## ASEAN’s Trade and Investment in a Fragmented World — Working Paper No. WP/2026/118

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### I. Key context and motivations
- Global trade experienced a marked structural shift during 2018–19 driven by escalation of China-U.S. trade tensions and reciprocal ad valorem tariffs, which largely remained in effect and were further intensified in 2025.
- ASEAN economies are deeply integrated with both the Chinese mainland and the United States and are at the intersection of trade realignment.
- Central research questions:
  - How did ASEAN countries respond to the 2018–19 tariff escalations in the short term and medium term (2022–2023)?
  - Did export gains reflect genuine production increases or transshipment?
  - Did tariffs induce reallocation of FDI and, if so, where and when?

### II. Data and measurement
- Trade:
  - Monthly CEPII-BACI dataset at HS 6-digit; observations grouped into four 24-month intervals: 2014–15, 2016–17 (pre-tension), 2018–19 (tension), and 2022–23 (post-tension).
  - Descriptive statistics constructed using IMF DOTS and sectoral aggregates from Trade Data Monitor (TDM).
- Tariffs:
  - Product-level (HS6) tariff changes from replication files of Fajgelbaum and others (2024); four tariff-change sets: TUSCH,ω; TCHUS,ω; TUSi,ω; TCHi,ω.
  - Tariffs aggregated from HS10 to HS6 using dollar-weighted averages based on U.S. Census data.
- Regression sample:
  - World’s top-50 exporters (excluding major oil exporters), including ASEAN-6 (see Table A.1).
- FDI:
  - ORBIS Cross-Border Investment database capturing greenfield (projects) and brownfield (M&A deals) at NAICS 6-digit level; includes ultimate vs immediate investor ownership.
  - ORBIS does not account for divestments; sample restricted to completed or presumed-completed transactions.
- GVC/value-added:
  - ADB MRIO tables following Belotti, Borin, and Mancini (2021) to compute foreign value added (FVA) and absorption measures.
- Inference:
  - Standard errors from 50 bootstrap samples; clustering at product level for trade regressions and at industry level for FDI regressions.

### III. Stylized facts and sectoral dynamics
- ASEAN integration and market shares:
  - ASEAN progressively expanded its presence in global trade since 2018; by 2023 ASEAN approached the United States in importance as a goods exporter for some product groups.
  - ASEAN’s share of global FDI reached nearly 15 percent in 2024.
- Electrical machinery and electronics:
  - By 2023, ASEAN accounted for more than 20 percent of U.S. imports of electrical goods.
  - Chinese mainland’s share had declined from a peak of over 40 percent in early 2018.
  - ASEAN simultaneously increased imports from the Chinese mainland in electronics (the “connector” role).
- Value-added and absorption:
  - Foreign value added (FVA) in ASEAN exports—particularly from the Chinese mainland—rose; ASEAN’s contribution to global value added expanded.
  - Vietnam’s share of FVA from the Chinese mainland in electrical and optical equipment exports rose from approximately 12 percent in 2017 to 18 percent in 2023.
  - ASEAN value-added absorption in final demand of both the United States and the Chinese mainland increased in absolute terms and relative to their total imports.
- Trade-volume patterns:
  - ASEAN exports of tariff-targeted goods continued to grow faster than non-targeted goods, both to the U.S. and globally, through 2022–2023, consistent with supplying substitutes for Chinese goods and operating along downward-sloping supply curves.

### IV. Identification and estimation strategy
- Baseline framework: difference-in-difference (DiD) guided by a Ricardian-Armington trade model with downward-sloping economy-specific supply elasticities, building on Fajgelbaum and others (2024).
- Core regression (separate for n = US, CHN, ROW):
  - ∆lnX_n_iω = β_n1iω ∆lnT_USCH,ω + β_n2iω ∆lnT_CHUS,ω + β_n3iω ∆lnT_USi,ω + β_n4iω ∆lnT_CHi,ω + α_nij(ω) + Ω_nSIZE_iω + π_n ∆lnX_n_iω,t−1 + ε_n_iω
  - β_nziω decomposed as β_nzi + β_nzj(ω) + Γ_nz SIZE_nziω for z = 1,2,3,4.
- Product classification: nine sectors—agriculture, apparel, chemicals, materials, machinery, metals, minerals, transport, and miscellaneous.
- Aggregation:
  - ∆lnX_WD_i = Σ_ω Σ_{US,CHN,ROW} λ_n_iω (dβ_n1iω ∆lnT_USCH,ω + dβ_n2iω ∆lnT_CHUS,ω + dβ_n3iω ∆lnT_USi,ω + dβ_n4iω ∆lnT_CHi,ω)
  - λ_n_iω denotes share of pre-tension export values for continuing products.

