## wpiea2026162-online-appendix

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---

### Exchange rate volatility and Central Bank interventions
- Exchange rate was "quite volatile, both daily and intradaily," with intensified volatility in the last weeks of November.
- Central Bank announced a sterilized intervention on 28 November involving:
  - spot dollar sales for a total of up to US$10.0 billion, and
  - the sale of currency hedging instruments also totaling up to US$10.0 billion,
  - with operations from 2 December through 29 May 2020.
- Following the announcement, volatility "declines," though "the full effects will only become evident as the weeks pass."
- November intervention program (28 November) again considered spot dollar sales (via auctions) and forwards (currency hedging), each for up to US$10.0 billion between December 2019 and May 2020; the monetary effects of these measures will be sterilized to keep liquidity provision in pesos consistent with the monetary policy rate.
- Early evidence: "exchange rate volatility has fallen significantly since the start of the program in the first days of December."

### Drivers of exchange rate movements and pass-through to inflation
- Recent movements are explained by "essentially domestic factors" rather than an external crisis.
- Until mid-October, peso-dollar fluctuations were relatively aligned with other Latin American economies and commodity exporters; since 18 October the Chilean peso "has diverged significantly from other currencies."
- An empirical model estimating exchange rate level based on usual fundamentals shows "a substantial decoupling since the start of the crisis."
- Decoupling not explained by changes in usual determinants (copper and oil prices, interest rate differential between Chile and the United States, etc.) but could reflect changes in country risk perception or future expectations implying depreciation of the real exchange rate (RER).
- Idiosyncratic depreciation implies a higher pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation:
  - Pass-through to inflation in one year is lower when dollar appreciation is global (counteracting effects), but higher for idiosyncratic peso depreciation because those countervailing factors do not materialize.
  - Consequence: "higher inflation is projected for tradable goods in the coming year."

### Liquidity measures, financial conditions, and market effects
- Measures announced on 13 and 14 November to provide liquidity in dollars and pesos included:
  - a 30- and 90-day currency swap program with a minimum rate equivalent to the LIBOR plus 200 bp,
  - a repo program in pesos through a collateralized window with a rate defined as a floating MPR (traditionally the MPR plus 25 bp) and with fairly long maturities,
  - authorization of repo operations backed by securities not traditionally accepted,
  - suspension of the issue of discount promissory notes (PDBC),
  - initiation of a buyback program for UF-denominated Central Bank securities.
- These measures had a significant effect on long-term rates and bank and corporate bond spreads:
  - The onshore spread was reduced from recorded peaks to around 200 bp.

### Economic activity, employment, and firm expectations
- Survey evidence on social crisis effects in November:
  - substantial effects on economic activity, "in some sectors greater than in October."
  - "It is relatively certain" the crisis will affect unemployment in December.
  - A large share of firms believe effects will last "for six months or more."
  - Surveys revealed immediate effects on employment; a majority of firms project workforce reduction in 2020.
  - High uncertainty regarding investment plans for next year.
- Financial conditions from surveys:
  - Decline in demand for credit, particularly consumer, mortgage, and commercial loans.
  - Supply-side adjustments smaller: longer credit approval process and higher interest rates.
- Information in coming weeks is "especially important" for determining inflation evolution in the medium term.

### Output gap, inflation outlook, and scenarios
- Output contraction in the fourth quarter led to a significant widening of the output gap (even considering the impact of production disruptions on potential growth) and future evolution suggests slow closure.
- Baseline scenario: weak demand partially offset by higher pass-through of peso depreciation to prices.
- Two critical factors determining inflation path for the next two years:
  - Lower inflationary pressures from capacity gaps (widened output gap closing slowly).
  - Stronger cost-push pressures, notably from an idiosyncratic peso depreciation with greater pass-through to local prices.
- Alternative scenarios:
  - More intense peso depreciation due to a resurgence of external uncertainty and/or deepening local crisis would imply a wider activity gap and increased inflationary pressures.
  - A scenario with significant labor cost pressures could lead to higher unemployment and inflation, together with a deeper contraction of activity.

