## wpiea2026067-online-appendix

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### 2.1 Households and consumption
- Consumption aggregation and price indices
  - Aggregate consumption:
    - C_t = [ γ^{1/χ}(C_{T,t})^{(χ−1)/χ} + (1−γ)^{1/χ}(C_{N,t})^{(χ−1)/χ} ]^{χ/(χ−1)} with γ ∈ [0,1], χ>0.
  - Sectoral demand:
    - C_{T,t} = γ (P_{T,t}/P_t)^{−χ} C_t.
    - C_{N,t} = (1−γ) (P_{N,t}/P_t)^{−χ} C_t.
  - CPI:
    - P_t = [ γ P_{T,t}^{1−χ} + (1−γ) P_{N,t}^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)}.
  - Tradable aggregate (home vs foreign):
    - C_{T,t} = [ (1−α)^{1/η} C_{Ht}^{(η−1)/η} + α^{1/η} C_{Ft}^{(η−1)/η} ]^{η/(η−1)} with α ∈ [0,1], η>0.
  - CES sub-aggregates:
    - C_{Ht} = [ ∫_0^1 C_{Ht}(j)^{(ε−1)/ε} dj ]^{ε/(ε−1)}, etc., with ε>1.
  - Domestic/imported tradable demand:
    - C_{Ht} = (1−α) (P_{Ht}/P_t)^{−η} C_t, C_{Ft} = α (P_{Ft}/P_t)^{−η} C_t.
  - Tradable CPI:
    - P_{T,t} = [ (1−α) P_{H,t}^{1−η} + α P_{F,t}^{1−η} ]^{1/(1−η)}.

- Foreign households
  - Foreign consumption aggregator mirrors home:
    - C^*_t = [ γ^{1/χ}(C^*_{T,t})^{(χ−1)/χ} + (1−γ)^{1/χ}(C^*_{N,t})^{(χ−1)/χ} ]^{χ/(χ−1)}.
  - Foreign tradable aggregator with home bias:
    - C^*_{T,t} = [ (1−α)^{1/η} C^*_{Ft}^{(η−1)/η} + α^{1/η} C^*_{Ht}^{(η−1)/η} ]^{η/(η−1)}.

- Household types: HTM and perpetual youth
  - Hand-to-mouth (HTM):
    - Consume all income each period:
      - (1 + τ_{C,t}) C^H_t = (1−τ_{l,t}) W_t N_t + T_t.
  - Perpetual youth (P):
    - Maximize:
      - E_0 ∑_{t=0}^∞ (β θ)^t [ 1/(1−σ) C_{P,t}^{1−σ} − 1/(1+ν) N_{P,t}^{1+ν} ].
    - Face taxes τ_C and τ_l; hold domestic government debt B_{H} and international bond B_{I} (real terms).
  - Aggregate consumption share:
    - C_t = ω C^H_t + (1−ω) C^P_t with ω the HTM share.

- Perpetual youth budget and adjustment costs
  - Budget constraint (real terms, scaled by (1−ω)):
    - (1 + τ_{C,t}) C^P_t + B_{H,t}/(1−ω) + B_{I,t}/(1−ω) + φ/(1−ω)^2 (B_{I,t} − B_{I,ss})^2
      = R_{H,t−1}/(θ(1−ω)π_t) B_{H,t−1} + R_{I,t−1}/(θ(1−ω)π_t) B_{I,t−1} + (1−τ_{l,t}) W_t N_t + Π_t/(1−ω) + T_t.
  - Adjustment cost φ on international bond holdings captures capital control frictions; φ set at very low levels in baseline calibration.
  - Extra return factor 1/θ reflects inheritance/new households in Blanchard (1985) framework.

- Labor supply and unions
  - Labor supplied to a union that maximizes weighted household utility; union faces wage adjustment cost φ_w.
  - With flexible wages (φ_w = 0), post-tax real wage:
    - (ε_w/(ε_w − 1)) C^σ N^ν = (1−τ_{l,t}) w^{real}_t.

- Intertemporal optimality and international linkages
  - Euler equation (perpetual youth):
    - 1 = β E_t[ (C^P_{t+1}/C^P_t)^{−σ} R_{H,t}/π_{t+1} ].
  - FOC for international bond with φ:
    - β λ_{t+1}/λ_t R_{I,t}/π_{t+1} = 1 + φ (B_{I,t} − B_{I,ss}).
  - Wedge between international and domestic government bond:
    - R_{I,t}/R_{H,t} = 1 + φ (B_{I,t} − B_{I,ss}).

- Foreign perpetual youth budget and UIP intuition
  - Foreign budget (accounts for exchange rate ε_t):
    - C^*_{P,t} + B_{F,t}/(1−ω) + B_{I,t} ε_t/(1−ω) = R_{F,t−1}/(θ(1−ω)π^*_t) B_{F,t−1} − R_{I,t−1} ε_t/(θ(1−ω)π^*_t) B_{I,t−1} + W^*_t N^*_t + Π^*_t/(1−ω) + T^*_t.
  - Foreign FOC for international bond:
    - ε_t/ε_{t+1} R_{I,t}/π^*_{t+1} = R_{F,t}/π^*_{t+1} = λ^*_t/(β λ^*_{t+1}).

- Real exchange rate and link to interest rates
  - Real exchange rate:
    - Q_t = ε_t P^*_t / P_t.
  - With φ:
    - Q_{t+1}/Q_t R_{F,t}/π^*_{t+1} = R_{H,t}/π_{t+1} (1 + φ (B_{I,t} − B_{I,ss})).
    - Collapses to standard UIP when φ → 0.