### V. Empirical results — Trade (short and medium term)
- Short-term (2018–19) findings:
  - Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand experienced relative export growth of approximately 10 to 15 percent in tariffed products compared to non-tariffed products.
  - Short-term estimates closely mirror Fajgelbaum and others (2024).
- Medium-term (2022–23) findings:
  - Sustained and amplified relative export growth in tariff-targeted products through 2022–23.
  - Point estimates for several ASEAN-6 countries approach a coefficient of 0.18, suggesting an 18 percent relative export growth in targeted products.
  - Indonesia and the Philippines show positive but not statistically significant trends.
- Cross-cutting patterns:
  - ASEAN exporters expanded shipments beyond the U.S., indicating capacity expansion and lower marginal costs (supplying global demand along downward-sloping supply curves).
  - Export gains in 2022–23 are negatively correlated with restrictive FDI policies and positively correlated with overall GVC integration.

### VI. Empirical results — FDI
- Aggregate FDI patterns:
  - Aggregate FDI inflows from the U.S. and the Chinese mainland grew substantially post-2018; U.S. FDI dipped in 2018 but recovered thereafter.
  - ASEAN’s share of global FDI reached nearly 15 percent in 2024.
- Vietnam-specific outcomes:
  - Vietnam experienced a relative increase in FDI inflows into tariff-affected firms approaching 40 percent, concentrated in the 2018–19 period.
  - Decomposition: relative FDI gains in 2018–19 reflect increased Chinese mainland acquisitions (M&A) plus increased greenfield investments from the rest of the world.
  - For 2022–23 the overall relative FDI effect is not statistically significant due to offsetting forces: increased greenfield investment from the rest of the world versus a substantial decline in U.S. investment (potentially linked to reshoring incentives under the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022).
- Interpretation:
  - Tariff-driven FDI growth was concentrated in Vietnam and limited to the initial 2018–19 period, suggesting investors interpreted tariffs as a signal of lasting shifts and front-loaded reallocations.
  - Vietnam’s preconditions—FDI incentives after WTO accession, young educated workforce, high female participation, political stability, proximity to the Chinese mainland—helped attract capital.

### VII. Aggregate outcomes, mechanisms, and risks
- Aggregate translation of sectoral gains:
  - Sector-level gains did not uniformly translate into aggregate export or macro improvements across ASEAN.
  - Vietnam shows stronger aggregate export growth relative to 2017; Thailand shows relative weakening in export performance compared with its pre-2017 benchmark and regional peers.
- Trade balances:
  - Overall ASEAN trade balance strengthened following the tension period, primarily driven by a surplus with the United States not fully offset by a deficit with the Chinese mainland.
  - Substantial heterogeneity across economies; sectoral gains in tariff-affected products (e.g., Thailand and Singapore) did not always improve aggregate trade outcomes.
- Mechanisms:
  - Evidence contradicts pure transshipment narratives: rise in FVA in ASEAN exports accompanied by a modest increase in ASEAN’s share of global domestic value added.
  - Resource reallocation toward newly competitive sectors may have occurred at the expense of previously dominant export sectors, limiting net aggregate gains.
- Risks and uncertainties:
  - Short-term benefits from trade diversion could be undermined by future fragmentation, weaker external demand, commodity price swings, and policy-driven distortions.
  - Continued global fragmentation poses risks of reduced external demand and heightened policy-driven distortions; long-term implications remain uncertain.