### Monetary policy deliberations and MPR decision
- Board consensus: diagnosis of the current state of the economy was "highly uncertain"; focus should be on comprehensive evaluations of the macroeconomic scenario in coming months.
- Report's baseline scenario pointed to "very low growth in 2020" and recovery beginning in 2021, relying partly on the assumption that uncertainty would dissipate; absent dissipation, "the economy could stagnate for several years."
- All Board members agreed that holding the MPR at 1.75% "dominated every other option" because:
  - Current monetary expansion was consistent with cyclical weakness, high uncertainty, and announced fiscal stimulus.
  - Consistency between exchange rate intervention and monetary policy limited room for rate reductions (speculation on reductions could generate volatility).
  - Raising the MPR would be inconvenient given the Report's scenario did not contemplate rises for some time despite short-term inflationary impact of peso depreciation.
- One Board member noted past reaction to deteriorating activity was to boost monetary stimulus but signaled prudence warranted signaling a flat MPR given the stress and uncertainty from social unrest.

### Financial infrastructure, stress-testing, and systemic risk
- Regulatory and infrastructure steps in the second half of the year:
  - Changes to the Compendium of Foreign Exchange Regulations put out for public consultation as part of modernization.
  - Regulation for extension of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System (allowing settling interbank payments denominated in US dollars) put out for public consultation.
  - Process toward inclusion of the Chilean peso in the global cash settlement system operated by CLS Bank was started in July.
- Market indicators:
  - In emerging economies, long-term sovereign rates have fallen significantly since the last FSR; associated volatility has reduced.
  - Volatility of the peso-dollar exchange rate remains around 10% annually, in the upper part of the distribution, consistent with a flexible exchange rate regime.
- Stress scenarios and testing:
  - Severe stress scenario: "annual output growth would reach 4.6% in the most critical quarter, to then converge in the medium term to a rate of 1.4% in 2021."
  - Adverse stress scenario: based on the 5th percentile of the distribution of the GDP forecast presented in the September Monetary Policy Report.
  - A stressed VAR is used with 15-day movements in the exchange rate, at 99% confidence (this variable is included as part of total risk in previous results).
  - International comparison: Australia’s RBA conducts a top-down stress test over a three-year horizon with baseline and adverse scenarios; the adverse scenario includes shocks to house prices, world growth (especially China), and global financial conditions.

### Corporate debt levels and vulnerabilities (Section 3)
- Corporate debt in Chile increased after the 2008–09 financial crisis, reaching a level comparable to developed economies.
- Total corporate debt as of the first quarter of 2020 reached 131% of GDP.
- External corporate debt is mainly concentrated in: loans from related firms (FDI) and overseas bonds; loans from related firms are often intra-group and reflect strategic parent decisions rather than direct financial/currency risk exposure.
- External bonds are reported to be largely hedged against currency risk via business revenues in foreign currency or use of derivatives.

### Currency mismatch and currency risk
- Currency mismatch was 4.3% of assets, with a peak of almost 10% in 2002.
- Between 2007 and 2018 the average currency mismatch of firms fluctuated between 2.3% at year-end 2007 and 6% in March 2017.
- Exchange rate hikes increased dollar-denominated liabilities; this was partially offset by dollar assets and currency derivatives.
- Currency mismatches are confined to a small percentage of firms and thus do not constitute a significant source of vulnerability for financial stability.
- Companies with a mismatch of more than 10% accumulate 11% of total assets; those with a mismatch of less than -10% account for 15% of assets (similar to ten-year averages).
- When financial and operational hedges are considered, the balance of foreign currency debt of firms without identified foreign exchange protection is 4.9% of GDP (an increase of 1.8 percentage points since December 2019).