- Present-value consumption for perpetual youth
  - Consumption relation:
    - C^P_t ∑_{τ=0}^∞ (θ β^{1/σ})^τ (Q_{t+τ})^{1−1/σ} = R_{t−1}/((1−ω) π_t) B_{H,t−1} + R_{I,t−1}/((1−ω) π_t) B_{I,t−1} + ∑_{τ=0}^∞ θ^τ Q_{t+τ} (Y^P_{t+τ}).
  - Q_{t+τ} defined as product of π and R terms across horizons.

### 2.2 Tariffs, prices, and exchange rates
- Tradable price indices with ad-valorem tariff τ_t:
  - Home tradable price index:
    - P_{T,t} = [ (1−α) P_{H,t}^{1−η} + α ((1 + τ_t) P_{F,t})^{1−η} ]^{1/(1−η)}.
  - Foreign tradable price index with τ^*_t:
    - P^*_{T,t} = [ (1−α) P^{* 1−η}_{F,t} + α ((1 + τ^*_t) P^*_{H,t})^{1−η} ]^{1/(1−η)}.

- Tradable inflation and terms of trade
  - Terms of trade S_t = P_{F,t} / P_{H,t}.
  - Relative tradable price:
    - P_{T,t}/P_{H,t} = [ (1−α) + α ((1 + τ_t) S_t)^{1−η} ]^{1/(1−η)}.
  - Tradable inflation (Π_{T,t} = P_{T,t}/P_{T,t−1}, Π_{H,t} = P_{H,t}/P_{H,t−1}):
    - Π_{T,t} = Π_{H,t} [ ((1−α) + α ((1 + τ_t) S_t)^{1−η}) / ((1−α) + α ((1 + τ_{t−1}) S_{t−1})^{1−η}) ]^{1/(1−η)}.
  - Foreign tradable inflation analogous using S_t^{−1}.

- Tariff shock effects
  - Tariff shock creates an immediate wedge between domestic price inflation Π_H and tradable consumer price inflation Π_T; this feeds into aggregate CPI inflation via tradables share γ.
  - Tariff does not directly enter household budget constraint except through relative price effects (see Lemma A.1).

- Non-tradable and aggregate inflation
  - Non-tradable inflation Π_{N,t} driven by domestic real marginal costs MC_{N,t}.
  - Aggregate inflation:
    - Π_t = [ γ (Π_{T,t} P_{T,t−1}/P_{t−1})^{1−χ} + (1−γ) (Π_{N,t} P_{N,t−1}/P_{t−1})^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)}.

- Real exchange rate decomposition
  - Q_t = ε_t P^*_t / P_t decomposed as:
    - Q_t = (ε_t P^*_{T,t} / P_{T,t}) × [ γ + (1−γ) (P^*_{N,t}/P^*_{T,t})^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)} / [ γ + (1−γ) (P_{N,t}/P_{T,t})^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)}.
  - Internal tradable/non-tradable price wedges affect aggregate RER even if tradable prices obey law of one price.

### 2.3 Firms and production
- Production technology and taxes/subsidies
  - Firm production:
    - Y_{k,t}(i) = A_{k,t}(i) K_{k,t}(i)^{μ_k} N_{k,t}(i)^{1−μ_k}.
  - Firms face investment subsidies φ_t, corporate tax τ_K, and consumption ad-valorem tax τ_C.
  - Depreciation P_k δ K_{k,t} deducted from revenues.

- Firm optimization and marginal cost
  - Labor FOC:
    - φ_t (1−μ) A_{k,t} K_{k,t}^{μ} N_{k,t}^{−μ} = (1−τ_{K,t}) w_t.
  - Post-tax marginal cost:
    - φ_t = (1−τ_{k,t}) MC_{k,t} = (1−τ_{k,t}) w_t (1−μ)^{-1} A_{k,t}^{−1} K_{k,t}^{−μ} N_{k,t}^{μ}.
  - Investment FOC and Tobin's q include P_{k,t}/P_t and adjustment κ.

- Transmission and markup shocks
  - Investment cost may use P_T or P_N depending on sector; tradable investment can use imported goods (P_H).
  - Lower markups (higher MC) raise q and desired investment and draw labor into the sector.
  - Simulated markup shock M^ε_t follows AR(1) (section 4).

- Market clearing
  - Aggregate production:
    - Y_{H,t} = I_{H,t} + C_{H,t} + C^*_{H,t} + I^*_{H,t}.
  - Home tradable market clearing:
    - Y_{H,t} = (1−α) (P_{H,t}/P_{T,t})^{−η} (C_{T,t} + I_{T,t}) + α (P_{H,t}/(ε_t P^*_{T,t}))^{−η} (C^*_{T,t} + I^*_{T,t}).
  - Non-tradable clearing:
    - Y_{N,t} = C_{N,t} + I_{N,t}.

- Pricing and optimal price setting (Rotemberg)
  - Retailer price adjustment cost φ_π/2 (P_{H,t+j}(i)/P_{H,t+j−1}(i) − 1)^2 Y_{H,t+j}; FOC yields pricing relation with adjustment terms.
  - Without adjustment costs:
    - P_{H,t}/P_t = ε/(ε−1) MC_t/P_t (standard markup rule).
  - Analogous for non-tradable and foreign sectors.

- Profits to perpetual youth households
  - Sectoral profits:
    - Π_{k,t} = P_{k,t}/P_t [ (1−τ_{K,t}) [ (1−(ε−1)/ε)(1−μ) Y_{k,t} + μ Y_{k,t} ] + δ τ_{k,t} K_t − I_{k,t} ].
  - Aggregate profits Π_t = Π_{H,t} + Π_{N,t}.

### 2.4 Accounting identities and policy rules
- Aggregates
  - GDP:
    - Y_t = GDP_t = (P_{H,t}/P_t) * Y_T + (P_{N,t}/P_t) Y_N.
  - Aggregate investment:
    - I_t = (P_{H,t}/P_t) * I_H,t + (P_{N,t}/P_t) I_N,t.