### VIII. Conclusions and policy-relevant implications
- ASEAN acted as “connector” economies: substituting for Chinese mainland exports to the United States while increasing imports from the Chinese mainland.
- Tariffs produced persistent and increasingly positive effects on ASEAN relative export growth through 2022–23 in tariff-targeted sectors, consistent with scale economies and capacity expansion.
- FDI reallocation was front-loaded and concentrated in Vietnam in 2018–19, weakening by 2022–23 as U.S. investment declined.
- Heterogeneous outcomes across ASEAN underscore the importance of:
  - Investment openness and FDI-friendly policy settings.
  - Supply-chain connectivity and GVC integration.
  - Country-specific preconditions (e.g., labor force characteristics, political stability, proximity to suppliers).
- Policy takeaway: to convert sectoral gains into broader aggregate improvements, countries may need policies that support complementary resource reallocation, mitigate policy-driven distortions, and sustain openness to diverse FDI sources.

*Source: wpiea2026118-source-pdf — https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026118-source-pdf.pdf*

### References .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .

### References

### Appendices and Figures
- Appendices:
  - A. Additional Figures & Tables (page 23)
- Tables:
  - A.1. List of Economies (page 23)
- Figures (listed with titles and page references where provided):
  - 1. ASEAN Trends in Exports and FDI (page 7)
  - 2. ASEAN Market Share in Imports of U.S. and Chinese Mainland (page 8)
  - 3. ASEAN’s Electrical Machinery and Electronics Trade Flows (page 9)
  - 4. Foreign and Domestic Value Added in ASEAN’s Exports (page 9)
  - 5. Foreign and Domestic Value Added in ASEAN’s Electronics (page 10)
  - 6. ASEAN’s GDP Absorption in the U.S. and the Chinese Mainland (page 11)
  - 7. ASEAN’s FDI Inflows from Major Partners (page 11)
  - 8. Enhanced Relative Gains and Reallocations (page 14)
  - 9. Correlates of Export Growth Gains in Tariff-Targeted Products (page 15)
  - 10. Relative FDI Inflows Growth: Projects + Deals (page 16)
  - 11. Vietnam’s FDI Inflows Growth over time: Projects vs Deals (page 17)
  - 12. ASEAN-6 Yearly Exports Coefficients (Reference Year: 2017) (page 19)
  - 13. Trade Balances (page 20)
  - A.1. ASEAN’s FDI Inflows: Ultimate vs Immediate Investor (page 24)
  - A.2. ASEAN’s Supply Curves (page 24)

### I. INTRODUCTION — Key points and context
- Global trade experienced a marked structural shift during 2018–19 driven by escalation of China-U.S. trade tensions and reciprocal ad valorem tariffs, which largely remained in effect and were further intensified in 2025.
- ASEAN economies are deeply integrated with both the Chinese mainland and the United States and are at the intersection of trade realignment.
- The paper examines how ASEAN countries responded to the 2018–19 tariff escalations, focusing on short- and medium-term implications.
- Literature notes reconfiguration of trade flows and GVCs after 2018–19 (citations mentioned in source).
- Investment strategies observed include “reshoring,” “nearshoring,” and “friendshoring” (citations mentioned in source).
- Evidence suggests fragmentation in FDI remains largely confined to a few strategic sectors (citations mentioned in source).
- Alongside Mexico and South Korea, Vietnam and Thailand are often cited as “winners” of the first round of China-U.S. trade tensions (citation mentioned).
- Concerns exist that export growth may reflect trade rerouting (transshipment) rather than genuine domestic production increases (citation mentioned).
- Counter-evidence shows Vietnam’s export gains linked to real domestic production increases (including rising female employment) and higher domestic content in US-bound exports (citations mentioned).
- No clear consensus exists on medium-term effects of the 2018–19 tariffs on ASEAN trade and investment flows; renewed surge in global trade policy uncertainty since February 2025 raises prospect of another wave of production reallocation.
- The paper combines descriptive analysis with causal inference, extending the 2018–19 analysis to the medium term (2022–2023).
- Findings replicated from Fajgelbaum and others (2024): ASEAN exports of tariff-targeted goods continued to grow faster than non-targeted goods, both to the U.S. and globally.
- Results consistent with ASEAN economies supplying substitutes for Chinese goods and operating along downward-sloping supply curves, implying cost-competitiveness and economies of scale realized in a relatively short period.
- The paper analyzes impact of tariffs on FDI flows using firm-level data and claims to be the first attempt to identify causal effects of tariffs on FDI with such data.
- The ORBIS Cross-Border Investment database is leveraged to capture both greenfield (projects) and brownfield (M&A deals) at the NAICS 6-digit business level.
- Tariff-driven FDI growth was concentrated in Vietnam and limited to the initial 2018–19 period, suggesting investors interpreted tariffs as a signal of lasting shifts; firms reallocated production and restructured supply chains.
- Relative sectoral gains do not necessarily imply aggregate trade gains; several ASEAN countries saw no increase in overall exports relative to the pre-tension period, with some early “winners” facing worsening trade balances.
- Risks: short-term benefits from trade diversion could be undermined by future fragmentation, weaker external demand, commodity price swings, and protectionist trade shifts.
- Paper structure:
  - Section II: Data
  - Section III: Stylized facts on ASEAN trade, investment, and GVC participation
  - Section IV: Empirical strategy
  - Section V: Main results
  - Section VI: Implications of fragmentation on ASEAN’s trade performance
  - Section VII: Conclusion