### Interest coverage, debt-at-risk, and stress tests
- Percentage of assets held by firms with lower interest coverage has fallen systematically over the last four years.
- International comparison (GFSR, 2019): Germany — 9% of total corporate debt at risk (firms with interest coverage ratio < 1); Chile — most recent estimate is 7% (after a downward trend).
- Firms use primarily long-term debt with maturities outside typical stress-test horizons, contributing to resilience.
- Severe stress scenario parameters:
  - annual GDP growth rate would reach -9.4% in the most critical quarter, converging to 1.4% in 2022;
  - short-term interest rate increases by 300 bp and long rate by 100 bp;
  - currency risk considers exchange rate volatility equivalent to a 16% variation.
- Stress tests indicate the corporate sector is more resilient to unexpected changes in interest rates and exchange rate due to long-term debt structure and limited currency mismatch.
- A fraction of large firms (reporting to FMC) will need additional financing to complement cash flow; financing mainly through domestic and external bonds implies that bank loans alone may not be sufficient and could constrain medium-size firm financing.

### Market conditions, interventions, and peso projections (selected episodes)
- November 2019 intervention announced by the Central Bank: US$20bn foreign exchange intervention over six months.
- EIU November 2019 scenario: expect peso to end 2019 at Ps764.7:US$1; end 2020 at Ps695.9:US$1; stabilise about Ps645:US$1 in 2023-24.
- Economist Intelligence Unit (2020) projections:
  - end-2019 peso Ps744.6:US$1; depreciated in Jan and Feb by 7.2% and 2.3% respectively;
  - expect appreciation to Ps688.2:US$1 at end-2020 (due to intervention), stabilise about Ps659.5:US$1 in 2023-24.
  - alternative EIU 2020 projection: exchange rate at end-2020 Ps808.2:US$1; average Ps700.2:US$1 in 2021-24.
- July 2022 Central Bank intervention program (announced 14 July 2022, implemented 18 July–30 September 2022): up to US$25 billion in extraordinary measures comprising:
  - sales of spot dollars for up to US$10 billion;
  - sales of foreign exchange hedging instruments for up to US$10 billion;
  - foreign exchange swap program for up to US$5 billion;
  - complementary liquidity provision via peso REPO operations.
- After the July 2022 announcement, empirical analysis finds a significant reduction (6.3%) in parity in days immediately after the announcement, and reductions in volatility indicators.
- At the statistical close of the July 2022 Report the exchange rate had increased by nearly 10% compared with the June Report.
- For short-term projections in the September 2022 Report, inflation projections used a starting nominal exchange rate of $890 per dollar (close to the week-average prior to release).
- Historical episodic notes:
  - Sharp peso depreciation following protests beginning in October 2019; December baseline incorporated a GDP contraction of 2.5% in Q4 2019; growth for 2019 around 1%.
  - From end-2019 the peso depreciation increased corporate debt in GDP terms because external debt is revalued in local currency.
  - March 2020 market stress: corporate and bank bond spreads increased over 75 bp in March and 40 bp in the year; deposit-swap rate spread increased but reversed after reduction in reference rate.

### Financial market structure, hedging, and policy measures
- Chile’s favorable external position features:
  - a large share of external liabilities as FDI;
  - external portfolio liabilities predominantly fixed-income;
  - deep local debt market enabling issuance of long-term bonds, including UF-denominated inflation-linked instruments;
  - households have limited foreign currency borrowing; government has a foreign currency surplus.
- Central Bank measures and regulatory agenda:
  - inclusion of corporate bonds as eligible collateral in peso liquidity programs (since November 2019 adaptations).
  - public consultation planned on foreign exchange operations in Chilean pesos to increase nonresident participation in local FX market.
  - promotion of Chilean peso inclusion in the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) system (medium-term process requiring regulatory and private-sector efforts).
  - plans to issue regulations for a large-value clearing house in U.S. dollars for peso-dollar spot operations and to recognise international payment systems for local clearing and settlement.
  - liquidity programs and bond purchase programs (FCIC1-LCL, FCIC2, FCIC3) with investments held to maturity.
- Market depth and risks:
  - Capital market shallowness and reduced long-term savings are highlighted as sources of vulnerability; priority to promote stable long-term savings and to activate the bonds market to provide corporate financing.
  - Higher long-term funding cost for banks could limit credit flows at longer maturities (e.g., home financing).
  - Deposit-swap spread increases signal reduced deposit liquidity at times of stress.
  - Banks are reported resilient with high provisions, liquidity, capital, and profitability; stress tests show banks would remain solvent with adequate liquidity under severe scenarios.