- Trade and current account
  - Current account balance:
    - CAB_t = (Y_t − C_t) + (R_{I,t−1} − 1) B_{t−1}/π_t.
  - Net international debt evolution:
    - B_t − B_{t−1} = CAB_t.

- Fiscal accounts and government bond holdings
  - Government revenues:
    - Rev_t = τ_t P_{F,t}/P_t C_{F,t} + τ_{C,t} C_t + τ_{L,t} W_t N_t + τ_{K,t} ( Π_t − (δ) K_t + (1−φ_t) I_t ).
  - Government expenditure:
    - E_t = T_t + φ_t I_t.
  - Government budget constraint:
    - B_{H,t} + E_t = Rev_t + R_{t−1}/π_t B_{H,t−1} + B^ε_I.
  - Government holdings of international bond B^ε_I evolve:
    - B_{G,I} − R_{I,t−1}/π_t B_{G,I} = ε_{G,t}.
  - Fiscal rule (debt-stabilizing):
    - E_t / Y_t = ρ_F (Rev_t / Y_t) − ρ_B B_{H,t} / Y_t.

- Monetary policy
  - Taylor-type rule:
    - R_{H,t} = R_{ss} ( π_t / π_{ss} )^{ψ_π}.

### 3 Parameters (calibrated values shown)
- Preferences & Households
  - Discount Factor β = 0.995
  - Inter-temporal substitution σ = 2.0
  - Inverse Frisch Elasticity ν = 0.33
  - Habit Persistence ρ = 0.7
  - Hand-to-Mouth Share ω = 0.3
- Technology & Capital
  - Capital Share μ_k = 0.33
  - Depreciation Rate δ = 0.025 (Quarterly)
  - Inv. Adjustment Cost κ = 3.0
- Openness & Sectors
  - Tradable Share γ = 0.5
  - T/NT Elasticity χ = 0.5
  - Trade Elasticity η = 2.0
  - Openness α = 0.3
- Nominal Frictions & Policy
  - Price Elasticity ε = 6.0
  - Rotemberg Parameter (prices) φ_π = 70
  - Rotemberg Parameter (wages) φ_w = 70
  - Taylor Rule (Inf) ψ_π = 1.5

### 4 Shock processes
- AR(1) processes (logs or levels)
  - Sector-specific productivity (logs):
    - ln(A_{T,t}) = ρ_A ln(A_{T,t−1}) + (1−ρ_A) ln(Ȧ_T) + ε_{A,T,t}.
    - ln(A_{N,t}) = ρ_A ln(A_{N,t−1}) + (1−ρ_A) ln(Ȧ_N) − ε_{A,N,t}.
  - Investment subsidy shocks:
    - τ_{sub,T,t} = ρ_{τ,sub} τ_{sub,T,t−1} + (1−ρ_{τ,sub}) ȳ_{τ,sub,T} + ε_{τ,sub,T,t}.
  - Markup shock on tradable:
    - M^ε_t = ρ_M M^ε_{t−1} + ε_{M,t}.
  - Tariffs and factor taxes AR(1); labor and capital tax shocks enter with negative sign (tax cut):
    - τ_t = ρ_τ τ_{t−1} + ε_{τ,t}.
    - τ_{L,t} = ρ_{τ,L} τ_{L,t−1} − ε_{τ,L,t}.
    - τ_{K,t} = ρ_{τ,K} τ_{K,t−1} − ε_{τ,K,t}.
  - Government reserve accumulation:
    - B_{g,I,t} = ρ_{gov} B_{g,I,t−1} − ρ_{g,stab} ( B_{g,I,t−1} / GDP_{t−1} ) + ε_{gov,t}.

*Source: wpiea2026067-online-appendix - 2.1  Households and consumption (PDF chapter).*

### 5.1 Micro-industrial policy: productivity related developments
- Temporary vs permanent 1% tradable productivity boost
  - Shock: 1% boost to tradable sector productivity; permanent case sets ρA = 1, temporary case sets ρA = 0.
  - Dynamics (perpetual youth households):
    - Temporary shock: households save part of the windfall, generating a current account surplus that exceeds the initial increase in investment (partly due to investment adjustment frictions).
    - Permanent shock: saving initially rises by less than in the temporary case, then rises alongside higher real interest rates and a higher marginal product of capital.
  - Reported magnitudes presented in figures for CAB(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP) across quarters.

- Non-tradable productivity fall vs tradable productivity rise
  - Paradox: A 1% fall in A_N can mirror the current account impact of a 1% rise in A_T.
  - Mechanism:
    - Low χ (< 1) → tradables and nontradables complements; rise in nontradable prices when A_N falls leads households not to substitute away.
    - RER appreciates, increasing relative value of domestic output and accompanied by decline in current account.
  - Variables highlighted: CAB(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Relative nontradable price, RER(-is appreciation).

### 5.2 Micro-industrial policy: Subsidies
- Investment subsidy (φ) and financing modalities
  - Policy: subsidy to investment encourages capital deepening; effects similar to productivity-induced capital deepening.
  - Financing cases:
    1. Tax-financed (via τc):
      - Immediate cost lowers consumption for perpetual youth and HTM households; aggregate saving declines.
    2. Debt/deficit-financed (low ρg):
      - Future tax liabilities partially discounted by perpetual youth (death probability θ); households save less than subsidy cost, lowering aggregate saving.
  - Reported variables: CAB(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP) under "De-cit-nanced" and "Tax-nanced" scenarios.