### II. DATA — Datasets, aggregation, and measures
- Trade data:
  - Monthly trade data from the CEPII-BACI dataset at the HS 6-digit level.
  - Observations grouped into four 24-month intervals: 2014–15 and 2016–17 (pre-tension period), 2018–19 (tension period) and 2022–23 (post-tension period).
  - BACI harmonizes UN Comtrade data by reconciling export and import declarations and adjusting for CIF-FOB discrepancies; BACI assigns export flow from economy A to economy B as the mirror of economy B’s import from A.
  - Descriptive statistics on trade flows constructed using IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and sectoral aggregates from Trade Data Monitor (TDM).
  - Note: Using UN Comtrade data as in Fajgelbaum and others (2024) would likely have biased results for the more recent period due to freight cost surges (as noted in source).
- Tariff data:
  - Sourced from replication files of Fajgelbaum and others (2024), building on Fajgelbaum and others (2020) and Bown, Jung, and Zhang (2019) datasets.
  - Four sets of product-level (HS6) tariff changes for the 2018–19 period: U.S. tariffs on the Chinese mainland (TUSCH,ω), Chinese mainland’s tariffs on the U.S. (TCHUS,ω), U.S. tariffs on third economies (TUSi,ω), and Chinese mainland’s MFN tariffs on third economies (TCHi,ω).
  - Tariffs originally reported at the HS10 level and aggregated to HS6 using dollar-weighted averages based on U.S. Census data.
- Regression sample:
  - Includes the world’s top-50 exporters (excluding major oil exporters), encompassing the ASEAN-6 economies (listed in Table A.1).
  - Regression analysis limited to this sample for statistical reliability; stylized facts cover broader ASEAN region.
  - Results presented only for ASEAN economies given paper’s focus; estimates for other economies available upon request (as stated in source).
- FDI data:
  - ORBIS Cross-Border Investment database includes both greenfield and brownfield investments (projects and M&A deals) at NAICS 6-digit business level.
  - ORBIS provides ultimate and immediate ownership of investors; important for financial centers acting as FDI conduits via special purpose entities (SPEs) such as Singapore and Hong Kong SAR.
  - Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates differences between immediate and ultimate ownership flows.
  - Stylized facts on FDI based on data from the ASEANStats database.
  - Note: ORBIS does not account for divestments; sample restricted to completed or presumed-completed transactions.
- GVC integration and value-added measures:
  - Calculated using ADB’s Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) tables following methodology of Belotti, Borin, and Mancini (2021).