### Key numeric facts and scenario parameters (verbatim)
- Currency mismatch: 4.3% of assets; peak almost 10% in 2002.
- Mismatch range 2007–2018: between 2.3% (year-end 2007) and 6% (March 2017).
- Debt of firms as of Q1 2020: 131% of GDP.
- GFSR (2019) debt-at-risk: Germany 9% of total corporate debt; Chile 7%.
- EIU peso forecasts (Nov 2019): end-2019 Ps764.7:US$1; end-2020 Ps695.9:US$1; stabilise about Ps645:US$1 in 2023-24.
- EIU alternative 2020: end-2020 Ps808.2:US$1; average Ps700.2:US$1 in 2021-24.
- Central Bank intervention announced Nov 2019: US$20bn over six months (nearly half of reserves).
- Severe stress test shocks: short-term rate +300 bp; long rate +100 bp; exchange rate volatility equivalent to 16% variation; GDP annual growth -9.4% in most critical quarter; converge to 1.4% in 2022.
- July 2022 extraordinary program: up to US$25 billion total (up to US$10 billion spot sales; up to US$10 billion hedging instruments; up to US$5 billion swaps).
- Exchange rate starting point used in September 2022 inflation projections: $890 per dollar.
- Empirical finding after July 2022 intervention announcement: parity reduction of 6.3% in days immediately after announcement.

### Foreign-currency balances and exchange-rate assumptions (selected external excerpts)
- Small reduction in the total balance at the end of the semester compared to the previous semester in foreign currency, driven by a decrease in the amount of funds kept abroad (Charts 1.1.3 and 1.1.4).
- External funding internalized in the domestic market reached BRL 450 billion.
  - Of the BRL 450 billion internalized, BRL 134 billion were allocated in lines related to export, import or onlendings.
- Financial institutions had access to external credit in a volume sufficient to meet domestic needs in both free-purpose and trade finance lines.
- Situation expected to continue in the next semester, with funding costs rising due to the international conjuncture and the internal uncertainties of the electoral period. (Banco Central do Brasil,2018, pp. 12)
- Exchange-rate assumptions (July–October 2019):
  - constant-path scenario exchange rate R$4.05/US$, over the R$3.85 value assumed in the June 2019 Inflation Report.
  - Changes in end-of-year exchange-rate assumptions compared to values of 6.14.2019 assumed in the June 2019 Inflation Report:
    - 2019: rose from R$3.80/US$ to R$3.90/US$ for 2019,
    - 2020: rose from R$3.80/US$ to R$3.90/ US$ for 2020,
    - 2021: rose from R$3.85/US$ to R$3.90/US$ for 2021.
  - For the end of 2022, the exchange rate is expected to be at R$3.95/US$. (Banco Central do Brasil, 2019, p. 47)

*Source: Central Bank of Chile excerpts as presented in wpiea2026162-online-appendix — Section 3 and related excerpts in the supplied content.*

### 2008. This is above the averages of the last fifteen and twenty years, consistent

### wpiea2026162-online-appendix - 2008. This is above the averages of the last fifteen and twenty years, consistent

### Exchange rate volatility and Central Bank interventions
- The exchange rate was "quite volatile, both daily and intradaily," with intensified volatility in the last weeks of November.
- To avoid excessive volatility or sudden movements, the Central Bank announced a sterilized intervention on 28 November involving:
  - spot dollar sales for a total of up to US$10.0 billion, and
  - the sale of currency hedging instruments also totaling up to US$10.0 billion,
  - with operations from 2 December through 29 May 2020.
- Following the announcement, volatility "declines," though "the full effects will only become evident as the weeks pass."
- A November intervention program (28 November) again considered spot dollar sales (via auctions) and forwards (currency hedging), each for up to US$10.0 billion between December 2019 and May 2020; the monetary effects of these measures will be sterilized to keep liquidity provision in pesos consistent with the monetary policy rate.
- Early evidence: "exchange rate volatility has fallen significantly since the start of the program in the first days of December."