### 5.3 Micro-industrial policy: Production targets
- Mandated output increase / permanent fall in tradable markup
  - Permanent fall in tradable markup → lower tradable price, higher tradable production and factor use (firms accept lower profits).
  - Indirect effects:
    - Relative shortage of nontradables → sharp rise in relative prices and RER appreciation due to inelastic nontradable demand.
    - Increased investment and labor demand; higher expected future income induces dissaving, lowering current account.
  - Variables shown: CAB(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Relative nontradable price(%), RER(-is appreciation).

### 5.4 Macro-industrial policy: Forced saving and capital controls
- Preference shock to discount rate β and capital flow regimes
  - Policy: persistent increase in saving via higher β (forced saving).
  - Two φ cases:
    1. Free financial flows (φ = 0):
      - Saving ↑ → CAB ↑; domestic and global interest rates ↓; exchange rate initially depreciates before investment rises.
    2. Strict capital flow restrictions (high φ, "CFM"):
      - Households cannot accumulate foreign assets; import demand reduction → large RER appreciation.
      - Domestic interest rates fall below international bond rate; domestic investment rises and CAB little changed.
  - Variables: CAB(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), InterestRates (Home / International bond), RER(-is appreciation).

### 5.5 Macro-industrial policy: reserve accumulation
- Government accumulation of international bonds with capital controls
  - Setup: φ = 1 for high private transaction costs; shock εg causes persistent government accumulation of B_{G,I}.
  - Effects:
    - Funded mainly through domestic bond issuance; higher domestic interest rates needed to induce private purchase of new net supply.
    - Domestic interest rates rise above global bond rate; persistent depreciation; fall in domestic absorption from lower consumption and investment.
  - Variables: CAB(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP), InterestRates (Home / Intlbond), RER(-is appreciation).

### 5.6 Combined Micro and Macro industrial policy
- Interaction: tradable production targets + forced saving
  - Micro: lower tradable markups → capital deepening expectations lower saving relative to investment; nontradable shortage raises relative prices and causes RER appreciation.
  - Macro: forced saving via β shock lowers consumption persistently (no capital controls in this combination).
  - Interaction effects:
    - Forced saving increases saving relative to investment, counteracting dissaving from production-target expectations.
    - Forced saving counteracts the RER appreciation seen in standalone micro-IP case.
  - Variables illustrated: CAB(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Inflation(ppt), Relative nontradable price, RER(-is appreciation), ToT(-is appreciation), Real interest rate.

### 6.1 Consumption smoothing (model extension)
- Habit formation and lifetime budget with perpetual youth
  - Household utility with habits:
    - E0 ∑∞_{t=0} β^t [1/(1−σ) (C_t(i) − ρ C_{t−1})^{1−σ} − 1/(1+φ) N_t^{1+φ}]
    - Habits reference aggregate consumption ρ C_{t−1}.
  - Define C̃_t = C_t − ρ C_{t−1}.
  - Budget constraint in C̃_t includes consumption tax (1 + τC,t), aggregate bond holdings B_T,t, investment I_t (1 − φ_t), wages, profits, transfers, and adjustment costs on international bond holdings.
  - FOCs:
    - C̃_t^{−σ} = (1 + τC,t) λ_t
    - λ_t = β R_t / Π_{t+1} λ_{t+1}
  - Forward iteration and lifetime budget constraint involve θ, Q_{t+τ}, and R_{t−1} (1−ω) θ π_t B_T,t−1; surviving households and new entrants treated explicitly to eliminate θ term in aggregate consumption function.

### A.1 Lemma (Tariffs and the budget constraint)
- Lemma A.1:
  - Imposition of tariffs does not alter the standard form of the household budget constraint; tariff effects operate only through relative and aggregate price adjustments.
  - Real cost of tradable consumption:
    - P_{H,t}/P_t C_{H,t} + (1 + τ_t) P_{F,t}/P_t C_{F,t}
  - Rewriting with C_H and C_F as functions of C_T and S_t and algebra using α, η, and tariff term (1 + τ_t) demonstrates the household budget constraint reduces to C_T; hence tariffs enter only via price effects.

*Source: wpiea2026067-online-appendix - 2.1  Households and consumption (PDF chapter).*

### 2.1  Households and consumption

### 2.1  Households and consumption

### Consumption bundles and price indices
- Aggregate consumption C_t is a CES aggregate of tradable and non-tradable goods:
  - C_t = [ γ^{1/χ}(C_{T,t})^{(χ−1)/χ} + (1−γ)^{1/χ}(C_{N,t})^{(χ−1)/χ} ]^{χ/(χ−1)} with γ ∈ [0,1], χ>0.
- Sectoral demand:
  - C_{T,t} = γ (P_{T,t}/P_t)^{−χ} C_t.
  - C_{N,t} = (1−γ) (P_{N,t}/P_t)^{−χ} C_t.
- CPI:
  - P_t = [ γ P_{T,t}^{1−χ} + (1−γ) P_{N,t}^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)}.
- Tradable bundle across home (H) and foreign (F) varieties:
  - C_{T,t} = [ (1−α)^{1/η} C_{Ht}^{(η−1)/η} + α^{1/η} C_{Ft}^{(η−1)/η} ]^{η/(η−1)} with α ∈ [0,1], η>0.
- Sub-aggregates (CES across varieties):
  - C_{Ht} = [ ∫_0^1 C_{Ht}(j)^{(ε−1)/ε} dj ]^{ε/(ε−1)}, etc., with ε>1.
- Demand for domestic and imported tradables:
  - C_{Ht} = (1−α) (P_{Ht}/P_t)^{−η} C_t, C_{Ft} = α (P_{Ft}/P_t)^{−η} C_t.
- Tradable CPI:
  - P_{T,t} = [ (1−α) P_{H,t}^{1−η} + α P_{F,t}^{1−η} ]^{1/(1−η)}.