### III. STYLIZED FACTS — Empirical observations
- ASEAN integration and market shares:
  - ASEAN countries have become increasingly integrated into global trade and investment networks.
  - ASEAN gained market share in U.S. imports, particularly in tariff-affected sectors such as electrical machinery and electronics.
  - ASEAN simultaneously increased imports from the Chinese mainland, consistent with the “connector” economies hypothesis.
- Value-added and absorption:
  - ASEAN exports’ foreign value added (FVA) from the Chinese mainland and the rest of the world has risen.
  - ASEAN’s contribution to global value added has expanded.
  - A growing share of ASEAN value added is ultimately absorbed by both the U.S. and the Chinese mainland, indicating ASEAN economies are active contributors to production rather than mere transit points.
- Sectoral dynamics:
  - ASEAN exports of tariff-targeted goods continued to grow faster than non-targeted goods, both to the U.S. and globally, through 2022–2023.
  - Findings are consistent with ASEAN supplying substitutes for Chinese goods and operating along downward-sloping supply curves, implying realized economies of scale in a relatively short period.

*Source: wpiea2026118-source-pdf - References (EXCERPTS) — https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026118-source-pdf.pdf*

### 2018. Since then, ASEAN has progressively expanded its presence in global trade, and in

### ASEAN Responses to the 2018–19 China–U.S. Tariff Escalation

### Trade trends and sectoral shifts
- Since 2018, ASEAN has progressively expanded its presence in global trade and in recent years has approached the United States in terms of its importance as a (goods) exporter.
- Inward FDI to ASEAN countries has increased steadily since 2017, with a temporary decline in 2020. ASEAN’s share of global FDI reached nearly 15 percent in 2024.
- By 2023, ASEAN’s share of U.S. goods imports had significantly reduced their difference to the respective Chinese mainland market share.
- Electrical machinery and electronics sector dynamics:
  - By 2023, ASEAN accounted for more than 20 percent of U.S. imports of electrical goods.
  - Chinese mainland’s share had declined from a peak of over 40 percent in early 2018.
  - ASEAN economies increased imports from the Chinese mainland in the electronics sector, consistent with the “connector” country role: replacing Chinese mainland’s declining exports to the U.S. while deepening import ties with the Chinese mainland.
- Value-added patterns:
  - Foreign value added (FVA) in ASEAN exports (particularly from the Chinese mainland) increased, while ASEAN’s own contribution to global value chains also grew.
  - Vietnam’s share of foreign value added from the Chinese mainland in electrical and optical equipment exports rose from approximately 12 percent in 2017 to 18 percent in 2023.
  - ASEAN value added absorption in final demand of both the United States and the Chinese mainland increased in absolute terms and relative to their total imports.

### Estimation strategy (methodology)
- Identification: difference-in-difference (DiD) approach guided by a Ricardian-Armington trade model with downward-sloping economy-specific elasticities, building on Fajgelbaum and others (2024).
- Objective: estimate short-term (2018-19 vs 2016/17) and medium-term (2022-23 vs 2016/17) effects of the 2018-19 tariffs on ASEAN exports and FDI inflows using granular product and industry-level data.
- Core regression (run separately for n = US, CHN, ROW destinations):
  - ∆lnX_n_iω = β_n1iω ∆lnT_USCH,ω + β_n2iω ∆lnT_CHUS,ω + β_n3iω ∆lnT_USi,ω + β_n4iω ∆lnT_CHi,ω + α_nij(ω) + Ω_nSIZE_iω + π_n ∆lnX_n_iω,t−1 + ε_n_iω
  - β_nziω decomposed as β_nzi + β_nzj(ω) + Γ_nz SIZE_nziω for z = 1,2,3,4.
  - Products classified into nine sectors: agriculture, apparel, chemicals, materials, machinery, metals, minerals, transport, and miscellaneous.
  - FDI regressions use NAICS 2-digit industry definitions; sectoral fixed-effect structure adjusted accordingly.
- Aggregation and inference:
  - Predicted changes aggregated via ∆lnX_WD_i = Σ_ω Σ_{US,CHN,ROW} λ_n_iω (dβ_n1iω ∆lnT_USCH,ω + dβ_n2iω ∆lnT_CHUS,ω + dβ_n3iω ∆lnT_USi,ω + dβ_n4iω ∆lnT_CHi,ω).
  - λ_n_iω denotes share of pre-tension export values for continuing products.
  - Standard errors: 50 bootstrap samples; clustered at product level for trade regressions and at industry level for FDI regressions.