### Drivers of exchange rate movements and pass-through to inflation
- Recent movements are explained by "essentially domestic factors" rather than an external crisis.
- Until mid-October, peso-dollar fluctuations were relatively aligned with other Latin American economies and commodity exporters; since 18 October the Chilean peso "has diverged significantly from other currencies."
- An empirical model estimating exchange rate level based on usual fundamentals shows "a substantial decoupling since the start of the crisis."
- The decoupling is not explained by changes in usual determinants (copper and oil prices, interest rate differential between Chile and the United States, etc.) but could reflect changes in country risk perception or future expectations implying depreciation of the real exchange rate (RER).
- Idiosyncratic depreciation implies a higher pass-through from the exchange rate to inflation:
  - Pass-through to inflation in one year is lower when dollar appreciation is global (counteracting effects), but higher for idiosyncratic peso depreciation because those countervailing factors do not materialize.
  - Consequence: "higher inflation is projected for tradable goods in the coming year."

### Liquidity measures, financial conditions, and market effects
- On 13 and 14 November, the Bank announced measures to provide liquidity in dollars and pesos, including:
  - a 30- and 90-day currency swap program with a minimum rate equivalent to the LIBOR plus 200 bp,
  - a repo program in pesos through a collateralized window with a rate defined as a floating MPR (traditionally the MPR plus 25 bp) and with fairly long maturities,
  - authorization of repo operations backed by securities not traditionally accepted,
  - suspension of the issue of discount promissory notes (PDBC),
  - initiation of a buyback program for UF-denominated Central Bank securities.
- These measures had a significant effect on long-term rates and bank and corporate bond spreads:
  - The onshore spread was reduced from recorded peaks to around 200 bp.

### Economic activity, employment, and firm expectations
- Survey information indicates substantial effects of the social crisis on economic activity in November, "in some sectors greater than in October."
- Projected and observed labor and firm outcomes:
  - It is "relatively certain" the crisis will affect unemployment in December.
  - A large share of firms believe effects will last "for six months or more."
  - Surveys revealed immediate effects on employment; a majority of firms project workforce reduction in 2020.
  - High uncertainty regarding investment plans for next year.
- Financial conditions from surveys:
  - Decline in demand for credit, particularly consumer, mortgage, and commercial loans.
  - Supply-side adjustments smaller: longer credit approval process and higher interest rates.
- The lack of precedents makes it difficult to predict the direction and magnitude of macroeconomic effects; information in coming weeks is "especially important" for determining inflation evolution in the medium term.

### Output gap, inflation outlook, and scenarios
- The output contraction in the fourth quarter led to a significant widening of the output gap (even considering the impact of production disruptions on potential growth) and future evolution suggests slow closure.
- Baseline scenario: weak demand partially offset by higher pass-through of peso depreciation to prices.
- Two critical factors determining the inflation path for the next two years:
  - Lower inflationary pressures from capacity gaps (widened output gap closing slowly).
  - Stronger cost-push pressures, notably from an idiosyncratic peso depreciation with greater pass-through to local prices.
- Alternative scenarios:
  - More intense peso depreciation due to a resurgence of external uncertainty and/or deepening local crisis would imply a wider activity gap and increased inflationary pressures.
  - A scenario with significant labor cost pressures could lead to higher unemployment and inflation, together with a deeper contraction of activity.