### Foreign households
- Foreign consumption mirrors home preferences:
  - C^*_t = [ γ^{1/χ}(C^*_{T,t})^{(χ−1)/χ} + (1−γ)^{1/χ}(C^*_{N,t})^{(χ−1)/χ} ]^{χ/(χ−1)}.
- Foreign tradable aggregator with analogous home bias:
  - C^*_{T,t} = [ (1−α)^{1/η} C^*_{Ft}^{(η−1)/η} + α^{1/η} C^*_{Ht}^{(η−1)/η} ]^{η/(η−1)}.

### Household types: hand-to-mouth and perpetual youth
- Two household types in each economy:
  - Hand-to-mouth (HTM): credit constrained, consumes all income each period.
    - (1 + τ_{C,t}) C^H_t = (1−τ_{l,t}) W_t N_t + T_t.
  - Perpetual youth (P): can hold positive or negative net assets, maximizes:
    - E_0 ∑_{t=0}^∞ (β θ)^t [ 1/(1−σ) C_{P,t}^{1−σ} − 1/(1+ν) N_{P,t}^{1+ν} ].
    - Faces sales tax τ_C on consumption, labor tax τ_l, and can hold domestic government debt B_{H} and international bond B_{I} (real terms).
- Aggregate consumption share:
  - C_t = ω C^H_t + (1−ω) C^P_t with ω the HTM share.

### Perpetual youth household budget and adjustment costs
- Budget constraint (real terms, scaled by (1−ω) factors):
  - (1 + τ_{C,t}) C^P_t + B_{H,t}/(1−ω) + B_{I,t}/(1−ω) + φ/(1−ω)^2 (B_{I,t} − B_{I,ss})^2
    = R_{H,t−1}/(θ(1−ω)π_t) B_{H,t−1} + R_{I,t−1}/(θ(1−ω)π_t) B_{I,t−1} + (1−τ_{l,t}) W_t N_t + Π_t/(1−ω) + T_t.
- Adjustment cost φ on changing international bond holdings captures capital control frictions and aids stationarity; φ is set at very low levels in baseline calibration.
- Perpetual youth extra return factor 1/θ reflects inheritance/new households in Blanchard (1985) framework.

### Labor supply and unions
- Labor from both household types supplied to a union that maximizes weighted household utility, faces wage adjustment costs.
- Union maximization (representative form) includes adjustment cost term φ_w on wage changes.
- With flexible wages (φ_w = 0), post-tax real wage satisfies:
  - (ε_w/(ε_w − 1)) C^σ N^ν = (1−τ_{l,t}) w^{real}_t.

### Intertemporal optimality and international financial linkages
- Euler equation for perpetual youth household:
  - 1 = β E_t[ (C^P_{t+1}/C^P_t)^{−σ} R_{H,t}/π_{t+1} ].
- FOC for international bond with capital control friction φ:
  - β λ_{t+1}/λ_t R_{I,t}/π_{t+1} = 1 + φ (B_{I,t} − B_{I,ss}).
- Wedge between international bond and domestic government bond:
  - R_{I,t}/R_{H,t} = 1 + φ (B_{I,t} − B_{I,ss}).
- Foreign perpetual youth household budget (accounts for currency rate ε_t):
  - C^*_{P,t} + B_{F,t}/(1−ω) + B_{I,t} ε_t/(1−ω) = R_{F,t−1}/(θ(1−ω)π^*_t) B_{F,t−1} − R_{I,t−1} ε_t/(θ(1−ω)π^*_t) B_{I,t−1} + W^*_t N^*_t + Π^*_t/(1−ω) + T^*_t.
- Foreign FOC for international bond (UIP intuition):
  - ε_t/ε_{t+1} R_{I,t}/π^*_{t+1} = R_{F,t}/π^*_{t+1} = λ^*_t/(β λ^*_{t+1}).
- Real exchange rate:
  - Q_t = ε_t P^*_t / P_t.
- Link between real interest rates and real exchange rate (with φ):
  - Q_{t+1}/Q_t R_{F,t}/π^*_{t+1} = R_{H,t}/π_{t+1} (1 + φ (B_{I,t} − B_{I,ss})).
  - Collapses to standard UIP when φ → 0.

### Consumption of perpetual youth household (present-value expression)
- Consumption relation (accounting for asset endowment and discounted future income Y_P):
  - C^P_t ∑_{τ=0}^∞ (θ β^{1/σ})^τ (Q_{t+τ})^{1−1/σ} = R_{t−1}/((1−ω) π_t) B_{H,t−1} + R_{I,t−1}/((1−ω) π_t) B_{I,t−1} + ∑_{τ=0}^∞ θ^τ Q_{t+τ} (Y^P_{t+τ}).
- Q_{t+τ} defined as product of π and R terms across horizons.

---

### 2.2  Tariffs, prices, and exchange rates

### Tradable price indices with tariffs
- Home tradable price index with ad-valorem tariff τ_t on foreign good:
  - P_{T,t} = [ (1−α) P_{H,t}^{1−η} + α ((1 + τ_t) P_{F,t})^{1−η} ]^{1/(1−η)}.
- Foreign tradable price index with tariff τ^*_t on imports from Home:
  - P^*_{T,t} = [ (1−α) P^{* 1−η}_{F,t} + α ((1 + τ^*_t) P^*_{H,t})^{1−η} ]^{1/(1−η)}.

### Tradable inflation and terms of trade
- Define terms of trade S_t = P_{F,t} / P_{H,t}.
- Relative tradable price:
  - P_{T,t}/P_{H,t} = [ (1−α) + α ((1 + τ_t) S_t)^{1−η} ]^{1/(1−η)}.
- Tradable inflation (Π_{T,t} = P_{T,t}/P_{T,t−1}, Π_{H,t} = P_{H,t}/P_{H,t−1}):
  - Π_{T,t} = Π_{H,t} [ ((1−α) + α ((1 + τ_t) S_t)^{1−η}) / ((1−α) + α ((1 + τ_{t−1}) S_{t−1})^{1−η}) ]^{1/(1−η)}.
- Foreign tradable inflation analogous, using inverse terms of trade S_t^{−1}.