### Empirical results: Trade
- Short-term (2018-19) outcomes:
  - Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand experienced relative export growth of approximately 10 to 15 percent in tariffed products compared to non-tariffed products.
  - Short-term estimates closely mirror Fajgelbaum and others (2024).
- Medium-term (2022-23) outcomes:
  - A sustained and amplified pattern of relative export growth in tariff-targeted products is documented.
  - Point estimates for several ASEAN-6 countries approach a coefficient of 0.18, suggesting an 18 percent relative export growth.
  - Indonesia and the Philippines show positive but not statistically significant trends.
- Cross-cutting findings:
  - ASEAN exporters expanded shipments not only to the United States but also to other markets, indicating capacity expansion and lower marginal costs (supplying global demand along downward-sloping supply curves).
  - Export gains in 2022–23 are negatively correlated with restrictive FDI policies and positively correlated with overall GVC integration, implying investment openness and supply chain connectivity matter for benefiting from trade diversion.

### Empirical results: FDI
- Aggregate FDI inflows from the U.S. and the Chinese mainland grew substantially post-2018; U.S. FDI dipped in 2018 but recovered thereafter.
- Vietnam uniquely experienced a relative increase in FDI inflows into tariff-affected firms:
  - Vietnam’s relative FDI increase is substantial—approaching 40 percent—and concentrated in the 2018–19 period.
  - Decomposition for Vietnam:
    - Relative FDI gains in 2018-19 reflect increased Chinese mainland acquisitions (mergers and acquisitions) plus increased greenfield investments from the rest of the world.
    - For 2022–23 the overall relative FDI effect is not statistically significant due to offsetting forces: increased greenfield investment from the rest of the world versus a substantial decline in U.S. investment (potentially linked to reshoring incentives under the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022).
  - Interpretation: early, front-loaded FDI responded to tariff-induced opportunities; Vietnam’s favorable preconditions (FDI incentives after WTO accession, young educated workforce, high female participation, political stability, proximity to the Chinese mainland) aided attraction of capital.

### Aggregate and medium-term implications of fragmentation
- Sector-level gains did not uniformly translate into aggregate export or macro improvements across ASEAN:
  - Vietnam shows stronger aggregate export growth relative to 2017.
  - Thailand shows a relative weakening in export performance compared with its pre-2017 benchmark and regional peers.
- Trade balances:
  - Overall ASEAN trade balance strengthened following the tension period, primarily driven by a surplus with the United States not fully offset by a deficit with the Chinese mainland.
  - Substantial heterogeneity across economies; sectoral gains in tariff-affected products (e.g., Thailand and Singapore) did not always improve aggregate trade outcomes.
- Mechanisms and uncertainties:
  - Resource reallocation toward newly competitive sectors—potentially driven by intensified industrial policies—may have occurred at the expense of previously dominant export sectors, limiting net aggregate gains.
  - Under continued global fragmentation, risks include reduced external demand and heightened policy-driven distortions; long-term implications for ASEAN and the global economy remain uncertain.

### Conclusion (key takeaways)
- ASEAN countries acted as “connector” economies: substituting for Chinese mainland exports to the United States while increasing imports from the Chinese mainland.
- Evidence contradicts pure transshipment narratives:
  - Rise in foreign value added in ASEAN exports accompanied by a modest increase in ASEAN’s share of global domestic value added.
- Tariffs produced persistent and increasingly positive effects on ASEAN relative export growth through 2022–23 in tariff-targeted sectors, consistent with scale economies and capacity expansion.
- FDI reallocation was concentrated in Vietnam, especially in 2018–19, driven by Chinese mainland acquisitions and greenfield projects from the rest of the world; this effect weakened in 2022–23 amid declining U.S. investment.
- Heterogeneous outcomes across ASEAN highlight the critical role of investment openness, supply chain integration, and country-specific preconditions in shaping who benefits from trade-policy shocks.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026118-source-pdf.pdf*