### Monetary policy deliberations and MPR decision
- Board consensus: the diagnosis of the current state of the economy was "highly uncertain"; focus should be on comprehensive evaluations of the macroeconomic scenario in coming months.
- The Report's baseline scenario pointed to "very low growth in 2020" and recovery beginning in 2021, relying partly on the assumption that uncertainty would dissipate; absent dissipation, "the economy could stagnate for several years."
- All Board members agreed that holding the MPR at 1.75% "dominated every other option" because:
  - Current monetary expansion was consistent with cyclical weakness, high uncertainty, and announced fiscal stimulus.
  - Consistency between exchange rate intervention and monetary policy limited room for rate reductions (speculation on reductions could generate volatility).
  - Raising the MPR would be inconvenient given the Report's scenario did not contemplate rises for some time despite short-term inflationary impact of peso depreciation.
- One Board member noted past reaction to deteriorating activity was to boost monetary stimulus but signaled that prudence warranted signaling a flat MPR given the stress and uncertainty from social unrest.

### Financial infrastructure, stress-testing, and systemic risk
- Regulatory and infrastructure steps in the second half of the year:
  - Changes to the Compendium of Foreign Exchange Regulations put out for public consultation as part of modernization.
  - Regulation for extension of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System (allowing settling interbank payments denominated in US dollars) put out for public consultation.
  - Process toward inclusion of the Chilean peso in the global cash settlement system operated by CLS Bank was started in July.
- Market indicators:
  - In emerging economies, long-term sovereign rates have fallen significantly since the last FSR; associated volatility has reduced.
  - Volatility of the peso-dollar exchange rate remains around 10% annually, in the upper part of the distribution, consistent with a flexible exchange rate regime.
- Stress scenarios and testing:
  - Severe stress scenario: sharp contraction of GDP in the short term with lower medium-term growth relative to test period; specifically, "annual output growth would reach 4.6% in the most critical quarter, to then converge in the medium term to a rate of 1.4% in 2021."
  - Adverse stress scenario: based on the 5th percentile of the distribution of the GDP forecast presented in the September Monetary Policy Report.
  - A stressed VAR is used with 15-day movements in the exchange rate, at 99% confidence (this variable is included as part of total risk in previous results).
  - International comparison: Australia’s RBA conducts a top-down stress test over a three-year horizon with baseline and adverse scenarios; the adverse scenario includes shocks to house prices, world growth (especially China), and global financial conditions.

*Source: Central Bank of Chile excerpts as presented in wpiea2026162-online-appendix - 2008. This is above the averages of the last fifteen and twenty years, consistent*

### Section 3 describes the debt dynamics of the sector, with an emphasis on external

### Section 3 — Debt dynamics of the corporate sector (emphasis on external)

### Corporate debt levels and vulnerabilities
- Corporate debt in Chile increased after the 2008–09 financial crisis, reaching a level comparable to developed economies.
- Total corporate debt as of the first quarter of 2020 reached 131% of GDP.
- External corporate debt is mainly concentrated in: loans from related firms (FDI) and overseas bonds; loans from related firms are often intra-group and reflect strategic parent decisions rather than direct financial/currency risk exposure.
- External bonds are reported to be largely hedged against currency risk via business revenues in foreign currency or use of derivatives.

### Currency mismatch and currency risk
- Currency mismatch was 4.3% of assets, with a peak of almost 10% in 2002.
- Between 2007 and 2018 the average currency mismatch of firms fluctuated between 2.3% at year-end 2007 and 6% in March 2017.
- The exchange rate hikes increased dollar-denominated liabilities; this was partially offset by dollar assets and currency derivatives.
- Currency mismatches are confined to a small percentage of firms and thus do not constitute a significant source of vulnerability for financial stability.
- Companies with a mismatch of more than 10% accumulate 11% of total assets; those with a mismatch of less than -10% account for 15% of assets (similar to ten-year averages).
- When financial and operational hedges are considered, the balance of foreign currency debt of firms without identified foreign exchange protection is 4.9% of GDP (an increase of 1.8 percentage points since December 2019).