### Tariff shock effects
- A tariff shock generates an immediate wedge between domestic price inflation Π_H and tradable consumer price inflation Π_T, which feeds into aggregate CPI inflation according to tradables share γ.
- Tariff does not directly enter household budget constraint except via relative price effects (see Lemma A.1).

### Non-tradable and aggregate inflation
- Non-tradable inflation Π_{N,t} driven by domestic real marginal costs MC_{N,t}.
- Aggregate inflation Π_t (with P_t = [ γ P_{T,t}^{1−χ} + (1−γ) P_{N,t}^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)}):
  - Π_t = [ γ (Π_{T,t} P_{T,t−1}/P_{t−1})^{1−χ} + (1−γ) (Π_{N,t} P_{N,t−1}/P_{t−1})^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)}.

### Real exchange rate decomposition
- Real exchange rate Q_t = ε_t P^*_t / P_t decomposed as:
  - Q_t = (ε_t P^*_{T,t} / P_{T,t}) × [ γ + (1−γ) (P^*_{N,t}/P^*_{T,t})^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)} / [ γ + (1−γ) (P_{N,t}/P_{T,t})^{1−χ} ]^{1/(1−χ)}.
- Internal tradable/non-tradable price wedges affect aggregate RER even if tradable prices obey law of one price.

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### 2.3  Firms and production

### Production technology and taxes/subsidies
- Firms producing tradable (H) and non-tradable (N) goods:
  - Y_{k,t}(i) = A_{k,t}(i) K_{k,t}(i)^{μ_k} N_{k,t}(i)^{1−μ_k}.
- Firms face investment subsidies φ_t, corporate tax τ_K, and consumption ad-valorem tax τ_C.
- Investment adjustment costs and standard tax treatment: depreciation P_k δ K_{k,t} deducted from revenues.

### Firm optimization and marginal cost
- First-order condition for labor:
  - φ_t (1−μ) A_{k,t} K_{k,t}^{μ} N_{k,t}^{−μ} = (1−τ_{K,t}) w_t.
- Post-tax marginal cost:
  - φ_t = (1−τ_{k,t}) MC_{k,t} = (1−τ_{k,t}) w_t (1−μ)^{-1} A_{k,t}^{−1} K_{k,t}^{−μ} N_{k,t}^{μ} (interpretable as post-tax marginal cost).
- Investment FOC and Tobin's q include price-of-output terms P_{k,t}/P_t and investment adjustment parameter κ.

### Transmission and markup shocks
- Cost of investment may be P_T or P_N depending on sector; tradable investment can use imported goods (P_H).
- Directive to produce at lower markups (higher MC) increases q and desired investment and draws labor into sector.
- Simulated markup shock M^ε_t follows AR(1) in shock processes (section 4).

### Market clearing
- Aggregate production must satisfy consumption and investment demands; tradable investment uses tradable output aggregator:
  - Y_{H,t} = I_{H,t} + C_{H,t} + C^*_{H,t} + I^*_{H,t}.
- Home tradable market clearing (domestic use + exports):
  - Y_{H,t} = (1−α) (P_{H,t}/P_{T,t})^{−η} (C_{T,t} + I_{T,t}) + α (P_{H,t}/(ε_t P^*_{T,t}))^{−η} (C^*_{T,t} + I^*_{T,t}).
- Non-tradable clearing:
  - Y_{N,t} = C_{N,t} + I_{N,t}.

### Pricing and optimal price setting (PCP with Rotemberg costs)
- Retailer faces price adjustment costs φ_π/2 (P_{H,t+j}(i)/P_{H,t+j−1}(i) − 1)^2 Y_{H,t+j} and chooses sequence {P_{H,t+j}(i)}.
- FOC (aggregate form) yields pricing relation with price adjustment terms; without adjustment costs reduces to:
  - P_{H,t}/P_t = ε/(ε−1) MC_t/P_t (standard markup rule).
- Analogous equations for non-tradable and foreign sectors.

### Aggregate profits distributed to perpetual youth households
- Sectoral profits Π_{k,t}:
  - Π_{k,t} = P_{k,t}/P_t [ (1−τ_{K,t}) [ (1−(ε−1)/ε)(1−μ) Y_{k,t} + μ Y_{k,t} ] + δ τ_{k,t} K_t − I_{k,t} ].
- Aggregate profits Π_t = Π_{H,t} + Π_{N,t}.

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### 2.4  Accounting identities and policy rules

### Aggregates
- Aggregate output:
  - Y_t = GDP_t = (P_{H,t}/P_t) * Y_T + (P_{N,t}/P_t) Y_N.
- Aggregate investment:
  - I_t = (P_{H,t}/P_t) * I_H,t + (P_{N,t}/P_t) I_N,t.

### Trade and current account
- Current account balance:
  - CAB_t = (Y_t − C_t) + (R_{I,t−1} − 1) B_{t−1}/π_t.
- Net international debt evolution:
  - B_t − B_{t−1} = CAB_t.