### REFERENCES

### REFERENCES

### References
- Alfaro, Laura, and Davin Chor, 2023, “Global supply chains: The looming “great realloca- tion”,” Techn. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Belotti, Federico, Alessandro Borin, and Michele Mancini, 2021, “icio: Economic analysis with intercountry input–output tables,” The Stata Journal, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 708–755.
- Bown, Chad P, Euijin Jung, and Eva Zhang, 2019, “Trump has gotten China to lower its tariffs. Just toward everyone else,” PIIE Trade and Investment Policy Watch, Vol. 12.
- Fajgelbaum, Pablo, Pinelopi Goldberg, Patrick Kennedy, Amit Khandelwal, and Daria Taglioni, 2024, “The US-China trade war and global reallocations,” American Economic Review: Insights, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 295–312.
- Fajgelbaum, Pablo D, Pinelopi K Goldberg, Patrick J Kennedy, and Amit K Khandelwal, 2020, “The return to protectionism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 135, No. 1, pp. 1–55.
- Freund, Caroline, Aaditya Mattoo, Alen Mulabdic, and Michele Ruta, 2024, “Is US trade policy reshaping global supply chains?” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 152, p. 104011.
- Gopinath, Gita, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Andrea F Presbitero, and Petia Topalova, 2025a, “Changing global linkages: A new Cold War?” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 153, p. 104042.
- ———, 2025b, “Changing Global Linkages: Bridging Geopolitical Fragments,” in AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 115, pp. 605–610 (American Economic Association 2014 Broadway, Suite 305, Nashville, TN 37203).
- IMF, 2023, “World Economic Outlook: A Rocky Recovery,” International Monetary Fund.
- Iyoha, Ebehi, Edmund Malesky, Jaya Wen, Sung-Ju Wu, and Bo Feng, 2024, Exports in Disguise?: Trade Rerouting during the US-China Trade War (Harvard Business School).
- Rotunno, Lorenzo, Sanchari Roy, Anri Sakakibara, and Pierre-Louis Vezina, 2024, “Trade Policy and Jobs in Vietnam: The Unintended Consequences of Trump’s Trade War,” International Monetary Fund.
- Schulze, T., and W. Xin, 2025, “Demystifying Trade Patterns In A Fragmenting World,” International Monetary Fund.
- Tan, Joanne, 2024, “How Widespread is FDI Fragmentation?” International Monetary Fund.

### Appendix A — Additional Figures & Tables
- Table A.1. List of Economies

- Regression Sample
  - Argentina
  - Australia
  - Austria
  - Belgium
  - Bangladesh
  - Bulgaria
  - Brazil
  - Canada
  - Chile
  - Colombia
  - Czech Republic
  - Denmark
  - Egypt
  - Finland
  - France
  - Germany
  - Greece
  - Hong Kong SAR
  - Hungary
  - India
  - Indonesia*
  - Ireland
  - Israel
  - Italy
  - Japan
  - Korea
  - Malaysia*
  - Mexico
  - Netherlands
  - New Zealand
  - Peru
  - Philippines*
  - Poland
  - Portugal
  - Romania
  - Singapore*
  - Slovakia
  - Slovenia
  - South Africa
  - Spain
  - Sweden
  - Switzerland
  - Taiwan POC
  - Thailand*
  - Turkey
  - Ukraine
  - United Kingdom
  - United States
  - Vietnam*
  - Lao PDR
  - Myanmar
  - Brunei Darussalam
  - Cambodia
  - The Chinese Mainland
  - Hong Kong SAR
  - Taiwan POC
  - Thailand*
  - Vietnam*
  - Philippines*
  - Malaysia*
  - Singapore*
  - Lao PDR
  - Myanmar
  - Brunei Darussalam
  - Cambodia

- Other ASEAN
  - Korea
  - South Africa
  - Spain
  - Sweden
  - Switzerland
  - Thailand*
  - Turkey
  - Taiwan POC
  - Vietnam*
  - United States

- Notes: * indicates ASEAN-6, together with other ASEAN form the ASEAN. Stylised Facts report data for the entire ASEAN group unless otherwise specified.

- Figure A.1. ASEAN’s FDI Inflows: Ultimate vs Immediate Investor
- Figure A.2. ASEAN’s Supply Curves

- ASEAN’s Trade and Investment in a Fragmented World 
- Working Paper No. WP/2026/118

*Source: wpiea2026118-source-pdf - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026118-source-pdf.pdf_