### Interest coverage, debt-at-risk, and stress tests
- Percentage of assets held by firms with lower interest coverage has fallen systematically over the last four years.
- International comparison (GFSR, 2019): Germany — 9% of total corporate debt at risk (firms with interest coverage ratio < 1); Chile — most recent estimate is 7% (after a downward trend).
- Firms use primarily long-term debt with maturities outside typical stress-test horizons, contributing to resilience.
- Severe stress scenario parameters:
  - annual GDP growth rate would reach -9.4% in the most critical quarter, converging to 1.4% in 2022;
  - short-term interest rate increases by 300 bp and long rate by 100 bp;
  - currency risk considers exchange rate volatility equivalent to a 16% variation.
- Stress tests indicate the corporate sector is more resilient to unexpected changes in interest rates and exchange rate due to long-term debt structure and limited currency mismatch.
- A fraction of large firms (reporting to FMC) will need additional financing to complement cash flow; financing mainly through domestic and external bonds implies that bank loans alone may not be sufficient and could constrain medium-size firm financing.

### Market conditions, interventions, and peso projections (selected episodes)
- November 2019 intervention announced by the Central Bank: US$20bn foreign exchange intervention over six months.
  - EIU November 2019 scenario: expect peso to end 2019 at Ps764.7:US$1; end 2020 at Ps695.9:US$1; stabilise about Ps645:US$1 in 2023-24.
- Economist Intelligence Unit (2020) projections:
  - end-2019 peso Ps744.6:US$1; depreciated in Jan and Feb by 7.2% and 2.3% respectively;
  - expect appreciation to Ps688.2:US$1 at end-2020 (due to intervention), stabilise about Ps659.5:US$1 in 2023-24.
  - alternative EIU 2020 projection: exchange rate at end-2020 Ps808.2:US$1; average Ps700.2:US$1 in 2021-24.
- July 2022 Central Bank intervention program (announced 14 July 2022, implemented 18 July–30 September 2022): up to US$25 billion in extraordinary measures comprising:
  - sales of spot dollars for up to US$10 billion;
  - sales of foreign exchange hedging instruments for up to US$10 billion;
  - foreign exchange swap program for up to US$5 billion;
  - complementary liquidity provision via peso REPO operations.
- Exchange rate behavior and volatility:
  - After the July 2022 announcement, empirical analysis finds a significant reduction (6.3%) in parity in days immediately after the announcement, and reductions in volatility indicators.
  - At the statistical close of the July 2022 Report the exchange rate had increased by nearly 10% compared with the June Report.
  - For short-term projections in the September 2022 Report, inflation projections used a starting nominal exchange rate of $890 per dollar (close to the week-average prior to release).
- Historical episodic notes:
  - Sharp peso depreciation following protests beginning in October 2019; December baseline incorporated a GDP contraction of 2.5% in Q4 2019; growth for 2019 around 1%.
  - From end-2019 the peso depreciation increased corporate debt in GDP terms because external debt is revalued in local currency.
  - March 2020 market stress: corporate and bank bond spreads increased over 75 bp in March and 40 bp in the year; deposit-swap rate spread increased but reversed after reduction in reference rate.

### Financial market structure, hedging, and policy measures
- Chile’s favorable external position features:
  - a large share of external liabilities as FDI;
  - external portfolio liabilities predominantly fixed-income;
  - deep local debt market enabling issuance of long-term bonds, including UF-denominated inflation-linked instruments;
  - households have limited foreign currency borrowing; government has a foreign currency surplus.
- Central Bank measures and regulatory agenda:
  - inclusion of corporate bonds as eligible collateral in peso liquidity programs (since November 2019 adaptations).
  - public consultation planned on foreign exchange operations in Chilean pesos to increase nonresident participation in local FX market.
  - promotion of Chilean peso inclusion in the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) system (medium-term process requiring regulatory and private-sector efforts).
  - plans to issue regulations for a large-value clearing house in U.S. dollars for peso-dollar spot operations and to recognise international payment systems for local clearing and settlement.
  - liquidity programs and bond purchase programs (FCIC1-LCL, FCIC2, FCIC3) with investments held to maturity.
- Market depth and risks:
  - Capital market shallowness and reduced long-term savings are highlighted as sources of vulnerability; priority to promote stable long-term savings and to activate the bonds market to provide corporate financing.
  - Higher long-term funding cost for banks could limit credit flows at longer maturities (e.g., home financing).
  - Deposit-swap spread increases signal reduced deposit liquidity at times of stress.
  - Banks are reported resilient with high provisions, liquidity, capital, and profitability; stress tests show banks would remain solvent with adequate liquidity under severe scenarios.