### Fiscal accounts and government bond holdings
- Government revenues:
  - Rev_t = τ_t P_{F,t}/P_t C_{F,t} + τ_{C,t} C_t + τ_{L,t} W_t N_t + τ_{K,t} ( Π_t − (δ) K_t + (1−φ_t) I_t ).
- Government expenditure:
  - E_t = T_t + φ_t I_t.
- Government budget constraint:
  - B_{H,t} + E_t = Rev_t + R_{t−1}/π_t B_{H,t−1} + B^ε_I.
- Government holdings of international bond B^ε_I evolve:
  - B_{G,I} − R_{I,t−1}/π_t B_{G,I} = ε_{G,t}.
- Government fiscal rule (debt-stabilizing):
  - E_t / Y_t = ρ_F (Rev_t / Y_t) − ρ_B B_{H,t} / Y_t.
  - Note: lower ρ makes stock of debt adjust more to shocks to expenditure or revenue.

### Monetary policy
- Monetary policy (Taylor-type rule):
  - R_{H,t} = R_{ss} ( π_t / π_{ss} )^{ψ_π}.

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### 3  Parameters (calibrated values shown)
- Preferences & Households
  - Discount Factor β = 0.995
  - Inter-temporal substitution σ = 2.0
  - Inverse Frisch Elasticity ν = 0.33
  - Habit Persistence ρ = 0.7
  - Hand-to-Mouth Share ω = 0.3
- Technology & Capital
  - Capital Share μ_k = 0.33
  - Depreciation Rate δ = 0.025 (Quarterly)
  - Inv. Adjustment Cost κ = 3.0
- Openness & Sectors
  - Tradable Share γ = 0.5
  - T/NT Elasticity χ = 0.5
  - Trade Elasticity η = 2.0
  - Openness α = 0.3
- Nominal Frictions & Policy
  - Price Elasticity ε = 6.0
  - Rotemberg Parameter (prices) φ_π = 70
  - Rotemberg Parameter (wages) φ_w = 70
  - Taylor Rule (Inf) ψ_π = 1.5

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### 4  Shock processes
- Exogenous processes are AR(1) in logs or levels:
  - Sector-specific productivity (logs) AR(1):
    - ln(A_{T,t}) = ρ_A ln(A_{T,t−1}) + (1−ρ_A) ln(Ȧ_T) + ε_{A,T,t}.
    - ln(A_{N,t}) = ρ_A ln(A_{N,t−1}) + (1−ρ_A) ln(Ȧ_N) − ε_{A,N,t}.
    - Foreign counterparts analogous with * superscripts.
- Investment subsidy shocks (persistent):
  - τ_{sub,T,t} = ρ_{τ,sub} τ_{sub,T,t−1} + (1−ρ_{τ,sub}) ȳ_{τ,sub,T} + ε_{τ,sub,T,t}.
  - τ^*_{sub,T,t} analogous.
- Markup shock on tradable sector:
  - M^ε_t = ρ_M M^ε_{t−1} + ε_{M,t}.
- Tariffs and factor taxes follow AR(1); labor and capital tax shocks enter with negative sign (tax cut):
  - τ_t = ρ_τ τ_{t−1} + ε_{τ,t}.
  - τ_{L,t} = ρ_{τ,L} τ_{L,t−1} − ε_{τ,L,t}.
  - τ_{K,t} = ρ_{τ,K} τ_{K,t−1} − ε_{τ,K,t}.
- Government reserve accumulation (home government international bond holdings B_{g,I}):
  - B_{g,I,t} = ρ_{gov} B_{g,I,t−1} − ρ_{g,stab} ( B_{g,I,t−1} / GDP_{t−1} ) + ε_{gov,t}.

---

*Source: wpiea2026067-online-appendix - 2.1  Households and consumption (PDF chapter).*

### 5.1  Micro-industrial policy: productivity related developments

### 5.1 Micro-industrial policy: productivity related developments

### Temporary vs permanent 1% tradable productivity boost
- Shock: 1% boost to tradable sector productivity; permanent case sets ρA = 1, temporary case sets ρA = 0.
- Dynamics (perpetual youth households):
  - Temporary shock: households save part of the windfall, generating a current account surplus that exceeds the initial increase in investment (partly due to investment adjustment frictions).
  - Permanent shock: saving initially rises by less than in the temporary case (anticipation of higher future income), then rises alongside higher real interest rates and a higher marginal product of capital.
- Key reported magnitudes: 1% productivity shock (temporary vs permanent) — effects presented in figures on CAB(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP) across quarters.

### Non-tradable productivity fall vs tradable productivity rise
- Paradox: A negative shock to non-tradable productivity (A_N fall by 1%) can mirror the current account impact of a positive tradable shock (A_T rise by 1%).
- Mechanism:
  - Low elasticity of substitution between sectors (χ < 1).
  - When A_N falls, the relative price of nontradables surges.
  - With tradables and nontradables as complements, households do not substitute away from now-expensive nontradables.
  - Result: RER appreciates, increasing the relative value of domestic output and accompanied by a decline in the current account balance.
- Variables highlighted: CAB(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Relative nontradable price, RER(-is appreciation) over quarters.

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### 5.2 Micro-industrial policy: Subsidies

### Investment subsidy (φ) and financing modalities
- Policy: Simple subsidy to investment (φ) encourages capital deepening; similar impacts to productivity simulations due to productivity via capital deepening.
- Two financing cases:
  1. Tax-financed: subsidy fully funded via a tax on consumption (τc).
     - Cost of subsidy immediately lowers consumption:
       - Perpetual youth households bear cost immediately and reduce consumption.
       - HTM households lower consumption given income constraints.
     - Aggregate saving declines consistent with immediate tax burden.
  2. Debt/deficit-financed: subsidy initially heavily deficit financed via low ρg (reducing the increase in taxes as government debt rises).
     - Future tax liabilities are partially discounted by perpetual youth households due to probability of death θ.
     - Households therefore save less than the cost of the subsidy, lowering aggregate saving.
- Reported variables: CAB(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP) under "De-cit-nanced" and "Tax-nanced" scenarios across quarters.

