are least correlated with overall concerns.
- Interpretation provided:
  - Taken together, overall concerns about immigrants seem to reflect concerns about economic prospect and security.

### Temporal and Group Heterogeneity (EVS comparisons between waves)
- Evolution over time:
  - Comparing Wave 2008 (field work 2008-2010) and Wave 2017 (field work 2017-2021) shows changing perceptions and heterogeneity across social groups.
  - Negative perceptions such as claims that immigrants take away jobs and that immigrants strain welfare systems have declined between these waves.
  - The improvement in perceptions may partly reflect the trend decline in the unemployment rates during the same period.
- Country-group differences:
  - The improvement in perceptions has been larger in the UK than in the EU.
- Native vs. existing immigrant attitudes:
  - Within the UK or the EU, existing immigrants tend to have better perceptions of new immigrants than natives.
  - Both natives and existing immigrants have improved perceptions of new immigrants over time.

### Cross-country Heterogeneity (WVS and EVS comparisons)
- WVS questions differ from EVS and cover job vacancies, unemployment, crime rates, and social conflict.
- Country patterns highlighted:
  - Greece (GRC) exhibits unfavorable perceptions on multiple fronts: large shares of respondents disagree that migrants fill important job vacancies and agree that migrants increase unemployment, the crime rate, and social conflict.
  - The UK (GBR) and Canada (CAN) tend to view migrants favorably across these aspects.
  - The Netherlands (NLD) shows divergent perceptions: close to 60 percent of survey respondents agree that migrants fill important job vacancies, while more than 70 percent agree that immigration increases crime rates.
- Illustrative survey statistics mentioned:
  - "close to 60 percent" agree that migrants fill important job vacancies (Netherlands example).
  - "more than 70 percent" agree that immigration increases crime rates (Netherlands example).

*Migration into the EU: Stocktaking of Recent Developments and Macroeconomic Implications — Annex II. A Further Look at Aggregate Perceptions Data, Working Paper No. WP/2024/211*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2024/english/wpiea2024211-print-pdf.pdf_