### Key numeric facts and scenario parameters (verbatim)
- Currency mismatch: 4.3% of assets; peak almost 10% in 2002.
- Mismatch range 2007–2018: between 2.3% (year-end 2007) and 6% (March 2017).
- Debt of firms as of Q1 2020: 131% of GDP.
- GFSR (2019) debt-at-risk: Germany 9% of total corporate debt; Chile 7%.
- EIU peso forecasts (Nov 2019): end-2019 Ps764.7:US$1; end-2020 Ps695.9:US$1; stabilise about Ps645:US$1 in 2023-24.
- EIU alternative 2020: end-2020 Ps808.2:US$1; average Ps700.2:US$1 in 2021-24.
- Central Bank intervention announced Nov 2019: US$20bn over six months (nearly half of reserves).
- Severe stress test shocks: short-term rate +300 bp; long rate +100 bp; exchange rate volatility equivalent to 16% variation; GDP annual growth -9.4% in most critical quarter; converge to 1.4% in 2022.
- July 2022 extraordinary program: up to US$25 billion total (up to US$10 billion spot sales; up to US$10 billion hedging instruments; up to US$5 billion swaps).
- Exchange rate starting point used in September 2022 inflation projections: $890 per dollar.
- Empirical finding after July 2022 intervention announcement: parity reduction of 6.3% in days immediately after announcement.

*Source: wpiea2026162-online-appendix — Section 3 (Central Bank of Chile and related excerpts as presented in the supplied content).*

### 2018.  However, in foreign currency, there was a small reduction in the total

### wpiea2026162-online-appendix - 2018.  However, in foreign currency, there was a small reduction in the total

### Foreign-currency balances and external funding (semester context)
- There was a small reduction in the total balance at the end of the semester compared to the previous semester in foreign currency, driven by a decrease in the amount of funds kept abroad (Charts 1.1.3 and 1.1.4).
- The external funding internalized in the domestic market reached the amount of BRL 450 billion.
- Of the BRL 450 billion internalized, BRL 134 billion were allocated in lines related to export, import or onlendings.
- Financial institutions had access to external credit in a volume sufficient to meet domestic needs in both free-purpose and trade finance lines.
- This situation is expected to continue in the next semester, with funding costs rising due to the international conjuncture and the internal uncertainties of the electoral period. (Banco Central do Brasil,2018, pp. 12)

### Exchange-rate assumptions and expectations (July–October 2019)
- The exchange rate used in scenarios that assume a constant path is R$4.05/US$, over the R$3.85 value assumed in the June 2019 Inflation Report (Figure 2.1).
- The median of expectations for the end-of-year exchange rate extracted from the Focus survey of September 13, 2019, points to:
  - decrease in 2019,
  - stability in 2020 and 2021,
  - and increase in 2022.
- When quarterly averages are considered, the exchange rate from the Focus survey also shows appreciation in 2020Q1.
- Changes in end-of-year exchange-rate assumptions compared to values of 6.14.2019 assumed in the June 2019 Inflation Report:
  - 2019: rose from R$3.80/US$ to R$3.90/US$ for 2019,
  - 2020: rose from R$3.80/US$ to R$3.90/ US$ for 2020,
  - 2021: rose from R$3.85/US$ to R$3.90/US$ for 2021.
- For the end of 2022, the exchange rate is expected to be at R$3.95/US$. (Banco Central do Brasil, 2019, p. 47)

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026162-online-appendix.pdf*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/wp/2026/english/wpiea2026162-online-appendix.pdf_