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### 5.3 Micro-industrial policy: Production targets

### Mandated output increase / permanent fall in tradable markup
- Simulation: Permanent fall in the markup in the tradable sector to approximate mandated production targets that sacrifice short-run profit.
- Direct effects:
  - Lowers price of tradable output.
  - Increases production and factor inputs (firms accept lower profits).
- Indirect effects:
  - Improved demand and output for tradables creates a relative shortage of nontradables.
  - Inelastic demand for nontradables → sharp rise in relative prices and RER appreciation.
  - Increased investment and labor demand to alleviate nontradable shortages.
  - Overall price level rises; higher expected future income from capital deepening induces dissaving, lowering the current account balance.
- Variables shown: CAB(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Relative nontradable price(%), RER(-is appreciation) over quarters.

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### 5.4 Macro-industrial policy: Forced saving and capital controls

### Preference shock to discount rate (β) and capital flow regimes
- Policy: Persistent preference shock to household discount rate β to increase saving and lower interest rates (forced saving).
- Two cases approximating capital flow regimes via φ (adjustment cost on international bond holdings):
  1. Free financial flows (φ = 0):
     - Persistent increase in saving → current account balance rises.
     - Domestic and global (international bond yield) interest rates lower.
     - Exchange rate initially depreciates before investment rises due to lower interest rates.
  2. Strict capital flow restrictions (high φ, "CFM" case):
     - Households cannot accumulate foreign assets to match desired saving.
     - Reduction in import demand from consumption suppression → large RER appreciation.
     - Domestic interest rates fall below international bond rate; domestic investment rises sufficiently so current account balance is little changed.
- Variables highlighted: CAB(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), InterestRates (Home / International bond), RER(-is appreciation).

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### 5.5 Macro-industrial policy: reserve accumulation

### Government accumulation of international bonds with capital controls
- Setup: φ set to 1 to introduce high costs for private sector international bond transactions; shock εg causes persistent government accumulation of international bonds (higher BG,I).
- Financing and equilibrium effects:
  - Accumulation funded primarily through domestic bond issuance.
  - Higher domestic interest rates required to induce private sector to purchase new net supply of bonds (private sector cannot sell down international bond holdings due to high transaction costs).
  - Result: domestic interest rates rise above global bond rate; persistent depreciation; fall in domestic absorption from lower consumption and investment.
- Variables presented: CAB(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP), InterestRates (Home / Intlbond), RER(-is appreciation) over quarters.

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### 5.6 Combined Micro and Macro industrial policy

### Interaction: tradable production targets + forced saving
- Micro policy: Lower desired markups in tradable sector (tradable output targets increase) → capital deepening expectations lower saving relative to investment; relative shortage of nontradables raises relative prices and causes RER appreciation.
- Macro policy: Additional forced saving via intertemporal preference shock (to β) lowers consumption persistently (no capital controls in this combination).
- Interaction effects:
  - Forced saving increases saving relative to investment, counteracting dissaving from production-target expectations.
  - Forced saving counteracts the RER appreciation that occurs in the standalone micro-IP case.
- Variables illustrated: CAB(%GDP), Inv.(%GDP), Saving(%GDP), Inflation(ppt), Relative nontradable price, RER(-is appreciation), ToT(-is appreciation), Real interest rate across quarters.
- Note: Simulated as a highly persistent (but declining) fall in desired tradable sector markup; "with additional forced saving" includes an additional shock to intertemporal preferences lowering consumption.

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### 6.1 Consumption smoothing (model extension)

### Habit formation and lifetime budget constraint with perpetual youth
- Household utility:
  - E0 ∑∞_{t=0} β^t [1/(1−σ) (C_t(i) − ρ C_{t−1})^{1−σ} − 1/(1+φ) N_t^{1+φ}]
  - Habits reference aggregate (not individual) consumption in previous period.
- Definitions and substitutions:
  - Replace C̃_t = C_t − ρ C_{t−1}.
  - Budget constraint written in terms of C̃_t and includes consumption tax (1 + τC,t), aggregate bond holdings B_T,t, investment I_t (1 − φ_t), wage income, profits Π_t, transfers T_t, and adjustment costs on international bond holdings.
- First-order conditions:
  - C̃_t^{−σ} = (1 + τC,t) λ_t
  - λ_t = β R_t / Π_{t+1} λ_{t+1}
- Forward iteration and lifetime budget constraint:
  - Present-value expressions involve survival probability θ, pricing kernels Q_{t+τ}, and the term R_{t−1} (1−ω) θ π_t B_T,t−1.
  - For surviving households the consumption equation includes an infinite sum ∑_{τ=0}^∞ (θ β^{1/σ})^τ (...) and adjustment for new entrants (weighting by θ and (1 − θ)), leading to elimination of θ term on return to B_T,t−1 in aggregate consumption function.
- Applicable to households who have survived the previous period and inherited assets; new entrants have no assets but receive wages and profits.

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### A.1 Lemma (Tariffs and the budget constraint)

- Lemma A.1: The imposition of tariffs does not alter the standard form of the budget constraint; effects operate through relative and aggregate price adjustment.
- Real cost of consumption of tradables expressed as:
  - P_{H,t}/P_t C_{H,t} + (1 + τ_t) P_{F,t}/P_t C_{F,t}
- Rewriting with relative price and substitution for C_H and C_F as functions of total consumption C_T and terms of trade S_t:
  - Expressions involve parameters α, η and the tariff term (1 + τ_t) raised to powers (1 − η) and further algebra shows the household budget constraint reduces trivially to C_T.
- Conclusion: inclusion of tariffs changes household outcomes only via aggregate and relative price effects, not the structural form of the budget constraint.

*Source: wpiea2026067-online-appendix - 5.1 Micro-industrial policy: productivity related developments*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026067-online-appendix.pdf_
